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1. PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent Office
FACTS
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's
Association for prohibition and injunction against
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office.
Respondent Director issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office.
It would appear that respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations in the past.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine
Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before
the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently,
the act of the respondent Director, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the
Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so
much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only
by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who
pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not
prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle
cases before the Patent Office; x x x that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United
States Patent Law.
ISSUE
1. WON the Director of Patent is authorized to
prescribe the said qualifying exam. NO
2. WON appearance before the patent Office and
the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes practice of law.YES
3. What is the nature of the duty of the Director of
Patent?
RULING
1. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines. Any member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
2. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and social proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law x x x
have been held to constitute law practice as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions.
The practice of law includes such appearance before
the Patent Office x x x. In the first place, although
the transaction of business in the Patent Office
involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
business has to be rendered in accordance with the
Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation
and application of other laws and legal principles, as
well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.

Another proof that much of the business and many
of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involve questions of law or a reasonable
and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the
registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a
compulsory license, and any party to any
other proceeding in the Office may appeal to
the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If
the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal
should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.
3. The Director of Patents, exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, thus, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge
and training, should be allowed to practice before
the Patent Office, without further examination or
other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may
require that members of the bar practising before
him enlist the assistance of technical men and
scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of US Patent authorized him to prescribe the rules
and regulations requiring that persons desiring to
practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination.
While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to
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show that they possess the necessary qualifications
and competence to render valuable service, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination
to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Section 78, is silent on this important point.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence
of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to
and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus, may not also require that any lawyer
practising before them x x x shall first pass an
examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice
law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason
that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of
the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions
are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
2. RENATO CAYETANO,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, HON. CARAGUE
PRELIMINARIES
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective

position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
PRACTICE OF LAW
BLACK defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation
of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with
the law. X x x
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (LAND TITLE ABSTRACT AND TRUST
CO. V. DWORKEN). A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, or body, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law.
This Court in the case of PHILIPPINE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION V.AGRAVA stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
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before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, x x x have
been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
X x x Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. X x x
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any
line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of
their profession, and he follows some one or more
lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.
(Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of
the term "practice of law.
PRIVATE PRACTICE
The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The practice of law is defined as the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law. Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.
X x x Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. Nonetheless, many lawyers
do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. X x x in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms.
CORPORATE LAW PRACTICE
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation.
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At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management.
Such corporate legal management issues deal
primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to
the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
X x x [Be this as it may,] the organization and
management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric x x x.
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.

The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod, he took his oath of office,
and assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and
void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years.
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries x x x.
Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked
with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer.
As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec.
In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development,
has worked with the under privileged sectors, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill.
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Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers
ISSUE
WON Christian Monsod based on the facts
aforestated is engaged in the practice of law so as to
render valid his appointment as Chairman of the
COMELEC. YES
RULING
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide.
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of
(Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
X x x The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority

to direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon
the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law.
The appointing process in a regular appointment as
in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero)
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's
comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at
least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific
standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is
met and complied with.
To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter,
means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed
and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of
medicine."X x x
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Several factors determinative of whether a particular
activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law"
implies customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer x x x.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance
for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is a habitual exercise.
2. Compensation. X x x that his professional
services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood
or in consideration of his said services.
3. Application of law, legal principle practice
or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term
"practice of law".
4. Attorney-client relationship. Hence, where
a lawyer undertakes an activity which
requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching
law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice
of his profession or a lawyer.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
As to the qualifications of the private respondent, I
fear that the ponencia (PARAS) may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of
law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless (too global to be workable).
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of
law even if his main occupation is another business
and he interprets and applies some law only as an
incident of such business.
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is
to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his
living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only

remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be
sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he
has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many
other positions worthy of his abundant talents but
not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot
shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged
in the practice of law for even one year. He is a
member of the bar but to say that he has practiced
law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But
if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has
not engaged in an activity where membership in the
bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned
is active and regular, not isolated, occasional,
accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for
ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one's decisive
choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it
out with intent and attention during the ten-year
period.
It appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law
except for an alleged one year period after passing
the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been
extremely limited because he was also working for
M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period.
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The Constitution requires having been "engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v.
Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): Practice is more
than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services.
While the career as a businessman of respondent
Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law.
As in the practice of law, doing business also should
be active and continuous. Isolated business
transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing
business.
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by
Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate
showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment
of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to
DENY the petition.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concur.

3. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
NICANOR C. ALVAREZ
FACTS
Complainant Teresita was the Municipal Treasurer of
San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent
Atty. Alvarez to defend her in criminal and
administrative cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Teresita’s version of the facts is as follows:
That she hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases
filed against her before the Office of the
Ombudsman.1 Atty. Alvarez was then working in the
Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health.2 He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance
fee.3 However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman
nor sign any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends
connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who
could help with dismissing her case for a certain
fee.5 Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the
amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances working at the Office of the
Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita
dismissed.
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty.
Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a resolution and decision recommending the filing of
a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her
dismissal from service, respectively.
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at
least a portion of the amount she gave.8 Atty.
Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita;
however, he failed to fulfill this promise.9 Teresita
sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he
failed to heed.
On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the
following:
That he is the Legal Officer III of the National Center
8
for Mental Health under the Department of
Health. He has authority to engage in private
practice of the profession. He represented Teresita
in several cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that
Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a case
was filed against her.
That he received a call from Teresita regarding a
meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss the decision
and resolution she received from the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing her from service for
dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section
3 of Republic Act No. 3019, respectively.20 Atty.
Alvarez accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00
as acceptance fee.21According to him, he arrived at
the amount after considering the difficulty of the
case and the workload that would be involved,
which would include appeals before the Court of
Appeals and this Court.22 However, the fee is
exclusive of filing fees, appearance fees, and other
miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying
and mailing.
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several
pleadings in connection with Teresita's case. And
that he prepared several letters to different
government officials and agencies.
That Teresita made staggered payments but did not
pay all the expenses for legal work performed and
advanced by him.
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of
the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita
informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer
interested in retaining his services as she had hired
Atty. Contado who was Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in
the cases against Teresita.
Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a
Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment of
Atty. Alvarez.30
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendationthe Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year. Atty. Alvarez was
also ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to
Teresita with legal interest from the time of demand
until its full payment.
On the unauthorized practice of law, the
Investigating Commissioner found that while Atty.
Alvarez claimed that he was authorized by his
superior to privately practice law, the pleadings he
allegedly prepared and filed did not bear his name
and signature. Hence, the Investigating
Commissioner stated that: The time that Respondent
spent in following up the case of Complainant in the
Office of the Ombudsman is a time lost to the
government which could have been used in the
service of many taxpayers[.]
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was
authorized by his superior to practice his profession,
the Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty.
Alvarez was prohibited to handle cases involving
malversation of funds by government officials such
as a municipal treasurer.
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found
that the attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked for were
unreasonable.
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give
to the Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00
because of the words of Respondent that he has
friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who can
help with a fee. That because of that guarantee,
Complainant was obligated to shell out every now
and then money for the satisfaction of the allege[d]
friend of the Respondent[.]
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution,43 but the Motion was denied by the
Board of Governors
ISSUE
1. WON Atty. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the
Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health under the Department of Health, is
9
authorized to engage in the private practice of law;
YES. And
RULING
1. YES, respondent committed unauthorized practice
of his profession.
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any
pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious
actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do
unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of
offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics
of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal
knowledge is considered practice of law. By
preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to
complainant, respondent practiced law.
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and
Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of
1986,53government officials or employees are
prohibited from engaging in private practice of their
profession unless authorized by their department
heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice
of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict
with the official functions of the government official
or employee:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
The authority to grant permission to any official or
employee shall be granted by the head of the
ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
In this case, respondent was given written
permission by the Head of the National Center for
Mental Health, whose authority was designated

under Department of Health Administrative Order
No. 21, series of 1999.
However, by assisting and representing complainant
in a suit against the Ombudsman and against
government in general, respondent put himself in a
situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly
and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that
his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest
of the Center and the Philippine government as a
whole."
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local
Government,60 the petitioner was an incumbent City
Councilor or member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Bago City. He was a lawyer by
profession and had continuously engaged in the
practice of law without securing authority from the
Regional Director of the Department of Local
Government.61 In 1989, the petitioner acted as
counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang
and filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and
Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto
C. Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City.
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative
case before the Department of Local Government
for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No.
6713 and relevant Department of Local Government
memorandum circulars on unauthorized practice of
profession, as well as for oppression, misconduct,
and abuse of authority.63 While the case was
pending before Department of Local Government,
the petitioner was able to secure a written authority
to practice his profession from the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government, "provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official functions."
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner
practiced his profession in conflict with his functions
as City Councilor and against the interests of
government.
In the first place, complaints against public officers
and employees relating or incidental to the
performance of their duties are necessarily
impressed with public interest for by express
10
constitutional mandate, a public office is a public
trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of
which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence,
judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would
actually be a judgment against the City Government.
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees
and assisting them to prosecute their claims against
City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to
Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in
the private practice of his profession, if such practice
would represent interests adverse to the
government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the
statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. The Local Government Code and
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid
conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows
it.
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is
a public officer, an employee of government. The
Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By
appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent is going against the same employer he
swore to serve.
Furthermore, this is consistent with the
constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
[P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."
The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish
the erring officer or employee but to continue to
uplift the People's trust in government and to ensure
excellent public service.

These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-
repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical
flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be
taken as working standards by all in the public
service.
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced
law, we find that there is now no need to determine
whether the fees he charged were reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before
this Court, the complainant must prove his or her
allegations through substantial evidence.
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies
on the party who makes the allegations. In the case
at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with
the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge
or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined
or penalized unless it is shown that they committed
a transgression of their oath or their duties, which
reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as
a member of the bar.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for
the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the
offense should also be considered.
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the
very least, made it appear to complainant that he
knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman
who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant's case.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and
1.0278prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
11
conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the
case will be dismissed because of his personal
relationships with officers or employees in the Office
of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon
780 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall
rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the court."
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery,
"[t]he transaction is always done in secret and often
only between the two parties
96
concerned." Nevertheless, as found by the
Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the
records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold
respondent guilty of influence peddling.
We agree with the penalty recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
We find respondent's acts of influence peddling,
coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit the
penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law. To be so bold as to peddle influence
before the very institution that is tasked to
prosecute corruption speaks much about
respondent's character and his attitude towards the
courts and the bar.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their
acquaintances or relationships with regulators,
investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system,
weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even
as they claim to be members of a noble profession.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to
even imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will
make a decision is an act worthy of the utmost
condemnation. If we are to preserve the nobility of
this profession, its members must live within its
ethical parameters.
While this Court is not a collection agency for
faltering debtors,97 this Court has ordered restitution
of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous
actions of lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore,
required to return to complainant the amount of

P500,000.00—the amount that respondent allegedly
gave his friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
4. B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO
FACTS
Medado graduated from UP with the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 19791and passed the same
year’s bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.
On 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath.3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.
it was only several years later, while rummaging
through his old college files, that he found the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that
he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
was probably just an attendance record.
He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved
in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “[that] since
he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the
Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to
his status as a lawyer”;
When he attended MCLEseminars, he was required
to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in
the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his
roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
12
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference and recommended that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Medado should be allowed to sign in the
Rolls of Attorneys. YES.
RULING
After a judicious review of the records, we grant
Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice
of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action
is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and
good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We
note that it was not a third party who called this
Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any
action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere
to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that
he possesses the character required to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent
and able legal practitioner, having held various

positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,
Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this
Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate
petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law
since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He
justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake
of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado
may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at
the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment
he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of
his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was
the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission
to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer
13
of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto
has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides. CANON
9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are
bound to comport themselves in accordance with
the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous
violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to
fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one
year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
5. LETICIA A. ARIENDA
vs.
EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, LEGAZPI CITY
FACTS

