Tamargo vs Awingan Case Digest

G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

FACTS:

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no
leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit
wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was
ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
Columna was arrested.

On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as “look out”
during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor,
respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.

Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint
against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his
affidavit before the investigating prosecutor.

During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter
disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the
extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the
latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. The investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing so that Columna could clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter.
During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited
letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.

In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said that he was only
forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of
the threats to his life inside the jail. The RTC judge denied the motion to withdraw the informations and
held that based on the March 8, 2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating
prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision.

Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna,
there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. Awingan and the Antiporda’s, on
the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against them because
of the rule on res inter alios acta.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the Antipordas
HELD:

Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against
respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused
and is considered as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object
and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it
cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence
was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession
of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them. (Harold V. Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727,
January 19, 2010)
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada
were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”.
At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with
prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):

1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I
exercise of the people power of revolution
which overthrew the whole government.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the
new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review
presented a political question; involves legal
questions.
EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected
the office of the President.
intra constitutional and the resignation of
the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political
questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8
of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material
relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without
doubt referring to the past opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and

after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely
to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect
on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
People v. Muit, et. Al.

GR No. 181043, August 12, 2003

TOPIC: Extra Judicial Confession; Interlocking Confession

FACTS:

(background – kidnapping stage)

Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, and Carnapping. Muit is part of the kidnapping team;Pancho Jr. was the backup for the
kidnapping team;Romeo was the trusted foreman of the victim, Engr. Ingnacio Ong. Jr. (Remeo is an
insider);Ferraer – one who was approached to use his house as safehouse.

One of the co-accused (Ferraer) was discharged from the cases because he served as a state
witness.Ferraer did not participate in the actual execution of the kidnapping. The group composed of
Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit succeeded in kidnapping their intended victim.

4. They were to proceed in a rendezvous point with Pancho Jr.

5. On the way to their meeting point they were intercepted by the police.

6. A gun battle ensued which left all of the kidnappers dead including the victim, except for Muit.

7. Muit was arrested.

(actual case – filing of the criminal case)

8. During trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses.

9. The testimony of these witnesses were corroborated by the extrajudicial confessions of Pancho
Jr. and Dequillo.

9.1 Dequillo claimed that he was allegedly tortured when he claimed he did not have knowledge.

9.2 Pancho Jr. claimed that he was tortured and was forced to sign an extra-judicial confession.

9.3 It was claimed that it was only after they signed that Atty. Mallare came.

10. Muit also executed 2 extra-judicial confessions. He was assisted by 2 different lawyers on both
occasions.

11. RTC – Makati: all guilty of the crime charged.

11.1 their claims of torture were belied because the medical certificates did not indicate that such
happened.
11.2 Also, assuming they did not have those extra-judicial confessions, there was enough evidence to
still convict them.

12. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC.

12.1 the extra-judicial confessions detailing their participation were executed with the assistance of a
counsel.

12.2 Muit, aside from his extra-judicial confession, was positively identified to have participated.

13. Hence this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho Jr. and
Dequillo?

HELD: No.

RATIO:

1. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against
them.

1.1 There is nothing on record to support appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions.

1.2 One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants’ extra judicial statements is
that each contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and
could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given by appellants.

1.3 Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their statements.
Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and affixed
their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional rights.

2. Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two
extra judicial confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his
brother, Dominador.
2.1 Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial
confession. Nevertheless, in Muit’s case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez
(witnesses presented by the prosecution, they were there when the kidnapping happened) as the one
who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the ground.

3. Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical
examinations done on them.

3.1 These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during
trial; appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while they were imprisoned
about the alleged tortures.

3.2 Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the alleged torture done to him to
the Department of Justice when he was brought there. Claims of torture are easily concocted, and
cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and independent corroborating evidence.

4. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the
prosecution’s case against Romeo.

4.1 The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it
recognizes various exceptions.

4.2 One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several
persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.

4.2.1 They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to
show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise
serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons
had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved.

4.2.2 These are known as “interlocking confessions.” Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo,
relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements but also on Ferraer’s testimony that Romeo
was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

As a rule, an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the person making it except when
several extra judicial statements are made by several persons charged with an offense and there could
have been no collusion in the said confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects
identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein.