Section 12, Art3

1981 –

1988 -
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would object to it on the ground that the waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel is void, having been made
without the presence of counsel. (Art. III, sec. 12(1); People v. Galit,
135 SCRA 465 (1980). The waiver must also be in writing, although this requirement might possibly have been complied
with in this case by embodying the waiver in the written confession. It should also be noted that under Rule 134, sec.
3, even if the extrajudicial confession is valid, it is not a sufficient ground for conviction if it is not corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.

1989 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(2) No, the waiver of the right to counsel is not valid, since it was not reduced in writing and made in the presence of
counsel. Under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and
in the presence of counsel.

1997 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The arguments of the accused are untenable. As held in People vs. Acot, 232 SCRA 406, the warrantless arrest of
accused robbers Immediately after their commission of the crime by police officers sent to look for them on the basis
of the information related by the victims is valid under Section 5(b).Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
According to People vs. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471, the right to counsel does not extend to police line-ups, because they
are not part of custodial investigations. However, according to People vs. Macan 238 SCRA 306, after the start of
custodial investigation, if the accused was not assisted by counsel, any identification of the accused in a police line-up
is inadmissible.

2000 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The confession of Ramos is not admissible, since the counsel assigned to him did not advise him of his rights. The fact
that his confession was taken before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution is of no moment. Even prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court already laid down strict rules on waiver of the rights during
investigation in the case of People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465

2001 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
According to People vs. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499 (1994), the confession is admissible. Under
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the confession is inadmissible only against the one who confessed. Only the
one whose rights were violated can raise the objection as his right is personal.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;
According to People us. Jara, 144 SCRA 516(1986), the confession is inadmissible. If it is inadmissible against the one
who confessed, with more reason it should be inadmissible against others.

2005 –
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The NBI was not correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing Atty. Barroso in his stead. Article III, Section 12(1)
of the 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less
than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. This is meant to stress the primacy accorded
to the voluntariness of the choice under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation' Thus, the lawyer
called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. The appointment of Atty. Barroso is questionable because he was visiting a relative working
in the NBI and thus his independence is doubtful. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as
proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. Considering that Mariano was deprived of counsel of his
own choice, the statement is inadmissible in evidence. (People v. Januario, G.R. No. 98252,February 7, 1997)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The NBI was correct in dismissing Atty. Santos as he was incompetent. The 1987 Constitution requires counsel to be
competent and independent. Atty. Barroso, being a bar topnotcher ably assisted Mariano and there is no showing that
his having a relative in the NBI affected his independence. Moreover, the accused has the final choice of counsel as he
may reject the one chosen for him and ask for another. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused where he raises no objection against the lawyer during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the truth of his statement before the swearing officer. Thus, once the prosecution shows
there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed
to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. A
confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency which are not present in this case. Accordingly, the statement is admissible.
(People v. Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 29, 1998)
2008 –
(a) As counsel for the accused, what constitutional rights will you invoke in his defense? (4%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER: As counsel for the accused I would invoke the constitutional right to be secured against
unreasonable searches and seizures (Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution) which guarantees: (1) sanctity of the
home, (2) inadmissibility of the capsules seized, (3) and inviolability of the person. A mere tip from a reliable
source is not sufficient to justify warrantless arrest or search (Peo vs. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233 Feb.
(b) How should the court decide the case? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The court should declare the search and seizure illegal:
1. The entry into the accused’s home was not a permissible warrantless action because the police had no
personal knowledge that any crime was taking place.

2. Due to the invalid entry whatever evidence the police gathered would be inadmissible.
3. The arrest of the accused was already invalid and causing him to vomit while under custody was an
unreasonable invasion of personal privacy (U.S. vs. Montoya, 473 US 531 [1985])

2009 –
Suggested Answer:
William was not denied with his Miranda rights. True that he has the right to counsel preferably of his choice. But if he
cannot afford the services of a counsel, he should be provided with one. Moreover, the Miranda rights are available
only during custodial investigation that is, from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the
purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused. therefore, it is proper that he was
only informed of his right at the police station.

ALTENATIVE ANSWER:
The fact that the police officer gave him the Miranda warning in halting English does not detract from its validity.
Under Section 2(b) of Republic Act No. 7438, it is sufficient that the language used was known to and understood by
him. William need not be given the Miranda warning before the investigation started. William was not denied his
Miranda rights. It is not practical to require the police officer to provide a lawyer of his own choice from the United
States (Gamboa vs. Cruz)

2011 –

(a) Brown, afraid of a "set up" against him, demanded that he be allowed to secure his lawyer and for him to be
present during the police line-up. Is Brown entitled to counsel? Explain (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Brown is not entitled to counsel during the police line-up. He was not yet being asked to answer for a criminal
offense.

(b) Would the answer in (a.) be the same if Brown was specifically invited by White because an eyewitness to the
crime identified him as the perpetrator? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Brown would be entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. He was already considered as a suspect and was therefore
entitled to the rights under custodial investigation. (People vs. Legaspi)

(c) Briefly enumerate the so-called "Miranda Rights". (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Miranda warning means that a person in custody who will be interrogated must be informed of the following:
(a) He has the right to remain silent; (b) Anything said can be used as evidenced against him; (c) He has the right
 to have counsel during the investigation; and (d) He must be informed that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him. (Miranda vs. Arizona)

2013 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The judgment of conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on the extrajudicial confession of the
accused. The lawyer assisting them must be independent. City Attorney Juan Buan is not independent. As City
Attorney, he provided legal support to the City Mayor in performing his duties, which include the maintenance of
peace and order (People vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The judgment of conviction should be reversed. The police officers committed an offense by confronting the three
accused. This is a violation to Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which states that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Judgment of conviction should be affirmed if the accused failed to object when their extrajudicial confession was
offered in evidence, which was rendered it admissible (People vs. Samus, 389 SCRA 93).

2014 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would rule in favour of Edward. The statements made are inadmissible. It was made in violation of the constitutional
rights of Edwards. Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody. The rights are available when the person interrogated is already treaded as a particular
suspect and the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime. However, during this stage, no
complaint or criminal case has been filed yet. As such, the person suspected to have committed a crime is not yet an
accused, since no case was instituted against him. However, in the case of Edward, the questioning made was more
than just a general inquiry into an unsolved crime. It was already in the accusatory stage in which the Miranda rights
must be given to the accused.
Sec 13, Art3

1989 –
May an alien invoke the constitutional right to bail during the pendency of deportation proceedings?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. an alien may not invoke the constitutional right to bail during the pendency of deportation proceedings. In Harvey
vs Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, it was held that the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked in deportation
proceedings, because they do not partake of the nature of a criminal action.

2005 –
a) The imposable penalty for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua and the accused is a minor;
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the accused is a minor where the imposable penalty for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua, bail would be a
matter of right. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under eighteen years of age,
he is entitled to a penalty, depending on his age, lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
crime committed. The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where
the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly
strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the accused has been established without objection to be
a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death. (Bravo v. Borja)

b) The imposable penalty for the crime charged is life imprisonment and the accused is a minor;
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the accused is a minor and the imposable penalty for the crime charged is life imprisonment, bail would not be a
matter of right. In the instant case, assuming that evidence of guilt strong, bail shall be denied as the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority is not available for violation of special laws penalized by life imprisonment.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Although the Constitution mentions only reclusion perpetua, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court adds life imprisonment,
and therefore, applying the PRO REO DOCTRINE, bail wouldstill be a matter of right, since it is favorable to the accused.

c) The accused has been convicted of homicide on a charge of murder and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the accused has been convicted of homicide on a charge of murder and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of from
8 to 12 years, bail is a matter of discretion. Under Rule 114, Sec. 5, par. 1 of the Rules of Court, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the appellate court. Admission to bail is discretionary.

2008 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As a general rule, bail is not a matter of right when the offense charged carries with an imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua or higher. In the present case, JC is charged with murder which has a penalty of reclusion perpetua, hence
he cannot be allowed bail. However, should the evidence of guilt be found weak after hearing, the court may in its
discretion, fix bail for temporary liberty.
2009 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
William is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. His contention is not tenable. Observing the territorial jurisdiction
of commission of the offense, the applicable law in the case is Philippine laws not the law of the country to where he
is a national (Section 13, Art. III of the Constitution). Under our law, bail is not a matter of right if the felony or offense
committed has an imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher and the evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec 14, Art3

1982 –

1983 –

1988 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion should be granted and the entry of judgment should be set aside. An accused is entitled to be heard by
himself or counsel. (Art.III, sec. 14(2)). Unless he is represented by an attorney, there is a great danger that any defense
presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal requisite and skill needed in court proceedings. There
would certainly be a denial of due process. (Delgado v.Court of Appeals)

2000 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The grant of the motion for postponement would not have violated the right of the accused to speedy trial. As held In
People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996). since the motion for postponement was the first one requested, the need for
the offended party to attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no substantial right of the accused would
be prejudiced, and the prosecution should be afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be
granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since continuous trial of cases is required and since the date of the initial hearing was set upon agreement of all parties,
including the private complainant, the judge properly dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.

2001 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54
(1989), the dismissal of a criminal casepredicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

2004 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two presumptions can be reconciled. The presumption of innocence stands until the contrary is proved. It may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon human experience. The presumption that RR is the one who stole
the cattle of OZ is logical, since he was found in possession of the stolen cattle. RR can prove his innocence by
presenting evidence to rebut the presumption. The burden of evidence is shifted to RR, because how he came into
possession of the cattle is peculiarly within his knowledge. (Dizon-Pamintuan v.People)

2013 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The court was wrong in relying on the silence of Arnold during the police investigation and during the trial. Under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, he had the right to remain silent. His silence cannot be taken as a tacit
admission, otherwise, his right to remain silent would be rendered nugatory. Considering that his right against self-
incrimination protects his right to remain silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it (People v. Galvez, G.R. No.
157221, March 30, 2007, 519 SCRA 521).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The court correctly convicted Arnold. There is no showing that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient. When
Arnold remained silent, he runs the risk of an interference of guilt from non-production of evidence in his behalf
(People v. Solis G.R. No. 124127, June 29, 1998,128 SCRA 217).
Sec 15, Art 3

1997 –
(a) Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended when
there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it.
(b) According to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall apply only to persons judicially charged with rebellion or offenses Inherent to or directly connected with invasion.
Any person arrested or detained should be judicially charged within three days. Otherwise, he should be released.
Moreover, under Section 13. Article III of the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

1997 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres vs. Gonzales. 152 SCRA 272 a judicial pronouncement that a convict
who was granted a pardon subject to the condition that he should not again violate any penal law is not necessary
before he can be declared to have violated the condition of his pardon. Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A
can be recommitted to prison. By accepting the conditional pardon, A, agreed that the determination by the President
that he violated the condition of his pardon shall be conclusive upon him and an order for his arrest should at once
issue.

2005 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition should not be given due course. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions
of a conditional pardon are PURELY EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The acceptance thereof
by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. Where the President opts to revoke the conditional pardon given,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment
of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. The determination
of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, is a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales)
2013 –
Did Vannie's counsel give the correct legal advice? (6%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The advice of Vannie’s counsel that she’ll file a petition for a writ of amparo is not correct. In
order that a writ of amparo can be availed of against a private individual for the disappearance of someone, the
involvement of the government is indispensable. There is no showing of any participation of the government in
Conrad’s disappearance (Navia vs. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Vannie’s counsel gave the correct legal advice. The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, or security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. Since there has been an enforced disappearance on the part of Conrad, the writ is
applicable.

(B) If the petition would prosper, can Col. Sangre be held liable and/or responsible for Conrad's disappearance? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Colonel Sangre cannot be held responsible for the disappearance of Conrad. Command
responsibility has no applicability to an amparo proceeding (Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233). It may be
established merely to enable the court to craft the appropriate remedies against the responsible parties (Balao vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Although writ of amparo does not pinpoint criminal culpability for a disappearance, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the purpose of imposing the appropriate remedy. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established to have participated in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedy, to be crafted,
such as the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties (Razon, Jr. Vs. Tagitis,
606 SCRA 598).

Sec 16, Art 3

2000 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of the accused to speedy trial, the precipitate
dismissal of the case is void. The reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double Jeopardy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) Since the dismissal of the case is valid, its reversal will place the accused in double jeopardy.

2001 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54
(1989), the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Sec 17, Art3

1986 –

1988 –
The privilege against self-incrimination is available not only in judicial proceedings but also in administrative
investigations. In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), it was held that the revocation of a
license as a medical practitioner can be an even greater deprivation than mere forfeiture of property. In some aspects
it is similar to criminal proceedings and, therefore, the respondent cannot be made to testify as a witness for the
complainant.

1998 –
1. No, Ong cannot refuse to answer the question on the ground that he would incriminate himself, since the law grants
him immunity and prohibits the use against him in a criminal prosecution of the testimony or evidence produced by
him. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Brown vs.
Walker. 161 U.S. 591, 597, what the constitutional prohibition against selfincrimination seeks to prevent is the
conviction of the witness on the basis of testimony elicited from him. The rule is satisfied when he is granted immunity.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In accordance with Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99, 107-108, If Ong is being cited merely as a witness, he may not
refuse to answer. However, if the question tends to violate his right against self-incrimination, he may object to it. On
the other hand, under the ruling in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 680, If he is a respondent, Ong may
refuse to answer any question because of his right against self-incrimination.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. No Ong cannot argue that the Civil Service Commission inferred his guilt from his refusal to answer. He was not
dismissed because of his involvement in the leakage in the medical examination but for his refusal to answer. This is a
violation of the law. He could be compelled to answer the question on pain of being dismissed in case of his refusal,
because he was granted Immunity.
In Lefkowitz vs. Turley. 414 U.S. 70, 84, the United States Supreme Court held: "Furthermore, the accommodation
between the interest of the State and the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means at its disposal to secure
testimony if immunity is supplied and testimony is still refused. This is recognized by the power of courts to compel
testimony, after a grant of immunity, by use of civil contempt and coerced imprisonment. Shilitani v. United States,
384 US 364. 16 L Ed
2d 622. 86 5 Ct 1531 (1966). Also, given adequate immunity the State may plainly insist that employees either answer
questions under oath about the performance of their job or suffer the loss of employment."

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3. Jes Ong can argue that his dismissal was based on coerced confession. In Garrity vs. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500,
the United States Supreme Court held: "We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth
Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained
under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of the
body politic."

2000 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) The objection of Borja is not tenable. As held in People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615 (1996), the rights guaranteed by
Section 12, Article in of the Constitution applies only against testimonial evidence. An accused may be compelled to
be photographed or measured, his garments may be removed, and his body may be examined.

2010 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The objection of Lt. Valdez is not valid. The right against self-incrimination refers to testimonial evidence and does not
apply to the production of a photocopy of the master plan of Camp Aquino, because it is a public record. He cannot
object to the request for him to confirm his custody of the master plan, because he is the public officer who had
custody of it. (Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 [1995]).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The objection is without merit. Right against self-incrimination is not violated because the right is simply against
testimonial compulsion. But the prohibition also extends to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers
and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where the State has a right to inspect the same
such as in this case. Pursuant to the production order issued by the court, there can be compulsion for the production
of documents sought in the order.

2014 –
No. Alienmae cannot invoke her right against self-incrimination even if the fear of incrimination is in regard to her
foreign law.

Under the territoriality principle, the general rule is that a state has jurisdiction over all persons and property within
its territory. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessary, exclusive, and absolute. However, the
are a few exceptions on when a state cannot exercise jurisdiction even within its own territory, to wit: 1) foreign states,
head of states, diplomatic representatives, and consults to a certain degree; 2) foreign state property; 3) acts of state;
4) foreign merchant vessels exercising rights of innocent passage or arrival under stress; 5) foreign armies passing
through or stationed in its territories with its permission; and 6) such other persons or property, including
organisations like the United Nations, over which it may, by agreement, waive jurisdiction.

Seeing that the circumstances surrounding Alienmae do not fall under those exceptions, that she is a foreign tourist
who received a complaint for fraud, such principle of territoriality can be exercised by the State to get the information
it needs to proceed with the case.

Sec 18, Art3

1980 –

1986 –

Sec 19
No bar qs

Sec 20, Art 3

1990 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) The petition should be granted, because Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional. In Tate vs. Short,
401 U.S. 395, the United States Supreme Court held that imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a convict who is
too poor to pay a fine violates equal protection, because economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for
distinguishing the duration of the imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and a convict who is
unable to pay it.
(2) On the other hand, in United States ex rel. Privitera vs. Kross, 239 F Supp 118, it was held that the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment for inability to pay a fine does not violate equal protection, because the punishment should
be tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does not compel the eradication of every disadvantage caused
by indigence. The decision was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 345 F2d 533, and the United
States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in 382 U.S. 911. This ruling was adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People vs. Williams, 31 ALR3d 920.
Sec21, Art3

1981 –

1986 –

1986 –

1997 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The dismissal of the first case for failure of the witnesses to appear
terminated the first jeopardy. As held in Caes vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54, the dismissal of a case for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear
constitutes an acquittal. The acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance No.
1000 bars his prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 500. Under Section 21, Article in of the Constitution, if an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for the same
act.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I would deny the motion. The dismissal of the first case is void and does not give rise to double
jeopardy. The dismissal of the first case is arbitrary and denied the prosecution due process of law. The trial was set
five days after the arraignment. There was no sufficient time to subpoena the witnesses and this was the first time the
witnesses failed to appear. As held in People vs. Declaro 170 SCRA 142, the dismissal of a case for failure of the
witnesses to appear at the initial hearing is arbitrary and void and does not give rise to double jeopardy.

2000 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of the accused to speedy trial, the precipitate
dismissal of the case is void. The reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double Jeopardy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) Since the dismissal of the case is valid, its reversal will place the accused in double jeopardy.

2001 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54
(1989), the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

2002 –
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second sentence of Article III, Section 21 of the
Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved in the two cases. The reckless
imprudence which resulted in physical injuries arose from the same act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap
v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an accused who was acquitted of driving
recklessly in violation of an ordinance could not be prosecuted for damage to property through reckless imprudence
because the two charges were based on the same act. In People v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was held that when
there is identity in the act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall bar
prosecution under the other.

SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

There is no double jeopardy because the act penalized under the Revised Penal Code is different from the act penalized
by the ordinance of Makati City. The Revised Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries,
while the ordinance of Makati City penalizes driving under the influence of liquor.
2008 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER: By presenting evidence of self-defense, JC effectively withdrew his plea of guilty (Peo vs.
Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, Aug. 31, 1966). In the absence of a valid plea, an essential element for jurisdiction of
the Court and first jeopardy was absent. Consequently, the court had no jurisdiction to acquit JC. Thus, an appeal
by the prosecution would not violate the rule against second jeopardy.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Double jeopardy sets in when the first jeopardy has attached. There is already first jeopardy when the accused has
validly entered his plea before the appropriate court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and his person and
that he has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against him has been terminated without his express
consent. In the present case, JC validly entered his plea of guilty but during the presentation of evidence he submits
evidence of self-defense. the consequence thereof is for the court to withdraw the plea of guilty and enter a plea
of not guilty. The validity of entering his plea is not affected. Therefore, his acquittal shall bar any similar indictment
that may be filed against him because of double jeopardy.

Sec 22, Art3

1982 –

1987 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The law is a bill of attainder by which Congress, by assuming judicial magistracy, in effect declares all officials and
employees during martial law (September 21, 1972- February 25, 1986) as disloyal and, on this basis, removes some
while subjecting others to a loyalty test. With respect to the provision declaring positions vacant, even the power to
reorganize can not be invoked because under the Freedom Constitution such power can be exercised only by the
President and only up to February 25, 1987. Since the law under question was presumably passed after February 25,
1987 and by Congress, it is unconstitutional.

1988 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In PAFLU v. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 (1969) the Supreme Court upheld the validity of sec. 23 of the Industrial
Peace Act requiring labor unions to submit, within 60 days of the election of its officers, affidavits of the latter that
they are not members of the Communist Party, against the claim that the requirement unduly curtailed freedom of
assembly and association. The Court pointed out that the filing of the affidavits was merely a condition for the
acquisition by a labor organization of legal personality and the enjoyment of certain rights and privileges which the
Constitution does not guarantee. On the other hand, the requirement constitutes a valid exercise of the State's police
power to protect the public against abuse, fraud and impostors.
But the disqualification of members of the CPP and its military arm, the NPA, from being officers of a labor union would
(1) nullify the amnesty granted by the President with the concurrence, it may be assumed, of the majority of the
members of Congress and (2) permit the condemnation of the former NPA members without judicial trial in a way that
makes it contrary to the prohibition against the enactment of bill of attainder and ex post facto law. The amnesty
granted to the former NPAs obliterated their offense and relieved them of the punishment imposed by law.
(Barrioquinto v, Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 (1949)). The amendment would make them guilty of an act, that of having
been former members of the NPA, for which they have already been forgiven by Presidential amnesty. For these
reasons, I would advise the association to work for the veto of the bill and, if it is not vetoed but becomes a law, to
challenge it in court.

2005 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Gibson is incorrect. In Wright v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.113213, August 15,1994, it was held that the retroactive
application of the Treaty of Extradition does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, because the Treaty
is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provided for the extradition of
persons wanted for offenses already committed at the time the treaty was ratified.

2007 –
a. Is the Philippines under an obligation to extradite Lawrence? State the applicable rule and its rationale.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Philippine is under no obligation to extradite Lawrence. Under the principle of dual or double criminality, the crime
must be punishable in both the requesting and requested states to make it extraditable. In this case, only the United
States had anti-hacker law at the time of the commission of the crime in May 2005. The rational for the principle of
dual criminality rests “in part on the basic principle of reciprocity” and “in part of the maxim nulla poena sine lege.”
(LA Shearer, 1971 Extradition in International Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 137.)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if there was no anti-hacker law in the Philippines when the United States requested the extradition of Lawrence,
if the act is similar to malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, The Philippines will be under the
obligation to extradite Lawrence (Coquia and Defensor, International law and World Organizations, 4th ed. P.342).

b. Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines adopted its anti-hacker legislation. Will that
change your answer?
The Philippines is under no obligation to extradite Lawrence. The rule is that the crime must be punishable in both
countries at the time of the commission of the offense. Since there was yet no such crime in the Philippines at the
time when the acts complained of were done, in so far as the Philippines is concerned, Lawrence did not commit
any crime; hence, an extradition of Lawrence is tantamount to an ex post facto application of the Philippine anti-
hacker law, prohibited by section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

2008 –
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although the National Police is civilian in character, it partakes of some of the characteristics of military life, thus
permitting the imposition of reasonable measures for discipline, uniformity in behavior and presentableness. The
circular does not go beyond what is reasonable and therefore passes the test of due process (Gudani vs. Senga, G.R.
No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006). In Kelly vs. Johnson, 425 US 238 (1976), the US Supreme Court said that the regulations
of personal appearance of policemen could be justified so long as there was a rational connection between the
regulation and the promotional safety of persons and property. The requisite connection was present since the
government had a legitimate interest in policemen’s appearances so that they would: (1) be readily recognizable to
the public and (2) feel a sense of “esprit de corps” that comes from being similar.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The circular is a valid exercise of police power. The rule-making power is vested in congress however, it can be
delegated to administrative agencies pursuant to a valid delegation requiring the concurrence of the following:
1. Made pursuant of law
2. Issued within the scope and purview of the law
3. Promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure
4. it must be reasonable

It is the policy of the state to secure peace and order through the PNP. Therefore, it is reasonable to require them to
be physically fit in order to secure peace and order in the community. This is to boost the confidence of the public that
they are not lazy and they are doing their job with dedication.