This is an administrative complaint for conduct
unbecoming a court employee and abuse of
authority filed by Arienda against respondent Evelyn
A. Monilla, a Court Stenographer.
In her letter-complaint1, complainant alleged that
respondent and Atty. Monilla, together referred to
as the spouses Monilla, went to complainant’s house
and offered their services in settling the estate of
complainant’s deceased mother.
According to the spouses Monilla, they would
prepare an extrajudicial settlement for complainant,
while respondent’s brother, Engineer Arquero,
would conduct the survey of the estate.
Complainant subsequently learned that the spouses
Monilla had no authority to settle her deceased
mother’s estate as Atty. Monilla was currently
employed at the DAR and respondent was not even
a lawyer but an ordinary court employee.
Respondent denied that it was she and her husband
who offered complainant their services. Respondent
averred that it was complainant and her sister who
did so. She claimed that her former co-employees at
the RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City conspired and
confederated with one another to induce
complainant to file the instant complaint against her.
Investigating Judge Soriao found that Evelyn A.
Monilla committed a simple misconduct unbecoming
of court personnel while she was a court
stenographer. And recommended the imposition
upon her of an administrative penalty of fine
equivalent to two months of the salary that she was
receiving when she resigned to be deducted from
her retirement benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator increased the
amount of the fine to four months salary.
ISSUE
WON was engaged in an unauthorized practice of
law. YES.
RULING
14
It bears to note that respondent admitted in her
comment that she prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
complainant’s deceased mother. The preparation of
an extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes
practice of law as defined in Cayetano v.
Monsod,8 to wit:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." x x
x.
Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to
prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. Worse, respondent also admitted receiving
money from complainant for her services. Being a
court employee, respondent ought to have known
that it was improper for her to prepare and finalize
the extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only
a lawyer is authorized to perform, and to receive
money therefor.
It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to a
private agreement between her and complainant.
However, respondent is an employee of the court
whose conduct must always be beyond reproach
and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion
that may taint the judiciary. She is expected to
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity
not only in the performance of her official duties but
also in her personal and private dealings with other
people to preserve the court’s good name and
standing.9
Respondent’s behavior and conduct, which led other
people to believe that she had the authority and
capability to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial
settlement of estate even when she is not a lawyer,
clearly fall short of the exacting standards of ethics
and morality imposed upon court employees.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful
conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or
deviation from the established norm, whether it be
work-related or not, amounts to misconduct.10 In
preparing and finalizing the extrajudicial settlement
of estate and receiving compensation for the same
even when she is not a lawyer, respondent is guilty
of simple misconduct, punishable under Section
52(B)(2) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service with
suspension for one month and one day to six
months. Considering that this is respondent's first
offense and that she had served the judiciary for
almost 16 years, a suspension of four months would
have been proper. Since respondent had already
retired, the Court instead imposes the penalty of a
fine equivalent to her salary for four months, to be
deducted from her retirement benefits.
6. RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE
PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
FACTS
Vicente Ching, is the legitimate son of a Chinese
farher, and a Filipino mother. He was born (1964)
and he resided in the Philippines.
After having completed a Bachelor of Laws course,
he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations.
In a Resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take
the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that
he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
Ching passed the Bar exam. However, because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was
not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, he was required to submit
further proof of his citizenship.
According to the OSG Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born
15
under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the
age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship.
The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was
only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he
could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG OSG then
explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching
the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of
majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which
had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
years. Said period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as
when a (sic) person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino.
But in Cuenco, it was held that an
election done after over seven (7)
years was not made within a
reasonable time.
ISSUE
WON Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within
a "reasonable time." (14 years). NO
RULING
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should be
made "upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11
April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 or over fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age
of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by
any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his

being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances
cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship.
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the
plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently,
we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority
until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a
result. this golden privilege slipped away from his
grasp.
7. B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
16
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ,
FACTS
Atty. Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Melingfrom
taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on
him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he
has three (3) pending criminal cases.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident
which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has
been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar.
Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled, Meling considered the three cases as "closed
and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the
charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling
admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases
filed against him makes him also answerable under
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar."5
As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the
OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation
"Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is
not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever
may have typed the letters.
As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation
"attorney" may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling
not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the
Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be
suspended until further orders from the Court.
ISSUE
WON Meling is justified in concealing the 3 criminal
charges against him or WON he is possessed of good
moral character so as to allow him to take the Bar.
NO.
RULING
We fully concur with the findings and
recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders
the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the
same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the
Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted
upon.
17
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the
Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.8 The requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the
application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not
been charged with any act or omission punishable by
law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer
or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her." Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not
reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His
deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court
to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence
of good moral character of the applicant.10 The
nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining
whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence
of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are
three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and
results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney",
knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court
had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the
use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a
Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine
Bar. The title "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of

law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
8. A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA
FACTS
Alawi, a sales representative of real estate,and
Alauya, the incumbent executive clerk of court of the
4th Judicial Shari'a District used to be friends.
Alawi was able to sell to Alauya a housing unit to be
paid on installments.
However, Alauya sought the termination of the
contract on the ground of vitiated consent.
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint and
accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and
libelous charges;"
X x x and
4. Usurpation of the title of
"attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken
for "councilor,""konsehal" or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to
the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
ISSUE
18
WON Alauya is justified in using for herself the title
of attorney. NO.
RULING
Persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the
term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an
officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may
not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As
a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had
been grievously wronged.
9. B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE
LAWYERS OATH
FACTS
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's
conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites. Initially the 8
accused entered pleas of not guilty but later on
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment
all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
Petitioner was granted probation and was
dischargedtherefrom.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order
of his discharge from probation.
ISSUE
WON Argosino is possessed with good moral
character. YES
RULING
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to
those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits"
from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout
19
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has
exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit
of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is
NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE
LAWYERS OATH
FACTS:
 Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the
bar examinations held in 1993.
 The Court however deferred his oath-taking
due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
 The criminal case which resulted in
petitioner's conviction, arose from the death
of a neophyte during fraternity initiation
rites sometime in September 1991.
 On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted
herein petitioner's application for probation.
 On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an
order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from
probation.
 On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this
Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
 The Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a

resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino
to submit to the Court evidence that he may
now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar.
 In compliance with the above resolution,
petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court
judges, and six (6) members of religious
orders.
 Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that
a scholarship foundation had been
established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight (8) accused in
the criminal case.
ISSUE: WON Al Argosino be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath
HELD:
 YES.
 After a very careful evaluation of this case,
we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
o In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes
that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber.
o The Court is persuaded that Mr.
Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan.
o We are prepared to give him the
benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of
youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
 We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's
oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality
for practicing law.
 Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath.
20
 If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
 The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino
will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community.
 As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to
the more unfortunate members of society.
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
FACTS:
 Complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty.
Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of
continuing grossly immoral conduct for
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña
under scandalous circumstances.
 Prior to this complaint, respondent was
already administratively charged four times
for conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court.
 In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved
on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time
the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the
penalty of six months suspension without
pay, while in Administrative Matters Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were
consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from the service of
respondent.
 Complainant and respondent married on
October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City.
 They established their residence in Antipolo,
Rizal, where eight of their eleven children
were born.
 In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City),
where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his

appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City
on January 30, 1976.
 Shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,
respondent began cohabiting with a certain
Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte.
 Elena gave birth to their first child, named
Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
 In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty.
Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for
immorality.
 After investigation, the penalty of
suspension from office for a period of six
months without pay was meted by this Court
upon respondent.
 Despite this penalty, respondent still
continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise
to another charge of immorality and other
administrative cases, such as: conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court, and
grossly immoral conduct.
 But his dismissal as a judge did not impel
respondent to mend his ways.
 He continued living with Elena, which
resulted in the birth of their second child
named Laella Peña Tapucar.
 Moreover, he completely abandoned
complainant and his children by her.
 On March 5, 1992, respondent contracted
marriage with Elena in a ceremony
solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A.
Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
 Complainant, in the meanwhile, had
migrated to United States of America upon
her retirement from the government service
in 1990.
 However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they
allegedly suffered because of their father's
acts, including deception and intrigues
against them.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Tapucar should be disbarred
HELD:
 YES
 Well settled is the rule that good moral
character is not only a condition precedent
21
for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain
one's good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity.
 The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that:
o Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
o Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
 Lawyers must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency, as well as morality
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
 Moreover, it should be recalled that
respondent here was once a member of the
judiciary, a fact that aggravates his
professional infractions.
 For having occupied that place of honor in
the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations
ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety.
 For a judge is the visible representation of
the law and, more importantly, of justice.
 The record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon him by this Court,
respondent continued his illicit liaison with a
woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife.
 The report of the Commissioner assigned to
investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the
contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude,
even arrogance, in the face of charges
against him.
 The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to
determine whether he still merited the
privileges extended to a member of the legal
profession, resolved the matter against him.
 For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not
be explained away.
 Keeping a mistress, entering into another
marriage while a prior one still subsists, as
well as abandoning and/or mistreating
complainant and their children, show his

disregard of family obligations, morality and
decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. S
 uch gross misbehavior over a long period of
time clearly shows a serious flaw in
respondent's character, his moral
indifference to scandal in the community,
and his outright defiance of established
norms.
 All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the
integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.
 Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED.
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant, vs. ATTYS.
ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
 Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-
affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for
disbarment against the respondents Atty.
Garrido and Atty. Valencia before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with
gross immorality.
 Maelotisea Sipin Garrido is the legal wife of
Atty. Angel E. Garrido.
 During her light moments with our children,
one of her daughters, Madeleine confided to
her that sometime on the later part of 1987,
an unknown caller talked with her claiming
that the former is a child of her husband.
 May Elizabeth, also one of her daughters
told her that sometime on August 1990, she
saw her husband strolling at the Robinson’s
Department Store at Ermita, Manila
together with a woman and a child who was
later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively.
 She did not stop from unearthing the truth
until she was able to secure the Certificate
of Live Birth of the child, stating among
others that the said child is their daughter
and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and
22
Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were
married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
 On June 1993, her husband left their
conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence.
 Since he left their conjugal home he failed
and still failing to give them their needed
financial support to the prejudice of their
children who stopped schooling because of
financial constraints.
 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges
and imputations.
 By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was
already married to Constancia David
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea.
 He claimed he married Maelotisea after he
and Constancia parted ways. He further
alleged that Maelotisea knew all his
escapades and understood his "bad boy"
image before she married him in 1962.
 Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his
marriages were contracted before he
became a member of the bar on May 11,
1979, with the third marriage contracted
after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977.
 Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were
born before he became a lawyer.
 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the
mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that
Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido since the marriage between them
was void from the beginning due to the then
existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia.
 Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew
of the romantic relationship between her
and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and
Atty. Valencia) met in 1978.
 Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his
second family.
 Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was
not a proper party to this suit because of her
silence; she kept silent when things were
favorable and beneficial to her. Atty.

Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no
cause of action against her.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Garido and Atty. Valencia should
be disbarred
HELD:
 YES.
As to Atty. Garido:
 Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with
procedure – such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this
case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant –
do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.
 The time that elapsed between the immoral
acts charged and the filing of the complaint
is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he
applied for admission to the practice of law,
and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession.
 In light of the public service character of the
practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot
have the effect of discontinuing or abating
the disbarment proceedings.
 Immoral conduct involves acts that are
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the
community.
 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency.
 The undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral
conduct that warrants his disbarment.
 His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the
highest degree.
23
 Atty. Garrido admitted that he left
Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had
romantic relationships with other women.
 He had the gall to represent to this Court
that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of
law are not mutually exclusive.
 Second, he misrepresented himself to
Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he
was already married to Constancia.
 This was a misrepresentation given as an
excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited
relationship.
 Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second
marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding
the subsistence of his first marriage.
 Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-
marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without
taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the
two women he took as wives and on his six
(6) children by his second marriage.
 Fifth, instead of making legal amends to
validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon
the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia who bore him a
daughter.
 Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal
knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia
(who was not then a lawyer) that he was
free to marry, considering that his marriage
with Maelotisea was not "valid."
 Seventh, as the evidence on record implies,
Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
 Eighth, after admission to the practice of
law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited
and had sexual relations with two (2) women
who at one point were both his wedded
wives. He also led a double life with two (2)
families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.
 Garrido committed multiple violations
relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his

lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the
profession.
 He did not possess the good moral character
required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar.
 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath,28
Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of
the land.
 In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the
crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with
Constancia was subsisting.
 He violated ethical rules of the profession,
specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he "shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which
demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides
that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal
profession."
As to Atty. Valencia
 Atty. Valencia should be administratively
liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality.
 The contention of respondent that they
were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978
when they got married shall not afford them
exemption from sanctions, for good moral
character is required as a condition
precedent to admission to the Bar.
 As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she
was under the moral duty to give him proper
advice; instead, she entered into a romantic
relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages.
 These circumstances, to our mind, support
the conclusion that she lacked good moral
24
character; even without being a lawyer, a
person possessed of high moral values,
whose confidential advice was sought by
another with respect to the latter’s family
problems, would not aggravate the situation
by entering into a romantic liaison with the
person seeking advice, thereby effectively
alienating the other person’s feelings and
affection from his wife and family.
 Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a
man who, in all appearances, was married to
another and with whom he has a family.
 Her actions were also unprincipled and
reprehensible to a high degree; as the
confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on
his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic
relationship with him during the subsistence
of his two previous marriages.
 We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned
the dignity of and discredited the legal
profession.
 She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA
FACTS:
 Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 133, requested the Court
Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo,
for authority to appear as pro bono counsel
of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladag for
Falsification of Public Document pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 40.
 Respondent admitted that he had appeared
in the said criminal case without prior
authorization.
 He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case
compelled him to handle the defense of his
cousin who did not have enough resources

to hire the services of a counsel de parte;
while, on the other hand, private
complainant was a member of a powerful
family who was out to get even with his
cousin.
 Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not
prejudice his office nor the interest of the
public since he did not take advantage of his
position.
 In any case, his appearances in court were
covered by leave applications approved by
the presiding judge.
 The Court issued a Resolution denying
respondent's request for authorization to
appear as counsel and directing the Office of
the Court Administrator to file formal
charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the
Court.
 Because of their close relationship, Ms.
Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice
when she was charged in the criminal case
for falsification by the private complainant,
Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in
filing the said criminal case was to "seek
vengeance" on her cousin.
 He explained that his cousin's discord with
Ms. Andres started when the latter's
husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the
conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga.
 Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the
private practice of their profession.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Ladaga engaged in prohibited
“private practice”
HELD:
 NO but REPRIMANDED
 It should be clarified that "private practice"
of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited,
does not pertain to an isolated court
appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature
25
habitually or customarily holding one's self
to the public as a lawyer.
 We believe that the isolated appearance of
City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice, within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules.
 Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind.
 In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise.
 Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services.
 The appearance as counsel on one occasion,
is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law.
 Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated
court appearances did not amount to a
private practice of law, he failed to obtain a
written permission therefor from the head
of the Department, which is this Court as
required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules
Sec 12. No officer or
employee shall engage
directly in any private
business, vocation, or
profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a
written permission from the
head of the Department:
Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute
in the case of those officers
and employees whose
duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time
be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee
is granted permission to
engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of

office hours should be fixed
by the agency to the end
that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And
provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in
the case of investments,
made by an officer or
employee, which do not
involve real or apparent
conflict between his private
interests and public duties,
or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take
part in the management of
the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of
directors.
 Respondent entered his appearance and
attended court proceedings on numerous
occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18,
1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as
borne out by his own admission.
 It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in
court.
 However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the
court to which respondent is assigned is not
the head of the Department contemplated
by law.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO
MINA, Respondent
FACTS:
 Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a
formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.
 The petitioner, describing himself as a third
year law student, justifies his appearance as
26
private prosecutor on the bases of Section
34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
 The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of
the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to
be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
 However, the MeTC denied permission for
petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law
Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.
 The courts a quo held that the Law Student
Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
petitioner, as a law student, from entering
his appearance in behalf of his father, the
private complainant in the criminal case
without the supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a law student, may
appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party litigant
HELD:
 YES
 In Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar
Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law
student appears before an inferior court,
where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer.
 Section 34, Rule 138 provides: By whom
litigation is conducted. - In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his

appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
 Thus, a law student may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the
bar.
 The phrase "In the court of a justice of the
peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34
of Rule 138.
 Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance
before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is
a law student.
 As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730,
by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of
a lawyer before inferior courts.
15. REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR.,
vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD
BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR.,
AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA,
FACTS
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a GOCC, hired
respondent Atty. Ignes as private legal counsel for
one (1) year. The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the COA gave their
consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes.
However, controversy later erupted when two (2)
different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Peña
board and Yaphockun board, laid claim as the
legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Peña board also
adopted a Resolution appointing respondents Atty.
Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Mann as private collaborating
counsels, under the direct supervision and control of
Atty. Ignes.
27
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, the 3 counsels
filed a case for Indirect Contempt of Court and a Civil
Case for Injunction and Damages .
On February 16, 2007, the OGCC approved the
retainership contract of Atty. Cuanan as new legal
counsel of KWD and stated that the retainership
contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14,
2007.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD
without legal authority in filing the aforesaid cases,
complainants filed a disbarment complaint11 against
the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. They likewise stated in their position
paper12 that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD
even after the OGCC had confirmed the expiration of
his contract.
In his defense,14 Atty. Mann stated that he and his
fellow respondents can validly represent KWD until
April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of
his contract’s pre-termination. Atty. Mann also
stated that he stopped representing KWD after April
17, 2007 in deference to the OGCC’s stand. Attys.
Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Mann’s
defense.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack
of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held that
Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for
one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he
was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract
when he filed the aforesaid pleadings.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that they
be fined ₱5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a
party without authority to do so. The Investigating
Commissioner found that they failed to secure the
conformity of the OGCC and COA to their
engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed
the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of
merit.
ISSUE

WON the 3 counsels acted with authority when they
filed the aforesaid 2 cases. ATTYS. VIAJAR, JR. AND
MANN HAD NO AUTHORITY TO FILE THE
AFORESAID CASES.
RULING
At the outset, we note that the parties do not
dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity if a
GOCC hires private lawyers.
Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the OGCC
which shall act as the principal law office of all
GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No.
9,19 issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998,
enjoins GOCCs to refrain from hiring private lawyers
or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters.
But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional
cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of
the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
Counsel, as the case may be, and the written
concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before
the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law
firm.
In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel
Corporation, we listed three (3) indispensable
conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer:
(1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional
cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General
or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA
must also be secured.
Based on the foregoing, we find that Attys. Viajar, Jr.
and Mann had no valid authority to appear as
collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24
and Civil Case No. 1799.
That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-
termination of his own retainership contract cannot
validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua,
Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as
counsel of KWD without authority, after his
authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC
28
and COA approved his retainership contract for one
(1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we
assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-
termination of his contract, the records still disprove
his claim that he stopped representing KWD after
April 17, 2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified
manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP on
March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript
of stenographic notes22 in Civil Case No. 1799 taken
on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the
extremely urgent motion for the immediate return
of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano
Office.
The following circumstances convince us that
respondents willfully and deliberately appeared as
counsels of KWD without authority. They presented
themselves voluntarily, on their own volition, as
counsels of KWD even if they had no valid authority
to do so.
Consequently, for respondents’ willful appearance as
counsels of KWD without authority to do so, there is
a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against
them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution,
and should be imposed only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting
the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe such as a
reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the
end desired.

WHEREFORE, Respondents Attys. Ignes, Mann,
Viajar, Jr., and Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully
appearing as attorneys for a party to a case without
authority to do so and FINED ₱5,000 each. They are
STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
16. SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA
PADILLA AGBULOS,
vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA
G. GARCIA,
FACTS
Respondents, Nicasio Gutierrez, et al, through their
counsel, Atty. Magbitang, filed with the RTC a
complaint against petitioners, spouses Agbulos, for
declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of
title, reconveyance and damages.
The complaint alleged that respondents inherited
from their father, Maximo, an eight-hectare parcel
of land.
Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in
making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a
Deed of Sale on July 1978 when, in truth, he died on
April 1977.
In their defense, petitioners averred that
respondents were not the real parties in interest,
that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before
a notary public, that they were possessors in good
faith, and that the action had prescribed.
The RTC granted the petitioners’ motion and
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the
subject property was under the CARP, some portions
of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there
was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal. The records
reveal that respondent Garcia wrote a letter to
Judge Bernardo stating that there was no formal
29
agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they
would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of
the plaintiffs was still in America.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Magbitang was authorized to file such
notice of appeal before the RTC. YES.
RULING
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial
court is presumed to represent such client before
the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates
this presumption.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the
RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw
Atty. Magbitang’s authority to represent
respondents in the case. The letter merely stated
that there was, as yet, no agreement that they
would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an
attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the
date of the lawyer’s first appearance and validates
the action taken by him. Implied ratification may
take various forms, such as by silence or
acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of
benefits flowing therefrom. Respondents’ silence or
lack of remonstration when the case was finally
elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced
to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client
with competence and diligence."12 Consequently, a
lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.13 In
light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitang’s act of filing
the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients
to direct him to do so was understandable, if not
commendable.
17. FELIMON MANANGAN
vs.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA,
BRANCH 28,
FACTS
Petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was
appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in
Region II.
A criminal case was filed against him. And an Order
of Arrest was also issued.
The records in the Criminal shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only
an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the
person charged in Criminal Case No.
639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a
lawyer who died in the vicinity of his
residence where he and his driver
died on the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real
Filemon Manangan and knowing
about the latter's death, assumed
the name, qualifications and other
personal circumstances of Filemon
Manangan. By means thereof, he
was able to pass himself off as a
lawyer and to actually practice law,
using even the Certificate of
Admission to the Philippine Bar of
Filemon Manangan which states that
he was admitted to the Bar on
March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres
M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining
a position as legal Officer I in the
Bureau of Lands.
Thus, the OSG recommends that he be punished for
contempt of court.
Petitioner filed before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ
of Preliminary Injunction but the petition was
dismissed for non-payment of legal fees.
30
On the dates set for preliminary investigation,
petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared
for about a year.
A Second Amended Information was filed, this time
Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag
(alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
About a year after, petitioner surfaced and, through
counsel, posted a bailbond.
Then, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss
the Criminal Case on the ground that the accused
had already died such that respondent Court had not
acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Judge Catral refused to declare the case closed and
terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive, in
fact he posted his bailbond.
ISSUE
WON
RULING
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a
fictitious person, having been born out of the lawful
wedlock of Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis;
and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to
charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on
the ground of prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of
basis. As the Solicitor General had disclosed, Andres
Culanag filed a Special Proceedng for the change of
his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon
Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real
name is Andres Culanag; that his entire school
records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and
that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the
latter being his real name. The impersonation was
carried to the extreme when, in petitioner's
Manifestation, his supposed heirs alleged that
accused had died before the filing of the
Information, the exact date of death of the real
Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also
masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M.

Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection
with the Criminal Case.
Further, it was additionally pointed out that
petitioner had also committed impersonation when
he represented himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan,
and filed a petition with this Court praying that his
right to practice law be affirmed. In those cases, we
ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really
Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the
petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt
for filing the two false petitions.
He explained that "he thought this Court would not
discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he
apologizes to the Court promising that he would not
commit the same act if he is excused and given
another chance."
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar
Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres
Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar
Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs.
Andres Culanag" wherein, this Court Resolved "to
direct that petitioner be subjected to mental
examination by a doctor from the National Mental
Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering
from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates
somewhat petitioner's present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the
foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to
claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon
Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for
more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently
heard, amply establishes that petitioner Filemon
Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued
fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper
conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct,
degrade, and make a mockery of the administration
of justice.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is
apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this
day.
31
18. DANIEL LEMOINE
vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR.
FACTS
Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified
complaint against respondent Atty. Balon, Jr., for
estafa and misconduct before IBP.
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim
with Metropolitan Insurance, the insurer of his
vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered
problems, he engaged respondent’s services.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding
attorney’s fees does not bear complainant’s
conformity, he not having agreed therewith.
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally
offered to settle complainant’s claim.
A day or a few days before he left for France,5 he
signed an already prepared undated Special Power
of Attorney authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to
bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for
the satisfaction of complainant’s claim.
Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check
which was received by respondent.
When complainant returned to the, Garcia echoed
to complainant what respondent had written him
that the claim was still pending and that it was still
subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan
Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00.
On complainant’s personal visit to the office of
Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed that his
claim had long been settled.
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a
letter12 wherein he acknowledged having in his
possession the proceeds of the encashed check
which he retained, however, as attorney’s lien
pending complainant’s payment of his attorney’s
fee.
As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to
turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to

acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorney’s
fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the
administrative action at bar.
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent asserted that his
continued retention of the proceeds of
complainant’s claim is in lawful exercise of his lien
for unpaid attorney’s fees. He expressed readiness,
however, to account for and turn them over once he
got paid, citing the so called contingent fee billing
method of "no cure, no pay" adopted by practicing
lawyers in the insurance industry, which to him was
justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract
between him and complainant, the latter having
rejected respondent’s letter-proposal.
ISSUE
WON Atty Balon was justified in withholding the the
proceeds of the insurance claim. NO.
RULING
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that he may come to
possess.
This commandment entails certain specific acts to be
done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of
all money or property received for or from the
client36 as well as delivery of the funds or property to
the client when due or upon demand.37
Respondent breached this Canon when after he
received the proceeds of complainant’s insurance
claim, he did not report it to complainant.
By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the
funds he received and held for the benefit of his
client, he committed professional misconduct.38 Such
misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for
it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of
complainant who was kept in the dark about the
release of the check, until he himself discovered the
same, and has to date been deprived of the use of
the proceeds thereof.
32
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his
dealings with his client not only violates his duty of
fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client’s cause but
also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name
of an honorable profession.39
That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds
for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him of his duty
to account for it.40 The lawyer’s continuing exercise
of his retaining lien presupposes that the client
agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be
charged. In case of disagreement or when the client
contests that amount for being unconscionable,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the
funds in his possession to the payment of his
fees.41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the
necessary action or proper motion with the proper
court to fix the amount of such fees.42
As for respondent’s claim that he had on several
occasions already delivered substantial portion out
of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for
complainant, this does not persuade, for it is bereft
of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to
believe that a lawyer like respondent could have
entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia
without documenting it, especially at a time when,
as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in
good terms.
It bears noting that for close to five long years
respondent has been in possession of complainant’s
funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The
deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until
its discovery by complainant after about a year, his
receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody
thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his
lack of good moral character. Worse, by
respondent’s turnaround in his Supplement to his
Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to
complainant’s friend Garcia the amount of which, so
respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled
to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing
more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible
position is tantamount to a refusal to remit
complainant’s funds, and gives rise to the conclusion
that he has misappropriated them.45

In fine, by respondent’s questioned acts, he has
shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of
the noble profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Balon, Jr., is found
GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct
in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is
hereby DISBARRED.
20. JORGE MONTECILLO, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO
M. GICA. Respondent
FACTS:
 As a result of an alleged slander committed by
Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the
former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a
"fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for
oral defamation against Montecillo and a case
for damages arising from the same incident.
 Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case and in
Civil Case, the Cebu City Court found that
Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid".
 Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the
City Court of Cebu but the Court of First Instance
upheld the decision of the City Court.
 The case was then elevated to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review by petitioner
Francisco M. Gica.
 The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner
Gica on the ground that the preponderance of
evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on
the principle that positive must prevail over the
negative evidence, and that "some words must
have come from Montecillo's lips that were
insulting to Gica".
 It is from this point that trouble began for
respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as
counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a
reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision
with a veiled threat by mentioning the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
"Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and
"judgment rendered through negligence", and
the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed
itself to be deceived.
33
 Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second
motion for reconsideration, filed without leave
of court, made another threat by stating that
"with almost all penal violations placed under
the jurisdiction of the President of the
Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and
205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in
Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of
martial law, the next appeal that will he
interposed, will be to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines."
 This Resolution of the Appellate Court fittingly
concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty
of contempt and condemned to pay a fine and
ordered suspended from the practice of law and
pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139.
 Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already
done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola,
Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices
for damages in Civil Case of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for
their decision.
 This is the undeniable indication that respondent
del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices
of the Appellate Court but he actually carried
out his threat, although he did not succeed in
making them change their minds in the case
they decided in accordance with the exercise of
their judicial discretion emanating from pure
conviction.
 Respondent filed an additional explanation with
this Court, wherein he stated, among other
things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are
rampant in and outside of the Government. It is
this state of things that convinced me that all
human efforts to correct and/or reform the said
evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies."
ISSUE: WON Atty. Del Mar is guilty of misconduct
HELD:
 YES
 To aged brethren of the bar it may appear
belated to remind them that second only to the

duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty
of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers
 A lawyer must always remember that he is an
officer of the court exercising a high privilege
and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.
 It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude.
 As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the court to which
he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken.
 Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
 It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant
respect for the two highest Courts of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment.
 In short, his allegation is that they acted with
intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of
the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
 He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for
law and justice as justification for his
contemptuous statements without realizing that,
in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is
merely pursuing his own personal concept of law
and justice.
 He seems not to comprehend that what to him
may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds
of others. He could not accept that what to him
may appear to be right or correct may be wrong
or erroneous from the viewpoint of another.
 For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with
supposed physical and mental ailments at that,
who dares to challenge the integrity and honor
of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
We have nothing but commiseration and
sympathy for his choosing to close the book of
his long years of law practice not by voluntary
retirement with honor but in disciplinary action
with ignominy and dishonor.
34
 To those who are in the practice of law and
those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a
reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and
minds that an attorney owes it to himself to
respect the courts of justice and its officers as a
fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions.
 Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his
misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall
be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice
of law until further orders of this Court, such
suspension to take effect immediately.
21. RENE P. RAMOS, complainant, vs. MOISES R.
RADA, respondent
FACTS:
 Moises R. Rada a messenger in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, is
charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil
Service Rule XVIII, which provides, “Sec. 12. No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal
of the Government.”
 He was extended an appointment by the Avesco
Marketing Corporation, thru its president, Jimmy
Tang, as representative to manage and supervise
real properties situated in Camarines Norte
which were foreclosed by the corporation.
 Rada accepted the appointment and discharged
his duties as administrator.
 He requested permission to accept the
appointment.
 It is not indicated that his acceptance and
discharge of the duties of the position of
administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as
messenger; nor has it been shown that he did
not observe regular office hours.
ISSUE: WON Rada has violated the civil service rule

HELD:
 YES with qualifications.
 Indubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil
service rule prohibiting government employees
from engaging directly in a private business,
vocation or profession or being connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department.
 But, indubitably, also, his private business
connection has not resulted in any prejudice to
the Government service.
 Thus, his violation of the rule — the lack of prior
permission is a technical one, and he should be
meted no more than the minimum imposable
penalty, which is reprimand.
 The duties of messenger Rada are generally
ministerial which do not require that his entire
day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the
Government.
 Such being his situation, it would be to stifle his
willingness to apply himself to a productive
endeavor to augment his income, and to award
a premium for slothfulness if he were to be
banned from engaging in or being connected
with a private undertaking outside of office
hours and without foreseeable detriment to the
Government service.
 His connection with Avesco Marketing
Corporation need not be terminated, but he
must secure a written permission from the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, who is hereby authorized to
grant or revoke such permission, under such
terms and conditions as will safeguard the best
interests of the service, in general, and the
court, in particular.
 ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Moises R. Rada is
adjudged guilty of a technical violation of Section
12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, for which he is
hereby reprimanded.
 He may however apply, if he so desires, for
permission to resume his business connection
with the corporation, in the manner above
indicated.
22. HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
35
FACTS:
 This is a complaint for disbarment filed by
Herminio R. Noriega against Atty. Emmanuel R.
Sison (admitted to the Bar on March 31, 1976)
on the ground of malpractice through gross
misrepresentation and falsification.
 Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent
Sison is a regular and permanent employee of
the SEC as a Hearing Officer and as such, "is
mandated to observe strictly the civil service
rules and regulations, more particularly ... the
prohibition of government employees to
practice their professions."
 That to circumvent the prohibition and to evade
the law, respondent assumed a different name,
falsified his Identity and represented himself to
be one "Atty. Manuel Sison", with offices at No.
605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, "at the times
that he will handle private cases."
 That under his said assumed name, respondent
is representing one Juan Sacquing, the
defendant in a case before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, submitting
pleadings therein signed by him respondent
under his assumed name, despite his full
knowledge That "Manuel Sison" is not a member
of the Bar and that his acts in doing so are illegal
and unlawful.
Contentions of Atty. Sison:
 He attached thereto a copy of the written
authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Associate
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, for him to appear as counsel of
Juan Sacquing, a close family friend, in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
 That he provided legal services to Sacquing in
view of close family friendship and for free.
 That he never represented himself deliberately
and intentionally as "Atty. Manuel Sison" in the
Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his
appearance, he always signed the minutes as
"Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison", and in one instance,
he even made the necessary correction when
the court staff wrote his name as “Atty Manuel
Sison."
 That due to the "inept and careless work of the
clerical staff of the JDRC", notices were sent to

