CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA,Petitioner, G.R. No.

170251

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

EMELITA BERNARDO, EVELYN BERNARDO as Promulgated:

Guardian of Erlyn, Crislyn and Crisanto Bernardo,*
June 1, 2011
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674.

The antecedents are as follows:

Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for
interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters. The complaint was
docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-221.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their predecessor-in-interest,
Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo. The parcel of land was later on
covered by Tax Declaration No. CD-006-0828 under the name of the respondents.

Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject property consisting of about 700
square meters was bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon
the death of Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter lot.

The COSLAP, in a Resolution[3] dated December 6, 1999, ruled that respondents have a rightful claim
over the subject property. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration and/or reopening of the
proceedings was filed by Alfredo. The COSLAP, in an Order[4] dated August 21, 2002, denied the motion
and reiterated its Order dated December 6, 1999. Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the
surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.[5] The CA, Twelfth Division, in its
Decision dated April 28, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the COSLAP. The CA
ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction
before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the proceedings before the said body. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.

Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, with the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT COSLAP HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF A TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONER'S HUSBAND IN
2002 RENDERED THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[6]

Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle and decide the question of
ownership over the subject land. Further, the present case cannot be classified as explosive in nature as
the parties never resorted to violence in resolving the controversy. Petitioner submits that it is the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject
property.

Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the present case.
Further, respondents argued that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
by reason of laches due to Alfredo's active participation in the actual proceedings before the COSLAP.
Respondents said that Alfredo's filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening of the
proceedings before the COSLAP is indicative of his conformity with the questioned resolution of the
COSLAP.

The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of
ownership between the parties.

The petition is meritorious.

The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established as a means of providing a
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and
members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.

Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its
adjudicatory functions:

Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. [7]

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. [8] Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP
has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to
the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and
explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or
emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the
COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the
nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent
injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the
COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.[9]

In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents'
complaint. The present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3,
paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive in
nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires
immediate action.

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency,
over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations
therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant
is entitled to any or all such reliefs.[10]

Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject
property, which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein,[11] the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts
depending on the assessed value of the subject property. [12]

The case of Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, [13] applied by the CA and invoked
by the respondents, is inapplicable to the present case. Banaga involved parties with conflicting free
patent applications over a parcel of public land and pending with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the
Bureau of Land's inaction within a considerable period of time on the claims and protests of the parties
and to conduct an investigation, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction and resolved the conflicting claims of
the parties. The Court held that since the dispute involved a parcel of public land on a free patent issue,
the COSLAP had jurisdiction over that case. In the present case, there is no showing that the parties
have conflicting free patent applications over the subject parcel of land that would justify the exercise of
the COSLAP's jurisdiction.

Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision
rendered, are null and void.[14] A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It
cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation. [15] All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect.[16] Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it
would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the
proceedings.[17]

Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by
reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue,
because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.[18] The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not
estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction
must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.[19]

In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for
the Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to apply, thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by
laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that
is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of
the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction
of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits.
It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction.[22]

The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the
application of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. [23]

Anent the issuance of OCT No. M-10991 in favor of petitioners husband Alfredo Herrerra in 2002,
respondents alleged that there was fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith in the issuance thereof. Thus,
respondents are now questioning the legality of OCT No. M-10991, an issue which this Court cannot
pass upon in this present petition. It is a rule that the validity of a Torrens title cannot be assailed
collaterally.[24] Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:

Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. − A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings before this Court as said
title was issued in the name of petitioner's husband only during the pendency of the appeal before the
CA. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for that purpose[25] and the present appeal before us, is simply not the
direct proceeding contemplated by law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
April 28, 2005 and October 17, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, dated December
6, 1999 and August 21, 2002, respectively, in COSLAP Case No. 99-221, are declared NULL and VOID for
having been issued without jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

JOAQUIN GA, JR., JUDITH GA G.R. No. 182185

GADNANAN and JESUSA GA

ESMAA,

Petitioners, Present:

Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Chico-Nazario,

Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura, and

Peralta, JJ.

SPOUSES ANTONIO TUBUNGAN

AND ROSALINDA TUBUNGAN Promulgated:

and NORBERTO GA,

Respondents. September 18, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated February
22, 2007 in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 00779, which set aside the Order dated November 20, 2000 and the Writ
of Demolition dated May 19, 2004 of the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in
COSLAP Case No. IL-00-06-085 for having been issued without jurisdiction. Also assailed is the February
21, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

Sometime in 1985, petitioner Joaquin Ga, Jr. filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Ownership
of a parcel of land, known as Assessors Lot No. 117, against respondent Norberto Ga before the
COSLAP. The complaint was subsequently re-filed on February 23, 2000 by petitioner Joaquins
daughters, Girlie and Grecilda Ga, and was docketed as COSLAP Case No. IL-00-06-085.

On November 20, 2000, the COSLAP rendered judgment declaring petitioner Joaquin and his heirs as the
lawful owners of the disputed lot.[2] Respondent Norberto moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied by COSLAP in an Order dated June 14, 2001.

On June 14, 2002, respondent Norberto, together with respondents Antonio and Rosalinda Tubungan,
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Preliminary Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order[3] before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, San
Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 0223. The petition assailed the validity
of the COSLAP decision and sought to enjoin the implementation of writs of execution [4] and
demolition[5] issued by the COSLAP pursuant to said judgment.

On March 3, 2005, the trial court issued an order[6] dismissing Civil Case No. 0223. It held that it had no
jurisdiction to nullify the COSLAP decision, as the same would be an interference with a co-equal and
coordinate body.[7] Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court
per Order dated April 18, 2005.[8]

Consequently, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial
courts order of dismissal. On February 22, 2007, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed
Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order dated November 20, 2000 and the Writ of
Demolition dated May 19, 2004, of the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems is hereby SET
ASIDE. Further, the respondent commission is hereby ordered to DISMISS COSLAP Case No. IL-00-06-085
for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The appellate court noted that respondents erred in filing a petition for certiorari before the trial court
when they assailed the validity of the COSLAP. According to the appellate court, respondents should
have directly filed the petition with the Court of Appeals, and not the trial court, in accordance with the
Courts decision in Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems.[10]Nevertheless, the appellate
court held that suspension of the rules on appeal was warranted, considering that the determination of
respondents substantive rights over the disputed lot far outweighs any procedural lapse that may have
been committed.[11]
Moreover, the appellate court held that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint filed by petitioners. Citing Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems,[12] it held that COSLAPs jurisdiction over land disputes is limited only to
those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license or grant from the government. In this
case, the records do not show that the parcel of land subject of petitioners complaint is public
land. Thus, the determination of which party was entitled to ownership and possession of said lot
belonged to the regular courts and not the COSLAP.[13]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution[14] dated February 21, 2008.

Hence, this petition raising the sole issue of whether the appellate court erred in relaxing the rules on
appeal considering its findings that respondents failed to avail of the proper remedy before the
appropriate court from the adverse decision of the COSLAP. Due to respondents procedural lapse,
petitioners contend that the COSLAP decision had become final and executory and that the Court of
Appeals should have dismissed respondents petition outright.

We find no reversible error in the assailed decision.

In Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[15] the Court held that all appeals from orders,
resolutions or decisions of the COSLAP should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. If a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy due to grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction, the same should also be brought to the Court of Appeals, as the said
court cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this case,
respondents did not timely appeal the COSLAP decision to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43, and instead
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, although with the Regional Trial Court, a body that is co-
equal with the COSLAP. Only later did they file a petition for certiorari with the appellate court assailing
the trial courts dismissal of their petition.

We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondents remedy from the decision of the
COSLAP was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as they assailed the lack of jurisdiction of said
body over the dispute. However, the petition should have been filed before the Court of Appeals and
not the trial court. In other words, while respondents availed of the correct remedy, they sought the
same from the wrong court. This mistake would have rendered the assailed COSLAP decision final and
executory, were it not for its patent nullity and invalidity.

In National Housing Authority v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[16] we held that a
judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is
no judgment at all. Thus, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.

We also declared in the same case that such a nullity is correctible only through a petition for
certiorari. A petition for certiorari that seeks the nullification of a void judgment cannot be dismissed for
timeliness as the same does not prescribe. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without
jurisdiction is void. It can never become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question. [17]

In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners complaint. The
disputed lot was not shown to be public land and the nature of the dispute is not among those which fall
under the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Executive Order No. 561 enumerates the instances when COSLAP
may exercise adjudicatory functions, as follows:

SECTION 3. Powers and Functions.- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber

concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

x x x x.

Administrative agencies like COSLAP are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, COSLAP has
two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter
is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in
nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons
and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem.[18]

Thus, the COSLAP may resolve land disputes that involve only public lands or lands of the public domain
or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a
timber concession, or a reservation grant.[19] However, the lot subject of the instant petition was not
shown to fall under any of these categories of land and appears to be a private unregistered
land. Neither is the dispute between petitioners and respondents critical and explosive in nature nor
does it involve a large number of parties that could result to social tension and unrest. It can also hardly
be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate action.

As such, the COSLAP should have dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction or referred the
same to the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over controversies relating to ownership and
possession of private lands. The records show that respondents have consistently assailed the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP,[20] and yet, the latter ignored the matter and simply proceeded to resolve
petitioners complaint. Since the COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the land dispute between petitioners
and respondents, the judgment it rendered on the case is null and void.

As stated earlier, a void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time. It is
thus clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of respondents petition for
certiorari as the judgment of the COSLAP could not have attained finality. In other words, the failure of
respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was not fatal to
the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the Court of Appeals. The latter remedy
remained available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 22, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00779 setting aside the November 20, 2000 Order of the Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. IL-00-06-085 and the Writ of Execution dated May 19, 2004 for
having been issued without jurisdiction, and the Resolution dated February 21, 2008 denying the motion
for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141523 June 8, 2005

DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS (COSLAP), Public Respondent,
ARIEL ONDE, EUGENE C. CAASI, BIENVENIDA C. PORTUGUESE, CRESENCIANO CHING, FLORA
DIONGSON, ALEX DIONGSON, FERMIN CARAZO, ANA DELEBIOS, ROMY CARAZO, ANA DELEBIOS,
ROMY BETONIO, FELIX DELEBIOS, REMEDIOS DEJOS, ROSINI CASTILLO, PABLO CALLA, FLORIANO
LAWAN, ROMEO LUMANSOC, MERCEDITA PALBAN, FELICIDAD C. UGPAY, RUPERTO TOLEDO, DAVID
BRILLANTES, GERARDO CANCERAN, SUSANA CARAZO, PABLITO WABINGA, CLAUDIO CANCERAN,
FORTUNATA SORILLA, EXUPERIO PADILLA, ALBERT SORILLA, JEAN SORILLA, FORTUNE SORILLA,
WILFREDO SEGOVIA, PROTACIO SEGOVIA, EDUARDO SEGOVIA, EDUARDO GABOTO, SERVANDO
PADILLA, ALRINO CANCERAN, LARRY SABELEONA, ALICE C. LAGURA, IGNACIO PADILLA, LYSA
CANCERAN, CRISTITUTO BAON, AGUSTINA BUNANI, LEANDRO ABINA, MARTINO PADILLA, FRANSISCO
SANORA, MARILOU CANCERAN, AVELINO DURABAN, PRIMITIVA CANA, LILIA VELASQUEZ, CIPRIANO
GABATO, NATIVIDAD CAUTIVER, ERNESTO GABATO, SPOUSES AGAPITO and ELENOR CAPAROSO, RUEL
CAPAROSO, JOSUE A. LAYON, BRYAN CAPAROSO, and MARIA S. STA. CRUZ, Private Respondents.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order to annul the Resolution of public respondent
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 and to restrain
COSLAP from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Subject of the instant petition is a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto.
Niño, Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman
Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after
emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over the
property and subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T-162663; and
the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property subject of the instant dispute ("Cuison
property").

Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private
respondents who are members of the Sto. Niño Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private
respondents were individually issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After
compulsory acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the names of the aforesaid
organizations.
Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing" and therefore
beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint docketed as DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-
93 on September 23, 1993 with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. Named respondents were the
Regional Director for Region XI of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register of Deeds of Davao City, SNFC, ARBA
and NAMAR-FADC-KMP.1

Respondent officials therein and SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property was agricultural
as per certification issued on June 30, 1990 by the Regional Officer of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city zoning ordinance classifying the Cuison
property as "urban/urbanizing" for being without the approval of the HLURB.

Evidence presented by the Bank consisted of a certification issued by the HLURB on October 13, 1993
correcting its prior classification that the Cuison property was agricultural and a written official
classification from the Davao City Zoning Administrator stating that Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No.
363, series of 1982 categorized the Cuison property as "urban/urbanizing."

On February 7, 1994, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision finding that the Cuison property
was not agricultural land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP because as early as 1982, it
had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing."2 The Provincial Adjudicator granted the Bank’s prayer
to nullify the compulsory acquisition proceedings with respect to the Cuison property and directed the
Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel the CLOAs issued to the beneficiaries and to reinstate TCT No.
T-162664 in the name of the Bank. After reinstatement of the Bank’s title over the Cuison property,
herein petitioner Davao New Town Development Corporation acquired the property and caused the
cancellation of TCT No. T-162664 and the issuance of TCT No. T-210500 in its name. Subsequently, the
Cuison property was further subdivided into seven (7) parcels now covered by TCT Nos. T-224628 to
224634 all registered in the name of petitioner.

Respondents in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 appealed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), where petitioner intervened as the
new owner of the Cuison property. The Bank opposed the appeal docketed as DARAB Case No. 2362.

While the appeal was pending, private respondents filed an unnumbered case with the Provincial
Adjudicator against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction and the restoration of their CLOAs and of TCT No. CL-850. They alleged that while the decision
of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 was seasonably appealed, the Register
of Deeds cancelled TCT No. CL-850 and reinstated the Bank’s certificate of title to the Cuison property.
They also claimed that petitioner had introduced preliminary works on the Cuison property and was
poised to forcibly eject private respondents from the premises.3The undocketed case filed anew with
the Provincial Adjudicator was consolidated with DARAB Case No. 2362.

On May 28, 1997, the DARAB rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 2362, partially affirming the
Provincial Adjudicator’s decision in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93. The DARAB also ordered the Bank
and petitioner to solidarily pay the disturbance compensation in favor of the beneficiaries.4 In ruling that
the Cuison property was outside the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform program, the
DARAB relied on the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 as interpreted
in Natalia Realty, et al. v. DAR,5 where it was held that lands converted to non-agricultural uses by
government agencies prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law are outside the
coverage of agrarian reform. According to the DARAB, since the Cuison property had been classified by
the city government as a site for human settlements and relocation prior to June 15, 1988, the Cuison
property cannot be categorized as an agricultural land.

On July 31, 1997, petitioner filed a manifestation to bring to the DARAB’s attention the July 27, 1997
compromise agreement executed by the parties, namely: petitioner Davao New Town Development
Corporation, SNFC, ARBA, Philippine Banking Corporation, and NAMAR-FADC-KMP, and the Legal
Assistance Division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office. The compromise agreement stated, among
others, that petitioner had agreed to give the beneficiaries disturbance compensation and to process
the titling of beneficiaries’ homelots in exchange for the latter’s peaceful evacuation of the Cuison
property and non-interference with petitioner’s projects in the area.

The DARAB conducted a hearing on August 1, 1997 where the parties manifested their knowledge of
and concurrence to the import of the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement. Thus, on
August 14, 1997, the DARAB issued a Resolution6 denying private respondents’ motion for
reconsideration of the DARAB decision and considered the case closed and terminated.

On September 25, 1997, herein private respondents filed a complaint for Injunction With Prayer for
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, Damages, and Restraining Order with the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Named respondents in the complaint were herein
petitioner, the Bank, the Regional Director of the DAR, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer and the Register of Deeds of Davao City. The complaint, docketed as
DARAB Case No. XI-1382-DC-97 and hereafter referred to as "the second DARAB case," alleged that the
decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 which was affirmed by the
DARAB on appeal was null and void for failure to implead the Republic of the Philippines as the real
party-in-interest in a suit for cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic.
Private respondents also claimed that they were not made parties to the proceedings in DARAB Case No.
XI-10-12-DC-93 and to the execution of the July 27, 1997 compromise agreement. 7

During the pendency of the second DARAB case, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Davao City, Civil Case No. 26-897-98, entitled Ariel Onde, et al. v. Davao New Town
Development Corporation and Timothy Te. In an Order8 issued on February 18, 1998, Judge Jesus U.
Quitain dismissed the case on the ground of forum-shopping in view of similarity of parties, prayer,
reliefs and remedies sought in Civil Case No. 26-897-98 and in the second DARAB case which was
pending before the Provincial Adjudicator.

On December 1, 1998, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in the second DARAB case and
ordered petitioner to pay herein private respondents disturbance compensation. 9 Both parties appealed
to the DARAB, which appeal remains unresolved to date.

Herein private respondents, who are members of SNFC, again referred their complaint with another
agency, this time, COSLAP. On December 10, 1998, COSLAP issued a subpoena on petitioner directing
the latter and PBC to appear for an investigation on the case docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-343.10 At
the scheduled investigation no representative from COSLAP appeared. On January 18, 1999, COSLAP
issued another subpoena on petitioner directing the latter to appear for another investigation. 11 In light
of the opposition raised by petitioner that it was not served a written complaint, the scheduled
investigation was deferred for the second time.

Upon urgent ex-parte motion by private respondents, COSLAP issued a status quo order12 on January 14,
1999 enjoining petitioner from disturbing the peaceful possession of private respondents in the Cuison
property. Petitioner filed a motion on January 25, 1999, seeking the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction of COSLAP and the lifting of the status quo order.13 Without ruling on petitioner’s motion,
COSLAP issued an order directing the parties to submit their respective position papers. Only private
respondents complied,14 after which the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On December 21, 1999, COSLAP issued the assailed Resolution15 in COSLAP Case No. 98-343, upholding
its jurisdiction over the case and declaring the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in the second
DARAB case as not binding upon the Republic and private respondents who were not impleaded in said
case. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Directing the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title of the land subject matter of this instant case in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines;

2. Directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOA’s in the name of the Farmer beneficiaries;

3. Directing the Davao Newtown Development Corporation to peacefully turn-over the possession of the
property and to pay reasonable damages to the farmer beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.16

Hence, the instant petition.

Although the petition is captioned as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure (with prohibition and application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with
temporary restraining order) and pursuant to Section 3, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, series of 1979,
the Court shall properly treat the same as an original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules on account of the jurisdictional question raised therein and the reliefs sought.

The instant petition seeks to nullify the assailed Resolution of respondent Commission and to restrain
respondent Commission from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction and for grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 17 Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refrained from passing upon the jurisdictional questions
raised in its motion to dismiss and that respondent Commission had threatened to immediately enforce
said patently void resolution, thereby rendering petitioner without any plain, adequate and speedy
remedy in the ordinary course of law.18 When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.19
The Court is not unmindful of the explicit directive in Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems,20where it was held that appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before the
Court in view of Rule 45, Section 121 but must be elevated to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure in the same manner that orders, resolutions or decisions of other quasi-judicial
agencies are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, in view of the nullity of
the assailed Resolution, the Court may entertain the petition notwithstanding the failure of petitioner to
appeal the Resolution to the Court of Appeals. If a decision is rendered without jurisdiction and
therefore a nullity, the same may be attacked anytime.22 While certiorari as a remedy may not be used
as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the
petition is genuinely meritorious.23 The Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari although
appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted such action, mindful that
dismissals based on technicalities are looked upon with disfavor. 24

Furthermore, it is significant to note that the instant petition does not show that petitioner has filed a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution before respondent COSLAP, which is a condition
precedent in order that this petition for certiorari shall be given due course. The general rule that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public
respondent an opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. However, this rule is subject to certain
recognized exceptions.25 Where the order (or a resolution as in the case at bar), is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, or where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
have been duly raised and passed upon in the lower court, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is
not necessary for a petition for certiorari to be given due course. 26 As will be shown later, COSLAP was
totally without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. This was correctly pointed out by petitioner
even before the assailed Resolution was issued by COSLAP. To require petitioner to question COSLAP’s
jurisdiction in a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent for the filing of the instant petition
could only be an idle exercise.

Now, the core issue of whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the matter. Petitioner mainly argues
that respondent Commission was without jurisdiction in entertaining private respondents’ complaint
and in promulgating the assailed Resolution because the matter falls within the primary and exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DARAB.

A reading of private respondents’ Position Paper submitted to the COSLAP and the assailed Resolution in
relation to the laws creating the COSLAP compels the Court to declare the nullity of the COSLAP
proceedings, including the assailed Resolution which was issued in excess of its jurisdiction.

First. The dispute between petitioner and private respondents over the Cuison property is not
cognizable by COSLAP. An account of the laws creating COSLAP and its predecessor is in order.

COSLAP was created on September 21, 1979 by virtue of E.O. No. 561. Its forerunner was the
Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) founded on July 31, 1970 pursuant to E.O.
No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked "to expedite and coordinate the
investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt
bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions." It was given
the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum and to call upon any department,
office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government owned or controlled
corporations and local government units, for assistance in the performance of its functions. At that time,
the PACLAP did not exercise quasi-judicial functions.27

On March 19, 1971, E.O. No. 305 was issued reconstituting the PACLAP. Apart from its policy-making,
oversight and investigative duties, E.O. No. 305 vested the PACLAP with adjudicatory powers phrased in
broad terms, to wit:

1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative

procedures, and in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands
and lands of the public domain; [emphasis supplied]

....

Thereafter, the PACLAP was reorganized pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 832 dated November
27, 1975. The law created a Policy Body to formulate its policies and submit them for its approval and an
Executive Committee to implement its policies and be in charge of its overall operations. In the general
language of P.D. No. 832, the adjudicatory power of PACLAP was retained and impliedly vested in the
Executive Committee, thus:

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to
any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, that when the Executive Committee decides
to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and
upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof;

...

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land
disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible;

In addition, the PACLAP was authorized to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the
appearance of witnesses and the production of records, books and documents before it. 28 Notably, P.D.
No. 832 did not contain any provision for judicial review of the resolutions, orders or decisions of the
PACLAP.

On September 21, 1979, the PACLAP was abolished and its functions transferred to the present COSLAP
by virtue of E.O. No. 561. Compared to the previous enabling laws of respondent COSLAP, E.O. No. 561
enumerated the instances of COSLAP’s exercise of adjudicatory functions, as follows:

SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

...

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

The Commission shall promulgate such rules and procedures as will insure expeditious resolution and
action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing
cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be
binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution,
order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and
shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. [emphasis added]

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield
only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.29 Under the law, the COSLAP has
two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely: (a) refer the matter to the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter
is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in
nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons
and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem.30

The instances when COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or
lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a
pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant. The Cuison property is private
property, having been registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioner. Thus, the
government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. The parties claiming the Cuison property are
herein petitioner and private respondents. None of them is a squatter, patent lease agreement holder,
government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural
minority.31 The dispute between the parties was not critical and explosive in nature so as to generate
social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. 32

It is true that under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over complaints
involving "other similar land problems of grave urgency." Where general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
kind as clear as those specifically mentioned. In the instant case, the dispute is between parties claiming
to be agrarian reform beneficiaries and a private property owner over a parcel of land which does not
form part of the public domain. Clearly, the instant dispute cannot be characterized to be of the same
kind as those enumerated under paragraph 2(a) to (d) of E.O. No. 561.
In relation to this, private respondents’ complaint falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DAR.
Private respondents’ Position Paper avers that they are agricultural lessees and beneficiaries of an
agricultural land whose CLOAs have been improperly cancelled by the DAR. There is no dispute that the
issue of the validity of the cancellation of private respondents’ CLOAs is within the competence of the
DAR. As provided by Section 50 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).

The grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no
other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by the DAR.
Neither R.A. No. 6657 nor E.O. No. 561 creating the COSLAP vests the latter and the DAR concurrent
jurisdiction in respect to disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws.

Instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred private respondents’
complaint to the DAR or DARAB, where another case involving the same parties, the same property and
the same issues was pending on appeal.

COSLAP filed its own comment to the petition, arguing that to divest itself of jurisdiction over the
subject matter will defeat the purpose of its creation. 33 It cited this Court’s pronouncement in Bañaga
vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,34 which pertinently states:

. . . It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of the cases
which are "critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action. However, the use of word "may" does not mean that the COSLAP’s
jurisdiction is merely confined to the above-mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive Order
are clear that COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more effective mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among
settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished
PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and resolve
land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it. 35

The abovementioned proviso, which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer
upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to
disputes over lands in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land
dispute in Bañaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was within the
authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the
DAR.

COSLAP also points out that by petitioner’s own admission in its motion to dismiss, the Cuison property
is not agricultural land covered by agrarian reform laws; thus, COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute.

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. It is conferred by
law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the averments of
the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer.36 Thus, it is the allegations in private
respondents’ complaint questioning the validity of the cancellation of their CLOAs which effectively
characterized the dispute to be within the competence of the DAR to the exclusion of respondent
COSLAP.

Second. COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial Adjudicator or any
other quasi-judicial agency for that matter. In their Position Paper, private respondents questioned the
validity of the DARAB and the Provincial Adjudicator’s order of cancellation of private respondents’
CLOAs and of the government’s certificate of title over the Cuison property on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines was not impleaded in those cases. Private respondents’ recourse from the
decision of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362, affirming the Provincial Adjudicator’s order of
cancellation of the compulsory acquisition proceedings, is to appeal the decision of the DARAB to the
Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Respondent COSLAP cannot arrogate the duty of
directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs of private respondents because the same falls within the
competence of the DAR subject to the appellate review of the Court of Appeals. Insofar as the
assailed Resolution delved on the propriety of the rulings of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362 and of
the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93, the Court finds COSLAP to have exceeded
its quasi-judicial functions.

Third. COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of the government’s title over the
Cuison property. Well-settled is the rule that a torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible.
Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding.

When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the
title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when
the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.
On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 37 As noted by private respondents
in their Position Paper, COSLAP directed the Register of Deeds to reinstate the certificate of title on the
Cuison property in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, the complaint of private
respondents before COSLAP sought an alteration petitioner’s certificate of title which COSLAP has no
authority to order pursuant to Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

Another overriding point. In United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems,38 the Court observed that by reason of the ambiguous terminology employed in E.O. No.
561, the power to assume jurisdiction granted to the COSLAP provides an ideal breeding ground for
forum-shopping.39 There is forum-shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the same
essential facts and circumstances.40

Private respondents’ complaint before the COSLAP questioned the validity of the cancellation of the
compulsory acquisition of the Cuison property, private respondents’ CLOAs and the government’s
certificate of title over the property on the ground that the real parties in interest were not impleaded in
the proceedings before the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB. Private respondents had previously
raised the same issue when it filed the second DARAB case before the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator whose decision thereon is presently on appeal before the DARAB. There is no question that
private respondents are guilty of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated December 21,
1999 issued by respondent Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 98-343

is SET ASIDE. Private respondents’ complaint in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction and forum-shopping. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.