BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA

Judicial Due Process Requisites

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k
more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El
Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio
however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non
resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of
publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court
to furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court
eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years
thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition
for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due
process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial
due process had been met. The requisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over
the property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

SENATOR JINGGOY ESTRADA VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on

Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen
(18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014,
Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits
of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and
to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” The Ombudsman denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue:

What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

Held:

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a

respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sections
3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary

investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable
cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose

of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state
prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its
very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we
find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those

in administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang
Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is
greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish
probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,”
while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare
suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the
United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the
prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must
be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because
such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights
and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence”
which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial
basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in
preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in
determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

JESSICA REYES VS OMBUDSMAN AND SANDIGANBAYAN

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Resolutions and Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

“Their arguments fail to persuade.

Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause
and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial
determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of
arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. The Court, in
People v. Castillo,242 delineated the functions and purposes of a determination
of probable cause made by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and the
trial court, on the other:

There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who
is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law
and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made
by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 243 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

As above-articulated, the executive determination of probable cause concerns

itself with whether there is enough evidence to suppot1 an Information being
filed. The judicial determination of probable cause~ on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. 24~ ‘

This notwithstanding, the Court in Mendoza v. People245 (Mendoza) clarified that

the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the
filing of a criminal information before it, narriely to1: (a) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; ( b) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and ( c) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause.246 The Court went on to elabqrate that “the option to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory” and reiterated that
“the court’s first option x x x is·. for it to ‘immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. “‘247 ·

Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu
proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitldd to make his own assessment
of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable cause to
order the arrest of the accused and proceed:with the trial; or in the absence
thereof, to order the immediate dismissal df the criminal case.248 This is in line
with the fundamental doctrine that “once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or
the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.”249
Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the trial courts in proceeding with
dismissals of this nature:

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always
proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack o( probable cause,
considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or
she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of
probable cause that he or she can dismiss th~ case. On ‘ . the other hand, if a
judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate I to’ proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.250 I

A careful study of the records yields the conclusion that the ~eci,uirement to
personally evaluate the report of the Ombudsman, and its supporting
documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it explicitly declared
in its Resolution251 dated July 3, 2014 that it had “p~rson~lly [read] and
[evaluated] the Information, the Joint Resolution f “, ‘ dated March 28, 2013 and
Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the f ‘ ‘ ·. [0?.1budsman ], together with the
a~ove-enumerated documents, including ·the,1~ annexes and attachments,
which are all part of the records of the pteliminary investigation x x x. “252 A
similar pronouncement was made by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution253
dated September 29, 2014, wherein it was said that “[a]fter further considering
the records of these cases and due deliberations, the Court finds the existence
of probable cause against the said accused xx x.”254 Later on, in a
Resolution255 dated November 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier
findings when it held that the presence of probabl~ cause against all the
accused “was already unequivocally settled x x x in its [Resolution] dated July 3,
2014 x x x.”256 Besides, the ‘Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the
presumption of regularity in the perfomiance of its official duties. 257 This
presumption was not convincingly overcome by either Reyes or the Napoles
siblings through clear and convirn~ing evidence, and hence, should prevail. 258
As such, the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes
and the Napoles siblings was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when
it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued warrants of arrest .
against them. 259

Also, the Court cannot lend any credence to Reyes’s protestations of haste qn
the part of the Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed Resolutions, absent any
clear showing that the presumed regularity of the proceedings has been
breached. Reyes would do well to be reminded of the Court’s ruling in Leviste v.
Alameda260 wherein it was instructed that “[s]peed in the conduct of
proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch
may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as
the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.” 261 i : :’

Finally, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed bn the~ part of the

andiganbayan in denying Reyes ‘s motion to suspend prdceedings against her
in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari qhestioning the Ombudsman’s
issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94′. Under Section 7, Rule
65262 of the Rules of Court, a mere pendendy of a. special civil action for
certiorari in relation to a case pending before *1e ~emit a’ quo does not ipso
facto stay the proceedings therein, unless the higher· court issues a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary 1 ibjunction against the conduct of such
proceedings. Otherwise stated, I a petition for certiorari does not divest the lower
courts of jurisdiction vdlidly acquired over the case pending before them. Unlike
an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an original action; it is not a continuation of
the proceedin~s in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, i*cluding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdictitjn. Thus, under. Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue
against the public respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of
prelimi~ary injunction in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The
peti~oner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a
meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the
proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the existende .of an
urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may ~e
prevented.263 In this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary
rdstraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94,
then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the pro6eedings
before I it. I

Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in
judicially determining the existence of probable cause against Reyes and the
Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes’s Urgent Mot1on to Suspend
Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R. Nos.
215880-94 is in order.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days
from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or trib nal, absent a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiratjon.
Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a
ground for an administrative charge. 1 263 Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse
Club, G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014, 726 SCRA 298, 312.”

UYBUCO VS PEOPLE

FACTS: On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and
Jeson Kirby Dichaveswere abducted and brought to a house in Merville
Subdivision, Parañaque. Nimfa was able to recognizedone of the kidnappers
as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer’s office.

14
Thekidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one
of the calls of the kidnappers,
Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several
business transactions. After,numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally
agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the

balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson
to bring the ransomalone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center
and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk,leave the trunk unlocked, and walk
away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor andP/Supt.
Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and
brought a camera to takephoto and video coverage of the supposed pay-off.
He identified Macias together with appellant and thelatter as the one who took
the ransom.

Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was alreadygone. Appellant
then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline
Stationalong South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and
found his sons and helper seatedat the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz
and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on
their radio that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their
direction. A few minutes
later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in
Makati. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately
approached the vehicle.
23
They introduced themselves aspolice officers and accosted the suspect, who
turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and
a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed
him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was
found inside. P/Supt. Cruz sawmoney, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?DOCTRINE:
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113
of theRules of Court, which provides:
“A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest aperson: x x x;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of factsindicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and, (c) x x x.
” A search incident to a lawful
arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:
“
A person lawfullyarrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constituteproof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
”
RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b)
cited abovenecessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest
can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating thatthe person to
be arrested has committed it. Records show that both requirements are present
in theinstant case. The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center
were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of
kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to theother police officers
stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personalknowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonablegrounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness thecommission of the offense
with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they
weremonitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be
informed that it was indeedappellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent
to personal knowledge based on probable cause.Likewise, the search
conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented
tosuch. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to
search the car, they can stillvalidly do so by virtue of a search incident to a
lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrests,it becomes both the
duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search
notonly on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter's reach. Therefore, it isonly but expected and legally so for the police to
search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.

ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS VS ALEXIS ALMENDRAS

MALIKSI VS COMELEC

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the
winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209
clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision ofthe votes, and, based on the
results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly electedMayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan
appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the
RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice
to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and
printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan
to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision
and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had
not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts
of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because
there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for
reconsideration. Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his
objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior
notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division. In the decision promulgated on March 12,
2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed
Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First Division
—
referring to the orders of the zFirst Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the
cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been
able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot
images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were
not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value
as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that
the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had
been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during
the revision. Hence, Maliksi filed the petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/O Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Divisionordered on
appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in theCF cards.
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the
COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images in the CF cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him
of his right to be present and observe the decryption proceedings. The records also showed
that Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by
the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First Division issued an Order dated 28 March 2012
directing Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for expenses for the supplies, honoraria,
and fee for the decryption ofthe CF cards, and a copy of the
Order was personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. Maliksi’s counsel was likewise given a
copy of Saquilayan’s Manifestation of
Compliance with the 28 March 2012 Order. In an Order dated 17 April 2012, theCOMELEC
First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount forexpenses for the
printing of additional ballot images from four clustered precincts, and a
copy of the Order was again personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. The decryption
took weeks to finish.Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the
decryption,printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division.
Inaddition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in his motion for
reconsiderationbefore the COMELEC En Banc. The Court has ruled:
x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply
theopportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. Therequirement is
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonableopportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. x x x.
There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity to be heard” does not only
mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact
that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation ofthe right to
due process. The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot beinvoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion forreconsideration.
MALIKSI VS. COMELECApril 11, 2013
In Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration he argued that the Supreme
Court en banc gravely erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation ofpeti
tioner’s constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing
and examination of the digital images of the ballots, which is the basis for the assailed14
September 2012 resolution of the public respondent, which in turn affirmed the 15 August
2012 resolution of the COMELEC First Division, were done inconspicuously

upon a motu proprio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to thepetitioner,
and for the first time on appeal.
HELD
: The Court grants Maliksi’s Extr
emely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, andreverses the decision promulgated on March
12, 2013 on the ground that the FirstDivision of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due
process by failing to give duenotice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Consequently, the Courtannuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with
the use of theprintouts of the ballot images.It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division
should not have conducted theassailed recount proceedings because it was then
exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to
conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6,
Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials. As
we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of
the recount proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to
the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and
printing of the picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite
unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s unwarranted deviation from
the standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to “take such
measures as [the Pres
iding Commissioner] may deem proper,” and even citing the Court’s minute resolution in
Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party
-List v.
Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the “COMELEC has the power to adopt
procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with
its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on
their opposing claims.”
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commissionon
Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure thespeedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties
the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon
adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated solightly
because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to theparties, or
to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should nothave upheld the Firs
t Division’s deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of
speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties withnotice of
its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements ofdue
process.