"Atty. Manuel Sison", at 605 EDSA, Cubao,
Quezon City, where respondent's parents
conduct a printing office and establishment,
which notices were honored by the personnel of
said office as respondent's family has called
respondent by the nickname "Manuel."
ISSUE: WON Atty. Sison should be disbarred
HELD:
 NO
 We hold that the allegations in the complaint do
not warrant disbarment of the respondent.
 There is no evidence that the respondent has
committed an act constituting deceit, immoral
conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or
corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney
to a part to a case without attorney to do so.
 There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules
and Regulations for his appearance as counsel
for the defendant in the JDRC Case was with
authority given by the Associate Commisioner Of
SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.
 It being an isolated case, the same does not
constitute the practice of law, more so since
respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for
his appearance because respondent and
defendant therein were close family friends.
 Such act of the respondent in going out of his
way to aid as counsel to a close family friend
should not be allowed to be used as an
instrument of harrassment against respondent.
 While it may be True that subsequent errors
were made in sending notices to him under the
name "Atty. Manuel Sison, ' the errors were
attributable to the JDRC clerical staff and not to
the respondent.
 At most, this Court would only counsel the
respondent to be more careful and cautious in
signing his name so as to avoid unnecessary
confusion as regards his Identity.
23. RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent
FACTS:
36
 This is a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for
defying the prohibition against private practice
of law while working as government prosecutor.
 Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992.
 Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat
filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus
Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago."
 Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
 Complainant now charges respondent with the
following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
 Complainant contends that respondent
is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations
of Taggat very well.
2. 2. Engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor
 Complainant also contends that
respondent is guilty of engaging in the
private practice of law while working as
a government prosecutor.
 Respondent claims that when the criminal
complaint was filed, respondent had resigned
from Taggat for more than five years.
 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his
undivided loyalty to Taggat.
 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.
 Respondent contends that complainant failed to
establish lack of impartiality when he performed
his duty.
 Respondent points out that complainant did not
file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing
the criminal complaint but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-
affidavit without mental reservation.

 Respondent also asserts that no conflicting
interests exist because he was not representing
Taggat employees or complainant.
 Respondent claims he was merely performing his
official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
 Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after
his appointment as government prosecutor, of
retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in
1996.
 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for
his consultancy services and not for
representation.
 Respondent submits that consultation is not the
same as representation and that rendering
consultancy services is not prohibited.
ISSUE: Whether being a former lawyer of Taggat
conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor
HELD:
 NO
 The Court exonerates respondent from the
charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct.
 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when
he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713.
 Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official duties."
 A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests."
 Exception: The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no
conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-
client relationship exists.
 Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate
the claim that respondent represented
conflicting interests.
37
 In the present case, we find no conflict of
interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997.
 The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to
non-payment of wages that occurred from 1
April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
 Clearly, respondent was no longer connected
with Taggat during that period since he resigned
sometime in 1992.
 The fact alone that respondent was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat and the case he resolved as government
prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient
basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests.
 A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the
client.
 The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests
only on matters that he previously handled for
the former client and not for matters that arose
after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.
 Respondent engaged in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor.
 Respondent argues that he only rendered
consultancy services to Taggat intermittently
and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat
from 1995 to 1996 as alleged.
 This argument is without merit because the law
does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement.
 Respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
 Respondent’s admission that he received from
Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
 Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for
government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is
suspension for six months and one day to one
year.

24. DAN JOEL V. LIM* and RICHARD C. TAN,
complainants, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA,
respondent.
FACTS:
 Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan,1 both
businessmen, filed a complaint for alleged
robbery or extortion and violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Atty.
Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerly employed
with the NLRC.
 Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week
of August 2000, respondent phoned him and
introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of the
Public Assistance Center, NLRC.
 Respondent informed him that his employees
filed a labor complaint against him in his office
and it was necessary for him to see and talk with
respondent.
 Respondent visited him in his office and told him
to settle the case or else his business, Top Gun
Billiards, would be shut down.
 Ditan and Ubante confirmed the filing of their
complaint against their employer, Lim, and that
after some dialogue, the aforenamed employees
executed an affidavit withdrawing their
complaint.
 According to Ditan and Ubante, they met the
respondent in Top Gun Billiards where the latter
often played billiards. One day, respondent gave
them a letter and asked them to sign it.
 Since they were busy at that time, they signed it
without reading and understanding its contents.
 Despite such withdrawal, respondent still called
Lim threatening the latter that he would pursue
the case, have his establishment closed and he
would be jailed if he did not come up with
P20,000.00 as settlement.
 Complainant Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing
Glass Supply said that sometime during the last
week of July, respondent called him, introduced
himself and informed him that one of his
employees filed an illegal dismissal case against
him.
 He remembered that before respondent's call,
he had suspended an employee, Bryan Tellen,
for leaving his workplace without permission.
38
 Before Tan sent his accountant, Ditas Guitierrez,
to respondent's office to represent him, he told
her to bring a copy of Tellen's suspension letter
and to inform respondent that Tellen had not
been dismissed.
 When Guitierrez returned, she told him that
respondent wanted him to pay his employee.
 She added that respondent did not give her any
copy of a formal complaint on the alleged illegal
dismissal.
 Complainant Tan added that when he gave
respondent the money, the latter promised to
take care of the illegal dismissal complaint.
 Respondent went to him a third time and asked
for an additional P10,000.00 allegedly for his
employee, Tellen, since the P15,000.00 Tan gave
earlier was for respondent only.
 Complainant Lim personally submitted a letter to
the NBI requesting the NBI to investigate
respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.
 According to the NBI report, after due
investigation, it decided to conduct an
entrapment operation.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct and should be disbarred
HELD:
 YES
 Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible
public office.
 Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. Extortion by a government lawyer, an
outright violation of the law, calls for the
corresponding grave sanctions.
 With the aforesaid rule a high standard of
integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as
compared to a private practitioner because the
delinquency of a government lawyer erodes the
people's trust and confidence in the
government.
 Noteworthy, as an Attorney IV and Chief of the
Public Assistance Center of the NLRC,
respondent failed to observe prudence by
hanging out and playing in the billiard hall.
 39

 Time and again, we have declared that the turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
practice of law is a noble profession. willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
 It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
who are competent intellectually, academically party without authority.
and morally.
 A lawyer must at all times conduct himself,
especially in his dealings with his clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.
 He must faithfully perform his duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
 A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative
sanctions which includes suspension and
disbarment.
 More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement
to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice;
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.
 Indeed, the primary objective of administrative
cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers, but also
to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard
of the lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them
as members of the bar.
 These pronouncements gain practical
significance in this case, considering that
respondent is a senior lawyer of the NLRC.
 As a lawyer, who was also a public officer,
respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal
profession.
 Respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona is found
administratively guilty of corrupt activity, deceit,
and gross misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED.

Nota bene:

The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an

attorney are: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral