RULE 101

Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons

SP1.9 People v. Dungo

FACTS: Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua, with a knife from the envelope he was carrying, inside the field office of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. Mrs. Sigua died and an information for murder was filed against Dungo. The accused
raised the defense of insanity. During the trial, the prosecution presented the victim’s husband, Atty. Sigua, to testify that
the accused visited their house to confront him on why his wife was making it difficult for the accused to transfer the
landholding his father to him.

Further, Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in
the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was
psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an
organic mental disorder secondary to cerebrovascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for
ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that
Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic

The trial court in Macabebe, Pampanga convicted him because the act of concealing a fatal weapon and the act of taking
flight in order to evade arrest indicates that accused was sane during the time he committed the stabbing.

The case went up to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

ISSUE1: Whether it is permissible to receive evidence of the accused’s mental condition for a reasonable period both
before and after the time of the act in question.

RULING: Yes. The Court held that “Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person
whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question.
Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.”

ISSUE2: WN the presumption of sanity was overthrown, sufficient enough to exempt the accused from criminal liability.

RULING: Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert
witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly
doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as
to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of sanity. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity
rests on the defense.

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a
defense in a confession and avoidance, and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the
burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

SC Affirmed the trial court’s decision.

RULE 102
Habeas Corpus
SP2.9 Mangila v. Judge Pangilinan

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of the detainee.

FACTS:

1. Seven criminal complaints were filed charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in
violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with
violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were
filed in the MTCc in Puerto Princesa City;

2. On the following day, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge, conducted a preliminary investigation on
the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a
warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases,
including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further
proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules;
 3. As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

4. Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the
preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause,
Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention.
Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a
motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already
forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant;

CA: As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured
by resort to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the
warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge erred in holding that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention

RULING: Yes. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention
is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue
where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.

SP3.9 Adonis v. Tesoro

FACTS: Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him
by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He is petitioning for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under Rule 102
of the 1997 Rules of Court, praying that the Court direct respondent Superintendent Venancio Tesoro, Director of the
Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, to have the body of Adonis brought before the court. Adonis’ detention was by virtue of
final judgment; he was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole. Additionally at the time he was granted
parole, and even until the pendency of this case, there was a second libel case pending against Adonis.

ISSUE: WON Adonis is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD: The writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is issued only for the lone purpose of
obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is NOT issued when the person
is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. (See Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court)

SP4.9 Ampatuan v. Judge Macaraig

MP: In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held.
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

Facts: PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the
cause of his restraint. PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine
Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to
policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim... press briefing was then conducted where it was
announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two COMELEC Officials. He was then detained at the
Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato
Gonzaga... due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. PO1
Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. Chief
Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan Order was approved. But
Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1
Ampatuan. petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
before the RTC of Manila. Resspondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause
why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. RTC resolved the Petition

Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under
restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative case for grave misconduct. claiming that habeas corpus will not lie
for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551
authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of administrative
case for grave misconduct. the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.
 Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was
yet no administrative case filed against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served
upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues
that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest
issued by any judicial authority against him.

Issues: Whether PO1 Ampatuan was lawfully detained

Ruling: Yes. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct.

petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his
liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody,
such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors... is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.

SP5.9 OCA v. Judge Perello

FACTS:
1. The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in all seven
branches of the RTC in Muntinlupa City, including Branch 276 then presided by herein respondent Judge Norma C.
Perello
2. The audit was prompted by reports of perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.
3. The audit team reported that for the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas corpus were assigned to Branch
276, the subject matters of which are classified into (a) hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal possession of
firearms; and (d) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
4. Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint against
Judge Perello for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct.
5. Judge Perello opined that the Audit Team that evaluated these Habeas Corpus cases filed with this Court are probably not
lawyers, hence, are not conversant with the Constitution, with jurisprudence, and the Rules on the grant of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus and the retroactivity of laws.
6. As found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period of prision correccional in granting the
writs for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners had served imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she
immediately ordered their release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted if
the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule when she granted the writs of habeas corpus even
if the convicted prisoners had only served the minimum period of their sentence

RULING: Yes. In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only served the
minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on graduation of penalties as
well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.

Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even without the pertinent copies of
detention and judgment of conviction. This is contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany the application for the writ of habeas
corpus. Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid down in Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Court finds Judge NPerello guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse
of discretion

SP6.9 OSG v. Judge Castro

FACTS:

1. Gao Yuan is a national of the People’s Republic of China (PROC) and holder of a special non-immigrant visa to
the Philippines and an immigrant visa to Canada. Gao Yuan, her husband James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their
two young children were on their way to a vacation in Canada when Philippine immigration officers arrested Gao
Yuan and prevented her from boarding her flight.

2. Gao Yuan's arrest was by virtue of an order issued by Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner Alipio
Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response to a letter dated Aug. 9, 2004 from the Consul General of the PROC
which alleged that Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and
 requested her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI Detention Center. In short, it was
an order for Gao Yuan’s deportation.

3. James Mahshi filed with the RTC Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus with TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. He alleged that Gao Yuan was illegally detained since she is “not a fugitive from justice as in fact, she
was not charged with any crime at the time she left China in 2001.” Gao Yuan allegedly filed with the DOJ a
petition for asylum as a political refugee.

4. The same day that the petition for habeas corpus was filed in RTC, Exec. Judge Eugenio, Jr. issued a 7-hour TRO
enjoining the BI from initiating any deportation proceeding and/or directing the suspension of any such
proceedings against Gao Yuan. During the clarificatory hearing, respondent Judge de Castro insisted on the
release on bail of Gao Yuan. Through an interlocutory order, the RTC took custody of Gao Yuan. The RTC
clarified that it was only a provisional release for the duration of the TRO. Respondent based the provisional
release on humanitarian reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the
PROC and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child.

5. It was after the filing of the habeas corpus that a summary deportation order was issued.

6. Hence, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo, filed an
administrative complaint against Executive Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr. and Judge Antonio I. De Castro
(respondent), for (a) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment; (b) grossly disregarding the law and prevailing
jurisprudence; and (c) dishonesty and abuse of authority.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge committed an error when he provisionally released Gao Yuan.

RULING: Yes. When an alien is detained by the BI for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation
Board, the courts of first instance, now RTCs, have no power to release such alien on bail, even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

Although respondent judge bears no ill-will in releasing Gao Yao provisionally, the case filed before him was for habeas
corpus and not for extradition. Hence, the simple issue was whether Gao Yuan was held under lawful authority. It is not
an extradition case where the prospective extradite applying do bail needs to show that she presents clear and convincing
evidence that she is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Thus, we find respondents failure to observe the law and procedure on petitions for habeas corpus inexcusable, albeit done
in good faith for humanitarian considerations and in the honest belief that Gao Yuans detention was in violation of due
process. Accordingly, respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC- Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors

SP7.9 Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera

FACTS: Raquel filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus directing petitioner Hazelina
to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody over the
child which was granted by the court. But, despite diligent efforts and several attempts, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in
personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC-Quezon City but was
dismissed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan. Thereafter, respondent filed a criminal
case for kidnapping against petitioner and her counsel.

Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted.
The Alias Writ was served upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City during the
preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent.

Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy is enforceable.

Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda.

HELD:

YES, the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. However, the petition may be filed with the
regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall
refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the
appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.

YES. The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they
belong. In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.

As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service of summons, to
begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

SP8.9 Salientes v. Abanilla

FACTS: Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's parents. Due
to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla
left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son. Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative
of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the
Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should not be
discharged from restraint. Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the
order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production of restrained
persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied. Salienteses filed
the current appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order and whether the
remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father

RULING: The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial
court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court
and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial
court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. An interlocutory order is not appealable
but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the
court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners
to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

Habeas corpus is available to the father. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette
have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action
is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to
him. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline
for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC- Writ of Amparo

SP9.9 Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo.

FACTS: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia
and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged
in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of
Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. Also, Escudero’s students
claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the
girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and
other students involved were barred from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data.
However, respondent contend that the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue. Since it is only
confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Moreover, they claim that STC gathered the
photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of habeas data is applicable in the instant case

RULING: Yes. Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Habeas data, to stress,
was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of
Amparo.

HOWEVER, the writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened. In the case at bar, the right to privacy was not violated because: (1) Facebook has
privacy safeguard tools, and (2) Utilization of these tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s invocation
of his right to informational privacy.

Also, claiming that the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. It is
well emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can
share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former.

SP10.9 Caram v. Atty. Segui

FACTS: Petitioner Christina had a relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the
child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children.
Baby Julian was “Legally Available for Adoption.” Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody was then commenced.
Christina changed her mind about the adoption and asked DSWD for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings.
The DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary informing her that
the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality which terminated her parental
authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby
Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody
of a minor child.

RULING: No. Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to
secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

SP11.9 Pador v. Arcayan

Facts: Petitioners alleged that rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter. Respondents barangay tanods
raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners received invitation letters for a
conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. Their counsel advised them not to send a letter-reply instead of attending.
Respondent Arcayan allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document.

Petitioners then concluded that the circumstances as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possible
violence from respondents – gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of
amparo.

Issue: Whether the allegations are sufficient bases to grant the writ of amparo

Held: No. The raid on the ampalaya farm was done with petitioner’s permission. Even assuming that the entry was done without
permission, the Court cannot grant the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. It was a mere
violation of petitioner’s property rights.

The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances.
SP12.9 De Lima v. Gatdula
MP: After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is
proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security is
under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion
presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner.

FACTS: On February 27, 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
in the RTC of Manila (In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP
No. 12-127405) The case was raffled to Judge Pampilo, Jr. on the same day. The Amparo was directed against petitioners
De Lima et al. Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al “to cease and desist from framing him up for the fake ambush incident by
filing bogus charges of Frusrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident”. Instead of deciding
on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also
set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection
order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases. In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that “[s]ince no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer.” The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in
Amparo cases. He opined that. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10 Even
without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days
after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the
memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer. On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a
“Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the
evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It
is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or
security of the respondent Gatdula. RTC denied MR filed by De Lima, et al De Lima, et al thus came to the SC assailing
the March 20 RTC Decision via Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Amparo can be executed and reviewed?

RULING: No. RTC committed several procedural errors on issuing the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

Irregularities in the RTC procedues:

1. The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive
pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
 The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy
remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated.
 A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
2. The holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return.
Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
3. The court required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al
 The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it
should be done prior to the hearing, not after.
 A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final
pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision.
 One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the
suit.
 A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
 The privilege of the Writ of Amparo is different from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo
 The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outline in the Rule on the Writ of Mparo
 After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will
mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or
security.
 A judgment which simply grants the “privilege of the writ” cannot be executed.
 Petition for Review – not the proper remedy. Petition for Certitorari is prohibited. However, simply dismissing the
present petition will cause grave injustice to the parties involved.
 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a
 lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC- Writ of Habeas Data

SP13.9 Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. In 2012,
while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero
then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne,
among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually
the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified
students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining the
commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s
policies and rules on discipline.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.

DISCUSSION:

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy,
among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the
right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part
in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. As such, the writ of
habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves.

RULING: NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject
digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

SP14.9 Lee v. Ilagan

MAINPOINT:
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Corollarily, the allegations
in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim.

FACTS:
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy
Margate Lee (Lee) were former common-law partners.

Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his
office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the
latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan
and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the
confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee
utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for
violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video
and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated
not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of
habeas data in his favor is warranted.

RTC – issued writ of Habeas Data directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera,
as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within
five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.

ISSUE: WN the RTC is correct for extending the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.

RULING: No.
Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would
be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be
uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security.

RTC decision is reversed and set aside, Petition of Ilagan is dismissed for lack of merit.

SP1.10 Gamboa v. Chan

FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa Commission which was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them
permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the
office of the President. Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine
National Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified her as PAG
coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual
maintaining PAGs. Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly
tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for
the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from
forwarding baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to
privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish
the source of the information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked
as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING: NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must
be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance.
In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed
to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

SP2.10 Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo

There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings.

The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.

FACTS:

1. This case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the April 12, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
granting the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data by petitioner Noriel Rodriguez, who is a member of Alyansa
Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP);

2. Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Petitioner was then abducted, tortured and
forced to confess to being a member of the New People's Army (NPA);

3. Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
petition was filed against formerPresident Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General;

4. Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, and five others. The writs were granted but
the CA dropped President Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of
office or actual incumbency as part of her presidential immunity. Also, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order and inspection order was denied by the CA;

5. The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the decision of the CA but before such motion could be
resolved petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration raising that the CA erred in not granting the interim
relief for temporary protection order and in dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent;

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by petitioner may be granted even after the writs of amparo and
habeas data have been granted; (2) Whether or not President Arroyo should be dropped as respondent because of her
presidential immunity.

RULING: (1) No. The interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides that interim reliefs may only be availed of upon filing of the petition or at
anytime before final judgment. Given that there has already been a final judgment in the given case, petitioner may no
longer avail of the interim relief of temporary protection order.

(2) No, President Arroyo should not be dropped. There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings as courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As it was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. Also, the Supreme Court (SC)
reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency. Given
these, former Pres. GMA cannot use presidential immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess
whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

RULE 103- Change of Name

RULE 108- Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

SP3.10 Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City
Under Section 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order.

FACTS: Petitioner fileda petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and named
respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. He prayed that the following entries
on his birth certificate be corrected as follows: 1) on the entry pertaining to the date and place of marriage of parents, from
“December 23, 1983, Bicol” to “Not Married”; 2) First name of mother, from “Tely” to “Matilde”; and, 3) First name,
from “Franc Ler” to “Francler.

The RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled
that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s
status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal
Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First
Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and
412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In its Order dated March 1, 2011, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by
the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048.

HELD: We agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be
corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048.

In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus, petitioner can avail of this
administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.

SP4.10 Republic v. Olaybar

MP: As long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register

A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.

FACTS: Respondent requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for
her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the MTCC, Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

The RTC granted Olaybar’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of
the alleged marriage contract. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds
that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. The motion for reconsideration
was denied, hence this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

HELD: YES. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware
of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only “evidence” of marriage
which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof,
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

SP5.10 Republic v. Uy
FACTS: In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to
her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known
for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise
relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname “Lugsanay” instead of “Sy” and citizenship
of “Filipino” instead of “Chinese.” The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s
filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from “Sy” (which is the surname of her father) to “Lugsanay” (which is
the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her
citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are
substantial.

RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent. CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition for correction is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties as strictly required by Article 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the requirements laid down in Article 108 of the Rules of Court was strictly complied with

RULING: No. In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent. It is
clear from that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon
the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named
in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

SC nullified the order granting Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma
S. Lugsanay Uy.

SP6.10 Fujiki v. Marinay

A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. However, it is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
 2. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.

3. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

4. RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

5. Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki as a "third person”
in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court,
which he now seeks to be judicially recognized. He also instituted an action cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry as he already have final decree declaring that their marriage was already dissolved.

6. The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING: Yes. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy.
However, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

SP7.10 Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo

Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings.

FACTS: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows. However he claims his parents
were never legally married and Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support
of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna
Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage and some academic records carrying the coseteng as his
surname

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through
appropriate adversarial proceedings.

FACTS: Yes. Generally his case is not under any grounds given by Rule 103 (change name). Since It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication what applies in this
case is Rule 108 which clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry
in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding with notice and publication.

SP8.10 Republic v. Mercadera

MAIN POINT: It falls under Rule 108. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the
change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of
the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
FACTS: Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth – from Marilyn
L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, pursuant to RA. No.
9048. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court
order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can
validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048." Mercadera was then
constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108
before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC falls under Rule 103 or 108.

RULING: It falls under Rule 108. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the
change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of
the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be
raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a
patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined
under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil
registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under
Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court
"to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to
conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its
intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A.
No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court
action to obtain relief.

SP9.10 Republic v. Cagandahan

The Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial.” That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male.

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the RTC of Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Birth Certificate
of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appears that Jennifer
Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To
further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both
male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the
Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the available evidence presented in court
including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.” The Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

SP10.10 Republic v. Kho

FACTS: Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate. Kho
petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; (2) delete “John” from his name; and
(3) delete the word “married” opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected
likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
 The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048, which allows
first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer approved of the change. The
Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that the correction not merely clerical but requires an
adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an adversarial proceeding

HELD: Substantial and controversial amendments in entries in the Civil Registry can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding. Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; “Adversary proceeding” has been defined as one having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished
from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded
the latter an opportunity to contest it.
The enactment of R.A. No. 9048 has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that
substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
petition under Rule 108—the obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of
clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.

SP11.10 Silverio v. Republic

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his first name changed from
Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of
the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either
name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the intervention of sex reassignment
surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code,
change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in statutes that underscore the public policy in
relation to women.

SP12.10 Limson v. Gonzales

MP: An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in
business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the
substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases.

FACTS: On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification, before the
Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City.

Vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, who penned the decision under review, pursuant to the raffle of May 8,
2013. The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based on Limson’s assertion that in the records of the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and that
Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, and who pretends to be said architect.
Registered [sic] with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty [sic] of falsification x x x." Gonzalez filed his Counter-
Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name)
GONZALEZ (father’s family name) y REGALADO (mother’s family name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was
still in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO
GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the University of Santo Tomas and therein took up architecture and that
upon commencement of his professional practice in 1943, he made use of his second name, JUAN. Consequently, in his
professional practice, he has identified himself as much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname
GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself
with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO. Gonzalez supposed [sic] his allegations with
various supporting documents x x x. After receiving pertinent Affidavits and evidentiary documents from Limson and
Gonzalez, respectively, the Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed EUGENIO
JUAN R. GONZALES [sic] is the architect registered in the PRC. Said Resolution was issued on March 30, 1998 x x x.
Limson elevated the Resolution of the Prosecutor x x x to the Secretary of Justice. Before the Secretary of Justice, she
utilized the basic arguments she had raised before the Prosecutor’s Office, with slight variations, in assailing said adverse
Resolution of the Prosecutor. After Opposition by Gonzalez, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal of Limson. The
Secretary of Justice affirmed and even expanded the findings of the Prosecutor x x x. Not content with said Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, Limson filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom; which, after Opposition by Gonzalez, was
dismissed by the Secretary of Justice, on September 15, 2000 x x x. Said dismissal was with finality.

ISSUE: Whether he is allowed to use different alias?

RULING: YES. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually,
usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time,
or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several
different names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name,
and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name.

SP13.10 Ursua v. CA
FACTS: The Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation regarding
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits and it was found out that the petitioner Cesario
Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources officer was involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees
and illegally-cut logs in the area. So, a complaint was filed against him which was initiated by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Before proceeding to the office of the Ombudsman, petitioner’s counsel talked to Oscar Perez and the latter
advised him that he could sign his name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When he
arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he was asked to sign his name on a log book and instead of writing his own
name, he wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative Division and hand in the letter to Loida
Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative Division in order to get a furnished copy of the complaint. Before petitioner left,
he was greeted by an acquaintance and from there Loida learned that the one who introduced his name as Oscar Perez is
actually the petitioner himself so the latter reported the matter immediately to the Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that
petitioner be accordingly charged.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or otherwise
known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.

RULING: The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142
thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and
recorded in the civil register.
Petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was
the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of
petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner
was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence
showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of
the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose
his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be
able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because
the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within
the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted.

RULE 104- Voluntary Dissolution of Corporations

SP14.10 Lexber, Inc. v. Dalman (2015)

MAINPOINT:
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; In sharp contrast to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Insurance
Commission (IC), nowhere in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB’s) charter is it expressly or
impliedly granted the power to appoint the rehabilitation receivers of financially distressed corporations under its
supervision and regulation.

FACTS:
Lexber is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of housing, construction, and real estate development. Its
housing projects are mostly located in the province of Benguet, Baguio City, and Cabanatuan City.

Among those who availed of Lexber’s housing projects are respondent-spouses Caesar and Conchita Dalman (Spouses
Dalman), who bought a house and lot under a contract to sell in Lexber’s Regal Lexber Homes at Tuba, Benguet.
Because of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and other external factors, Lexber’s financial condition deteriorated. It was
forced to discontinue some of its housing projects, including the one where the Spouses Dalman’s purchased property is
located.

As Lexber could no longer pay its creditors, it filed a petition for rehabilitation with prayer for the suspension of payments
on its loan obligations. Among its creditors are the Spouses Dalman who are yet to receive their purchased house and lot,
or, in the alternative, a refund of their payments which amounted to P900,000.00.

The trial court gave due course to Lexber’s rehabilitation petition and appointed Atty. Rafael Chris F. Teston (Atty.
Teston) as rehabilitation receiver.

The Spouses Dalman filed a motion for reconsideration from this order and argued that consistent with Rule 4, Section 11
of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), the trial court should have dismissed
outright the rehabilitation petition because it failed to approve the rehabilitation plan within 180 days from the date of the
initial hearing.

The Spouses Dalman further submitted that no rehabilitation petition of a real estate company like Lexber should be given
due course without the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) prior request for the appointment of the
rehabilitation receiver.

RTC - denied Spouses Dalman’s motion for reconsideration.

CA – 1) ruled that the trial court should have dismissed Lexber’s rehabilitation petition outright as there was no evidence
to show that the HLURB requested the appointment of Lexber’s rehabilitation receiver; 2) held that the rehabilitation
petition must also be dismissed since the rehabilitation plan was not approved within the prescribed 180-day period under
Rule 4, Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part when it gave due course to the
rehabilitation petition, despite: a. the absence of the HLURB’s prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver; and b. the lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of a rehabilitation plan.

RULING:
The SC cannot decide yet because the case is still pending under CA; however it said that:

1. The HLURB’s prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver is not a condition precedent before the trial
court can give due course to a rehabilitation petition.
XXX the powers granted to the HLURB are focused on its regulation of real estate companies to ensure that the investing
public is protected from fraudulent real estate practices. These powers do not touch upon the HLURB’s authority to
intervene in the general corporate acts, e.g., the rehabilitation, of those under its supervision.

2. The lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan should not automatically result to the
dismissal of the rehabilitation petition.
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by
convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the
period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the
petition.

The records of the present case show that on May 4, 2007, Lexber filed a motion for the extension of the period for the
approval of the rehabilitation plan. However, the trial court never issued a resolution on this motion. Instead, on June 12,
2007, it issued an order giving due course to the petition. The records also reveal that after the initial hearing, the trial
court had to conduct additional hearings even after the lapse of the 180-day period.

Lexber could not be faulted for the non-approval of the rehabilitation plan within the 180-day period. XXX The trial
court’s decision to approve or disapprove a rehabilitation plan is not a ministerial function and would require its extensive
study and analysis. As it turned out, after careful scrutiny of the rehabilitation petition, and its annexes, the trial court
eventually disapproved Lexber’s rehabilitation plan and dismissed the rehabilitation petition.

Petition is denied.

SP1.11 BPI Family Savings Bank v. St. Michael Medical Center, Inc.
FACTS: Spouses Virgilio and Yolanda Rodil, sole proprietors of the St. Michael Diagnostic and Skin Care Laboratory
Services and Hospital (St. Michael Hospital), planned on upgrading their hospital into a full service 11-story hospital. In
line with this, the spouses Rodil incorporated the St. Michael Medical Center Inc. (SMMCI), where they intended to
consolidate the operations of the hospital.
Using their personal funds and a mortgage loan from the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Savings Bank), the spouses
commenced construction of a new hospital building. Unfortunately, only several floors were constructed and the 11-story
hospital building was never completed as envisioned. As of May 2006, SMMCI was neither operational nor earning
revenues.

On Aug. 11, 2010, SMMCI filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. In its petition, SMMCI claimed that St. Michael
Hospital, although operating profitably, was weighed down by its loan obligations.
SMMCI further claimed that while several persons signified interest in investing in SMMCI, they needed enough time for
audit and due diligence.

In its proposed rehabilitation plan, SMMCI wanted BPI Savings Bank to: (a) defer foreclosing on the mortgage
constituted to secure the loan extended to SMMCI; and (b) agree to a moratorium of at least two years before SMMCI
would start servicing its loan obligation to the bank.

RTC approved the plan, which was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, BPI Savings Bank appealed.

ISSUES: Whether RTC and CA correct when they approved the rehabilitation plan. What is Corporate Rehabilitation?

RULING: No. In resolving BPI Savings Bank’s appeal, the SC reversed the lower courts’ rulings and laid down some
important doctrines in rehabilitation law for the guidance of the bench and the bar in the future.

First, for a rehabilitation petition to be granted, there must be a viable business to be restored. This is because
rehabilitation “contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the company to gain a
new lease of life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings.”
The SC said that while SMMCI had indeed “commenced business” by opening a credit line with BPI Family Bank to
finance the construction of the new hospital building, it neither formally operated nor earned any income since its
incorporation.

Second, petitioner must comply with the requirement of material financial commitment. A mere negotiation with
investors is not enough.
ISSUE 2: WN the rehabilitation plan shows material financial commitment.

RULING 2: No. In this case, aside from the harped on merger of St. Michael Hospital with SMMCI, the only proposed
source of revenue the Rehabilitation Plan suggests is the capital which would come from SMMCI’s potential investors,
which negotiations are merely pending. Evidently, both propositions commonly border on the speculative and, hence,
hardly fit the description of a material financial commitment which would inspire confidence that the rehabilitation would
turn out to be successful.
A material financial commitment becomes significant in gauging the resolve, determination, earnestness and good faith of
the distressed corporation in financing the proposed rehabilitation plan.

Third, there must be a liquidation analysis submitted as part of a rehabilitation plan. The failure of SMMCI to comply
with this requirement “prevent[ed] the Court from ascertaining if the petitioning debtor’s creditors can recover by way of
the present value of payments projected in the plan…”
RTC and CA erred in upholding the rehabilitation plan, thus the lower courts’ decisions are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation is DISMISSED.

RULE 105-Judicial Approval of Voluntary Recognition of Minor Natural Children

SP2.11 Hernaez v. IAC

An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special proceedings mentioned in
Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on ordinary civil
actions.

FACTS:

1. Teodoro Hernaez Jr. filed an action against Teodoro Hernaez Sr. for acknowledgment and support, which the
court granted;
2. The decision was later annulled by IAC due to lack of summons by publication;
3. SC reversed, holding that an action for compulsory recognition is governed by rules on ordinary civil actions.
Thus, summons by publication is not required.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication is necessary in action for compulsory recognition

RULING: No. An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special proceedings
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed by the rules on
ordinary civil actions.
The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since the same applies only to cases falling under
Article 281 of the Civil Code where there has been a voluntary recognition of the minor natural child, i.e., prior
recognition of the minor natural child in a document other than a record of birth or a will, which is absent in the instant
case.

In fine, an action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Thus, service of summons on the putative parent
shall be as provided for under Rule 14. Said action shall be brought against the putative parent only; his heirs may be
made party defendants only under the circumstances mentioned in Article 285.

RULE 106- Constitution of Family Home

SP3.11 Ocampo v. Ocampo
Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal

FACTS: On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground
of psychological incapacity. On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision4 declaring the marriage between
Virginia and Deogracio as null and void.

On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties.
Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand. The trial court rendered the assailed Order 6 stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

In the disputed Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia’s appeal. Virginia moved for
reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated October 5, 2011.

Thus, the instant petition for review substantially questioning whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the
conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

HELD: While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code provisions on
conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they
were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the
Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

SP4.11 Eulogio v. Bell, Sr.

DOCTRINE: To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to
establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

CASE SUMMARY: RTC issue a writ of execution, wherein the property levied was the respondents’ family home. The
respondents filed an MR on the ground that the property is a family home. But, petitioners argued that the property could
still be attached as its value exceeds the statutory limit. SC held that the said property couldn’t be sold on execution since
it has already been judicially determined with finality that the value is well within the statutory limit.

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Paterno and Rogelia Bell executed a contract of sale of their residential house and lot with petitioner
spouses Enrico and Natividad Eulogio. However, they and their children filed a complaint for annulment of the contract of
sale and quieting of title. RTC granted the said complaint. However, the trial court ordered them to pay spouses Eulogio
P1M plus interest. Both appealed to CA, but decision was affirmed.

RTC issued a writ of execution, wherein the said property was levied on execution. Spouses Bell filed an MR to lift the
writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family home. However, RTC eventually denied the MR, since the
Spouses Eulogio invoked Article 160, and appointed a Board of Appraisers. Spouses Bell appealed before CA, which
granted the petition of Spouses Bell.

ISSUE: W/N the family home of the Spouses Bell may be sold on execution under Article 160, FC

RULING: NO, respondent’s family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts:
(1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

In the instant case, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home, and that its
value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Please see Bullet Point No. 2 in the Notes re: Res
Judicata.

During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by petitioners. The sole
evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was
null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage.

Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction
at the expense of respondents’ rights over their family home.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SP5.11 Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan

FACTS: Spouses Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2
million. As security, Sps. Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential
house and lot situated in Los Banos, Laguna. When Sps. Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests
and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage

At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (Sps. Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the
bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale, which was registered with the Registry of Deeds
of Calamba City and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-412512. The one-year redemption period expired without the
Sps. Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, Sps. Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership. Despite
the foregoing, the Sps. Fortaleza refused Sps. Lapitan s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject
property.

In the RTC, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession which was opposed by Sps.
Fortaleza. For repeated failure of spouses Fortaleza to appear at the scheduled hearings, the RTC allowed spouses Lapitan
to present evidence ex parte. he RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession. Spouses Fortaleza moved for
reconsideration, claiming that the subject property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. RTC denied
their motion which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether a family home is exempt from sale and foreclosure; Whether Sps. Fortaleza can still exercise their right
of redemption

RULING: 1. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of
the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that Sps. Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28,
1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of
record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the
Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.

2. No. The Sps. Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by
an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from the
registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have
waived or abandoned their right of redemption.

RULE 107- Absentees

SP6.11 In Re: Reyes v. Alejandro

Judicial declaration of an absentee spouse necessary, when he has properties to be taken cared of or administered by a
representative or when the absentee’s spouse is asking separation or administration of property.

FACTS:

1. In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her husband
Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and
since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband
left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts.
 2. After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes left no properties
there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee. CA affirmed. HAHAHA

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need to file for declaration of absentee in the absence of properties nor debts

RULING: No. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be
taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the
absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the
administration of all classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to
declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the
wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings.

RULE 109- Appeals in Special Proceedings

SP7.11 Aranas v. Mercado
FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado and their five children. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. Thelma, child of Emigdio in his
first marriage, filed a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate which was granted.

Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death,
Emigdio had left no real properties but only personal properties. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that
were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. Then Teresita filed on appeal for the approval of its inventory on which the RTC issued an order
finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, particularly
the property sold and assigned to Mervir Realty so it denied Teresita's motion for the approval of the inventory and
denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory
was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether RTC erred in denying the appeal of Teresita?

RULING: No. an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final
judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,[21] which also governs appeals in
special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject of
an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with
preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-
appealable.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may
be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates
the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person
is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on
behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall
be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it
be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple
appeals are permitted.

SP8.11 Sps. Lebin v. Mirasol

MAIN POINT: The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional.

FACTS: In a special proceedings case involving the settlement of the estate 
of the late L.J. Hodges, the RTC Branch 27
of Iloilo City issued an order dated May 3, 1995. On May 23, 1995 Sps Lebin moved for reconsideration and/or new trial.
March 2, 1998 RTC denied MR/MNT. March 27, 1998 Sps Lebin filed a notice of appeal in the RTC. May 5, 1998 Also
filed a record on appeal. On Jan 25, 1999 Presented an ex parte motion to approve the record on appeal. Mirasol filed
MTD on the ground that the record on appeal had been filed late. RTC granted the MTD and the was also MR denied
ISSUE: Whether Sps Lebin failed to timely file a record on appeal

RULING: YES. Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 
is the elimination of the record on
appeal in most cases, retaining the record on appeal only for appeals in special proceedings and in other cases in which the
Rules of Court allows multiple appeals. 


A judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or final order determining
and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the
proceeding, unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court. The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal
instead of only a notice of appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of
being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts.

a. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the 
elevation of the original records to the appellate court as
to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. 


b. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original records
remain with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the
appealed matter. 


• Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period for perfecting the appeal by record on
appeal to take into consideration the need for the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day period a
party aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in special proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and a record on
appeal upon the adverse party within the period in addition, the appealing party shall pay within the period for taking
an appeal to the clerk of the court that rendered the appealed judgment or final order the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by record on appeal,
or the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court may
be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.

IN THIS CASE
• Although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, they submitted the record on appeal only on
May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the date they received the
denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days
from their notice of the judgment. Their appeal was not perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record on appeal
happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection of their appeal.

SP9.11 Republic v. Nishina

In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and
determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth
record and change of surname in the civil registry.

FACTS: Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father
Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As they could not
find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her birth in
1993 under the surname of her mother’s second husband, “Hakamada.” Later on, it surfaced that her birth was in fact
originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name “Nisaida Sumera Nishina.” Hence, she filed before the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of
Malolos, Bulacan. After hearing the petition, RTC granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of
Malolos “to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993 and to change particularly the
surname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe. A copy of the Order was received on by the OSG which filed, on
behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,
alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections
2 and 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case

RULING: No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special
proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special
proceedings. A record on appeal, in addition to the notice of appeal, is thus required to be filed as the original records of
the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by said court and held to be final. In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary
since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

SP10.11 Republic v. Marcos II

FACTS:
1. the RTC of Pasig, acting as a probate court, in a Special Proceeding, granted letters testamentary in solidum to
respondents Marcos II and Imelda as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
2. the petitioner Republic filed MR.
 3. Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a bond as directed by RTC and that he took his oath as
named executor of the will.
4. RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order
appointing her as Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.
5. Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner
Vinzons-Chato.
6. RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the MR filed by
respondent Imelda.
7. Republic filed with SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the
RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.
8. the First Division of SC issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA
9. the CA dismissed the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal.

ISSUE: Is it proper for the petitioner to question the issuance of letter of testamentary to the respondents by filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to the Supreme Court.

RULING: No. The subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents,
do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. Petitioner offered no plausible
reason why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper remedy was still available. The CA was thus
correct that the remedy that petitioner should have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
which states:
Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. An interested person may appeal in special proceedings
from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:
(a) allows or disallows a will;

SP11.11 Quasha v. LCN

Facts: Proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Raymond Triviere were instituted by his widow. Atty. Syquia and
Atty. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the decedent, were appointed administrators of the his
estate. As administrators, they incurred expenses for the payment of taxes, security services and the preservation and administration of
the estate and litigation expenses.

Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha file a motion for payment of their litigation expenses. The trial court denied the motion citing their
failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate.

Atty. Quasha died. Atty. Zapata also from the Quasha Law Office took over as the counsel of the Triviere children and continued to
help Atty. Syquia in the setttlement of the estate. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata field another Motion for payment for their own behalf
and for their respective clients.

LCN as the only remaining claimant against the estate of Triviere filed it comment on/opposition to the motion. LCN averred that its
claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate; thus no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid.

The RTC granted the motion but reduced the sums to be paid. LCN sought recourse from the CA. The CA deleted the awards in favor
of the children and widow of Triviere adopting the position of LCN that its claim was an unpaid obligation barring the distribution of
the residue of the estate.

Issue: Whether the awards in favor of the petitioner children and widow of the decedent is not a distribution of the residue of the estate

Held: While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a
distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial
and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate,
although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for.

Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such
discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal
may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (Section 1, Rule 90).