Beley vs Torres

Facts:
Jose A. Tan, Jr., and Pacifico Mendoza, seized the plates of the truck of the plaintiff and on the same occasion also
seized the driver's license of the driver of the plaintiff, Quirico Curamen.

When the defendant Jose Tan learned that the truck impounded belonged to Marbella, Tan asked Marbella to explain
why the plate of the truck was not displayed at the back part thereof; that by reason of the non-display of the plate at
the back of the truck Marbella was accused before the Justice of the peace court of Rizal, Nueva Ecija; that even upon
the delivery of the truck to plaintiff Marbella, by order of the court, the said plate had not been delivered to Jose Tan;
that the reason for the failure or refusal of Marbella to deliver the plate as demanded was due to the fact that, as found
out later, upon verification from the Motor Vehicles Office, Cabanatuan City, the truck was not registered during the
current year 1960, although it bore plate No. T-30371 1960 in the name of Agripina Vidal of San Jose, a plate which was
reported as having been lost in the Motor Vehicles Office, etc.

Issue:
Whether the confiscation of the plates and driver’s license was proper.

Held:
Yes. It is apparent from the above circumstances, therefore, that the plate and license number of the truck, which were
ordered in the court's order now subject of the petition to be delivered back to Marbella, were taken by Tan because
the truck had not been registered and was using a plate of a vehicle registered in the name of Agripina Vidal of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, in violation of Section 36 of the Motor Vehicle Law. The confiscation of the plate and the driver's
license was, therefore, due to a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law by Marbella, for operating a vehicle on the public
highways without the corresponding certificate of registration and plates (Sec. 21, Ibid). The plate was evidently a stolen
plate and the same was being used by Marbella for a truck of his own which was not registered.

The law furthermore permits the retention by the police or by the public prosecuting officer of the thing stolen, or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense (Section 12, Rule 122, Rules of Court).

The license plate in question was the object which was stolen from the truck of Agripina Vidal and at the same time
constitutes evidence that Marbella was using a stolen plate on his truck that was operating on the highways. The
retention of the driver's license was also justified in view of the fact that the truck was found being used with a stolen
plate, and the driver's license is to be utilized as evidence against the driver of the truck.

The above circumstances certainly justify the employee of the Motor Vehicles Office at Cabanatuan City to impound
the plate and the driver's license, and the judge below should have refused to order the return of the articles, which
were lawfully confiscated and lawfully retained by the predecessor of the petitioner herein.

One other point may be considered, and that is, the claim of the petitioner herein that since Beley was not a party to the
original action, and neither was his predecessor in interest, the order in question for the delivery to Marbella of the license
plate and the driver's license is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The objection is a technical one. We prefer to base
our decision in the case on the ground that petitioner herein had the right to retain possession of the articles mentioned
because they are the instruments of an offense or evidence thereof.
Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

FACTS:
These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18, 2011, where it upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be
held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power
to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the
elected officials.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Constitution mandates the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?
2. Whether RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements?
3. Whether the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 is constitutional?
4. Whether the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
5. Whether the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs violates the elective and representative nature of
ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
6.Whether the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's supervisory powers over autonomous
regions?

HELD:
RA No. 10153 is constitutional

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election
in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even
willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not
covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time
the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide
merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the
people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument
to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in
a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic
process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.

2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not
provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision
in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the supermajority vote requirement
set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass
irrepealable laws.

Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being
an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through
a plebiscite.

3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the
regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM
regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no
specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover
capacity.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. Since elective
ARMM officials are also local officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It,
therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by
the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

4. The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), has granted the
COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and
unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM
elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the
classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution;
the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local governments and autonomous
regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The
power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief
that the President's appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners
foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not
of the people. This is incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are
replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has
the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent
than real.
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005]

FACTS:
This case involves the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, which is a town that is not supposed to exist yet but is
insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Andong was created through Executive Order No. 107 issued by Pres.
Macapagal in 1965, which was declared void in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965).

Sultan Camid alleges that Andong ―has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials
appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents.‖ He however concedes that since 1968,
no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions in Andong.
He also alleges that the town has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS Office, among others. According to him,
public officials of Andong have been serving their constituents in their own little ways and means despite absence of
public funds. To bolster his claims, he presented to the Court a DENR-CENRO Certification of the total land area of the
Municipality of Andong. He also submitted a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City
concerning Andong’s population (14,059). He also lists several government agencies and private groups that have
allegedly recognized Andong.

Camid assails the DILG certification of 18 municipalities certified as ―existing‖ per DILG records. These 18, were among
the 33 municipalities whose creation was voided by the Court in the Pelaez case. He imputes grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the DILG for not classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality and in not including it in its records
and official database.

Camid also argues that EO 107 remains valid because of the decision of court in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Hon.
Mendez, where the court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a de facto municipal
corporation. He insists that inspite of insurmountable obstacles, Andong lives on. Hence, its existence should be given
judicial affirmation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality whose creation by executive fiat, which was previously voided by the Court, may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative or implementing statute.

RULING:
The Court said that the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to
the de novo appreciation of factual questions. Also, the Pelaez case and its offspring cases ruled that the President has
no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual
cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was
lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by the Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local
Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects these municipalities had labored under.

Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation. This is because there are eminent
differences between Andong and the other municipalities. The most prominent is that, the EO which created Andong
was expressly annulled by the Court in 1965. The court said that if it would affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of
its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, it would in effect condone defiance of a valid order of the Court.
Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC), as it requires that,
for the municipality created by EO to receive recognition, they must ―have their respective set of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of the LGC. Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. The
national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and
refusing to conduct municipal elections in the void municipality. Andong is not listed as among the municipalities of
Lanao del Sur in the Ordinance apportioning the seats of Congress in the 1987 Constitution. Finally, Andong has not been
reestablished through statute. In contrast, the 18 municipalities in the DILG certification, were recognized as such
because subsequent to the ruling in the Pelaez case, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.

Section 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially-dissolved municipalities such as Andong,
which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. On the other hand, the municipalities
judicially-dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG.
Cawaling vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001
Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts:
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment
of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of
R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition
of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issue:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the
City of Sorsogon
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held:
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may
be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province
city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new
local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply
because we feel it is unwise or impractical.‖

3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a
subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural
and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed
of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy
for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed
careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or
portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to
doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, vs CITY TREASURER

Facts:
On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732 declaring as officially and legally existing, pursuant to
Republic Act 2370, the several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.

Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was created under Section 27 of the Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within
the barrio, as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release the share
for said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation to those of barrios Agdao and
Bucana, cannot be determined, because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by
law.

On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the request of the same barrio Central or Poblacion
for release of its 10% share in real property taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created only in 1963 in
violation of Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios out of chartered cities, so that said barrios are not
recognized under Republic Act 3590 providing for the abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes. Accordingly, he
ruled that the allocated 10% share of taxes for barrios Agdao, Bucana and Central should accrue and be given to barrio
Central only, after all conditions therefor are met.

On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao, thru its barrio captain, a petition for
declaratory relief with mandamus, against Davao City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor, alleging the facts
mentioned earlier in this decision. Among others, the petition questioned the legality of Resolution No. 732 of Davao
City's Council creating barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of the Auditor in passing in audit an alleged
expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10% fund; and the failure of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three
barrios concerned. And it prayed that the court order payment to petitioner by respondents of its 10% share in realty
taxes as provided by Republic Act 3590, declare illegal the creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and prohibit the
Auditor from approving expenditures out of its 10% share.

Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January 29, 1965, respondents answered, stating among
other averments, that barrio Central is inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other barrios claiming the 10%
share in real property taxes corresponding to the territory claimed by petitioner; that Republic Act 3590 providing for the
10% share applies only to barrios in municipalities and municipal districts, not to those in cities; and that the alleged
expenditure in question was legal and not taken from the 10% share allocated for barrios.

After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965, however, the Court, upon motion of the Fiscal,
dismissed the case without prejudice, on the ground that the issues were rendered academic by the passage of
Republic Act 4354, on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in its motion for
reconsideration, took the present appeal.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal order was proper.

Held:
Yes. Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or
Poblacion was not mentioned therein. Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished barrio
Central as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo had sufficient and tenable reason to
dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for being academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in Davao City,
cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under Republic Act 3590. Said law must be presumed,
until squarely challenged and declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional, especially because the power to
create or abolish municipal corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June 30, 1962). Petitioner
may of course assail the constitutionality of said new law. The present suit, however, is not for that purpose. Nothing in the
pleadings questions said law's validity, for the reason that said law came after the pleadings were joined. Neither was
there amendment to said pleadings. The court a quo, therefore, rightly dismissed the present suit, without prejudice, that
is, not thereby precluding the filing of a suit to assail the validity of Republic Act 4354.
DAR vs Sarangani

Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution No. 97-08 adopting a 10 year comprehensive
development plan of the municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03, reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005
Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses. Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive
Development Plan and the Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani
Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel.

A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARP commercial farms deferment
scheme. The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Council
(MPDC)showed that respondents properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from
agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005
land use plan of Alabel. The respondent then field an application for land use conversion of certain parcels of land.

Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to
the DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members
were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June
15, 1998. Later, the PLUTC agreed to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which was still viable for
agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to the submission of certain requirements. Later, the DAR Secretary
cio R. Morales, Jr. denied
SACI’s application for land use conversion. SACI appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders.

Issue:
WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for the acquisition of land

Held:
No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the
subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998

Issue:
WON the DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary
reference

Held:
Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands.
Memorandum Circular No. 54 Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 specified the scope and
limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all
ordinances authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of the province in
the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly urbanized or independent component cities in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993.Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been
reclassified for non-agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR
should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use
conversion applications, thus:

While DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual
landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance with the
requirements and limitations under existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area]
to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under
environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS law. Defin
cases may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying
certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely,
therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local
Sanggunian as primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners. In
this case, petitioners have already complied with the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and
regulations of the DAR.

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when
the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the

requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present
case where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its
provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, thelocal government has reclassified certain portions of its land
area from agricultural to non-agricultural.

Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR
should utilize the comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents whose
lands have already been reclassified by the local government for non-agricultural uses. This is not to say, however, that
every property of respondents which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall
be automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject to the limitations and
conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation
376.5424 hectares, a portion totalling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts, are
-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to
redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the
CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15,1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the
eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents
properties are located.

In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of
Alabel did not operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991
on the reclassification of lands explicitly states that [n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or
modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No.6657. Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, ―the mad rush‖ of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The
16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed
into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of
the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting
a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Consolidation of Rulings)

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the
House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual
income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provisionexempting the
particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Are the cityhood laws
converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

November 18, 2008 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. ―The Cityhood Laws
violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.‖ ―The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria
prescribed by law, are material in determining the ―just share‖ of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes.”
(League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)

March 31, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.

April 28, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.

December 21, 2009 Ruling

Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or
Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear
legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income
requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect
insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a
political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed
unfair. ―Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of
1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC,
December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the
SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)

August 24, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and
reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs)
converting 16 municipalities into cities. ―Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of
18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-
vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior
decision,‖ the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws
violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that ―no city…shall be created…except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.‖ It stressed that while all the criteria for the
creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an
exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. ―The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express
language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged
Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,‖ the Court held.

The Court further held that ―limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found
in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional
for violation of the equal protection clause.‖ (GR No. 176951,League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No.
177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec,
August 24, 2010)

February 15, 2011 Ruling

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the
Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011 Ruling

Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. ―We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied
with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no
less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain
collective wisdom of Congress,‖ the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation
of cities.

―The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of
conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took
effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in
Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the
said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th
Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion
bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both
Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the
express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of
RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express
exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.”

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was
arbitrary. ―While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid
down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy,
decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.‖
Navarro v. Ermita
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers
and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October
2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the
COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother
province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of
provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.

Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao
del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal
act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory,
Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?

Suggested Answer:

February 10, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum
population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12
square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its
ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which
exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the
said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. ―There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic
law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law,‖ held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12,
2010)

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.

April 12, 2011 Ruling

Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that
Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, ―The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands,‖ is declared VALID.

According to the SC, ―with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of
viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided
for.‖

―But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.‖

xxx ―There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but
not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood
that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted
in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.‖

xxx―Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision
could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province
that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component
cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to
Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area
criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that
Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress,
and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by
bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.‖

xxx ―What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results
of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province.‖
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail
the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to to seek the review of
said interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.

FACTS:
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del Sur.
Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying
and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.

In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista
did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the
special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista
countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC

HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing
the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the
petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve
him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors
committed by the Division upon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the
COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho
v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had
the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by
Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.
Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City v.Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation

FACTS:
Baguio City and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation agreed on June 26, 2000 that the latter (Jadewell) will be in
charge for the on-street parking as well as the installation of modern parking meters (DG4S Pay and Display Parking
Meter) in the City. However, the City Council through City Resolution No. 037 s. 2002 alleged that Jadewell failed to
comply with the agreement thus the Council revoked it. Baguio City informed Jadewell through its President, Rogelio
Tan, on a letter dated September 22, 2006 of the rescission and in compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement
section 12, 60 days was given to Jadewell prior to its effectivity. However, Jadewell had not questioned. Instead, filed a
contempt case against Mayor Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the City Council including the City Legal Officer, Melchor Carlos R.
Rabanes. Jadewell sought legal action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio questioning the revocation but it
was beyond the 60-day period provided in the MOA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of the agreement was valid?

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that since Jadewell has not questioned the legal efficacy of the notice but raised only the
issue as a matter of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents, thus the rescission had taken effect and the
MOA between the City and Jadewell legally ceased to exist.

BAGABUYO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have
two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created.
Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was contending that
the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City
in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution;
the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No.
9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC

Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a
legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city.

On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for
the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact
but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that ―the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.‖

Issue: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

Held: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have ―a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand.‖

House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos ―will be 254,030 by the year 2010.‖ The
Certification states that the population of ―Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.‖ The Certification further states
that it was ―issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.‖

First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the
National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued
only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of
the middle of every year.

Moreover, the Certification states that ―the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.‖ The
Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a
growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and
credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
unreliable or speculative.
Aquino III V. Comelec

Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled ―An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.‖

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in
a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase ―each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand‖ from the phrase ―or each province‖ point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of
and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either
of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement
UMALI vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.183-2011, requesting the
President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva
Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the
qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued Minute Resolution No.12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified
Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in
conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the
creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the
local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in the rights
and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to
the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to
be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the
Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of
the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not
apply to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453,
as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent
pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994from a municipality to an independent component city
pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of
Santiago.

COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city
into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this
instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no
boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised
by the city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the
criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be
necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebiscite not only those in Cabanatuan City.

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in
a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the
declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under
Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction
should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the
voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution.

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined
is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. In Tan v. COMELEC,
which involved the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the
LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite. As held:

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of
the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing
boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic
will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN v. COMELEC and HADJI ABOLAIS R.
OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN
G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000
BUENA, J.:

CASE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC
dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as "ghost precinct"

FACTS:

On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin,
herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan.

On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to the respective BEI of the
questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for
abolition of precincts and annulment of book of voters.

On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together
with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the 23 barangays, filed an "Answer in Opposition" which
included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul
the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the
incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.

After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the COMELEC issued an Order
dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation.

The COMELEC Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir,
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation on the
alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation conducted." Consequently, Atty. Tahir
created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing Election Officers
Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost
barangays in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."

On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts. It was found out that: in
Barangay Padian Torogan, there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no roof, and the other is a
wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously means that no single human being could possibly reside in these
two structures. Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. So this
contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the Census saying that the area has 45 households
with a total population of 285. In Barangay named Rakutan, the ocular inspection was stopped by the Madalum
Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun

On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of
COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that
Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.

On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct."

ISSUE: Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost
precinct. NO.

HELD: The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one declared as a ghost
precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared
"Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would be the
election precinct in the said place.

The determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said
precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the
COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in
the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified
that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If
there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It
is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate.
A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic
cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government
unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. In the
case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a
plebiscite 16 conducted for the purpose in the political units affected.

The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant
facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an
election by means available to it.

The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any finding
of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand.

Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The
sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an
electoral exercise.

Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by
law.

On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral
process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of
some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.
ROBERTO LACEDA, SR., vs. RANDY L. LIMENA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Laceda, Sr., and Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay. Limena filed a petition for disqualification
and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had
already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited
from running for the fourth time.

Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he asserted
that when he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third term,
the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the
City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the
new political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.

Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served three consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes
the three-term limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to office. He alleged that when
he was elected in 1994 the prohibition did not exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for the
fourth time, he would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to the election in 2007.
The COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified. Laceda moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Whether the 3 term limit rule will apply

Ruling:
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its decision on the requisites enunciated
in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section 43 of the Local
Government Code. Laceda argues that said case is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while
the instant case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his third term in a new
political unit and therefore he should not be deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for
purposes of applying the three-term limit.

In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and
converted into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of
the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They
are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over
whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt
Laceda's term.
SALVA vs. MAKALINTAL
G.R. No. 132603 (September 8, 2000)

FACTS:

The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with
Barangay Dacanlao, Municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the
required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto
exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Governor of Batangas for being ultra vires,
particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several
government agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the
abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the
petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought
before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the
COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit
that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and
Resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the comelec from implementing its resolution no.
2987, series of 1998, which provided for the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on february
28, 1998 to decide on the abolition of barangay san rafael and its merger with barangay dacanlao, calaca, batangas,
pending the determination of civil case no. 3442 for the annulment of ordinance no. 05, resolution no. 345 and comelec
resolution no. 2987.

HELD:

Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Court ruled that ―…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before
the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order
reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Herrera vs COMELEC

Facts:
In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province
subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two
consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads,
representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.

Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras—1st district
(Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?

Held:
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

Ratio:
1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent
means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for
considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are
contiguous or adjacent.

2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As required by
COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.

3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic
Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district,
shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.

4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants of
the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was
based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics Office.
MARIANO V. COMELEC

Facts:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into
a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3
years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

Held:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides
that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of 250,000.
Municipality of Kananga v. Madrona
FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement,
the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the
same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government Code
had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their
differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section
118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY
DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY
URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR. — ―Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. —
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this
end: ―(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. ―(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2)
or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned. ―(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly
referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned. ―(d) Boundary disputes involving a component
city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities,
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties. ―(e) In the event the sanggunian fails
to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall
decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.‖

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or
a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other — or between two or more highly urbanized
cities — shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of
the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component, city created under Republic Act No. 179. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a
component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an
independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then,
the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. —
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent
component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent
of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas
Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives to the
defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the
parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an
independent chartered city.
Municipality of Sta Fe vs Municipality of Aritao
GR No. 140474; 21 September 2007
Ponente: Azcuna

Facts:

In October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya for the determination of boundary dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. The trial was
almost over when the court realized its oversight under existing law. On December 9, 1988, the court suspended the
proceedings and referred the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. In turn, the Sanggunian
concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinances & Resolutions which adopted the former
Provincial Board’s Resolution No. 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian
approved the Committee’s recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings &
preservation of the status quo pending finality of the case.

In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion ruling that
since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a ―decision‖ favoring a party. The
court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to
amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is
reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan & no longer with the trial court. The RTC granted the motion. The CA then affirmed. According
to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting
jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect. Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of
the people expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over
previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling
boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people
should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial Courts no longer have
jurisdiction over boundary disputes.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: No

Ratio:

The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to dismiss
an action ―whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.‖ Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly
because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-bound to take
judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial – for the decision of a
court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never
become final and executory. Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court
to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the
court’s decision a ―lawless‖ thing. As correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the
case concerning a boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because the
decision is totally unacceptable to them.

Supporting laws: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the provinces in
which the municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of the Province where the
municipalities are situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); -
Sangguniang Panlalawigan where the municipalities are situated, appeal with the RTC.

The Sanggunian Panlalawigan has an expanded role in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside
from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable
settlement of the case, the SPanlalawigan is now specifically vested with ORIGINAL jurisdiction to actually hear and
decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its IRRs. The trial court now has no
power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Spanlalawigan
elevate the same (Mun of Sta Fe v Mun of Aritao 140474 Sept 21, 2007)
G.R. No. 169435
Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos
FACTS
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden,
Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which
was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed
by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 [5] dated September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753
entitled ―An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte.‖
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos’ boundaries as stated in the
second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: ―on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.‖
ISSUE
whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
HELD
No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Only the barrios
(now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only
the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded.
Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of
Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the
description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of
the legislative intent.
STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC.
vs.
City of Pasig
G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land with
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio
Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that
covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal. The
two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all
bearing the Cainta address, were issued. TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and
92870. The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.

Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court,
on June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in
Barrio TatlongKawayan, Pasig City. On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary
dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City.

On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including
penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the
improvements thereon

Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its
predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta
on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the
real estate taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.

The RTC ruled in favor of Pasig. Upon Pasig's motion for execution pending appeal, the same was granted by the RTC.
The CA ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia.

ISSUE: Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or
to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucia’s TCTs.

HELD:
Under Presidential Decree No. 464, or the ―Real Property Tax Code,‖ the authority to collect real property taxes is vested
in the locality where the property is situated. This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local
Government Code. Thus, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on
properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably within
its geographical boundaries.

The Court cited the case of Mariano, Jr. v Commission on Elections which stated that ―the importance of drawing with
precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.‖ Clearly
therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that
the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested
to it by law.

The Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the
outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights.
In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to pay,
but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of
the contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there would be no controversy at
all. In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due
on the subject
Ynot vs. IAC
Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then
charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right
to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order
to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on
the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
Republic vs. Daclan
Facts:
Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station was established by the Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau
of Animal Industry (BAI), Region I, for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended
beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government. In support of the said project,
plaintiffs6 executed four documents denominated as Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines
donating to the latter four parcels of land. These parcels of land are located at Barrio Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. The
donation was subject to the conditions that these parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a
breeding station, and 2) shall not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the donors or their
heirs.

Sometime in 1991, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of the Department of
Agriculture (DA), were devolved to the local government units pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160. Thus, defendant
Province of La Union assumed the powers and functions of the DA, in the operation of the breeding station.

In particular, the deeds of donation8 stipulated –

a. That the land herein mentioned shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used
for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the DONOR or his heirs;
xxxx

c. That in case of non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the DONOR and all permanent improvements existing
thereon shall become the property of the DONOR; x x x9

All in all, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197267 – Federico Daclan, Josefina Collado, Teodoro Daclan, Jose Daclan (the
Daclans) – and several others donated around 13 hectares of land to the Republic. The uniform deeds of donation
covering these parcels of land contained the same conditions, including the above stipulations relative to exclusive
purpose/use and automatic reversion.

Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on a 1.5-hectare
portion of the 13-hectare donated property.

In a September 4, 2003 Letter to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, the Daclans and other donors
demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding station has ceased operations and that
the land has been abandoned.

Issue:
Whether the Daclans can ask for the return of their donated properties

Held:
Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As defined, ―devolution
refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.‖ It includes ―the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions and responsibilities.‖33 While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province of La Union by
the Department of Agriculture as a consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and continued to function as a
breeding station; and the purpose for which the donations were made remained and was carried out. Besides, the
deeds of donation did not specifically prohibit the subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic. The
Daclans should bear in mind that ―contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are transmissible.

The Daclans lament the supposed failure of the Province to provide ―agricultural extension and on-site research services
and facilities‖ as required under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
failure they believe, constituted a violation of the stipulation contained in the deeds of donation to develop and
improve the livestock industry of the country. Yet this cannot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands;
on the contrary, to allow such an argument would condone undue interference by private individuals in the operations
of government. The deeds of donation merely stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the establishment of a
breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, and that in case of non-use, abandonment or cessation of
the activities of the BAI, possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the Daclans. It was never stipulated that
they may interfere in the management and operation of the breeding station. Even then, they could not directly
participate in the operations of the breeding station.
Thus, even if the BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, its activities continued when its functions were
devolved to the local government units such as the Province of La Union. It cannot be said that the deeds of donation
may be nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct; its functions continued in the government offices/local
government units to which said functions were devolved.

Lastly, the CA cannot validly order the return to the Daclans of the donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is
situated, because such portion was not donated by them. They admitted that the 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC
is constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to the government, but belonged to other
donors who are not parties to the instant case. As far as the Daclans are concerned, whatever they donated
remains part of the breeding station and so long as it remains so, no right of reversion accrues to them. Only the original
owner-donor of the 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is constructed is entitled to its return.
The Homeowners Association of El Deposito, et al., vs. Hon. Lood, et al., G.R. No. L-31864, Sept.29,1972
Facts: The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS, successor-in-interest of National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority [NAWASA]) asserted ownership of a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and Halo Halo
in San Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El Deposito" from the Spanish times). Said land, declared for taxation
purposes in the name of the old Mehopolitan Water District, are composed of aqueducts and an underground reservoir.
Portions of the land were sold or leased by NAWASA. MWSS desired the demolition and removal of the houses and
structures on the subiect land.

The petitioners claimed the same land, and moved to reopen the cadastral proceedings on it. The CFI denied the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings. The same petitioners later filed a special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed. Reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit.

Lower Court's Ruling: The CFI issued orders to demolish and remove the houses and structures on the subject land. No
further justification exists to continue the stay order against the removal and demolition of the constructions.

Issue: Whether the CFI exceeded its authority and jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
preliminary injunction sought to stay demolition and removal of petitioners' houses and structures

Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled in favor of the CFI. Authority was not
exceeded and there was no grave abuse of discretion in the CFI's denial of petitioners' motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction allegedly "to maintain the status quo" and stay demolition and removal of their illegal constructions found to
be public nuisances per se and serious hazards to public health. Petitioners' constructions have been duly found to be
public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without
building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which supplies potable
water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code. As stated in
Sitchon vs. Aquino, the police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by summary proceedings of
public nuisances per se.
Legaspi v. City of Cebu
Facts:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the
traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City) providing for the immobilization of vehicles found to be in violation of the
same.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban brought suit in the
RTC against the City of Cebu, seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of
due process and for being contrary to law, and damages. Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had
properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents
from his office; that upon his return after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp,
and a notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp; that he had
been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important
client on that day; that his car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had
first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car;6 that the fine was imposed
without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized;
that he had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car
was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic
regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping
and P1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his
car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM
operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a
court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John
Does to demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street
outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be allowed to
unload his materials and equipment from the front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter’s car had been parked in
the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; that while waiting for the anay exterminator
to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the
call; that after a short while, his son–in–law informed him that unknown persons had clamped the front wheel of his car;
that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by CITOM representatives with
a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover to criminal charges; and that in the
late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 1664 met the requirements of procedural due process

Held:

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under our
laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax
delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.

The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 was of the same character as the aforecited
established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked
vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension.
Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial–type hearing prior to
the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the
apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention
of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance
against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.

Finally, Legaspi’s position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the Astillero case declaring Ordinance No. 1664
unconstitutional bound the City of Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being decided
differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too much importance to an irrelevant decision of
the RTC – irrelevant, because the connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown. For another, he
ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in
these cases being already pending in the CA. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated
that in the regular course of proceedings, the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would
ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain
from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the
―interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation,‖ should have exercised a ―becoming
modesty‖ on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution required the majority vote of
the Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine. Such ―becoming modesty‖ also forewarned that any
declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that a declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza

Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the
following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by
the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense is that
Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to
8027.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the
act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in
the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.
Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of
the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.
The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which
have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003.
Social Ju stice Society v. Atienza, Jr
., Februa ry 13, 2008, Corona, J.

The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by the Department of Energy and oil giants Chevron,
Petron, and Shell; and reiterated its March 7, 2007 decisionordering the Manila City mayor to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 directing the removal of theterminals from Pandacan by the said oil companies. The said Ordinance reclassified
portionsof the Manila districts of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directedcertain business
owners and operators, including the three oil giants to cease and desistfrom operating their businesses there.

Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila City Council on November 28, 2001 and effective December 28, 2001,
reclassifies portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directs the owners and operators of
businesses to cease and desist from operating their businesses within 6 months from the ordinance’s effectivity. Among
the businesses in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of Chevron, Petron, and Shell.

Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned the validity of the said ordinance. They argued that they are fighting for their right
to property alleging that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. Are the contentions of the oil
companies tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a measure enacted pursuant to the delegated police power of local
government units ―to promote the order, safety, and health, morals, and general welfare of the society.‖ It explained
that ―based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.

When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to
property, the former should prevail.‖ (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.

The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be
delayed.

NOTES:

In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to ―enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.‖ One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled
by the courts. He has no other choice. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7, 2007)

In 2008, The Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and Shell, and instead
reiterated its March 7, 2007 decision. (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)

In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration of the three big oil players. The Court
stressed that the second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court. It said that it already passed upon the basic issues in its February 13, 2008 resolution and noted that the arguments
of the oil firms were a mere rehash of their arguments raised in the first motion for reconsideration. (Min. Res., GR No.
156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009)
 CASE: Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916)
DATE: 25 November 2014
PONENTE: J. Perez

FACTS
On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and
Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by
the proximity of communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and reliability of
supply and distribution of petroleum products.

On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of
Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.

Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were given six months from the date of
effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.

On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila an action to annul Ordinance No.
8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was
issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.

On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled ―An Ordinance Adopting the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto‖. This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.

On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.

The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance
No. 8027 is constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable
conflict between them.

SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone
under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and a
Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.

Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their contentions are as follows:
- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the general welfare of the people
- It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as well as health and environment related
municipal laws and international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic
and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child
- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to
repeal Ordinance No. 8027
 On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil companies contend that:
- The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to
show that they have suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result of the act complained of
- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the related provisions of the Constitution,
the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy
available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only exercises appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution
- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be modified
- There is a valid exercise of police power
 On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude
the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor
Lim.

ISSUES
 WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan Terminals

RULING

Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the
SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:

―Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a target
in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore becomes necessary to remove these
terminals to dissipate the threat.‖

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the
Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil
depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how
remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of
an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual
but of residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake.
Social Justice Society v. Lim (Motion for Reconsideration)
At first blush, the clause "cease and desist" appears to specifically refer only to the operations, considering that Sec. 3 of
Ordinance No. 8027 provides for a period of six (6) months from the date of its effectivity "within which to cease and
desist from the operations of businesses."

However, in the Decision dated 7 March 2007 in G.R. No. 156052, the Court granted the petition which sought the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 and the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. By so granting
the petition, it necessarily follows that the relocation and transfer it ordered contemplates the complete removal of the
facilities.

These cases being a mere sequel to the earlier petition, we so hold that the relocation and transfer contemplated
therein include the removal of the facilities, especially so when the city plans on building commercial establishments to
replace the Pandacan terminals and provide a source of employment for displaced employees. Accordingly, the
comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five days from receipt of the Decision shall also include the removal of
the facilities.
China Banking Corporation v. Martir
Facts: In 1994, the spouses Wenceslao and Marcelina Martir, executed real estate mortgages in favor of
petitioner China Banking Corporation over three parcels of land as security for their credit line in the amount of
P1,800,000.00. The loan was released in tranches, and for every amount released, respondents executed the
corresponding promissory note.
On September 12, 1997, respondents failed to pay the monthly interests on the promissory notes, thus a
demand letter dated October 8, 1997 was sent reminding them of their obligation. Respondents still failed to pay; hence,
the promissory notes and the credit line were no longer renewed by petitioner. A final demand letter dated December
29, 1997 was sent through registered mail to respondents by petitioners counsel. At that time, respondents total
obligation amounted to P1,705,000.00.
On May 20, 1998, upon the application of petitioner, the properties subject of the real estate mortgages were
extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction for P2,400,000.00 with petitioner as the sole bidder. A Certificate of
Sale was issued in favor of petitioner on May 21, 1998, and registered with the Register of Deeds on June 6, 1998.
From March to May 1999, respondents sent series of letters to petitioner inquiring the amount of loan availed
from the credit line, as well as the amount needed to redeem the foreclosed properties. Petitioner, however, failed to
respond to the inquiry. In a letter dated May 11, 1999, respondents formally offered to pay the amount of P1,300,000.00
to petitioner. Said amount was based on petitioners letter dated October 8, 1997 stating that the principal obligation
amounts to P1,300,000.00.
On May 17, 1999, respondents filed a complaint for nullification of the foreclosure proceedings alleging non-
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of publication, posting, registration, payment of filing fees and sheriff
fees, and failure to report the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and sale to the Executive Judge. Respondents also
imputed bad faith on the part of petitioner, which allegedly prevented them from redeeming their properties.
Issue: Whether foreclosure proceedings complied with the jurisdictional requirement of publication
Held: No. In invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale, the appellate court found that the posting and
publication requirements were not met, thus:
In this case, the appellee Bank failed to comply with both the requirements of posting and
publication. The notice of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale was posted in the barangay hall and Hall
of Justice of General Santos City for only fourteen (14) days, i.e. from May 6 to May 20, 1998 in
violation of the mandated twenty day period. Likewise, the publication in SUN STAR, a local
newspaper, was not valid on the ground that said newspaper is not an accredited newspaper of
general circulation in General Santos City pursuant to P.D. No. 1079. This is confirmed by the
Certification of Mr. Elmer D. Lastimosa, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, dated January 12, 1999 which states that:

xxxx

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that SUN-STAR, General Santos published by Ang

Peryodiko Dabaw, Inc. with editorial and business address at Halieus Mall,
Pendatun Avenue, corner Lukban Street, General Santos City is not an accredited
local newspaper insofar as this Court is concerned and therefore not qualified to
publish judicial notices, court orders and summonses and all similar announcement
arising from court litigation required by law to be published, as provided in Section
1 of P.D. No. 1079.

xxxx

THIS IS TO FURTHER CERTIFY that SUN-STAR General Santos has filed a

Petition for Accreditation docketed as Miscellaneous Case No. 1797 now pending
consideration before the sala of Honorable Executive Judge Antonio S. Alano.
The requirements for posting and publication in extrajudicial foreclosure are set out in Act No. 3135, as
amended:
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at
least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property
is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
Jurisprudence, however, has decreed that the publication of the notice of sale in a newspaper of general
circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirements of the law. The Court has
elucidated that:
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching
effects than posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an
announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed
nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board, no
matter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the publication of
the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance
with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had
 been effected such that those interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of the law
had been thereby subserved.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the
property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained, immaterial
errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the
notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the
validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.

Presidential Decree 1079, the governing law at the time of the subject foreclosure, requires that notices shall be
published in newspapers or publications published, edited and circulated in the same city and/or province where the
requirement of general circulation applies, thus:

Section 1. All notices of auction sales in extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
under Act No. 3135 as amended, judicial notices such as notices of sale on execution of real
properties, notices in special proceedings, court orders and summonses and all similar
announcements arising from court litigation required by law to be published in a newspaper or
periodical of general circulation in particular provinces and/or cities shall be published in newspapers
or publications published, edited and circulated in the same city and/or province where the
requirement of general circulation applies; Provided, That the province or city where the publications
principal office is located shall be considered the place where it is edited and published: Provided,
further, That in the event there is no newspaper or periodical published in the locality, the same may
be published in the newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulated in the nearest city or
province: Provided, finally, That no newspaper or periodical which has not been authorized by law to
publish and which has not been regularly published for at least one year before the date of
publication of the notices or announcements which may be assigned to it shall be qualified to publish
the said notices.

Presidential Decree 1079 requires a newspaper of general circulation. A newspaper of general circulation is
published for the dissemination of local news and general information; it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; and it is published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be devoted to the interest or published
for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The newspaper
need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation.
Presidential Decree 1079, however, does not require accreditation. The requirement of accreditation was
imposed by the Court only in 2001, through A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC or the Guidelines in the Accreditation of Newspapers
and Periodicals Seeking to Publish Judicial and Legal Notices and Other Similar Announcements and in the Raffle
Thereof. This circular cannot be applied retroactively to the case at bar as it will impair petitioners rights.
Moreover, as held in Metrobank v. Peafiel, the accreditation by the presiding judge is not conclusive that a
newspaper is of general circulation, as each case must be decided on its own merits and evidence.
The accreditation of Maharlika Pilipinas by the Presiding Judge of the RTC is not decisive of
whether it is a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong City. This Court is not bound to adopt
the Presiding Judges determination, in connection with the said accreditation, that Maharlika
Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation. The court before which a case is pending is bound to
make a resolution of the issues based on the evidence on record.
In the instant case, the Affidavit of Publication executed by the account executive of Sun Star General Santos
expressly provided that the said newspaper is of general circulation and is published in the City of General Santos. This
is prima facie proof that Sun Star General Santos is generally circulated in General Santos City, the place where the
properties are located. Notably, respondents did not claim that the subject newspaper was not generally circulated in
the city, but only that it was not accredited by the court. Hence, there was valid publication and consequently, the
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale are valid.
City of Olongapo v. Stallholders of East Bajac-Bajac Public Market of Olongapo City

On June 30, 1993, the Olongapo City Council enacted Ordinance No. 14 (Series of 1993), fixing the monthly rental
fees for the different stalls in the new public market. Respondents questioned the validity of said ordinance by filing an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The appeal was made pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government
Code, which states:

SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. -
The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within
sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied.)

As grounds for their appeal, respondents alleged that the ordinance: (1) violated Sections 130 and 186 of the Local
Government Code as the rates fixed therein are unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory, not equitable, not based as
far as practicable on the market vendors' ability to pay, and contrary to declared national policy; (2) was sought to be
implemented despite lack of publication; and (3) did not comply with "the essence and spirit of the public hearings."

In a Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Secretary of Justice upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 14 (Series
of 1993).

Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Justice Secretary's Resolution. The Secretary of Justice, however,
refrained from taking action on respondents' motion for reconsideration apparently in view of the pendency of a
case[5] filed in this Court questioning the validity of said Section 187. In a Letter dated November 23, 1993 and addressed
to counsel for respondents, Chief State Counsel Elmer T. Bautista wrote:

With reference to your Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution of this Office dated September 29, 1993, upholding
the constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. 14, s. 1993 of the City of Olongapo, please be informed that in view of
the adverse ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 33) dated October 26, 1993, and pending final
determination by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991), the Secretary of Justice deemed it appropriate to refrain from taking action thereon in the meantime.

Per the Secretary's Memorandum dated November 5, 1993, copy attached, you are, however, advised to file your
appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction.[6]

The contents of the "Secretary's Memorandum" referred to in the above letter is reproduced below:

In view of the adverse ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 33) dated October 26, 1993, and pending final
determination by the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991) which empowers the Secretary of Justice to pass upon on appeal, the legality and/or constitutionality of
tax ordinances or revenue measures adopted by local government units, you are hereby directed to refrain from taking
action on and/or accepting petitions/appeals filed in accordance with said legal mandate, and inform the appellants
thereto to file their appeal directly with the courts.

On December 22, 1993, respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City an "action to
declare void Olongapo City Ordinance No. 14, s. of 1992 and for writ of prohibition."

Issue: whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1993 is void insofar as the procedural requirements of
the Local Government Code or R.A. 7160 on the approval of revenue measures under Rules 187 and 188 thereof is
concerned

Held: Yes. In its Decision dated August 31, 1998, the Court of Appeals held that the issue of the ordinance's
publication did not require any trial and that the City had complied with the requirements of publication. It declared:

As to the issue [of] whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1993 is void insofar as the procedural
requirements of the Local Government Code or R.A. 7160 on the approval of revenue measures under Rules 187 and 188
thereof is concerned, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that no genuine triable issue exists that requires trial
on the merits.
Exhibits "4", "4-A", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9" and "10" attached to the Answer undisputedly show that proper publication, posting in
public places, and public hearings were complied with in accordance with the requirements of the Local Government
Code of 1991. We find no genuine triable issue on this matter and therefore the trial court committed no reversible error
in rendering summary judgment thereon. We agree with the RTC that the procedural requirements have been met by
the City Council of defendant Olongapo City in the enactment of the subject ordinance. There were publications,
posting and public hearings as shown by the aforementioned exhibits of defendants. The fact that appellants' views
were not considered by the City Council does not render the enactment of the ordinance invalid.
National Power Corporation v. Province of Isabela

Facts:

Respondent Province of Isabela filed an action for sum of money against petitioner NPC, a government-owned and
controlled corporation engaged in the generation and sale of electric power.

Respondent alleged in the complaint that petitioner’s Magat River Hydro-Electric Plant is located within its territory and
that, for this reason, it imposed a franchise tax on petitioner pursuant to Section 137 of Republic Act No. 7160. It averred
that petitioner paid the franchise tax for the years 1992 and 1993 but failed and refused to pay, despite demands, the
franchise tax for the year 1994. Respondent likewise sought the payment of legal interest plus damages.

In its Answer, petitioner averred that the Magat River Hydro-Electric Plant is constructed on the land owned by the
National Irrigation Administration, which is situated at Susoc, Sto. Domingo, Potia, Ifugao. It admitted that it paid
franchise tax to the respondent for the years 1992 and 1993, but that it did so only upon respondent’s representation that
the Magat Hydro-Electric Plant is located within its territorial jurisdiction. It alleged that, due to the boundary dispute
between the respondent and the Province of Ifugao, it is in a quandary as to whom it should pay the franchise tax.
Petitioner averred that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 242 prescribing the procedure for the administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims, and
controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. Moreover, respondent did not exhaust administrative remedies by first settling its boundary
dispute with the Province of Ifugao.

The controversy on the payment of franchise tax could be settled in an action for interpleader, which petitioner
intended to file against respondent and the Province of Ifugao.

With leave of court, the Province of Ifugao filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, later amended, against both petitioner and
respondent, claiming that the Magat Hydro-Electric Power Plant from which petitioner derives its income subject to
franchise tax is situated within its territory. All the principal structures of the power plant are within its jurisdiction; only
those incidental structures which have nothing to do with the production of hydroelectric power are located within the
respondent’s territory. It alleged that it is the one actually maintaining the power plant, as it maintains the watershed
that ensures the continuous flow of water to plant’s reservoir. It averred that, through misrepresentation, respondent
succeeded in claiming and receiving payment of franchise tax from the petitioner for the years 1992 and 1993. The
intervenor also claimed that it is not precluded from asserting its lawful claim despite the undue payment of the
franchise tax to the respondent. It maintained that respondent has no legal basis to assert a claim over the franchise tax
over the power plant. It prayed that judgment be rendered–

1. Ordering the National Power Corporation to pay unto intervenor the sum of P7,116,949.00 representing the
franchise tax for 1994 and all franchise tax accruing thereafter;

2. Ordering the Province of Isabela to pay unto intervenor the aggregate amount of P9,473,275.00 representing
the franchise tax for the years 1992 and 1993 plus legal interest;

3. Ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally attorney’s fee and litigation expenses.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

In answer to the amended complaint-in-intervention, respondent asserted that the Magat Hydro-Electric Power Plant is
located within its territory. It averred that the power plant is an expansion of the Magat River Irrigation System,
constructed in 1957 and located in Ramon, Isabela, and the Siffu River Irrigation System, located along the boundaries of
San Mateo and Ramon, Isabela. All communications received and sent during the construction of the power plant were
addressed to the respondent and not the intervenor. If the power plant is located within the intervenor’s territorial
boundary, it should have laid its claim over it during its construction in 1974. Petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of
laches and estoppel because they have known way back in 1976 that the location of the power plant is within
respondent’s territory. In fact, this has been well publicized all throughout the Philippines.7

Petitioner, for its part, asserts in its answer to the complaint-in-intervention that it is a non-profit corporation pursuant to
Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 (its charter); as such, it is not covered by the Local Government Code, and therefore not
obliged to pay franchise tax. The imposition of the franchise tax on appellant would run counter to Section 13 of its
charter
Issue: Whether NAPOCOR is exempt from paying franchise taxes

Held:

No. The case is on all fours with the case of National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, where this very same
issue was settled by the Court. In the Cabanatuan case, petitioner likewise refused to pay franchise tax to the City
of Cabanatuan by invoking the tax exemption provided under its charter. It argued that Section 137 of the LGC does
not apply to it because its stocks are wholly owned by the National Government, and its charter characterizes it as a
non-profit organization. The Court, however, declared that petitioner is not exempt from paying franchise tax.

Indeed, taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption
to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed.[23] Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and
unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be mistaken. They cannot be extended by mere
implication or inference.[24] In this case, petitioner relies solely on the exemption granted to it by its charter, arguing that
its exemption from franchise tax remained despite the enactment of the LGC.

The Court also addressed this issue in the Cabanatuan case where it held that the LGC has expressly withdrawn
such exemption, thus:
x x x [S]ection 193 of the LGC withdrew, subject to limited exceptions, the sweeping tax
privileges previously enjoyed by private and public corporations. Contrary to the contention of
petitioner, Section 193 of the LGC is an express, albeit general, repeal of all statutes granting tax
exemptions from local taxes. It reads:

Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (italics supplied)

It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Not being a local water district, a cooperative registered under R.A. No. 6938, or a non-stock
and non-profit hospital or educational institution, petitioner clearly does not belong to the exception.
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to point to some provisions of the LGC that expressly
grant it exemption from local taxes.

But this would be an exercise in futility. Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs
can impose franchise tax notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special
law. This particular provision of the LGC does not admit any exception. x x x

Even prior to the Cabanatuan case, the Court already declared in City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes that
the franchise tax may still be imposed despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws, explaining thus:

x x x The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter is
clearly manifested by the language used in Sections 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such
exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and
impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for an express, albeit general,
withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used.

Nonetheless, petitioner seeks to avoid paying the franchise tax by arguing further that it is not liable therefor
under Section 137 of the LGC because said tax applies only to a business enjoying a franchise. It contends that it is not a
private corporation or a business for profit. Again, we do not agree. The Court also declared in the Cabanatuan case
that petitioner qualifies as a business enjoying a franchise:

In section 131 (m) of the LGC, Congress unmistakably defined a franchise in the sense of a
secondary or special franchise. This is to avoid any confusion when the word franchise is used in the
concept of taxation. As commonly used, a franchise tax is a tax on the privilege of transacting
business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state. It is not levied on the
corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of
the rights or privileges granted to it by the government. Hence, a corporation need not pay franchise
tax from the time it ceased to do business and exercise its franchise. It is within this context that the
phrase tax on businesses enjoying a franchise in Section 137 of the LGC should be interpreted and
understood. Verily, to determine whether the petitioner is covered by the franchise tax in question, the
 following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner has a franchise in the sense of a secondary or
special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the
territory of the respondent city government.

Petitioner fulfills the first requisite. Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6395,
constitutes petitioners primary and secondary franchises. It serves as the petitioners charter, defining its
composition, capitalization, the appointment and the specific duties of its corporate officers, and its
corporate life span. As its secondary franchise, Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended, vests the
petitioner [with x x x certain] powers which are not available to ordinary corporations x x x

xxxx

Petitioner also fulfills the second requisite. It is operating within the respondent city
governments territorial jurisdiction pursuant to the powers granted to it by Commonwealth Act No.
120, as amended. x x x[28]

Petitioner was likewise characterized therein as a private enterprise for profit, on the following ratiocination:

Petitioner was created to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power

and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the
transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Pursuant to this mandate, petitioner generates
power and sells electricity in bulk. Certainly, these activities do not partake of the sovereign functions
of the government. They are purely private and commercial undertakings, albeit imbued with public
interest. The public interest involved in its activities, however, does not distract from the true nature of
the petitioner as a commercial enterprise, in the same league with similar public utilities like telephone
and telegraph companies, railroad companies, water supply and irrigation companies, gas, coal or
light companies, power plants, ice plant among others; all of which are declared by this Court as
ministrant or proprietary functions of government aimed at advancing the general interest of society.

Petitioner nevertheless contends that respondent cannot impose a franchise tax on it because it is an
instrumentality of the National Government. It also cites the case of Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation[30] which held that a government-owned and controlled corporation whose shares of stock are owned by
the national government is exempt from local taxes.

This contention, however, is without merit. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule admits of an
exception, i.e., when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the
aforementioned entities.[31] Section 137 of the LGC is one of those exceptions. It authorizes the province to impose a tax
on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction.

Thus, the doctrine laid down in the Basco case is no longer true. In the Cabanatuan case, the Court noted
primarily that the Basco case was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when no law empowering the local
government units to tax instrumentalities of the National Government was in effect. [32] It further explained that in
enacting the LGC, Congress empowered the LGUs to impose certain taxes even on instrumentalities of the National
Government.
Cagayan Electric v. City of Cagayan de Oro

DOCTRINE: Failure to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within the statutory period of 30 days from the effectivity of the
ordinance is fatal to one’s cause.

FACTS: On January 10, 2005, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro (City Council) passed Ordinance No.
9503-2005 imposing a tax on the lease or rental of electric and/or telecommunication posts, poles or towers by pole
owners to other pole users at ten percent(10%) of the annual rental income derived from such lease or rental. The City
Council, in a letter dated 15 March 2005, informed Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO),
through its President and Chief Operation Manager, Ms. Consuelo G. Tion, of the passage of the subject ordinance. On
September 30, 2005, appellant CEPALCO, purportedly on pure question of law, filed a petition for declaratory relief
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 9503-2005 before the Regional Trial Court.

RULING: CEPALCOs act of leasing for a consideration the use of its posts, poles or towers to other pole users falls under
the Local Government Codes definition of business. Business is defined by Section 131(d) of the Local Government Code
as "trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit." In relation to
Section 131(d) ,20ς Section 143(h)21ςrνll of the Local Government Code provides that the city may impose taxes, fees,
and charges on any business which is not specified in Section 143(a) to (g)22ςrνll and which the sanggunian concerned
may deem proper to tax.

CEPALCO is mistaken when it states that a city can impose a tax up to only one-half of what the province or city may
impose. A more circumspect reading of the Local Government Code could have prevented this error. Section 151 of the
Local Government Code states that, subject to certain exceptions, a city may exceed by "not more than 50%" the tax
rates allowed to provinces and municipalities.29ςrνll A province may impose a franchise tax at a rate "not exceeding
50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts."30ςrνll Following Section 151, a city may impose a franchise tax of up to 0.0075
(or 0.75%) of a business gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or
realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. A municipality may impose a business tax at a rate not exceeding "two percent of
gross sales or receipts."31ςrνll Following Section 151, a city may impose a business tax of up to 0.03 (or 3%) of a business
gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.

CEPALCO also erred when it equates Section 137s "gross annual receipts" with Ordinance No. 9503-2005s "annual rental
income." Section 2 of Ordinance No. 9503-2005 imposes "a tax on the lease or rental of electric and/or
telecommunication posts, poles or towers by pole owners to other pole users at the rate of ten (10) percent of the
annual rental income derived therefrom," and not on CEPALCOs gross annual receipts. Thus, although the tax rate of
10% is definitely higher than that imposable by cities as franchise or business tax, the tax base of annual rental income of
"electric and/or telecommunication posts, poles or towers by pole owners to other pole users" is definitely smaller than
that used by cities in the computation of franchise or business tax. In effect, Ordinance No. 9503-2005 wants a slice of a
smaller pie.

However, we disagree with the City of Cagayan de Oros submission that Ordinance No. 9503-2005 is not subject to the
limits imposed by Sections 143 and 151 of the Local Government Code. On the contrary, Ordinance No. 9503-2005 is
subject to the limitation set by Section 143(h). Section 143 recognizes separate lines of business and imposes different tax
rates for different lines of business. Let us suppose that one is a brewer of liquor and, at the same time, a distributor of
articles of commerce. The brewery business is subject to the rates established in Section 143(a) while the distribution
business is subject to the rates established in Section 143(b). The City of Cagayan de Oros imposition of a tax on the
lease of poles falls under Section 143(h), as the lease of poles is CEPALCOs separate line of business which is not covered
by paragraphs (a) to (g) of Section 143. The treatment of the lease of poles as a separate line of business is evident in
Section 4(a) of Ordinance No. 9503-2005. The City of Cagayan de Oro required CEPALCO to apply for a separate
business permit.

More importantly, because "any person, who in the course of trade or business x x x leases goods or properties x x x shall
be subject to the value-added tax,"32ςrνll the imposable tax rate should not exceed two percent of gross receipts of
the lease of poles of the preceding calendar year. Section 143(h) states that "on any business subject to x x x value-
added x x x tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent
(2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year" from the lease of goods or properties. Hence, the 10% tax
rate imposed by Ordinance No. 9503-2005 clearly violates Section 143(h) of the Local Government Code.

Finally, in view of the lack of a separability clause, we declare void the entirety of Ordinance No. 9503-2005. Any
payment made by reason of the tax imposed by Ordinance No. 9503-2005 should, therefore, be refunded to CEPALCO.
Our ruling, however, is made without prejudice to the enactment by the City of Cagayan de Oro of a tax ordinance that
complies with the limits set by the Local Government Code.
Camp John Hay Development Authority v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals

Facts: In a letter dated 21 March 2002, respondent City Assessor of Baguio City notified petitioner Camp John Hay
Development Corporation about the issuance against it of thirty-six (36) Owner’s Copy of Assessment of Real Property
(ARP), with ARP Nos. 01-07040-008887 to 01-07040-008922covering various buildings of petitioner and two (2) parcels of
land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) in the John Hay Special Economic Zone (JHSEZ),
Baguio City, which were leased out to petitioner.

In response, petitioner questioned the assessments in a letter dated 3April 2002 for lack of legal basis due to the City
Assessor’s failure to identify the specific properties and its corresponding assessed values. The City Assessor replied in a
letter dated 11 April 2002 that the subject ARPs (with an additional ARP on another building bringing the total number of
ARPs to thirty-seven [37]) against the buildings of petitioner located within the JHSEZ were issued on the basis of the
approved building permits obtained from the City Engineer’s Office of Baguio City and pursuant to Sections 201 to 206 of
RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991.

Consequently, on 23 May 2002, petitioner filed with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals (BTAA) of Baguio City an
appeal under Section 226 of the LGC of 1991 challenging the validity and propriety of the issuances of the City Assessor.
Petitioner claimed that there was no legal basis for the issuance of the assessments because it was allegedly exempted
from paying taxes, national and local, including real property taxes, pursuant to RA No. 7227, otherwise known as the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.

The BTAA cited Section 7, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure Before the LBAA, and enjoined petitioner to first comply
therewith, particularly as to the payment under protest of the subject real property taxes before the hearing of its
appeal. Subsequently, the BTAA dismissed petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in the 20 September 2002
Resolution6 for lack of merit.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case before the CBAA. The CBAA denied petitioner’s appeal, set aside the BTAA’s
order of deferment of hearing, and remanded the case to the LBAA of Baguio City for further proceedings subject to a
full and up-to-date payment of the realty taxes on subject properties as assessed by the respondent City Assessor of
Baguio City, either in cash or in bond.

Citing various cases it previously decided,8 the CBAA explained that the deferment of hearings by the LBAA was merely
in compliance with the mandate of the law. The governing provision in this case is Section 231, not Section 226, of RA No.
7160 which provides that "appeal on assessments of real property made under the provisions of this Code shall, in no
case, suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes on the property involved as assessed by the provincial or
city assessor, without prejudice to subsequent adjustment depending upon the final outcome of the appeal." In
addition, as to the issue raised pertaining to the propriety of the subject assessments issued against petitioner, allegedly
claimed to be a tax-exemptentity, the CBAA expressed that it has yet to acquire jurisdiction over it since the same has
not been resolved by the LBAA.

On 8 September 2004, the CBAA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Ruling: The Court finds the petition unmeritorious and therefore rules against petitioner.

Section 252 of RA No. 7160, also known as the LGC of 1991, categorically provides:

SEC. 252. Payment Under Protest. – (a) No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall
be annotated on the tax receipts the words "paid under protest." The protest in writing must be filed within thirty (30) days
from payment of the tax to the provincial, city treasurer or municipal treasurer, in the case of a municipality within
Metropolitan Manila Area, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt.

(b) The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest, shall beheld in trust by the treasurer concerned.

(c) In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or portion of the tax
protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit against his existing or future tax liability.

(d) In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty-day period prescribed in subparagraph
(a), the tax payer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of this Code.
(Emphasis and underlining supplied)
Relevant thereto, the remedies referred to under Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991 are those
provided for under Sections 226 to 231. Significant provisions pertaining to the procedural and substantive aspects of
appeal before the LBAA and CBAA, including its effect on the payment of real property taxes, follow:

SEC. 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is
not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may,
within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of
Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the
purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of
the appeal.

SEC. 229. Action by the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – (a)The Board shall decide the appeal within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of receipt of such appeal. The Board, after hearing, shall render its
decision based on substantial evidence or such relevant evidence on record as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support the conclusion.

(b) In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Board shall have the powers to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, conduct ocular inspection, take depositions, and issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum. The proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining
the facts without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings.

(c) The secretary of the Board shall furnish the owner of the property or the person having legal
interest therein and the provincial or city assessor with a copy of the decision of the Board. In case the
provincial or city assessor concurs in the revision or the assessment, it shall be his duty to notify the
owner of the property or the person having legal interest therein of such fact using the form
prescribed for the purpose. The owner of the property or the person having legal interest therein or the
assessor who is not satisfied with the decision of the Board may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the decision of said Board, appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, as here in provided.
The decision of the Central Board shall be final and executory.

SEC. 231. Effect of Appeal on the Payment of Real Property Tax. – Appeal on assessments of real property
made under the provisions of this Code shall, in no case, suspend the collection of the corresponding realty
taxes on the property involved as assessed by the provincial or city assessor, without prejudice to subsequent
adjustment depending upon the final outcome of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991, clearly sets forth the administrative remedies available
to a taxpayer or real property owner who does not agree with the assessment of the real property tax sought to be
collected.

The language of the law is clear. No interpretation is needed. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that if a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.15

To begin with, Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property owner questioning the assessment should
first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of fact, the words "paid under protest" shall be
annotated on the tax receipts. Consequently, only after such payment has been made by the taxpayer may he file a
protest in writing (within thirty (30) days from said payment of tax) to the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall
decide the protest within sixty (60)days from its receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged to entertain the protest
unless the tax due has been paid.

Secondly, within the period prescribed by law, any owner or person having legal interest in the property not satisfied with
the action of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may file an appeal with the LBAA
of the province or city concerned, as provided in Section 226 of RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991. Thereafter, within thirty
days from receipt, he may elevate, by filing a notice of appeal, the adverse decision of the LBAA with the CBAA, which
exercises exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all appeals from the decisions, orders, and resolutions of the Local
Boards involving contested assessments of real properties, claims for tax refund and/or tax credits, or overpayments of
taxes.