(Palgrave Studies in Economic History) M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas, Joseba de La Torre (Eds.) - The Economic History of Nuclear Energy in Spain - Governance, Business and Finance-Palgrave Macmillan (2017) PDF

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN SPAIN
Governance, Business and Finance
Edited by
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
and Joseba De la Torre
Palgrave Studies in Economic History
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Kent Deng
London School of Economics
London, United Kingdom
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M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas • Joseba De la Torre
Editors
The Economic
History of Nuclear
Energy in Spain
Governance, Business and Finance
Editors
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas Joseba De la Torre
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Universidad Pública de Navarra Universidad Pública de Navarra
Pamplona, Spain Pamplona, Spain
Palgrave Studies in Economic History

ISBN 978-3-319-59866-6 ISBN 978-3-319-59867-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59867-3
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Preface
While writing this book some countries have announced the launch
of a nuclear power plant construction program and others are prepar-
ing to do so in the coming years. According to data from the Nuclear
News Agency NUCNET, at the beginning of 2017, 59 new reactors are
being built in the world and another 143 are planned for the next three
decades. In terms of electricity production, these new reactors would add
211,000 MWe of installed nuclear capacity, equivalent to 54% of all the
power currently installed in the 448 nuclear power plants operating on
our planet. Each nuclear project continues to pose technological, eco-
nomic and security challenges of enormous dimensions, with environ-
mental, social and political effects that prompt action from international
organizations, governments, companies and society.
The promoters of the atom argue that, assuring safety, nuclear devel-
opment is necessary as a base-load energy to combat climate change, the
volatility of oil prices and a guarantee for electricity supply. However,
recalling the accidents at Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011),
the debate over the extension of the licenses to continue the operation
nuclear power plants beyond the 40 years originally granted, and finding
permanent storage solutions for spent fuel and irradiated materials pro-
voke the distrust sections of the population (with large variation across
countries in scale and scope). One of the many paradoxes of this sce-
nario is that, within the European Union, while Germany plans to phase
v
vi Preface
nuclear power by 2022, the UK, France, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria
have decided to develop new atomic plants. Far from being a contro-
versial subject of the past, nuclear power is still on the front page in the
present and will remain so in the future.
The arguments of current energy officials in countries as diverse as
Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, Sudan and Ghana are reminiscent
of those used by pioneers of nuclear power in the 1960s and 1970s.
Governments, agencies and companies back then proclaimed that nuclear
programs would provide safe and cheap electricity, boost industrializa-
tion and reduce energy dependency. There is hardly any information on
how and who will pay for such projects in Africa and Asia, or whether
the technological, business and financial capacities have been considered.
The International Atomic Energy Agency oversee these projects and the
implied governments have negotiated with China and Russia, who seem
willing to provide the know-how and the massive financial support that
building a nuclear power plant requires. In this sense, the nuclear history
of Spain that we present in this volume can be paradigmatic to under-
stand the present, the expectations and the foreseeable successes and mis-
takes that these emerging economies may face in the coming years.
Most of the history of nuclear energy written to this day has focused
on the study of the industrial countries that pioneered all relevant aspects
this source of electricity. The US first, immediately followed by the Soviet
Union, the UK, Canada, France and West Germany were innovators of
this new technological challenge, diffusers of their industrial, health and
alimentary applications, which promised eternal prosperity for humanity,
but also posed known and unknown risks.
In that first phase of nuclear history, there were other countries with
economic potentials a priori insufficient to sustain a project of the scale
required to deploy this expensive and complex technology. Spain was
one of them but its history has gone quite unnoticed. In the middle of
the twentieth century Spain decided to promote a program of nuclear
power plants that, at the time of its maximum splendor, sought to install
reactors in forecasted amounts that surpassed those planned by economic
powers such as West Germany or Japan. Other developing countries that
pursued nuclear power at the time, such as India, Pakistan, Argentina
and Brazil, did so with proposals more modest than the Spanish one.
Preface
vii
Perhaps South Korea and Taiwan are examples of greater similarity to

Spain. The three countries shared strategic economic objectives and
authoritarian political regimes. In fact, Spain was the only country of the
Western Bloc that successfully propelled an atomic program, while at the
same time abominating liberal democracy. From a modest start, and with
the full support of part of the regime leaders, private utilities and foreign
aid, Spain emerged as an early adopter and champion importer of com-
mercial nuclear equipment. In fact, by the mid-1970s, Spain became the
largest customer of the US—the world’s largest provider of nuclear tech-
nology. At its maximum, the utilities formally applied to install reactors
with a combined capacity of nearly 35,000 MWe. The government pre-
authorized the installation of over 15,000 MWe. Yet, a combination of
economic, political and social factors led the curtailment of the Spanish
nuclear program to just ten reactors connected to the grid by 1988, just
over 7,500 MWe. The seven reactors in operation in 2017 provide about
20% of electric power.
This book aims at solving some of the paradoxes that arise from this
story, which chronology runs from 1950 to 1985. We seek to explain how
Spain, one of the least developed economies of the southern European
periphery, with a scant initial technological and industrial level, with
companies barely subject to international competition and, moreover,
governed by a dictatorship, could successfully insert itself among the pio-
neers of the world’s nuclear energy. The economic and industrial take-off
of Spain between 1960 and 1975 served to leave behind the autarkic
economic policy and to deploy the atomic project. However, the nuclear
excitement failed to reach all its objectives. It was possible to build power
plants with foreign technology (mostly North American but also French
and German), and gradually increase the local technological content,
innovating and competing internationally. But at the end, just a frac-
tion of the forecasted plants achieved operation, and the manufacture of
a Spanish reactor fueled by domestically enriched uranium never hap-
pened. The nuclear industry narrative justifies this partially frustrated
success by holding the Socialist government accountable for paralyzing
the nuclear program decreeing a nuclear moratorium in 1984. On the
contrary, the antinuclear movements allege they forced the moratorium
with their protests. As historians, we intertwine a mass of qualitative and
viii Preface
quantitative evidence for explaining how a young democracy assimilated

the dictatorship’s nuclear legacy within a context of a crude economic
and financial recession, the raise of social demands and the threats to
democratic consolidation.
Each of the eight chapters of this volume analyze and solve some spe-
cific elements of the institutional, economic, financial, business, techno-
logical and social architecture that configure the essence of that history.
The book presents a case study, that of the economic history of nuclear
power in Spain, yet it does so in permanent contact with an international
context nourished from multiple historiographical sources. The subtitle
Governance, Business and Finance seeks to identify the processes of inter-
action and decision-making among the actors involved in the atomic
project. Those interactions lead to the creation and management of new
laws, rules and institutions, administered by an authoritarian political
regime. What the Spanish example shows is that the relations between
the state and the market under a dictatorship facilitated the collaboration
between government and companies to undertake this megaproject, in
the absence of checks and balances to supervise the decisions made.
Chapter 1 offers a global overview synthetizing the macro-economic
and political developments on which the nuclear programs rooted around
the world, from the golden age and until after the two oil crises. This
approach serves to contextualize the Spanish case within these worldwide
dynamics, offering the key elements to build a comparative history, and
some initial indications about the true dimensions of the Spanish nuclear
program. In the next step, in Chap. 2, we identify and dissect the main
actors involved in the Spanish atomic project. Experts, scientist, military,
policymakers, promoters, engineers, consultants and energy consumers
articulated a project forced to evolve with the changes in the political
economy of the dictatorship and in the technological model finally fol-
lowed. After 40 years, the transition to democracy changed many things
in Spain, but in our context two issues stand out. First, voicing criti-
cal arguments from antinuclear movements became legally possible and
socially noticeable. Second, the new institutional framework replaced
most of the actors involved, except a crucial stakeholder: the directors of
the electric companies, who would have to negotiate the atomic halt of
1984.
Preface
ix
Chapter 3 explains the origins and the behavior of the electro-nuclear

lobby during the decisive decision-making phase about who would own
the nuclear business in Spain, the state or the market. Or rather how the
costs and benefits of an energy that everyone understood as strategic for
the country’s development and economic well-being would be shared.
The developmentalist economic policy and the influence of the promot-
ers tilt the balance in favor of the lobby. Thus, the private companies led
the development of nuclear power in Spain. However, as Spain could not
develop a nuclear program on its own, the collaboration of the techno-
logical leaders came about. In fact, the Spanish scientific and industrial
system had been establishing contacts with French and German experts
and entrepreneurs since the 1950s, which came to fruition years later. As
shown in Chap. 4, the contacts of JEN—the Spanish nuclear agency—
physicists with German, French and American laboratories led to a swift
supply of the highly specialized human capital required for the develop-
ment of a thermonuclear civil program.
The private sector could afford to take bold nuclear investment deci-
sions because it counted on the state backup. Chapter 5 reveals it. In a
very short time Spain became the “billion-dollar client” of the Exim Bank
due to the purchases of US nuclear equipment and enriched fuel. The
breakdown of dollar borrowing by company—until now unknown in its
magnitude—confirms the level of indebtedness that the electric sector
incurred to build thermonuclear plants. The debasement of the exchange
rate and increase of the price of money, between the end of the Carter
administration and the arrival of Reagan to the White House, trapped
the promoters in a spiral of negative cash flows. This explains why the
state came to the rescue of companies and that, in return, they accept
the nationalization of the electricity grid. In the meantime, the export
of the North American technological model to a selective club of the
nuclear countries played an essential role in maximizing the huge invest-
ments made in the US since the 1950s. The American multinationals had
been supported by US economic diplomacy and the abundant financ-
ing from their public and private banking. It was very difficult for third
parties to compete and win international nuclear contracts under these
conditions. Only the industry of France and West Germany managed to
x Preface
obtain contracts in the very active Spanish nuclear market, as discussed

in Chaps. 6 and 7.
The capture of contracts to launch the Vandellós and Trillo nuclear
power plants with the industry of France and the German Federal
Republic, in which business networks entwined with the political inter-
ests of the governments involved, constituted pyrrhic victories against
the North American nuclear commercial hegemony. Both examples offer
similarities and differences of interest. On the one hand, the French
nuclear route activated very soon after 1945. It sought to guarantee
national independence in the bipolar world of the Cold War. It used
its own technological development, that of the reactors that used natu-
ral uranium created in alliance between the public and private sectors,
and a permanent connection with the military uses of plutonium. West
Germany, on the other hand, saw its strategy tied up by the Allies’ mis-
trust during the postwar period, although it tried to revive a network of
atomic research laboratories that would eventually connect with private
industry.
Chapter 8, as an epilogue, establishes a balance between the objectives
of the Spanish nuclear program, the promises made in the years of atomic
optimism, and their results. We examine the compliance of the objectives
in the energy field by looking at the impact of nuclear energy on energy
issues such as the actual changes in energy matrix, the external energy
dependency and the security of supply. Our review of historical evidence
provides some rebuttals to the principal promises that pushed the Spanish
nuclear program since its inception. But it also finds some accomplish-
ments about how nuclear power helped to modernize the country.
Being the first economic history of the sector we have given priority
to establishing a state-of-the-art that has left out some pieces that will
require further study. Thus, the avid reader would surely miss the history
of the antinuclear movements, the local impacts at sitting places or a
more comprehensive description of the vicissitudes of the configuration
of the fuel cycle from uranium mining to waste management.
Except for a few of the balances established in the last chapter, this is
a story that ends in 1985. It remains pending the analysis of what has
happened since then to our days, both in the Spanish dimension and the
international dimension. One of the merits of this book is an effort of
Preface
xi
analysis and conceptualization that incorporates, from a dual macro- and

microeconomic perspective, the study of the decision-making and the
configuration of a business ecosystem with international ramifications.
And this case study shows that the economic history of nuclear energy
must necessarily be studied within a global context that integrates the
economic, political and social dimensions.
Chronology of the Spanish Nuclear
Program
1948 A secret nuclear energy program (EPALE) started by Franco dictatorship.

1951 Nuclear Energy Board (JEN) created for nuclear research.
1956 Two consortia founded by private electricity utilities to build nuclear
plants: NUCLENOR and CENUSA.
1957 TECNATOM founded by Banco Urquijo to develop nuclear activities.
1957 The Ministry of Industry creates the Directorate General of Nuclear
Energy.
1958 The first experimental swimming pool reactor built in Madrid (Moncloa
facilities) by JEN and General Electric.
1959 The government opens a factory to process natural uranium from the
Southern areas of the Iberian Peninsula.
1961 ARGOS experimental reactor at the School of Industrial Engineering of
Barcelona.
1962 ARBI experimental reactor at the School of Industrial Engineering of
Bilbao.
1962 The nuclear industry creates the lobby Spanish Atomic Forum.
1964 First nuclear Law: planning of nuclear energy policy, safety, risks and
insurances.
1964 First Eximbank credit authorization for the export of a turnkey nuclear
project to Zorita NPP.
1964 First Development Plan establishes a high degree of Spanish
participation in nuclear projects which set it at a minimum of 40%.
1966 Palomares accident: four hydrogen bombs drop from a US bomber
landing near the small fishing village of Palomares (Almería). One of
the earliest civil contaminations by plutonium in the world.
1967 First administrative complaint filed against Irta NPP by a local group
defending tourism activities.
xiii
xiv Chronology of the Spanish Nuclear Program
1968 Zorita NPP by Westinghouse becomes the first to supply commercial

electricity to the grid.
1968 The Spanish Government refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
1969 National Electricity Plan revised the local participation in nuclear
projects until it got to 50% in 1972, 60% in 1975, and 75% in 1978.
1971 Garoña NPP by GE connected to a regional grid.
1971 Accidental Discharge of radioactive water from the JEN facilities into
the river Manzanares in Madrid.
1972 National Energy Plan foresees the installation of new nuclear 22.7 GW
by 1985 (requiring at least two new nuclear stations per year).
1972 A new Decree on Nuclear and Radioactive Regulations introduced the
process to authorize a NPP: siting, construction and operation.
1973 Government plans for new National companies for supply nuclear
equipment (ENSA) and fuel cycle (ENUSA).
1976 Emergent local environmental antinuclear groups around the country
go into the public eye.
1977 Moncloa Pacts included the agreement on energy policy and nuclear
matters.
1978 ETA, first terrorist attacks against Lemóniz NPP.
1979 First Nuclear debate in a new democratic Parliament.
1979 The Civil Guard killed an antinuclear militant in an antinuclear protest
in Tudela (Navarra).
1980 Law creating the CSN (Nuclear Safety Board) as the only competent
body for nuclear safety and radiation protection, as an independent
organism.
1981 ETA kills the engineering Director of Lemóniz NP. A year later his
substitute too.
1984 The Socialist Party’s Government establishes a nuclear moratorium and
the electric utilities financial rescue.
1984 Spanish Parliament creates ENRESA as a public, non-profit organization
responsible for the management of radioactive waste.
1988 The last of 10 nuclear reactors become operational. Nuclear provides
almost half of the electricity in mainland Spain.
1989 Vandellós I accident: a fire in one of the turbines-generator (classified
3 in INES). Closure of the reactor. Decommission ordered.
1994 As a consequence of the restructuring of the electricity sector, large
shares of previously NPP private property ends up on the hands of
ENDESA the public electricity company.
2006 Zorita NNP, closes down after 38 years of operation initiating its
decommission by 2009–10.
2015 Spanish consumers finish paying the cost of the nuclear moratorium.
Acknowledgments
This book is the result of research work that explores unpublished sources
of archives, parts of which have been submitted for discussion in different
seminars and congresses over the years. That is why our list of thanks to
the colleagues with whom we have discussed topics and exchanged ideas
is extensive. We have also accumulated a better and qualified knowledge
of the sector thanks to oral history by some of the protagonists. The
three workshops on Economy and Nuclear Energy in Spain, c. 1950–2010
held at the Public Universities of Navarra, Pompeu Fabra and Autónoma
de Madrid have given us the testimony of Jorge Fabra (one of the cre-
ators of Red Eléctrica Española), Martín Gallego (Secretary of State for
Energy in 1983), Gonzalo Madrid (first director of Ciemat) and Alberto
Lafuente (Director General of Energy in the early 1990s and member of
the Governing Board of the International Atomic Energy Organization),
whose premature death we regret.
The two sessions that we organized in the XVIIth World Economic
History Congress (Kyoto, Japan, August 2015), and in the First Congress
on Business History/20th Congress of The European Business History
Association (University of Bergen, Norway, August 2016), and the
participation of any of the authors in the International Meeting
Electric Worlds/Mondes électriques (Paris, December 2014), The
Energy Economics Iberian Conference EEIC (Lisbon, 2016), and The
International Conference on Energy Research and Social Science (Sitges,
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
2017) have served as a meeting point to present results and to discuss

with Martin Chick, Duncan P. Connors, Marly Kamioji, Chris Pokarier,
Mauro Elli, Elisabetta Bini, Michael Camp, Niall MacKenzie, Pierre
Lanthier and Takeo Kikkawa, among others. The colleagues from the
Basque Country University and the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
invited us to present some sections of the project, just as we did in
the XI Congreso Internacional de la Asociación Española de Historia
Económica (CUNEF, Madrid, 2014) and in the two International
Congress on Historical Links between Spain and North America (Franklin
Institute, Alcalá de Henares, 2014 and CUNY, New York, 2015).
We want to mention Santiago López, Paloma Fernández, Jesús Mª
Valdaliso, Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo, Rafael Uriarte, Patricio Saiz,
Rafael Castro, Pablo Díaz Morlán, Adoración Álvaro, Carlos Aguasaco,
Elena Martínez-Ruiz, Isabel Bartolomé, Bernardo Batiz-Lazo, Ernesto
López, Emilio Huerta, Julio Tascón, Misael López Zapico, María Jesús
Santesmases, Raquel Lázaro, José Ramón Rodríguez Lago, Ana Romero
de Pablo, Fernando Guirao, Xavier Tafunell, Michael Aaron Rockland
and Clemens Zimmermann.
In 2015 three of us joined the consortium formed to research the
History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) a project financed by
the EU under the Horizon2020 program. We have learned a great deal of
the interaction with the colleagues of across Europe and beyond. The list
of names of a consortium of 23 institutions would exceed the patience of
our readers, but we would like to mention at least those that directly con-
tributed to this volume by sharing materials, bibliography and knowledge:
Stuart Buttler and Nalalia Melnikova. Also to those that organized and
attended the two sessions within the panel entitled “History of Nuclear
Energy and Society” at the European Social Sciences History Conference
(ESSHC 2016): Christian Forstner, Jan-Henrik Meyer, Arne Kaijser,
Wilfried Konrad, Karl-Erik Michelsen, Ioan Parry, John Whitton and
Josep Lluís Espluga. The research objectives of HoNESt brought us to
meet the stakeholders of Spanish industry. Even when they may not share
our views, we feel obliged with CEIDEN (the R&D platform of the
Spanish nuclear industry), ENSA, ENUSA, Tecnatom and Foro Nuclear,
who received us and answered our questions, which directly and indi-
rectly inform parts of this volume.
Acknowledgments
xvii
We also must also offer thanks for the support received by the archi-
vists and technicians of a score of libraries and archives scattered among
Spain, the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. All
the authors of this book belong to two intersecting research projects. We
are indebted with the generosity of the whole research team when shar-
ing their materials to the benefit of this volume: Albert Presas facilitating
us the access to the British sources fetched by him and to the complete
digitalized collection of the magazine Energía Nuclear; Josean Garrues
providing the documentation he obtained at the archives from Nuclenor;
Esther Sanchez sharing relevant sources and documents obtained in her
field trips to France and Vandellós. Sharing resources made possible cross
examining information and filling the gaps.
We want to express our gratitude to our research assistants at Public
University of Navarra: Elena Aramendia for her help gathering and digi-
talizing sources and with the editing process; Cristina Greño and Diego
Sesma for their data-mining work. In any case, our institutional and per-
sonal debts are numerous.
Finally, none of this would have been possible without the pub-
lic funding achieved in competitive calls and provided the resources
for the authors to complete fieldwork, attend conferences and pay
for many of the services required for bringing research to the public.
Among the funding bodies, we must thank the Spanish Ministry of
Economics and Competitiveness (projects: The Deployment of Nuclear
Energy in Spain from an International Perspective: Economics, Business
and Finance, c. 1950–1985 [HAR 2014/53825 R]; The Livelihood of
Man [HAR2013–40760-R]; Industrial Crisis and Productive Recovery in
Spanish History, 1686–2018 [HAR2015–64769-P); the Spanish Ministry
of Defence (El factor internacional y la transformación de las Fuerzas
Armadas (1953–1982): diplomacia de defensa y transferencia de tecnología,
[ref. 2014–09]); the Bank of Spain (The External Financing of Spanish
Industrial Development through the IEME (1950–1982)), and, last but
not least, the European Commission/Euratom research and training pro-
gram 2014–2018 (History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt), grant
agreement No. 662268).
Contents
1 Seeking the Perennial Fountain of the World’s Prosperity 1

M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas and Joseba De la Torre
2 Who was Who in the Making of Spanish Nuclear

Programme, c.1950–1985 33
Joseba De la Torre
3 The Nuclear Business and the Spanish Electric-Banking

Oligopoly: The First Steps 67
Josean Garrués-Irurzun and Juan A. Rubio-Mondéjar
4 Human Capital and Physics Research for the Spanish

Nuclear Program 97
Albert Presas i Puig
5 How did Spain Become the Major US Nuclear Client? 119

M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas and Joseba De la Torre
xix
xx Contents
6 An Alternative Route? France’s Position in the Spanish

Nuclear Program, c. 1950s–1980s 155
Esther M. Sánchez-Sánchez
7 The Long Road to the Trillo Nuclear Power Plant:

West Germany in the Spanish Nuclear Race 187
Gloria Sanz Lafuente
8 Energy Planning, Nuclear Promises and Realities 217

Beatriz Muñoz-Delgado and M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
ppendix A. List of Nuclear Projects in Spain

A
since 1959 to Present 249
Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry (2011) 255
Bibliography 259
Index 279
Abbreviations
BOE Boletin Oficial del Estado (Official State Bulletin, the

place for publishing laws)
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CENUSA Centrales Nucleares SA (a private joint venture for
nuclear power in the South of the country)
CERN Center of the European Organization for Nuclear
Research
CIEMAT Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas
Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (Public Research
Agency for Energy, Environment and Technologies)
CSN Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (Nuclear Safety Board)
CSNI Consejo de Seguridad de Instalaciones Nucleares
(Nuclear Plants Safety Board)
EDF Electricite de France
ENDESA Empresa Nacional de Electricidad SA (National
Company for Electricity)
ENEA European Nuclear Energy Agency
ENRESA Empresa Nacional de Residuos Radioactivos SA
(National Company for Nuclear Waste)
ENSA Equipos Nucleares SA (National Company for
Nuclear Equipment)
xxi
xxii Abbreviations
ENUSA Empresa Nacional de Uranio SA (National Company

for Uranium cycle)
EPALE Estudios y Patentes de Aleaciones Especiales (the first
Spanish nuclear research public body)
FECSA Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña (a private electricity
utility)
FORO Forum Atómico Español (today known as Foro
Nuclear) (Nuclear Industry lobby)
GE General Electric
GIFT The Inter-University Group on Theoretical Physics
HECSA Hidroeléctrica de Cataluña (a private electricity
utility)
HIDROLA Hidroeléctrica Española (a private electricity utility)
HIFRENSA Hispano-francesa de Energía Nuclear (French and
Spanish joint venture for Vandellós I)
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IBERDUERO A private electricity utility
IEN Instituto de Energía Nuclear (Nuclear Energy
Institute)
INI Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Industry
Institute)
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
JEN Junta Energía Nuclear (Nuclear Energy Board)
KWU Kraftwerk Uninion (AG plus Siemens branch for
nuclear development)
NUCLENOR Centrales Nucleares del Norte (Nuclear Power Plants
of the North)
PEN Plan Energético Nacional (Energy National Planning)
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
TECNATOM Técnicas Atómicas SA (engineering company provid-
ing services for nuclear plants)
UEM Union Electrica Madrileña (the pioneer utility on
nuclear power in Spain)
UNESA Unidad Eléctrica SA (Electrical management
Association)
Abbreviations
xxiii
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WH Westinghouse Corporation
WNA World Nuclear Association
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 World’s nuclear reactors by construction start date and

capacity, 1950–2011 11
Fig. 1.2 Map of nuclear power plants planned and installed in Spain
1960s–1980s20
Fig. 3.1 Corporate network of the largest Spanish banking firms,
and electricity and auxiliary industries (1960). Sphere:
Electricity companies; banks and auxiliary industries;
Square: UNESA. The thickness of the links depends on
the number of directorships 79
Fig. 3.2 Egonets of Bank of Vizcaya, Bank of Bilbao, Iberduero and
Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola) in 1960. The relations of
the Banco de Vizcaya (also known as “Electric Bank”) with
other banks, utilities and auxiliary companies have marked
in black 82
Fig. 5.1 Global Nuclear Export Orders (no. of reactors) and share
of the US in the Western nuclear market 1955–80 122
Fig. 5.2 Global import orders for nuclear reactors (1955–80) 123
Fig. 5.3 Cumulative applications, pre-authorizations and nuclear
capacity connected Spain (1959–88). Distribution of nuclear
applications and pre-authorizations by geographical areas 134
xxv
xxvi List of Figures
Fig. 5.4 Nuclear capacity planned by Spanish utilities 1959–1975 135

Fig. 5.5 Scheduled repayment instalments by Spanish electricity
utilities on their Eximbank credits (1968–90) 141
Fig. 5.6 Accumulated costs of the Spanish nuclear project
supplied by US 142
Fig. 5.7 Declining US share on Spanish nuclear project costs,
1964–77 (and Exim Finance share on US costs of Spanish
projects)143
Fig. 8.1 Forecast for electricity consumption and nuclear needs by
MacVeigh (1957) vs. historical data of electricity
consumption and nuclear capacity Spain 1950–2000 220
Fig. 8.2 Map of Spanish provincial industrial electricity consumption
in 1960 222
Fig. 8.3 Electric intensity of Spanish GDP, 1950–2000 (MWh per
million $ Gheary-Khamis of 1990) 226
Fig. 8.4 Spanish dependence on energy imports, 1950–2008 (%) 228
Fig. 8.5 Primary energy consumption in Spain by source,
1950–2008 (PJ) 229
Fig. 8.6 Electricity generation in Spain by source,
1980–2014 (TWh) 235
Fig. 8.7 Energy Mix Concentration Index (EMCI) in Spain with
and without nuclear power, 1959–2009 237
Fig. 8.8 Spain and EU-15 vs. France electricity prices
comparison for industrial and domestic consumers in
Euros/kWh (excluding taxes and levies), 1985S1–2007S2 238
Fig. 8.9 Spanish net trade of nuclear equipment and fuel elements
1965–2010 (million real US dollars) 241
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Production of electricity, contribution of nuclear power

in non-communist countries by 1973 19
Table 5.1 Eximbank financing support of nuclear power exports
through December 31, 1969 127
Table 5.2 The Spanish nuclear market for nuclear reactors (successful
tenders, under construction and operative) 137
Table 5.3 Stakeholders and interest in the Spanish electricity sector
by 1978 139
Table 6.1 French and Spanish financing for Vandellós 1 nuclear plant 168
Table 8.1 Successive historical forecasts for nuclear installed capacity
in Spain 225
Table 8.2 Spanish nuclear cluster by Sectors (2011) 241
xxvii
1
Seeking the Perennial Fountain
of the World’s Prosperity
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
Nuclear fission was discovered in 1939, and the world’s first chain reaction
was achieved by the Manhattan Project on 2 December 1942 at the
University of Chicago. However, it was not until after World War II, on
20 December 1951, that electricity was first generated from nuclear power.
Yet, the beginning of civil nuclear power is commonly set at President
Eisenhower’s address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8
December 1953, later called the “Atoms for Peace” speech.1 At the time,
only four nations—US, UK, Canada and the Soviet Union—possessed
the atomic secret. The nations of the world began striving for a solution to
the dilemma posed by the atom: it embedded the greatest danger ever
known to humankind but also the potential to become the “perennial
Research for this chapter was financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
(project ref. HAR2014-53825-R) and by the European Commission and Euratom research and
training program 2014–2018 (History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt), grant agreement
No. 662268).
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (*) • J. De la Torre

Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics (INARBE),
Universidad Publica de Navarra, Spain
© The Author(s) 2017 1

M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas, J. De la Torre (eds.), The Economic History of Nuclear Energy in
Spain, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59867-3_1
2 M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas and J. De la Torre
fountain of world prosperity.”2 Forecasted applications of atomic power

included atomic-powered ships, submarines, aircrafts, trains, automobiles
and even farm tractors.3 Specialist envisaged atomic energy to be used in
intensive energy sectors such as aluminum, phosphates, cement, bricks,
flat glass iron and steel but also in residential heating.4 Including the pro-
duction of electric power from atomic piles, the agricultural and medical
applications were all on their way. Yet nuclear power failed to become the
ubiquitous technology the early advocates anticipated.
A review of the literature of the origins of nuclear power reveals that
economic history has been mostly absent from the analysis. Maybe
because many analysts concluded that the economic aspects ranked well
below other crucial issues: geopolitical status, technological and institu-
tional systems, scientific knowledge, social perception of risk and safety
or ideological opposition against and in favor the uses of the atom.
Without disregarding all these other important surroundings, this chap-
ter focuses on the economic forces that played a role in the development
of nuclear programs around the world.
The point is that we do not have an economic history of nuclear energy.
In fact, it is possible to say that a history that includes the economy, the
companies and the finances of this energy with the tools of economic
historians has scarcely begun. However, we have a very marked narrative
for the great milestones of atomic history in which the economy seems
marginal: the bombs on Japan, the optimism of peaceful uses, the spread
of nuclear programs in both sides of the Iron Curtain and nuclear pessi-
mism following the accidents of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and
the media battle won by the antinuclear against the pronuclear discourse
of the state and the industry. At least social history and the history of sci-
ence and technology have progressed and offer a theoretical framework
that the economic historian must consider. The sociological approach has
coined the concept of “technopolitics,” which includes the political,
social and cultural impact of what Hetch (2014) calls “nuclear exception-
alism” confronting utopian dreams and dystopian nightmares.5 In this
sense, Balog’s (1991) analysis of bureaucratic politics in the nuclear power
industry is useful.6 Science historians provide as a key factor the develop-
ment of scientific systems of nuclear energy and their political impact in
each country and in international organizations.7 These two historio-
Seeking the Perennial Fountain of the World’s Prosperity 3
graphical currents show the value of historical actors to understand such

a complex phenomenon. On the other hand, the history of international
relations offers relevant elements of the nuclear puzzle in the context of
the Cold War, atomic weapons, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
political intrigues.8
This absence of economic history is surprising because from the begin-
ning of the nuclear age there was a concern about the financing of nuclear
power plants. National and international institutions considered the eco-
nomic aspects as strategic.9 A large part of the bill would come out of
public budgets. In addition, much of the literature on nuclear economics
and energy policy in the 1970s and 1980s attempted to explain the finan-
cial impact before and after the Harrisburg accident, especially in the
context in which US companies suspended more than half of their
projects.10
Perhaps the temporal proximity and the sensitive nature of the topic
added to the difficult access to the archieves. The fact that from the 1990s
nuclear energy mostly disappeared from the public debate may have also
played a role. We need an economic history that includes its economic
and financial significance and scope, the actors (regulators and policy-
makers, scientific experts and engineers, promoters and industrialists,
citizens and consumers). Neither is there a business history that explains
the nuclear ecosystem,11 the industrial infrastructures, the markets, the
attitudes of the entrepreneurs and the institutional influence.
The challenge of securing an adequate supply of affordable energy is
inherent to modern societies. Over the past 60 years, additional require-
ments have been added to the desirable energy qualities: secure, sus-
tainable, clean and so on. This chapter makes use of economic history
as a mean for clarifying those aspects of the historical framework that
influenced the outcome of the decisions. From this perspective, the
interaction of the macro-economy, in combination with economic pol-
icy and the industrial structure, defined the energy requirements and
the country’s ability to meet energy demand by choosing among the
competing technologies. Beyond setting the energy requirements and
limiting the financially feasible options, the institutional setting also
defined how and who took (or influenced) the decision-making
process.
he Macro-economic Background
T
to the Nuclear Decision-making
The overall positive correlation between economic growth and energy
growth remains one of the most important stylized facts we can draw
from history. There has been a stable relationship between countries’
GDP per capita and per capita energy use over the last 40 years.12 For
longer periods of time the extent of this correlation and its patterns over
time are highly variable, and the direction of the causality remains unclear.
Whether highly energy-consuming countries are richer because they con-
sume more energy than the others, or they consume more energy pre-
cisely because they are richer, is still an open question.13 But the fact is
that economic history makes it evident that the industrial standing of any
country may be gauged, with a fair degree of accuracy, from its level of
energy consumption.
Even when correlation between economic output and energy con
sumption is strong and positive, not all forms of energy have the same
impact on economic output. While remaining trapped in traditional/
organic forms of energy seems to have a negative correlation with the level
of development attained by any one country,14 electrification seems to be
highly correlated with economic growth since its qualities make it far more
productive than other forms of energy.15 These basic energy economic
principles have been known and used as tools of political economy from
the beginning of the twentieth century.16 The nuclear option therefore,
with its promise to supply enormous quantities of electricity, was from the
beginning associated to economic progress and industrialization.
Given the relations just explained, economic growth appears intrinsi-
cally connected to energy consumption, and electricity consumption in
particular. Therefore, economic cycles determine a good deal of the energy
planning, options, efforts and decisions taken. We need to understand the
different macro-economic frameworks that affected the nuclear system.
There exists a wide consensus about the general traits of global macro-
economic history since World War II to the present. Even when each
country and region may have experienced slight variations, any economic
history textbook provides general traits shared across the world in three
stages:17 the golden age from the end of World War II to 1971, the decel-
eration and crisis that followed the end of the Bretton Woods system and
the oil crises (1971–81), and the restructuring and change of the 1980s
and 1990s and the new challenges that closed the century. Each of those
provided distinct scenarios for the nuclear system decision-making.
950s–1971: Hyper-growth After World War II—The

1
Golden Age
The 1950s emerged from the ashes of the two world wars and the eco-
nomic Great Depression in between. The lessons learned the hard way
during the previous 30 years opened the door to new policies of greater
international collaboration, solidarity and coordination. The interna-
tional order that emerged from the Bretton Woods conference in 1944
provided the basis for the reconstruction and the growth that would mark
the issuing decades. International institutions such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement for
Tariff and Trade (GATT latter evolved into the World Trade
Organization—WTO) all arose from Bretton Woods. Also, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), drawing on the precedents
set by other organizations, developed into a charter of an international
agency, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956. As
indirect consequences of those, other multilateral organizations such as
the European Organization Economic for Cooperation (OEEC) and its
Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) and Development and the European
Treaty of Rome, the germ of the current European Union, and the birth-
place of EURATOM itself, also contributed to the new mutual assistance
climate.
The new supranational institutions brought macro-economic stabil-
ity—and a fixed exchange rate to the dollar—and together with the
reconstruction effort, new technologies and new business organizations
fostered global economic growth to unprecedented levels. Income per
capita almost doubled in the world from 1950 to 1971—it tripled in the
Western world. In the same period the world’s primary energy consump-
tion quadrupled, mostly due to the growth of energy consumption in
developed countries.18 Energy demand surged around the world for

industry, transport, commercial and domestic uses. The development in
oil and gas fields supplied cheap and abundant fossil fuels for the growing
demand. Among final energy sources, electricity grew faster than any
other source including oil. In many parts of the Western world, electricity
demand grew at rates well above 7%, which implied it doubled every
decade (for Spain see Chap. 8).
Accompanying the worldwide economic growth, two other eco-
nomic characters emerge in this period: the consolidation of the multi-
national firms and the active participation of governments in the
economy. State intervention in economic activity was ubiquitous prior
to World War I in places as varied as Victorian Britain, republican
Brazil and Bismarck’s Germany. After steering their economies through
two world wars and a depression, by 1950, railways, airlines, coal, elec-
tricity, iron and steel, gas and telecommunications were fully or partly
government owned mostly everywhere in Western Europe—even
though public ownership had emerged in a variety of ideological set-
tings—socialist, fascist, pro-market.19 Governments across the globe
would create large state-owned enterprises (SOE) and multiple eco-
nomic agencies for intervening in the most varied aspects of economic
activity: industry, banking, trade and so on.
Most nuclear programs began and grew from the 1950s to the 1970s.
The developments in the nuclear system mirrored the key macro-economic
characteristics of the period: the need to match the ever-growing electric-
ity demand, setting multilateral international collaboration agencies, the
strong intervention of the state and increasing role of few multinationals.
By the early 1960s, demonstration power reactors were in operation in all
the leading industrial countries, although the economic competitiveness
of nuclear energy was still in question and the competition among the
technological alternatives for reactor design remained unsettled.20
The first nuclear reactors connected to the electricity grid, Obninsk in
the Soviet Union by 1954, Calder Hall in the UK by 1956 and
Shippingport in the US by 1957, proved the concept, but were far from
been commercially viable. They were small (5 MWe, 50 MWe and
90 MWe respectively), each applying dissimilar technologies and with
plenty of unknowns to be solved. The announcement of the first
commercial contract for a civil nuclear plant in the US, Oyster Creek,
came in December 1962. General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse (WH)
threw themselves into conquering both the US and the international
market with a successful marketing campaign. For these two companies,
it was time to monetize the enormous effort they had been putting into
developing the technology since the 1940s, with the support of the fed-
eral government and large private companies. The sales pitch of GE and
WH stated that atomic energy was close to being able to compete with
conventional sources of electricity. It would soon be cheaper to build a
nuclear power plant than a conventional one.21
In a frenzy of optimism for atomic technology, public decision-makers
from many countries accepted these predictions and rushed to embrace
the nuclear option. Western governments persuaded themselves that
nuclear power plants were a good choice to guarantee cheap electricity,
reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, and sustain medium-term eco-
nomic development. Yet, until the late 1960s, nuclear plants were built
for gaining construction and operating experience with new technologies
rather than for an inherent economic profit of nuclear power.22 By 1967,
US utilities alone had ordered more than 50 power reactors, with an
aggregate capacity larger than that of all orders in the US for coal- and
oil-fired plants.23 Internationally, the turnkey projects implied a cascade
of orders in the second half of the 1960s (see Chap. 5 of this volume).
But turnkey projects were also a sort of investment for obtaining infor-
mation through “learning by doing” in an effort to capture rents from the
second-generation reactors.24 The potential was there, but it was not until
utilities gained confidence that light-water reactors were reliable and
could become economically competitive that nuclear power stations
began to be constructed on a large scale.
Slowdown and Oil Crisis
The surge of orders of nuclear power installations in the early 1970s was
more in anticipation of favorable future conditions with larger reactor
units than a reflection of actual economics at the time.25 The nuclear
power boom will soon encounter, as the world economy, a major
slowdown which then will turn into the worst economic crisis since the
Great Depression. The end of the golden-age cycle began with the “tem-
porary” suspension of the dollar–gold standard in August 1971. While
the dollar devaluations of the Nixon’s Administration made the prices of
US goods and services competitive in world markets for the first time in
a decade, it also ended the stability brought by the Bretton Woods sys-
tem in the international currency markets. Soon after, in October 1973,
an astronomical increase in oil prices consequence of the OPEC block-
ade, initiated a worldwide economic crisis. For a short while, the oil
crisis of 1973–74 looked like an opportunity to foster nuclear power, as
a solution for the now onerous oil imports.26 But the economy slum
proved otherwise. Planners had overestimated countries’ electricity
needs assuming that demand would increase steadily at a rate exceeding
that of economic growth. As the economy slowed down, so did the elec-
tric demand. By 1975, the curve of nuclear orders had already passed its
peak. Furthermore, over two-thirds of all nuclear plants ordered after
January 1970 were eventually cancelled.27 In the US nuclear invest-
ments stalled in the late 1970s, with no new plants ordered after 1978.
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, where the first oil crisis was
hardly felt and markets’ logic did not apply, the Soviet Union received
export orders for 28 reactors during the 1970s. Most of the orders were
from East European countries, but customers included Finland, Cuba
and Libya.28
The second oil crisis, in 1979, hardened the world’s economic outlook
and implied a definitive change in energy policy concentrating efforts in
reducing energy consumption. The uncertainties over the world economy
translated into falling energy consumption in many countries, more
expensive dollars, and soaring interest rates, particularly after 1981. For
the nuclear system, the uncertainties and economic adversities only got
worse after the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident of 1979. In most coun-
tries operating or planning nuclear plants, the financial situation grew
more serious as new, stricter safety regulations (the so-called TMI effect)
made it harder for bidding companies to meet project deadlines.
In parallel, the 1970s saw a surge in environmentalism, resulting in new
environmental legislation, environmental ministries and, in several coun-
tries, the founding of formal Green political parties, all anti-nuclear.29
1982–1990s: Restructuring the World Economy
The last 20 years of the twentieth century brought about the most far-
reaching changes in the world’s scene since 1945. It also provided wider
variety in economic occurrences. The end of the Cold War and of the fear
of a nuclear Armageddon came accompanied by a major economic,
social, and political crisis in Eastern Europe before and after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. The early 1980s also resulted in the major sovereign
debt crisis in peace times affecting large parts of Latin America, Eastern
Europe, and Africa. Meanwhile, the rapid economic progress in China
and in the “tigers” of North East and South East Asia astonished the
world and the old continent progressed towards a European Union. For
the first time energy consumption delinked from economic growth in
developed countries (slower growth on energy consumption than in the
economy) while energy consumption in the developing world continued
to outgrow economic activity.
In terms of economic policy, the deep crisis of the 1970s brought
about new paradigms which would win the day from 1982 onwards. The
ideas of economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman—advocating
monetarism, a greater scope for markets and limited government—won
out over the state ownership and protection of industry of the previous
decades. These policies in Europe and Japan manifested clearly in the
privatization of large state-owned enterprises, the end of subsidies and
the reduction or elimination of economic government agencies. For the
nuclear sector, the change in the political economy implied the end of
subsidized loans—at least those of the Eximbank for exports of US
nuclear technology, crucial in the previous decades as we shall see in
Chap. 530—and in many countries the privatization of electricity utili-
ties, that had ordered nuclear plants previously, had to continue without
state support.
The explosion of the Chernobyl reactor unit 4 in April 1986 in Ukraine,
at the time the flagship of the USSR’s nuclear power program, broadened
the opposition to nuclear power worldwide. Countries that were plan-
ning to build nuclear power plants abandoned them after Chernobyl
(Egypt, Italy and Poland), and countries that had slowed down their pro-
grams or declared moratoriums before the accident (Austria, Spain) ratified
their decision. Security became the major issue for nuclear power-operat-
ing countries. Beyond the nuclear sector, the accident had further politi-
cal implications in the Eastern Bloc.31
During the 1980s, pairing with the energy crisis, the concern contin-
ued to deepen about humankind’s ability to sustain economic develop-
ment without further injury to the planet’s natural environment. The
decision to hold the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, added two new concepts
into the political agenda: sustainability and climate change. In September
1995, the IAEA Secretariat provided the Board with a detailed survey of
nuclear power contribution to sustainable development, and presented
hydropower and nuclear power as the only available large-scale energy
sources that had relatively low “external” costs (i.e. indirect costs besides
capital, operating and maintenance costs) fighting greenhouse emis-
sions.32 In the meantime, the monitoring and control agencies for com-
mercial nuclear power had been set up. Established by the nuclear power
industry the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was born to
investigate the TMI accident. The World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) is an international group of nuclear power plant
operators, formed in 1989, following the Chernobyl accident. Both are
charged to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability in the oper-
ation of commercial nuclear power plants worldwide and improve per-
formance through mutual support, exchange of information and
emulation of best practices.33
Against the different macro-economic backgrounds just described, we
can now observe the development of nuclear power worldwide with more
precision. Figure 1.1 shows the world’s 478 reactors in operation by
2011, by their construction start date and capacity, labelled by each of
the 32 hosting countries. It makes evident that most nuclear programs
started and grew during the golden age, with a big spur from the late
1960s to the mid-1970s. The economics of the nuclear system shared the
macro-economic glooms and uncertainty of the late 1970s and early
1980s, except in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where the dollar
devaluations and the first oil crisis were hardly felt. For the last quarter of
the twentieth century only Asia, where economic growth continued at
high levels, saw more nuclear power built.
1500 LT LT
FR
BR
DE
DE GB
SE
1000
ES
IR BE BG KR
CH ZA TW RU
Capacity (Mw)
UA
JP
CA CZ
US
RO
FI MX MX
US BR TW
SI CN
FR
KR AR
500
CA
NL HU HU
SE BG CZ
RO
RU BE FI SK AM SK
CH PK
JP UA
AR CN
GB IN
IN
ES
PK
Shippingport(US)
Calder Hall(GB)
0
Obninsk(RU)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Construction start date
Sources and notes: own elaboration from IAEA data for the 478 reactors in operation by 2011, plus the
plants that had been decommissioned before that date for Spain, and the starting date of construction for
Obninsk, Calder Hall and Shippingport which compete to be the first nuclear power plants ever connected
to the electricity grid. The lines mark the accidents of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
respectively. For each country the first and last nuclear plant by construction date has been labeled using
their ISO 2 codes.
Fig. 1.1 World’s nuclear reactors by construction start date and capacity,
1950–2011
Figure 1.1 also makes evident a paradox: a technology that aspired to

become the perennial fountain of world’s prosperity was adopted by little
more than 30 of the almost 200 nations of the world. And it was a deci-
sion taken (or not) well before any major accident took place. In fact,
almost 65% of the world’s reactors (308 of the 478 reactors) started their
construction before TMI, and about half of the nuclear countries had
already halted nuclear orders before 1979.34 No new country entered the
list of nuclear-powered nations after that date, with one notable excep-
tion: China, which began its commercial nuclear power projects in the
1980s, even when it had mastered the military uses since 1964. The rela-
tively short list of nuclear-powered nations contrast with the number of
nations that showed interest at the dawn of the industry: by the end of
1959, the US had concluded agreements for cooperation in the peaceful
uses of atomic energy with 42 countries; a decade later, the Soviet
Union had nuclear cooperation agreements with an additional 26
countries.35
Do the nuclear-powered nations share any common traits? The list
of countries with operating nuclear facilities in 2011, ordered by the
starting construction date of their first commercial plant, include:
Russia, UK, US, West and East Germany, Spain, India, Switzerland,
France, Canada, Sweden, Pakistan, Japan, Romania, Argentina,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Brazil, Slovakia, Taiwan, South Korea,
Ukraine, Netherlands, Hungary, Slovenia, Iran, Armenia, South Africa,
Mexico, Lithuania, Czech Republic and China.36 Beyond all the other
plausible explanations for this paradox (cultural, geostrategic etc.), the
next section explores the political economy, industrial economics and
business decision-making influencing the resolution about joining the
nuclear club.
conomic Policy, Industrial Economics

E
and Business Decision-making
The atomic choice had more economic policy implications than just the
average pick of an energy technology over another to meet future electric-
ity demands. Although this book focuses on the civil uses of the atom, it
should not be ignored that very few of the nuclear-powered countries in
the list openly sidelined the military uses of the atom from the start of
their civil programs. The superpowers of the Cold War were all nuclear
countries of dual use. The rest of the list contains countries that were part
of the wider strategies of the superpowers during the Cold War, and had
their own military aspirations. As least until the safeguards first and the
non-proliferation policies later, forced some countries to reluctantly
shelve their atomic military plans sooner or later (for Spain see Chap.
2).37 Some others, like India in 1974, Pakistan in 1982 or North Korea in
2005, achieved their objectives. Israel is widely known to have developed
nuclear weapons, but has not acknowledged its atomic forces.
Building nuclear power plants required strong governments. The risks

involved in many fronts—security, financial, environmental—could only
be addressed with the supervision of the state. The countries betting on
nuclear power had hard-wearing governments actively involved in the
economic affairs of their territories. Governments leading the industrial
policies in their nations maintained some form of nationwide energy
planning and scientific institutions with governmental research pro-
grams. Whether through the central planning of the Soviet Bloc, the
indicative planning of the Western nations, Japan, Taiwan or South
Korea, or the Import Substitution Industrialization policies of Latin
America, the governments on the nuclear list all had a heavy hand on
their economies. Every country aiming at having a nuclear program
started by creating a state-level agency for the purpose: some notorious
examples include the AEC (US), CEA (France), UKAEA (UK), JEN
(Spain) and so on.
The implicit promise of modernization brought by the abundant elec-
tricity of the atomic reactors was paired with the pulling effect that the
nuclear industry was expected to play in countries aiming to fast-track to
the developed world. Nuclear reactors, for better or worse, become the vis-
ible symbol of technical progress and national attainment.38 Consequently,
many governments made nuclear programs a central piece of their indus-
trialization strategies. The nuclear system became a pulling force for the
national industry. This manifested in different forms. After the nuclear
pioneering countries, some follower countries started to erect their own
nuclear power plants—Germany, France, Sweden, South Korea and Japan.
Other significant nuclear-importing countries took the opportunity to
develop their auxiliary industry by pushing hard for increasing local par-
ticipation in imported nuclear projects.39 Spain will be one of those, as we
will see in several of the chapters of this volume.
As can be observed in Fig. 1.1, from the late 1960s it was becoming clear
that the trend was towards larger nuclear power plants. Those countries
that were in the market for nuclear power had to have sufficiently large and
integrated electrical networks to accommodate nuclear plants of standard
sizes—about 500–1000 MWe. The belief that the transition from low- to
high-capacity reactors (from 500 MWe to over 1000 MWe) could be
achieved simply through economies of scale was shattered by a reality
fraught with technical problems, the need to review safety standards, failure
to meet deadlines, and, ultimately, swollen funding costs.40 From the start
of commercial nuclear reactor construction in the mid-1960s through the
1980s, capital costs (dollars per kilowatt of capacity) for building nuclear
reactors escalated dramatically. Although unit costs for technology usually
decrease with volume of production because of scale factors and techno-
logical learning, the case of nuclear power has been seen largely as an excep-
tion that reflects the idiosyncrasies of the regulatory environment as public
opposition grew, regulations were tightened, and construction times
increased.41
The trend towards larger reactors left out many nations that had irreg-
ular or insufficient electricity demand and inadequate grid connections.
They simply could not take advantage of an uninterrupted supply of large
amounts of electricity. However, nuclear manufacturers, flooded with
orders for larger plants, showed little enthusiasm for pursuing the pro-
duction of smaller ones.42 Only Pakistan and India kept ordering small
reactors that accommodated their electricity network needs (see Fig. 1.1).
Portugal had to renounce to the idea to install a nuclear plant, in part for
the lack of an integrated electricity network. In fact, the world’s nuclear
largest manufacturer, the US, recognized in the early 1980s that if the
rational economic development of the customer nations was to be con-
sidered, only a few Asian, African and Latin American countries had
power grids large enough to distribute electricity produced by even the
smallest commercially available US nuclear reactor.43
By concentrating in larger units in the hope of lower construction cost
the nuclear industry missed the opportunity of achieving lower costs
associated with manufacturing many units of the same type.44 Learning
effects suggest that standardization is a successful strategy to overcome
delays and uncertainties during the construction process and thus reduce
the cost of the following reactors of the same series.45 Nuclear power
plants are “site-built” which have difficulties to standardize since each
project has to adapt to the specific location. Yet, if a company could build
the same reactor over and over under consistent conditions, then learning
by doing—the efficiency gains that arise from perfecting processes—is
more likely to occur. This can lead to efficiency gains: saving on site-
related costs (like evacuation plans), getting specialized equipment and

workers, and consolidating control rooms.46
Again, the question is whether customers could afford buying reactors
in groups and digest so much electricity at a single site. The data in Fig. 1.1
can be used as distant proxy for observing standardization. France, South
Korea, Russia, Ukraine, India and to some extent China, built reactors of
identical capacity. In the US, Spain, Sweden and Germany nuclear reac-
tors came in different sizes, often individually ordered and built.
In most parts of the world, many aspects of the nuclear system involve
business decisions. Where the private initiative prevailed, decisions
tended to be market oriented; where state intervention took the upper
hand, profits remained optional and losses could be sustained for longer
periods of time. From a business perspective, nuclear projects rank among
the largest and lengthiest to complete, which contributes to make them
riskier. Most large infrastructure projects fall within this category: build-
ing dams, transport and telecommunication infrastructure and so on.
The nuclear system classifies as a not-perfectly-competitive-market. Non-
perfectly-competitive refers to the fact that competition is restricted
either because there are very few suppliers (oligopoly)—in the extreme
with only one supplier, it becomes a monopoly—or because there are
very few buyers (monopsony)—as conventional and nuclear power
plants, aircrafts, telecommunications equipment, and construction and
mining machinery. Either extreme provides the ability to exert certain
control over prices in the market.
Yet building a power plant requires the contribution of wide branches
of industry, which may be perfectly competitive. Coordinating their effort
obliges complex logistics and planning. Roughly speaking the business
involved can be classified as either suppliers or buyers, among the former
the over 1000 contractors required for building a single nuclear power
plant, with the reactor manufacturer as the key figure. The implication for
nations aspiring to build commercial nuclear power plants is that it
required some minimum-level domestic industrial base to contribute to
the non-critical elements of the project (civil and auxiliary engineering).
The buyers of nuclear power plants typically were electric utilities of
above certain size. Yet, in many occasions large reactor manufacturers and
utilities may hold ownership participation on each other’s shareholding,
or a third party—the state, investment funds—may be the principal

owner of both supplier and buyer (see Chap. 3). This intertwined owner-
ship relationship makes much less clear cut the optimal decision path for
each of the participants in the nuclear system.
Some business decisions by the suppliers had historically marked the
evolution of the nuclear sector, for instance, licensing reactor patents to
third parties or offering turnkey projects at fixed price. Licensing opened
the door for manufacturing domestic reactors in France, Sweden, Japan
and South Korea. Turnkey projects, initially offered at a price just equiva-
lent to coal-fired plants, lost money to the reactor manufacturers for
awhile. But it can also be considered a private demonstration program
that allowed manufactures to create enough market for latter generations
of reactors.47
Attention must be paid to how decisions were taken by the buyers. The
structure of electricity utilities varies from a single national company
(France, Britain, South Korea), passing by few large private companies
organized as oligopoly (Spain), to a myriad of large, medium and small
private companies (US). Single centralized decision-making can only be
achieved under the single-company scenario. Coordination of the
decision-making process vanishes as more companies intervene, which
will impact things such as the choice of a single technology and size for
the reactor.
Some economists argue that more than safety or waste issues, cost is
nuclear Achilles’ heel.48 According to Plumer (2016) back in the 1960s,
new reactors in the US were considered one of the cheaper energy sources
around, but two decades later, after a series of missteps, costs had increased
sixfold.49 And the ever-rising costs seemed to replicate across the globe in
all nuclear countries, except maybe South Korea.50 Ever since, experts
have been debating whether nuclear cost problems are an intrinsic flaw of
this technology or whether lessons can be learned from the hundreds of
reactors built to date.51
The capital costs are probably key element for nuclear power business
decision-making. The high capital cost of nuclear plants means that due
to their overall economics, and the feasibility of their financing,52 it was
“simply impossible during the 1960s and 1970s for the private utilities in
countries such as South Korea, the Philippines, Spain, and Yugoslavia to

raise, in the private market, the $500 million or more required for a sin-
gle nuclear plant.”53 With only a few exceptions, national export financ-
ing institutions of the principal supplier nations undertook external
financing of nuclear power projects.54 The existence of the credit (subsi-
dized or not) needed to be matched on the buyer side, with companies of
sufficient size and solvency willing to accept the required financial com-
mitments for 10–15 years.
The financial support of supplier’s governments is still true today for
nuclear projects through Export Credit Agreements (ECAs). This sup-
port can take the form of direct credits or financing, refinancing, interest-
rate support (where the government supports a fixed interest rate for the
life of the credit), aid financing (credits and grants), export credit insur-
ance and guarantees. These financial facilities were in the past and con-
tinue to be crucial for the business decision-makers when determining
whether to go ahead or cancel their nuclear projects. The availability of
financial means depends to a large extent on the macro-economic back-
ground, and thus our explanatory circle closes.
The review of this section reveals some shared features among the
countries seeking the perennial fountain of prosperity promised by
nuclear power.55 The nuclear countries had strong governments, and/or
the sustenance of a superpower to fence the risk involved; they possessed
an integrated electricity network and/or sufficient electricity demand to
plug a reactor; they all had some industrial base to develop the nuclear
technology and/or accommodate the technological transfer. And finally,
these countries had the ability to tap on the financial resources required
(whether nationally or internationally). The nuclear nations differed in
many aspects, but regarding their nuclear endeavor, they had dissimilar
types of business organizations involved in the demand side of nuclear
decision-making, with standardization seeming most likely to occur in
countries with lesser agents taking part on the decision over the reactor
choice.
Having laid down the general macro-economic background and some
of the general economic, industrial, and business features shared by
the countries deciding to enact civil nuclear programs, the last section of
the chapter provides a general introductory background to the Spanish

nuclear program.
he Spanish Nuclear Program: Pioneer

T
and Outlier
While Spain shares the common basic traits just described of the coun-
tries deciding to install nuclear electricity, as we shall confirm along the
pages of this volume, it also stands out both as a pioneer and as an outlier.
That Spain was an early adopter can be established on multiple grounds:
the first official steps in the nuclear field began in 1948 (see Chap. 2);
Spain was among the earliest signatories of bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreements and of the international bodies related to nuclear power;56 the
first Spanish commercial nuclear plant happened to be the first US export
of a turnkey nuclear project that was eventually completed and connected
to the grid in the world (see Chap. 5);57 Spain also imported the first
French export of a nuclear reactor (see Chap. 6) and was also among the
earliest clients for German reactors (see Chap. 7). As a result, by 1973,
when the rush of orders for nuclear plants seem to materialize through
the world, Spain already ranked third among countries with the largest
share of nuclear electricity over total electricity produced and seventh
largest producer in the West (see Table 1.1).
The governmental national electricity plans made in Spain in the early
1970s called for 23,000 MWe of nuclear power to be installed by 1985,
the equivalent to all the power plants installed in Spain in 1973. The
Spanish nuclear projections exceeded those of France, South Korea or
Japan at the time (see Chap. 8). At its maximum Spain pre-authorized
over 20 reactors with plans for almost 40 in total (see Fig. 1.2 and
Appendix 1).58 Yet, a combination of economic, political, and social
factors led the curtailment of the Spanish nuclear program to just 10
reactors connected to the grid by 1988 (see Chaps. 2 and 5). The seven
that remain operative in 2016 provided around 20% of electric power.59
Among the early adopters, Spain also stood out as one of the poorest
economies and the only dictatorship in the West to be able to join the
Table 1.1 Production of electricity, contribution of nuclear power in non-

communist countries by 1973
Total gross electricity Gross nuclear Percent of
production(billion electricity production nuclear
Country kWh) (billion kWh) electricity (%)
Switzerland 37.7a 6.2 16.4
United 284.4 28.0 9.8
Kingdom
Spain 75.8 6.6 8.7
Canada 267.2a 18.3 6.8
France 183.3a 11.2 6.1
Pakistan 9.0b 0.5 5.6
United States 2073.6a 87.4 4.2
West Germany 299.0 12.6 4.2
India 63.1 1.9 3.0
Sweden 77.3 2.1 2.7
Italy 143.5 3.1 2.2
Japan 436.4 9.4 2.2
Netherlands 52.6 1.0 1.9
Notes: The data is arranged as in the original source of the data. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Nuclear Power and the Demand for Uranium
Enrichment Services, Table 1.1, p. 4. (September, 1974). CIA Document Number
CIA- RDP85T00875R001900030
a
Reported net production figures that have been adjusted to obtain estimated
gross production
b
Estimate
nuclear club.60 By the early 1950s, Spain was slowly emerging from a
decade of economic stagnation, food rationing and widespread depriva-
tion brought by the policies of a military regime that become an interna-
tional outcast for its pro-Axis bias during World War II. Applying the
scheme of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear power
proposed by the Eisenhower administration in a poor country with a
dictatorship that was still functioning as an autarchy would be somewhat
different from how the American proposal would work in industrial
and democratic powers. The Spanish institutional setting combined a
dictatorship with a lobbying electricity sector that influenced without
opposition the decisions that were made by officials in the government
and in its regulatory agencies (see Chaps. 2 and 3). This setting defined
Fig. 1.2 Map of nuclear power plants planned and installed in Spain 1960s–1980s
Sources: Own elaboration from data in Appendix A
how decisions were made in the Spanish case: without any checks or bal-
ances.61 The Spanish case fills a gap in the international literature on
nuclear programs. There are good accounts of the civil nuclear programs
in Western democracies (US, West Germany, France and Britain), its
Asian outpost (South Korea) and in the communist world (USSR, East
Germany), but Spain represents a distinct case of a fascist dictatorship
gradually realigned with the Western alliance.62
Spain is also the only of the early significant nuclear energy producers
that did not evolve to manufacture reactors nationally. As in other coun-
tries, the early projects tended to be turnkey where the reactor manufac-
turer’s country will provide most of the engineering. Progressively the
Spanish industry would achieve higher levels of participation, fostered by
the First Development Plan (1964–67) that from the beginning sug-
gested a minimum 40% of local participation in nuclear power plant
construction. By the 1970s, around 60% of the new plants built were
executed by local companies, mostly concentrated in the civil works and
low–medium technological bits. Yet the Spanish nuclear sector continued

to grow to serve the nuclear plants projected. When five of the nuclear
projects under construction were paralyzed by the nuclear moratorium of
1984, and several other projects were abandoned by the utilities along the
way, Spain had developed an industrial sector around components
(ENSA) and engineering for nuclear power plants (Empresarios
Agrupados, Tecnatom, ENUSA), which in the absence of a domestic
market, managed to raise above the moratorium of the 1980s and com-
pete internationally (see Chap. 8). But Spain never built its own reactor
or enriched the required uranium domestically.
A priori, the domestic reserves of natural uranium would be a lever
for a reactor relatively more independent from foreign assistance.63 The
government also inaugurated a factory to process natural uranium in
1959.64 At the end, except for Vandellós I—the graphite natural ura-
nium French reactor (see Chap. 6)—the rest of Spanish reactors used
enriched uranium. The US monopolized the process for the non-com-
munist world until 1974, even if the uranium came from the Spanish
mines in the early years. The government transferred all uranium-min-
ing activities to a public company (ENUSA) in 1972. Created as a state-
own company and remaining so to the present, ENUSA is Spain’s
nuclear fuel supplier from 1979, except for Trillo NPP supplied from
Germany (see Chap. 7). In 1985, the ENUSA factory of Juzbado
(Salamanca) was commissioned to manufacture combustible elements
for the Spanish nuclear reactors departing from imported enriched ura-
nium (see Chap. 8).
Despite the economic, financial and industrial relevance of the Spanish
nuclear program, it has been overlooked by the economic history litera-
ture. The nuclear program is addressed in passing in the literature dealing
with the history of the electricity companies.65 The first approaches with
an economic focus, however, emerged precisely in historical accounts of
the Spanish electricity sector and specific nuclear plants.66 Within Spain,
most of the historical literature about the nuclear sector has been concen-
trated in the study of the technology transfer,67 of the development of
networks for institutional scientific research68 and nuclear applications
other than electricity such as medicine69 or industry.70 The anti-nuclear
movements have garnered little attention by the historians too, although

the literature produced by them was prolific at the time (see Chap. 2).
There are some local histories about specific power plants, also exist writ-
ten mostly by those opposing to the projects.71
The chapters in this volume focus in explaining what made it possible
for Spain to be among the first European countries to have access to com-
mercial nuclear power. The Spanish dictatorship aggressively pursued
nuclear development to achieve status on the international stage and
pushed for the technological prowess for its plans for industrialization.72
However, Spain could not do so alone; it required the eager collaboration
of technological leaders because nuclear power demanded institutional,
business, financial, and technological capabilities from abroad.
The book analyzes the history of the nuclear program in Spain, from
its inception in the 1950s to the nuclear moratorium in the early 1980s.
Public debate on nuclear energy in Spain is hampered by three deficien-
cies. First, there is little accurate information about the sector’s specific
origins in our country. Second, existing information is not sufficiently
put into the appropriate historical context. Finally, an encompassing view
of the nuclear sector in its multiple angles is absent. This book aims to
start filling these deficiencies by investigating the economic, financial,
and business origins of nuclear energy in Spain and the multiple implica-
tions of its deployment, from a national as well as international d
imension.
The chapters lay out how the Spanish nuclear program came about, how
it was financed, who were the main architects and beneficiaries at the
industrial, financial, commercial and banking levels. We are also inter-
ested in the macro-economic impacts of nuclear energy. These include
different energy policy aspects (such as energy mix and energy security)
but also its impact on the country’s external balances. All in all, we want
to present the Spanish case within the international framework of the
pioneering countries in nuclear development.
Our main hypothesis is that the Spanish nuclear program can be
understood only from an international perspective. Third countries facili-
tated the necessary technological transfer and granted the funds through
officially subsidized credits, without which the Spanish nuclear program
would have not been feasible. The Spanish case would indeed be better
understood if considered as one piece within the international develop-
ment of nuclear energy. The actual dimension of the Spanish nuclear

sector, which exceeded the relative economic and political clout of the
country at the time, responds to the combination of domestic and for-
eign interests in, mainly, the economic, political, and security fields.
Notes
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace Speech | IAEA,” 1953, https://
www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech. Mara Drogan, “The
Nuclear Imperative: Atoms for Peace and the Development of U.S. Policy
on Exporting Nuclear Power, 1953–1955,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 5
(November 2016): 948–74, doi:10.1093/dh/dhv049.
2. A quote attributed to Churchill, David Fischer and International Atomic
Energy Agency, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The
First Forty Years (Vienna: The Agency, 1997), 32.
3. US Department of Energy, “The First 50 Years of ORNL,” Oak Ridge
National Laboratory Review 25, no. 3 (1992): 1–235, http://web.ornl.
gov/info/ornlreview/archive_pdf/vol25–3-4.pdf
4. Sam H. Schurr and Jacob Marschak, Economic Aspects of Atomic Power
(York, PA: Princeton University Press, 1950), http://cowles.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/pub/misc/specpupb-schurr-marschak.pdf
5. Gabrielle Hecht, Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the
Global Cold War, Inside Technology (MIT Press, 2011), doi:10.1126/sci-
ence.1247727; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power
and National Identity after World War II (MIT Press, 2009), https://mit-
press.mit.edu/books/radiance-france; Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear:
Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (MIT Press, 2014).
6. Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in
American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945–1975 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991); Paul Josephson, “Technological
Utopianism in the Twenty-First Century: Russia’s Nuclear Future,”
History and Technology 3, no. 19 (2003): 277–92; Paul Josephson, Red
Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Arne Kaiser, “Redirecting Power:
Swedish Nuclear Power Policies in Historical Perspective,” Annual
Review of Energy and the Environment 17 (1992): 437–62.
7. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War,
1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989); John Krige, American Hegemony

and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, MA and
London: MIT Press, 2006); and William J. Nuttall and Alexandre
Bredimas, “A Comparison of International Regulatory Organizations
and Licensing Procedures for New Nuclear Power Plants,” Energy Policy,
no. 36 (2008): 1344–54.
8. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of
U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 1998); Sharon Tanzer, Steven Solley and Paul
L. Leventhal, Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002); Williams Burr, “A Scheme of
‘Control: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’
Group, 1974–1976,” The International History Review 36, no. 2 (2014):
252–76, doi:10.1080/07075332.2013.864690.
9. OEEC, “European Nuclear Energy Agency, The Industrial Challenge of
Nuclear Energy. Stresa Conference, Vol. III Survey of European
Programmes. Economics of Nuclear Power and Financing Programmes”
(New York: OEEC, 1959); P.W. Mummery, P. Sporn and I.R. Maxwell,
Progress in Nuclear Energy, The Economics of Nuclear Power (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1959); Federal Power Commission, The 1970 National
Power Survey (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1971), chaps. 2, 6 and 20.
10. Steve D. Thomas, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in The Realities of
Nuclear Power: International Economic and Regulatory Experience, ed.
Steve D. Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
128–64; James M. Jasper, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the
United States, Sweden, and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990); Andrew Blowers and David Pepper, Nuclear Power in Crisis:
Politics and Planning for the Nuclear State (New York: Nichols PubCo,
1987); Duncan Lyall Burn, Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis: Politics
and the Atomic Industry (London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy
Research Centre, 1978); Jack N. Bankerbus, “Nuclear Power Ad
Government Structure: The Divergent Paths of the United States and
France,” Social Science Quarterly 65, no. 1 (1984): 37–47; James Everett
Katz and Onkar S. Marwah, Nuclear Power in Developing Countries: An
Analysis of Decision Making (Lexington Books, 1982).
11. Jonathan Scurlock, “A Concise History of the Nuclear Industry
Worldwide,” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place in a
Sustainable Energy Future?, ed. David Elliott, Energy, Cl (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 24–34.
12. Zsuzsanna Csereklyei, M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas and David I. Stern,

“Energy and Economic Growth: The Stylized Facts,” Energy Journal 37,
no. 2 (2016): 223–55, doi:10.5547/01956574.37.2.zcse.
13. Chien-Chiang Lee, Chun-Ping Chang and Pei-Fen Chen, “Energy-
Income Causality in OECD Countries Revisited: The Key Role of
Capital Stock,” Energy Economics 30, no. 5 (2008): 2359–73.
14. M.d. Mar Rubio and Mauricio Folchi, “Will Small Energy Consumers
Be Faster in Transition? Evidence from the Early Shift from Coal to Oil
in Latin America,” Energy Policy 50, no. 34 (2012): 50–61, doi:10.1016/j.
enpol.2012.03.054; M.d. Mar Rubio et al., “Energy as an Indicator of
Modernization in Latin America, 1890–1925,” Economic History Review
63, no. 3 (2010): 769–804, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0289.2009.00463.x.
15. Cluter J. Cleveland, Robert K. Kaufman and David I. Stern, “Aggregation
and the Role of Energy in the Economy,” Ecological Economics 32 (2000):
301–17, doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(99)00113-5.
16. See section I in Rubio et al., “Energy as an Indicator of Modernization
in Latin America, 1890–1925.”
17. Angus Maddison, Monitoring The World Economy, 1820–1992 (Paris:
OECD, Development Centre Studies, 1995).
18. Primary energy refers to sources which involve human induced extrac-
tion or capture (such as coal, crude oil, natural gas, biomass). Secondary
energy is energy embodied in primary energy and extracted by human
transformation. Nuclear and hydroelectricity tend to be considered
among primary energies. Primary electricity is only a commonly used
abridged expression for hydro- and nuclear electricity. Actually primary
electricity does not exist, electricity being in any case a secondary form
of energy. Ben Gales et al., “North versus South: Energy Transition and
Energy Intensity in Europe over 200 Years,” European Review of Economic
History 11, no. 2 (2007): 219–53, doi:10.1017/S1361491607001967.
19. Robert Millward, “Public Enterprise in the Modern Western World. An
Historical Analysis,” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 82,
Issue 4, (2011) pp. 375–398
20. There was an array of possible designs for nuclear reactors, the basic dif-
ferences depending on the fuel, the cooling and the moderating ele-
ments, and until the late 1960s there were no clear advantages to either
of them. Eventually, three types of reactors commercialized internation-
ally: the light-water nuclear power reactor, using low enriched uranium
as its fuel and ordinary water as its coolant and moderator was built
originally to a US design in Western countries and to a similar Soviet
design in the USSR and Eastern European countries. The gas graphite
reactor using natural uranium as its fuel, moderated by graphite and

cooled by carbon dioxide was a technological design favored by Britain
and France. Finally, Canada marketed a quite different nuclear power
reactor using natural gas as its fuel and heavy water as its coolant and
moderator. Within each of these three main types there will be further
design categories. For instance, among the light-water reactors, there will
be pressurised (LPW) and boiling water (BWR) reactors in the west,
while the Soviets will built two types: the WWER series and the RBMK,
the type made conspicuous by Chernobyl. Fischer and International
Atomic, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 149.
21. Steve Cohn, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Power (1945–1990):
The Rise and Fall of an Official Technology,” Journal of Economic Issues
24, no. 3 (1990): 781–811; Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and
Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945–1975.
22. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Nuclear Power and the Demand
for Uranium Enrichment Services” (Washington, 1974), opp. 2–3,
h t t p s : / / w w w. c i a . g o v / l i b r a r y / r e a d i n g r o o m / d o c s / C I A -
RDP85T00875R001900030095–1.pdf
23. Fischer and International Atomic, History of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, 147.
24. H. Stuart Burness, W. David Montgomery and James P. Quirk, “The
Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power,” Source: Land Economics 56, no. 2 (1980):
188–202, http://www.jstor.org
25. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Nuclear Power and the Demand
for Uranium Enrichment Services,” 2–3.
26. And the US embassies through the world received orders to explain the
advantages of nuclear power to their host economies. The US embassy in
Madrid responded to the request for opportunities in the following
terms 8 March 1974:
“Embassy suggests following areas presenting either new opportunities
for US exports or good prospects for increased US export share of
Spanish market as result higher petroleum and raw material prices and
supply shortages: 1. Technical assistance and equipment sales for Spain’s
expanding nuclear energy and thermal energy industry […] While
Westinghouse and GE as well as us design firms, e.g. Bechtel, Foster
Wheeler, have played major role in Spanish nuclear energy program, US
industry must continue be energetic in meeting other competition
sources in order exploit increasingly attractive possibilities.” NARA,
Document number 974MADRID01553.
27. Steve Cohn, Too Cheap to Meter: An Economic and Philosophical Analysis
of the Nuclear Dream (State University of New York Press, 1997), 127.
28. Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress, “U.S. Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Policy: Impact on Exports and Nuclear Industry Could
Not Be Determined” (Washington, DC, 1980), 10. See also Chap. 5 in
this volume.
29. The 1970s were a decade of significant opposition to nuclear power in
Europe. Austria in 1978 had rejected nuclear power in a general referen-
dum, opposition had stopped Ireland and Portuguese attempts at nuclear
development in the late 1970s, and in 1980 Swedish voters approved a
referendum to phase out the country’s operating nuclear power plants.
30. William H. Becker and William M. McClenahah, Jr., The Market, the
State and the Export–Import Bank of the United States 1934–2000
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). Appendix B. No nuclear credit was
authorized in 1986 and a tiny credit of $8900 was authorized in 1987.
None thereafter.
31. Some summaries of the nuclear histories of Eastern Europe can be found
in HoNESt Consortium, “Validated Short Country Report, Deliverable
3.6,” 2017.
Energy Agency, p. 118.
33. See http://inpo.info/AboutUs.htm and http://www.wano.info/en-gb/
aboutus/
34. Nathan Hultman and Jonathan Koomey, “Three Mile Island: The Driver
of US Nuclear Power’s Decline?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no.
3 (May 1, 2013): 63–70, doi:10.1177/0096340213485949.
36. Italy should appear in the list of nuclear powered nations right after the
US, but voted in 1987 to shut down all four of its NPPs. The first Italian
nuclear power plant began construction in 1958. Igor Londero and
Elisabet Bini, Nuclear Italy: An International History of Italy’s Nuclear
Policies during the Cold War (Trieste: EUT, 2017).
37. For the development of the safeguards policies see Chap. 8 in Fischer and
International Atomic, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
38. Irvin Bupp and J.C. Derian, “‘The Nuclear Power Industry’ in
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy (‘Murphy Commission’) Vol. 1” (Washington, DC,
1975), 94.

Not Be Determined,” 34.
40. Arnulf Grubler, “The Costs of the French Nuclear Scale-up: A Case of
Negative Learning by Doing,” Energy Policy 38, no. 9 (2010): 5174–88,
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.003.
41. Hultman, Koomey and Kammen, “What History Can Teach Us about
the Future Cost of U.S. Nuclear Power.”
43. EXIM, George Holliday, Eximbank’s Involvement in Nuclear Exports,
Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, GPO, March 2, 1981), 20. Box L1, Folder 277. Ex-Im
Bank Archives.
44. Koomey and Hultman, “A Reactor-Level Analysis of Busbar Costs for
U.S. Nuclear Plants, 1970–2005.”
45. Lina Escobar Rangel and François Lévêsque, “Revisiting the Nuclear Power
Construction Costs Escalation Curse,” IAEE Newsletter, no. 3 (2013): 14–6.
46. Brad Plumer, “Why America Abandoned Nuclear Power (and What We
Can Learn from South Korea),” Vox.com, 2016, http://www.vox.
com/2016/2/29/11132930/nuclear-power-costs-us-france-korea
47. Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk, “The Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power.”
48. Allan Cohen, “General Electric,” Sales and Marketing Management,
1997; Bernard L. Cohen, “Costs of Nuclear Power—The Achilles’ Heel,”
in Before It’s Too Late: A Scientist’s Case for Nuclear Energy (Boston, MA:
Springer US, 1983), 217–39, doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-4577-0_8.
49. Plumer, “Why America Abandoned Nuclear Power (and What We Can
Learn from South Korea).”
50. Sungyeol Choi et al., “Fourteen Lessons Learned from the Successful
Nuclear Power Program of the Republic of Korea,” Energy Policy 37, no.
12 (2009): 5494–508, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.08.025.
51. Plumer, “Why America Abandoned Nuclear Power (and What We Can
Learn from South Korea).”
52. Grant Harris et al., “Cost Estimates for Nuclear Power in the UK,”
Energy Policy 62 (2013): 431–42, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.116.
53. EXIM, “Speech Outline for Rees Nuclear Testimony,” 2 (1982). Ex-Im
Bank Archives Box H128, Folder 705, College Park, Maryland, US.
54. EXIM, Eximbank Programs in Support of Nuclear Power Projects
(Washington, DC, 1970), 3. Box J11, Folder 2347. Ex-Im Bank
Archives, College Park, Maryland, US.
55. Scott Victor Valentine and Benjamin K. Sovacool, “The Socio-Political

Economy of Nuclear Power Development in Japan and South Korea,”
Energy Policy 38, no. 12 (December 2010): 7971–9, doi:10.1016/j.
enpol.2010.09.036. Comparing these two countries the authors find the
following sharing features: (1) strong state involvement guiding eco-
nomic development; (2) centralization of national energy policymaking;
(3) campaigns to link technological progress with national revitalization;
(4) influence of technocratic ideology on policy decisions; (5) subordina-
tion of challenges to political authority; and (6) low levels of civic activ-
ism. We extend some of these characteristics to all nuclear countries
adding some more.
56. Spain signed the first bilateral nuclear agreement with the US AEC in 1955
(see Chap. 5), and the second with the French CEA the following year (see
Chap. 6). A Spanish delegation attended all of the Geneva Conferences
from the first one—the First International Conference on the Peaceful uses
of Atomic Energy, held in August 1955; as a consequence, Spain was among
the original signatories of Statute of the IAEA in 1957; Spain participated
in the ENEA from 1958, under a decision of the OEEC Council, a year
before the official ascension of the country to the OEEC/OECD; there it
followed that Spain was admitted to the study group working of the cre-
ation of the European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated
Fuels (Eurochemic) which was set up on 27 July 1959 (on Eurochemic see
https://www.oecd-nea.org/cen/publications/68-eurochemic.pdf).
57. None of the three exports of US reactors that were ordered before 1962
had commercial uses. The reactor for the nuclear plant of Taipur (India),
which was also a turnkey project, was ordered in 1963 but it was con-
nected by 1969, a year after the Spanish plant of Zorita was finished.
Joseba De La Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, “Learning by Doing: The
First Spanish Nuclear Plant,” Business History Review (forthcoming), fnt. 1.
58. Joseba De la Torre and M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a
Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement in the Spanish Atomic
Program, 1950–85,” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (October
23, 2016), 385–411, doi:10.1177/0022009415599448.
59. Red Electrica de España (2016) www.ree.es
60. Other countries under dictatorial rule starting nuclear programs coming
after the Spanish example, such as South Korea or Turkey, had periods of
civil rule in between. Other non-democratic nations such Argentina or
Yugoslavia had yet to make their nuclear plans while Spain had is first
reactor already plugged to the network. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas,
“Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship”: fnt. 1.
61. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship”: 409.

62. Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in
American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945–1975; Tony Hall, Nuclear
Politics: The History of Nuclear Power in Britain (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1986); Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and
National Identity after World War II; Joachim Radkau, Aufstieg Und Krise
Der Deutschen Atomwirtschaft 1945–1975 (Reinbek bei Hamburg:
Rowohlt, 1983); Choi et al., “Fourteen Lessons Learned from the
Successful Nuclear Power Program of the Republic of Korea”; Wolfgang
D. Müller, Geschichte Der Kernenergie in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
Anfänge Und Weichenstellungen, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Schäffer Verlag für
Wirtschaft und Steuern, 1990); Selahattin Murat Sirin, “An Assessment
of Turkey’s Nuclear Energy Policy in Light of South Korea’s Nuclear
Experience,” Energy Policy 38, no. 10 (October 2010): 6145–52,
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.071; Sonja D. Schmid, Producing Power
(The MIT Press, 2015), https://mitpress.mit.edu/producing-power
63. Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior
del desarrollo industrial español a través del IEME (1950–1982), Estudios
de Historia Económica, vol. 69 (Banco de España, 2015), chap. 5. The
dictatorship restricted the access to the country’s uranium and radioac-
tive mineral resources from 1948, forbidding exporting it. Decree of
December 29, 1948 published in Boletín Oficial del Estado [BOE] no.
19 (Madrid, 1949).
64. The Factory General Hernandez Vidal, operated in Andújar (Jaen) from
1959 to 1981.
65. Gonzalo Anes and Antonio Gómez Gómez Mendoza, Un Siglo de Luz :
Historia Empresarial de Iberdrola (Madrid: Iberdrola, 2006); Gonzalo
Anes, Santiago Fernández Plasencia and Juan Temboury Villarejo, Endesa
En Su Historia (1944–2000) (Fundación Endesa, 2001); Antonio Gómez
Mendoza, Javier Pueyo, and Carles Sudrià, Electra y el Estado: La inter-
vención pública en la industria eléctrica bajo el Franquismo, 1st ed. (Cizur
Menor: Thomson Civitas, 2007); Julio Alcaide Inchausti and et al.,
Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad: Cien Años de Historia (Sevillana de
Electricidad, 1994), http://books.google.es/books?id=lJPLAAAACAAJ
66. Josean Garrues, “Las estrategias productivas, financieras e institucionales
de Iberduero” (Madrid: Iberdrola, 2006), 497–573; Esther Sánchez
Sánchez, Rumbo al Sur: Francia y la España del desarrollo, 1958–1969
(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006).
67. Albert Presas i Puig, “The Correspondence between Jose Maria Otero
Navascues and Karl Wirtz: An Episode in the International Relations of the
Junta de Energia Nuclear,” Arbor-Ciencia Pensamiento y Cultura 167, no.
659–60 (December 2000): 527–601; Albert Presas i Puig, “On a Speech by
Jose Maria Albareda Given before Germany’s Academic Authorities: A
Historical Note,” Arbor-Ciencia Pensamiento y Cultura 160, nos. 631–2
(August 1998): 343–57; Albert Presas i Puig, “Science on the Periphery.
The Spanish Reception of Nuclear Energy: An Attempt at Modernity?”
Minerva 43, no. 2 (June 2005): 197–218, doi:10.1007/s11024-005-2332-7;
Ana Romero de Pablos, “The Early Days of Nuclear Energy Research in
Spain: Jose Maria Otero Navascues’s Foreign Trip (1949),” Arbor-Ciencia
Pensamiento y Cultura 167, no. 659–60 (December 2000): 509–25; Javier
Ordoñez and José M. Sánchez-Ron, “Nuclear Energy in Spain: From
Hiroshima to the Sixties” (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996),
185–213; José M. Sánchez-Ron, “International Relations in Spanish
Physics from 1900 to the Cold War,” Historical Studies in the Physical and
Biological Sciences 33, no. 1 (2002): 3–31, doi:10.1525/hsps.2002.33.1.3;
Francesc X. Barca-Salom, “La Politica Nuclear Espanyola: el cas del reactor
nuclear Argos,” Quaderns d’Història de l’Enginyeria IV (2000): 12–44.
68. Ana Romero de Pablos and José M. Sánchez Ron, Energía Nuclear en
España. De la JEN al CIEMAT (CIEMAT, Madrid: Ediciones Doce
Calles, 2001); Ana Romero de Pablos, “Poder político y poder tec-
nológico: El desarrollo nuclear español (1950–1975),” CTS: Revista
Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad 7, no. 21 (2012):
141–162; Ordoñez and Sánchez-Ron, “Nuclear Energy in Spain: From
Hiroshima to the Sixties.”
69. Manuel Castell Fàbrega, Historia de La Medicina Nuclear En España
(Bellaterra: Publicacions de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1992);
Alfredo Menéndez Navarro, “Atoms for Peace … and for Medicine:
Popularization of the Medical Applications of Nuclear Energy in Spain,”
Revista Espanola de Medicina Nuclear 26, no. 6 (November 2007): 385–99;
Mª Jesús Santesmases, “Peace Propaganda and Biomedical Experimentation:
Influential Uses of Radioisotopes in Endocrinology and Molecular
Genetics in Spain (1947–1971),” Journal of the History of Biology 39, no. 4
(November 2006): 765–94, doi:10.1007/s10739-006-9112-6.
70. Francesc X. Barca-Salom, “Dreams and Needs: The Applications of
Isotopes to Industry in Spain in the 1960s,” Dynamis 29 (2009): 307–36.
71. Benito Sanz, Centrales nucleares en España. El parón nuclear (Valencia:
Fernando Torres, 1984).
72. Joseba De la Torre and María del Mar Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for
a Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement in the Spanish Atomic
Program, 1950–1985,” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016):
385–411, doi:0022009415599448.
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (mar.rubio@unavarra.es) is an energy economist and eco-

nomic historian. She holds a PhD from the London School of Economics (United
Kingdom), and a Master’s for the same institution and Graduate in Economics
from the University Carlos III of Madrid. Her academic training was completed at
a year of stay (Fulbright funding) in the Department of Economics at the University
of California at Berkeley (California, US). Her research interests focus on the long-
term relationships between energy and economic growth. Recently her research
effort focused on the economic and financial history of the Spanish Nuclear
Program. She is the PI of a national research project on the matter and she is the
person in charge of the Scientific Secretariat of the European consortium that inves-
tigates the “History of Nuclear Energy and Society” (HoNESt). Her more recent
publications include articles in Journal of Contemporary History, Energy Journal,
Energy Policy, Economic History Review and Business History Review.
Joseba De la Torre (jdelatorre@unavarra.es) is Professor of Economic History

at the Department of economics at Public University of Navarre, Spain. He
holds a PhD in History from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His
main research field is the Spanish economic policy from Franco’s dictatorship to
the democracy, and in particular the industrial policy and the indicative plan-
ning of developmentalism (1940–1980s). He has been Visiting Scholar at La
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris and at the Center for European and
Mediterranean Studies of New York University. He has taken part in a research
team for the study of the economic and financial history of nuclear energy in
Spain, and in the European consortium that investigates the “History of Nuclear
Energy and Society” (HoNESt), an EU Horizon 2020/Euratom-funded Project.
His most recent publications include articles in Journal of Contemporary History,
Business History Review and Revista de Historia Industrial.
2
Who was Who in the Making of Spanish
Nuclear Programme, c.1950–1985
Joseba De la Torre
In 1964, the leading Spanish electricity companies began an ambitious

project to construct nuclear power plants. Twenty years later, Spain was
one of the most nuclear countries in the world. For facilitating quick
adoption of one of the most cutting-edge technologies of the post-war
world, it was vital to secure government support for private companies
and the transfer of US expertise and financial credit, encourage the emer-
gence of a local capital equipment industry and engineering services, and
train experts and operators.
The Spanish government decreed a nuclear moratorium in 1984.
It closed down five reactors that were close to being connected to
the grid. The state and the electricity companies negotiated the
No. 662268).
J. De la Torre (*)
Department of Economics, Universidad Publica de Navarra, Pamplona,
Navarra, Spain

34 J. De la Torre
distribution of the financial costs of that decision. The reduction of

the domestic market affected the industry’s business strategy that was
formulated during the expansion phase and generated highly quali-
fied employment.
We have selected two events that sum up Spain’s nuclear experience.
Government played a leading role in both the events. While Spain was a
dictatorship in 1964, it was a democracy in 1984. The institutional
framework for the decision-making process had changed radically.
Identifying who were the actors of that history—the experts, politicians
and entrepreneurs—and how it was perceived by society will give a better
understanding of the Spanish case and show how it fits in the global sce-
nario of countries that opted for nuclear power in the middle of the twen-
tieth century.
Atoms for a Dictatorship
One of the arguments used in an attempt to explain the success of
Franco’s Spain in rolling out its nuclear energy programme focuses on
the symbiotic relationship that arose between the political powers, the
scientific community, and business and financial groups. The inaugura-
tion of the works of the first Spanish Nuclear Power Station in Zorita in
July 1965 demonstrates this relationship by bringing together some of
the principal participants in the atomic project on one meeting. After
the Bishop of Sigüenza-Guadalajara had blessed the works and before
setting off the dynamite charge for excavating the reactor building, the
president of the promoting company Unión Eléctrica Madrileña
(Madrid Electrical Union), the director of the Nuclear Energy Board
(JEN), the Minister of Industry of the Spanish Government and the US
Ambassador addressed a group of industrial bankers, bureaucrats and
politicians.
The keynote speech was delivered by Minister López Bravo, who
summed up some features of the energy policy: (1) the forecast for coun-
try’s economic growth needed increased availability of electricity, and the
nuclear option was already viable ‘within the market economy’ and open
Who was Who in the Making of Spanish Nuclear Programme... 35
to competition; (2) electrical programmes and the operation of the grid

demanded increased investment and the coordination of the public and
private sectors; and (3) the nuclear project was an opportunity to create a
new industry in Spain for technological equipment that should seek out
and consolidate collaboration with the foreign firms and local engineer-
ing groups.
In his brief speech, the director of the JEN emphasised two ideas.
Zorita was the result of a project that the government started ‘after the
end of the last war’. The plant would use Spanish uranium as fuel, though
it would be enriched in the US. The US ambassador referred to the agree-
ments for the transfer of material and the ‘training of personnel’ and
announced that Spain was thus crossing ‘the threshold to the future’.
Finally, the president of the owning company predicted the construction
of Zorita II, a second reactor that would produce twice the amount of
power; additionally, in order to calm fears in the county, he insisted ‘nei-
ther this power station nor any other would explode’. Briefly, the propa-
ganda highlighted the role of private enterprise and put its trust in a
technological progress that was full of opportunities. Atomic optimism
was in full swing.1
However, it was no easy job to forge an alliance between policymakers,
experts and entrepreneurs. The players shared the idea that electricity
from nuclear sources was essential for the country’s economic develop-
ment, reducing dependency on foreign energy and improving the balance
of payments. However, regulators and promoters had their differences
about who should take the lead (the state or the market), the kind of
technology (with natural or enriched uranium) and the pace of technol-
ogy implementation (immediate or when the industry attains maturity).
There was economic logic behind each one of these options. That meant
the country’s capacity to lead and finance the atomic programme.
Nevertheless, the most important thing was the political decision to make
Spain one of the pioneers of nuclear energy, irrespective of the cost. The
exercise of power and the nature of economic policy would define the
strategy to be followed. Therefore, the Autarky in the 1950s and the
opening up of the economy in the 1960s determined the model’s defini-
tive characteristics.
36 J. De la Torre
cientists and the Military in the Autarkic

S
Nuclear Project
Three high-ranking military men set out the strategic guidelines for
Spain’s nuclear programme between 1951 and 1962, reflective of post-war
Spain. The Minister of Industry, Joaquín Planell, and the president of the
Industrial and National Institute (INI), Juan Antonio Suanzes, had
trained as engineers in the navy and the director and Chairman of the
Nuclear Energy Board (JEN), José María Otero Navascués, was a mili-
tary scientist with good connections overseas. Planell and Suanzes set out
an indelible industrial policy. Otero was in charge of the nuclear plan for
a long time. It seems logical that the army was the first to be interested in
learning about nuclear technology and the other applications of physics
developed during the Second World War. However, this was soon to be
extended to civil uses.
In 1946, the Government had taken back control of the exploration of
its uranium deposits, while senior military officers and a group of indus-
trial engineers shared first-hand information about the results of the
Manhattan project and the outlook that it could provide for the Spanish
industry.2 In 1948, a nuclear research institute was created in the utmost
secrecy, which three years later became the JEN.3 Under the tutelage of
the Presidency of the Government and with control over the exploitation
of Spanish uranium, the Board was going to play a key role in the first
phase of the atomic take-off. Its objectives fitted fully with the doctrine
of Autarky. The Board’s first challenge was to equip itself with a highly
qualified team of human resources that would learn and do research
about this new and unfamiliar technology. This resulted in a second chal-
lenge, which was to ‘create a major national industry’ that would produce
a part of equipment and basic components for the civil use of nuclear
energy. It would entail the involvement of private companies and espe-
cially the INI, which was the state’s industrial holding company and
included a nuclear section.
The directors of the JEN were aware of the backwardness of the coun-
try and realised the need to establish international contacts that would
allow the transfer of knowledge and a fast technological learning process.4
The first Spanish nuclear physicists completed their training in Italy and
the US. They would later train in the United Kingdom and France. Prior
to the first ‘Atoms for Peace’ conference, the scientists from JEN were
granted the observer status as they visited the nuclear station of
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC),
participated in the meetings of the European Association of Nuclear
Scientists and received technical assistance from German laboratories.5
However, the US was the key player in the process of integrating Spain
into the nuclear deployment of the west. Before the mutual defence treaty
was signed between the Eisenhower administration and the Franco
Government in September 1953, the nuclear issue had approached both
countries. Two years earlier, the State Department and the US Atomic
Energy Agency had extended their support in establishing contact
between Westinghouse International and the Minister of Trade and
Industry to learn about Spain’s uranium potential6 at first hand. The eco-
nomic, technical and military aids began to arrive from the US with the
enforcement of Madrid bilateral military agreements. The directors and
technicians of the JEN visited the main atomic research laboratories and
companies in Chicago, Oak Ridge and Pittsburgh, where the training
courses were given between 1954 and 1956. The first transfer of nuclear
technology—a reactor and enriched uranium for laboratory trials in the
JEN’s facilities—was made possible by a coordinated action between the
US government, the General Electric Company, the Exim Bank and the
Spanish Nuclear Board.7 As a ‘friendly country’, Spain benefited from the
Atoms for Peace programme and the US gained a client because they
were already thinking about future sales of commercial reactors to Spain.
The United Kingdom considered Spain, Japan, Brazil, Germany and
Sweden as potential purchasers from their nuclear industry, although the
British did recognise that, in 1955, Spain was still a weak economy for
taking on commitments.8 Meanwhile, the JEN signed international
agreements that focused on nuclear energy.
The people who drove the Spanish nuclear programme from the
Ministry of Industry, INI and the JEN were imbued with the thought of
the import substitution industrialisation (ISI). As one British observer
commented, ‘the policy is to put Spain in a position to produce the
greater part of its civilian power programme’.9 In this way, Planell,
38 J. De la Torre
Suanzes and Otero managed a project that sought to ‘nationalise’ tech-

nologies and gain access to external know-how. This was an oxymoron. In
those days, Spain’s international deals were subject to strict government
controls. There were scarce means of payment and very little foreign capi-
tal and foreign technical assistance. The JEN was keen at all costs to
pursue access to technology using natural Spanish uranium, and there-
fore, under the auspices of the INI, it looked to collaboration with the
UKAEA.10 This meant that nuclear power plants were a matter for the
state to consider and that private firms would occupy only a subsidiary
position. It is noteworthy that in the late 1950s even the most advanced
countries were unaware of the most competitive nuclear technology.
Under these conditions, the possibility of combining local natural ura-
nium and commercial reactors made in Spain was a remote desire, at least
for entrepreneurs.
ntrepreneurs and Engineers: The Challenge

E
of a Nascent Industry
Private business groups were not willing to accept a minor role. They soon
proposed a strategy to occupy a dominant position in the nuclear pro-
gram in the face of state interventionism. Electricity firms had the power
and influence to do so. Far from nationalising the strategic power sector,
Francoism had reinforced the status quo of the major electricity compa-
nies, which were mostly owned by the leading banks. In 1944, these firms
had received the government’s approval to create the Unidad Eléctrica SA
(UNESA), a lobby group that coordinated the production and distribu-
tion of electric current through the grid. Electrical restrictions following
the Spanish civil war had begun to be lifted through new investments by
major private companies that shifted from hydroelectric power plants to
thermal.11 The experience of managing large engineering works, handling
credit, and establishing contact with the US and European firms enabled
these companies to take on the nuclear project. Furthermore, the electric-
ity industry had built up some groups comprising highly skilled
engineers who were familiar with collaborating with foreign experts on
macro projects.
Some industrial engineers were authentic architects of nuclear strategy

and took on the functions of business leadership, project management,
public dissemination of energy policy, and the orchestration of a lobby.
They had first-hand knowledge of what the US had been doing since
1945. These engineers knew the limitations of the Spanish industrial
economy. They frequented meetings of the Atomic Industrial Forum in
New York and reacted to the business expectations put forward at the
1955 Geneva Conference. Post their return from Switzerland, a group of
these industry captains had a meeting with General Franco to convey
their objectives. The nuclear programme should be the responsibility of
the private enterprise. The next step entailed the creation of a two-
business consortium to build nuclear power stations in regions that were
historically controlled by the private enterprises, which would enable
them to distribute a substantial part of the future of the nuclear market
and reinforce their unequivocal commitment. Centrales Nucleares del
Norte SA [Nuclear Power Plants of the North] (Nuclenor) joined forces
with Iberduero and Eléctrica del Viesgo and designed the first plant for
the Bilbao area in 1958. Meanwhile, Centrales Nucleares SA (Cenusa)
collaborated with Unión Eléctrica Madrileña (EMU), Hidroeléctrica
Española (HE) and Sevillana de Electricidad (SE) to operate in the cen-
tral, eastern and southern areas of the peninsula.12
However, this group of entrepreneurs and engineers was also aware
that the complexity and costs of a nuclear plant cannot be resolved by
merely purchasing the most advanced technology from abroad. They had
to look for industrial solutions in a country that possessed very low-level
nuclear technology and had to manage the supervision and execution of
certain processes and operations with local capital. It shows that the pri-
vate enterprises had another opportunity for creating new industries,
diversifying existing ones, or promoting engineering and consultancy ser-
vices on a massive scale. Their approach again collided with the autarkic
plans of the INI and the JEN. In other words, the electrical lobby was
challenging the state’s plans, although everything seemed harmonious in
the public sphere.
In fact, the government’s industrial policy aimed to forge an alliance
between the public and private bodies that fitted into the institutional
framework of the Autarky. Since 1955, the JEN had been one of the
40 J. De la Torre
major private firms in the governing council and in various working com-
mittees linked to research in experimental reactors and new materials.
Since the private enterprises potentially benefited by the technological
advancements, they were asked to contribute financially in part towards
these advancements. In reality, the companies considered this as the price
to be paid to get authorisation for their first power stations. Meanwhile,
in 1957 and 1958, the industrial banks and firms founded engineering
firms, such as Técnica Atómica SA (Tecnatom), and capital goods compa-
nies, such as Técnicas Nucleares SA or Construcciones Nucleares that
joined Babcock & Wilcox, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, Uniquesa, and
General Electric Española in Bilbao.13 Three years later, at the end of
1961, this emerging ecosystem was incorporated as the Foro Atómico
Español (FAE) [the Spanish Atomic Forum] as an alliance of industries
that were looking for a niche market in nuclear energy: steelworks, metal
and mechanical engineering, shipping industry, chemical works, electron-
ics and producers and distributors of electricity, engineering companies
and consultancies, and the JEN and INI.14 Notwithstanding, behind this
scheme, there were two different proposals regarding who should lead the
nuclear power programme: the Junta de Energía Nuclear, the public body
that had assumed a lot of regulatory power in the matter of research and
safety, or the private companies that made up the power oligopoly, whose
hegemony had strengthened since 1944. The result was going to depend
on the economic policy and the strategic managers’ capability.
romoters and Technocrats: The Triumph of Nuclear

P
Developmentalism
The truth is that by 1959 the days of the Autarky were numbered. The
risk of Spain becoming bankrupt led to a shift in economic policy under
the tutelage of the World Bank and IMF.15 However, until 1964 it was
still not clear whether the private companies would lead the construction
of the nuclear power plants. Over those five years, the visible face of that
process was Gregorio López Bravo, a young politician who first occupied
the department of foreign trade, followed by the department of the
Spanish Institute of Foreign Currency, and finally the Ministry of
Industry. In his first role, he was responsible for liberalising the foreign
currency market and foreign transactions; in the second, he promoted an
industrial policy that was very favourable to foreign capital. These two
issues had far-reaching consequences for decisions that were still pending
about the nuclear programme. As the person responsible for foreign
trade, López Bravo had the chance to establish contact with monetary
authorities, entrepreneurs and bankers in the US. He had attended the
boards of directors of a dozen INI industrial companies and had a good
knowledge of the energy sector, both public and private. López Bravo’s
appointment as the Minister of Industry in July 1962 was greeted by the
US press as ‘an invitation to foreign capital’ to participate ‘in the Spanish
economy’.16
The new industrial policy aimed to replace the autarkic principles with
external liberalisation and business freedom under the supervision of the
government. It was a case of providing Spanish entrepreneurs an access to
leading foreign technology in order to raise the country’s industrial stan-
dards. The heads of the INI and the JEN resisted the change as much as
they could. However, other people less exposed to public opinion and
with direct access to political power supported this 180-degree turn in
industrial management. The managers of two private consortiums acted
towards implementing this challenge. Their business was at stake. Jaime
MacVeigh,17 in charge of the design of the Cenusa power stations and
director of Tecnatom, and Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines,18 head of
Nuclenor, led the bet to accelerate the implementation of this programme
in partnership with the US industry. They attended scientific and busi-
ness meetings on nuclear power in the US and maintained contact with
the nuclear agencies in each country, multinational corporations, and
international agencies. They collaborated as lecturers disseminating the
civil uses of nuclear power. They were both driving forces behind the
Spanish nuclear lobby.
On a commercial mission to England in 1960, MacVeigh made a very
relevant situation diagnosis. His company’s plans relied on the opinion of
the government. He believed that the Spanish industry could participate
in a conventional power station by manufacturing turbines, items of
instrumentation, alternators and steam raising equipment, but not in the
fuel cycle. For this reason, he considered the JEN trials as ‘a big mistake’.
42 J. De la Torre
MacVeigh declared himself a supporter of the plan to import the reactor

and he was familiar with the US financial facilities.19 Moreover, to achieve
this, it was necessary to influence the decision-makers. Gutiérrez-Cortines
personally told Minister Planell ‘they doubted whether the government
intended allowing the private utilities to build nuclear stations’. The
answer was ‘the Government would support (…) at the appropriate
time’.20 The problem, in fact, was that the people in charge of the autarkist
policy were still in their posts and did not understand the meaning of the
new economic policy. The President of the JEN acknowledged in June
1960 that he had doubts over ‘Spain’s ability to expand exports to increase
its foreign earnings’. His firm view continued to be that ‘Spain must plan
to be as economically self-sufficient as possible’. Therefore, it was logical
that he would be ‘surprised’ because MacVeigh and Gutiérrez-Cortines
‘were now thinking of installing large nuclear power reactors in the late
sixties’. To foreign observers, however, it seemed clear that the govern-
ment ‘will soon reconsider whether to proceed on their lines or to devise
a new programme’.21 Decision-making was charged with tensions
between supporters and opponents of the new approach of the nuclear
programme.
However, this did not come immediately. By late 1961, MacVeigh
was more forceful in his strategy and drafted a confidential report,
wherein he was critical of the policy of the JEN and its president. This
report was given to López Bravo. In his opinion, Otero’s plan to pro-
ceed with the experimental projects was illusory and expensive for a
country like Spain. Moreover, the fuel cycle would not be viable until
1970, hardly cover the needs for uranium, and delay the rollout of the
power stations. Therefore, the report advised supporting the private
initiative that was prepared to construct immediately ‘a small and stan-
dard plant with a future’; it would be of the ‘boiling water’ type and
come at a ‘reasonable’ cost. Those running the Zorita project firmly
believed that they had to speed up the nuclear race using the US tech-
nology and in collaboration with the private companies. This business
engineer was right to consider that everything depended on two essen-
tial factors: ‘the capacity of Spanish industry’ to respond to this chal-
lenge and ‘the (economic) liberalisation’ that access to the foreign
market would provide.22
López Bravo was planning to promote both the factors upon assuming
the role of Minister in mid-1962. In Madrid, the president of the JEN
confessed to the British Ambassador, his lack of agreement with the new
head of Industry and Energy, who had a seat on the Nuclear Board. Otero
thought that the efforts of the new minister towards encouraging private
instead of state enterprises exceeded that of his predecessors.23 The utili-
ties had already expressed their disagreement with the nuclear agency and
its support towards light-water reactors and enriched uranium, that is,
technology sourced from the US.24 The government needed time to rede-
fine the role of the INI, which came under the Ministry of Industry, and
to agree on a five-year plan with the JEN and private industry to invest in
three power stations of 300 MWe each, in addition to the 160 MWe
Zorita power station. The path for the plan cleared after the resignation
of the then president of the INI.25 López Bravo agreed that Otero would
continue in JEN, and imposed a programme that satisfied the electrical
lobby and did not completely defeat the leaders of the Board. Therefore,
the two reactors using enriched uranium and one using natural uranium
were authorised:26 Zorita (PWR, Westinghouse), Garoña (BWR, General
Electric) and Vandellós (natural uranium, EDEF). In the short term this
choice was explained because a different company had tendered each
reactor and they ‘were offered under excellent economic conditions’.27
Without there being any certainty in the outcome of the plan, the ran-
dom result of trying out different technologies would strengthen the
industry in the long term.
These things were happening around the time when the government
approved its first Nuclear Energy Law in 1964, an instrument that was
going to be the key to developing the first generation of power stations
and reconciling the state and market.28 On the one hand, this legislation
gave a better definition to the functions of the Board as an advisory body
of the government and was responsible for certifying safety in all nuclear
installations, while programme planning was the responsibility of the
Department of Energy. On the other hand, the legislation’s support to
the development of the nuclear industry was specified only indirectly, ‘by
not requiring private capital to take on excessively arduous responsibili-
ties’ in the case of accidents (sic). However, the transcendental element to
understanding the government’s decision-making role was explained by
44 J. De la Torre
some engineers of Cenusa and Nuclenor to some British colleagues: ‘this

(law) would provide for the minister of industry to be the nominated
person to license nuclear power installations’.29 López Bravo would have
all the authority and the last word in awarding the tenders.
lanners, Consultants and Multinationals: Nuclear

P
Utopia Unchained
Seven years after the nuclear power station at Shippingport (Pennsylvania)

had been connected to the grid, Spain, one of Europe’s most backward
countries, was among the first to replicate a new and expensive technol-
ogy that demanded scientific, entrepreneurial and institutional capabili-
ties. The four power stations that were to be located on the waters of the
rivers Tagus (Zorita) and Ebro (Garoña) and the Mediterranean Sea
(Vandellòs and Irta) represented an unprecedented challenge for both the
electricity and engineering companies. It is true that this undertaking
took place during stage of intense economic growth and industrialisation.
Any macro project seems feasible during such a phase. The first three reac-
tors of the proposal went ahead through ‘turnkey contracts’, starting from
1964. It seemed logical to resort to that system because of both the low
industrial level and the explicit aim of ‘learning by doing’. In fact, only a
very small percentage of conventional equipment for these power stations
was manufactured in Spain, between 35% and 40%, and the level of
technology developed was also low.30 To improve this, the ministries of
Industry and Commerce supported the creation of SERCOBE (Technical
and Commercial Service for Goods and Equipment Manufacturers), an
organisation aimed at fostering cooperation between manufacturers and
engineers who were shortly going to be involved in major energy proj-
ects.31 The first three power stations were connected to the electrical grid
in 1968, 1971 and 1972, respectively, with hardly any delays.32 Let there
be no mistake about it. Although using foreign technology, it involved
increasing high value-added output that is manufactured in Spain.
The learning curve was so intense in this short period between 1967
and 1972 that the electricity companies and the state set out to design a
nuclear programme of enormous proportions. They were convinced of
their capability to undertake a plan that, during its formulation, seemed

unattainable. In other words, it seemed utopian. Both López Bravo and
his successor in the Department of Industry, since October 1969, José
Maria López de Letona, believed that developing Spain had the c apabilities
of facilitating (1) an increase in the number of nuclear power plants, (2)
a rise in the highly specialised manufacture of capital equipment and (3)
development of the enriched fuel cycle entirely at a Spanish plant. At that
time, only the US and the Soviet Union had these capabilities, while
Euratom continued its efforts to replicate them. The Spanish bureaucrats
and experts transmitted this idea at all the international forums, while
entrepreneurs placed emphasis on accelerating the development of the
second generation of nuclear power stations.33 Furthermore, as in other
countries, government policy was betting on the early emergence of the
fast reactor.34 They thought everything was technologically possible and
in the short term.
The promoters saw their proposals reflected in the 1969 National
Power Plan, a programme developed by UNESA and approved by the
Minister of Industry. Their calculations determined that, to the rate of
industrial growth, the required load would triple every 10 years.35
Iberduero and Cenusa had presented their blueprints for Lemóniz and
Almaraz, while Unión Eléctrica Madrileña was looking for a site for
Zorita II. That meant submission of bids for at least six new reactors in
one year. According to the review of the plan in 1972, nuclear energy
should have provided about 50% of the electricity supply in 1983. This
meant allocation of contracts for two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors every
year for a decade. In addition, the plan would focus on investments to
carry forward the fuel cycle and the production of capital goods that are
also included in the 2nd and 3rd Development Plan and were defined as
the ‘two pillars’ of ‘our future energy independence’.36 The idea that with-
out electricity there would be no economic development or welfare also
implied37 public expenditure on expanding the means of transport, con-
nection and distribution of the high-voltage grid owned by UNESA. The
Developmentalism covered in all aspects believing that ‘the available
nuclear energy is cheap and virtually inexhaustible’.38
This programme provided an opportunity for business in the medium
and long term, thereby intensifying attention of domestic and foreign
46 J. De la Torre
companies. Nuclear Engineering International, the magazine that had

brought together the civilian industry from the producer countries since
1956, praised the Spanish project without hesitation as ‘a tremendous
programme of investment in capital intensive generating plants’ and said
that ‘it does show what can be done when everybody in one country pulls
in the same direction instead of opposite directions’. In other words, this
was achieved ‘by mutual agreement between the wide diversity of utility
companies, industrial concerns and Government’.39 Spain was considered
by foreign countries an example to be imitated in the nuclear race. In the
early 1970s, few activities of international trade raised greater expecta-
tions than those that generated contracts linked to a power station, from
the reactor and the fuel to the electrical equipment. The Westinghouse
and General Electric dominated those markets, but other major European
and the US companies competed with ‘extremely attractive tenders in
order to break into the Spanish market’. Particularly, the process engi-
neering companies fought to capture contracts for the execution of proj-
ects. Bechtel held ‘the strongest position to supply what the Spaniards
need’.40 The peculiarity was that foreign firms sought a Spanish partner.
The programme was diversified and it incorporated some changes in
the institutional framework. To this end, the government designed a
scheme in which the INI assumed greater industrial and financial promi-
nence, although in a more subsidiary position. First, the Institute boosted
the fuel cycle. The Empresa Nacional del Uranio S.A. (ENUSA) [National
Uranium Company] was established at the end of 1971 with the aim of
ensuring the manufacture in Spain and supply of enriched uranium for
the future power stations. Its capital was underwritten by the state (60%)
and the major electricity firms (40%) that were promoting the nuclear
power stations. The procurement of funds for this project posed a chal-
lenge, and the initial technological base was imported from the US.41 In
the long run, INI decided to rely on in-house development of technol-
ogy, which would turn out to be unrealistic. The next of the government’s
strategy was to support the emergence of a large manufacturer of nuclear
equipment, particularly the steam generation system and its components.
Equipamientos Nucleares SA (ENSA) [Nuclear Equipment] was founded
through a consortium of major metallurgical companies in 1972—pri-
vate ones such as the Babcock & Wilcox Española, SA, Mecánica de la
Peña SA, and Stein & Roubaix Española SA; public companies such as
that held by INI, Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima SA. under the protec-
tion of the government. It declared ENSA as a ‘preferred industry’ and
tasked it with the supply of reactor vessels and generators for the Spanish
power stations that were under construction. The technology partners for
this industry were once again Westinghouse and GE.42
Finally, the Ministers of Industry reinforced INI’s engineering firms as
instruments of the programme for developing large nuclear power stations.
Post the selection of the type of reactor and supplier of equipment the pro-
moter was required to assign the engineering of each project to a Spanish
company and another foreign company to foster collaborative action. The
AUXIESA was created in 1966 with majority public capital, and it later
brought in two major private banks, the Vizcaya and the Español de
Crédito, to be able to act on its industrial projects. By 1971, Auxiesa had
matured as it shared contracts from the nuclear projects of Vandellós,
Lemóniz, Garoña and Almaraz with the US firms Ebasco, Bechtel, Gibbs
& Hill and Burns & Row; the English companies, Mertz & McLean and
Simons; and the French companies, Socia and Alsthom.43 The same con-
text of competition for energy contracts was what allowed some engineer-
ing companies founded by the industrial banks in the 1950s to grow; it also
encouraged the merger of some consultants such as Empresarios Agrupados
SA—Técnicas Reunidas SA, Ghesa, and Eptisa—which had already
acquired experience of working with thermal power stations. In late 1973,
the manager of SENER, a firm created in 1954 to provide solutions to the
naval industry and which had developed projects in the petrochemical
industry, explained with the utmost clarity, ‘they realise that nuclear power
is big business and that by Government decree Spanish technology will be
required to take the lead as soon as the learning process is over’.44
Enusa, Ensa, Auxiesa and Sercobe thus symbolised the government’s
effort to accelerate the domestic industry’s participation in the nuclear
programme, and, indeed, it meant rejecting turnkey contracts to have
direct control over projects and intensify the learning process with for-
eign partners. This was not always considered a priority option by the
electricity companies. Faced with the government’s idea of Spanish
nuclear technology, the promoters wanted to connect the reactors on an
immediate basis and start earning profits on their investments.45 They
48 J. De la Torre
were clear about the fact that safety and efficient operations of a nuclear
power station required trained operators and supervision of power
stations needed sophisticated technology, and not reliance on centres of
assistance and learning on the other side of the Atlantic. Thus, Tecnatom,
one of the pioneers in the sector, became the services engineering firm for
six Spanish electro-nuclear companies in 1973.46
These strategic activities entailed financial commitment of a higher
order than the capacities of companies from a developing country.
Moreover, the supervision of the State was again inevitable in this
instance. The deployment of the programme had the support of a very
active economic diplomacy, which mediated between Spanish promot-
ers and nuclear power multinationals. The Ministers of Industry played
a basic commercial function during their foreign tours and visits to
international agencies. In the case of the US, economic, financial and
industrial advisors in the Embassy in Washington explained how Spain
in 1973 became the ‘billion-dollar client’ of the Exim Bank. From the
first credits for Zorita and Garoña in 1965 and 1966 to the last ones in
1981, these technicians accompanied and advised representatives of the
electricity companies in negotiating their contracts with the US public
and private banking institutions. This issue was considered ‘reserved’ for
the ambassadors.47 The same applied in the cases of France and
Germany.48
The observe of the coin was the effective diplomatic machinery initi-
ated during the presidencies of R. Nixon and G. Ford, with Secretary of
State (1969–77), H. Kissinger, offering generous conditions to develop-
ing countries such as Iran, Taiwan, South Korea and Spain to enable
them to purchase nuclear power stations in an increasingly competitive
market.49 Among all of them, the best customer for the US industry was
Spain, which was cited as an example at the shareholders’ meeting of
Westinghouse Electric Co. (WEC) in 1972. The WEC had just sold five
nuclear plants to Spanish companies, which guaranteed jobs in the US.50
Furthermore, as the company’s financial experts pointed out ‘the price
level on foreign orders has been slightly higher than it has been for
domestic. So we have looked on it as excellent business.’51 The 1973–74
oil crises would speed up purchases of nuclear reactors and equipment.
This fact coincided with Kissinger’s proposal to create the ‘Nuclear
Suppliers Group’ in order to review the policy for nuclear exports to

countries that were not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) after the atomic explosion in India in 1974.52 The fact that
Spain at the end of the Franco regime refused to sign the Treaty does not
seem to have hindered the plans of its companies, although it may indi-
cate the tendency of its military to think about developing nuclear
weapons.53
The political uncertainty of a dictatorship in its last days failed to halt
the nuclear utopia that had been triggered. Quite the opposite. In August
1975, W.J. Cassey, president of the Exim Bank, went to Madrid to meet
the people responsible for the programme (such as the Ministry of
Industry, the INI, the JEN and ENUSA) in order to assess and strengthen
the financing plan for the development of nuclear energy.54 Between
January 1974 and the first democratic elections in June 1977, the govern-
ment pre-authorised 11 new nuclear projects that would receive the US
credits even before they had been approved definitively.55 Even though at
that juncture there had been three Ministers of Industry, that spirit per-
sisted. This ambitious plan was being made for the long term that was
planned to be rolled out by 1985. The nuclear legacy of the Francoism
would have to be administered by a young democracy.
The Power of Democracy

‘Spain has now been nuclearised, in an undemocratic way’ and ‘without
any kind of debate’.56 In a historical perspective, this statement, uttered
in the Parliament in 1978, was quite well in accordance with the reality
of the facts in a country that left an authoritarian regime with the goal of
nuclear development. Spain’s transition to a democratic system took
place in the middle of an economic recession that modified the expecta-
tions of the technocrats in the Franco regime. In a context of high infla-
tion, rapid industrial decline, drop in the demand for electricity, and the
financial market deterioration, energy policy faltered and delays began to
accumulate in the construction programme for power stations, particu-
larly, and there was a sharp rise in costs. What is more, the newly won
political freedom and public opinion meant that those who had
50 J. De la Torre
promoted the nuclear expansion were soon subjected to the scrutiny of a

democratic society.
For those political, business and scientific elites the scenario was radi-
cally changing. In the institutions, media and on the street, critics reacted
against the nuclear paradigm and had begun to manifest themselves
locally before the end of the dictatorship. There was talk on the need to
shut down the nuclear programme. This evolution toward a liberal
democracy was slow to replace the political actors. Those in the conserva-
tive governments from 1977 to 1982 had their own profile very close to
the nuclear lobby. However, the scenario changed after the electoral vic-
tory of the Socialist Party in 1983. The scientific system also underwent
changes, although the role of the experts was not questioned and new
generations of technicians continued to join. The heads of the large firms
promoting nuclear reactors were the unique characters of the old order
that remained. The nuclear transition culminated between 1983 and
1985 with the moratorium negotiated between the Government and
owners of the companies.
ctivists and Defenders of the Territory: The Anti-

A
nuclear Spirit
Some of the young people who reached adulthood between the late 1960s
and the mid-1970s participated in movements opposing to the prolifera-
tion of nuclear power stations in Spain. The chronology and the map of
the protests and mobilisations coincide completely with those of the
authorisations from the Ministry of Industry to the promoters to start the
project or the works. This activism was not only a faithful expression of
‘Not in my backyard’ but also echoed the social perception of nuclear
threat and the risk of radioactivity shared by many societies in the west-
ern world since the 1960s. Although the propaganda insisted that with-
out nuclear plants there would be no economic development and welfare,
and press freedom was pursued, the Spanish people were familiar with
images of the atomic bombs on Japan, the tests in the Pacific, and
the bipolar world of the Cold War arms race. Sometimes the voice of
foreign experts who warned that civil programmes ‘should not be put
into practice until any substantial health risks had been eliminated’ was
transmitted by the media.57 It was also in Spain where the first major
nuclear accident in Europe occurred, taking up the front pages of the
news internationally. Information about the collision of the two US air-
craft when four hydrogen bombs from one of the aircrafts fell to earth
near the fishing village of Palomares (Almeria) was censored. The govern-
ment used this as an act of propaganda with a view to minimising the
risk.58 The seriousness of the so-called Palomares ‘incident’ in 1966 and
the less well-known discharge of radioactive water from the JEN facilities
into the river Manzanares in Madrid59 in 1970, helped to spread nuclear
fear and encourage opposition to the deployment of the power stations.
In other words, the anti-nuclear spirit had been invoked before the end
of the dictatorship, even though the demonstrations were sporadic and
localised.
This rejection was observed in all of the places chosen for installing a
nuclear reactor. The leading electricity companies clashed with local
interests, who were spontaneously organised to stop every project. The
local opposition in the final years of the Franco regime finally took shape
of a movement of anti-nuclear crusade that occupied the public space
and had its maximum expansion during Spain’s transition to democracy.
It is likely that part of its relevance had its roots in the leadership of a very
small group of qualified leaders. The industrial engineer Pedro Costa
Morata, the sociologist Mario Gaviria, and the economist José Allende
were actors who symbolise the strategy. Each of them reacted in late
1973, when it was announced that the installation of one or more power
stations in the areas where they lived or where they came from had been
authorised. Each of them separately applied a similar pattern to defend
their territory. They approached the provincial governments and munici-
palities to deny the permits and works licenses; they contacted social and
economic groups—fishermen, farmers, industrialists, middle classes,
professionals and vacationers—who felt the threats of such a project, in
order to organise local opposition; they organised conferences and publi-
cations to broadcast the conflict; and, above all, they filed legal suits to
delay the process. Far from being disconnected, these locals sought out
meeting points and designed a strategy of activism that connected with
52 J. De la Torre
the antinuclear movements that were already proliferating in Europe and

the US.
The political context was against the anti-nuclear activists, and the
most effective thing was to use the existing legal framework to denounce
the utility companies in the law courts. They had learned this from the
first nuclear project that had stalled in Spain thanks to local pressure.
Between 1966 and 1973, the city of Peñíscola and some entrepreneurs in
the tourist sector disputed against Hidroeléctrica Española SA when it
tried to build a nuclear power station at Irta, on a Mediterranean beach.
The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the tourist interests. Seven years of
waiting was enough to deter the promoter. This plan was repeated for
stalling other projects involving sites on the coast of Andalusia, Murcia,
Galicia, Cantabria, and the Basque country. Agricultural development
and consumption of water from the Ebro, Tagus, and Douro rivers played
a key role in opposition to reactors in Aragon, Extremadura and Castilla-
León. The struggle for fishing grounds was essential in Catalonia. In all
these cases, the projects were stalled when the municipalities of these
places formally and roundly demonstrated their rejection of the nuclear
sites. There were areas wherein the projects could not be stalled because
the provincial and municipal institutions and the local population
accepted the nuclear installations owing to the economic and employ-
ment benefits that they provided to the region, even though part of the
population had opposed the project. The government had information
about the local social opposition.60
The fact that cannot be neglected is that symbolically the opposi-
tion against nuclear programmes took the shape of a political opposi-
tion to the Franco regime and its subsequent successors, including
rejection of the electricity oligarchy. This interpretation is also given
by a few representatives of the regime who while filing court com-
plaints about the sites chosen for some of the stations.61 It is true that
the Spring of anti-nuclear movement lasted throughout the period of
Spain’s transition to democracy, even though it did not manage to
materialise into a political party. The environmentalist platforms imi-
tated the European and the US protest model.62 A referendum was
called for to enable the citizens to show their favour or opposition for
the nuclear programme. Suddenly, in late 1977, an unexpected agent
broke out—terrorism from the ETA—which distorted everything.

The attempt to paralyze the Lemoniz nuclear project through bomb-
ings, kidnappings and assassinations became a defiance against the
companies and the State.63 Meanwhile, in parliament, the newly legal-
ised political parties, both those in power and those in opposition,
debated about what to do with a nuclearised Spain, in the context of
the economic and energy crisis.
L obbyists and Politicians in Transition: The Status

Quo Threatened
The seriousness of the economic situation required a review of an energy

policy that had been designed along the lines of developmentalism for
times of boom and not for an adverse scenario. Both the state and com-
panies had committed to and launched plans for investing in energy
infrastructures based on a growth rate that was not going to recover. The
balance of payments deficit was being aggravated by oil purchases and
forecasts of electricity demand were being frustrated remorselessly. To
overcome the problem, the last Franco government offered to keep the
entire nuclear programme in order to ‘relieve the energy crisis’.64 The first
democratic government reformulated this same idea in the so-called
Moncloa Pacts (the name of the Spanish Government headquarters,
October 1977). These covenants, in practice, were the agreement between
parties of the left and right that were established with the intention of
dismantling the interventionist economic model. A few who negotiated
the agreement on industrial policy and energy were to be key decision-
makers on nuclear matters in the medium and long term.65 In order to
achieve the objectives of balance of payments, they considered the ‘devel-
opment of our own resources’ of oil, nuclear fuels, hydropower and coal.
The nuclear sector reflected on the old and the new ideas in the debate.
It was necessary to make ‘the maximum possible use of national technol-
ogy’. Besides, it was important for the state to control and coordinate
imports of nuclear equipment and the transfer of technology. A reflec-
tion of the new way of thinking can be seen in the commitment to ensure
that nuclear installations would be in the ‘most suitable’ locations, with
54 J. De la Torre
involvement of local authorities and an ‘appropriate compensation’

system.66
Nevertheless, a debate on nuclear energy in a democracy meant ques-
tioning the hegemonic role of the private electrical sector built under the
dictatorship, which at that time was named the electrical and financial
oligarchy. In fact, the Moncloa Pacts reached in the autumn of 1977
included ‘optimisation of the electricity transport and distribution sys-
tem’ and the merger of companies. For some, this opened up the expecta-
tion for nationalisation of the high-voltage electrical line that the
companies owned. The Minister of Energy Alberto Oliart had admitted
that ‘the electricity industry needs to be restructured, but not nation-
alised’.67 Meanwhile, the left parties had included this last proposal in
their programmes since 1976.68 However, it turned out that the person
who advocated nationalising the grid and proposed retaining the new
nuclear power stations with the public sector was the conservative Vice
President of the Economy, Enrique Fuentes Quintana. Right at the
moment when the National Energy Plan was being reviewed, before
sending it to the Parliament, a serious conflict broke out within the
centre-right government. From the outside, the Chairman of UNESA
proclaimed that ‘the only hope that we have is nuclear power’.69 The
Minister of Industry made sure that the Cabinet rejected the proposal of
Fuentes Quintana, who immediately resigned. Oliart’s attitude was inter-
preted as ‘a strict defence of the interests of the electrical oligarchy’.70
Although he was relieved of his post, another minister close to the nuclear
lobby who came from the Spanish Confederation of Entrepreneurs’
Organizations (CEOE Vice President) and led the Confederation of
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises [CEPYME] replaced him.71
Cleared the threat of nationalisation, the presidents of the leading elec-
tricity companies knew that their statements of account were hiding a
very high financial risk. Nuclear fever required them to multiply their
investments in assets by more than six times. The world’s capital market
had depreciated and the companies awarded with the contracts began to
experience accumulating delays in their works, which had an impact on
direct and indirect costs. With their expectations frustrated, the govern-
ment and the companies decided to retain the constructions that had
already been authorised and postpone the rest of the plan for a decade. In
other words, according to the Electrical Plan of 1979, the 22,000 MWe

planned for 1985 was reduced to 14,000 MWe (seven reactors under
construction), and the rest (eight others) were slated for return in 1987.
In addition, all this the bases of generous public funding, privileged tax
treatment and 10% annual dividends to shareholders was retained.72 For
that reason, there was demand for putting an end to ‘a private business
with permanent public funding’,73 and investigations were published that
denounced the electrical and financial oligopoly and ‘the business’ of the
nuclear power plants.74 At the same time, some voices called for the pro-
gramme to continue in order to avoid ‘serious economic and social effects’
on the activity and employment of the construction companies and their
capital equipment, while the Atomic Forum launched a campaign warn-
ing of the ‘outcomes of a nuclear moratorium in Spain’.75
However, the Harrisburg accident affected those plans by both high-
lighting the social perception of the risk and strengthening of anti-nuclear
feelings and the new demands on the safety of the plants, which increased
costs, delayed the works, and demanded greater effort from public
finances. The planned nuclear power reduction and delays in the con-
struction and operation of the seven reactors aggravated the financial
situation of ENUSA, the joint venture that was going to provide enriched
uranium for all the power stations included in the 1975 plan. To get it,
their managers had committed to the purchase of ore and enrichment
procedures from the US, the USSR, and Eurodif. The failure to comply
with time limits placed it on the brink of default in 1980. The govern-
ment’s response was to facilitate the exit of the utility companies from
ENUSA—with the JEN acquiring all of their shares—and to finance the
stock of uranium through the general budget of the state.76 Meanwhile,
the Nuclear Safety Council was created at the start of 1980 as an inde-
pendent state agency, solely competent in that matter and in radiation
protection. The JEN retained the functions of scientific and industrial
research. Both the aforementioned episodes lead to reflect on the point at
which the state was acting as the ultimate guarantor of the nuclear pro-
gramme, taking into account the perverse effect of the technically and
financially unviable plans of the promoters.
Faced with this dilemma, there was only one explanation: the effective-
ness of the nuclear lobby in achieving the continuity of the policymakers
56 J. De la Torre
in the main decisions on energy policy. The instability that was affecting
the centre-right governments resulted in no less than five Ministers of
Industry between December 1975 and the end of 1982. By contrast, in
all of those seven years, there had been only one Commissioner of Energy,
Luis Magaña, a technocrat par excellence.77 He made regular public
appearances and his speeches were reinforced with the impact of the sec-
ond energy crisis of 1979. As said by Magaña, ‘replacing oil with nuclear
energy not only saves the foreign exchange used to buy oil, but it means
jobs in the capital goods sector within the country’. His aim was to speed
up the programme for power plants ‘in order not to build up the least
delay’. In private, the directors of the leading electricity companies
thanked him for his ‘drive, tenacity, and decision’ on the start-up of the
Almaraz plant in 1981. From the point of view of his political adversar-
ies, however, Magaña represented ‘the investment excesses’ of the electri-
cal sector.78
Behind that value judgment was the analysis of a group of mining
engineers and economists who had worked in the INI Economic Studies
Service since the early 1970s producing industrial reports and financial
proposals. With an ideological focus somewhere between Keynesian and
social democratic, this group shared the view that certain basic industries
should not be left in the hands of powerful groups who sacrificed the
public interest. The generation and distribution of electricity was one of
them.79 Between 1977 and 1980, Martin Gallego and Carmen Mestre
exposed to public opinion their diagnosis of the sector and the financial
accounts of the private electricity companies. Some firms were so over-
whelmed by nuclear investments. They had close to a negative cash flow
and were doomed to continual refinancing. However, they were able to
distribute 10% net dividends, annually. ‘What is unsustainable is the cur-
rent policy of seeking to simultaneously satisfy the consumer and the
shareholders at the cost of transferring the problem to those who will be
in charge in the future.’80
This group of young economic analysts was the future. The INI
Economic Studies Service was one of the supplier for the socialist govern-
ment that won the elections in October 1982 as the Ministers of Economy
(M. Boyer) and Industry and Energy (C. Solchaga), the director general
of Mines (J.M. Kindelan), and other positions in the Energy Department,
(Gallego was Secretary-General and Mestre was General Manager). The

approach between rationalisation and nationalisation of the electrical
sector was to be put into practice starting from 1983, supported by a
government with an absolute majority in the Parliament and for the first
time independent of the electro-nuclear lobby. Its basic task was to
nationalise the high electrical grid and establish a so-called nuclear mora-
torium, which, in practice, was going to be more than an extension to the
compliance with the Spanish Atomic programme.
The moratorium meant, above all, a bailout of the electro-nuclear sec-
tor. We refer to the evidence in Chap. 5 of this volume. The bubble of
debt meant servicing a debt equivalent to nothing less than 75% of the
total turnover of the sector.81 The bad situation of the electricity compa-
nies explains why they should accept nationalisation of the grid.82
Additionally, a process of negotiation should be started between the gov-
ernment, the companies, and the national and foreign banks to fix the
technical mechanisms for a financial rescue. The planned 14,000 MWe
nuclear projects were reduced to 7500 MWe, more adjusted to the size of
the country and, in an economic context, that was still negative. However,
there was a political decision behind that agreement—to decide how to
manage Spain’s nuclear development. The economic and financial rebal-
ancing fell in the hands of those citizens who would assume in their
electric bills for the next 30 years the compensation paid to the major
electricity companies for cancellation of the five reactors that were to be
connected to the gird (Lemóniz I and II, Valdecaballeros I and II, and
Trillo II). The slowdown in the programme was experienced in the form
of a threat from capital goods. The engineering industries complained
about the loss of jobs, of technological decapitalisation, and loss of an
international market in which they were already competing.83 Four years
later, the Salomon Brothers Agency did a study that concluded that the
private electricity industry in Spain had overcome the crisis and was expe-
riencing a future of stability and prosperity.84 The international nuclear
market would clear away the shadows over the capital goods industries in
the long run.
58 J. De la Torre
Notes
1. The National Archives of United Kingdom [henceforth NAUK] AB
65219. Report of the British Ambassador to the Foreign Office and the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency [UKAEA] (7/7/1965).
2. NAUK, Foreign Office [FO] 371.923228. José Ignacio Martín Artajo,
La Energía Atómica: sus características y su aplicación para fines militares
(Madrid: Instituto Católico de Artes e Industrias, 1946).
3. Decree-Law of 22 October 1951. José Ma Otero Navascués, “Nuclear
Energy in Spain,” Nuclear Engineering International 17, no. 188 (1972):
25–8.
4. Otero, 1972, “Nuclear Energy in Spain,” p. 25. Albert Presas i Puig,
“The Correspondence between Jose Maria Otero Navascues and Karl
Wirtz: An Episode in the International Relations of the Junta de Energia
Nuclear,” Arbor 167, no. 659–60 (2000): 527–601. See Chap. 4 in this
volume.
5. NAUK, FO 371 125 244. ‘Spain is one of those power-hungry countries
most interested in use atomic power.’
6. NAUK, FO 371.923228. Top Secret Report of 13/07/1951. Meeting
between Suanzes and W.H. Knox, president of Westinghouse.
7. Ana Romero de Pablos and José Manuel Sánchez -Ron, Energía Nuclear
en España. De la JEN al CIEMAT (Madrid: Ministerio de Ciencia y
Tecnología, 2001).
8. NAUK, Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] 371 121949,
OEEC Nuclear Energy.
9. NAUK, FO AB 38280. Report on a visit to the Spanish Nuclear Energy
Organisation (20-29/3/1961).
10. NAUK, FCO 371 121953, OEEC Nuclear Energy (1957). M. Adamson,
L. Camprubi, and S. Turchetti, “From the Ground Up: Uranium
Prospection in Western Europe,” in The Surveillance Imperative:
Geosciences during the Cold War and Beyond, ed. S. Turchetti and
P. Roberts (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 23–44.
11. Antonio Gómez Mendoza, Javier Pueyo, and Carles Sudrià, Electra y el
Estado : la intervención pública en la industria eléctrica bajo el Franquismo,
1st ed. (Cizur Menor: Thomson Civitas, 2007). See Chap. 3 in this
volume.
12. Romero de Pablos and Sánchez-Ron, 2001, Energía Nuclear en España.
See also Chaps. 2 and 5 in this volume.
13. NAUK, FO AB 371 132 737. Visit of the UKAEA to companies linked
to nuclear energy (October 1958). Tecnatom, Tecnatom 1957–2007.
Medio siglo de tecnología nuclear en España (Madrid: Tecnatom SA,
2007). See Chap. 3 in this volume.
14. Archivo Histórico del Banco de España [henceforth AHBE], Instituto
Español de Moneda Extranjera [henceforth IEME], Secretariat, C.137.
Report for the Presidency of the Government (1961). FAE (1963). Ana
Romero de Pablos, “Energía Nuclear e Industria en la España de
Mediados del Siglo XX. Zorita, Santa María de Garoña y Vandellòs I,” in
La Física en la Dictadura. Físicos, fultura y poder en España 1939-1975,
ed. Nestor Herrán and Xavier Roque (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona, 2012), 45–63, p. 49. De la Torre and Rubio, 2015, La
financiación exterior del desarrollo industrial español, p. 102.
15. Manuel-Jesús González, La economía española del Franquismo,
1940–1070. Dirigismo, Mercado y Planificación (Barcelona: Tecnos,
1979).
16. De la Torre and Rubio, 2015, La financiación exterior del desarrollo indus-
trial español, pp. 46–47.
17. De la Torre and Rubio, 2015, La financiación exterior del desarrollo indus-
trial español, pp. 110–11. Jaime Mac Veigh, Ensayo sobre un Programa de
Energía Nuclear en España (Madrid: Banco Urquijo, 1957).
18. Manuel Gutiérrez Cortines, “Las Centrales Atómicas en los programas
de construcción de las empresas eléctricas,” in Círculo de La Unión
Mercantil e Industrial de Madrid (Madrid: Círculo de la Unión Mercantil
e Industrial de Madrid, 1958).
19. NAUK, FO 371149577. Note for the record (2/5/1960).
20. NAUK, FO 371149578. Note for the record (10/5/1960). “The
Americans would provide credit for 15 years which was likely to be dou-
ble that available from the European companies. In these circumstances
the Americans tender might have to be accepted.”
21. NAUK, FO 371149578. Note of record on visit to JEN (15/6/1960).
22. AHBE-IEME, Secretaría, C.133. FO. AB 61105. Visit of Señor
MacVeigh to Atomic Construction Limited (14/8/1959). MacVeigh
explained that “this is more easily obtained if the foreign currency
involved is American dollars as better credit terms are available from the
Americans”.
23. NAUK, AB 6591. British Embassy Report (23/11/1962).
60 J. De la Torre
24. Their goal was “to buy nuclear reactors with the minimum capital invest-
ment and on the maximum amount of loans from external sources which
would suggest that they would accept one of the lower capital cost
American water reactor […] than the higher cost as [British] Magnox”.
NAUK, AB 38323. Note of record (25/11/1964).
25. Otero “was profoundly disturbed by the resignation” of Suanzes, “a close
and confident of General Franco” and “favourably disposed to the Junta’s
ideas for a nuclear power programme”. Even more, he “is clearly not
prepared to recommend the construction of any power reactor in Spain
which does not use his concentrates”. NAUK, AB 38280. Discussion
JEN-UKAE (4/3/1964). Ibid., Visit of UKAEA to Madrid (December
1962).
26. Ibid. Otero thought that “The utilities are strong and influential in
Spain”. They had already been warned by British industry experts: the
type of reactor chosen “will depend to a great extent on the influence the
Junta has with Senor López Bravo, the responsible minister”. NAUK,
AB. 65 91. Note of record (29/4/1963).
27. Manuel Gutiérrez Cortines, “Nuclear Industry in Spain,” Nuclear
Engineering International 17, no. 188 (1972): 31–2.
28. BOE-A-1964-7544. The law did not cover the fact that alliances should
be established with foreign partners to improve their technological and
organisational capacities. The idea that it was necessary to achieve a high
degree of Spanish participation in nuclear projects was covered in the
first Development Plan (1964–67), which set it at a minimum of 40%
(including civil engineering). From 1969, the National Electricity Plan
went on revising that figure until it got to 50% in 1972, 60% in 1975,
and 75% in 1978.
29. NAUK, AB 6591. Notes on a visit to Windscale by three Spanish
Nuclear engineers (27/1/1964). “The JEN were not mentioned as a fac-
tor in Spain’s nuclear programme, except for the experimental work they
were doing in organic moderated rector system for the future.”
30. Enrique Kaibel, “Manufacture of Components for Nuclear Power
Stations by Spanish Industry,” Nuclear Engineering International 17, no.
188 (1972): 35–7. Manuel Gutiérrez Cortines, 1972, “Nuclear Industry
in Spain,” p. 32.
31. José Ignacio Pradas Poveda, “Los Bienes de Equipo como columna ver-
tebral de la Industria: Una aproximación a la evolución industrial desde
la perspectiva asociativa,” Economía Industrial, no. 394 (2016): 117–23.
ABC (1/5/1974: 54). Sercobe, “a semi-official body”, “serves […] to
interface with the Government on the national industrial policy” and “to
assist members firms to understand the future requirements in their field
both in scale and in technology”. NAUK, AB 38763. Report December
1973.
32. ABC (13/12/1968), La Vanguardia (22/09/1971 and 09/06/1972).
33. NAUK, AB. 38323 (25/11/1964). The 1969 report emphasised the
need for standardisation of nuclear plants and forecasted the construc-
tion of a fuel plant; the JEN was assigned these responsibilities. NAUK,
AB 38763 Report (November 1969).
34. The JEN had been giving preference to this line of research since 1968;
it has been looking for preferred partners in Great Britain, Germany and
France. NAUK, FCO 55299 Report Spain (July 1968) and Visit of
Señor López Bravo (April–May 1969).
35. BOE, no. 199 (20/8/1969).
36. Energía Nuclear, 1967, no. 49: 428–9.
37. Alfonso Álvarez Miranda, Política Energética e Industrial. Intervenciones
del Ministro de Industria Alfonso Álvarez Miranda (Madrid: Ministerio de
Industria y Energía, 1976).
38. Adolfo Pérez Luiña, “Energía Nuclear: riesgos y beneficios,” Energía
Nuclear, no. 74 (1971): 491–501.
39. Nuclear Engineering International, January 1972. Survey of Spain.
40. NAUK, FCO 91829, Report about Spain Nuclear Programme (July
1968).
41. BOE no. 15, January 18, 1972, p. 915–916. Archivo Histórico de la
Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales [ASEPI], 4912 C. and
C. 26.
42. BOE, no. 236, 2/10/1972, p. 99–17598.
43. The President of UNESA had “an action crucial in the entry of capital
private in Auxiesa”. ASEPI, C.566, exp. 1748, letters President INI and
Industry Minister, 26 and 27/7/1971).
44. NAUK, AB 38763. Visit to Spanish Atomic Energy Organisations
(17–21 December 1973).
45. NAUK, FCO 55299. Confidential Reports of Spain (October 1968 and
July 1969).
46. Tecnatom (2007, p. 60). AB 38763.
47. AHBE, IEME, Data Control, C. 1973. ASEPI, C. 26. Report on deal-
ings with Exim (28/11/1973).
48. Chaps. 4 and 5 of this book.
62 J. De la Torre
49. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American
Foreign Relations, 1969–1977 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah. The United States and
Iran in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
50. “While much of the work on these plants will be done in Spain, a large
share will be performed by Westinghouse employees here in the United
States. A lot in the Pittsburgh area”, Donald C. Burnham, executive offi-
cer said. “In other words, part of the job has be done in Spain”. The
Pittsburgh Press, (April 6, 1972). Library and Archives Senator John
Heinz History Center [henceforth LASHHC] Archives Series I Box 31.
51. “What is the toughest competitor worldwide. […] The General Electric
Corporation, of course, dwarfs all of the other ones. I would put Brown
Boveri next. Siemens certainly is a factor worldwide, and ultimately the
Japanese are going to be a factor worldwide, although really they aren’t
too much of a factor now”. LASHHC, Archives Series I Box 6. Financial
Analyst Seminar, February 22, 1972.
52. Burr Williams, “A Scheme of ‘Control: The United States and the
Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974–1976,” The International
History Review 36, no. 2 (2014): 252–76. Canada, France, Japan, West
Germany, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and United States belonged
to the group and in which Kissinger declared to feel “load[ed] around
the world, like Don Quixote”. See also http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukev-
ault/ebb467/
53. Guillermo Velarde, Proyecto Islero. Cuando España pudo desarrollar armas
nucleares (Córdoba: Guadalmazán, 2016).
54. The National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] Document
1975STATE186005.
55. María del Mar Rubio-Varas and Joseba De la Torre, “‘Spain-Eximbank’s
Billion Dollar Client’: The Role of the US Financing the Spanish Nuclear
Program,” in Electric Worlds/Mondes Électriques. Creations, Circulations,
Tensions, Transitions (19th–21st C.) (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2016),
245–68.
56. It was the Deputy Socialist Javier Solana. Diario Congreso Diputados,
no. 129, p. 5169.
57. Pérez Luiña, 1971, “Energía Nuclear: riesgos y beneficios.”
58. Rafael Moreno, La Historia secreta de las bombas de Palomares (Barcelona:
Crítica, 2016). Michael A. Rockland, An American Diplomat in Franco
Spain (Hansen Publishing Group, 2012).
59. “At the beginning this fact was denied by a JEN official”. The JEN “has
bought vast amount of agricultural products which have been buried”.
Nuclear Engineering International, no. 5, June 1971. Blanco y Negro
(26/6/1971).
60. Among the documentation that the new Industry Ministry, Alfonso
Alvarez Miranda got with his appointment in 1975 an exhaustive listing
of the nuclear projects under consideration and the social opposition
existing (or not) in each case. AAAM personal documentation.
61. Alvarez Miranda, 1976, Política Energética e Industrial.
62. Wolfgang Rüdig, Anti-Nuclear Movements: A Survey of Opposition to
Nuclear Energy (Harlow: Longman Group, 1990). Vicenç Fisas, Centrales
nucleares: Imperialismo tecnológico y proliferación nuclear (Madrid: Campo
Abierto Ediciones, 1978). Benito Sanz, Centrales Nucleares en España. El
parón nuclear (Valencia: Fernando Torres, 1984). Pedro Costa Morata,
Ecologiada (100 Batallas): Medio Ambiente y Sociedad en la España reci-
ente (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011). Raúl López Romo and Daniel
Lanero Táboas, “Antinucleares y Nacionalistas. Conflictividad
Socioambiental en el País Vasco y la Galicia rurales de la Transición,”
Historia Contemporánea 43 (2012): 749–77. Luis Sánchez-Vázquez and
Alfredo Menéndez-Navarro, “Nuclear Energy in the Public Sphere:
Anti-Nuclear Movements vs. Industrial Lobbies in Spain (1962–1979),”
Minerva 53, no. 1 (2015). Springer: 69–88. Mario Gaviría and José Ma
Perea, El paraíso estancado. la complementariedad hispanoalemana (La
Catarata, 2015), 227–36.
63. Raúl López Romo, 2012, Euskadi en Duelo: la Central Nuclear de
Lemóniz como símbolo de la transición vasca.
64. Interview with C. Pérez de Bricio, Minister of Industry and Energy ABC
(17/10/1976).
65. The commission was composed by the Minister of Industry A. Oliart,
the Commissioner of Energy L. Magaña, and three energy experts of
Socialist Party, Communist Party and Center-right Party, J.M. Kindelan,
R. Tamames, and J.L. Mellán. ABC (26/10/1977).
66. Moncloa Pacts, in Fuentes Quintana, Enrique, “Los Pactos de La
Moncloa y la Constitución de 1978,” in Economía y Economistas espa-
ñoles, ed. Enrique (director) Fuentes Quintana, vol. 8 (Barcelona: Galaxia
Gutenberg/Círculo de Lectores, 2004), 233–34. The Memorandum of
NY Federal Reserve about Spain’s Economic Policies and the Devaluation
of the Peseta had synthesised this idea: “a nuclear energy program
64 J. De la Torre
designed to eventually cut oil imports”. Archives of Federal Reserve

Bank of New York [AFRBNY], Research Memorandum, August 30,
1977. Box 615911.
67. ABC (7/8/1977, p. 38) y ABC de Sevilla (7/8/1977, p. 19).
68. Salvador Martín Arancibia, “Energía y Política,” Cuadernos de Ruedo
Ibérico, no. 63–6 (1979). París: Ruedo Ibérico: 269–302.
69. Words of Alegre Marcet. ABC (15/10/1977, p. 38).
70. Statement by Deputy Letamendia (Diario Congreso Diputados, no.
129). Oliart had worked for the electronic companies like a bank man-
ager (ABC, 9/9/1980).
71. The new Minister of Industry and Energy A. Rodríguez Sahagún
summed it up: “the nuclear option is an option that we necessarily have
to walk”. Diario Congreso Diputados, no. 47 (20/4/1978, p. 1701).
72. ABC (18/12/1977, p. 22). Journal of Sessions, no. 10 (1/11/1979).
73. Words of the communist deputy R. Tamames. Congressional Journal of
Deputies, no. 47 (20/4/1978).
74. Juan Muñoz and Ángel Serrano, “La configuración del sector eléctrico y
el negocio de la Construcción de Centrales Nucleares,” Cuadernos de
Ruedo Ibérico 63–69 (1979): 127–267. See Chap. 3 of this book.
75. Words of Popular Party congressman Valle Menéndez. Diario Congreso
Diputados, no. 47 (20/4/1978). Foro Atómico Español, Efectos directos
de una moratoria nuclear En España (Madrid: FAE, 1979).
76. ASEPI, Financial situation of Enusa, 1979–1982. C. 222.
77. This Mining engineer worked as civil servant from 1964. In 1975 was
nominated General Director of Energy and Commissioner in 1977.
BOE 27/12/975_26763 and 9/3/1977_6080.
78. Alfonso Ballestero, José Ma de Oriol y Urquijo (Madrid: Lid., 2014), 234.
79. Miguel Boyer, 1980, “La Empresa Pública en la estrategia industrial
española: El INI.” Crecimiento Económico y crisis estructural en España:
(1959–1980), p. 645.
80. María Carmen Mestre, “Las Empresas eléctricas durante la crisis ener-
getica,” Investigaciones Economicas, no. 3 (1977): 143–74. Martín
Gallego Málaga, 1978, “El futuro del sector eléctrico español,” El País,
May 27. Martin Gallego Málaga, Carmen Mestre Vergara, and Adolfo
Sánchez-Real, 1980, “El Sector Eléctrico, entre la racionalización y la
nacionalización,” El País, July 16.
81. Conference of M. López de Pablos, President of Iberduero. ABC
(30/10/1984).
82. Santiago López-García, “Cuando optimizar se convierte en un Bien

Público,” in La Creación de Red Eléctrica de España: Empresarios y regula-
dores en tensión: [1982–1985], ed. Santiago López-García (Madrid: Red
Eléctrica de España SA, 2010), 11–14. Martín Gallego Málaga, Carmen
Mestre Vergara, and Juan Manuel Kindelán, “La gestación de Red
Eléctrica de España en el marco de la reestructuración energética del
primer Gobierno socialista,” in La creación de Red Eléctrica de España:
Empresarios y reguladores en tensión: [1982–1985] (Madrid : Red Eléctrica
de España, 2010), 23–32.
83. According to Sener, Empresarios Agrupados and Initec, the Spanish
nuclear programme enabled technological innovation, with an interna-
tional projection, and exports of nuclear goods and services to Mexico,
Argentina, Ecuador and Pakistan. ABC (1/12/1983, p. 139).
84. A summary of the report on ABC (2/9/1988).

holds a PhD in History from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His main
research field is the Spanish economic policy from Franco’s dictatorship to the
democracy, and in particular the industrial policy and the indicative planning of
developmentalism (1940–1980s). He has been Visiting Scholar at La Maison
des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris and at the Center for European and
Energy and Society” (HoNESt), an EU Horizon 2020/Euratom funded Project.
3
The Nuclear Business and the Spanish
Electric-Banking Oligopoly: The First
Steps
Josean Garrués-Irurzun
and Juan A. Rubio-Mondéjar
“Neither atoms have an ideology, nor reactors are Marxists or Capitalists”

José María de Areilza (ABC, July 29, 1979)[Minister of Foreign Affairs
in Spain -1975- 76-and ambassador in the United States (1954-60)and
France (1960-64)]
Introduction
Evaluating the Spanish Nuclear Program is a complex task. The prepara-
tion, development and implementation of it did not emerge from a pre-
conceived plan nor was it perpetrated by a small group of individuals,
although final decisions involved few. Analyzing and evaluating the
This work was supported by the Project of Research “The Livelihood of Man” [HAR2013-
40760-R] and “Deployment of Nuclear Energy in Spain” [HAR2014-53825-R] of the Ministry
of Economy and Competitiveness of the Spanish Government. We would like to thank the
excellent team who have run and managed the Historical Archives of BBVA which have provided
us with the appropriate documentation for this article.
J. Garrués-Irurzun (*) • J.A. Rubio-Mondéjar

Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics,
Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain

68 J. Garrués-Irurzun and J.A. Rubio-Mondéjar
nuclear option resulted intricate due to secrecy, thereby exerting influ-

ence over all sectors (politics, military, business and environmental).
Under such restrictions, this text comprises reflections regarding the
development stage of the Spanish Nuclear Program (PNE). The initial
phase was significant, since the decisions which were made conditioned
the subsequent stages, and to a great extent, were irreversible or their cor-
rection resulted in high overall costs.
Considering the multiple perspectives from which the commercial
exploitation of nuclear energy can be analyzed, this text focuses on insti-
tutional aspects, particularly corporate details. The interest towards the
corporate standpoint lies in the fact that literature on the nuclear option
from a technological, economical or environmental perspective barely
considers the influence of corporate decisions.1 Aforesaid omission is jus-
tified to some extent as nuclear programs in many countries were created
and managed directly by the state, following World War II, through cen-
trally planned economies or mixed economies in which the energy indus-
try was nationalized. In countries where this did not occur (for instance,
the United States of America, Germany or Spain), the private nature of
companies justifies their reluctance to reveal competitive strategies, espe-
cially when their activity as a public service, preferential interest or poten-
tial danger was subject to intense political and social scrutiny.
Furthermore, the implementation of the energy policy in a market
economy is a business. In some undemocratic and developing countries,
such as Spain in the period under analysis, one can apply the words of the
British Conservative Party in 1981: the Francoist regime (in this case)
“has never believed that business of government is the government of
business”; despite there being some disorganized attempts by the govern-
ment to implement a substitution model for imports, through the INI
(Spanish National Institute of Industry).
Political and economic factors, both national and international, played
a major role in implementing the Spanish nuclear program. Among the
elements that the literature of the subject has explained in detail, one can
find the US policy for the marketing of nuclear reactors, the financial
facilities by the Export–Import Bank and the wishes of the Franco regime
to break the international isolation and economic backwardness of Spain.
However, in the end the electricity companies built the nuclear power
plants privately, although regulated by the state. Therefore, understanding
The Nuclear Business and the Spanish Electric-Banking... 69
the Spanish nuclear business requires disentangling the companies and

entrepreneurs involved and their logic of action within the Spanish indus-
trial fabric from the 1950s through the 1960s, which is the aim of this
chapter. The high fixed capital required by utility companies, coupled
with the limitations of the Spanish financial system, demanded the par-
ticipation of banks, which monitored their investments from their own
executive teams. Nuclear investment elevated the long-existing symbiotic
relationship between electric utilities and banks to a new level, strength-
ening the electric-banking oligopoly.2
Which information does the literature regarding the behavior of elec-
tric companies in the Spanish Nuclear Program provide us? Recently, De
la Torre and Rubio, analyzing the state’s role in implementing the Spanish
nuclear system,3 concluded that the support of the government was cru-
cial, as one would find it difficult to start up and implement a nuclear
program without the according institutional framework. Moreover, it
upholds the need to “ponder the private sector’s contribution in seeking
support from the state, especially that of the utility companies that will
ultimately be in charge of building the nuclear plants”. In this sense, one
of its conclusions indicates that the particular way in which the Spanish
Nuclear Program (PNE) was performed resulted from the power electric
lobbying had over the regulator.
The most interesting studies for the purpose of this essay derive from
two areas: the history of technology and economic history, that is, from
the research of a handful of researchers who can be recognized by cross-
referencing bibliographies of more recent essays (e.g. Luis Sánchez, in his
thesis on The Spanish Atomic Forum4 gathers most of his literature from
the first area5 and De la Torre and Rubio-Varas in the second case6). Both
sources contribute towards a good understanding of the “nuclear subject”
and compilation of an exhaustive bibliography regarding nuclear energy
research in Spain. We need to clarify two matters. First, essays from the
history of technology, apart from the classic by Caro on “Spanish Nuclear
History”, are essential for acquiring accurate knowledge on institutional
framework and the first phase of the Spanish Nuclear Program (PNE).
Second, alongside the works of Sudrià, Gómez-Mendoza and Pueyo,7 the
contributions marking the area of research on the participation of electric
companies in the nuclear program are performed by Sánchez-Sánchez, on
the power plant in Vandellós,8 and by De la Torre and Rubio on Zorita,9
whose essays really allow one to fully comprehend the political, ideologi-
cal and economic contexts under which decisions on the implementation
of the Spanish Nuclear Program were made.
In any case, the assessment of the role of companies in the Spanish
Nuclear Program allows one to learn their strategies first hand: interests,
resources and results. Thus, this gears one to inexorably enquire into
business archives, apart from some good pieces of work, such as the essay
by Serrano and Muñoz (1979),10 in order to delimit the logic of the con-
duct of the electric lobby concerning the nuclear subject.
This chapter is organized into several sections. After the introduction,
the second section explains the transition of rough ideas, towards nuclear
energy commercialization, to its reality. The third section relates the
forced collaboration between the state and electric companies. Initially,
one can observe how the state allows electric companies participate in the
nuclear management program, without any apparent conflict of interest
between the parties. Nonetheless, subsequently, the analysis of primary
business sources—in particular, the Bank of Vizcaya—clearly identifies
the financial sector as what guided electric company strategies behind the
scenes, thereby ensuring the nuclear development model was not against
the interests of the electric-banking oligarchy.
he Journey Towards the Commercialization

T
of Nuclear Electric Energy: From Ideas
to Reality
Electric production through atomic energy finds its origins in the mili-
tary industry and research centers associated to it. The UN Conference in
Geneva “Atoms for Peace” held in August, 1955, called for the elimina-
tion of nuclear secrecy and promotion of its peaceful use worldwide.11
Nine years prior to this, however, the Atomic Energy Control Act granted
a Civil Commission (United States Atomic Energy Commission—AEC)
with almost all the authority concerning the continuing development of
this energy in the United States.12 A year later, the AEC notified US
Congress of the necessary collaboration of private companies to maintain
the country’s pre-eminent position in the nuclear energy field.
The first advances in atomic energy use as a driving force occurred in

submarines in the United States.13 During those dates, the application for
industrial or domestic use was linked to three factors: traditional energy
availability, the price of uranium and the cost of nuclear production, or,
the technological advances in the field. Scientists ventured that the
nuclear energy development was an economic or competitive alternative
in the industry between the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the Atomic Energy Act, approved in
August 1954, modified the Atomic Energy Act (1946), thereby allowing
American private companies access to governmental restricted data on
nuclear energy production and fissile material, as well as patenting pro-
cesses associated to these activities. At the same time, the new legislation
boosted the information exchanges with other nations through the
Eisenhower program “Atoms for Peace”.
Four months after the creation of the Board of Nuclear Energy (JEN),14
in 1951, José María Oriol, chairman of the electric company Hidrola,
pled in favor of the private initiative, North American aid and the
development of human and energetic potential—where nuclear energy
played a prominent role—towards the country’s industrial progress.15
The change of political orientation in the United States implied provid-
ing money and technology to “free” countries that were prepared to invest
pacifically in atomic energy. This justifies the signing in Washington of
the “Agreement for Cooperation between the US and Spanish Governments
concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy” on 19 July 1955.16 The agreement
relaunched the basic nuclear development program (resources, and elec-
tronic equipment of the University of Madrid), as well a group geared
towards the development of atomic reactors of the Spanish Nuclear
Energy Board (JEN). Previously, a subcommittee of the AEC visited the
facilities at JEN (Madrid) in February 195517 and, on the occasion of the
Eisenhower grant, Gutiérrez Jodrá (JEN) and López Rúa (chemistry lec-
turer) visited the President of the United States in March as well as several
nuclear production plants.18
Around the time of the Geneva Conference (1955), the dissemination
of the civil uses of nuclear energy quickly spread.19 Upon the release of
industrial and commercial use of nuclear energy, large Spanish electric
companies watched out for new opportunities that this technology could
bring after displaying it competitively in comparison to classical energies.

The chairman of Iberduero (Ricardo Rubio), for instance, informed his
administration board in mid-August, 1955 that “the current situation of
relative experiences to atomic power stations, that is the interests of elec-
trical companies, among them, Iberduero, will firmly take up the oppor-
tunities that this new source of energy generation provides”.20
The North American strategy to make their technological investments
($12 billion US) profitable and maintain the control of them consisted in
selling their technology to developing countries.21 The high economic
cost and strict technical restrictions of acquiring nuclear energy led the
US government to support its electrical material building industry. This
was achieved essentially by offering funds to buy, install and maintain
nuclear power plants and facilitate the training of human capital of the
countries interested. Developing countries saw nuclear energy as an
unbeatable opportunity to lessen the economic distance between them-
selves and leading countries. In Spain’s case, apart from the benefits of
energetic independence, the Dictatorship used the nuclear subject to
politically strengthen the regime, aiming to show its citizens (1) its man-
agement ability to modernize the country and (2) its gradual integration
to the international concert (“free nations”) alongside the leading coun-
try, the United States.
However, the political debate was not as grim. In the context of the
Cold War, the opening of the United States to share nuclear energy aimed
to tighten links and control the “free world” against the threat of commu-
nism, being sold as an act of generosity for the world’s social progress.22
Regarding industrial policy throughout these years, the speech given by
the Minister of Justice, Joaquín Planell, in the XXVIII International
Congress of Chemistry in Madrid (CSIC, 22–31 October 1955) is
explanatory. The Minister highlighted four key factors for industrial prog-
ress: human potential, especially in technical-scientific fields; availability
of raw materials; depth of the market; and use of capital; remarking that
financial availability was essential but only when the remaining three fac-
tors were well developed. Subsequently, Planell presented an analysis of
the Spanish market, recommending an improvement in the training of
technicians, as well as the proper provision of the country’s raw material.
Reverting to this first point, he recognized the progress made in the
revious 15 years and was hopeful that the state and private entities would
p
achieve it in the future. Concerning the second factor, when he referred
to energy resources and important hydro-electrical resources in the coun-
try, he stressed that “Spain does not need to recur to nuclear energy as
urgently as other countries” as one could not predict its economic com-
petitiveness in the short term. Meanwhile, considering the irregularity of
the rain-meter and substitution of thermal energy in a country lacking in
fuel, one could justify “the sole use—when appropriate—of limited and
complementary nuclear energy to avoid fuel imports”. As things stood,
Planell concluded “that we would undoubtedly have to actively prepare
ourselves for this source of energy”.23
Initially, in a gradual effort according to the country’s characteristics,
the technical collaboration for training workforces aimed to develop
experimental prototypes. In August 1955, several Spanish technicians
worked in Harwell (the United Kingdom) and Argonne (the United
States) to build the first Spanish reactor.24 Visits from American authorities
intensified. For examples sake, in a tribute by the American Chamber of
Commerce to the ambassador of the United States, Lodge, in Bilbao, the
guest of honor acknowledged the industrial relations (public and pri-
vate), and also encouraged future ones using the economic assistance pro-
gram ($162 million US)25 signed between both countries in 1951.26
uclear Trade-Off: National Interests

N
and Businesses Condoned to Agree
Electrical Companies Come on the Scene: CADRI
Up until present, the private initiative on the nuclear subject had been
notably absent: most performances had been led, directly or indirectly, by
the Spanish government. It was not uncommon for two reasons. First,
the aforesaid agreements emerged from the initiative taken between the
American and Spanish governments, due to the international relations
between countries. Second, due to the Francoist policy, as the atomic
matter was linked to a high national interventionist defense and indus-
trial policy which did not leave any space for the participation of private
companies. The initial situation began to change progressively due to

motives that this essay will unveil.
The Ministerial Order of 19 July 1955 which created the Spanish
Advisory Commission for Industrial Reactors (CADRI) was the first institu-
tional step. Whereas Spain would be prepared in the future for the build-
ing and maintenance of energy power plants, concentrating “all the efforts
of other state and public organisms as well as private groups in this indus-
try” under the Nuclear Energy Board (1951) was recommended. For the
abovementioned motives, the Commission was created with “ample offi-
cial and private representatives interested in this issue”, to advise the
Spanish National Energy Board (JEN), as well as act as “a channel of
communication for all concerns, efforts and interests […] to be evaluated
and submitted to debate by the Government, when appropriate”.27
Upon being questioned on future plans for power reactors, the chair-
man of the Spanish National Nuclear Energy Board (JEN), in April 1956
commented that “it should be borne by Spanish industrial and financial
groups, alone or in collaboration with foreigners, with the advice and
through the Spanish National Nuclear Energy Board”. In a context of
high investments from first powers, and technical and experimental aid
to the rest of the free world, it described the situation as “truly encourag-
ing for industrial and financial groups in Spain to come to the Nuclear
Energy Board to offer its economic power and make use of its technical
staff to be trained in the next facilities”.28
Undoubtedly, Spanish authorities aimed not to be “a humble guest” in
the international concert regarding the atomic age, when the country, for
the first time ever, seemed to have potentially enough natural resources
(uranium) in comparison to its limited resources during the petroleum or
coal era.29 The Administration, under the Francoist dictatorship, made
huge political and institutional efforts to develop human capital for
atomic activity, essential for assimilating technological transfer and reduc-
ing dependency;30 however, it could not surrender technical capital and
private funding. Ultimately, regarding electrical production, the state
could not dissipate the sector’s experience of over 70 years, which in asso-
ciation with the financing sector had become one of the key sectors for
country’s the industrial development.31
It did not seem plausible for private electrical companies, under the
economic context of a dictatorship interested in military development of
atomic energy, to assume initiatives in which they were not competent.
In fact, electric companies required the maximum collaboration of the
state, the latter being focused on producing electricity, and therefore
pleased to externalize others business phases.32
Regarding the interest of electrical companies in the nuclear business,
one must not forget—as literature frequently does—that big electric
companies had a particular interest in the commercial development of
this type of energy. Historically, every technological rupture (such as the
development of high-voltage power supplies and hydro-electricity from
dams since the 1920s) restored the sector’s status quo. The best-positioned
companies in the electric-banking oligopoly should not give up the
nuclear option unless they assumed the medium- and long-term cost of
being displaced, marginalized or excluded from the electricity business.
With this confluence of interests, authorities and companies persis-
tently considered the problem of when the Nuclear Program was to be
put into practice. Two clashing points of view emerged: (1) one group
who believed nuclear plant investment would come in the long term,
when they were profitable and classical resources had been exhausted,
and (2) another group who believed that the investments should be made
before the cost of nuclear KW was cheaper than classical energies, and be
prepared due to the rapid growth of consumption and long terms of
power-plant construction.
An element of reference, inevitably, was when the leading countries
began to use their nuclear facilities. The first electro-atomic plant to be
operated was in England on 17 October 1956. This country had 25,000
technicians and employees, two scientific centers (Manchester and
Cambridge University), the atomic center at Harwell, the power plant at
Calder Hall, as well as the 12 plant projects to be initiated in 1965.
Meanwhile, in Spain, there were 200 university student technicians’ and
1200 atomic researchers.33
The clearest indicator of the government’s decision to deal with the
execution of the nuclear program for commercial purposes, including
private companies, was the Ratification of the Cooperation Agreement
between Spain and the United States of American regarding the Civil Use
of Atomic Energy. Signed in Washington, on 16 August 1957,34 the
Agreement extended the RD Program tending towards the implemen-
tation of peaceful uses of atomic energy, and the management of
energy reactors. Article VII foresaw the direct implication of indi-
vidual and private organisms in Spain or the United States of
America.35
Six months prior to this, on 24 February 1957, a Presidency Order
from the government reorganized CADRI, denoting “the growing inter-
est that big Spanish Industrial and Electric Companies had in the peace-
ful use of nuclear energy and the need to gather ideas and proposals”, in
the appropriate nuclear energy board body (CADRI itself ), and recom-
mended the extension of the number of vocal representatives of the
industry.36
The question regarding when the “nuclear career” was going to begin
also implied other questions of less importance: Who was going to be in
charge of implementing the nuclear program and how it was going to be
done? The answer to these questions did not seem so obvious. Evidently,
until the nuclear moratorium in 1985, the leading roles, interests and
management methods were varied. The lines they follow will be occupied
in the initial phase.
Apparent Brotherhood
During Nuclear sessions, organized by Water, Gas and Electrical

Syndicates on 22 May 1957, José María Otero (JEN) pledged his support
to plants using natural uranium and believed the new power in 1972
onwards would be nuclear.37 Regarding economic opportunities to install
nuclear energy in Spain,38 he concluded that spanifying raw materials
(creating enrichment plants) and heavy water production to promote the
installation of pumps required intensive technical training for the
personnel.
During the same sessions, Planell (Industry Minister) described the
creation of a General-Directorate of Nuclear Energy (25-2-57)39 as
proof of the government’s decision to undertake “the establishment of

nuclear power stations without qualms in the near future”. In this
sense, he stated in 1959 that contracts with building merchants would
probably be signed to put the plants into operation for 1962, aiming
for the Spanish industry to participate in the task, given the high
financial cost of the commitment.40 The idea of not building more
thermal plants from 1960, by Planell, did not seem to coincide with
the criteria of the President of INI. Suanzes, who was in favor of
amplifying the thermal plants to cater for determined markets (e.g.
Catalonia and Andalusia).41
Manuel Gutiérrez Cortines (Director of Electra Viesgo), in a confer-
ence with important members of the administration and private compa-
nies, denoted that it would be impossible to cater for future demands
with classical systems, considering the rapid evolution of consumption.
He also added that,
as soon as it became clear that atomic energy could be the answer to such a
serious problem, all electrical companies kept a close eye on the possibili-
ties of this new technique which had fortunately proved its ability to gener-
ate large quantities of electric; at prices that initially were unsure, but
would be, however, less for nations whose industrial development was
impeded due to the lack of energy. Thus, Spanish electric companies
decided to take on the nuclear option.
In fact, these companies informed the dictator Franco in August 1955,

through UNESA (electric lobby), “Its presence as electric entities in
nuclear fields, and its aim to incorporate atomic plants to its building
programs”.42 This decision was backed, according to Gutiérrez Cortines,
by technical advances in the sector. Nonetheless, it was mainly due to the
determined British nuclear policy and warm recommendation of the
Three Wise Men at EURATOM, performed in 1957 on single market six
countries. According to this organism, the danger of depending on fuel
encouraged the nuclear investment of large groups “as quick as possible”,
as each yearly delay implied the construction of classical plants which
would consume coal or fuel for the following 20 or 30 years. Thus, the
“precocious” position of electric companies before the general and dicta-

tor Francisco Franco was ratified.
Gutiérrez Cortines recognized public (JEN) and private (School of
Industrial Engineering of Bilbao, EIIB) efforts made until then, but also
highlighted that “everything is just in preparation for the decisive step
towards the construction of atomic plants and its incorporation to the
national electric system”. Thus, the expert remarked on the creation of
regional entrepreneurial groups (NUCLENOR and CENUSA) of Spanish
electric companies.43
In response, the Industry Minister (Planell) expressed his satisfaction
concerning electric companies’ concerns on building large nuclear plants,
complemented the regional distribution criteria and concluded that the
Industry Ministry and government “support all these initiatives” in order
to resolve the electric matter in time.44
ower in the Background: The Technical

P
and Organizational Capacities of Electric Companies
managed by the Financial Sector
What was the context in which the Spanish electric sector operated, and
who made the decisions on nuclear matters?
From a productive point of view, the main problem in the 1940s and
beginning of the 1950s was how to solve electrical restrictions. The imple-
mentation of the National Industry Institute (INI) through the public
company ENDESA (1944) in the electric sector was perceived from pri-
vate companies’ point of view as an intrusion that should be avoided at
all costs, to the point that it questioned the “good work” of the private
monopoly of electric production and distribution in Spain. The electric-
banking oligopoly did not have a well-developed joint plan of action, but
just a basic program which consisted in avoiding the nationalization of
the electric sector and coordinate with the Administration, as if it was one
sole company, especially in the management of energy transportation.
Suspicion towards the electric policy of the INI, however, strengthened
the union of electric companies, grouped at UNESA (Fig. 3.1). In May
Fig. 3.1 Corporate network of the largest Spanish banking firms, and electricity and auxiliary industries (1960). Sphere:
Electricity companies; banks and auxiliary industries; Square: UNESA. The thickness of the links depends on the number of
directorships
The Nuclear Business and the Spanish Electric-Banking...
Source: prepared by the authors based on the Financial Yearbook of Bilbao (1960)
79
1953, this situation was clear regarding the attempt by the public indus-
trial consortium to deal with the restrictions in the most affected con-
summation points (Barcelona, Valencia, Cartagena, Malaga and Bilbao
or Seville) by installing thermal plants, as they did not fully trust that the
INI would delegate its installation and management to private
companies.45
The growth of productive facilities to confront electric restrictions or
the increase in electric demand required financial standing. The lack of
liquid assets of the postwar era and the resilient control on the scarce cur-
rency in the country by the Foreign Currency Institute46 hindered con-
siderably the importation of electric material necessary to increase its
capacity. The technological dependence of the industrial sector regarding
big foreign electrical, hydraulic and thermal production and distribution
teams could not replace it with its own technology.47 Moreover, electric
fees were practically frozen from before the Civil War until its modifica-
tion in 1953.
Electrical companies transferred all these issues onto their banks of
reference. At the end of 1953, UNESA needed to present the
Administration with an assessment of the investments in the sector, and
therefore the different “electrical-banks” were informed. The link between
different Spanish banks materialized institutionally through the Spanish
Banking Board and shares between different financial entities; as well as
the few exceptional agreements in which the industrial investment strat-
egy or division was referred.48
If distinguished Spanish financial entities were not among those who
initially applied for North American credit ($62.5 million US), they
formed a big part of their management.49 Electrical companies were
aware of how to benefit from North American aid given the well-known
link between financial and electrical sectors highly effective over a long
period (A good example can be seen in the Spanish corporative networks
displays in Figs 3.1 and 3.2).
Briefly described the context in which the electric sector operated, we
will explain who made the decisions on nuclear matters? In the following
lines on the negotiations of the first Spanish nuclear plan, the authors
have opted to maintain the complexity of the negotiating process (detail-

ing dates, politicians, executives and companies involved) although this
requires a more demanding reading. The management board of Iberduero,
at the beginning of 1954, verified the present seriousness and the need for
a high-level meeting among peer companies (Iberduero, Viesgo, Sevillana,
Unión Eléctrica Madrileña; and the banks of Bilbao and Vizcaya).50 One
of the main unresolved problems of the electric sector was determining
the new constructions.51 At the end of July 1955, having being informed
by advisors at the Bank of Vizcaya on the research English and North
Americans had been performing on the commercial use of nuclear
energy52 and the contacts the French EDF had with Spanish electrical
companies,53 the executives acknowledged the importance of the nuclear
subject and proposed companies from its hydro-electric group, which
contacted INI to create a research partnership.54
Around the same time, the Administration board of Electra Viesgo
analyzed research performed by Gutiérrez Cortines on the use of thermal
plants, some in collaboration with the INI.55 In mid-September, one of
the advisors from the bank of Vizcaya related this problem with atomic
plants and contemplated two solutions: (a) approach the matter to
UNESA or (b) discuss it within the hydro-electric group.56
At the beginning of December, the plans of INI were unveiled by its
president (Suanzes), and the Bank of Vizcaya left it in the hands of
Iberduero and Viesgo to transfer its plans on nuclear energy in Spain to
the Chief of State and government (Franco).57 It would seem that it
aimed to define whether the research on nuclear energy should be under-
taken by the public INI or private companies, in particular, electrical
companies associated to the Bank of Vizcaya (the essential role of Bank of
Vizcaya in the Spanish Corporative Network is shown in Fig. 3.2).58
Regarding the previous matter, on 28 December 1955, the advisor of
Viesgo, Gutiérrez Cortines, sent a letter to the advisor of Vizcaya, Ignacio
Muguruza, highlighting “the need for private companies to take initiative
on this matter”. Upon discussing different points of view, they agreed to
visit representatives of the Bank of Vizcaya and other hydro-electric com-
panies of England to study their progress.59
82
J. Garrués-Irurzun and J.A. Rubio-Mondéjar
Fig. 3.2 Egonets of Bank of Vizcaya, Bank of Bilbao, Iberduero and Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola) in 1960. The relations
of the Banco de Vizcaya (also known as “Electric Bank”) with other banks, utilities and auxiliary companies have marked
in black
Source: prepared by the authors based on the Financial Yearbook of Bilbao (1960)
Regarding the construction of an experimental reactor, at the begin-

ning of March 1956, the INI aimed to build one with enriched uranium,60
suggesting that the companies linked to the city of Bilbao would join
Iberduero, Viesgo, Hidrola, Babcock and General Eléctrica Española.61
The position of the electric companies regarding both mat-
ters (research institutions and experimental reactor) was settled soon
after. On 13 March, the chairman of Hidrola (Oriol) invited the manag-
ing director of the Bank of Vizcaya (Manuel Gortázar) and vice-president
of JEN (Otero) to a lunch meeting.62 After, Gortázar held talks with the
representatives of Viesgo (Gutiérrez Cortines) and Iberduero (Rubio),
stating “the non-interference of Hidroeléctrica Española in the Northern
market on the occasion of its participation in these [nuclear] projects”.63
In mid-August, Otero (JEN), Torrontegui (Babcock & Wilcox) and
Gortázar (Bank of Vizcaya), alongside other representatives of entities
involved, had a meeting in which the constitution of a trading company
was put forward. Approximately 20 companies (50% of the capital)
would be united to build a 15,000 KW reactor, costing 10 million dol-
lars.64 Upon disagreements between the vice-president of the JEN
(Otero) and president of INI (Suanzes) on the participation of private
companies, the advisor of the Bank of Vizcaya, Jesús María Rotaeche,
proposed the participating entities discuss the matter “with the
Government’s presidency to learn the opinion of the high officials regard-
ing the matter”.65 The response was in favor of the private companies
given that the authorities pointed out that a new partnership “should be
done upon consulting the Hydro-electric companies that had started the
matter”.66
A few days later, the President of Vizcaya held talks with Hidrola
(Oriol) and Iberduero (Rubio) on the aforementioned group of compa-
nies to start training personnel in nuclear fields proposed by the JEN; but
they refused to be in charge of exploiting public commercial power reac-
tors, as they did not wish to engage electric companies in future public
projects.67
As a last resort, at the beginning of September 1956, the Bank of
Vizcaya approved the establishment of the Industrial Atomic Institution
(entity for the use of nuclear experiences) and established its position
concerning future activities with Iberduero and Viesgo.68 Three months
later, the Board of Vizcaya studied the reports from a trip to the United
States on the development of nuclear energy.69
The position of the Bank of Vizcaya, towards the end of December,
was to ensure “not to lose the initiative that the Bank of Vizcaya once had
on this matter”.70 This position was also conditioned by the radical
change of opinion of Pablo Garnica (President of Banco Urquijo and
Electra Viesgo), in favor of exploiting his own nuclear power plant, after
meeting held with the Minister-Vice secretary of the government’s presi-
dency (Carrero Blanco).71
In mid-January 1957, Viesgo notified the Bank of Vizcaya its interest
in meeting the chairman of the JEN72 to create a society formed by
Iberduero and Viesgo to specifically build a nuclear plant in Northern
Spain.73
In mid-February, three projects of sponsored companies were consid-
ered by: (1) Iberduero-Viesgo, (2) the Bank of Urquijo and (3) the School
of Industrial Engineering of Bilbao—EIIB.74
The first project, surely activated through aggressive industrial policy
that the president of the INI had explained a month before to the banks
of Vizcaya and Urquijo, was specified in the constitution of NUCLENOR
(Nuclear Power Stations in Northern Spain Company Plc), on 2 March
1957.
The second, promoted by the Bank of Urquijo, led to the creation of
the engineering company TECNATOM (Techniques Atomic Company
Plc), on 4 April 1957.
The third, seven months later, was in line with the Bank of Vizcaya’s
idea of emulating the aforementioned project of the Bank of Urquijo, but
in this case creating a group of the main Vizcaya companies around the
EIIB, to enhance practical applications of atomic energy.75 This led to the
creation of CONUSA (Nuclear Constructions Company Plc) on 4
February 1958.76
The idea of Hidrola (Oriol) to create nuclear regional companies
spread at the beginning of November and Hidrola, Sevillana and
Chorro started to participate in the South of Spain. This project
seemed to respond to the news that INI was going to create a
company—with minimum levels of public participation—which

united all nuclear projects, as well as build one sole atomic plant
(400,000 KW) in the South of Spain.77 This activity was counteracted
by the Bank of Vizcaya who deemed it appropriate to create a similar
company to NUCLENOR, and delegated Torrontegui with the fund-
ing management of CENUSA (Nuclear Power Plants Company Plc) in
which Hidrola, Sevillana and Unión Eléctrica Madrileña ultimately
participated. If the nuclear company proposed by INI had been estab-
lished, Iberduero would have also been expected to participate in it;78
however, the latter would have broken the regional distribution, in
which Hidrola would not intervene in the north of the country and
Iberduero, in the center.
In mid-April, Iberduero (Rubio) met with the president of INI. Suanzes
expressed his “desire to reach an agreement with all the interested parties
on the [nuclear] matter”. The Bank of Vizcaya agreed to maintain the
criteria “by sustaining absolute freedom of action on the matter to con-
tinue studies that had commenced”.79
During October and November, the chairmen of the Bank of
Vizcaya and Hidrola held talks on several occasions on the plans of
INI to install a nuclear plant in Catalonia.80 The concerns of the
financial and electrical entities increased as the Chief of the Industry
of Burgos, following orders from the Ministry, refused the request of
NUCLENOR to install an atomic plant in its market.81 The electric-
banking oligopoly must have thought the Ministry of the Industry
model occurred as any nuclear activity should include the participa-
tion of the INI. However, doubts were soon resolved at the beginning
of December when the Minister of the Industry informed to the
chairman of Sevillana (Carlos Mendoza) of his desire for “the first
central of this type to be installed in the center of Spain, without the
National Institute of the Industry intervening”.82 NUCLENOR
(Rubio) had already made it clear that it did not wish to participate in
nuclear research projected by CENUSA in southern markets nor the
center of the country and it would support the funding of previous
studies on the dual-use reactor (experimental and commercial) pro-
grammed by the Director General of Nuclear Energy (Otero), pro-

vided that JEN did not stop its nuclear plans.83
In the 1960s, the progressive economic liberalization process spread
to the electric sector, in particular, the nuclear area. The Administration
began to allow, to certain extent, due to international pressure, a more
open market. At the end of May in 1960, the representatives of
NUCLENOR, CENUSA and other interested parties met in Madrid
with the Industry’s vice-secretary to address the issue on nuclear
energy exploitation by electric energy production companies.84 Eleven
months later, the chairman of Sevillana (Mendoza) held a lunch meet-
ing with the vice-secretary of the industry (Suárez) in which they con-
vened the creation of the integrated Commission of NUCLENOR,
CENUSA and JEN.85 A few days later, the Bank of Vizcaya met with
the representatives of the World Bank to discuss, among other things,
the behavior of INI, fiscal and accounting issues, foreign technical
assistance and the attitude of the private banking sector regarding
credits.86
In 1962, a new spokesperson or negotiator with the Administration
emerged; the Spanish Atomic Forum (FAE), whose president was Oriol
(Hidrola), and vice-presidents Gutiérrez Cortines (Viesgo), Mac-Veigh
(TECNATOM) and Gaztelu (INI), which had 71 members of all sectors
linked to the nuclear business.87
Upon creating management companies of most of the nuclear initia-
tives in the country and a specific institution that represented the nuclear
lobby (FAE),88 uniting the main companies in the sector, monitoring by
the banks was less visible or one could say that economic agents in the
nuclear subject were given more freedom. Furthermore, it was recognized
years later by the president of the Bank of Vizcaya (Pedro de Careaga), in
1972 that the banks must have acted carefully as their double presence in
the electric business as providers of material and fuel, and as electrical
consumers could have certain benefits in controlling businesses,89 thereby
running the risk of (1) limiting company freedom, and (2) being posi-
tioned in a dangerous area susceptible to inter-entrepreneurial conflicts
of interest.90
In view thereof, one can conclude that the management and initial
development of the nuclear program were deeply conditioned by several
factors. Specialists on this matter have explained many of these aspects,

but have also overlooked other important ones. Considering the interna-
tional politics and intervention of Franco’s state, a balance of literature
could summarize the key elements of the Spanish nuclear program in the
following expression: “the state had it and the private companies man-
aged it”. Nonetheless, our research demonstrates that the process was not
straightforward at all.
The first part of the text insists on a forced collaboration between the
state and electric companies. Overall, it relates the creation process of the
nuclear sector as a result of dialectics between an inconsistent state and
powerful electric companies. Regarding the state, the policies by INI or
JEN did no always coincide (sometimes they were contrary) with the
guidelines of the Ministry of the Industry. Regarding electrical compa-
nies, in an institutional self-regulated sector (UNESA), they were not
prepared to miss out on technical and organizational possibilities that
nuclear development brought in order to renew the old oligopolistic sta-
tus quo. The most important contribution of this chapter lies, however,
in its second part in which an apparently collateral, but essential, ques-
tion is addressed. It aims to determine the logic of the association of old
capitalist interests of financial entities, within the recognizable network
of electric-banking interconnections, in this case, the Bank of Vizcaya,
which always remained in the background. Its ability to influence strate-
gies from the electric sector was decisive for the Spanish nuclear project’s
configuration.
Notes
1. Two interesting exceptions are: Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-
Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement
in Spanish Atomic Program, 1950–1985,” Journal of Contemporary History
51 (2016) and Luis Sánchez-Vázquez, “Uranio, reactores y desarrollo tec-
nológico: relaciones entre la Junta de Energía Nuclear y la industria
nuclear española (1951–1977),” in La Física en la Dictadura. Físicos,
Cultura y Poder en España 1939–1975, eds. Néstor Herran and Xavier
Roqué (Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 2012).
2. Juan A. Rubio-Mondéjar and Jósean Garrués-Irurzun, “Economic and

Social Power in Spain: Corporate Networks of Banks, Utilities and other
Large Companies,” Business History 58 (2016): 858–879.
3. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship: State
and Business Involvement in Spanish Atomic Program, 1950–1985,”
365–411.
4. Luis Sánchez Vázquez, La legitimación de la energía nuclear en España: el
Fórum Atómico Español, 1962–1979 (Granada: University of Granada,
2010).
5. A non-exhaustive selection can be found in: Javier Ordónez and José
Sánchez-Ron, “Nuclear Energy in Spain. From Hiroshima to the Sixties,”
in National Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science and
Technology, ed. Paul Forman and José Sánchez-Ron (London: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1996), 185–213; Francesc Barca Salom, “La
política nuclear espanyola: El cas del reactor nuclear argos,” Quaderns
d´Historia De lÉnginyeria 4 (2000): 12–44; Ana Romero de Pablos and
José Sánchez-Ron, Energía nuclear en España: De la JEN al CIEMAT
(Madrid: Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, 2001); Francesc Barca
Salom, “Les aplicacions dels isòtops a la indùstria durante el franquisme,”
Quaderns d´Historia De lÉnginyeria 7 (2006): 1–44; Francesc Barca
Salom, “Nuclear Power for Catalonia: The Role of the Official Camber
of Industria of Barcelona,” Minerva 43 (2015): 163–81; Ana Romero de
Pablos, “Poder político y poder tecnológico: El desarrollo nuclear espa-
ñol (1950–1975),” Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia Tecnología y
Sociedad 7 (2012): 141–62; Ana Romero de Pablos “Energía nuclear e
industria en la España de mediados del siglo XX. Zorita, Santa María de
Garoña y Vandellòs,” in La Física en la Dictadura. Físicos, Cultura y Poder
en España 1939–1975 (Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona,
2012), 45–63.
6. M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Energy in Spain. A Research Agenda
for Economic Historians,” in A Comparative Study of European Nuclear
Energy Programs, ed. Albert Presas (Berlin: Max Planck Institute for the
History of Sciences, 2011), 71–94; Joseba De la Torre y M.d. Mar
Rubio-Varas, “El Estado y el Desarrollo de la Energía Nuclear en España,
c. 1950–1985” (working paper, Asociación Española de Historia
Económica, Madrid, 2014); Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-
Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement
in Spanish Atomic Program, 1950–1985,” M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas and
Joseba De la Torre, “Spain–Eximbank’s Billion Dollar Client: The Role

of the US Financing the Spanish Nuclear Program” (working paper,
Asociación Española de Historia Económica, Madrid, 2016).
7. Antonio Gómez-Mendoza, Javier Pueyo and Carles Sudrià, Electra y el
Estado: la intervención pública en la industria eléctrica bajo el franquismo
(Pamplona: Thomson-Civitas, 2006). Carles Sudrià and Antonio
Gómez-Mendoza, Un siglo de luz: historia empresarial de Iberdrola
(Madrid: Iberdrola, 2006).
8. Esther Sánchez-Sánchez, “La centrale nucléaire hispano-française de
Vandellos: logiques économiques, technologiques et politiques d’une
decisión,” Bulletin d’Histoire de l’Electricité 36 (2000): 5–30.
9. Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, “La financiación exterior
del desarrollo industrial español a través del IEME, c. 1950–1982,”
Estudios de Historia Económica 69 (2015): 99–125.
10. Juan Muñoz and Angel Serrano, “La configuración del sector eléctrico y
el negocio de la construcción de centrales nucleares,” Cuadernos de Ruedo
Ibérico 63/69 (1979): 127–267.
11. Atoms for Peace was the name of the speech given by Dwight
D. Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly in New York on 8 December
1953.
12. The President Harry S. Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act (McMahon
Act) on 1 August 1946 passing atomic energy control from military to
civil hands, brought into force on 1 January 1947.
13. In Spain, on 28 April 1949, the Nobel award-winner for Chemistry,
Theodor Svedberg gave a conference at CSIC (Spanish National Research
Council), under the presidency of the Minister of Industry and
Commerce, Suanzes, titled “The Man and the Machine” in which the
matter of transforming atomic energy, from military to civil use was
addressed. ABC, 29 April 1949, 14.
14. See Chap. 2.
15. ABC 24-2-1952.
16. BOE, January 6, 1956. The United States signed nine bilateral agree-
ments: Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Columbia,
Brazil and Argentina.
17. The North American Nuclear Energy Subcommittee visited Spain in
February of 1955. ABC, February 15, 1955, 16.
18. Both took part in the course on nuclear energy (7 months) in a labora-
tory in Chicago, titled “operación fraternidad” (operation Brotherhood).
Doctor Gutiérrez Jodrá has already spent one year performing nuclear stud-
ies in Chicago. La Vanguardia Española, March 11, 1955. In March 1955,
for instance, Carlos Sánchez del Río gave a talk called “Pacific applications of
nuclear energy)” at Casa de América and ten months prior to that, Manuel
Torres inaugurated a course on Social Economy and Politics with the con-
ference “Economic Consequences of Nuclear Energy in the Industrialisation of
Spain.” ABC, March 15, 1955, 24 and ABC, May 23, 5, 1954, 56.
19. A total of 16 Spanish representatives attended this event: seven of which
were linked to the National Nuclear Energy Board (JEN), three from the
State Administration and six from companies. Among the administra-
tive representatives were the president of the National Institute of
Industry (INI)—Suanzes—and the Vice-secretary of the Industry—
Suárez. Among the Spanish representatives from private and public com-
panies were: General Eléctrica Española, Iberduero, Hidrola, ENDESA,
Hidro-Nitro and Sevillana de Electricidad. BOE, August 6, 1955.
20. Minutes of the Administrative Board in Iberduero, August 19, 1955, 367.
21. On this topic, the article of the José María Massip in ABC, April 25,
1956, 35, titled “Towards the economic and social performance of
NATO” is illustrative. The idea of using this military organism, through
the civil use of nuclear energy is proposed for economic progress and to
link developing countries to American interests.
22. ABC, June 12, 1955, 55: “The United States will help free countries to
produce atomic energy for peaceful purposes.” In order to have a more
comprehensive overview of the subject matter, see Bertrand Goldschmidt,
Las rivalidades atómicas, 1939–1968, trans. María I. Sanz (Madrid: JEN,
1969). See Chaps. 1 and 2.
23. ABC, October 28, 1955, 37.
24. ABC, August 21, 1955, 52–53. See Chap. 5.
25. ABC, September 23, 1955, 34. See Chap. 1.
26. Decree-Law of 9th February 1951 which establishes rules for its manage-
ment; BOE, March 14, 1951. The Export–Import Bank of Washington
acted as an American Administrative Agent. Decree of the 16 March
1951 which develops BOE, April 4, 1951.
27. Order of 19 July 1955 which created the Advisory Board of Industrial
Reactors. BOE 24-7-1955.
Thus, the CADRI became an advisory body of the JEN, whose vice-
president was: J. Mª Otero, and spokesperson: A. Colino (JEN), two
representatives of the Industry Ministry, two from INI and, from private
areas: J.L. Redonet, L. Torróntegui, J. Mª Oriol, M. Gortázar, A. García
Vinuesa, and J. Cervera, and acting as a secretary, F. Goded.
28. ABC, April 3, 1956, 28.

29. ABC, June 5, 1956, 56, “Our Economic Situation” from a series of arti-
cles titled “Spain before the Atomic Era,” initiated on 27-4-1956 and
written by Ricardo de Urgoiti.
30. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship: State
and Business Involvement in Spanish Atomic Program, 1950–1985”.
Oscar Calvo-González, “American Military Interests and Economic
Confidence in Spain under the Franco Dictatorship,” Journal of Economic
History 67 (2007): 740–67. Oscar Calvo-González, “Neither a Carrot
Nor a Stick: American Foreign Aid and Economic Policymaking in
Spain during the 1950s,” Diplomatic History 30 (2006): 409–38.
31. Rubio-Mondéjar and Garrués-Irurzun, “Economic and Social Power in
Spain: Corporate Networks of Banks, Utilities and Other Large
Companies”.
32. The aforesaid phases, such as the fuel cycle, were unrelated to their tradi-
tional activity and the sole competence of the state for international
security and protection purposes. The two phases of fuel refers to the
mining and concentration of uranium, enriching, manufacturing of fuel
assemblies (1st Phase), as well as its treatment after waste irradiation and
storage (2nd Phase).
33. ABC, October 8, 1957, 23, on the World Agency of Atomic Energy for
peaceful uses. Statements by José Sebastián Erice, Spanish Ambassador
in Austria.
34. It replaced the agreement from 1955 and was ratified on 24 January
1958, BOE February 12, 1958.
35. As well as the establishment of agreements for material cessions and expor-
tation, including equipment and devices, and furthermore, the provision of
services when duly authorized. The Agreement, amended by the Agreement
signed on 29th November 1965 was renovated on 20 March 1974. On 20
October 1976 the Peace and Cooperation Treaty between Spain and the
United States with different complementary agreements which aimed to
maintain nuclear cooperation for peaceful uses of the United States as long
as Spain moved towards signing a Treaty to not proliferate nuclear weapons
or put all their nuclear facilities under the safeguard of IAEA.
36. Order of 24 February 1957 which reorganizes the Industrial Reactors
Committee. BOE, March 6, 1957. One year later, the Law of 17 July
modified article 2 of the decree which founded the JEN, thereby estab-
lishing research and exploitation regulations for radioactive minerals by
private companies, as they were going to receive radioactive minerals for
its concentration and profit, on a par with the JEN “legal personality and
administrative and economic autonomy” in comparison to the exceptional
legal and economic bases maintained up until then. BOE, July 18, 1958.
37. In the conference “Towards a Nuclear Industry in Spain” considering the
country’s mineral resources and the incapacity of having enriched
uranium.
38. ABC, May 23, 1957, 41. He calculated that the investment made until
1977 would be approximately $2386 million US (UNESA) and
$2401 million US (McLain).
39. The Decree-Law of 25 February 1957 on the reorganization of the State
Central Administration which creates the General Management of
Nuclear Energy for peaceful purposes in the Industry Ministry which
would include everything concerning industrial and peaceful uses of this
type of energy. The new General Management of the Nuclear Energy
Board was assigned. BOE, February 26, 1957.
40. ABC, May 23, 1957, 41. In February 1958, on the occasion of the inau-
guration of the thermal plant of Escombreras, extended the deadline to
1965. ABC, February 27, 1958, 53.
41. ABC, July 13, 1957, 50.
42. Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines, “Las centrales atómicas en los programas de
construcción de las empresas eléctricas” (conference declared at the
Mercantile and Industrial Union Circle, Madrid, February 1958), 6–7.
43. Ibid., 8–9.
44. ABC, February 27, 1958, 53.
45. Permanent Commission of Vizcaya Bank (hereinafter PC VB), March 16,
1953, 264. Archives of the Bank Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank
(AHBBVA). Bilbao.
46. Rubio-Varas and De la Torre, “Spain—Eximbank’s Billion Dollar Client:
The Role of the US Financing the Spanish Nuclear Program”.
47. It must not be forgotten that connections with North American teams
were present from practically the early stages of the sector; especially
with their two signature firms: International General Electric Co. and
Westinghouse.
48. In the case of the Bank of Vizcaya and the Bank of Bilbao, at the begin-
ning of 1951 they aimed to create a linking body to manage the indus-
trial investment policy, providing continuity to the partial collaboration
agreement politics which aimed for the exchange of bank shares in their
corresponding businesses. See Fig. 3.1.
49. For example, The New York Times, May 3, 1949, 10, in the article titled
“Spain Starts Talks with U.S. on a Loan. Washington Said to Abandon
Political Objections to Deal With Export–Import Bank” commented
that “Jose Maria Oriol, important industrialist, already has begun pre-
liminary talks with the Export–Import Bank on orders from the Madrid
Government” and after cited that “The United Press said that Andres
Moreno, chairman of the Hispano-American Bank, left Madrid by plane
Monday in connection with the negotiations.”
50. AHBBVA, PC VB, May 5, 1954, 229–30.
51. The remaining two were: the energy exchange regulations and presidency
of UNESA.
52. AHBBVA, PC VB, July 26, 1955, 324.
53. AHBBVA, PC VB, August 4, 1955, 340.
54. The Bank entrusted the advisors Urrutia and Torrontegui to deal with
the matter, “given the huge transcendence it could have for the economic
future of Spain.” AHBBVA, PC VB, July 20, 1955, 316.
55. Gutiérrez Cortines was ex-General Directorate of Standard Eléctrica.
AHBBVA, PC VB, July 22, 1955, 320 and AHBBVA, PC VB, August
26, 1955, 364.
56. AHBBVA, PC VB, September 12, 1955, 388. For clarification purposes,
the advisor Torrontegui (chairman of Babcock & Wilcox) held a speech
in the Bank on “the possible industrial uses of atomic energy.”
57. AHBBVA, PC VB, December 10, 1955, 154.
58. At the end of 1955, JEN discussed the position of the Bank of Vizcaya
concerning nuclear energy. AHBBVA, PC VB, October 20, 1955 and
AHBBVA, PC VB, December 10, 1955.
59. AHBBVA, PC VB, December 28, 1955, 128. Torrontegui contacted the
English firm Babcock. AHBBVA, PC VB, January 14 1956, 156.
60. The chairman of Hidrola (Oriol) informed the chairman of Vizcaya of
the project of INI. AHBBVA, PC VB, March 2, 223.
61. The chairman of the Bank of Vizcaya, some days after, discussed the
topic with the chairman of Urquijo/Viesgo (P. Garnica Echavarría).
AHBBVA, PC VB, March 7, 1956, 231.
62. Previously, the chairman of Vizcaya held a meeting with Otero to obtain
information about his visit to England. AHBBVA, PC VB, March 12,
1956, 238.
63. AHBBVA, PC VB, March 14, 1956, 241.

66. AHBBVA, PC VB, August, 17, 1956, 42.
67. AHBBVA, PC VB, August 16, 1956, 40; AHBBVA, PC VB, August 17,
1956, 42; and AHBBVA, PC VB, August 30, 1956, 62.
68. AHBBVA, PC VB, July 3, 1956 and AHBBVA, PC VB, September 3,
1956, 71.
69. The advisor, Torrontegui, provided a fulsome discussion on the impres-
sion he had obtained from the American Congress of the Association of
Manufacturers and highlighted the need to urgently discuss the matter.
Torrontegui was the managing director of the American subsidiary
Babcock & Wilcox in Spain, whose main branch was a pioneer in design-
ing and manufacturing nuclear components in the United States.
AHBBVA, PC VB, December 21, 1956, 228. AHBBVA, PC VB,
December 20, 1956, 226.
71. AHBBVA, PC VB, January 23, 1957.
72. AHBBVA, PC VB, January 11, 1957, 260.
73. The meeting also discussed the authorization for implementing a research
company around EIIB on power reactors, to issue expert certificates in
nuclear energy (by JEN and EIIB) and in collaboration with the capital
goods industry for mounting prototypes. AHBBVA, PC VB, February 2,
1957, 292 and AHBBVA, PC VB, February 4, 1957, 294.
74. AHBBVA, PC VB, January 16, 1957, 315.
75. AHBBVA, PC VB, October 15, 1957, 240; AHBBVA, PC VB, October
18, 1957, 246.
76. The banks of Vizcaya and Bilbao 80 participated in its creation, although
later had doubts on their legal implication: doing it directly or using
individual front men. AHBBVA, PC VB, December 6, 1957,
78. AHBBVA, PC VB, October 2, 1957, 220. The information INI’s
involvement was provided by Oriol.
79. AHBBVA, PC VB, April 23, 1958, 108.
80. AHBBVA, PC VB, October 10, 1958, 337; AHBBVA, PC VB,
November 27, 1958, 397.
81. AHBBVA, PC VB, November 14, 1958, 378.

84. AHBBVA, PC VB, May 1, 1960, 294.
87. There were 50 bodies as standing members; electrical companies
(Hidrola, Iberduero, Viesgo, ENDESA, Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico,
Unión Eléctrica Madrileña, Sevillana or Hidruña); plant managers
(CENUSA and NUCLENOR); auxiliary industry (CONUSA,
BABCock and Wilcox, TECNATOM, Estudios and Proyectos
Eléctricos); JEN; insurance companies (Unión Iberoamericana, La
Estrella) and the Bank of Vizcaya. Luis Sánchez Vázquez, La legitimación
de la energía nuclear en España: el Fórum Atómico Español, 1962–1979
(Granada: University of Granada, 2010), 99.
88. The role of the Spanish Atomic Forum as the representative of the
nuclear sector in the public arena during the golden years of the nuclear
power industry from the 1960s to the 1970s, in: Luis Sánchez Vázquez
and Andrés Menéndez-Navarro, “Nuclear Energy in the Public Sphere:
Antinuclear Movements vs. Industrial Lobbies in Spain (1962–1979),”
Minerva 53 (2015): 69–88.
89. On this occasion, it is referring to electrical material but it could be
applicable to the whole sector.
90. At the beginning of October 1972, upon the idea of a society of banks
that would take part an official tender, the possibility of constituting a
mechanical construction society was studied. The managing director of
the Bank of Vizcaya (Gortázar) was in favour of giving freedom to sub-
sidiary Babcock & Wilcox, for it to form an alliance with Maquinaria
Terrestre y Marítima, Mecánica de la Peña, and Stein et Roubaix, at the
same time as he deemed it would be appropriate to offer financial aid to
the future society. AHBBVA, PC VB, February 10, 1972, 380. It was the
origin of ENSA (see Chap. 2).
Josean Garrués-Irurzun (jgarrues@ugr.es) is Doctor in Economic History. He

currently serves as Professor of the Business and Economic Faculty at the
University of Granada. His interests cover a wide sample of topics in industrial
organization, energy policy, business history and corporate networks. His con-
tributions about the regulation and evolution of the Spanish electricity market
and the companies involved and the nationalization of the electricity grid has
been published in Business History, Revista de Historia Industrial and Renewable
and Sustainable Energy Reviews.
Juan A. Rubio-Mondéjar (jarubio@ugr.es) works as a researcher and lecturer

at the Department of Theory and Economic History (University of Granada).
He holds a BA in History and Business, MA in Economic History and received
his PhD in Economics from the University of Granada. His areas of focus are
entrepreneurship, business networks and their relationship to regional develop-
ment. At present, he is studying the evolution of the Spanish corporate elite in
the last century, as well as the link between private banking, the public sector
and industrial companies.
4
Human Capital and Physics Research
for the Spanish Nuclear Program
Albert Presas i Puig
The decision by the Spanish government in the early 1950s to favour

nuclear power as a source of energy1 had important consequences for
Spain at various levels: the economy, industry, international politics, and
society. Inevitably, the development of the nuclear energy option also had
an enormous impact on scientific disciplines, especially physics in general
and various engineering fields. Also inevitably, though, in a country that
has not traditionally considered science and knowledge to be the back-
bone of development and social progress, the development of these disci-
plines based on the reception of nuclear energy was hazardous, sometimes
erratic, and often uncertain. Despite all this, it can be asserted that it was
based on this effort regarding nuclear energy that Spain began its path in
pursuit of levels of scientific quality and excellence equal to those of
neighbouring countries.2
This text has benefitted from help from the HoNESt Project, financed by the Euratom research
and training programme 2014–2018 under grant agreement No. 662268.
A. Presas i Puig (*)
Department of Humanities, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

98 A. Presas i Puig
In terms of the physical sciences, in addition to the lack of a consoli-

dated tradition of scientific knowledge and stable scientific policy, there
were the tragic consequences of the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). Death,
persecution and exile cut short, both physically and institutionally, efforts
initiated in the first decade of the twentieth century that were beginning
to bear fruit in terms of quality and recognition. Thus, with the fascist
victory of 1939 in Spain, research in the physical sciences was the prod-
uct of scientific institutions and organizations of the new regime whose
purpose was, above all, to institutionally cut off the earlier tradition iden-
tified with liberal thought and the Council for the Expansion of Studies
(Junta para Ampliación de Estudios, JAE), which was identified with secu-
larism and positivism. As seen in its actors and main objectives, the aim
of the new organizations (especially the CSIC, Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas—Superior Council of Scientific Research) was
to break with the JAE, and with it, the entire previous scientific
tradition.
What was the state of the physical sciences in Spain in the 1950s?
Taking the Civil War as a moment of rupture, we can say that, prior to
1939, in a country that had more than 60% illiteracy in 1900, the Spanish
scientific community that was focused on the physical sciences was quite
small and, hence, never reached a critical mass capable of imposing pri-
orities and tasks. Qualitatively, its status was higher than that of other
disciplines (with the exception of the medical sciences, thanks to the
presence of Santiago Ramón y Cajal, who received the Nobel Prize for
medicine in 1906), but in no way was it comparable to the state of the
physical sciences in more advanced countries in the region.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, physics was a discipline
without resources, without infrastructure and isolated from international
advances; its teaching, furthermore, was based on out-dated and irrele-
vant manuals. As in other disciplines, before 1939, there were figures
involved in various levels of the international scientific community.
However, here, too, there were scarce resources and they were unable to
impose what might be defined as an efficient scientific system capable of
creating “schools” and with it ways of doing science. This lack meant the
loss of these figures as of 1939 due to deaths, exile or ideological purges,
Human Capital and Physics Research for the Spanish Nuclear... 99
a reality that made it difficult to substitute another generation of scien-

tists trained according to international parameters. Another element
must be added to this: the incorporation into Spanish centres and univer-
sities of the classic disciplines that defined the international scientific
realm, but not those representing new tendencies or areas of research.
This would be the case with nuclear physics, discipline par excellence of
the 1920s and 1930s, which could not be incorporated into research and
plans of study in Spain until the 1950s. It should also be remembered
that until the 1970s, physics could only be studied at three Spanish uni-
versities: Madrid, Barcelona and Zaragoza.
Prior to 1939, there was one institution, the Physics Research
Laboratory (Laboratorio de Investigaciones Físicas), part of the JAE, which
under the direction of Blas Cabrera had gathered the Spanish scientific
elite and had been gradually incorporated into the international trend.
This meant recognition and economic assistance from the Rockefeller
Foundation, which enabled it to raise the level of its work considerably.
Nevertheless, the efforts by the JAE were guilty of centralism, for they
concentrated nearly exclusively on Madrid.
We thus arrive at 1939 with disciplines in which, despite the tremen-
dous advances experienced after the work of the JAE, there was no fore-
most figure comparable to Santiago Ramón y Cajal in the medical
sciences. Similarly, despite the recognition of the Physics Research
Laboratory and particularly its director, Blas Cabrera, the international
position of the discipline was lacking and with absolutely no solid scien-
tific fabric. As a result of the Civil War, Blas Cabrera, like many others,
went into exile, leaving behind a discipline that would require many years
to recover.
In 1939, the new authorities created the Superior Council of Scientific
Research (CSIC), an institution that replaced the JAE and sought to
strengthen scientific research outside the universities. As it was made
clear, the intention was ironclad ideological control of the activities of its
personnel. Moreover, the figure of professional researcher and collabora-
tor without teaching obligations was established. The creation of the
CSIC meant once again bringing nearly all of Spanish scientific research
into a single institution located, once again, in Madrid.
100 A. Presas i Puig
It took an event that changed the course of twentieth-century world

history and affected science like no other to put the field of physics on the
political agenda of the governments of most countries: the Second World
War and its conclusion with the atomic bombs dropped on Japan.
he Atomic Bombs in Japan and Their

T
Reception in Spain
As in all countries, the first news Spain received about the practical appli-
cation of nuclear energy was that of the explosion of the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear blasts in Japan were a
show of limitless power and force. Within a tradition of strategic thought
based on military might and arsenal, the atomic bomb offered an abso-
lutely decisive method: possessing the bomb meant possessing absolute
force. The fascination caused by this brutal demonstration had a general
impact and similar consequences in nearly all countries, regardless of
their political systems.
Carried along by an outsized optimism, many countries believed they
could, at least in theory, gain access to the new technology, despite know-
ing nothing of the costs and consequences. Unlike the United States and
Canada, participants in the Manhattan Project, very little had been car-
ried out in Europe besides in Great Britain, France, Germany and the
Soviet Union. With these exceptions, the precarious situation of nuclear
physics at the end of the war somewhat resembled that of most countries.
Due to relations established in the interwar period, there existed a com-
munity of young scientists distributed throughout more or less all the
countries onto which fell the responsibility of organizing and promoting
nuclear research in their respective countries.
Access to nuclear energy, due to lack of knowledge about the effects of
radiation, was understood according to the traditional parameters of
technological innovation. Therefore, the new possibilities were based on
known technologies with the necessary innovation, and thus, the think-
ing was that the conventional strategies for scientific and technological
development would apply.3 The extraordinary technical and financial dif-
ficulties were revealed through a lack of knowledge about the existence
of an element that would require new strategies for access: radioactivity.4

The expectations arising from this first military application of nuclear
energy resulted in the criss-crossing of military and civil discourses and
rhetoric.5
As in most countries, the evaluation of nuclear energy by Spanish
authorities was of a military character. A few days after the explosions in
Japan, publications linked to the regime clearly and roundly expressed
that “The country that disposes of the atomic bomb will be able to impose
defeat upon its enemy”.6 While they intuited the technical and economic
difficulties of acquiring the atomic bomb, they also saw the benefits of
possessing nuclear armament for an isolated country that felt threatened
by the new international order. If Spain wished to play an important role
at the international level, possessing the bomb was a necessity.
Linked to a new form of scientific organization, the atomic bomb
exemplified the political and military importance of the new possibilities
offered by science.7 The rhetoric of the new Spanish authorities expressed
the need for an industrial complex that was capable of guaranteeing mili-
tary power for the defence of the country. The consequence of this policy
was the creation of the National Institute for Industry (Instituto Nacional
de Industria, INI); subsequently, nuclear energy would also merit this
consideration.
Another of the keys to defining efforts to gain access to the new source
of energy appeared in a reference in the press in mid-August of 1945:
“Spain is one of the most fortunate countries; it possesses some of the
most important [uranium] sites in Europe […] Spain owns up to one
seventh of the world’s uranium deposits, which puts it among the coun-
tries that can most easily gain access to atomic energy”.8 Possessing ura-
nium deposits, in this context, meant thanking Divine Providence for its
generosity towards the country: “Is this not another proof of the favour
with which Providence has distinguished our beloved country?”9
Evidently, in these circumstances and with this type of help, accessing
nuclear energy was seen as the most advantageous option.
From a strategic point of view, possessing uranium meant possessing an
element with an extraordinary exchange value, as until then, only the
United States and Great Britain had access to uranium from Congo.10 In
fact, the uranium deposits would be the trump card for Spanish authorities
in their efforts to access the new technology and train personnel. Aware of
the situation, the government decreed in October of 1945 its exclusive
rights to the exploitation of uranium deposits on Spanish soil. The com-
mission for nuclear studies created in 1948 was developed under the mili-
tary authority of Carrero Blanco, an admiral in the Navy with ties to
Franco.11
Aspirations of accessing nuclear energy were adjusted to the regime’s
strategy for industrialization and economic development. Considering
the boycott and isolation imposed by the West on the Franco regime, this
industrial development policy aimed to enable national development.12
The Beginnings of Nuclear Research in Spain

The first testimony of a lecture about the benefits of nuclear energy to
military authorities dates to late 1945. José Ignacio Martín-Artajo gave a
talk that was published immediately under the title “The atomic energy:
its characteristics and its use to military ends”. According to the publica-
tion, “an extraordinarily high number of officers of military staff, of pro-
fessors and engineers attended this conference [at which they got] a fairly
straightforward exposed technical summary of what was needed to pro-
duce the atomic bomb”.13
In what we might consider the first step towards nuclear energy, the
Institute of Geology and Mining began exploring for possible uranium
deposits throughout the Spanish territory.14 At the same time and as a
result of the lecture by Martín Artajo, the Marines began to gather and
analyse all possible information about nuclear energy.15 In charge of this
task was José Maria Otero Navascués, who would serve as the backbone
of Spanish nuclear development, especially the areas of scientific and
technological research. Despite these circumstances, a chance event was
needed in order to fire the starting gun. It was a visit to the institute led
by Otero Navascues in 1948 by Italian physicist Francesco Scandone that
ultimately confirmed Spain’s potential in its efforts to access nuclear tech-
nology. Scandone expressed his interest in acquiring Spanish uranium in
exchange for bringing Spanish scientists into his research on nuclear
energy in Milan; that is, he offered to trade uranium for knowledge. This
was the first instance of access to research on the topic. Otero’s efforts
with his superiors pointed to the benefits of a possible collaboration with
the Italians, and a series of samples was sent to Italy, while the Italians
received a group of young Spanish scientists to become specialized.16 As
of this moment, frenetic activity began. In the summer of 1948, a
Research Commission (Comisión de Estudios) was created that was ori-
ented mainly towards training personnel and obtaining and testing sam-
ples of uranium and, in the medium term, building a reactor that would
use natural uranium and heavy water.17 In September of 1948, the legal
and financial framework was established with the creation of the private
company known as Studies and Patents for Special Alloys (Estudios y
Patentes de Aleaciones Especiales, EPALE), subsequently renamed the
Board for Atomic Research (Junta de Investigaciones Atómicas, EPALE/
JIA), directly under the government’s presidency.18 The objectives of the
new group were as follows:
(a) “to establish relationships and exchanges with other foreign organiza-
tions conducive to training a team of Spanish scientists in the mod-
ern knowledge of prospecting radio-actives minerals and of the
industrial benefits of nuclear energy”;
(b) “to win on an experimental scale the material needed for the produc-
tion of atomic energy”; and
(c) “to prepare and to project the construction of an experimental ther-
monuclear pile” in Spain.19
Due to the nature of these objectives and much like in other countries,
the new company was of a secret character.20 The tasks it was assigned
involved training personnel, prospecting and mining, uranium extraction
and subsequent treatment, physics and instrumentation research, the
design of chemical and metallurgic plants and obtaining heavy water,
building reactors and isotope production for medicine.21 As can be seen,
the programme was extremely ambitious.22
In late 1951, Spain created its Nuclear Energy Board (Junta de Energía
Nuclear, JEN) based on previous structures. In this way, the first phase of
the Spanish nuclear programme came to a close. The new JEN, already
publicly recognized, would oversee all aspects of atomic energy as well as
take responsibility for advising on its development.23 The group that was
assembled around Otero in the late 1940s could be considered the first
Spanish group dedicated to nuclear issues.24
J osé María Otero-Navascués, Architect

of the Spanish Nuclear Programme
José María Otero Navascués (1907–1983) is among the most important
figures—if not the most important—in Spain’s scientific and technologi-
cal development in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly
because of his contribution in the area of nuclear energy. Born in Madrid,
he was a naval engineer and an artillery officer in the Marines. He came
to be a very powerful person within the system of scientific and techno-
logical research, which he helped to develop based on international mod-
els of management. As previously mentioned, he was a promoter within
JEN and, until his final days, its figure of reference.
In the late 1920s, once finishing his military training, Otero turned to
physics. It was in those days that he met a celebrated Swiss physicist with
whom he worked in Zurich. He later left for Berlin to work in optics.
This experience gave him first-hand knowledge of what it meant to “do
science”. After the Spanish Civil War, Otero was named secretary of the
physics institute at the recently founded CSIC. He gradually became the
most important figure in Spanish science, defining strategies and priori-
ties in the physics agenda and that of many of the technical disciplines.
As president of the Commission for Applied Physics (Comisión para la
Física Aplicada), created to define priorities in technical research, in 1946,
Otero stressed the importance of nuclear energy and noted the lack of
specialists.25
Otero enjoyed many contacts abroad, which he utilized to overcome
Spain’s isolation with regard to science. As part of his efforts to establish
collaborations to access more advanced research, he travelled to Italy and
Switzerland in 1949. He later visited Werner Heisenberg in Göttingen.
There, he also met with members of the German physics elite, Karl Wirtz
in particular, with whom he would establish a strong friendship. Wirtz,
who would be the bastion of the German nuclear programme,26
would play a fundamental role in JEN’s personnel training programme as

an advisor to Spanish authorities on nuclear energy issues. Among the
Spanish scientists that benefitted from that relationship were Ramón
Ortíz Fornaguera, who worked with Werner Heisenberg, and Carlos
Sánchez del Río and María Aránzazu Vigón, who worked with Wirtz.
Later on, these young researchers would be one way or another respon-
sible for Spanish research on nuclear physics. A little later, the first joint
seminars were organized in Madrid with apparatus provided by German
industry.27 This would be the beginning of a policy of personnel training
by JEN that would define a large part of the strategy regarding nuclear
research.
During its existence (in 1986 it became CIEMAT to incorporate other
areas of research), JEN carried out great efforts with regard to nuclear
technology. Its most important achievements were obtaining the JEN-1
test from the United States under the “Atoms for Peace” program, as well
as the development of the reactors known as ARGOS, ARBI, JEN I, JEN
II, and the fast-breather reactor CORAL. A series of activities was thus
put in motion that would include the mining of uranium, facilities for
reining the metal and producing fuel, pilot plants for the separation of
isotopes, the production and extraction of plutonium, the treatment of
nuclear waste, and nuclear instrumentation, among others. All this
entailed, for the first time, having an environment that would situate
Spain among the group of “qualified importers”, that is, technology-
importing countries capable of participating in a very high percentage of
what was the acquisition, in this case, of nuclear technology.28
JEN as Revitalizer of Spanish Physics

To understand the situation of Spanish research at the moment at which
JEN was established, it is helpful to consider a lecture given by José Otero
Navascués in August of 1952 on the theme “Research and the University”
at the Summer School at Santander. Otero, who already had many aca-
demic responsibilities, lamented the state of Spanish research in general
and especially basic research, signalling the prevailing scepticism that
reigned in the industry and even in the current government administration
towards research.29 In his strategy, Otero sought to generate a dynamic

capable of resolving those difficulties, attending especially to the training
of a scientific and technological elite that served as the basis of subsequent
development.
In his determination to create a solid community dedicated to prob-
lems involving nuclear energy and to extend more advanced physics,
from his first days at JEN, Otero Navascués made it a priority to identify
young talent in faculties throughout the country to incorporate them
into JEN. This strategy generated tensions at the universities whose best
students opted to pursue professional careers at JEN. Thus was created
the first generation of students supported by Otero, the very first genera-
tion of scientists dedicated exclusively to research. Carlos Sánchez del
Río, Ramón Ortíz Fornaguera, Luís Gutierrez Jodra and María Aranzazu
Vigón were the first. All of them would subsequently go on to lead differ-
ent divisions within JEN. It should be noted that Otero’s strategy involved
research stays at the most advanced centres abroad, something that was
quite novel in the academic realm. The centres accessed by this first gen-
eration were in locations like Milan, Göttingen, California, Pennsylvania
and Chicago, among others.
JEN’s relationship with the universities and with Spanish scientific
research was exemplified by the fact that during its process of establish-
ment and growth and finally obtaining its own facilities, JEN occupied
spaces in the Faculty of Science at the Universidad Complutense de
Madrid and at CSIC.30 As the development of nuclear energy was a prior-
ity for state authorities from a scientific, technological and industrial
point of view, JEN, as an organization in charge of this task, would cap-
ture the lion’s share of the resources dedicated to research and technologi-
cal development, to the detriment of other sectors. From this position of
power and as part of his strategy to strengthen high-level training, Otero
designed a policy of support for science faculties through economic assis-
tance and leadership on concrete research projects that helped professors
obtain the basic infrastructure needed for their researchers. This involved,
on one hand, a magnificent help in consolidating the disciplines. The
discretional nature of the assistance, however, which was dependent on
the figure of Otero, afforded him an enormous amount of control over
research and the assigning of posts in the universities. Otero Navascues

was frequently criticized for this. The researchers that would go on to
hold teaching positions in theoretical physics, atomic and nuclear physics
and the different types of engineering related to nuclear technology came
from the groups supported by JEN.31
A key element in JEN’s basic functions was the Institute for Nuclear
Studies (Instituto Energía Nuclear, IEN), dedicated to training the per-
sonnel that would be in charge of the development of this energy source,
as well as the related disciplines. The creation of a specialized training
centre appeared in the 1964 law on nuclear energy, which demonstrated
the aspiration by Otero, the president of JEN, to have an Institute for
Nuclear Studies to coordinate research and teaching related to nuclear
energy. Based on this law, the IEN was created within JEN itself. It should
be remembered that at this point, Spain was already participating in
CERN (the European Organisation for Nuclear Research). The creation
of the IEN was justified by the growing need for training in the new dis-
ciplines and the scant capacity up until then of Spanish universities in
regards to tradition, means, and personnel. The IEN would end up play-
ing an essential role in consolidating nuclear physics and supporting the
establishment of the discipline in a university setting that was still recov-
ering from the consequences of the Civil War.
The model that was proposed for the IEN was MIT, which reflected
both the ambition and also the stakes involved.32 According to its stat-
utes, the institute’s board would be formed by representatives from JEN,
the universities, industry, and the government administration. Once
again, the strongman was Otero. In the same year IEN was created,
nuclear engineering training courses were given that would gradually
come to substitute those previously given by JEN.33
At a time when the universities still lacked high-level training for the
nuclear disciplines and there was no scientific community of physicists
outside JEN, the IEN played an essential role in both the development of
research as well as in the creation of the groups and schools that would
later institutionalize research in the universities. Disciplines such as
nuclear physics, theoretical physics, chemical engineering, metallurgy,
mining prospecting, nuclear medicine, protection against radiation, and
molecular biology would not have been possible without the efforts of
the IEN. It also provided support for environmental impact studies,
quality guarantees, and other techniques and procedures that, due to the
demands of the sector, began first in the nuclear industry but were gradu-
ally incorporated into other sectors.34
JEN and, concretely, the IEN have by now begun to play essential
roles in creating professorships in physics and technical disciplines in
Spanish universities. Since its creation, the IEN did not limit its contri-
bution to training but, rather, through it, promoted assistance measures
that would extend primarily during the 1970s and benefit universities in
Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville, Granada, Córdoba, Zaragoza,
Oviedo, and Valladolid. Others were incorporated at a later point. As we
shall see, IEN assistance was especially key in the creation and function-
ing of the Inter-University Group on Theoretical Physics (Grupo
Interuniversitario de Física Teórica, GIFT). With national development
and an incipient stabilization of scientific policies, together with the
growing number of universities, the IEN began losing its functionality,
with assistance flowing through other organizations and institutions.
The so-called cátedras or professorships of Biophysics and Solid State
Physics, along with the High-Energy Group (Grupo de Altas Energías),
were created within JEN itself. In an effort to imitate other research cen-
tres, the cátedras’ objective was to transfer research carried out in the heart
of JEN to the world of academics and industry. These professorships,
which motivated courses and seminars that were gradually incorporated
into higher education, also helped to define strategies and criteria among
groups dedicated to these issues.
IEN assistance for the new centres often took the form of scholarships
for training abroad, a practice JEN systematically incorporated into its
programme and which entailed maintaining contacts with centres of
international prestige, as well as the possibility of participating in inter-
national projects and collaborations. Numerous contracts for interna-
tional cooperation took shape through the Institute, including that
carried out with the International Atomic Energy Agency, facilitating
technology transfer among member countries through specific training
courses, scholarships, and shared projects.35
Spanish Experimental Physics at CERN

Spain joined the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Conseil
Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire, CERN) in 1961, a time when it
did not have the necessary personnel or infrastructure to participate in
the organisation. All signs suggest that Spain’s membership was compen-
sation to the government of Otero Navascués for cancellation of the
DON project (the development of a Spanish nuclear power reactor) on
which JEN based its mission and that suggested a new division of power
with regard to nuclear energy within the regime. Be that as it may, offi-
cially, the presence of Spain at CERN was understood as an incentive for
Spain to develop a scientific policy that would enable it to meet interna-
tional standards. Shortly afterward, reflecting this erratic policy in its new
priorities, Spain, represented by JEN and with the support of the admin-
istration, ran as a candidate for the seat of the new CERN accelerator,
which would complement the one already in place in Geneva.36 As there
were several candidate countries, to avoid tensions between them, it was
finally decided to also place it in Geneva.
The participation of Spain in an international centre of excellence
quickly revealed the deficiencies of training and personnel of the Spanish
representation. Given the type of experimental physics that was con-
ducted at CERN, the lack of specialization in the Spanish community
became evident. Several initiatives were launched by JEN to overcome
these shortcomings. One of these was the convocation, in 1965, of a
specialization course in high-energy physics for university students.37 The
creation, in 1965, of an experimental laboratory for high-energy physics
at JEN was intended to compensate for Spain’s deficiency with regard to
personnel and infrastructure, which would eventually call into question
the possibilities of profit and return from Spanish participation in CERN,
even more now that Spain had survived the first pre-selection of candi-
dates for the seat of the new accelerator.
The constitution of the laboratory dedicated to high-energy physics
required hiring outstanding Spanish physicists who had worked abroad.
These included Antoni Llobet, who would be the head scientist. Beginning
in 1967, these years were highly productive, allowing for the formation
of a nucleus of scientists incorporated into the dynamics of CERN with

heavy participation in international groups. It was also a period marked
by frequent exchanges of researchers, facilitating the presence of Spanish
scientists at other centres and in international competitions. All this led
to the formation of a working group that met international standards.
This can be understood as the beginning of high-energy experimental
physics at JEN.
The developments that led to the establishment of experimental phys-
ics in Spain, however, were abruptly aborted with the departure of Spain
from CERN. Political and economic considerations led to the conclusion
that the returns did not compensate for the investment; consequently, in
1968 the authorities of the regime decided to leave the European labora-
tory. Although there has been speculation about the real reasons for the
departure of Spain,38 the fact is that a lack of qualified personnel and of
technical and industrial facilities needed to accommodate the technical
and scientific innovations emanating from CERN made the transfer of
knowledge from CERN too difficult. It was necessary to wait until 1983,
when in another political, social and economic context, the newly demo-
cratic Spain rejoined CERN.39
JEN as a Promoter of Theoretical Physics

JEN and its interest in developing nuclear technology played an essen-
tial role in the development of nuclear physics. As we have discussed,
while at the beginning its aim was simply the development of nuclear
technology, it also took on related aspects. Theoretical physics was no
exception. The support of JEN—as always, through the figure of Otero
Navascués—for the creation of the Institute for High-Energy
Theoretical Physics (Instituto de Física Teórica de Altas Energías, FTAE)
would be crucial. The first physicists working on theoretical physics
(sometimes along with other interests) were located within JEN when
they started out, and from there, the first generations emerged in the
1960s that would form the basis of subsequent development. JEN
organized the first courses on elementary particles for postgraduates,
identifying a disciplinary community of interests that would foster
later activities geared towards creating a community that was entirely
homologized and recognizable. JEN supported this strategy with the

creation of professorships in theoretical physics. Contributing to this
consolidation was the expansion of the Spanish university system in the
late 1960s and particularly in the 1970s with the creation of new sci-
ence faculties. Little by little, as we will see, that first generation from
FTEA that gathered at GIFT became incorporated into the new pro-
fessorships in theoretical physics, thus reaching institutional recogni-
tion and particularly their gradual independence from JEN. Meanwhile,
this entailed the deconcentration of the classical centres of Spanish
physics (especially Madrid) and the distribution of experts throughout
the country. With this, JEN lost its position of control, and also, it
could be said, its role as a motivator had come to an end. While the
participation (and subsequent exit) of CERN was important to experi-
mental physics, the possibilities offered, as of the 1960s, of access to
means of excellence in the research also had a large impact on Spanish
theoretical physics.
Along with the creation of a community of experimental physicists
(which was aborted by CERN’s exit from Spain and would take years to
recover), theoretical physics experienced extraordinary advances which
took it from a sad state to the equal of that of many countries in the
region. This development can be followed through the history of GIFT,
one of the most unique scientific organizations to have existed in our
country.40 Having belonged to another generation in a country that was
undergoing rapid sociological and economic change and having enjoyed
the assistance of JEN for research stays abroad that introduced new stan-
dards of work, the members of GIFT saw full incorporation into the
international community as their main objective.
Just as Spain’s entry into CERN can be interpreted as compensation to
JEN for the cancellation of the DON project, one of that body’s strategic
projects, its subsequent exit in 1968 was accompanied by compensation
in the form of increased financing for Spanish physics by the government
(although it never reached the amount given by CERN).41 Despite all
this, the assistance was crucial for the development of the discipline.
GIFT was an attempt to organize a group of researchers dedicated to
theoretical physics. It did not have an institutional character, nor did it
correspond to any university division, but was the only group of “friendly”
university professors dedicated to physics that saw the need to establish
more or less explicit ties between themselves.42 It is apparent that there

was a desire for recognition and a new way of relating to centres of
power—that is, JEN. GIFT also reflected the desires of a generation that
had grown up in a social context that was very different from that of pre-
vious generations (which saw cuts to the sciences) and had been trained
at international centres of excellence and hence knew the modes of scien-
tific organization. Frequently, the organizational models attempted to
incorporate their own international experiences. The institutional and
personal channels that were offered through CERN were useful for this
purpose, whether through participation in international projects or as a
route to facilitating the training of students and, hence, the new genera-
tions in international centres of excellence.
The members of GIFT represented the theoretical physics of JEN and
the CSIC and the universities of Valencia, Zaragoza and Madrid, with
others incorporating later on: the Universitat de Barcelona, Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid and Universidad Autónoma Barcelona. Because of
its non-institutional nature, the government assistance given to GIFT
was managed through JEN, which also lauded the initiative. In the
democratic period and in the new framework of normality in scientific
policy, the function of GIFT languished and eventually disappeared in
1998.
GIFT and the development of theoretical physics reflected a national
scientific policy that was without a clear structure, direction or long-term
planning. This lack of policy was also, in this case, compensated for as
much as possible by JEN’s efforts to stimulate the disciplines linked to
nuclear energy. In a reflection of the country’s tradition, the theoretical
physics that was being created did not enjoy support from an industry
that was little given to research. Similarly, the meanderings of policies of
assistance and support by the Franco governments responded more to
personal impositions or to relationships of power were such that efforts
did not always flourish.
However, despite all the difficulties entailed by improvised actions,
physics was able to become one of the scientific disciplines that most
rapidly rose to meet international standards, and once established, it
would set work methods and strategies for other developments and areas
of knowledge, such as molecular biology.
Conclusion
Upon analysing the reception of nuclear energy in Spain, we can affirm
that with it, the fabric of science and research (especially in the most
directly related disciplines) was generated in the country for the first time
and that while it developed erratically, it became comparable to that of
more advanced countries in terms of standards and results. This develop-
ment was produced around JEN, the institution responsible for all things
related to nuclear energy. However, above all, it was due to the work,
vision and management of José M. Otero Navascués, who was able to see
the nuclear project as a unique opportunity for scientific and technologi-
cal modernization as well as an opportunity for training in these areas. In
a country with a chronically lacking scientific tradition, and in a Francoist
Spain, without counterweights, Otero held a privileged position in the
regime he so fervently served. His actions coincided with modifications
in the international political context that had an important impact
on support and consideration for the physiochemical sciences. The
evidence that science had been a decisive element in the outcome
of the Second World War, exemplified by the atomic bombs dropped on
Japan, led governments to become conscious of its geo-strategic impor-
tance and the need to determine development priorities. This led to the
first scientific development policies. The Spanish regime was not indif-
ferent to this and quickly established a policy of scientific and techno-
logical development in line with the priorities of the regime: autarky and
defence. Nuclear energy would play a central role in this. Because of its
political and economic importance, the nuclear research developed by
JEN claimed a large portion of the resources dedicated to scientific and
applied research. As the centre where advanced nuclear engineering
research was exclusively concentrated (the universities and technical
schools only gave introductory courses), JEN trained all the scientists
and technicians that worked on nuclear issues (fission, fusion, detectors,
etc.). However, JEN, following Otero’s strategy, also developed a pro-
gramme for helping universities consolidate courses of study. To pro-
mote and develop teaching and theoretical research on physics, JEN had
a series of financial assistance packages for different professorships. This
made possible the rapid establishment of professorships in theoretical
physics, atomic physics, nuclear physics, and nuclear engineering. The

professorships were organized around two groups: the Inter-University
Group on Theoretical Physics (GIFT), dedicated to theoretical physics
and elementary particle physics, and the Nuclear Fusion Institute
(Instituto de Fusión Nuclear) for groups involved in nuclear fusion.
As part of its 1960s-era strategies of opening up towards Europe and
responding assuredly to questions of internal politics, Spain joined
CERN. Also due to internal politics, Spain announced its withdrawal a
few years later, unable to take advantage of the high membership quotas
due to the lack of a scientific policy capable of assuming the benefits of
participation. This was another example of the improvisation and short-
term planning that would define Spanish physics until the 1970s. Little
by little, as in other areas of the country, the physical sciences were incor-
porated into a process of “normalization” (frequently determined by the
international context) that made it possible, as of the 1970s, for Spain to
have a scientific community that, if not equal to that of more advanced
countries, had made enormous strides to close the gap.
Notes
1. Despite an awareness of the importance of the use that was made of the
military rhetoric generated after the atomic bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this essay is limited to nuclear research for civil
purposes. Some recent contributions to the consideration of the military
use of nuclear energy in Spain can be found in G. Velarde, Proyecto Islero.
Cuando España pudo desarrollar armas nucleares (Madrid: Guadalmazán,
2016).
2. A. Roca-Rosell, “La historia de la física, un referente cultural,” in La
física en la dictadura. Físicos, cultura y poder en España 1939–1975, ed.
Néstor Herran and Xavier Roqué (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, 2013), 9–13. A. Presas i Puig, “Las ciencias físicas durante el
primer franquismo,” in Tiempos de investigación. JAE-CSIC, cien años de
ciencia en España, ed. Puig-Samper, M. Á. (ed.) and Antonio Santamaria
García (coord.) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,
2007), 299–304. A. Presas i Puig, “Science on the Periphery: The Spanish
Reception of Nuclear Energy: An Attempt at Modernity?,” Minerva 43,
no. 2 (2005): 197–218.
3. M. Mladjenovic, 1989, “Nuclear Energy Centres as Pioneers of Science

in Less Developed Countries.” Proceedings of the International Conference
on “The Restructuring of Physical Sciences in Europa and the United States,
1945–1960”, Università La Sapienza, Rome, Italy, 19–23 September
1988. M. De Maria, M. Grilli, and F. Sebastiani (eds.), Singapore and
New Jersey: World Scientific, pp. 312–18.
4. M. Mladjenovic, 1989, “Nuclear Energy Centres as Pioneers of Science
in Less Developed Countries”.
5. M. Eckert and M. Osietzki, Wissenschaft für Macht und Markt:
Kernforschung und Mikroelektronik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(München: Beck, 1989), 248.
6. Mundo, VI, 276, 19.08.1945, p. 605.
7. Quoted by A. Blanco García, 1946, “Fundamentos de la bomba
atómica,” Revista “Ejército”, 68, 69 y 70.
8. El Noticiero Universal, 10.08.1945, p. 3.
9. La Vanguardia, 12.08.1945, p. 10.
10. D. Mongin, La bombe atomique française, 1945–1958 (Paris: LGDJ,
1997), 47.
11. K. Sabá, “Spain’s Nuclear and Non-Proliferation Policy,” in How Western
European Nuclear Policy Is Made. Deciding on the Atom, ed. H. Müller
(London: Macmillan, 1991), 112.
12. C. Moya, El poder económico en España, 1939–1970 (Madrid: Tucar
Ediciones, 1975), 216.
13. J.I. Martín Artajo, La energía atómica: sus características y su aplicación
para fines militares (Madrid: Instituto Católico de Artes e Industrias,
1946), 5.
14. BOE, 4 October 1945, 278, p. 2133.
15. J.M. Otero Navascués, 1957b, “Programa español de energía atómica,”
DYNA, 1957, 4, abríl, pp. 216–23.
16. J.M. Otero Navascués, 1957b, Programa español de energía atómica,
p. 218. L. Villena, 1984, “José María Otero Navascués (1907–1983),”
Óptica Pura y Aplicada, 17, pp. 1–12.
17. J.M. Otero Navascués, 1957b, Programa español de energía atómica,
p. 217.
18. Revista de Ciencia Aplicada, no. 34, 1953, p. 458.
19. Quoted by A. Roca Rosell and J.M. Sánchez Ron, Esteban Terradas
(1883–1950). Ciencia y técnica en la España contemporánea (Barcelona:
Ediciones del Serbal.original in italics, 1990), 304.
20. Quoted by A. Roca Rosell and J.M. Sánchez Ron, 1990, Esteban
Terradas (1883-1950), p. 304.
21. J.M. Otero Navascués, 1957a, Hacia una industria nuclear. Energía
Nuclear, 1, julio-septiembre, 3, pp. 14–38.
22. J.M. Otero Navascués, 1957b, “Programa español de energía atómica,”
DYNA, 1957, 4, abríl, pp. 216–23. From 1948 until 1951, EPALE had
an annual budget of 18 million pesetas. In 1952, the budget of the JEN
rose steadily from 37 million in 1952 to 92 million in 1955, 231 million
in 1957, 293 million in 1960 and 453 million in 1963. A. Roca Rosell
and J.M. Sánchez Ron, 1990, Esteban Terradas (1883–1950), p. 309.
23. Revista de Ciencia Aplicada., no. 22, 1951, pp. 449–50, and no. 50,
1956, pp. 269–71.
24. J. Ordoñez, Sánchez Ron, and J. M., “Nuclear Energy in Spain: From
Hiroshima to the Sixties,” in Natural Military Establishments and the
Advancement of Science and Technology. Studies in the 20th Century
History, ed. Paul Forman, Sánchez Ron, and José Manuel (Dordrecht;
Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 185–213.
25. R. Caro, et al. (eds.), Historia Nuclear de España (Madrid: Sociedad
Nuclear Española, 1995), 62.
26. A. Presas i Puig, 2000, La correspondencia entre José M. Otero Navascués
y Karl Wirtz, un episodio de las relaciones internacionales de la Junta de
Energía Nuclear. Arbor, núm. 659–660, noviembre-diciembre,
pp. 527–601.
27. A. Presas i Puig, 2000, La correspondencia entre José M. Otero Navascués
y Karl Wirtz. See Chap. 7 in this volume.
28. L. Izquierdo. El IEN (IEE) y las ciencias y técnicas nucleares en España.
Revista SNE, junio 1998, pp. 15–8, p. 16.
29. J. M. Otero Navascués, 1953, Universidad e investigación. Revista de
educación, 1953(6), 19–25, here p. 21.
30. R. Caro, et al. (eds.), 1995, Historia Nuclear de España, p. 269.
31. G. Velarde, 2016, Proyecto Islero, p. 178. R. Caro, et al. (eds.), 1995,
Historia Nuclear de España, p. 269.
32. J. M. Sánchez Ron and A. Romero de Pablos, Energía nuclear en España:
de la JEN al CIEMAT (Madrid: Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología,
2001).
33. L. Izquierdo, 1998, El IEN (IEE) y las ciencias y técnicas nucleares en
España, p. 15.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 17.
36. X. Roqué. España en el CERN (1961–1969), o el fracaso de la física
autárquica, in N. Herran, X. Roqué eds. 2012. La física en la dictadura.
Físicos, cultura y poder en España 1939–1975. Bellaterra: Universitat

Autònoma de Barcelona, pp. 239–259.
37. M. Aguilar and F. J. Ynduráin, 2003. El CERN y la Física de altas energías
en España. REF Mayo-Junio 2003, pp. 17–25.
38. Roqué (2012).
39. Aguilar and Ynduráin (2003).
40. M. Aguilar and F. J. Ynduráin, 2003, El CERN y la Física de altas energías
en España. REF Mayo-Junio 2003, pp. 17–25.
41. Ibid., p. 20.
42. Ibid.
Albert Presas i Puig (albert.presas@upf.edu) is Associate professor at the

Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. He holds a PhD from the Technische
Universität Berlin. He lectures in the history of science and has been a research
fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. Prof.
Presas has an extensive publishing curriculum and long-standing experience in
cutting-edge European research and project coordination. His research interests
focus on science, culture and power; science in the European periphery; science
and Francoism; and the history of nuclear energy. In the last five years, he has
been involved in eight research projects funded by different Spanish institutions
such as the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Science and Innovation, the
Generalitat de Catalunya (Catalonia’s local government), the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, and Max-Planck Society. He is currently the coordina-
tor of the European consortium that investigates the “History of Nuclear Energy
and Society” (HONESt). His publications include articles in Technology and
Culture, Journal of Modern European History, and Minerva.
5
How did Spain Become the Major US
Nuclear Client?
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
The Spanish dictatorship pursued nuclear development doggedly to achieve

status on the international scene and push the technological prowess for
industrialization.1 But it could not do it alone. The Spanish business and
industrial capabilities required strategic alliances with major US businesses
to create a sector virtually from scratch. Against all odds, a destitute, inter-
nationally ostracized and dictatorial country emerged as an early adopter
and champion importer of commercial nuclear infrastructure.
The Spanish nuclear program can only be understood if considered as
one piece within the international development of nuclear energy. The
actual dimension of the Spanish nuclear project, which exceeded the rela-
tive economic and political clout of the country at the time, responds
No. 662268).
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (*) • J. De la Torre

Universidad Publica de Navarra, Pamplona, Navarra, Spain

to the combination of domestic and foreign interests in the economic,

political and security fields. On the foreign front, the US nuclear indus-
try, with Congress support, and the Export–Import Bank (Eximbank)
funding made the difference. In this chapter, we show how these inter-
ests collude to turn Spain into the major nuclear client of the US by the
mid-1970s.
The first section of the chapter relies on Rubio-Varas and De la Torre
(2016) for a summary of the global market for nuclear reactors from the
late 1950s to the early 1980s, exposing the crucial role played by US
companies and financing facilities in the Western expansion of nuclear
technology. The section “The Spanish Market for Nuclear Reactors and
the US Economic Diplomacy” concentrates on the emergence of Spain as
one of the earliest and world’s largest buyers of commercial nuclear infra-
structure. The Spanish utilities decided to opt for importing US nuclear
technology largely because of the financial facilities granted by US public
and private institutions. These financial facilities included, among other
things, long maturities for the credits. Eventually, the electricity com-
panies had to reimburse them in instalments that become increasingly
burdensome from the early 1980s, which, as shown in the section “The
Nuclear Financial Compromises: A Peek into Repayment”, contributed
to the decision about the Spanish nuclear moratorium of 1984.
he Global Market for Nuclear Reactors

T
1950s–1980s: The US Leadership
Through Technology and Financial Facilities
By the early 1950s it was clear that nuclear science could not remain an
American monopoly and that its spread was inevitable.2 By taking an
active role in assisting foreign nuclear programs, the US influenced the
nuclear policies of other nations, shared their technological developments,
obtained guarantees on safeguarding nuclear materials and hastened the
adoption of broader disbarment measures.3 The light-water reactor, fueled
by low-enriched uranium and cooled and moderated by ordinary water,
was the US alternative to the more expensive gas-cooled reactors built by
How did Spain Become the Major US Nuclear Client? 121
the British and the French in the 1950s, who started their own domestic
nuclear programs.4 Two US manufacturers, Westinghouse and General
Electric, became major developers of light-water reactors, specializing in
pressurized and boiling-water reactors, respectively. However, until the
introduction of “turnkey projects” in the nuclear business in 1962, with a
bid for the construction of a plant at Oyster Creek, New Jersey, the inter-
national market for nuclear reactors remained stagnated: the UK had
received two orders for its Magnox reactor from Japan and Italy, the USSR
one order to East Germany while the US received seven international
orders for nuclear reactors:5 a merger world’s total of ten reactors ordered
internationally up to 1964.
Turnkey projects improved the scenario. The turnkey plants were
offered at a guaranteed fixed price, set in advance, competitive with coal-
and oil-fired alternatives. The turnkey projects successfully attracted US
utilities to nuclear power and gained their manufacturers a strong domes-
tic foundation from which they then expanded internationally, even if
the manufacturers lost money in the process.6 In the five years after the
introduction of turnkey projects into international biddings for nuclear
reactors, from 1965 to 1970, Westinghouse and General Electric received
export orders for 17 reactors, three more than that received by all of the
rest of the world suppliers together over an identical period—including
the Soviet Union exports to third parties.7
Before the oil crisis hit, the US companies captured almost 80% of the
international sales of nuclear reactors to Western countries, but the US
share declined to less than 50% from 1974 to 1980 (see Fig. 5.1). During
the second half of the 1970s, other Western manufacturers, which had
been gaining experience by building nuclear plants in their countries,
came to compete in the international market, mostly the German
Kraftwek Union, the French Framatome and the Canadian AECL. At
this point it is worth noticing that just about a fourth of all nuclear reac-
tors ever connected in the world were sold internationally, since the major
nuclear nations tend to build them domestically. By 1975, the curve of
orders had already passed its peak in the US.8 Another major change in
the sector during the 1970s was the virtual end to the US monopoly on
uranium enrichment services by 1974 when the Soviet Union decided to
sell enriched uranium to Western countries.9
90
80
Global nuclear export orders (nº of reactors)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1955–1964 1965–1970 1971–1973 1974–1980
Western Nuclear Export Orders (nº of reactors) USSR nuclear export orders (Nº of reactors)
US share in Western nuclear market
Fig. 5.1 Global Nuclear Export Orders (no. of reactors) and share of the US in the
Western nuclear market 1955–80
Source and notes: Commercial reactors only. Western orders from Table 1 in Rubio-Varas and
De la Torre (2016). For USSR orders I.A. Andryushin, A.K. Chernyshev, and A. Yudin Yu.
Taming the Nucleus. Pages from the History of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure
of the USSR (I.A. Andryushin, A.K. Chernyshev, and A. Yudin Yu. Ukroshenie yadra. Stranicy
istorii yadernogo oruzhiya i yadernoi infrastruktury SSSR). Sarov: Saransk, 2003, p. 362.
Kindly translated by N. Melinkova. Assuming the orders were placed 8–10 years before the
plants became operative. Note these are orders rather than built reactors—some orders
were cancelled
While nuclear technology suppliers concentrated in a handful of coun-

tries in the world, the list of countries placing importing orders expanded
over the years. Two countries stand out as major clients for power reac-
tors ordered internationally from 1955 to 1980: Spain with 19 reactors
and Japan with 15 reactors (see Fig. 5.2). Both were early adopters too.
After them, South Korea ordered in the same period 9 reactors, while
Switzerland ordered 7 reactors. These four countries concentrated over
half of the nuclear import orders in the Western world—Spain alone
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
Nº of import or ders of nuclear reactors

3
2
1
0
From Western Suppliers From USSR
Fig. 5.2 Global import orders for nuclear reactors (1955–80)

Source and notes: Commercial reactors only. Western orders data, and USSR exports to non-alienated countries from “Nuclear Power
Plants—Export Orders since 1974.” Box H 116, Folder 524, Ex-Im Bank Archives. USSR exports to Eastern Europe taken from I.A. Andryushin,
How did Spain Become the Major US Nuclear Client?
A.K. Chernyshev, and A. Yudin Yu. Taming the Nucleus. Pages from the History of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure of the USSR
(I.A. Andryushin, A.K. Chernyshev, and A. Yudin Yu. Ukroshenie yadra. Stranicy istorii yadernogo oruzhiya i yadernoi infrastruktury SSSR).
Sarov: Saransk, 2003, p. 362. Kindly translated by N. Melinkova. Assuming the USSR orders were placed 8–10 years before the plants became
operative. Note these are orders rather than built reactors—some orders were cancelled
123
20% of them. Given that until the mid-1970s the US quasi-monopolized

the world’s atomic market, most of those orders were from US manufac-
turers. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Eastern countries ordered
imports of nuclear reactors from the USSR in a clear division of the
world’s nuclear market between East and West, only broken by Finland.
Within this global scenario, Rubio-Varas and De la Torre (2016)
explored the financial facilities that the US provided for its exports of
nuclear technology from the late 1950s to the early 1980s. Nuclear
power plants rank among the largest export transactions in world com-
merce.10 With only a few exceptions, public financing institutions of the
principal supplier nations undertook external financing for the export
of nuclear power projects.11 In the US, the Export–Import Bank of the
United States (Eximbank) played this role, contesting other government-
sponsored export financing institutions.12
The Eximbank facilitated exports in situations where there existed an
unwillingness or inability of private institutions to assume the politi-
cal and/or commercial risks of large and long-term credits—notably
aircraft, conventional and nuclear power plants, telecommunications
equipment, and construction and mining machinery. The facilities had
a subsidy element derived from the fact that foreign borrowers received
credit terms that were more favorable than would be otherwise available
(or even feasible) in private capital markets: direct credits, refinancing,
interest-rate support, export credit insurance and guarantees.13 Over the
period 1955–85, the Eximbank financed more than half of the interna-
tional sales of nuclear reactors to the Western world. By the late 1970s
all but one—sold to Switzerland—of US reactor exports came with an
Eximbank financial package.14 From this fact, we hypothesize that the
decision of the US government of pumping public money for exporting
nuclear facilities explains a great deal of the US share in the global nuclear
market before the 1980s. We explore this hypothesis by observing the
Spanish case, which stands out in the global nuclear market as the largest
client for civil atomic technology. Yet, if the Eximbank offered similar
facilities to all buyers of nuclear technology, why did Spanish utilities
order many more nuclear plants than the rest of customers?
he Spanish Market for Nuclear Reactors

T
and US Economic Diplomacy
The shift towards economic liberalization that was conducted by Franco’s
government from 1959 was intrinsically related to US foreign policy
towards Spain. It all began with the financial and military agreements of
1953 between Spain and the US, which turned Spain from “United
Nations outcast to US partner.”15 With the support of the US, Spain
applied and eventually joined major international organizations.16
Towards the end of the 1950s, external developments combined with a
domestic economic crisis, which forced a complete economic policy
reorientation, represented by the Stabilization Plan of 1959.17 The Plan,
drafted with the aid of the International Monetary Fund, marked the
beginning of a new era in the Spanish economy as the country entered a
process of economic liberalization and international market integration.
The industrial policy abandoned the autarky and bet on modernizing
Spanish businesses’ manufacturing capacities through access to techno-
logical capital and foreign business organizations. The nuclear program
synthesized this paradigm, raising Spain to a privileged position among
the beneficiaries of the US nuclear program.
When in November 1959 Nuclenor formally applied for the permis-
sion of the government to begin the preliminary studies and works to
build a nuclear power plant by the Ebro river, there existed no legislation
in Spain to that effect.18 Other Spanish utilities also began to ponder
the nuclear option around the same time. Union Electrica Madrileña
(UEM), the utility providing electricity for Madrid, went ahead with its
plants to build the first Spanish nuclear plant; most commonly referred
to by its location, Zorita, but officially named after the president of the
company, José Cabrera. From 1960 UEM had entrusted its newly created
engineering company, Tecnatom, and the American Bechtel Co. with
the economic and industrial studies for the project. They decided on an
imported pressurized light-water reactor utilizing enriched uranium as
fuel under a turnkey contract: the reactor manufacturer, Westinghouse,
would take all responsibility for turning the key to the operator once
the reactor became operational under a fixed-price agreement.19 UEM
conceived the project as an investment for obtaining information through

“learning by doing” for developing civil and industrial capabilities.20 In
fact, Zorita became a project of strategic interest for the industrial private
sector and the government.
In February 1962, the UEM applied for a quick government approval
of Zorita’s project, to start immediately building. The government took
a whole year arguing that it could not attach specific conditions to an
“authorization” given that the legislation to rule nuclear facilities was still
under study. Thus, in March 1963, the government used an alternative
formulation, “agreement in principle”, noting the need for further study
of several relevant aspects: legal, financial, pricing, third party liability,
insurance and so on.21 Equally unprecedented was the need to obtain
enriched uranium commercially. While no legislation allowed the US
Atomic Energy Commision (AEC) to sell enriched uranium to foreign
countries in long-term contracts and no protocols existed to manage
spent fuel generated abroad, the process had to be created from scratch
to supply the Spanish reactors. The AEC and UEM managed to reach an
agreement by which Spanish-mined uranium would be enriched in the
US, splitting the costs of the uranium cycle among them.22
Zorita happened to be the first US export of a turnkey nuclear project
that was eventually completed.23 It also received one of the first nuclear
credits authorized by the Eximbank (see Table 5.1). The utility faced the
exceptional financial challenge of investing the equivalent to 100% of
its actives on Zorita’s project.24 The total estimated cost of the project
exceeded 41 million dollars, of which 30.5 million had to come from
abroad.25 Eximbank only financed the purchases of American goods. This
consignment could include investment in construction projects (build-
ings for the reactor, turbo generator and water pump), the mechani-
cal and electrical assembly, technical assistance and personnel training
services, and the fuel charge to be processed with an American license
in a European country. Financing the equipment and services of non-
American origin was possible either by giving entrance to the large pri-
vate banks or by negotiating directly with the suppliers. In the case of
Zorita, 80% of the foreign capital came from the Eximbank, and the rest
came from the Chase Manhattan Bank. Domestically the Urquijo Bank
(principal shareholder of the utility) and the Hispano-Americano Bank
Table 5.1 Eximbank financing support of nuclear power exports through December 31, 1969
Share
Contract of
value of Exim
US Eximbank on US
export credit Grace export
Date Capacity sales autorizations period Repayment Interest sales
Country authoriz. Obligor (MWe) (000$) (000$) (years) term (years) rate (%) (%)
Belgium 15/1/59 Euroatom 266 16,250 16,250 8 15 4.50 100
and
France
Germany 15/1/59 Euratom 250 28,500 28,500 8 15 4.50 100
Italy 22/10/59 IMI for SELNI 272 34,216 34,000 7 13 5.25 99
Spain 27/8/64 UEM 153 28,352 24,500 7 15 5.50 86
Japan 30/6/66 JAPC 357 38,610 33,681 5 16 5.50 87
Japan 9/2/67 Kansai Elct. 340 38,044 34,849 5 16 5.50 92
Power Co
Japan 22/6/67 TEPCO 460 49,929 45,149 4 16 6.00 90
Spain 29/6/67 NUCLENOR 460 44,329 43,760 3 15 6.00 99
Japan 27/11/68 TEPCO 784 81,752 68,781 5 15 6.00 84
Japan 6/2/69 Kansai Elct. 500 36,386 30,976 3 15 6.00 85
Power Co
Taiwan 24/7/69 Taipower 550 88,560 79,704 5 15 6.00 90
Korea 21/8/69 KECO 600 75,198 47,250 4 15 6.00 63
Korea 21/8/69 KECO 600 75,198 14,648 7 15 6.00 19
Sources and notes: Contracts include the costs of nuclear power capital equipment, fuel and related services. Information
about contracts and credits amounts from “Nuclear Power Plant Financing. 1964–70—Summary Sheet: Eximbank
Financing Support of Nuclear Power Exports through December 31, 1969”, Box H127, Folder 3747. Ex-Im Bank Archives
Interest rates, grace and repayment periods from: “Name of Memorandum.” Studies of Nuclear Power Programs
127
Developed Under Ex-Im Bank. Box H127, Folder 3749. Ex-Im Bank Archives
shared the risk of the remaining funds,26 while UEM had to make a down
payment of 3 million dollars in cash.
Most of the legal requirements and contracts were formalized along
1964: the government approved in April the first Spanish Nuclear Law
and in July it granted the construction permit—in August the Eximbank
authorized the credit. Construction began in the summer of 1965.
With the first Spanish atomic project, firms at both sides of the Atlantic
acquired and perfected the specific capabilities that were required to
build a commercial nuclear reactor.27 Some of the elements stood as a
learning experience for all parties involved, including many aspects that
would have continuation. Contact with nuclear leaders in Europe and
America and generous financing from American public and private bank-
ing had continuity. The learning process for technicians and specialists
intensified.28 In fact, Tecnatom, the Spanish engineering company ini-
tially born for managing Zorita’s project, developed its own technology
for training purposes, using the first nuclear plant as a training school for
Spaniards and foreigners.29 Zorita’s experience helped with the creation
of protocols for the logistics of transport and timing supplying the dif-
ferent components to the plant site, for Spain and worldwide. All of this
added to the upgrade of the low-tech equipment and civil work provided
by Spanish companies to the level appropriate for matching US nuclear
manufacturing standards (see Chap. 8). The learning curve and technical
improvements allowed better performance for American firms in foreign
countries, with discounts on the capital cost for the utilities.30
Meanwhile, Nuclenor’s project, back then called Bilbao-Ebro, later
known by the short name of the sitting village, Garoña, had been in the
making since 1959. It remained under study by the government until
it was pre-authorized in 1963. During those years, Nuclenor had con-
tinued keeping contacts abroad and carried civil works on the site.31 In
1963, with the help of Gibbs & Hill and Merz & McMellan, Nuclenor
launched the call for bids for the reactor. It specified the bids had to be
submitted before mid-1965 and could make use of any of the available
technologies. Nuclenor expected offers from the Nuclear Power Group
of England of a gas-cooled rector and from light-water reactors man-
ufacturers like Babcock & Wilcox, International General Electric and
Westinghouse. The utility kept continuous contacts with the bidders dur-
ing the process.32 General Electric won the bid for the reactor.
In the choice of the technological leader for Garoña it is possible to

identify some pre-existing factors in favor of General Electric. First,
General Electric had a 3% participation in Iberduero—the half-owner
of Nuclenor—and kept two seats in Iberduero’s board.33 Second, the
contracts for technical assistance of General Electric to Iberduero for
the construction of thermal plants financed with the resources of the
Eximbank during the 1950s must have played a determining role.34
Third, General Electric offered to provide both the transitory financing
while the Eximbank credit was negotiated and a secondary credit to com-
plete the purchase of enriched uranium and of some services. For the
latter purposes, it used both its American headquarters and its subsidiary
in Germany (General Electric Technical Services).35
The process for obtaining the financing for Garoña from the Eximbank
formally began in September 1966. The parts signed the contract in June
1967. The Eximbank provided a loan of $37.7 million to cover all the
imports of components of the plant of American manufacture, and sec-
ond loan of $6.5 million for the cost of the enrichment of the uranium, in
analogous conditions to Zorita’s. For both credits the Eximbank required
a bank or Spanish state guarantee.36 Nuclenor resorted to a consortium
of five of the most important private Spanish banks (Bilbao, Vizcaya,
Santander, Español de Crédito and Central), with which Iberduero and
Viesgo were historically related. The delegate of Nuclenor to Washington
for the signature with Eximbank, Manuel G. Cortines, indicated that
the conditions of credit were frankly the best that could be obtained.
And he continued, “I am convinced that they are better than those they
have conceded for similar suppliers in other countries, for example,
Japan, and I am sure that this is due to the extremely efficient man-
agement by the Ministry of Commerce, the Foreign Financing and our
Embassy.”37 Confronting Cortines’s perception with the documentation
of the Eximbank regarding nuclear credits within the decade refutes the
idea of a more favorable treatment for Spanish projects by the American
bank (see Table 5.1). While it is true that the Eximbank financed a larger
share of the US export value in the case of Garoña than in other nuclear
credits, it is also true that it granted a slightly shorter grace period to
begin repayment. The remaining of the conditions matched those of the
other customers.
The procedure followed for the first two Spanish nuclear projects set
the rules for the inner working of the Spanish market for nuclear reactors.
Utilities decided on the sitting location, conducted the bidding process
and selected the specific reactor supplier and the engineering firms. In
parallel, the utilities applied for obtaining the authorization for the sit-
ting of the plant from the government, the so-called “pre-authorization”.
With the two first nuclear projects underway, two other nuclear proj-
ects set forward in the late 1960s: Irta and Vandellós I. The first one,
pre-authorized in November 1966, has been forgotten to Spanish nuclear
history after a long judicial process, where the promoter utility—Hidro-
electrica Española (Hidrola)—lost the legal challenge in competition
with tourism interest in the Mediterranean coast.38 The second one, offi-
cially pre-authorized in 1967, in progress since at least 1964, had a very
different nature to the rest of Spanish nuclear projects (see Chap. 6 in
this volume).
As the first generation of Spanish nuclear plants progressed towards the
connection of three out of the four planned reactors, with a combined
capacity just above 1000 MWe, UNESA—the electricity lobby—worked
on the projections for the future of the Spanish electricity market. By
order of the Ministry of Industry in September 1968 UNESA wrote
the first draft of what would become the First National Electricity Plan,
published by August 1969.39 The Plan projected 2,500 MWe of nuclear
installed capacity for 1975 and 8,500 MWe for 1981.40 It reflected the
aspirations of the utilities of achieving a 20% nuclear share on their
generation in the medium term. In the long term, they envisage up to
a 60% nuclear share by year 2000, with an astonishing 71,000 MWe
nuclear capacity.41 With those numbers in mind, the second generation
of nuclear power plants began to be considered by the utilities. Public
reports already mentioned several new nuclear projects all along 1968
and 1969: Lemoniz in the North of the country and for the service of
the center and South of the country Almaraz; a second reactor for Zorita
appeared plausible too.42
The decision-making for building Almaraz NPP illustrates the fac-
tors weighted by the utilities. The idea of procuring a nuclear plant for
Sevillana de Electricidad dated back to the creation in 1958 of CENUSA,
a joint venture with UEM and Hidrola. Ten years later little progress
had taken place, besides the study for a nuclear plant in Castejon.43 By
1969, the sitting of a nuclear plant in Almaraz, which could serve the
areas of influence of the three utilities in the Centre-East and South of
the country, began to take shape. For a while, it looked like Portugal
would enter in equal footing with the three Spanish utilities on Almaraz
project with 25% each.44 The call for bidders for the reactor specified a
minimum size of 850 MWe, even if the maximum size catalogued by the
National Electricity Plan was 500 MWe. The utilities opted for a larger
reactor “because they [850 MWe] represent a 20% of economy in the
installation with respect to 500 MWe”.45 The general opinion expressed
by the members of the Management Committee of Sevillana was that
“given the very high investment that it would represent, it is very possible
that this nuclear power plant is not convenient, if do not to represent
a great advantage over conventional plants”.46 Thus the need to upsize
the project for gaining economic advantage.47 The Ministry of Industry,
initially reluctant to accept larger reactors, finally conceded it.48 In July,
1970 Almaraz project had already received four tenders for the reactor:
three from American companies (Westinghouse, General Electric and
Combustion Engineering) and one German from the combination of
Siemens-AEG.49 The US Betchel Engineering Office in collaboration
with the Spanish AUXIESA valued the offers.50 Despite this, the nuclear
project generated agitated discussions within Sevillana’s board. Some
board members insisted on the idea that Almaraz was “no more than
a project yet, undecided whether it will be executed and that may take
two to three years to decide”, and wanted to make sure the government
understood it as such.51
By the end of the year, once finished with the study of the bids
for Almaraz in their technical and economic terms—awarded to
Westinghouse—the utilities involved deemed it important to obtain
first-hand information from the North American utilities building or
projecting nuclear power plants. The directors of the four major Spanish
utilities—Iberduero, Hidrola, UEM and Sevillana—travelled to the US,
in company of the Government’s General Director for Energy.52 They
visited utilities in New York, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco, the
Edison Electric Institute and the headquarters of Betchel Co.
The managers of the American utilities assured their Spanish counter-

parts that the technical problems of nuclear plants were already solved,
and that nuclear plants clearly provided more usable hours than large
conventional plants. The Americans warned about the difficulty to assess
budgets and building times correctly. Furthermore, they cautioned the
miscalculation risks feared larger in the Spanish case given the compul-
sory domestic industrial participation, which had little experience with
the matter.53 They clarified that in projects with large capital investments,
such as nuclear projects, any delay would cause considerable increases in
the overall costs. The president of Sevillana, however, had a clear idea of
how to minimize the risks involved: “it is expected that the Ministry of
Industry, will adopt the necessary measures to circumvent these eventual
damages”.54 In December 1971, the companies requested government
permission for sitting a second reactor in Almaraz.55
The assurances received in the US in conjunction with the assumption
that the Spanish government would come to the rescue if anything went
wrong, led the utilities to push forward their nuclear plans. Consequently,
the Spanish nuclear program boomed over the first half of the 1970s.
Until March 1975, date of the last application for a nuclear project, the
Spanish utilities applied for permissions to install 32 reactors with a com-
bined nuclear capacity of over 33,000 MWe, excluding the four plants
of first generation (see Fig. 5.3). From October 1971 to August 1976,
date of the last sitting authorization, the government pre-authorized 15
reactors, with a combined capacity just over 15,000 MWe. It is tempting
to interpret the utilities initial application as a mere expression of inter-
est, where the electrical companies simply wanted to demonstrate inter-
est in nuclear and keep a stock of selected sites.56 On the contrary, the
electricity companies launched calls for suppliers, negotiating contracts
with providers and financiers in parallel to obtaining the governmental
permissions. This became well known to the US stakeholders.57 It also
explains how projects that never got the government pre-authorization,
such as Escatrón or Punta Endata, had reactors adjudicated to manu-
facturers and obtained credit authorizations from the Eximbank (see
Appendix A). Thus, the utilities formalized more contracts with suppliers
and bankers than plants eventually pre-authorized by the government.
Figure 5.3 helps with the analysis of the geographical distribution

of the nuclear applications by the utilities and the pre-authorizations
by the government. The distribution of the nuclear applications and
pre-authorizations mirrors the distribution of the Spanish market that
the electricity companies had been employing since the 1940s.58 Three
large areas (Centre-North, Centre-East and Catalonia) took about three
quarters of the nuclear market and three other areas applied for about
the last quarter. In most cases, nuclear projects resulted from joint part-
nerships among the private electricity utilities. Only the largest private
companies (Iberduero, Hidrola, UEM, FECSA and Sevillana) dared
applying for nuclear projects on their own. UEM had already done it
with Zorita. Of the remaining attempts, only Hidrola (Cofrentes) and
FECSA (Ascó I) will manage to conclude a nuclear project singlehand-
edly (see Appendix A).
Figure 5.4 shows the individual company’s commitment to nuclear
energy. In the middle of the nuclear euphoria, in September 1973,
Iberduero applied at once for authorization to install five reactors for a
total of almost 5,000 MWe.59 It implied enlarging what already was the
largest nuclear scheme of any single company: Iberduero owned half of
Garoña (460 MWe) already in operation, and the company had started
building two reactors in Lemoniz (930 MWe each). Sevillana applied for
5000 MWe in three different sites in the six months between December
1973 and May 1974. FECSA also doubled its nuclear ambitions between
1973 and 1974. The combined nuclear capacity planed by the three of
them—Iberduero, Sevillana and FECSA—exceeded the nuclear aspira-
tions of all the remaining Spanish utilities together. If we only consider
the plants pre-authorized by the government, then the installed capacity
pre-authorized to those three companies plus Hidrola concentrated two-
thirds of the Spanish nuclear project.
From the data in Fig. 5.4, it stands out that only in one case, the gov-
ernment denied all the nuclear applications: Endesa, the largest public
electricity utility, did not obtain pre-authorization for any of the projects
it applied for—Escatrón, Chalamera and El Paramo.60 Other utilities will
end up without nuclear power given that not all pre-authorized plants
progressed towards construction. It is the case with the utilities of the
40000
GOVERNMENT
134
UTILITIES' APPLICATIONS 1975

PRE-AUTHORIZATIONS 1976
(BY GEOGRAPHYCAL ZONE)
35000 (BY GEOGRAPHICAL ZONE)
North-West North-West
5% Andalucia 6% Andalucia
16% 11% Aragon
30000 5%
Centre-North Centre-North
23% 21%
Aragon
11%
25000 Catalunya
27%
Centre-East Catalunya Centre-East

20000 21% 24% 30%
15000
Nuclear capacity (MWe)

10000
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas and J. De la Torre
5000
Ulies' applicaons Pre-autorized by government conected
Fig. 5.3 Cumulative applications, pre-authorizations and nuclear capacity connected Spain (1959–88). Distribution of
nuclear applications and pre-authorizations by geographical areas
Sources and notes: Own elaboration from data in Appendix A. For the attribution of nuclear project to a geographical area, the share of
each utility has been attributed to the area of influence defined in the Ministry of Industry reports as follows: Andalucia: Sevillana; Aragon:
IEA,ERZ, ENDESA; Catalunya: ENHER, FECSA, FHS, HEC; Centre-East: UEM, Hidrola; Centre-North: Iberduero; North-West: FENOSA, HIC,
Viesgo
Iberduero
Sevillana
FECSA
Hidrola
ENHER
UEM
ENDESA
Viesgo
ERZ
EIA
FENOSA
HEC
HIC
FHS
EDF
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000

nuclear capacity (MWe)
Pre-authorized applied no autorized
Fig. 5.4 Nuclear capacity planned by Spanish utilities 1959–1975

Sources and notes: Own elaboration from data in Appendix A. Hidrola’s pre-authorized
capacity includes the 500 MWe of Irta’s project. The company abandoned the project in 1973
North-West—FENOSA, HIC, Viesgo—which projects, despite being

pre-authorized, got discarded along the way.61
The Spanish nuclear surge correlated with three important external
shocks. The suspension of the convertibility of the dollar in August 1971
(which made US imports cheaper for Spain up to 1975), was followed in
October 1973 by an astronomical increase in oil prices. The third exter-
nal force behind the boom was the marketing offensive for selling reac-
tors and nuclear technology driven by the Nixon administration.62 The
US viewed the oil crisis as an opportunity for expanding nuclear power
in the world.63 So did many governments, at least in the immediate after-
math of the first oil crisis. In the Spanish case, most of the nuclear appli-
cations from the utilities happened before the oil crisis hit, but about half
of the Spanish nuclear program got approval from the government from
1974 to 1976 (see Fig. 5.3 and Appendix A).
To the dismay of British, French and German manufacturers also

bidding for the Spanish nuclear market, the American manufacturers
systematically won the bids for nuclear reactors and technical assistance
launched by the Spanish utilities until the mid-1970s.64 The US finan-
cial assistance both directly through Eximbank loans, and indirectly by
guaranteeing private loans for the nuclear projects, made it impossible
to compete for the European manufacturers.65 According to an inter-
nal memorandum of the Eximbank, as of end-1976 Spain had ordered
some 17 nuclear power plants.66 Except for Vandellós I, financed by
the French government, all the remaining offers for nuclear reactors
came with an offer of Eximbank financial support, which made the
Spanish electricity market the largest nuclear client of the US by, at the
same time, converting Spain into the largest nuclear borrower of the
Eximbank.67
The first exception to the US supremacy in the Spanish reactor market
came in 1975. The utilities promoting Trillo NPP selected the German
offer over the American one, disregarding the Eximbank financial pack-
age included in the bid (see Chap. 7 in this volume). A set of tele-
grams sent from the US Embassy in Madrid to the Secretary of State
in Washington, in the immediate aftermath of the decision, reveals the
perception of Westinghouse about the matter and their fears about the
future bidding processes.68 They noted that their firm had already lost
a $100 million contract at Trillo due primarily to the more favorable
financing terms offered by that German firm. They expressed the fear
that non-competitive financing could cause Westinghouse to lose the
contracts for the three reactors it was bidding for at the time: Vandellos
II and Escatron I and II. There were more projects at stake. When Viesgo
initiated contacts for the plant of Santillan, it made clear that US finan-
cial terms must met European competition, explicitly mentioning the
example of about six months earlier when Westinghouse lost the bidding
of Trillo.69
Given the importance of the Spanish market for nuclear reactors, the
US economic diplomacy needed to keep working on it. The US Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger, made it clear in his exchanges with the US
Embassy in Madrid: with many proposed nuclear power projects in the

US being deferred or cancelled, sales relating to the Spanish nuclear proj-
ect “will help US manufacturers retain their specialized engineering and
technical staff and maintain production workforces”.70 The Eximbank
representatives organized a visit to Spain in June 1976 to meet with appro-
priate government, bank and business officials in Madrid, Barcelona and
Bilbao.71 The first of the primary objectives listed for the trip was the
review of the Spanish nuclear program, with emphasis on the energy pro-
grams in the meetings with the Finance and Industry Ministries. They
arranged separate meetings with all the utilities with nuclear projects in
place and planned visits to Almaraz and Lemoniz sites. The US embassy
kept reporting to the State Department and the Eximbank about the
French and German nuclear interest in Spain.72 At the end, the US man-
ufacturers only lost one more bid—Regodola at the end of 1977—again
to the German consortium. A US Congressional commission concluded
that those orders, which broke a virtual monopoly on nuclear orders held
by the US in Spain (see Table 5.2), “can more accurately be attributed to
superior financing packages offered by the Germans than to any nonpro-
liferation policies advocated by the US Government”.73
Table 5.2 The Spanish nuclear market for nuclear reactors (successful tenders,
under construction and operative)
Reactors awarded by Reactors with
utilities in bidding government building Operative
processes permits reactors
1977 1981 1988
Westinghouse 16 8 6
(US)
General Electric 6 4 2
(US)
KWU (Germany) 3 2 1
EDF (France) 1 1 1
Total 26 15 10
Sources and notes: own elaboration from data in Appendix A. Note that in
several occasions once the bidding process concluded the actual purchase order
did not follow up
he Nuclear Financial Compromises: A Peek

T
into Repayment
It is worth placing the nuclear debt of the Spanish electrical companies in
perspective. By 1980, the outstanding balance of the electricity sector
represented 69% of the total Spanish credits pending amortization with
the Eximbank.74 Eleven of the fifteen most indebted Spanish companies
with the American public bank were electricity companies, a ranking
headed by Iberduero and Hidrola. The Eximbank did not concern itself
with the wisdom of the nuclear purchases from the buyer’s point of view.75
In 1978, Martin Gallego, three years before he became General Secretary
for Energy, wrote a series of articles in a national newspaper which help to
understand how the major electricity companies have driven themselves
into heavy overinvestment resorting to international debt. He has served
as Industry counselor at Washington Embassy, witnessing the dealings of
the Spanish companies in the US.76 Martin Gallego classified the stake-
holders of the electricity sector in Spain, pointing at the imbalance of
power regarding the decision-making process in the Spanish electricity
sector. He identified that a tiny group of people held the power over the
decisions being made (see Table 5.3).77
Martin Gallego pointed out the disadvantages of the lack of integra-
tion of Spanish private electric companies compared to the predominantly
public ones in most European countries. He signaled the reduced size and
productivity of the Spanish utilities, much lower than of US private power
companies. He also noted that the focus of the utilities’ nuclear invest-
ments, essentially oriented towards their benefits, posed serious difficul-
ties for the government to amend actions that prevented the construction
of public trust, which was inexistent but indispensable.78 Meanwhile, the
economic crisis was deepening, and ETA-the basque separatist terrorist
group- contributed to the debate with its terror attacks on nuclear interests
in the Basque Country. Some antinuclear movements asked for a morato-
rium and a popular plebiscite already in 1979.79 By their part, the energy
sector entrepreneurs’ association continued its campaign in favor of atomic
energy, warning about the risk of a return to underdevelopment if the
nuclear path was to be abandoned. In written press, TV debates and radio
programs the pro-nuclear insisted that nuclear was the only way out of the
Table 5.3 Stakeholders and interest in the Spanish electricity sector by 1978
Influence
on the
Size of electricity Needs and wants
Stakeholder Type group sector from the sector
Consumers Industrial Small Relative Acceptable
service,
minimum price
Domestic Large Very Idem plus avoid
(all of scarce subsidizing
them) industrial
consumers
Environmentally Expropriated Large Very Risk, sanitary
affected landowners. scarce decay and
population by the Affected by environmental
electricity actual or effects. Seek
installation potential appropriate
emission of compensation
sulphur,
nuclear
radiation, etc.
Shareholders of Individual Large Very Return on
electricity shareholder scarce investment.
companies Institutional Small Scarce Liquidity.
shareholder Good share price
in capital
markets
Oligarchy Tiny Huge Continue to keep
(electricity the control of
families the sector,
owners and getting around
banks) rationalizing
the sector by
increasing tariffs
Employees of White collar Tiny Relative Maintaining high
electricity wages
companies Blue collar Medium Scarce Promotion, keep
job and salary
Source: Translated from M. Gallego Málaga, “El futuro del sector Eléctrico
español (3),” El País 27-05-1978
economic crisis (caused indeed by the strong dependence on petroleum).80

Nonetheless, the real problem for the utilities will not be the increasing
public opposition, but their financial commitments in the middle of the
largest economic crisis in decades, both domestically and internationally.
The terms of the Eximbank credits for nuclear reactors granted

moderate interest rates, ranging from 6 to 9%, and long grace periods
hoping the repayments would begin after the plants began operation.
Except in the cases of Almaraz and Lemoniz, whose initial instalments
were planned for 1977 and 1978, respectively, the remaining credits for
second- and third-generation reactors would begin repayment beyond
1981. Furthermore, Valdecaballeros, Sayago and Punta Endata credits
had their first installments programed after 1986 (and none of the three
projects was finalized).81
One of the consequences of the international crisis and its political
response was the appreciation of the dollar. The exchange rate with the
dollar escalated from less than 60 pesetas per dollar in the mid-1970s
to over 120 pesetas per dollar at the end of 1982. In effect, the loans
which first payments began in the early 1980s, more than doubled their
cost in pesetas. We could not fetch the utilities’ accounts of their nuclear
credit repayments, but we can approximate the challenge of the repay-
ment using the Eximbank data to calculate the cash flow of theoretical
payments (amortizations plus interest) that the electricity utilities would
have to face, based on the credit conditions. Inflation impacted plant
constructions costs, but did not find equal reflect on the electricity tariffs
the companies charged to clients since they were regulated by the govern-
ment. Still, the credits had to be repaid in dollars.
There are no official figures about the cost of the Spanish nuclear pro-
gram. But some indirect routes help to understand its magnitude. We
calculated the cost in pesetas of the instalments to be repaid. Figure 5.5
compares the instalments of the utilities’ Eximbank nuclear credits with
those of the credits the electricity companies obtained for their conven-
tional plant equipment. The combined effect of the first instalments and
the rise of the exchange rate to the dollar contribute to the fact that the
nuclear repayments due on the nuclear Eximbank credits almost doubled
from 1979 to 1981, and then again the amounts due increased more than
twofold from 1981 to 1983. The amounts due on purchases of conven-
tional plant equipment and services reached about a third of the nuclear
financial commitments. The chances of refinancing other currencies
become increasing complicated in the early 1980s too.
Nonetheless, the financial commitments of the utilities with the

Eximbank were just the tip of the iceberg. The legal limitation for the
Eximbank to exclusively financing US components and services meant
that the public bank loans progressively lost their pre-eminence as part
of the money required for nuclear projects abroad. Some of the most sig-
nificant nuclear importers—Italy, South Korea, Spain—pushed hard for
increasing local participation in nuclear projects.82 While plants became
larger and more expensive over time, a larger share of the projects became
local costs (Figs. 5.6 and 5.7).
Figure 5.6 shows the accumulated expected costs of all the Spanish
nuclear projects as they appeared in the Eximbank credits authorizations.
The public bank published the expected total cost of the project, the
US content, and the part financed by the Eximbank. Therefore, these
total costs should be taken as a lower limit to the actual costs, since in
20000
18000
16000
14000
Million current Pesetas
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Nuclear plants Covenonal plants
Fig. 5.5 Scheduled repayment instalments by Spanish electricity utilities on their

Eximbank credits (1968–90)
Sources and notes: data on individual Eximbank credits to Spanish utilities appendix I in De
la Torre and Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior a través del IEME. We estimated the cash
flow of theoretical payments (amortizations plus interest) that the electricity utilities would
had to face, given the credits conditions published at authorization. The actual payment
schedule is unknown. Exchange rates from Officer (2015)
10000
1000
million US $
total cost
100
US cost
Exim
finance
10
1964
1967
1970
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1973
1973
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977
1977
1978
1978
1980
Fig. 5.6 Accumulated costs of the Spanish nuclear project supplied by US
Sources: Elaborated from data in Export–Import Bank of the United States, Authorizations
for Nuclear Power Plants and Training Center from Inception thru March 31, 1983, Exhibit B.
[1959–1983]. Box H128, Folder 705. Ex-Im Bank Archives
all cases, final costs exceeded initial calculations. By its part, Fig. 5.7
makes evident that the initial Spanish nuclear projects were more reli-
ant on US materials and Eximbank financing than the last ones. The
Eximbank financed roughly about half of the US equipment required.
Given that the US share on total costs went from above 70% to less than
20%, the Eximbank contribution to the total expected costs of Spanish
nuclear plants declined substantially over time. The major Spanish pri-
vate industrial banks (Banco Urquijo, Banco de Bilbao, Banca March,
Banco Español de Crédito, Banco de Vizcaya), which played a major
role as intermediaries with the US financial institutions, also channeled
domestic funds for the Spanish nuclear project.83 Kissinger had expressed
US worries about the capacity of the Spanish capital market to finance
its share in the nuclear program already in 1975.84 The gap between what
could be financed resorting to the Eximbank and the Spanish industrial
banks was covered mostly by private international banks. Consequently,
our estimates of the financial commitments of the Spanish electricity util-
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
US share in total project costs
20% Exim share on total cost
Expon. (US share in total project costs)

10%
Expon. (Exim share on total cost)
0%
1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
Fig. 5.7 Declining US share on Spanish nuclear project costs, 1964–77 (and Exim Finance share on US costs of Spanish
projects)
Sources and notes: data on individual Eximbank credits to Spanish utilities appendix I in De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, La financiación exte-
rior a través del IEME. We estimated the cash flow of theoretical payments (amortizations plus interest) that the electricity utilities would
have to face, given the credits conditions published at authorization. The actual payment schedule is unknown. Exchange rates from
Officer (2015)
143
ities on their outstanding credits with the Eximbank shown in Fig. 5.5

above represent a small and decreasing fraction of the total international
debt the utilities had to deal with in the early 1980s.
The first elected Parliament in 40 years rescaled down the nuclear proj-
ect in 1979. The socialist government elected at the end of 1982 included
in its electoral program the need to introduce a nuclear moratorium. The
government portrayed the moratorium as the necessary “rationalization”
of the electricity sector and the only viable option to restore their wrecked
finances—a “giant snowball”: the companies were in negative numbers,
it did not matter how the figures were calculated.85 The companies had
more debts to pay than income entering their accounts. The gap was
expected to get worse given the nuclear commitments building at that
time. A financial rescue had to be done without harming the share price
on the stock market of the companies involved and seeking the complic-
ity of the international banks to continue financing them.
After a period of consultation and negotiation with the power compa-
nies and the banks, in the autumn of 1983, the government announced a
nuclear moratorium.86 It responded to the double imbalance of excess of
borrowing and of power pants.87 It was a “temporary” halt; revisable by
1992, if the energy demand required it, the five reactors affected by the
moratorium may restart building again.
UNESA and the Spanish Atomic Forum eventually acknowledged the
moratorium as inevitable. They accepted the compensation mechanisms
but expressed concern regarding the impact on auxiliary industries.88 And
they also questioned the pure techno-economic reasoning and suspected
political reasons behind the moratorium. For some years, the companies
hoped the affected plants would be finished and pressed for it.89 Then the
Chernobyl nuclear accident happened and the option to restart the works
seemed further away.
The procedure for the compensation to the utilities for the moratorium
took a long time, reaching the first agreement by 1988. The companies
argued that the moratorium “addressed, in a realistic fashion, the finan-
cial adjustment of the sector, made necessary due to the major investment
that had been demanded from the sector by the Administration in the
past”.90 In other words, the companies blamed the overinvestment on
the coercion of previous administrations not on their mismanagement,
thus the administration must compensate them. The compensation of

the recognized costs was securitized in bonds guaranteed by the Spanish
government, and the cost being paid on the electric tariff by consumers
in their monthly bill until 2015.
In 1994, the five nuclear projects paralyzed a decade earlier finally
became officially cancelled. Ironically, because of the restructuring of the
electricity sector in the early 1990s, the ownership of many of the nuclear
power plants ended up in the hands of ENDESA, the public electricity
company that could not build its own.91
Notes
1. Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, “Learning by Doing: The
First Spanish Nuclear Plant,” Business History Review, (forthcoming)
2. This section summarizes sections 1 and 2 in M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas and
Joseba De la Torre, “‘Spain—Eximbank’s Billion Dollar Client’. The Role
of the US Financing the Spanish Nuclear Program,” in Electric Worlds/
Mondes Électriques: Creations, Circulations, Tensions, Transitions (19th–21st
C), ed. Alain Beltran et al. (Peter Lang, 2016), 245–70, doi:10.3726/978-
3-0352-6605-4, while referring to the original sources in most cases.
Proliferation Policy: Impact on Exports and Nuclear Industry Could Not
Be Determined” (Washington, DC, 1980), 4; Mara Drogan, “The Nuclear
Imperative: Atoms for Peace and the Development of U.S. Policy on
Exporting Nuclear Power, 1953–1955,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 5
(November 2016): 948–74, doi:10.1093/dh/dhv049.
Proliferation Policy: Impact on Exports and Nuclear Industry Could Not
Be Determined,” 8–9.
5. The US sales went to Belgium, Italy, Japan, West Germany, India, France
and Spain.
6. H. Stuart Burness, W. David Montgomery and James P. Quirk, “The
Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power,” Source: Land Economics 56, no. 2 (1980):
188–202, http://www.jstor.org
7. Rubio-Varas and De la Torre, “‘Spain—Eximbank’s Billion Dollar

Client’. The Role of the US Financing the Spanish Nuclear Program,”
table 1.
8. Steve Cohn, Too Cheap to Meter : An Economic and Philosophical Analysis
of the Nuclear Dream (State University of New York Press, 1997), 127.
9. Later two consortia formed for the same purpose France, Italy, Belgium
Iran and Spain formed EURODIF; the United Kingdom, The
Netherlands and West Germany formed URENCO. Comptroller
General’s Report to the Congress, “U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Policy: Impact on Exports and Nuclear Industry Could Not Be
Determined,” 10.
10. Ibid., 38.
11. EXIM: Eximbank Programs in Support of Nuclear Power Projects
(Washington, DC, 1970), 3. Box J11, Folder 2347. Ex-Im Bank
Archives.
12. EXIM: Eximbank, Press Release, February 17, 1970, Bound Press
Releases, January 6, 1970–June 30, 1970, J6g, 2275, Ex-Im Bank
Archives.
13. EXIM: Holliday, G. Eximbank’s Involvement in Nuclear Exports
(Congressional Research Service, GPO: Washington, DC, March 2,
1981), 4. Box L1, Folder 277. Ex-Im Bank Archives. See also, R. Seiler,
Budgeting for Eximbank: A Case Study of Credit Reform, United States,
Congressional Budget Office (Washington, DC, 1990), 8.
14. EXIM: Eximbank Programs in Support of Nuclear Power Projects
(Washington, DC, 1970), 3. Box J11, Folder 2347.
15. Oscar Calvo-González, “American Military Interests and Economic
Confidence in Spain under the Franco Dictatorship,” Journal of Economic
History 67, no. 3 (2007): 740–67.
16. Spain integrated successively in the International Monetary Fund
(1958), the World Bank (1958), the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (1959) and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (1963).
17. A survey about the literature and the impact of the Stabilisation Plan on
the Spanish economy can be found in Leandro Prados de la Escosura,
Joan R Rosés and Isabel Sanz-Villarroya, “Economic Reforms and
Growth in Franco’s Spain,” Working Papers in Economic History
(Getafe, 2011), http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/HISEC/working_
papers/working_papers_general.html
18. Memoria Nuclenor, 1959 & 1960.
19. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, “Learning by Doing: The First Spanish

Nuclear Plant.”
20. Ibid.
21. In the Orden de 27 de marzo 1963, BOE No. 8, 3 April 1963 the gov-
ernment argued that it could not attach specific conditions to an “autho-
rization” given that the legislation to rule nuclear facilities was still under
study, thus the government used an alternative formulation: “agreement
in principle”.
22. Ibid.
23. None of the three exports of US reactors that was ordered before 1962
had commercial uses. The reactor for the nuclear plant of Taipur (India),
which was also a turnkey project, was ordered in 1963 but it was con-
nected by 1969, a year after the Spanish plant of Zorita was finished.
EXIM: “Nuclear Power Plants—Export Orders since 1974.” Box H 116,
Folder 524. Ex-Im Bank Archives, College Park, Maryland, US.
24. Esperanza García Molina, José Ruiz Osoro and Ignacio Fernández Bayo,
50 Años de Tecnatom : Medio Siglo de Tecnología Nuclear En España
(Madrid: Divulga, SL, 2007), 50.
25. EXIM: Export–Import Bank of the US, “Authorizations for Nuclear
Power Plants and Training Center from Inception thru March 31, 1983,”
Exhibit B. [1959–1983]. Box H128, Folder 705. Ex-Im Bank Archives.
26. Núria Puig Raposo and Eugenio Torres Villanueva, Banco Urquijo, un
Banco con Historia (Madrid: Turner, 2008).
27. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, “Learning by Doing: The First Spanish
Nuclear Plant.”
28. Ibid.
29. Adoración Alvaro Moya, “The Globalization of Knowledge Based
Services: Engineering Consulting in Spain, 1956–1975,” Business History
Review 88, no. 4 (2014): 681–707.
30. Paul L. Joskow and George A. Rozanski, “The Effects of Learning by
Doing on Nuclear Plant Operating Reliability,” The Review of Economics
and Statistics 61, no. 2 (May 1979): 161, doi:10.2307/1924583.
31. Nuclenor, Memoria 1959 to 1963.
32. Nuclenor, Memoria 1964 and 1965.
33. Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior del
desarrollo industrial español a través del IEME (1950-1982), Estudios de
Historia Economica No. 69 (Madrid: Banco de España, 2015), http://www.
bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/
EstudiosHistoriaEconomica/Fic/roja69.pdf
Iberduero was founded in 1944 joining two pre-existing companies.

It became the first producer of electricity in Spain, with nearly 20% of
the total. It owned a network of over one hundred hydroelectric plants
and operated a dozen thermal plants, with a dominant market position
in northern Spain. Josean Garrues, “Las estrategias productivas, finan-
cieras e institucionales de Iberduero” (Madrid: Iberdrola, 2006),
497–573.
34. Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior
del desarrollo industrial español.
35. ABE, IEME, Operaciones financieras, Box 1885.
36. ABE, IEME, Control de Datos, Box 1973. Carta de 26/6/67. Chavarri
had been Head of the Office for American Help in the Ministry of
Commerce in Madrid (ABC, 3/1/58).
37. ABE, IEME, Control de Datos, Box 1973. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas
(2015a).
38. See Chap. 2 in this volume.
39. Francisco Pascual, “Panorámica de La Energía Nuclear,” Energía Nuclear
62 (1969): 488.
40. Plan Electrico Nacional, Orden del Ministerio de Industria de 31 de
Julio de 1969, BOE 30/8/1969.
41. Ibid.
42. Pascual, “Panorámica de La Energía Nuclear.” Fig. 4, p. 494.
43. ASEPI: Sevillana de Electricidad, Acta del Consejo de Administración,
18/12/1968. Box 4511, SEPI Archive.
44. ASEPI: Sevillana de Electricidad, Comite de Gerencia, 8/7/1970,
Resumen enviado por el Consejero Gaztelu al INI. Box 4721, SEPI
Archive.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. It also happened in the case Iberduero’s project: originally Lemóniz had
been pre-authorized in 1969 for a single reactor of 500 MWe later
expanded in 1971 to two units of 900 MWe.
48. ASEPI: Sevillana de Electricidad, Comite de Gerencia, 8/7/1970,
Resumen enviado por el Consejero Gaztelu al INI. Box 4721, SEPI
Archive.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. The summary of the trip of the CEOs of the Spanish utilities to the US
in 1970s that we provide here comes from the report of the tour pro-
vided by the president of Sevillana to his Board. ASEPI: Sevillana de
Electricidad, Acta del Consejo de Administración, 21/12/1970, Box
4900, SEPI Archive.
53. See the discussion on the “compulsory national participation” in Chap.
2 in this volume.
54. The literal sentence in Spanish is: “Es de esperar, sin embargo, que el
Ministerio de Industria, llegado el momento, adopte las medidas nece-
sarias para evitar estos posibles perjuicios,” ASEPI: Sevillana de
Electricidad, Acta del Consejo de Administración, 21/12/1970, Box
4900, SEPI Archive.
55. BOE.
56. Eight years after the promulgation of the first nuclear law, in 1972, a
new Decree on Nuclear and Radioactive Regulations was promulgated.
For nuclear power plants the decree introduced a three-step process: sit-
ing, construction and operation. Each phase required authorization to
be granted by the Ministry of Industry and Energy after the safety evalu-
ation performed by the JEN. The 1964 law introduced the siting autho-
rization, usually referred to as “pre-authorization” (autorización previa).
Not Be Determined,” 44–5.
58. See Chaps. 2 and 3 in this volume.
59. Iberduero applied for the two units in Punta Endata (Deba), two in
Ea-Ispaster (Orguella), one more in Tudela–Vergara the 27th of
September of 1973. See Appendix B.
60. The state had some minority shares in some of the private utilities (e.g.
Sevillana, Unión Electrica). The public ownership of nuclear power
plants was restricted to the participation of smaller public companies in
Vandellós I (see Chap. 6 in this volume).
61. The projects that obtained pre-authorization, financing and contracts with
reactors manufacturers but were discarded before the moratorium deserve
a research project on their own, far beyond the scope of this chapter. It is
unclear when, how, and why those projects were abandoned or cancelled.
62. Joseba De la Torre and María del Mar Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for
a Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement in the Spanish Atomic
Program, 1950–1985,” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016):
385–411, doi:0022009415599448.
63. Rubio-Varas and De la Torre, “‘Spain—Eximbank’s Billion Dollar

Client’: The Role of the US Financing the Spanish Nuclear Program”.
64. There was no tender process for Vandellós I; see Chap. 6 in this volume.
It was the same with the British “surrounded by great commercial secrecy
in order to keep the Americans out” (UK Report 17/10/1968). Instead
Otero “stressed that if there were ever any question of buying a nuclear
reactor on a turnkey basis the order would go to the US, but Spain was
very interested in a ‘marriage’ between its nuclear industry and that of an
European partner”. Telegram (25/10/1968). FCO 52299.
65. Indirect collaboration of Eximbank with private banks was formalized
with the birth of PEFCO (Private Funding Corporation) in 1970. Major
US banks also participated in the nuclear loans to Spain such as the
Chase Manhattan Bank and the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
of New York. See Rubio-Varas and De la Torre “Spain—Eximbank’s
Billon Dollar Client.”
66. EXIM: J.C Cruse, Memorandum Spanish Nuclear program Box H 116,
Folder 524. Ex-Im Bank Archives.
67. Rubio-Varas and De la Torre “Spain—Eximbank’s Billon Dollar Client.”
68. NARA: 9 September 1975. Telegrams between Embassy in Madrid and
Secretary of State in Washington. Document numbers Madrid 06260
091426z. NARA Archive.
69. NARA: 3 December 1975 Telegram from the US Consul in Bilbao to
US State Department in Washington Document Number:
1975BILBAO00254. NARA Archive.
70. NARA: 25 Sept 1975: Telegram from the Secretary of State, Washington,
to US Embassy in Madrid. Document number: 1975STATE229036.
NARA Archive.
71. All the information of the Eximbank visit to Spain in 1976 comes from
NARA: 22 May 1976, Telegram from the Secretary of State, Washington,
to US Embassy in Madrid Document Number: 1976STATE125706.
NARA Archive.
72. NARA:17 Sept 1976: Telegram from the US Embassy in Madrid to the
Secretary of State, Washington Subject: French interest in Nuclear Power
Reactor sales to Spain ref: MADRID 7101; 29 September 1976:
Telegram from the US Embassy in Madrid to the Secretary of State,
Washington.
73. Nonetheless, the report also observed that “US companies seeking busi-
ness in Spain argue strongly that the US position on proliferation and
the policies enacted to sustain that position have eroded the market posi-
tion of the US and will affect future US business opportunities. It may
be some time, however, before that hypothesis can be fully tested. Spain
is unlikely to award any new plant orders in the near future”. Comptroller
General’s Report to the Congress, “U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Policy: Impact on Exports and Nuclear Industry Could Not Be
Determined.”
74. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior del desarrollo indus-
trial español, 95.
75. EXIM: George Holliday, Eximbank’s Involvement in Nuclear Exports.
Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, GPO, March 2, 1981), 20. Box L1, Folder 277.Ex-Im Bank
Archives.
76. Martin Gallego also formed part of the research team of Kindelan in the
within the INI. See Chap. 2 in this volume.
77. Most of this section derives from M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas et al., “Spain
Short Country Report,” in Validated Short Country Report. Consortium
Deliverable 3.6, ed. HoNESt Consortium, 2017, 952–1025.
78. Gallego Málaga et al. (2010).
79. “Muchos piden un plebiscito popular,” El País, 27-04-1979.
80. In prime time, with only one TV channel, there was a debate in June
1979 about “nuclear danger” in which participated mostly actors, with
the notable absence of the nuclear industry and the electricity compa-
nies. RTVE, 21 June 1979; available at: http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/vid-
eos/la-clave/clave-peligro-nuclear/3605246/
81. Individual credit data can be found in appendix I in De la Torre and
Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior a través del IEME.
Not Be Determined,” 34.
83. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, La financiación exterior del desarrollo indus-
trial español a través del IEME, chap. 4.
84. Rubio-Varas and De la Torre, “Spain—Eximbank’s Billon Dollar Client.”
85. Interviews with Mestre Martin Gallego, and a government employee
who was directly involved with the calculations who prefers to remain
anonymous. From Rubio-Varas et al., Spain Short Country Report.
86. Ministry of Industry and Energy of October 14, 1983. The New Energy
Plan passed in 1984, and so were the provisions establishing how the
costs of the moratorium would translate on to electricity tariffs. It would
take four more years to define the recognized costs of the moratorium
(see BOE-A-1988-4778).
87. This formed the essence of the strategy by the Ministry of Power and
Industry; see Cortes Generales: Congreso de los Diputados no. 12, ‘Acta
de la Comisión de Industria, Obras Públicas y Servicios’ 22/02/1983,
available at: http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/
Congreso/Publicaciones/
88. The Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE) and the
Confederation of the Metal sector also expressed their fears for the
nuclear manufacturing network. El País (October 15, 1983; November
6, 1983; December 6, 1983; December 17, 1983). See: an appraisal of
the power company situation, in Emilio Ontiveros and Francisco José
Valero, “El Programa Financiero Del Sector Electrico,” Economía
Industrial 243 (1985): 45–52; an overview of the nuclear sector in Foro
Nuclear, La Industria Nuclear Española (Madrid, 2011).
89. Rubio-Varas, et al., Spain Short Country Report.
90. The power companies’ view was expressed at the Unión Eléctrica-Fenosa
General Assembly, held in May 1984. From Economía Industrial, 1984,
no. 237.
91. ENDESA became eventually privatized in 1998. Gallego Málaga, “Mas
cambios en el sector eléctrico,” El País 18/10/2000; Joan Majo, “¿Fue un
error privatizar Argentaria y Endesa?” El País 17/3/2010.
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (mar.rubio@unavarra.es) is an energy economist and

economic historian. She holds a PhD from the London School of Economics
(United Kingdom), a Master’s from the same institution and is a graduate in
economics from the University Carlos III of Madrid. Her academic training was
completed during a year of stay (Fulbright funding) in the Department of
Economics at the University of California at Berkeley (California, US). Her
research interests focus on the long-term relationships between energy and eco-
nomic growth. Recently her research effort focused on the economic and finan-
cial history of the Spanish Nuclear Program. She is the PI of a national research
project on the matter and she is the person in charge of the Scientific Secretariat
of the European consortium that investigates the “History of Nuclear Energy
and Society” (HoNESt). Her more recent publications include articles in Journal
of Contemporary History, Energy Journal, Energy Policy, Economic History Review
and Business History Review.

holds a PhD in History from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His main
research field is the Spanish economic policy from Franco’s dictatorship to the
democracy, and in particular the industrial policy and the indicative planning of
developmentalism (1940–1980s). He has been Visiting Scholar at La Maison
des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris and at the Center for European and
Energy and Society” (HoNESt), an EU Horizon 2020/Euratom-funded Project.
6
An Alternative Route? France’s Position
in the Spanish Nuclear Program, c.
1950s–1980s
Esther M. Sánchez-Sánchez
“Concevoir un réacteur, c’est bien; le vendre, c’est mieux”

Rémy Carle, engineer and senior official of EDF
and CEA, and CEO of Technicatome, 1974*
The emerging Spanish industry was profoundly disrupted after the Civil War
(1936–39) and the autarkic policy implemented by Franco’s dictatorship in
Research for this paper was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
(projects ref. HAR2015-64769-P and HAR2014-53825-R) and the Spanish Ministry of Defence
(project ref. 2014-09). We would like to thank the research assistantship and facilities provided by
the staff of the following archives: Archives du Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères, Archives
d’Électricité de France, Service d’Archives du Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique, Archives
Nationales de France-Centre des Archives Contemporaines, Archivo Histórico de la Sociedad
Estatal de Participaciones Industriales and Arxiu Municipal de Vandellòs i l’Hospitalet de l’Infant.
Thanks go also to the participants in meetings sponsored by the HAR2014-53825-R project for
their useful feedback and advice. Of course, all remaining errors or deficiencies are solely ours.
The opening quote from Mr. Carle is extracted from his intervention at the French-Spanish
*
Conference on Nuclear Energy held in Madrid on 19-20 November 1974, Archives historiques
d’Eléctricité de France (henceforth AEDF), box B0000469386.
E.M. Sánchez-Sánchez (*)

Dpto. Economía e Historia Económica, Universidad de Salamanca,
Salamanca, Spain

156 E.M. Sánchez-Sánchez
the 1940s, which kept Spain apart from the prosperity of the Western
world for about two decades. However, the great lack of resources and
technological backwardness inevitably led the Spanish decision-makers
to seek recourse to foreign capital and skills, even, paradoxically, during
the hardest years of economic nationalism. From the early 1950s onwards,
while the autarky gave way to a more flexible policy of import substitu-
tion, the United States became Spain’s main commercial, financial and
technological partner. However, France was able to compete with the
world leader in some key sectors of the Spanish economy, such as the
nuclear industry, that mobilized enormous human, financial, scientific,
technical, business and diplomatic means.
It was not easy to achieve collaboration. Quite the opposite, at the end
of the Word War II France had led the international condemnation of
Franco’s regime, pressuring other Western countries into breaking rela-
tions and excluding Spain from the UN, the Marshall Plan and the
Bretton Woods institutions. Furthermore, the French government had
unilaterally decreed the closure of the Pyrenean border from 1946 to
1948, obtaining unexpectedly no more than a significant loss of trading
and financial positions in the Spanish market to the benefit of Great
Britain and the United States.1
The rejection towards the Spanish dictatorship decreased as the Cold
War tensions increased. France, like the rest of Western powers, ended up
placing realism before ideology,2 that is, banishing any politico-ideological
objection towards Franco’s regime and focusing on the Spanish geograph-
ical situation, anticommunism, historical relationships and economic
potential for growth. So from 1948 France restored economic relations
with Spain, starting with an annual trade agreement and negotiations in
the financial, cultural and military fields. Bilateral relations received a
strong boost at the end of the 1950s. This resulted directly from General
De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic’s arrival in France and the application
in Spain of a more liberal economic policy, which would share many
traits with French indicative planning.3 Since then, French–Spanish eco-
nomic links progressed rapidly and intensely, as demonstrated by grow-
ing commercial exchanges, investment operations, technology transfers,
remittances from Spanish migrants working in France and currency from
French tourists visiting Spain. As a result, French goods, capital and
An Alternative Route? France’s Position in the Spanish Nuclear... 157
expertise greatly participated in the Spanish economic miracle of the

1960s, in an often fierce fight against other foreign competitors, mainly,
in this order, the United States, West Germany and Great Britain.4
During the years of Spanish transition to democracy, after Franco’s
death in 1975, political relations between France and Spain weakened,
due to the feeble French support for both the entry of Spain in the
European Economic Community (EEC) and the extradition of Basque
ETA terrorists taking refuge in France. Moreover, the Spanish economy’s
growth cycle had almost run its course, giving way to a period of reces-
sion marked by industrial decline, bank failures and increasing inflation.
Despite all, French–Spanish economic relations continued in progress,
being concentrated in the north-to-south exports of capital goods and
investments in automobile, large retail, engineering, arms and nuclear
sectors.5
Academic literature about French nuclear history has hardly dealt with
the Spanish case. The international relations of the French government
agencies and private or state-owned companies related to nuclear matters
have focused on the major world leaders (United States, Great Britain
and West Germany), the countries of the former French colonial empire
(like Algeria or Niger) and current emerging markets (such as China).6 In
Spain, the transnational approach, undertaken mainly by technology his-
torians, has targeted Germany, Italy and the United States.7 Some prog-
ress has been made, nonetheless, in better understanding the construction
process of the French–Spanish Vandellós 1 nuclear power plant (NP),
located in Spain.8
This chapter analyzes France’s contribution to the development of the
nuclear industry in Spain from the 1950s to the 1980s, based on unpub-
lished sources from public archives in France and, to a lesser extent, in
Spain, along with published records and bibliography. The text is struc-
tured in three sections: the first presents a review of the nuclear sector in
France from its origins up to the present; the second addresses France’s
main nuclear operation in Spain: the construction of the Vandellós NP;
and the third analyzes subsequent efforts made by the French govern-
ment and companies to intensify nuclear cooperation with Spain,
attempting to seize projects and market niches from the United States
and West Germany. Some conclusions will close the chapter.
F rance Goes (and Remains) Nuclear: State

and Businesses in the French Nuclear Program
The French nuclear program, strongly linked to the State, combined
from its beginnings both civil and military dimensions. Producing elec-
tricity from nuclear sources and obtaining the atomic bomb were atop
the list of aspirations for governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics,
regardless of their political stripes. In 1945, as France was still recovering
from World War II, General De Gaulle’s provisional government created
a State agency for nuclear energy, the Atomic Energy Commission
(Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, CEA) with the mission of “pro-
moting and coordinating nuclear research in all areas of science, industry
and national defense”.9 A few years later, the first experimental reactor,
named Zoé, began operations alongside reactors of the Marcoule com-
plex (G1, G2 and G3), which were dedicated to generate military-grade
plutonium. In 1960, with De Gaulle once again at the helm of the execu-
tive, France entered the select club of countries possessing the atomic
weapon, together with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union.
Meanwhile, the first plants intended for the civil production of elec-
tricity from nuclear power were connected to the grid: Chinon 1 (1963),
Chinon 2 (1965), Chinon 3 (1966), Chooz (1967), Saint Laurent des
Eaux 1 (1969) and Saint Laurent des Eaux 2 (1971). They were owned
and managed by the large public company Électricité de France (EDF),
which since its nationalization in 1946 had formed a monopoly over the
generation, transport and sale of electricity in France. Private initiative
was not entirely sidelined in the process. In fact, to successfully carry out
the massive nuclear mission, EDF and the CEA promoted the creation of
big industrial groups such as Indatom (1955), the Groupement Atomique
Alsacienne-Atlantique (GAAA, 1959) and the Société d’Études et
d’Entreprises Nucléaires (SEEN, 1965), which were composed of numer-
ous public and private champions nationaux, including prominent exam-
ples such as Péchiney, Air Liquide, Saint Gobain Nucléaire, Babcock &
Wilcox, Fives-Lille-Cail, Stein & Roubaix, Alsthom, Thomson-Houston,
Compagnie Générale de Télégraphie sans Fil and Compagnie Générale
d’Électricité.
For nearly two decades, French technology was able to dominate the
internal market for nuclear reactors. Unlike the methods of Westinghouse
(Pressurized Water Reactor-PWR) and General Electric (Boiling Water
reactor-BWR), which were based on the use of enriched uranium and
light water, the French process employed natural uranium as fuel, graph-
ite as a moderator and carbon gas as a refrigerant (UNGG technology).10
UNGG technology had the support of the CEA and the executive under
De Gaulle. Both clung to the national independence provided by the
natural uranium available in mainland France and its overseas
departments.11 Indeed, uranium enrichment remained under the duo-
poly of the United States and the Soviet Union, which exported the final
product to their respective allies at high prices, for strictly civil purposes
and under close monitoring. The desire to follow a uniquely French path
and not identify with any of the blocks was the main premise of Cold
War foreign policy in France, with the double goal of increasing the
country’s international stature and gaining clients in the Third World. De
Gaulle and the CEA also defended the capacity of UNGG reactors to
irradiate large quantities of plutonium (P239), an essential raw material, in
the absence of enriched uranium (U235), to sustain the French nuclear
armament and a new type of reactor that was under research by the
CEA—fast reactors or breeders.12 The American technology, for its part,
had the support of EDF and other large French companies such as
Schneider or Alsthom, which prioritized the lower operating costs of NPs
using enriched uranium over the national independence and the policy of
“Grandeur” exalted by the Gaullists.13 At the end of the 1960s, a succes-
sion of events resolved the technological controversy. The first was the
launch of a public tender process in 1967 for a new UNGG plant, the
Fessenheim NP. EDF, major construction companies, and even some
prominent members of the CEA, such as Jules Horowitz, exited the pro-
cess, citing its expected unprofitability and high opportunity costs. Also
in 1967, the French Pierrelatte isotope separation factory produced its
first ingot of enriched uranium for military use, breaking the two super-
powers’ exclusivity. The following year, France successfully tested the
hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb, which barely used plutonium. Finally,
in 1969, Georges Pompidou replaced De Gaulle at the helm of the Fifth
Republic, causing greater rapprochement with the United States and
NATO, even on sensitive nuclear issues.14 As a result of all of this, the

French government officially recognized that its national technology had
become a cul-de-sac, a “wonderful but costly technology […] which must
now be abandoned to clear the way for more profitable pathways”.15
In anticipation of this abandonment, the company Franco-Américaine
de Constructions Atomiques (Framatome), under the Schneider group,
had purchased PWR licenses from the US firm Westinghouse, which had
in turn acquired a minority percentage of shares in Framatome. At the
hands of Framatome, PWR technology had won the race against UNGG
technology for the French-Belgian reactors at Chooz and Tihange. Finally,
Fessenheim would also acquire the reactor patented by Westinghouse.
The trend was unstoppable. In 1975, the French government granted
Framatome a monopoly on the construction of NPs in France or by
France, with the condition that its shares would go progressively to the
CEA to the disadvantage of Westinghouse. The PWR procedure, which
was the most widely used around the world (for lower costs and superior
reliability), ended up equipping also the entire French nuclear park
(“frenchified” with own technological upgrades and renamed REP—
Réacteur à Eau Pressurisée).16 In return for yielding to Framatome the
nuclear equipment (l’îlot nucléaire), the CGE-Alsthom group, licensee of
General Electric’s BWR technology, got the supply of the conventional
equipment (l’îlot classique) to all French NPs to be constructed in France
and abroad. Each part would be in charge of recruiting their respective
subcontractors, which tended to adopt a ‘cascade’ organization. Therefore,
after reaching ten UNGG reactors (one of them in Spain),17 France
definitively renounced its filière nationale, recognizing the greater eco-
nomic (though not technological) competitiveness of its rival American
technologies.
The cessation of UNGG technology did not deter French efforts on
nuclear matters. Much to the contrary, the oil crisis revived the will for
energy independence and justified the need to grant nuclear energy an
increasingly important role in the French energy portfolio (Messmer Plan
of 1974). This led to a spectacular growth in NPs (from 12 to 25 reactors,
from 8000 MWe to 30,000 MWe of installed capacity) and the prolifera-
tion of other infrastructures linked to the nuclear cycle (from uranium
extraction facilities to high radioactive waste treatment centers).18
The fast-breeders in particular absorbed a large amount of funds and

resources. They were considered as the wonder-source of energy for the
future, given that they functioned by burning plutonium and generating
more plutonium than what was burnt, thus multiplying available energy
and guaranteeing fuel self-sufficiency. To a large extent, the fast-breeder
pathway was conceived as the new French filière after UNGG’s with-
drawal. The experimental fast-breeder reactor known as Rapsodie (40
MWe) reached criticality in 1967. It was followed by Phénix (233 MWe)
and Superphénix (1200 MWe), which became operational in 1973 and
1985, respectively. Superphénix was closed only a dozen years later, due
to some technical failures and, above all, its vast and growing operating
costs in comparison to PWR plants: “in brief, Superphénix was too bur-
densome, too soon, too big and too fast […] Fast-breeder electricity was
a bad business”.19 The last NP connected to the grid in France was Civaux
2 in 1999. The increase in power demand had been overestimated and
the construction of new reactors reached an impasse or “hiver nucléaire”.20
Since then, EDF has been holding its activities of electricity generation
and distribution; the CEA has focused on research and innovation; and
companies related to the atom have ensured the operation and mainte-
nance of the nuclear arsenal, as well as progress in security improvements
and dismantling processes. They all work together when performing proj-
ects abroad, mainly in emerging economies such us China.
France currently ranks first worldwide in nuclear energy production by
population density, and second, behind the United States, by number of
NPs. Nuclear industry, the third largest domestic industry after automo-
tive and aeronautics, provides some 400,000 direct jobs, mostly high-
skilled, and accounts for 2% of GDP.21 Throughout its entire history, the
French nuclear sector has maintained strong links to the State, through
ministries, research bodies, state or para-state companies, and a powerful
corps of government officials (the nucleocrats).22 French antinuclear
movement has always been multiform, minoritarian and vague in the
whole anti-capitalist movement. Protests by anti-nuclear groups have
been limited to the local level and scarcely echoed in the National
Assembly, even after the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fuskushima
accidents. The only exception was the closure of the Superphénix reactor
in 1998, a milestone that Les Verts Ecologist Party achieved during its
membership of the Plural Left coalition that governed France from 1997
to 2002.23 Hence, French public opinion has generally approved of the
nuclear program, whether implicitly or explicitly, considering it a symbol
of national independence, technological modernity, and energy stability
and savings.24 The explanation lies, in large part, in the vast and aggres-
sive public information campaigns organized since its origins by EDF
and the CEA, which managed to create a favorable climate towards the
nuclear (civil) option. To these should be added the big financial
compensations granted to municipalities that host NPs, as well as the ris-
ing attention (and funding) devoted to safety and environmental issues.25
he Largest Ever French Nuclear Operation

T
in Spain: The Vandellós 1 Plant
The Vandellós 1 NP, located on the coast of Tarragona in the Catalonia
region of Northeastern Spain (one of the most developed of the country),
was the last instance of UNGG technology and the first and only time it
was exported. Fully installed in 1972, it was Spain’s third NP after Zorita
(1969) and Santa María de Garoña (1971). The plant’s ownership and
production were distributed equally among EDF and three Spanish
firms: Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña S.A. (FECSA, private), Hidroeléctrica
de Cataluña S.A. (HECSA, private) and Empresa Nacional Hidroeléctrica
del Ribagorzana (ENHER, public).26
Contacts between EDF and Spanish electricity producers had been
forged in the 1950s due to a series of agreements regarding the bilateral
exchange of (hydro)electric energy.27 These accords, which would sooner
or later involve all of the major Spanish electric companies, made it pos-
sible to solve seasonal production deficits in French and Spanish hydro-
logical offer.28 They functioned well and were renewed repeatedly. EDF
overcame the challenges presented by the multiplicity, dispersion and
autonomy of its interlocutors, which were distributed among numerous
public and private societies. Not even UNESA, the electricity industry
lobby created in 1944, acted as a single interlocutor, given the frequent
differences in criteria among its members. The foundation in 1985 of

Red Eléctrica de España, a company dedicated exclusively to transporta-
tion and operation for the Spanish electrical system, was hence quite wel-
come. Furthermore, France added to its energy exports some loans to
purchase equipment from French companies, which helped large firms
like Alsthom or Neyrpic to access and/or consolidate positions in the
Iberian market.
Also in the 1950s, the CEA and its Spanish equivalent, the Nuclear
Energy Board (Junta de Energía Nuclear, JEN) maintained a constant
exchange of information, materials and experts. By virtue of the bilateral
accord of 1956 (signed just one year after the Spain-United States agree-
ment within the “Atoms for Peace” campaign), several dozen Spaniards
carried out visits, stays and training and specialization courses at the
French research centers at Saclay, Orsay and Cadarache and plants at
Marcoule, Chinon and Saint Laurent des Eaux.29 The main promoters of
these programs were José María Otero Navascués (JEN’s Director),
Claude Colin (Science and Technology attaché at the French Embassy in
Spain) and Antoine Pinay (founder and President of the Comité franco-
espagnol d’Échanges Techniques).30 Ministers, diplomats and military
officials did the rest, particularly the Spanish Ambassador to France José
María de Areilza, the Spanish Industry Minister Gregorio López Bravo,
and the French Ministers of Scientific Research and Atomic and Space
Issues Gaston Palewski and Alain Peyrefitte. Otero had the idea of build-
ing a NP in Spain using French technology. Areilza took charge of send-
ing the project to French officials. And López Bravo, Palewski and
Peyrefitte negotiated its putting into operation at the bilateral and domes-
tic fronts.31
The decision to build the Vandellós reactor was announced on 2
October 1964 in a joint communiqué that was widely reported on by
major media outlets on both sides of the Pyrenees. In the following
months, various events were held to strengthen contacts and sell the
intergovernmental project to businesses: the first Spanish-French Nuclear
Conference (Madrid, 14 to 24 October); the first French Technological
Exposition in Spain (Madrid, 13 to 25 October); and a Financial Protocol
(25 November) through which France granted 750 million Francs in
credit to Spain primarily for the acquisition of nuclear equipment.32
López Bravo intervened directly so that the private Catalan firms FECSA
and HECSA could participate in the Vandellós project, with a subsidiary
role for the public company ENHER.33 In January 1965, a bilateral
working group was formed, comprising representatives of EDF and the
CEA on the French side and FECSA, HECSA, ENHER and the JEN on
the Spanish side. The group oversaw studies of the location, financing,
fuel cycle, and legal and administrative procedures related to the project.
It was given specific instructions from the Spanish Ministry of Industry
to: (a) examine whether the French plant could compete with American
plants, and (b) ensure a high level of participation for Spanish industry.34
An examination of costs was carried out based on a comparative study of
gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors and light-water reactors, taking
as models the future project of Vandellós and the project underway at
Santa María de Garoña. This study revealed that for equal power, the
costs of installation and generation using the French technology would
be noticeably higher than for the American technology—at least 20%
higher. It could only be made equivalent by increasing the power and
obtaining exceptional financing conditions, better than those offered by
the US Export–Import Bank (Exim Bank) with regard to loans value,
interest rates and repayment terms. French authorities did not hesitate:
We must accept these conditions swiftly and without question, given the
political and economic importance of this operation […]. It is important
to act quickly, as our Spanish interlocutors may be under pressure by more
tempting American offers.35
The company Hispano-Francesa de Energía Nuclear S.A. (HIFRENSA),

founded in Barcelona in 1966, was charged with directing the construc-
tion of the Vandellós NP. To “avoid sensitivities and give the glory of the
operation to the Spaniards”,36 the French granted its presidency to the
Catalan businessman and HECSA’s CEO Pere Duran Farell, with EDF’s
Deputy Director General Pierre Ailleret serving as vice president. Shortly
after its creation, HIFRENSA opened public bidding for the “turnkey
project”37 to build the plant. It went to the only participant, a group of
25 French construction, engineering and capital goods companies38 gath-
ered at the Société pour l’Industrie Atomique (SOCIA), which was given
the role of industrial architect. The French companies, convinced of the

limited commercial life of UNGG reactors, declined to participate along-
side the State in financing Vandellós. However, they did not pass up the
opportunity to sell their goods and services on the neighboring country
in the hopes of acquiring high short- and long-term profits. On the
Spanish side, the greatest hesitance was expressed by FECSA, “which
does not believe in the viability and commercial use of UNGG technol-
ogy […,] prefers the American reactors and is in HIFRENSA because it
is required to be by López Bravo”.39 Apart from the French companies,
SOCIA subcontracted more than 50 Spanish firms, particularly for the
civil engineering work, the supply of electrical and mechanical equip-
ment, and the manufacturing of the reactor vessel. The Spanish firms that
received the main contracts were large construction companies such as
Entrecanales y Távora, La Maquinista, Constructora Pirenaica, Entrepose,
Degrémont and Schwartz-Hautmont, most of them subsidiaries or at
least technological partners of French multinationals. Additionally, sev-
eral dozen small and medium-sized local businesses worked on the site.
Some were spawned by the nuclear industry, while others adapted to it by
diversifying and modernizing their production.40 As a whole, participa-
tion by Spanish industry reached 42%.41 Given the “in-progress” state of
French technology, both the French and Spanish enterprises conceived of
Vandellós as a valuable exercise in entraînement or learning-by-doing:
“experience is the best teacher […] we are all going to learn, to train and
be able to train others”.42
The French government’s official announcement that it would abandon
UNGG technology did not affect the Vandellós NP, in large part because
its construction was too far advanced to turn back: “The Vandellós project
has long passed the point of no return […] Certainly, the Spaniards would
not have accepted the project if they had known that Vandellós could be
the last unit of its kind”.43 The construction works were extended over five
years.44 Minor problems such as the insufficient quality of some Spanish-
made parts or delays due to tariff exemptions procedures were easily
solved, as was the claim by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA)
regarding the presumed use in Vandellós of CEA-UKAEA joint owner-
ship patents. The plant was connected to the grid in May 1972 and func-
tioned for just 17 years of the 40 years that were initially projected. A fire
in the turbines area in 198945 led to its closure in 1990 and the beginning
of dismantlement in 1991. The huge requirements in terms of safety made
the nuclear facility uneconomic to repair. Its 323 permanent workers
could opt to go to other NPs, join the National Radioactive Waste
Company ENRESA, or take early retirement on favorable terms.46
As all the studies had projected, the cost of the French NP was to be
clearly higher than that of its American predecessors, besides that its total
final cost exceeded the original estimate by 16.7%: Vandellós 1 absorbed
751 million Francs (US$ 146.7 million) versus $49.3 million for Zorita
(153 MWe with a PWR reactor) and $78.9 million for Santa María de
Garoña (300 MWe, BWP reactor).47 Why, then, did the project succeed?
A combination of reasons went into this decision. First, the government
of Charles De Gaulle, a fierce defender of UNGG technology, needed
access to foreign markets to demonstrate its maturity and start industrial
production. Spain was considered as an excellent destination, given its
geographic and cultural proximity, its significant industrial needs and its
close and historic ties to France: “if we do not secure anything in this
country, which is so close, so interconnected with France and desirous of
using its own natural uranium, any other export operation for a French-
style plant will be extremely difficult”.48 French authorities also believed
that the Spanish choice would facilitate the French nuclear exports to
countries that were geographically and/or culturally similar to Spain
(such as Portugal or Latin American nations), or to countries seeking to
“escape the power exercised by the United States through the supply of
enriched uranium”.49 As a result, France carried out an intense campaign
to sell the advantages of the UNGG option to Spain, advantages that,
after arduous negotiations, the Spanish evaluated positively, giving the
green light to the project. These advantages were as follows:
1. The use of Spanish natural uranium. The JEN and the CEA alleged that
Spain’s reserves of natural uranium—then estimated at 11,000 tons (or
3% of the global supply)—guaranteed the domestic supply of fuel, thus
reducing dependence on the United States for provisions of enriched
uranium and promoting local uranium companies. Even in the unlikely
case that the United States would agree to enrich Spanish uranium,
Spain would still have to pay large sums of money for the enrichment
process, from which French technology was exempt. Thus, even if at

any time natural uranium was significantly more expensive than
enriched uranium from abroad, it would still have to be privileged.50
2. Favorable financing conditions. The French Treasury committed to cov-
ering the total cost of the installation of the NP, estimated at 455 mil-
lion Francs, or 20% of the 2.5 billion Francs budgeted under the Fifth
indicative Plan (1966–70) for the exportation of capital goods.51 Spain
would pay the supplementary expenses, indirect expenses and price
hikes, equivalent to some 170 million Francs to be distributed between
public and private funding sources. French financing was structured in
three parts: 350 million Francs, amortizable in 15 years at 3% interest
rate for purchasing materials, equipment and services in France; the
equivalent in Pesetas of 60 million Francs at 5.5% interest rate over
15 years for the assembly in situ of the plant; and 45 million Francs
(later raised to 84 million)52 at a 4% interest rate over 10 years to deal
with the first fuel load, following treatment in France of the Spanish
mineral. The French Treasury transferred the money to the Spanish
Instituto de Crédito a Medio y Largo Plazo, under the Ministry of
Finance, and entrusted its management to two public entities: The
Crédit National, a representative of the French Treasury, and the Banco
de Crédito Industrial, belonging to the Instituto de Crédito a Medio y
Largo Plazo. All principal and interest payments would begin six
months after the plant entered into service.53 In this way, the French
government was able to compete with the advantages accorded by Exim
Bank for the financing of Zorita and Garoña.54 “Messieurs les atom-
istes, vous avez gagné”, declared the then Prime Minister Pompidou at
the Inter-Ministerial Committee meeting on 25 February 1966 to
approve public funding for Vandellós. The Spanish part was covered
with capital shares and obligations by FECSA, HECSA and ENHER,
an international banking credit led by the US firm Smith & Barney,
and smaller loans from Bankinter and Banco Urquijo (Table 6.1).
3 . Offers of industrial and political compensation. France guaranteed a
high percentage of participation for Spanish industry in the plant con-
struction, 5–10% higher than in American NPs. Some Spanish com-
panies could even participate in operations with a high technological
content, which would be viable because Vandellós 1 was going to be
Table 6.1 French and Spanish financing for Vandellós 1 nuclear plant
Amount
(million Interest Repayment
Start date Creditor FF) Use rate term
27/07/1967 French 350 Equipment & 3% 15
Treasury services
purchases
27/07/1967 French 60 On-site assembly 5.5% 15
Treasury
27/07/1967 French 45 First core fuel 4% 10
Treasury
Total France 455
– Spanish 170 Diverse (civil – –
(public & work, technical
private) assistance,
funding personnel
training,
housing, visits.
etc.)
Estim. Total 625
Cost
Real Total 751
Cost
Source: AEDF
nearly an exact replica of the Saint Laurent des Eaux 1 NP, which was
under construction on the shores of the Loire River. In any case, EDF,
the CEA and the construction firms would regularly send technicians
for on-site supervision of the assembly and functioning of the equip-
ment, and for quality control checks for all the parts manufactured in
Spain. In the political realm, France committed to backing Spain’s
entry into the EEC, which the Franco government had been aspiring
to join since 1962. The French nuclear option would mean strength-
ening ties with the industrialized nations of Western Europe, or at
least with France, one of the most prominent ones, and hence would
undoubtedly facilitate the path towards European integration.55
4 . Additional risks assumed by EDF and the CEA. The unit capacity of
Vandellós rose to 480 MWe to compensate for investment costs and
resist comparisons to American NPs. This oversizing foresaw a major
energy surplus during its first years of operation. EDF committed, for
a maximum of nine years, to buying all the excess energy that could
not be absorbed by the Spanish market, and also to cover any possible
deficits or interruptions in supply at Vandellós with energy from
France. The provision of energy in both directions was carried out
through the Rubí–La Gaudière interconnection line (380 KV), built
under previous agreements.56 For its part, the CEA, recognizing that
the risks assumed by the builders “would far exceed those commonly
accepted by French industries”, signed various insurance policies with
the support of the French government to cover possible technical
issues and price variations.57
5 . The civil and military possibilities of plutonium. The UNGG reactors
produced a much larger volume of plutonium than light-water reac-
tors and were also outside of the aegis of the United States and the
IAEA. France and Spain agreed that the waste from the Vandellós
reactor (some 400 kg per year) would be sent to France (Marcoule and
La Hague sites) for reprocessing and recovering plutonium. The CEA
would be in charge of removing and transporting the waste in exchange
for part of the plutonium, and the rest would be sent to Spain. Spanish
authorities could use their share of the plutonium freely as long as
they did not offer it to third countries and allowed a certain amount
of supervision by the CEA.58 None of the contracts for Vandellós
included any commitment to the (peaceful or military) use of pluto-
nium, which France promoted as among the advantages of the UNGG
reactor. In addition, the CEA intentionally exercised little control in
an effort to avoid sensitivities and possible requests for reciprocal
inspection.59 As in France, both economic and political-military
objectives had motivated Spain’s prompt nuclear adventure.60
Afterwards, Spanish military leaders repeatedly admitted that Spain
had the technological capability to manufacture bombs and did not
want to renounce it in advance in order to leave the possibility open
to having someday its own nuclear arsenal.61 Certainly, manufacturing
bombs with plutonium recovered from Vandellós 1, either directly of
following reprocessing abroad, seemed to be one of its best options.62
Due to this intention, Spain avoided signing the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty of 1968 despite repeated pressure from the United
States.63
The Vandellós 1 NP was an important source of employment and

income for the municipality of Vandellós i Hospitalet de l’Infant, which
saw annual population growth of 3.7% between 1967 and 1975 and a
20-point increase in the rate of economic growth.64 The majority of the
Spanish staff lived in Poblat d’Hifrensa, a modern industrial village
designed by the rationalist architect Antoni Bonet Castellana with a
marked social hierarchy: apartments for workers, row houses for techni-
cians, and separate chalets for engineers and managers.65 The French tech-
nicians and engineers resided in their own complexes, which were built
and equipped for that purpose and graced with all the necessary comforts
“to welcome them in the most agreeable conditions possible”.66 The French
personnel in Spain were instructed not to act superior to their Spanish
colleagues: “The Spanish are proud and vulnerable […] The engineers
must be treated as equals, as first-rate engineers, and not dispatched with
generalities or smooth talk”.67 During construction and first years of oper-
ation, local opposition to Vandellós was minimal, concentrated among a
few fishermen and tourism promoters.68 France hurried to placate them
with studies based on EDF and CEA data demonstrating that all safety
procedures had been followed and that the only possible drawback was
thermal pollution due to the use of seawater as coolant, which caused the
water temperature to rise by a maximum of 6 degrees centigrade.69
Vandellós 1, Starting or End Point?

Vandellós 1 served as an example and source of motivation for France to
intensify nuclear ties with Spain. First, there was the need to ensure the
profitability of a project to which huge financial, industrial and political
efforts had been dedicated. Second, cooperation in the field of nuclear
energy would benefit the whole of industrial and scientific-technological
cooperation. Finally, the outlook was promising: Spain’s 1975 Energy Plan
projected a nuclear capacity of 23,000–25,000 MWe by 1985, i.e. 55–60%
of total electricity production, a sum of 21 cumulative GWe. France
aspired to play a prominent role in that nuclear boom, extending its par-
ticipation to the entire fuel cycle, from uranium mining prospecting to
spent fuel storage and reprocessing.70
Framatome participated in all the public bidding processes for the

construction of new PWR reactors in Spain. To pave the way, it created
the subsidiary Framatome Proyectos Industriales S.A. and courted alli-
ances with local partners, such as the group of engineering companies
Empresarios Agrupados S.A., the construction firm Equipos Nucleares
S.A., and the Fierro family’s Banco Ibérico.71 Framatome had the sup-
port of French representatives from all areas. Diplomats, businesspeople
and engineers recognized the benefits of nuclear cooperation and insisted
to the Spanish on the need to limit the “excessive and exclusive” presence
of the United States and lend greater weight to the European alternative.
They also stressed the resulting possibilities for Spanish industry, which
could participate in the construction of plants (nuclear or conventional)
in Spain, France and other countries (primarily in the Middle East,
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa).72 The French also agreed to
submit the newly constructed NPs to IAEA and Euratom supervision if
requested by the Spanish. Cooperation with Spain was not usually pro-
posed in strictly bilateral terms. On the contrary, the door was left open
for other European powers, as this was considered the only way to com-
pete with the major US firms. Collaboration with West Germany was
especially desirable, given its increasing industrial and political influence
in Spain.73
In the 1970s, the possible construction of fast-breeders, capable of
producing their own fuel and generate up to 70 times more energy than
ordinary reactors, spurred great interest among French and Spanish
experts. In successive meetings organized alternately in Madrid and
Paris,74 French authorities examined the prospect of selling a reactor like
the Phénix (maximum 450 MWe) or Superphénix (from 1200 to 2000
MWe) to Spain. The first had already been connected to the grid in
France, and the second was in the study phase within the CEA. For its
sale domestically and abroad, the firm Groupement pour les Neutrons
Rapides had been created under the coordination of Alsthom and Fives-
Cail-Babcock. The JEN in Spain already possessed an experimental fast
reactor at zero capacity, the Coral I, but wanted a commercial reactor
that, in addition to producing energy, could recycle, at least partially, the
irradiated plutonium coming from NPs in operation.75 As with Vandellós
1, French leaders considered the possibilities of ceding the “turnkey”
technology, building a mixed working group to study the modalities of

the installation, and founding a joint participation society to lead the
construction project. Meanwhile, various French firms led by Saint
Gobain Techniques Nouvelles offered their assistance to the spent fuel
treatment plant that the JEN planned to build in the province of Soria.76
Indeed, the plutonium reprocessing technologies and the functioning of
fast-breeders were too complex and expensive to be addressed alone, no
matter how much the Spanish economy had grown.
Another front of cooperation was uranium enrichment in Europe.
Spain was part of the European consortium Eurodif, founded in 1973 as
an initiative of EDF with the threefold aim to face the growing demand
for enriched uranium, guarantee the security and stability of prices, and
diversify supply sources (that is, to get out from under the control of the
United States). Using technology patented by the CEA, Eurodif built a
facility for uranium enrichment through gaseous diffusion in Tricastin,
France, that would equip all member countries based on their participa-
tion in the share capital.77 Spain, through the Empresa Nacional del
Uranio S.A. (ENUSA), under the public holding Instituto Nacional de
Industria (INI), acquired 11.11% of shares, obtaining a volume of
enriched uranium that covered 20% of national demand.78 In the mining
sector, ENUSA and its French counterpart, the Compagnie Générale des
Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA), linked to the CEA, signed a series of
accords for the joint exploitation of natural uranium in Niger (the d
eposits
at Akouta and Akokan). On the other hand, EDF negotiated new
exchange agreements with the Spanish firms Red Eléctrica, Endesa and
Iberdrola, which guaranteed the continued transfer of electricity between
France and Spain, the construction of new interconnection lines through
the Pyrenees, and various forms of cross-participation at electrical plants.
Moreover, the CEA, EDF, Framatome and their respective subsidiaries
carried out studies and provided technical assistance to some Spanish
companies. An example is the assistance delivered by the engineering
company SOFRELEC to Spanish firms participating in trans-Pyrenean
power lines, as well as EDF’s assistance to ASELÉCTRICA, the embryo
of Red Eléctrica, to adapt the Spanish NPs to the electrical grid. In 1982
the EDF-CEA framework agreement of 1956 was renewed in attempting
to relaunch cooperation. All these accords entailed many visits by top
politicians and managers, exchanges by students and professors, and stays

by experts at plants and research centers in both countries. The French
government typically accepted all the conditions proposed by its inter-
locutors. It only declined to proceed with the request by the Spanish
Ministry of Marine Affairs to collaborate on building nuclear-propelled
attack submarines and helicopter carriers—something it would later
lament not approving, as this would have increased opportunities for
French industry in Spain.79
Much to its regret, after Vandellós 1, France would not complete
another ambitious operation in the Spanish nuclear program. All major
projects failed. The second- and third-generation Spanish NPs, such as
Vandellós 2 and Trillo 2, were attributed to the United States and West
Germany. Working against France were the greater financing advantages
offered by American and German banks and the deterioration of French–
Spanish political relations during the first years of Spanish transition to
democracy.80 Subsequently, the nuclear moratorium (announced in
1983) prevented the projects of Regodola and Vandellós 3 NPs, which
France had seen as “its last opportunity”.81 Similarly, it stopped the con-
struction of fast-breeders, the progress on the irradiated fuel treatment
plant, and the supply of enriched uranium as part of Eurodif. As a result,
offers to collaborate on building reactors in other countries also failed to
materialize. All these projects remained suspended for several years but
were not directly annulled due to vagueness on Spanish authorities, who
in conversation with their French counterparts displayed great optimism,
promising the stoppage was merely temporary and so the nuclear pro-
gram would be soon re-launched, “as soon as the lack of financial means
and some local resistances (Lemoniz NP) have been resolved”.82
By the early 1980s, French leaders admitted that current nuclear ties
with Spain were modest and disappointing. Geographic proximity, his-
toric relations and the ambition of both nuclear programs ought to have
produced more satisfactory results.83 After Vandellós 1, no other large-
scale State project was established. Nuclear cooperation became increas-
ingly restricted to academic and business arenas, expressed in assistance
agreements signed between private or specific institutions. However, the
shadow of Vandellós 1 would hang over French and Spanish relations for
a long time. Despite the initial contract, France supplied 80% of the
natural uranium utilized both in the first load and in subsequent refuel-
ing of the reactor, for it was noticeably cheaper than natural uranium
from Spain. Meanwhile, the combined impact of devaluations of the
Peseta and cycles of inflation following the 1970s oil crisis exacerbated
and prolonged Spain’s debts with France, even though these eventualities
had been partially foreseen in the financing contracts and would later be
in part offset by the devaluation of the Franc. Finally, successive commit-
ments were renewed up through the present day for the storage and treat-
ment of plutonium from Vandellós at the French complexes of Marcoule
and La Hague,84 in exchange for no small sum of money. These pay-
ments, which the government and electric companies pass on to Spanish
citizens in their electricity bill, will continue until Spain builds the con-
troversial Centralized Temporary Storage Facility (currently on hold) or,
failing this, Temporary Individual Storage Units at each NP. The nuclear
stoppage did not, however, affect the bilateral exchange of energy, which
redoubled with the construction of new interconnection lines across the
Pyrenees, the latest in 2015.
Concluding Remarks
Not many sectors have absorbed so many endeavors and resources as the
nuclear sector. The Spanish nuclear program, a tremendously ambitious
task for a still developing country, led to the deployment of colossal
efforts to acquire knowledge, capital and high-tech equipment from the
main Westerns powers, particularly, in this order, the United States,
France and West Germany. Consequently, a country with a dictatorship
and a lagging economy became in less than two decades one of the world-
wide nuclear first-comers, achieving a nuclear power capacity not far
behind the main nuclear leaders. On the other hand, France, involved for
a long time in its own (and not always successful) nuclear research,
entered in the postwar period the group of major nuclear powers, just
behind the United States and the Soviet Union. Willing to export its
national technology, the French government offered Spain exceptional
compensations: advantageous loans, a high participation for domestic
industries, a relatively free use of the spent fuel, and stronger supports to
industrial and political projects. The French State, represented by EDF

and the CEA, accepted virtually all of their partners’ requirements, justi-
fying every unilateral concession and assuming exceptional risks and lia-
bilities. Only in this way, Spain agreed to purchase an obviously costly
and obsolete technology. On top of this, military purposes cannot be
excluded, even if it is difficult, if not impossible, to find solid and reliable
evidence to investigate it.
Among all the nuclear reactors planned (over 40) and finally connected
to the grid (10) in Spain, only the Vandellós 1 reactor was French. It was
the third NP installed in Spain and above all represented a unique case: it
was the last implementation of the French UNGG technology and its
first and only export; it was also the first Spanish NP to be dismantled
after the most serious nuclear incident that has ever occured in the coun-
try. Besides, Vandellós 1 witnessed the setting for confrontation between,
on one side, the national pride and military engineerism represented by
the CEA, the JEN and the INI, and, on the other side, the dominant
commercial approach of EDF and the Spanish private companies. Given
the size of the public sector in France, the private initiative did not play
in Vandellós 1 a role as relevant as in the American or German reactors
built in Spain. French and Spanish governments, led by their respective
nuclear agencies, subordinated the economic rationality to the politico-
military advantages, that is, the ability of French UNGG NPs to avoid
the American omnipresence and facilitate new industrial, military and
political projects. In the end, the spectacular growth of US NPs in the
international market (most with PWR-Westinghouse technology)
exhausted the commercial possibilities of the French technology. France
itself had no option but to waive its filière nationale and adopt the
American procedure. Therefore, the French alternative route could not be
a reality, since it could not differentiate from a European route that was
required to cooperate with the United States.
On balance, Vandellós 1 was more a political-military decision than an
economic, scientific or technological one. At any rate, by building the facil-
ity, France encouraged the development of the Spanish infrastructure and
business fabric, enhanced local capabilities, and thus gave new impetus to
the Spanish industrial modernization. The plant became a magnificent
training school for Spaniards and foreigners, and a place where economic
and political prospective partnerships were forged. Last but not least, access
to French capital, goods and technology allowed Spain to diversify its eco-
nomic and foreign policy options, reducing its heavy dependency on the
United States and paving the way towards greater interrelations with
European governments and businesses. In this respect, the French route
became not an alternative but a complementary route, unable to replace
the United States but able to break monopolies and diversify offerings.
Notes
1. Pedro A. Martínez Lillo, Una introducción al estudio de las relaciones his-
pano–francesas (1945–1951) (Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 1985);
Florentino Portero, Franco aislado: La cuestión española, 1945–1950
(Madrid: Aguilar, 1989); and Xabier Hualde, El “cerco” aliado. Estados
Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Francia frente a la Dictadura Franquista
(1945–1953) (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2016).
2. Anne Dulphy, La politique de la France à l’égard de l’Espagne de 1945 à
1955. Entre idéologie et réalisme (Paris: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,
2002).
3. Joseba De la Torre and Mario García-Zúñiga (eds.), Entre el Mercado y el
Estado. Los planes de desarrollo durante el franquismo (Pamplona:
Universidad de Navarra, 2009).
4. Esther M. Sánchez, Rumbo al Sur. Francia y la España del desarrollo,
1958–1969 (Madrid: CSIC, 2006).
5. Rafael Castro, Génesis y transformación de un modelo de inversión interna-
cional: El capital francés en España, c.1850–2006, PhD Dissertation,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2010; Esther M. Sánchez,
“Francia y la España del tardofranquismo y la transición. Sinergias
económicas en un marco de cambio político, 1970–1986,” Hispania 254
(2016): pp. 847–82; and Núria Puig and Rafael Castro, “Patterns of
International Investment in Spain, 1850–2005,” Business History Review
83 (2009): 505–37.
6. Among the better-known works, we can mention: Maurice Vaïsse (dir.),
La France et l’atome. Études d’histoire nucléaire (Bruxelles: Bruylant,
1994); Alain Beltran and Jean-Paul Couvreux, Electricité de France. 50
ans d’histoire(s) à l’internationale (Paris: Cherche-Midi, 1996); Henri
Morsel, Histoire de l’électricité en France (T.3. 1946–1987) (Paris: Fayard,
1996); and Boris Dänzel-Kantof and Félix Torres, L’énergie de la France:

du Zoé aux EPR, une histoire du programme nucléaire français (Paris:
F. Bourin, 2013).
7. See, among others, Rafael Caro (ed.), Historia nuclear de España (Madrid:
Sociedad Nuclear Española, 1995); Ana Romero de Pablos and José
M. Sánchez Ron, Energía nuclear en España. De la JEN al CIEMAT
(Madrid: Doce Calles/CIEMAT, 2001); José M. Sánchez Ron,
“International Relations in Spanish Physics from 1900 to the Cold War,”
Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 33 (2002): 3–31;
and Albert Presas, “Science on the Periphery. The Spanish Reception of
Nuclear Energy: An Attempt at Modernity?,” Minerva 42 (2005):
197–218. An updated state of the art (together with a more in-depth
analysis of the economic, business and financial dimensions) in Joseba
De la Torre and Mar Rubio, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship. State
and Business Involvement in the Spanish Atomic Program, 1950–1985,”
Journal of Contemporary History 51 (2016): 385–411.
8. Frédéric Marty and Esther M. Sánchez, “La centrale nucléaire hispano-
française de Vandellos: logiques économiques, technologiques et poli-
tiques d’une décision,” Bulletin d’Histoire de l’Electricité 36 (2000): 5–30;
Esther M. Sánchez, “La connexió hispano-francesa: intercanvis d’energia
elèctrica i cooperació nuclear, c. 1950–1990,” Recerques 61 (2010):
101–36; and Ana Romero de Pablos, “Energía nuclear e industria en la
España de mediados del siglo XX. Zorita, Santa María de Garoña y
Vandellós 1,” in La física en la dictadura. Físicos, cultura y poder en España,
ed. Néstor Herrán and Xavier Roqué (Barcelona: UAB, 2012), 45–63.
9. “Ordonnance no. 45-2563 du 18 octobre 1945 instituant un
Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique,” Journal Officiel de la République
Française, 31/09/1945. The beginnings of the CEA in Bertrand
Goldschmidt, Le complexe atomique. Histoire politique de l’énergie nuclé-
aire (Paris: Fayard, 1980); Aline Coutrot, “La creation du Commissariat
à l’Énergie Atomique,” in De Gaulle et la nation face aux problèmes de
défense, 1945–1946, Institut du Temps Présent/Institut Charles de
Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1983); Marie-José Lovérini, L’Atome de la recherche à
l’industrie: le Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (Paris: Gallimard, 1996);
Paul Reuss, L’épopée de l’énergie nucléaire: une histoire scientifique el indus-
trielle (Paris: EDP Sciences, 2007); and Cyrille Foasso, “La R&D nuclé-
aire en France de 1945 à 1965: le Département des études de piles du
CEA,” Annales Historiques de l’Electricité 5 (2007): 63–74.
10. On the origins and development of UNGG technology and its differ-
ences with regard to American procedures, see: Jean-François Picard,
Alain Beltran, and Martine Bungener, Mémoire d’une entreprise publique,
histoire orale d’EDF, 1946–1981 (Paris: CNRS/EDF, 1981); ibid.,
Histoires d’EDF. Comment se sont prises les decisions de 1945 à nos jours
(Paris: Dunod, 1985); Marcel Boiteux, Haute tension (Paris: Odile Jacob,
1983); Jacques Leclercq, L’ère nucléaire (Paris: Hachette, 1986); Georges
Lamiral, Chronique de trente années d’équipement nucléaire à Electricité de
France (Paris: AHEF, 1988); Georges-Henri Soutou, “La logique d’un
choix: le CEA et le problème des filières électronucléaires,” Relations
Internationales 68 (1991): 351–77; Rémy Carle, L’électricité nucléaire
(Paris: PUF, 1993); Georges-Henri Soutou and Alain Beltran (eds.),
Pierre Guillaumat, la passion des grands projets industriels (Paris: Editions
Rive Droite, 1995); Gabrielle Hecht, Le rayonnement de la France.
Énergie nucléaire et identité nationale après la Seconde Guèrre Mondiale
(Paris: La Découverte, 2004); and Boris Dänzel-Kantof and Félix Torres,
L’énergie de la France. Great Britain had also embarked on a technology
similar to UNGG (Magnox reactors). Like France, it lacked the neces-
sary industrial equipment to enrich uranium and aspired to create pluto-
nium bombs. It was able to export a 160 MWe Magnox unit to Italy (La
Latina) and another 166 MWe to Japan (Tokai). See Simon Taylor, The
Fall and Rise of Nuclear Power in Britain (Cambridge: UIT Cambridge,
2016).
11. Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade
Hardcover (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012).
12. See Walter C. Patterson, The Plutonium Business and the Spread of the
Bomb (New York: Random House, 1985); and Maurice Vaïsse, La
Grandeur. Politique étrangère du général De Gaulle 1958–1969 (Paris:
Fayard, 1998).
13. Overall, natural uranium was cheaper than enriched uranium. However,
the costs of construction and exploitation for French plants (still in the
prototype stage) were higher than for the American plants (already in the
industrial stage).
14. In this regard, see the revealing article by Richard Ullman, “The Covert
French Connection,” Foreign Policy 75 (1989): 3–33; and the subsequent
works by Pierre Melandri, “Aux origins de la cooperation nucléaire
franco-américaine,” in La France et l’atome, Maurice Vaïsse (dir.),
pp. 235–54; Jacques Villain, La Force nucléaire française. L’aide des
États-Unis (Paris: Institut de Stratégie Comparée, 2014); and John Krige,

“A Transnational Approach to US Nuclear Weapons Relationships with
Britain and France in the 60s and 70s,” in Cold War Science and the
Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge, ed. Jeroen van Dongen (Leiden:
Brill, 2015), 59–73.
15. Enterprise, editorial no. 738 (1969), p. 186.
16. Today, France has 58 operational reactors distributed at 19 NPs, which
provide 75% of the energy consumed in the country. All function with
PWR technology (the last UNGG unit closed in 1994). Framatome is
part of Areva, strongly linked to EDF and 80% controlled by the State.
Fessenheim is the oldest NP in the country.
17. Three at Marcoule, three at Chinon, two at Saint Laurent des Eaux and
one at Bugey, in addition to the Spanish reactor.
18. On French political economy after the global energy shock, see Jean-
Marcel Jeanneney (ed.), L’Économie française depuis 1967: la traversée des
turbulences mondiales (Paris: Seuil, 1989); Eric Bussière (dir.), Georges
Pompidou face à la mutation économique de l’Occident, 1969-74 (Paris:
PUF, 2003); Frédéric Abadie and Jean-Pierre Corcelette, Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2009); Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Le
pouvoir et la vie, 22nd ed. (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2007);
and Serge Berstein, Jean-Claude Casanova, and Jean-François Sirinelli,
Les années Giscard. La politique économique, 1974–1981 (Paris: Armand
Colin, 2009).
19. Claude Bienvenu, Superphénix. Le nucléaire à la française (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 1999), 183. Further information concerning fast-breeder
reactors in Walter C. Patterson, The Plutonium Business. A study of esca-
lation over time of French nuclear program’s costs in Arnulf Grubler,
“The Costs of the French Nuclear Scale-up: A Case of Negative Learning
by Doing,” Energy Policy 38 (2010): 5174–88.
20. In words of Dänzel-Kantof and Torres, L’énergie de la France.
21. Dänzel-Kantof and Torres, L’énergie de la France, pp. 19–20.
22. The first to use the word was the journalist Philippe Simmonot in his
book Les nucléocrates (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble,
1978).
23. This episode marked the birth of the network Sortir du Nucléaire, a fed-
eration of over 900 anti-nuclear associations and 60,000 members. See
www.sortirdunucleaire.org, accessed in March 2017.
24. Dänzel-Kantof and Torres, L’énergie de la France, pp. 25 and 341–55.
25. Also the present of French nuclear policy have generated an extensive and
varied bibliography. We will limit ourselves to recommending the recent
work by Dänzel-Kantof and Torres, L’énergie de la France, which gathers
numerous references to prior research and interviews with some key actors.
26. In 1967, the family business Fuerzas Hidroeléctricas del Segre requested
entry into the group. FECSA, HECSA and ENHER agreed to offer it
2% each from their own 25% stakes. Thus, capital and energy ended up
with the following split: 25% for EDF, 23% for FECSA, HECSA and
ENHER and 6% for Fuerzas del Segre. Minutes of the Administrative
Council of HIFRENSA in Archivo Histórico de la Sociedad Estatal de
Participaciones Industriales (henceforth ASEPI), box 4640.
27. List of agreements and companies in Esther M. Sánchez, “La connexió
hispano–francesa,” p. 109. More details in Renan Viguié, La traversée
électrique des Pyrenées. Histoire de l’interconnexion entre la France et
l’Espagne (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2014); and Red Eléctrica de España
(www.ree.es, accessed June 2016).
28. Known as “winter against summer,” the electrical interconnection agree-
ments were based on the provision of energy to France during the winter,
when its hydrological production was reduced due to freezing, in
exchange for supplying energy to Spain during the summer, a season that
generated excess stores in France due to thawing and scarcity in Spain
due to drought.
29. More details in “L’Enseignement du nucléaire en France,” special issue of
Revue Générale Nucléaire, 5 (1984); Ana Romero de Pablos and José
M. Sánchez Ron, Energía nuclear en España; Néstor Herrán, “Isotope
Networks: Training, Sales and Publications, 1946–65,” Dynamics, 29
(2009): 285–306; and Alfonso Carpio, “Ciencia y política exterior fran-
cesa en la España de Franco: el caso de los físicos catalanes,” in La física
en la dictadura (1939–1975), 221–38.
30. JEN–CEA relationships greatly intensified thanks to the close personal
friendship between Otero Navascués and the CEA’s Director of External
Affairs Bertrand Goldschmidt. See their correspondence in the Service
d’Archives du Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (SACEA), AR-2008-
22-73, dossiers no. 1/6, 2/6, 4/6 and 5/6, 1954–1963. Otero’s international
trajectory and connections abroad in Leonardo Villena, “José María Otero,
un científico internacional,” Arbor 450 (1983): 95–108; Juan R. De Andrés,
José María Otero de Navascués Enríquez de la Sota, marqués de Hermosilla. La
baza nuclear y científica del mundo hispánico durante la Guerra Fría (México:
Plaza & Valdés, 2005); and Carlos Pérez, José María Otero Navascués. Ciencia
y Armada en la España del siglo XX (Madrid: CSIC, 2012).
31. Negotiation process described in Frédéric Marty and Esther M. Sánchez,
“La centrale nucléaire hispano-française de Vandellos”; and Esther
M. Sánchez “La connexió hispano–francesa”.
32. Esther M. Sánchez, Rumbo al Sur, pp. 303–11.
33. “Ampliación del financiamiento de ENHER para atender a sus par-
ticipaciones en una central nuclear hispano–francesa y otras empre-
sas,” ASEPI, file 906. An overview of the main Spanish nuclear
players in Joseba De la Torre and Mar Rubio, “Nuclear power for a
dictatorship”.
34. Letter from Gregorio López Bravo, Spanish Industry Minister, to Alain
Peyrefitte, French Minister of Scientific Research and Atomic and Space
Issues, Madrid, 4/6/1966, and “Informe de la central nuclear hispano-
francesa en Cataluña,” December 1965, both in ASEPI, file 906.
35. Memo by French Ministers of Industry and Atomic and Space Issues to
the Prime Minister, Paris, 8/2/1966, Archives historiques d’Eléctricité de
France (AEDF), box 89522.
36. Letter by EDF Engineer G. Lamiral to Deputy Director of Equipment
J.P. Roux, nd., AEDF, box 89522.
37. Plant complete, with all tests passed, ready to begin functioning imme-
diately and maintain normal and efficient exploitation. “Contract avec le
Groupe de Constructeurs. Notice explicative,” AEDF, box 890521.
38. Indatom, SEEN, GAAA, Alsthom, Campenon-Bernard, Ateliers et
Forges de la Loire, Compagnie Electro-Mécanique, Babcok & Wilcox,
Stein & Roubaix, Compagnie Générale d’Electricité, Compagnie
Générale de Télégraphie Sans Fil, Neyrpic, Péchiney, Saint Gobain
Techniques Nouvelles, Forges et Ateliers du Creusot, Jeumont-Schneider,
Ugine Kuhlmann, Société Industrielle Delattre-Levivier, Compagnie de
Constructions Mécaniques Procédés Sulzer, Chantiers de l’Atlantique,
Compagnie d’Entreprises Électriques, Mécaniques et de Travaux Publics,
Société Hispano-Alsacienne, Société Parisienne pour l’Industrie
Électrique, Compagnie Industrielle de Travaux and Merlin et Gérin.
Indatom and SEEN were acting as coordinators. Central nuclear de
Vandellós, no. 2, 1968; and “Contrat de contre-garanties pour la centrale
de Vandellos (CEA-SOCIA),” AEDF, box 890520.
39. Meeting of the Administrative Council of HIFRENSA, 3/10/1968,
AEDF, box 891165.
40. The whole list of Spanish firms can be found in Esther M. Sánchez, “La
connexió hispano–francesa,” p. 128.
41. Minutes of the 14th meeting of the Administrative Council of
HIFRENSA, Barcelona, 19/11/1970, AEDF, box 891165.
42. “Note concernant la conduite de l’affaire Vandellos,” 10/4/1967, AEDF,
box 890521. The same dynamic is observed at Zorita and Santa María
de Garoña NPs. Joseba De la Torre and Mar Rubio, “Learning by Doing:
The First Spanish Nuclear Plant,” Business History Review (in press).
43. “Les problèmes de la collaboration hispano–française dans la centrale de
Vandellos,” 11/3/1969, AEDF, box 891165.
44. The evolution of the construction work, illustrated with numerous pho-
tographs, can be followed in the bulletins of HIFRENSA: Central nuclear
de Vandellós, nos. 1 to 13, 1968–1969. More is available in the minutes
of the meetings of the Executive Commission and Administrative
Council of HIFRENSA, AEDF, box 891165.
45. It was the deadliest nuclear accident ever to occur in Spain, rated 3 on
the International Atomic Energy Agency-IAEA’s International Nuclear
Event Scale (which ranges from 0 to 7), which means that there was a
release of radioactivity, although in low doses.
46. ENRESA, Central Nuclear de Vandellós I. Memoria del desmantelamiento,
1998–2003 (Madrid: ENRESA, 2003).
47. New reloads of fuel, waste treatment and dismantling costs are not
included. AEDF, box 890521. Based on the exchange rate for 1 January
1973.
48. “Conclusion actuelle de la négociation franco–espagnole sur la centrale
nucléaire de Catalogne, 30/12/1965,” AEDF, box 89522. Similar per-
ceptions in Gaston Palewski, Mémoires d’action, 1924–1974 (Paris: Plon,
1988), 281.
49. Memo by the Direction des Affaires Politiques-Service des Affaires
Atomiques of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 27/10/1964,
Documents Diplomatiques Français, 2002, no. 157.
50. Letter by Spanish Ambassador in Washington Marqués Merry del Val to
the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 26/05/1964,
Archives of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE-E),
R-12044/8; and minutes of the JEN (1961), Archivo Histórico del
Banco de España (AHBE), IEME, box 139. For a comparative analysis
of French and Spanish uranium policies, see Matthew Adamson, Lino
Cambrubí, and Simone Turchetti, “From the Ground Up: Uranium
Prospection in Western Europe,” in The Surveillance Imperative:
Geosciences during the Cold War and Beyond, ed. Simone Turchetti and
Peder Roberts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 23–44.
51. The possibility of financing Vandellós under the Financial Protocol of
1963 was originally considered, but the French banks that controlled
80% of the Protocol demonstrated serious reservations in that regard
due to lack of confidence in a technology with an uncertain future.
Memo to the Minister of Industry, n.d., Archives Nationales de France-
Centre des Archives Contemporaines (AN-CAC), Industrie,
19890566/72.
52. “Avenant au Protocole du 27 juillet 1967 relatif au financement d’une
centrale nucléaire,” Paris, 26/11/1970, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA19700108 (accessed in February
2017).
53. “Protocole entre le gouvernement de la République française et le gou-
vernement espagnol relatif au financement d’une centrale nucléaire,”
Madrid, 27/7/1967, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.
do?accord=TRA19670081 (accessed in February 2017).
54. Joseba De la Torre and Mar Rubio, La financiación exterior del desarrollo
industrial español a través del IEME, 1950–1982 (Madrid: Banco de
España, 2015), chap. 5.
55. Letter from Peyrefitte to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris,
6/6/1966, Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hence-
forth AMAE-F), Cabinet du Ministre, Maurice Couve de Murville,
1958–67, vol. 76.
56. Conditions and modes of application in the reports “Centrale Nucléaire
de Vandellos. Historique de la négociation et charges acceptées par
EDF,” 14/9/1967; and “Centrale de Vandellos. Résumé des charges
prises par l’EDF et le CEA,” Paris, 21/2/1967, AEDF, box 890520.
57. “Contrat de contre-garanties pour la centrale de Vandellos (CEA-
SOCIA),” AEDF, box 890520.
58. See “Contrôle de la centrale nucléaire franco-espagnole,” AEDF, box
891165; and “Informe de la central nuclear hispano-francesa en
Cataluña,” December 1965, ASEPI, file 906.
59. Ibid.
60. Albert Presas, “Science in the periphery”; Francesc X. Barca, “Secrecy or
Discretion: Transfer of Nuclear Technology to Spain in Franco Period,”
History of Technology 30 (2010): 179–96; and Javier Ordóñez and José
M. Sánchez Ron, “Nuclear Energy in Spain. From Hiroshima to the
Sixties,” in National Military Establishment and the Advancement of
Science and Technology, ed. Paul Forman and José M. Sánchez Ron
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Pub.), 185–213.
61. “Relations nucléaires franco-espagnoles,” memo by the Direction des
Affaires Politiques, Sous-direction des Questions Atomiques, MAE,
Paris, 24/6/1980, AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1977–81, vol. 4367;
and “Nota para el Excmo. Sr. Capitán General [Agustín Muñoz Grandes]
sobre la posibilidad de fabricar plutonio (bombas de plutonio) en
España,” Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica/Archivo de la
Fundación Francisco Franco, MF R-7276, file 4226. I thank Lorenzo
Delgado for this reference.
62. This is according to some military scientists and technicians from JEN
that would have been personally involved in the project of obtaining
plutonium bombs for Spain, a project that ultimately had to be aban-
doned due to high costs, lack of agreement at high government levels,
and the desire not to jeopardize friendly relations with the United States.
Guillermo Velarde, Proyecto Islero. Cuando España pudo desarrollar armas
nucleares (Córdoba: Guadalmazán, 2016).
63. Spain eventually signed in 1987, and France in 1992. Safeguards agree-
ments with the IAEA had been concluded, however, at the beginning of
the 1980s, i.e. Spain would finally have then renounced nuclear weapons.
64. HIFRENSA, Vandellós I. Historia de la primera central nuclear catalana
(Barcelona: HIFRENSA, 1997), 22–3 and 25.
65. Sport, culture and leisure facilities were common for all the residents.
See Juan F. Ródenas and Elisenda Pla, Antonio Bonet Castellana. Poblat
d’Hifrensa, l’Hospitalet de l’Infant (Barcelona: Col·legi d’Arquitectes de
Catalunya, 2008). French archival material shows numerous demands
received by Spanish engineers wishing to work on Vandellós 1. As regards
French engineers, Vandellós served as a springboard into management
positions in CEA, EDF and other national champions. EDF internal
memo, n.d., AEDF, box 890520.
66. Letter by the director of the Planas del Rey Urbanization in L’Hospitalet
de l’Infant, 30/11/1966. AEDF, box 890520.
67. “Note concernant la conduite de l’affaire Vandellos,” 10/4/1967, AEDF,
box 890521.
68. See Municipal Minutes Books in Arxiu Municipal de Vandellòs i
l’Hospitalet de l’Infant (AMVHI). It should be noted that Franco’s dic-
tatorship denied to the very end basic rights such as the right to strike,
free expression or association.
69. Memo by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 28/1/1976,

AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1977–81, vol. 4367.
70. “Coopération nucléaire avec l’Espagne”, memo by the Direction
Générale des Relations Culturelles, Scientifiques et Techniques, MAE,
Paris, 12/7/1978, AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1977–81, vol. 4367.
71. “Coopération nucléaire avec l’Espagne”, memo by the Direction
Générale des Relations Culturelles, Scientifiques et Techniques, MAE,
Paris, 28/1/1976, AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1971–76, vol. 421.
72. Memo by the commercial counsellor of the French Embassy in Spain,
Madrid, 31/7/1974, AN-CAC, Industrie, 820511/2.
73. “Compte-rendu d’une misión en Espagne,” 30/4/1975, AEDF, box
B0000469386.
74. The minutes reveal the most assiduous participants: on the French side,
the CEA, EDF, Technicatome, Alsthom and the Fives-Cail-Babcock
group; and on the Spanish side, the JEN, ENDESA, ENHER, SENER,
AUXIESA and Equipos Nucleares, AEDF, box B0000469386.
75. “Collaboration franco–espagnole sur les reacteurs rapides,” 3/11/1975,
AEDF, box B0000469386.
76. See Luis Castro, La bomba atómica española. La energía nuclear en la
Transición (Luis Castro, 2015).
77. Apart from Spain and France, there were other three founding members:
Sweden, Belgium and Italy. Sweden withdrew from the project in 1974,
being replaced by Iran. Also in early 1970s, Great Britain, The
Netherlands and West Germany had formed another consortium for the
same purpose: URENCO.
78. The rest coming, at lower prices, from the United States and (starting in
1974) from the Soviet Union. “Enrichissement européen: un calendrier
chargé,” 19/9/1973, AEDF, box 891165; and “Coopération nucléaire
franco–espagnole,” note from the Direction des Affaires Politiques,
Sous-direction des Questions Atomiques et Spatiales, MAE, Paris,
14/6/1982, AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1981–1985, vol. 5144.
79. Memo for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 20/10/1975,
AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1971–76, vol. 421.
80. Esther M. Sánchez, “Francia y la España del tardofranquismo y la tran-
sición,” pp. 847–82.
81. “Relations nucléaires avec l’Espagne,” memo by the Délégation Générale
à l’Énergie du Ministère de l’Industrie, Paris, 17/8/1977, AMAE-F,
EUROPE, Espagne, 1977–81, vol. 4367.
82. “Coopération nucléaire…,” AMAE-F, EUROPE, Espagne, 1981–1985,

vol. 5144.
83. Memo by the Direction des Affaires Politiques, Sous-direction de
Questions Atomiques et Spatiales, MAE, Paris, 12/11/1980,
AMAE-F. EUROPE, Espagne, 1977–81, vol. 4367.
84. French production of military-grade plutonium stopped in 1991.
Esther M. Sánchez-Sánchez (esther.sanchez@usal.es) is Associate Professor of

Economic History at the University of Salamanca, Spain. She holds a PhD in
History from the University of Salamanca, in association with the University of
Sorbonne-Paris IV. She has carried out pre- and postdoctoral research and teach-
ing stays at the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Madrid, the
University of Barcelona and the University of Paris VII-Denis Diderot. Her
research has focused on French–Spanish economic relations during the twenti-
eth century, including the analysis of the large flows of bilateral trade, invest-
ment, technical assistance, migrants’ remittances and tourists’ currency, as well
as the study of French multinationals’ role in the Spanish socio-economic mod-
ernization. She is the author of Rumbo al sur. Francia y la España del desarrollo,
1958–1969 (Madrid: CSIC, 2006). Her most recent publications include arti-
cles in Enterprise & Society, Journal of Contemporary History, Industrial &
Corporate Change, Business History, Hispania and Revista de Historia Industrial.
7
The Long Road to the Trillo Nuclear
Power Plant: West Germany
in the Spanish Nuclear Race
Gloria Sanz Lafuente
The road to [atomic] hell [was] paved with good intentions
Introduction
In early September of 1975, the engineer Hans Frewer, a member of the
presidency of Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU AG), wrote a letter to Dr.
Karl Wirtz of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre to inform him that
they had won the bid to build the Trillo nuclear plant in Spain. The letter
is an example of a theory of the firm based on evolutionary economics
and is of interest for several reasons. First, Frewer signaled that the project
Research for this paper was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
(project ref. HAR2014-53825-R).
G. Sanz Lafuente (*)
Dept. Economia, Universidad Publica de Navarra, Pamplona, Navarra, Spain

188 G. Sanz Lafuente
had been obtained amid an intense dispute with the American company
Westinghouse. He then stressed that the contract had been the result of a
complex, multifaceted process. He finished by thanking Karl Wirtz for
being a key piece of that complex puzzle, due to his work over the course
of many years in Spain, work that aimed to strengthen nuclear cooperation
and that, Frewer believed, had boosted confidence in West Germany’s
industrial potential among Spanish nuclear companies.1 On July 29,
1975, the Spanish company Unión Eléctrica S.A. had sent Westinghouse
the decision in favor of KWU, and in early September, the Ministry of
Industry published pre-authorization for the plant (see Chaps. 1, 2, 5
and 6).2
In the 1970s, North American companies dominated the Spanish
nuclear market.3 Until 1975, two of the three reactors and 57% of the
installed capacity belonged to Westinghouse and General Electric. The
only reactor from outside these two companies was French.4 Meanwhile,
90% of the capacity and 10 out of 11 authorized and pre-authorized
reactors as of the end of 1975 were linked to North American companies.
Another 10% of the capacity and the remaining reactor corresponded to
the Trillo power plant. That same year, West Germany became the lead-
ing European investor in Spain, after the US, represented by companies
that had long trajectories since the first wave of globalization, such as
AEG and Siemens. Both merged their reactor businesses in 1969 to
become KWU.5
This chapter aims to examine the complex web of relationships estab-
lished between nuclear companies and institutions from West Germany
and Spain. Their initial limitations will be analyzed, along with difficul-
ties and the progressive construction of collaborative relationships amid
changing political and economic contexts in the young German democ-
racy and the Spanish dictatorship. The idea is to explain how the bid for
the nuclear plant at Trillo was won. Our theoretical point of departure is
situated between a perspective on the firm as a structure of technical
organization and hierarchies and another focused on the consideration of
open-market competition determined exclusively by the price of transac-
tions. Licenses, R&D agreements, supply contracts with technical assis-
tance, equity stakes, development assistance financing and other complex
types of relationships forged over many years all contributed to the study
The Long Road to the Trillo Nuclear Power Plant: West... 189
of a complex nuclear ecosystem based on international technology and

finance such as that of Spain. In this way, the chapter moves beyond the
simple study of the market versus hierarchies and business techniques.
The objective is to emphasize the internal and external adoption of busi-
ness decisions, in the context of an evolving but also specific operation
and regulation conditions and opportunities, for a nuclear project in a
given company in Spain.6
ooperating Within the New Nuclear Faith:

C
German Scientists in the Early Spanish Nuclear
Program, 1949–66
The inequality of nuclear budgets, the ties to the military and US control
of enriched uranium and technology generated limitations for possible
technological alternatives to nuclear deployment and marked the atomic
paths of many countries. The neutron economy was international from
its inception, had little autonomy due to its civil and military intersec-
toral overlap, and flourished in the absence of any other alternative tech-
nology financed by the international market with the same impetus. In
comparative terms, and without expanding on relative measures in each
country, if we examine only the budgets of the nuclear agencies of the
four main countries in 1960, the US agency USAEC had funding of
around $11.5 billion (85%), followed by Britain’s UKAEA ($1 billion)
and France’s CEA ($900 million), with approximately 7% each. The
budget of Germany’s Federal Ministry for Scientific Research ($270 mil-
lion) represented 2% of the combined nuclear public budged of the four
countries. The situation had not changed much by 1965. Far smaller yet
was the budget of Spain’s Nuclear Energy Board (Junta de Energía Nuclear,
JEN), which by 1968 reached $15 million and had 2100 employees;
1100 of these employees were at the Moncloa center in Madrid, of which
300 were academics. The rest were working on uranium mining.7 A sin-
gle nuclear research center in Germany, the KFK, had 871 employees in
1960, with 227 academics and 439 researchers from 30 countries receiv-
ing training.8
It was precisely the technological and financial challenge entailed by

nuclear development that led to the early appearance of international
projects and spaces of encounter during the 1950s. The idea was to share
experiences, costs and financial risks in a completely new sector with many
uncertain potential technological developments. There was a desire to
broaden a small national framework that lacked human capital and suffi-
cient financial resources to face these risks. The Spanish dictatorship
remained outside of the projects like EURATOM and CERN, of which
Spain was not a part until 1960, although it did have researchers at the
latter center later on, amid tensions due to its scant contribution to financ-
ing the project.9 Some 33% of the German atomic budget went to nuclear
international bodies in 1961. There were other supranational meeting
spaces from the 1950s that were shared by West Germany and Spain,
along with many other countries. The European Atomic Energy Society
(EAES) was conceived of as a forum for sharing experiences among
national nuclear programs. The same can be said of the European Nuclear
Energy Agency (ENEA), which emerged within the OECD with the
Eurochemic project in Mol, Belgium. In 1962, Spain became part of the
European Atomic Forum (FORATOM), the propaganda and communi-
cation entity designed to defend the nuclear energy sector. Both countries
were also part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which
arose as a center for international control and supervision.10
owards a Nuclear Industrial Ecosystem in West

T
Germany
The beginnings of the nuclear industry in Germany occurred later than

in the US, Great Britain, France or the USSR. The Paris Treaty, along
with other legal measures, prohibited nuclear production and research in
Germany for civil and military uses until 1955 and the enrichment of
uranium until 1960.11 However, in January of 1946, the scientists that
had participated in the nuclear bomb project during the Third Reich
returned to Göttingen from their detention site in the United Kingdom
and began reconstructing the new Max Planck Institute for Physics in
what was then the British occupation zone. Karl Wirtz was part of that
group, and he, along with Heisenberg, lent continuity to German nuclear
research. In 1957, Wirtz became the director of the Karlsruhe Nuclear
Research Centre (Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, KFK), an institu-
tion that, together with the Jülich Research Centre (Kernforschungsanlage
Jülich, KFA), was one of two scientific, academic and incubator sites for
R&D in this sector, which at times were in competition. The first rela-
tionships and communication gave rise to shared spaces for industrialists
and scientists such as the Society for the Study of Physics (Physialische
Studiengesellschaft, PSG) founded in Düsseldorf in 1954.12
Beginning in 1955, West Germany had a ministry for nuclear affairs
led by Franz Josef Strauss (CSU).13 This ministry was charged with
obtaining the first test reactors in the US and Great Britain, drafting the
nuclear legislation promulgated in 1960, and organizing the ministry’s
two main consultative bodies: the German Atomic Commission, formed
in 1956 by representatives from industry and science and technicians
from the ministry, and the Reactor Safety Commission, which had a sim-
ilar composition but required unanimity for decision-making as of
1958.14 Finally, the ministry was in charge of organizing the first five-year
nuclear program—the Eltwiller Program—with public financing, which
lasted from 1958 to 1962. This was followed by other five-year planning
programs, up until the public and parliamentary debates generated by
the fourth program.15
In West Germany, the chemicals sector and others linked to the con-
struction of non-nuclear plants and the manufacturing of electric com-
ponents soon demonstrated their interest in producing for and entering
a market that got its first boost with the Atoms for Peace Conference in
1955. Companies such as Hoechst and Degussa found nuclear develop-
ment to be an opportunity to operate in this sector through the manufac-
turing of nuclear fuel or in the production of moderators for the reactors,
such as heavy water. Big chemical companies had a high-energy use and
some of them intended to produce their own nuclear power some years
later.16 In the case of electrical engineering, relationships—particularly
with the US—were created or taken up again as of the mid-1950s. AEG
and General Electric were linked by equity stakes prior to the war. In
1958, both obtained the contract for the Kahl am Rhein nuclear power
plant requested by the electric company RWE. Meanwhile, from 1964 to
1970, they had an agreement regarding the sharing of licenses and experi-
ences.17 In 1957, Siemens, which had a long trajectory of relationships
with Westinghouse, expanded its 1954 agreement by including the
licensing of nuclear reactor technology. The agreement made possible the
transfer of the domain of North American know-how and was in force
until 1970. There were differences between the two companies in terms
of nuclear reactors. AEG was tied to General Electric’s model of boiling
light-water reactors (BWR) or Siedewasserreaktor (SWR), while Siemens
combined the Westinghouse model of pressurized-water reactors (PWR)
or Druckwasserreaktor (DWR) with the search for its own reactor.
Siemens’s model was a heavy-water reactor (HWR) or Schwerwassereaktor
based on the use of heavy water with natural uranium as fuel. Natural
uranium fuel was cheaper and more accessible than enriched uranium.
AEG, meanwhile, opted to represent the installation of the cheapest and
simplest reactor on the market at the time, that of General Electric, and
Siemens combined the use and study of the license for pressurized light-
water reactors by Westinghouse with research on parallel technology
based on the heavy-water reactor.18
There were more examples of this collaboration. Interatom
(Internationale Atomreaktorbau GmbH) was founded in 1957 to develop
light-water reactors, followed by the German firm Demag AG, a
California firm tied to North American aviation known as Atomics
International,19 and Nukem (Nuklear-Chemie-Metallurgie GmbH), a
nuclear fuel company established in 1960 with the participation of three
firms with majority German capital and another from Britain. These were
the chemicals company Degussa, Heinrich Mandel’s electric company
RWE (Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitätswerks AG), Metallgesellschaft
and Rio Tinto Zinc, linked to the chemical and mining sectors. In sum,
industrial cooperation came about based on prior experience in other
fields and the recognition of the dominance of the North American
industry of light-water reactors with enriched uranium that materialized
through the use of license agreements. In a parallel manner, autonomous
technological developments occurred in the area of reactors (heavy water).
There were other companies that provided reactors like Brown Boveri/
Krupp Reaktorbau GmbH (BBK) and BBR (Babcock-Brown Boveri
Reaktor GmbH (BBR)). There was also early European collaboration to
attempt to control the fuel cycle, which led to Uranit (formed by Nukem
AG Gelsenberg, AG and Hoechst AG) in 1969 and to Urenco in 1971,
along with Ultracentrifuge Netherland and British Nuclear Fuel.20 WAK,
a reprocessing plant went into operation in 1971. Hoechst and Nukem—
later Gelsenberg AG and Bayer AG too—founded the GWK (Gesellschaft
zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH) to erect this repro-
cessing plan. Finally, this nuclear development was accompanied from
the beginning—as in other countries with nuclear industries—with criti-
cism, opposition and various problems and failures that generated losses
at the plants.21
he First Relationships with Spain: From Heavy Water

T
to Networking
While the West Germany’s nuclear beginnings unfolded slowly and largely
under the tutelage of the US and allies, its ties with the Spanish nuclear
program were forged early on. A training and employment period in
Germany was part of the biographies of many Spanish physicists and engi-
neers prior to the war. This was the case with the mining engineer José
Cabrera, president of Unión Eléctrica Madrileña S.A (UEM) after whom
Spain’s first nuclear plant was named.22 However, what happened during
the 1950s and early 1960s? On one hand, the first scientific relationships
with Spain in the nuclear arena were formed through the Nuclear Energy
Board (Junta de Energía Nuclear, JEN) and the future director of the
KFK. Well known is the presence of Otero Navascués in Göttingen in
1949, that of Wirtz in Madrid in 1951, and the correspondence between
the two of them. Also the correspondence between some Spanish actors
such as Xula Vigón, Carlos Sánchez del Río, José Romero Ortiz (chief
engineer of the Geological and Mining Institute of Spain) and the afore-
mentioned Karl Wirtz.23 Franz Josef Strauss, German nuclear affairs min-
ister, made an official visit to Spain in July of 1956; the previous year, he
made an unofficial trip to address military issues and the possibility of
acquiring uranium from Spain.24 Meanwhile, the first contacts were made
with future industry leaders such as Heinz Schimmelbusch, a future mem-
ber of the presidency of the firm Nukem who accompanied Wirtz on his
first trip in 1951. Schimmelbusch was working in 1951 in Degussa. In the

1950s, the JEN purchased equipment in Degussa and Leybold.25
For his visit to the Moncloa plant in Madrid from 23 to 26 June of
1955, Wirtz drafted a situation report on Spain. It began by recognizing
US dominance in an industry that was still emerging and evolving and its
broad links with military demand, noting that, in many countries, this
relationship impeded the practical and free development of nuclear tech-
nology. Wirtz emphasized that the nuclear programs of the “first movers”
had a dual purpose: ensuring domestic supply and generating an export
industry in reactors. For Wirtz, Spain was one of the countries in which
nuclear energy would become important due to limited coal reserves.
Despite the distance separating West Germany and Spain in industrial
production and the training of technical human capital, the two coun-
tries were at the same crossroads of technological uncertainty regarding
the future of the many types of reactors. Wirtz believed that Spain should
not hesitate to purchase a test reactor (swimming-pool reactor), although
it would surely become outdated in a few years, as it would enable domes-
tic experimentation and the training of young Spanish physicists and
technicians. The US market for test reactors was seen as preferable. Wirtz
saw uranium mining as having an important role as a source of indepen-
dence for any nuclear program.26 Based on data from the JEN in 1955,
Wirtz believed Spain’s uranium reserves to be “considerable” and hence
“it will need to engage in the manufacturing of fuel”. He argued that
these plans should be “continued energetically” and concluded that “in
this way, a long independence would be guaranteed for the physicists and
technicians themselves, which would be greatly useful”. The plan for
Spain to build a future reactor on its own was linked to heavy-water tech-
nology because this would be a precedent for more advanced reactors. In
any case, it had to be made clear to Spanish authorities that this develop-
ment was for the “peaceful purposes” of nuclear energy, not to develop
bombs,27 an aspect that did not seem to be entirely clear.
To summarize, just as in West Germany, the backbone of the JEN’s
strategy for Spain in the mid-1950s was not only the production of elec-
tricity but also the creation of a complete domestic nuclear industry,
including the fuel cycle. In 1958 the company Graphitwerk Kropfmühl
AG exported pure graphite to Spain.28 The next step was established
through the company Interatom and made clear the financial limitations
of the project of developing a nuclear sector in the public and private
arenas. JEN planned a new test reactor and, in 1960, sought to request it
from Atomics International. Financing difficulties led Otero to ask Wirtz
for Interatom’s participation. The objective was clear. West Germany
could supply that which could not be obtained from the US and was not
yet produced in Spain. In this way, federal public financing could be
obtained. Otero himself planned to travel to Germany to obtain “cheap
credits”. Firms such as Degussa and Nukem were also aware of the acqui-
sition. The reactor would be multiple-use and would operate using natu-
ral uranium moderated by heavy water. Schimmelbusch doubted the
possibilities for participation in a German nuclear industry that was still
in its infancy. Wirtz addressed Dr. Joachim Pretsch, of the Ministry of
Nuclear Affairs, but was told that financial assistance in the form of
development aid could not be applied and that the Spanish project could
only be considered if there were a request made to a German industry.29
It is not surprising that the early Spanish nuclear program demon-
strated an interest in a technological development based on natural ura-
nium nor that its collaboration with German researchers would have
involved an interest in heavy water, which was among the technological
developments followed in that country. Meanwhile, it was not just a proj-
ect by the JEN. There was a private Spanish chemicals company involved
in the project until well into the 1960s. Energía e Industria Aragonesas,
S.A. (EIASA), founded in 1918, collaborated with the JEN from 1959 to
1967. EIASA was a company of the Urquijo group and participated in
1975 to promote the Trillo nuclear power plant together with UEM.
With public assistance from the JEN, EIASA created facilities for the
recovery of heavy water from electrolytic cells and the synthesis of com-
plementary quantities. EIASA had six hydroelectric plants in Huesca due
to its high electricity consumption, and considered this activity to be a
“technical originality” and a “singular activity” for involvement in what it
considered “the new nuclear era”. Its administrative council was presided
over by José María de Urquijo y Landecho, whose brother, Luis, had
served as the Spanish ambassador to Bonn from 1959 to 1964. Hence, it
was an electrochemical company such as EIASA that began the private
sector’s entrée into the nuclear program in 1959.30
Relations between the two countries were not only based on the KFK and
Degussa-Nukem with the JEN and between Juan Vigón and Jülich31 but,
rather, the rapprochement followed the same path by which it had begun:
nuclear fuel. Gerhard Stoltenberg, who had recently centralized German
scientific policy amid intense criticism, visited the facilities of the JEN in
Madrid and in Andújar with Otero Navascués in 1966 and, in a letter
addressed to both the JEN president and Industry Minister Gregorio López
Bravo, proposed cooperation with West Germany on “natural uranium and
heavy water” reactors, the integration of “young Spanish physicists in the
CERN” and a plan for a Spanish-German fuel factory in Spain. Although
the diplomatic services approved the proposal, they demonstrated reserva-
tions because “there could be problems with security controls” for the
nuclear fuel and the construction of the factory that “could lead to attacks
on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)”.32 The ADN news agency of
the Soviet occupation zone, the GDR, released a story in January 1967 with
the title “Madrid–Bonn Atomic Axis Intensifies”. It announced the creation
of a facility for manufacturing pure uranium in Ciudad Rodrigo with assis-
tance from West Germany. Both the ambassador in Madrid and the minis-
try in Bonn denied the story, saying there was interest among the government
but that they wanted a State facility. Meanwhile, the US and West Germany
saw themselves as possible suppliers along with other European countries,
and the final decision was political in nature.33
he German Nuclear Industry

T
Within the Spanish Market, 1967–75
In 1969, the governments of the two countries took very different paths.
The Spanish dictatorship continued to develop its nuclear program with-
out signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). West Germany,
under the new Brandt government, with much reticence in the now well-
formed German nuclear sector, signed it in 1969 and ratified it in 1974.
Likewise, Spain signed a contract with the USAEC to obtain enriched
uranium supplies, while West Germany declined to do so, as this would
limit its ability to develop a reactor industry of its own, which it deemed
impossible to create without control over the fuel cycle. Meanwhile, the
major German electrical engineering companies had acquired experience
in light water through the training of teams in the US, licenses and the
joint construction of nuclear plants in the country. AEG, with General
Electric, obtained contracts for the first two nuclear plants in West
Germany: Kahl am Rhein (operative from 1962) and Grundremmingen
(operative from 1967). For its part, Siemens built Obrigheim (operative
from 1969) with some technological changes under license agreement
with Westinghouse, while continuing to develop heavy water at the
MZFR (operative from 1966), at the Niederaichbach plant and the
Atucha plant in Argentina (operative from 1974).34
etween the Failed AEG Contract and the Fast-Breeder

B
Reactor
Technological development for domestically produced reactors such as

those using natural uranium were gradually sidelined in the second half
of the 1970s, although they were maintained in countries such as Canada.
Wirtz and Winnacker stated in 1975 that behind the dominance of light
water there was really no open-market technological competition besides
the large stock of enriched uranium (235 uranium) in the mid-1950s
from large North American military facilities, which exceeded military
demand itself, and the triple functionality of technological development
that, with modifications, was also used in submarines and airplanes.35
Both also stated that the heavy-water reactor had been progressively
abandoned in West Germany and in many countries due to safety issues
and high maintenance costs generated for businesses.36
In Spain, under the framework of developmentalism, the JEN contin-
ued to test nuclear technology and generate international contacts.
However, the electric companies were the ones that built the commercial
plants in Spain.37 Before the Zorita plant was put in motion and with the
Santa María de Garoña plant already authorized by the government,
AEG attempted to enter the Spanish atomic market in 1967. The com-
pany tried to leverage its experience in building plants in West Germany
to bid on a plant for Hidroeléctrica Española (HE). The documentation
does not provide information as to the type of reactor in question. It

could have been the 500-MWe Irta (Castellón) project or the scheme to
expand the Zorita nuclear plant.38
However, what gained consolidation internationally was the fast-
breeder reactor, which ended up becoming another myth about the future
of nuclear technology.39 The fast reactor never ended up being built for
commercial purposes in any lasting way due to multiple safety issues.
What did it consist of? Faith in finding a continual cycle of nuclear pro-
duction based on a more advanced reactor. This hypothetical reactor
would require less nuclear fuel (U235) and would produce more pluto-
nium and enriched uranium (U238). Indeed, this was the aim of research
in industrialized countries with nuclear programs, from the USSR and
US to France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and West Germany. There
were different prototypes and even joint research programs. By 1972,
France was leading investment in Europe, followed by the United
Kingdom and North America (with slightly less). Given the economic
advantages entailed in the cost of the fuel cycle and storage of natural
uranium, it was the countries with the most powerful nuclear programs
and less endowment with fuel that had most strongly bought into the
“myth”. The sodium-cooled fast breeder was one of the prototypes, and
the use of plutonium was considered the axis of storage in the fuel cycle.40
Indeed, it was not only about the reactor but also about utilizing advanced
fuels. As in the past, reactors and fuel went hand in hand, and further-
more, what was proposed was the large-scale introduction of fast-breeder
reactors. The idea was to create nuclear parks.41
Relations between Spain and West Germany were moving in this
direction. Conversations between Industry Ministers López Bravo and
Stoltenberg in May of 1967 were focused on the fast reactor, along with
other military issues. The federal report highlighted “the willingness of
the Spanish government to open the Spanish market for nuclear plants to
German plants”, if the federal government would support “the installa-
tion of a fast reactor prototype or the subsidizing of a test plant in Spain”.42
One month later, Stoltenberg expressed his willingness to collaborate on
the fast reactor, a 500–600 MWe prototype within a framework of scien-
tific cooperation and technological development.43 While representatives
of the JEN alluded to the necessary facilities for financing the prototype
and cited French and Spanish collaboration on Vandellós as an example,
the final protocol by the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research alluded
to the presence of a German nuclear plant in the Spanish market as a
favorable element of that development.44
The meetings and visits by German and Spanish delegations between
1967 and 1968 were intense and not only limited to official and scientific
arenas. Amid the change in government and the reticence of the new
national executive in the face of the dictatorship, and vice versa, the
accord was not signed until 1970 and with modifications. Collaboration
on this topic between the JEN and KFK was also agreed to in 1967, and
in 1968, Karl Wirtz led the German delegation that maintained contacts
in Madrid with politicians, scientists from the JEN, and businessmen
from the electric companies and other industrial sectors. Their proposal
sought to help the JEN with the fast-breeder reactor, designing an experi-
mental program. In 1969, representatives of the Spanish Ministry of
Industry, the JEN and business leaders travelled to West Germany.45 The
group included Manuel Gutiérrez Cortines, an old friend of Wirtz’s who
was then in charge of the company Ibernuclear and the Spanish Nuclear
Forum, and Julio Hernández Rubio, president of the administrative
council of UEM beginning in that year after a long career at Eptisa, an
engineering services company from Grupo Urquijo. Both made clear the
interest of the electric companies in light water reactors and their willing-
ness to entertain offers by suppliers, which could include West Germany.
According to Wirtz, the interest by Hernández Rubio and Gutiérrez
Cortines in the fast breeder was associated with the moment in which the
reactor could be utilized, although they looked favorably upon efforts by
the JEN in this sense. Finally, the Germans sought to establish the exact
role of the Ministry of Industry in the nuclear program. What was clear
was that the ministry made the decisions, and as a result, special care had
to be taken in relations with its leadership so that the German industry
could participate in Spanish contracts.46 The meeting occurred at the
same time that Siemens and AEG formed the company KWU, uniting
their nuclear reactor construction departments with a clear orientation
towards opening the domestic market and also opening up to exports.47
he Capture of the Trillo Contract in the “Great

T
Spanish Nuclear Market”
The 1960s and early 1970s were the moment of greatest fascination with
the neutrons economy in Spain among both public and private enter-
prise. There were limited considerations regarding its safety, which was
afforded six lines of a seven-page report describing the Spanish nuclear
program in Lugano in 1969. The issue of waste and long-term effects did
not appear in those lines. The state holding of INI participated with a
30% stake in Ibernuclear along with 70% by the private firms with the
objective of producing enriched uranium and natural uranium for the
reactors, pointing to the need for foreign technical assistance for the facil-
ity. There was also interest in building a reprocessing plant for irradiated
fuel from the already established plants. Finally, the demand was not just
for fuel, plants and reactors; there was also growing demand for radioac-
tive isotopes in pharmacology.48 Furthermore, the developmentalist
nuclear project was not only the dream of a military dictatorship and a
new and costly vector of electricity generation for businesses, but it was
also the axis of a diversification process related to the neutron economy
with multiple direct and indirect industrial ramifications and interna-
tional public and private connections.
The program presented by the JEN at the 1969 meeting of the
European Atomic Energy Society already included the Trillo plant,
although not yet under that name. When did the Trillo project begin? In
February of 1967, Unión Eléctrica Madrileña (UEM) requested the
expansion of the Zorita plant with a new 500–600 MWe reactor. In
1970, the company requested an expansion in capacity with Zorita II
and Zorita III. In May of 1972, UEM presented the draft project at the
Delegation of the Ministry of Industry and the plant would be located in
Trillo (a small rural village in the province of Guadalajara). It sought
authorization to install two reactors with a capacity of 1000 MWe each.
The first unit was slated to begin functioning in 1982 and the second in
1986. In 1974, a new draft project was presented “in accordance with
the conclusions of our National Electricity Plan”. The increase in capac-
ity was associated with “technological advances that allow for higher-
capacity groups” and the consideration of an optimal size of 1000 MWe
because the equipment “needs to be complemented with pumping facili-

ties that utilize excess energy at the site, thus achieving maximal use of
the plants”. This was the era of efficient nuclear parks, of the “simultane-
ous benefits of scale and duplication” and “proximity to the center of
consumption”. The “notable reduction in consumption” mentioned in
the speech to the shareholders in 1974 and 1975 did not lead to any
modification of the project.49 The new location in Trillo was associated
with the canalization of water resources from the Tagus River to the
Segura River to bring water to the east of the country. The new canaliza-
tion reduced the water resources and the necessary cooling capacity of
the Tagus River in the area of the old Zorita plant.50 UEM, which now
possessed water-use rights at Entrepeñas, Buendía and Bolarque reser-
voirs, had a 40% stake in the canalization,51 which utilized electricity for
pumping and was part of the Second Development Plan. The German
public company Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) financed through
credit valued at 160 million marks and 40 million more in financial
assistance the new canalization. This same entity provided credit for
exports for the construction of Trillo in 1975, among many others.52
Two other companies will enter the Trillo project. EIASA and Electricas
Reunidas de Zaragoza (ERZ) had 20% each one. 60% remained in
UEM hands on 9 June 1975.53
In early 1971, when Trillo was still considered an expansion of Zorita,
KWU was already demonstrating interest in the project.54 However,
KWU had not obtained any nuclear contracts in Spain, despite having
participated in the tenders for plants at Almaraz and Lemóniz in 1969.
The contracts for all the equipment were awarded to Westinghouse.55 The
same occurred with the two reactors at Ascó, despite Siemens’ good rela-
tions and industrial presence in the area, while the Confrentes plant went
to General Electric.
Despite the improved offers, there was a significant obstacle, and not
only for the German company. On one hand, the European capital mar-
ket could not compete with the financial conditions of Eximbank,56
which were impossible to match or exceed for such costly projects with-
out ignoring other sectors. On the other hand, the system of guarantees
for an official German loan was more demanding than in North America.
Finally, in the case of the Almaraz and Lemóniz plants, the Spanish
Ministry of Industry declined to give KWU the guarantee from the

Spanish government that it ended up giving to Westinghouse.57 KWU’s
offer of collaboration and technical assistance on fuel manufacturing to
the ENUSA’s president during his trip to West Germany in 1972 was not
embraced, nor was there German collaboration at ENSA.58 After losing
the tender for the reactors at Ascó, Wahlter Schnurr, coordinator of
German relations with Pakistan, Argentina, Chile and Spain, synthesized
the contradictory situation: (a) Spain was bound up with the US for its
supply of enriched uranium; (b) Spanish electrical companies were
dependent on Westinghouse, and Ascó was one such multinational proj-
ect; and (c) the JEN was seeking to produce enriched uranium in its own
facilities using Westinghouse reactors in the process.59 However, a com-
pany with an integral fuel production cycle was never established in
Spain. In 1972, Alfredo Les Floristán and Julio Hernández Rubio visited
SBK (Schnell-Brüter-Kernkraftwerks Gesellschaft mbH) in Essen, which
was linked to the fast breeder and emphasized UEM’s collaboration
agreement for the project, as well as the participation of other European
businesses in the prototype.60
The Trillo contract entered a new phase between 1973 and 1975.
Changing circumstances altered the context. The end of Bretton Woods led
to the first monetary fluctuations as of the early 1970s, affecting businesses
as well as states. The oil crisis opened up new opportunities for nuclear
expansion. Inflation and instability in the balance of payments made for-
eign currency more important to the Spanish nuclear program. The
monopoly on enriched uranium began to shift, though without disappear-
ing entirely, with uranium from the USSR entering the market. There were
Ostpolitik in West Germany and in Spain under the Franco dictatorship.
UEM itself compared offers for nuclear fuel recharge and the inspection of
the Zorita plant between Westinghouse and “the Germans” in 1973, opt-
ing for the former for its “lower price” due to “liquidations and pending
prior payments” with Westinghouse.61 In 1974, UEM cancelled fuel sup-
ply contracts for that plant with Weico (Westinghouse Electric International
Company) and Wapcos (Westinghouse Atomic Power Company of Spain)
and signed a new one with Westinghouse.62 Meanwhile, the Eximbank did
not finance the same percentage of nuclear purchases in 1974, according to
the company records of UEM.63
German diplomacy, scientific and technical cooperation and businesses

had been working in a coordinated manner and with shared information.
Bilateral diplomatic talks between Spain and West Germany included
many related issues such as the installation of the PAL versus SECAM
system of television, collaboration between CASA and Eurokopter, Spain’s
request for financial assistance for the Júcar-Turia project, and interest in
Trillo, among others. Specialized scientific and technical cooperation in
the nuclear arena made an important stride with the signing in 1973 of
the agreement between the JEN and the Nuclear Research Society, to
which the KFK belonged. Karl Wirtz was present, along with Foreign
Minister López Rodo, the German ambassador in Madrid, and represen-
tatives from the company Interatom (property of KWU).64
The JEN was undoubtedly a powerful intermediary for KWU on its
path towards securing the Trillo bid. However, what was in play in the
relationship at that stage was not only the provision of scientific equip-
ment but also knowledge regarding safety, evaluation and technical
inspections. In 1971, a leak of radioactive water at the Moncloa facilities
brought international inspectors to Spain. In late 1972, there were hints
about problems at the Zorita plan due to failures in an intake valve and
in the control system. In 1974 there were failures in the PWR reactor
vessel.65 Meanwhile, safety began to be part of the strategic marketing of
plants internationally in the 1970s. At the time, safety was conceived of
more in terms of “engineering” than of “occupational health and safety”,
as if all the activity inside and outside of a plant were automated, when
in fact it was not. The objective was to offer “safety” in the face of possi-
ble “enemies” both inside and outside the plants, as well as against acci-
dents and stoppages by reactors, which had occurred and limited the
capacity of those that were already installed.66 As noted, the Trillo con-
cession granted to KWU in late 1975 was associated with the occasion of
the Hispanic–German meeting on nuclear safety and protection from
radiation in fall of that year. It was clear to the German attendees that the
JEN possessed broad theoretical knowledge regarding the material and
scant practical experience. Particularly surprising was that there was no
system of information and accounting for radiation doses among person-
nel at nuclear facilities. However, the JEN’s “vital interest” was not on
radiation protection but on the safety expertise and evaluation that

accompanied authorizations in West Germany. The institution inter-
vened in this process in Spain. Agustín Alonso Santos of the department
of nuclear safety stated that the JEN would have a role in the future
authorization of Trillo—as of August, the plant was only pre-autho-
rized—and that the electric companies were aware of the relationship
with West Germany. Plans were made to visit the German Institute for
Reactor Safety and form a relationship with its system of technical
inspection for industrial facilities. The JEN had just signed a contract for
the exchange of experiences regarding plants with the North American
USNRC and was interested in similar experiences “in view of the Trillo
project”. It was also attempting to utilize calculation programs distinct
from North America’s LOCA analysis for Trillo, as this was proving bur-
densome. Finally, technical support was requested from the JEN in “the
process leading to the authorization of Trillo”. In the mutual understand-
ing initiated through this plant, it was also surprising that the cost of the
entire evaluation process ahead of official authorization did not fall on
the proponent company, as in West Germany, but rather on the Ministry
of Industry.67
Another controversial issue was that of the differences between the
North American system of contracts—well known among Spanish elec-
tric companies—and KWU’s turnkey system, especially as it related to
greater participation for Spanish businesses and engineering consultants
in the construction of the plant. As recognized years later by representa-
tives of the consulting firms, for Spanish engineering, the Trillo conces-
sion meant “complete responsibility for engineering and architectural
services for this plant, without the participation of foreign engineering”.
The objective was to develop and provide the services that had tradition-
ally been in the hands of foreign consultants.68 With Trillo, KWU had
obtained “the reactor, the turbine generator, the fuel and part of the engi-
neering, while the complete development of the project would be in the
hands of a Spanish architecture and engineering firm”.69 It was West
Germany’s only imported plant and also the most Spanish one of them
all. This greater responsibility stemmed from a process of globalization of
knowledge-based services,70 which was based on businesses with experi-
ence in building nuclear plants prior to Trillo and on its broad relationship
with North American engineering companies. Projects built before Trillo

used two engineering companies, one local and one foreign, with Gibbs
& Hill Inc. and Bechtel at the helm.71 The company slated to oversee
engineering at Trillo would be Empresarios Agrupados, which was formed
through a joint venture by EPTISA, GHESA and Técnicas Reunidas
S.A. The former was the property of Banco Urquijo and was directed for
many years by Julio Hernández Rubio (now president of the UEM
Administrative Council). Finally, the work of Peter von Siemens since the
1960s may have been influential. The Siemens president, who was well
connected at UEM through Luis de Urquijo y Landecho, industrial
group President Marqués de Bolarque, and Siemens España President
Jose María Aguirre Gonzalo, extended his network of relationships with
major Spanish entrepreneurs. Spanish industry and KWU had regularly
cooperated in supplying parts and components for various conventional
electrical plants.
Meanwhile and without government pre-authorization for the facility,
UEM was buying up landholdings in the municipality of Trillo and
receiving offers for the reactor.72 In 1973, KWU was the fourth leading
company in projects after GE, Westinghouse and Brown, Boveri & Cie
(BBC).73 Although its largest nuclear projects were not in Europe but
rather in Brazil and Iran, the large Spanish market was an important one.
Meanwhile, the German nuclear company already had a partial or full
stake in various companies linked to the integral cycle of the plants—
Interatom, Alkem, RBU (Reaktor-Brennelement Union) and NRG—as
well as an expanding stake in Siemens.74 The company had followed a
path by relying on comprehensive reactor and fuel element services. It
had just completed the plant at Borssele in Holland (which began operat-
ing in 1973) and was tasked with Gösgen-Däniken in Switzerland. The
Swiss plant would be a model for Trillo I. The nuclear plant Biblis A
(1.146 MWe) went into operation at the beginning of 1975 in West
Germany. In Spain, the company sought to sweeten the deal with finan-
cial support from KfW and demonstrated with ample data the tough
competition entailed by facing Westinghouse together with Eximbank.
Suddenly, something unexpected occurred. On July 2 1974, the US
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, which a few months later split into
different agencies including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC))
announced a decision to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment con-

tracting. This decision was made to enable the AEC to review pending
requests from foreign and domestic customers as compared to its con-
tracting capability.75 In April of 1975, the US publication Weekly Energy
Report published an article titled “NRC Ruling on Exports Angers
Europe”. It described an European Economic Community (EEC) mem-
orandum protesting the decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to suspend US licenses to export reactors or nuclear material,
allegedly to review regulations and proceedings guiding these activities in
the US. The article recognized that the EEC was entirely dependent on
enriched uranium—60% from the US and 40% from the USSR—and
that it complained about delays and problems this decision could cause
for European nuclear companies.76 These delays were crucial to the Trillo
outcome.
At this same time, JEN Director Francisco Pascual Martínez informed
Wirtz that the Spanish government was in talks with the Federal Foreign
Office to seek financing for Trillo. Francisco Pascual Martínez described
Alfredo Les Floristán as “decisive” at UEM. Les Floristán told him that “it
appeared” the company was going to request a reactor from KWU. Pascual
Martínez had been deputy general director of ENSA and knew how dif-
ficult it was to obtain nuclear contracts. If the portion produced in Spain
were increased, ENSA would have a role.77 The decision-making process
was a long one. KWU’s offer was pricier than that of Westinghouse. In
the end, the UEM council was unanimous, and the explanation given by
its president, Julio Hernández Rubio, was that there was no “immediate
financial viability” in the Westinghouse offer, unlike that of KWU, which
had “firm credits and timelines”.78
They did not wait for Westinghouse. In the session on 18 November
1975, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) granted three credits for
exports for the Trillo plant worth 500 million marks ($203.67 million):
300 million marks to UEM, 100 to EIASA, and another 100 to ERZ.
The cost of the entire project was estimated to be 2.150 million marks
($875.76 million).79 On 28 November, a credit was signed with
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale for 200 million marks ($81.47
million). KWU also granted credits for the operation. On 16 December,
the contract was signed with KWU, along with credit for construction in
the amount of 310 million marks ($126.27 million).80
According to JEN’s Director in 1974, the Trillo concession was

explained by the need to diversify and reduce dependence on the US
nuclear industry on the part of electric companies and the government in
Spain. Meanwhile, important roles were also certainly played by several
other factors: scientific cooperation; the myth of the fast breeder; interest
in technological diversification; access to West German evaluation, safety
and technical inspection know-how; an increased industrial role for
Spain; greater control over local engineering; and the complementarity of
German public and private financial resources.
The successful bid for Trillo also cannot be understood without con-
sidering the long chain of reactions and business experiences forged over
the course of decades, constant communication and travel by many dif-
ferent actors, diplomatic efforts, the creation of a complete fuel cycle
nuclear industry in West Germany, the new context of openness after
1973, and the final blow by the NRC in 1975. And there was more. In a
session in November of 1975, UEM’s director mentioned the lifting of a
temporary US embargo against Spain for its lack of adhesion to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the post-Franco government
still had not signed.81 The constellation of factors comprising the puzzle
of KWU’s successful bid for the Trillo nuclear plant would never again be
replicated. Never again did the German company obtain another con-
tract as part of the Spanish nuclear enterprise, despite attempts. The con-
struction of the Trillo plant had begun to get underway at the end of a
dictatorship, and a hazardous transition to democracy awaited.
Notes
1. GLA Abt. 69 KFK-INR Nr.168. Letter, 12.09.1975. Generallandesarchiv
Karlsruhe (GLA) Nordliche Hildapromenade 3, Karlsruhe, Germany.
2. ASEPI Meeting, administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 12.09.1975.
Archivo Histórico SEPI. Velazquez 134, Madrid (Spain). BOE
15.09.1975, No. 221.
3. See Chaps. 1 and 5 on this volume. Also see Joseba de la Torre and Mar
Rubio, La financiación exterior del desarrollo industrial español a través del
IEME (1950–1982). Estudios de Historia Económica N° 69. Madrid: Banco
de España (2015). Joseba de la Torre and Mar Rubio “Learning by Doing:
The First Spanish Nuclear Plant.” Busines History Review. (forthcoming).
4. See Chap. 6 in this volume. Also see Esther M. Sánchez, “La connexió
hispano–francesa: intercanvis d’energia elèctrica i cooperació nuclear, c.
1950–1990,” Recerques 61 (2010): 101–36.
5. Javier Loscertales, Deutsche Investitionen in Spanien 1870–1920
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), 147–56. Nuria Puig Raposo and
Adoración Álvaro Moya, “La huella del capital extranjero en España: un
análisis comparado,” Revista de Historia Industrial 58 (2015): 270–1.
6. Harmut Berghoff, Moderne Unternehmensgeschichte (München: Schöningh,
2004), 172–3. Mark C. Casson and Howard Cox, “International Business
Networks: Theory and History,” Business and Economic History 22 (1993):
42–53.
7. Josef Rembser, “Atomhaushalte in den US, Groβbritannien, Frankreich
und der Bundesrepublik,” in Atomwirtschaft, March (1966): 114–18.
The author notes the difficulty of drawing comparisons. Data from Spain
in the report on the visit of the JEN in 1968 GLA Abt. 69 KfK INR-
Nr.104. Karl Wirtz. Atomenergie in Spanien 18.09.1968.
8. GLA Abt. 69 KfK-GF-1 Nr. 152. Bericht der Geschäftsführung, seit 29.
10.1955, 29.04.1960.
9. Ana Romero and José M. Sánchez Ron, Energía nuclear en España. De la
JEN al CIEMAT (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas,
Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT), 2001), 83–9.
10. GLA Abt. 69 KfK-INR Nr 257. Letter by the European Atomic Society,
10.04.1957. Energía Nuclear Nota, No. 146 November–December
(1983), 598. Data on participation in GLA Abt. 69 KfK No. 358. Dr.
Schnurr Votrag anlässlich der 1. Technischen Tagung des Deutschen
Atomforums in Karlsruhe vom 11. bis 13. 10. 1960 “Über die deutsche
Beteiligung an internationalen Projekten”.
11. Law 25 of 29 April 1946 and Law 22 of 2 March 1950. Michael Knoll,
Atomare Optionen.Westdeutsche Kernkwaffenpolitik in der Ära Adenauer
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013), 210. Tilmann Hanel, Die
Bombe als Option (Essen: Klartext, 2015), 36.
12. This was a networking space presided over by Karl Winnacker, presi-
dent of the company Hoechst, AG and the German Atomic Forum
from 1959 until 1973. Heinrich Mandel (RWE) succeeded him in
1973.
13. Strauss was followed by Siegfried Balke (CSU). In 1962, under Hans
Lenz (FDP), the ministry came to be known as Federal Ministry of
Scientific Research. It kept this name from 1965 to 1969 under Gerhard
Stoltenberg (CDU). As of 1969, under Hans Leussink (no party), it

became the Federal Ministry of Education and Science.
14. The latter institution went to the Ministry of the Interior in 1972.
15. Joachim Radkau, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Atomwirtschaft:
1945–1975. Verdrängte Alternativen in der Kerntechnik und der Ursprung
der nuklearen Kontroverse (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983), 149,
265 and 449.
16. Christian Marx, “Der zerplatzte Traum vom industriellen Atomzeitalter.
Der misslungene Einstieg westdeutscher Chemiekonzerne in die
Kernenergie während der 1960er und 70er Jahre,” Zeitschrift für
Unternehmensgeschichte (ZUG) 1/60 (2015): 3–28.
17. Susanne Hilger, “Amerikanisierung” deutscher Unternehmen. Wettbewerb
strategien und Unternehmenspolitik bei Henkel, Siemens und Daimler-
Benz (1945/49–1975) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 65–7; Hanel, Die
Bombe, 100–1.
18. Radkau, Aufstieg und Krise, 108; Hilger, “Amerikanisierung”, 68. Wielfried
Feldenkirchen, “Drivers and Limits of Americanization in the West
German Electrical and Electronics Industry,” in America as Reference?
German and Japanese Industry during the Boom Years. Transforming American
Management and Technology Models, eds. Akira Kudo, Matthias Kipping,
and Harm G. Schröter (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 120. In
1972 Siemens began working on PWR with Combustion Engineering
(CE). Wolfgang D. Müller, Geschichte der Kernenergie in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Anfänge und Weichenstellungen Band 1 (Stuttgart: Verlag für
Wirtschaft und Steuern, 1990), 415.
19. Karl Winnacker and Karl Wirtz, Das unverstandene Wunder. Kernenergie
in Deutschland (Düsseldorf and Wien: Econ Verl., 1975), 160. In the
mid-1970s, this company shifted into the hands of KWU.
20. Energía Nuclear Editorial Año XVII, July–August, No. 84 (1973), 258.
See Agustín Alonso, “La energía nuclear en Europa y el mundo,” Energía
Nuclear 143 May–June (1983): 191–209.
21. Winnacker and Wirtz, Das unverstandene 202. Radkau, Aufstieg und
Krise, 434. Christian Joppke, Mobilizing against Nuclear Energy. A
Comparison of Germany and the United States (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993), 37ff., 91ff. See for some European countries
Helena Flam, ed., States and Anti-Nuclear Movements (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1994).
22. Unión Eléctrica Madrileña, S.A. 50 años al servicio de la capital de España
(Bilbao: Imprenta industrial, 1962), 5–6. See also Chap. 5 in this
volume.
23. Albert Presas, “La correspondencia entre José M. Otero Navascués y Karl
Wirtz, un episodio de las relaciones internacionales de la Junta de Energía
Nuclear,” Arbor, 659–60 (2000): 527–602. GLA Abt.69 KfK-INR-No. 52.
24. Birgit Aschmann, Birgit Treue Freunde…? Westdeutschland und Spanien
1945–1963 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999), 231. Romero de Pablos and
Sánchez Ron, Energía nuclear en España, 69.
25. Karl Wirtz, Im Umkreis der Physik (Karlsruhe: Kernforschungszentrum
Karlsruhe GmbH, 1988), 87. GLA Abt. 69 KfK-INR Nr 52.
CSIC. Curso de Física Nuclear Aplicada November 1950–July 1951.
Otero Navascués himself recalled in a 1972 letter the early days with
Schimmelbusch, stating “we began the production of fuel with the facili-
ties supplied by you in 1952.” PA AA B35 Band 509. Letter from José
María Otero Navascués to Heinz E. Schimmelbusch, Madrid 19.06.1972.
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA AA) Kurstraβe 36, Berlin
(Germany). Romero de Pablos and Sánchez Ron, Energía Nuclear en
España, 114–16.
26. GLA Abt. 69KfK-INR Nr. 52 Letter from José Romero Ortiz to Karl
Wirtz, 06.05.1950. Letter from Karl Wirtz to Ramón Ortiz, 08.01.1955.
See Romero de Pablos and Sánchez Ron, Energía Nuclear en España,
34–40.
27. The complete report in GLA Abt. 69 KfK-INR Nr 52. Karl Wirtz.
Bericht, 5.07.1955.
28. Müller, Geschichte der Kernenergie, Vol. 1, 409.
29. GLA Abt. 69 KfK-INR Nr 52. Letter from Karl Wirtz, to Dr. H. Reuter
(Demag AG) 31.10.1960. Letter from Karl Wirtz to Dr. L. Fischer.
Zernn (Interatom), 04.11.1960. Letter from Karl Wirtz to Direktor
Dip. Ing. H.E. Schimmelbusch (Nukem), 04.11.1960. Letter from Karl
Wirtz to Otero Navascués (JEN) 29.12.1960. In 1961, an economic
cooperation agreement was signed that sought to increase participation
by German capital in Spanish companies, with long-term financing as
development assistance and the development of joint projects. BOE, 29
May 1961.
30. Energía e Industrias Aragonesas, S.A. 1918–1968. Fiftieth Anniversary
(Bilbao: Lerchundi, 1968), 32–3. Energía e Industrias Aragonesas.
Company pamphlet. 1974 s/p. About Unión Eléctrica Madrileña,
Iberduero, Viesgo and the JEN see Antonio Gómez Mendoza, “UNESA
y la autorregulación de la industria eléctrica (1944–1975),” in Electra y el
Estado, Antonio Gómez Mendoza, Carles Sudrià and Javier Pueyo (Cizur
Menor: Thomson-Civitas, 2007), 551–2.
31. PA AA B35 Band 77. Der Bundesminister für wissenschaftliche Forschung.

Betr: Zusammenarbeit, Kernforschung und Kerntechnik. 24.11.1966.
32. PA AA B35 Band 77. Auswärtiges Amt. An den Bundesminister für wis-
senschaftliche Forschung. Betr: Zusammenarbeit mit Spanien, 12.12.1966.
33. PA AA B35 Band 77. Auswärtiges Amt. Am das Bundesministerium für
wissenschaftliche Forschung. Betr. Zusammenarbeit mit Spanien,
26.01.1967. PA AA B35 Band 77. Deutsche Botschaft an das Auswärtige
Amt. Betr. Deutch-Spanische Zusammenarbiet, Madrid 26.01.1967.
PA AA B35 Band 77. Bundesminister für Wissenschaftliche Forschung.
An das Auswärtige Amt. Betr: Zusammenarbiet mit Spanien,
11.04.1967.
34. Müller, Geschichte der Kernenergie Band II, 252, 383, 415.
35. Winnacker and Wirtz, Das unverstandene, 192–3. Joachim Radkau,
“Kernenergie-Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik: ein Lernprozess. Die
ungeplante Durchsetzung des Leichtwasserreaktors und die Krise der gesell-
schaftlichen Kontrolle über die Atomwirtschaft,” in GG 4 (1978): 195–222.
36. Winnacker and Wirtz, Das unverstandene, 143–6.
37. See the Chap. 2 in this volume.
38. Frankfurter Rundschau 23.02.1967 US-Firma spielt Sperrvertrag aus.
ABC 24.02.1967. Industriales norteamericanos se interfieren en la venta
a España de una central de energía nuclear. GLA Abt 69 KfK INR Nr.
57 Atomkraftwerke in Spanien, Pläne für die Errichtung neuer
Atomkraftwerke 11.04.1973. AMT Unión Eléctrica S.A. Anteproyecto
de la Central Nuclear de Trillo. Madrid, mayo de 1974. Ingeniero de
caminos Eduardo Díaz del Río; Ingenieros industriales Jaime Suárez
Gómez y Juan Ignacio Pardo Albarellos. 1-2 Box 87. Archivo Municipal
de Trillo (AMT), Plaza Mayor, 1. Trillo (Spain).
39. Relations between West Germany and United States in a letter from
Glen W. Wensch of the reactor development division of USAEC to Karl
Wirtz of KfK in GLA Abt. 69 KfK Nr.393. 10.02.1964.
40. Romero de Pablos and Sánchez Ron, Energía Nuclear en España, 187–8.
41. GLA Abt. 69 KfK Nr. 901. Prospect of development of fast-breeder
reactors in the European Community. March 1973. Report prepared by
UNIPEDE. See also Klaus Barthelt, “Entwicklungsperspektiven in der
Nuklearindustrie,” Atomwirtschaft, August–September (1987): 399.
42. PA AA B35 Band 77. Abteilung I. Aufzeichnung. Betr: Zusammenarbeit
mit Spanien, 25.07.1967. PA B35 Band 77. Letter from Dr. Gerhard
Stoltenberg to Gregorio López-Bravo 04.08.1967.
43. PA AA B35 Band 77. Abteilung I. Aufzeichnung. Betr: Zusammenarbeit

mit Spanien, 25.07.1967. PA AA B35 Band 77. Letter from Dr. Gerhard
Stoltenberg to Gregorio López-Bravo 04.08.1967. PA AA B35 Band 77.
Letter from López Bravo to Gerhard Stoltenberg, 13.09.1967. Letter
from Gerhard Stoltenberg to Gregorio López-Bravo 15.09.1967. PA AA
B35 Band 77. Memorandum 08.09.1967. For both the letter on 4
August and the letter on 15 September, Stoltenberg did not utilize dip-
lomatic channels, which led to a complaint by Ambassador Meyer-
Lindenberg on 27 October 1967. PA AA B35 Band 77. Auswärtiges
Amt. An das Bundesministerium für wissenschaftliche Forschung. Betr.
Deutsch-Spanische Zusammenarbeit, 27.12.1967. PA AA B35 Band 77.
Fernschreiben. Madrid 18.10.1967 (Scheel).
44. PA AA B35 Band 77. Schriftbericht-Fernschreiben aus Madrid.31.10.1967.
PA B35 Band 77. Ergebnisprotokoll […] über die deutsch-spanische
Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der schnellen Brüterreaktoren am 26.
und 27. Oktober 1967 in Madrid. PA AA B35 Band 77. Ergebnisprotokoll
[…] über die deutsch-spanische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der
schnellen Brüterreaktoren am 26. und 27. Oktober 1967 in Madrid.
45. PA AA B35 Band 382.Sachstand. Unterzeichnung des Rahmenabkommens
zwischen Deutschland und Spanien über Zusammenarbeit in der wissen-
schaftlichen Forschung und Technologischen Entwicklung. 16.04.1970.
46. GLA Abt, 69 KfK Nr. 455 Wirtz, Karl. Besuch der spanischen Delegation
am 8. Juli 1969.
47. Hilger, “Amerikanisierung”, 61. “Bernhard Plettner began in 1966, while
still CEO of SSW (Siemens-Schuckerwerke AG) to push for a merger of
the activities of the two companies in the power business. He believed
that such a merger was the right way to deal effectively with the interna-
tional competition and the changing market.” Wilfried Feldenkirchen
and Eberhard Posner, “Bernhard Plettner. New Markets and Fields of
Business,” in The Siemens Entrepreneurs. Continuity and Change,
1847–2005 (Munich/Zurich: Piper, 2006), 169.
48. GLA Abt. 69 Kfk INR Nr.104. Atomenergie in Spanien 18.09.1968.
Ana Romero and José M. Sánchez Ron, Energía nuclear en España,
149–55. GLA Abt. 69 Kfk INR Nr. 57 Junta de Energía Nuclear.
Nuclear programme activities prepared for European Atomic Energy
Society Meeting, Lugano April 26–30 1969.
49. ASEPI Administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 27.06.1969 Box 4719.
ASEPI Memoramdum 70. Commission of Union Eléctrica. 27.10.1970.
Box 4719. ASEPI Speech by the president to shareholders. 26.05.1975.

Box 5550.
50. AMT. Unión Eléctrica S.A Anteproyecto. 2-3, Box 87. ABC 28.01.1968.
The new canalization was geared toward export agriculture and future
investment in housing and tourism.
51. ASEPI Memorandum 141 of the commission of Unión Eléctrica.
31.03.1973. Box 5193.
52. PA AA B35 Band 382. Besuch Bundesminister in Madrid. 27.04.1970.
53. Details provided in the preamble to the pre-authorization grant, BOE
15.09.1975. No. 221.
54. PA AA B35 Band 509. Deutsche Botschaft. Industrielle Anwendung der
Atomenergie in Spanien 25.01.1971.
55. Presenting offers for PWR reactors were Westinghouse, Combustion
Engineering and KWU (Siemens). Presenting offers for BWR reactors
General Electric, the Swedish company ASEA, British Nuclear Design
and Construction Ltd (BNDC) and KWU (AEG). PA AA B 35 Band
509. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft. An das Auswärtige Amt. Betr: Spanien/
Kernkraftwerkprojekt in Almaraz und Lemoniz. 09.09.1971.
57. PA AA B 35 Band 509. Deutsche Botschaft. Industrielle Anwendung in
Spanien. Hier: Kernkraftwerke Lemóniz und Almaraz. 01.12.1971. De
la Torre and Rubio Varas La financiación exterior, 148. Winnacker and
Wirtz Das unverstandene, 130–1.
58. PA AA B 35 Band 509. Letter from José María Otero Navascués to
Heinz E. Schimmelbusch. Madrid 19.06.1972. PA AA B 35 Band 509.
Deutsche Botschaft. Betr: Deutsch-Spanische Zusammenarbeit,
07.07.1972.
59. PA AA B35 Band 509. Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft.
An das Auswärtige Amt. Betr: Koordination für Spanien, Argentinien
und Rumänien 08.05.1972.
60. ASEPI Speech by the president to the shareholders on the exercise of
1971. 20.05.1972. Memorandum of the Unión Eléctrica meeting held
14 November 1972. Box 5048. About the SNR-300 ASEPI Speech by
the president to the shareholders on the exercise of 1973. 12.05.1974.
Box 5378.
61. ASEPI Note […] Administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 9.11.1973.
Box 504. In 1973 Eurodif was born with the participation of ENUSA.
Unión Eléctrica had shares in ENUSA. ASEPI Note […] Administrative
council of Unión Eléctrica 15.02.1974. Box 5378.
62. ASEPI Minutes of the delegate commission in the administrative coun-

cil 01.03.1974. Box 5378.
63. ASEPI Note […] Administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 4.10.1974.
Box 5378.
64. PA AA 114270. GfK. An die Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in
Madrid. Deutsch-Spanische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der
Kernenergie. (Pressemitteilung) 18.7.1973. PA AA 114270. Unterzeichnung
der Einzelvereinbarung GfK-JEN und Übergabe des Mehrzweck-
Natriumsveruchkreislaufs am 27. Juli 1973 in Madrid. 7.09.1973. Leiter des
Internationalen Büros der GfK. Dr. Hans Jürgen Laue.
65. ASEPI Memorandum 133 of the Comisión de la Unión Eléctrica de
12.12.1972. Box 5193. ASEPI Note […] administrative council of
Unión Eléctrica 4.10.1974. Box 5378.
66. Radkau Aufstieg and Krise, 344ff.
67. GLA 69 Kfk INR Nr. 53. Internationales Büro. D. Nentwich. Betr: 1.
Deutsch–spanisches Seminar über “Strahlenschutz und Nukleare
Sicherheit” in Madrid vom 29.9–10.10.1975.
68. A. Cerrolaza, F. Albisu, and F.P. Zabalza, “Development of Engineering
Services with the Evolution of the Nuclear Programme,” Nuclear
Engineering International, Survey of Spain, January (1977), 51–3.
Cerrolaza represented INITEC-Energía, Albisu represented Sener, and
Zabalza represented Empresarios Agrupados.
69. Müller, Geschichte der Kernenergie, Band II., 414.
70. Adoración Alvaro Moya, “The Globalization of Knowledge Based
Services: Engineering Consulting in Spain, 1953–1975,” Business History
Review, 88, no. 4 (2014): 681–707.
72. ASEPI Report on activities in Unión Eléctrica S.A 1974 Box 5550.
73. Hilger, “Amerikanisierung”, 73.
74. Hilger “Amerikanisierung”, 69. Thomas (1988) p. 162. Steve D. Thomas,
“Federal Republic of Germany,” in The Realities of Nuclear Power: International
Economic and Regulatory Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), 128–64.
75. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 created the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; it began operations on January 19, 1975. https://www.nrc.
gov/about-nrc/history.htmlU.S. State Department telegram to the
IAEA, July 15, 1974. NARA Document Number: 1974STATE152033_b.
I thank M. Rubio Varas for this information.
76. Weekly Energy Report, “NRC Ruling on Exports angers Europe”. April
14 1975.
77. GLA 69 KfK INR No. 53 K. Wirtz. Gespräch mit Pascual, Junta de
Energía Nuclear am 23.04.1975 in Paris.
78. ASEPI Minutes of the administrative council of Unión Eléctrica
25.06.1975. Box 5550.
79. ASEPI Minutes of the administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 28.11.1975.
Box 5550. KfW Historisches Konzernarchiv 3042/1Exportkredit Unión
Eléctrica S.A. (Madrid) Nr. IV/22a. Exportkredit Eléctricas Reunidas de
Zaragoza S.A (Zaragoza); Exportkredit Energía e Industrias Aragonesas S.A
(Madrid) Nr.IV/ 22b. Kreditbewilliungsausschusssitzung am 18.11.1975.
Historisches Konzernarchiv-KfW. Charlottenstraβe 33/33a, Berlin
(Germany). Hipólito Español, 1975–1985. Crisis energética. Aumento del
peso eléctrico aragonés, in ed. Luis Germán Zubero, ERZ (1910–1990). El
desarrollo del sector eléctrico en Aragón (Zaragoza: IFC-ERZ, 1990), 203.
Exchange rate between US$ and DM (deutsche Mark) in 1975
1$=2.4550DM. Lawrence H. Officer, “Exchange Rates between the United
States Dollar and Forty-One Currencies.” MeasuringWorth, 2017.
80. ASEPI Note […] administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 19.12.1975.
Box 5551.
81. ASEPI Note […] administrative council of Unión Eléctrica 28.11.1975.
Box 5551.
Gloria Sanz Lafuente (gloria.sanz@unavarra.es) is Doctor in History and assis-

tant professor of Economic History at the Universidad Pública de Navarra.
Visiting Research Fellow at the Heidelberg University and Research Fellow in the
Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz (Germany). European Research
interests in Social and Economic Histoy (19 and 20th centuries). Publications
in Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the UK.
8
Energy Planning, Nuclear Promises
and Realities
Beatriz Muñoz-Delgado
and M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
By 1978, as the delays accumulated in the construction of the Spanish

nuclear power plants, the president of one of the utilities promoting
nuclear power in Spain insisted before its shareholders’ general assembly
on the importance of continuing with the nuclear plans:
1. nuclear power is the only solution to meet the growing electricity

demand in Spain at least until the end of the century,
(project ref. HAR2014-53825-R).
B. Muñoz-Delgado (*)
Department of Economic Analysis: Economic Theory and Economic History,
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
Universidad Pública de Navarra, Pamplona, Navarra, Spain

218 B. Muñoz-Delgado and M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas
2. nuclear power has been adopted by all civilized countries, whichever

their political regime,
3. nuclear energy is more economical than that obtained by other sys-
tems, therefore constituting a key factor for the competitiveness of our
industry,
4. the delays in the 7 reactors currently being built is causing very serious
damage to the economy of the country, imposing an unnecessary
external indebtedness by the import of petroleum,
5. in addition to the mentioned economic harm, the delays […] threaten
to produce electric energy restrictions precisely in the years in which a
recovery of the national economy can be expected coinciding with the
entry of Spain into the [European] Common Market.1
In just a few sentences the speech laid down the principal promises
that had been pushing the Spanish nuclear program since its inception:
nuclear power was the only solution for meeting the ever-growing elec-
tricity demand, besides being the cheapest of all the alternative technolo-
gies, and a key to fight the expensive dependence on imported oil. There
had been additional explicit and implicit potentials associated with the
deployment of nuclear power in the previous decades: nuclear power
would help to modernize the country, raising Spanish industry to inter-
national levels; it would create thousands of jobs and bring economic
development to the destitute areas where the plants sit and so on.
Energy became one of the strategic sectors for Franco’s regime since it
was directly related to economic growth. The absolute dependence on
imported oil implied that petroleum imports represented a quarter
(24.4%) of the total imports of Spain in 1950. The external energy depen-
dence and the energy bill were not only a heavy burden but a hindrance
for the autarky’s purposes. Moreover, the Spanish energy prospects pointed
to a great increase in energy consumption, in general, and in electricity
consumption in particular. Nuclear energy arose as an answer for the
increasing electricity demand, the energy-mix diversification and for min-
imizing the high external dependence and the associated energy bill.
In this chapter, we first have a look at the energy planning objectives
and promises that justified the atomic option in the earliest forecast about
Energy Planning, Nuclear Promises and Realities 219
nuclear power in Spain. The arguments mirrored those of the interna-

tional literature. Then we turn to examine the compliance of the objectives
in the composition of the energy field by looking at the impact of nuclear
energy on energy issues such as the actual changes in the energy matrix,
the external energy dependence and the security of supply. We also chal-
lenge the “too cheap to meter” argument by showing the historical evolu-
tion of electricity prices after nuclear power utilization began. In the final
section of the chapter, we turn to some of the externalities of the intro-
duction of nuclear power in Spain such as its impact on the introduction
of quality controls across a wide array of industries and the creation of a
nuclear industrial cluster. Our contributions, far from being a final bal-
ance on the rate of achievements obtained or failed, rather aim at shed-
ding some historical light on the promises made and the realities that
followed.
isions of the Future: Nuclear Optimism

V
and Energy Planning
Probably the first non-governmental technical-economic report on the
need to incorporate nuclear energy into the Spanish energy matrix was
produced by the Research Service of Banco Urquijo in February 1957.2
Entitled “Essay on a nuclear program for Spain” (“Ensayo sobre un pro-
grama de energía nuclear en España”) and written by Jaime MacVeigh,
the essay concluded that before 1970 Spain would face a major deficit
of traditional electricity generation that could only be offset by intro-
ducing nuclear power. Given the urgent need to meet the excess
demand, MacVeigh urged in his essay to start working on the first com-
mercial nuclear power plant no later than 1964 and continue later at an
exponential rate. According to the hypotheses of the essay, nuclear
power installed in 1970 should be 0.35 GW, peaking by the year 2000
between a minimum of 21 GW to a maximum of 39 GW of nuclear
power generation. Or, what is the same, the equivalent to a minimum
of 106 to a maximum of 194 nuclear reactors of 200 MWe operating in
the year 2000.3
MacVeigh’s hypotheses on the growth between 5 and 7% annually of

the Spanish electric demand from 1950 to 2000 proved to be excessively
conservative in the short term and medium term, although remarkably
precise in the long term, as shown in Fig. 8.1. His nuclear projections,
however, were extremely optimistic. At the height of the Spanish nuclear
program, in the final phase of the dictatorship, between 1971 and 1976,
the installed capacity would never have exceeded 33 GW if all the proj-
ects that the utilities applied for had become operational.4
MacVeigh knew the obstacles that a project like the one he was propos-
ing would have to face. Just as the president of General Electric at the
40
Nuclear power operave (GW) right axis
Nuclear min forecast (GW)

35
FORECAST VS HISTORICAL NUCLEAR POWER INSTALLED CAPACITY (GW)

Nuclear max forecast (GW)
30
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION (LOG OF KWH PER CAPITA)
historical elect. Consumpon (le)
elect cons max forecast (7%) -le- 25
Elec. cons. min forecast (5%)-le-

1000
20
15
10
100 0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Fig. 8.1 Forecast for electricity consumption and nuclear needs by MacVeigh
(1957) vs. historical data of electricity consumption and nuclear capacity Spain
1950–2000
Sources: Jaime MacVeigh, Ensayo sobre un Programa de Energía Nuclear en España (Madrid:
Banco Urquijo, 1957). Memories of UNESA for actual electricity consumption divided by the
population in Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell, Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos
XIX y XX, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Fundación BBVA, 2005). Joseba de la Torre and María del Mar
Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement in the
Spanish Atomic Program, 1950–1985,” Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016):
385–411, doi:0022009415599448 for the nuclear historical installed capacity
same time, MacVeigh recognized that the technical problems were solved
but the economic were not.5 The report from the Urquijo Research
Service admitted that the cost of nuclear kWh produced at commercial
nuclear power plants at that time was no less than twice the current fossil
fuel costs. MacVeigh further stated in his essay that the order of magni-
tude of investments in nuclear power plants from 1965 to 2000 would
have to be between 150 and 280 billion pesetas of 1955 (from $14 to $25
billion at the official exchange rate); that is excluding the additional facil-
ities that a nuclear program would entail. Including those, the full devel-
opment of the program could account for 25–40% more.6
Despite the foreseeable obstacles, one month after the publication of
the MacVeigh’s report, in March 1957, the companies Electra de Viesgo
and Iberduero constituted the joint-stock company Nuclenor for the
development of nuclear power in the north of the country. Also in April
1957, Tecnatom was set up to serve as technical support in the stamping
of nuclear energy in Spain, supported by Urquijo Bank itself among other
banks and MacVeigh as the company’s main promoter and CEO from its
birth. In 1958, Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola), Unión Eléctrica
Madrileña (UEM) and the Sevillana de Electricidad promoted Cenusa,
with the intention to develop nuclear power in the south.7 So the com-
mercial development of nuclear energy in Spain began in a regionalized
market that mirrored the actual split of the nation’s electricity supply
among the electricity companies (see Chaps. 2, 3 and 5).
The consumption of electricity in Spain had a very regional imprint,
marked by the concentration of industry in few provinces. Industrial
consumption accounted for almost 80% of all electricity consumption of
the country in 1960 (that is excluding domestic services—buildings and
transport, public lighting and agricultural uses of electricity).8 By 1975,
industrial consumption still accounted for almost 60% of all electricity
consumption.9 Figure 8.2 shows the Spanish industrial electricity con-
sumption by province in 1960. The six provinces with the largest electric-
ity consumption for industrial purposes (Barcelona, Asturias, Vizcaya,
Guipúzcoa, Madrid and Cantabria) consumed more together than the
remaining 44 provinces of the country. Furthermore, the electricity con-
sumption of the industry installed in the province of Barcelona alone
surpassed that of the 29 provinces with the least industrial electric con-
sumption. It appears then clear that the projects of the first generation of
Fig. 8.2 Map of Spanish provincial industrial electricity consumption in 1960

Source: own elaboration based on data from Ministerio de Industria, Dirección General de
Industria, Estadística de la Industria de Energía Eléctrica, Resumen del Año 1960 (Madrid,
1961), 16–17
nuclear reactors in Spain responded to the need to feed the industrial

rush of those regions: Zorita for Madrid, Garoña for the Northern regions
(Asturias, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa and Cantabria) and, for the needs of
Barcelona, the projects of Vandellós.
The perceived pressing need to develop nuclear power to meet the
growing electricity demand as consequence of the fast industrialization in
the country permeated the early discourses about the matter. Manuel
Gutiérrez-Cortines, vice president and CEO of Nuclenor explained it in
1958 at a conference about the atomic plants in the building programs of
the electricity companies:
“The strong industrialization of the country […] was a source of concern

to all those who somehow had the responsibility for the electrical supplies
of the country. Because the foreseen needs for electricity cannot be achieved
by the technical means considered hitherto normal, since the water supplies
of the nation do not reach quadruple of what is now in service and the
problem cannot be solved by thermal generation without any limit. Because
the national production of coal is now scarce in order to fully cover national
needs. Because coal and oil, even if they were disposed of in a reasonable
amount, cannot be happily burned in the generation of electricity, since
they are better employed in other ways for the national economy and
because in any case, their use in the enormous quantities that would be
necessary, would mean a sacrifice in foreign currency and a dependence on
foreign trade, which at all costs should be avoided. In view of this situation,
it was obviously necessary to find another procedure other than hydraulic
and thermal technologies to generate the electrical energy that is needed.
But this procedure was not found in the tides, nor in the winds, nor in the
force of the sun. That is why as soon as it became clear that atomic energy
could be the solution to the problem, all important electrical companies
would closely monitor the possibilities of this new technique, which fortu-
nately soon proved to be capable of generating important amounts of elec-
tricity; at prices about which initially we had very little idea, but that in any
case, would be infinitely less expensive for the nation that strangles its
industrial development by lack of electrical energy’’.10
The ideas expressed by Gutiérrez-Cortines before the whole of the

Spanish industrial sector in 1958 simply translated those expressed in
international reports about nuclear energy. The Department of Economic
and Social Affairs of the United Nations concluded in 1957 that “the sav-
ings in annual outlay of foreign exchange that may result from the use of
nuclear power will be of importance, in particular to those underdevel-
oped countries which suffer acute external-payments difficulties and
where conventional fuel has to be imported”.11 In turn these ideas about
the relevance of atomic power for the industrialization process of
backward economies had already been put in place by the Cowles

Foundation report about the economic aspects of nuclear power in
1950.12 This same report was amply cited and its conclusions repeated at
one of the earliest conferences about nuclear energy and industrialization
in Spain, pronounced in 1954.13 And the same ideas kept repeating in the
decades ahead as we saw in the opening sentences of this chapter.
Upon these foundations of imported arguments, the Spanish govern-
ment and the electricity entrepreneurs’ association—UNESA—threw
themselves into achieving the target of producing nuclear electricity. The

energy sector has been considered for many decades as a strategic sector
that needed to be regulated by the economic authorities. In Spain, the
energy activities have historically been considered a public service operat-
ing under conditions where the market solutions were very limited. There
was a wide scope for planning the energy supply and demand. The indic-
ative planning of the 1960s also reached the energy industry, but with the
energy crisis of the 1970s the idea of ordering the energy markets from a
public planning body took on more force. The national energy plans have
embodied the desires and objectives of this conception of energy activi-
ties.14 Yet, for the electricity sector the government entrusted the electric
lobby—UNESA—with the task of planning and forecasting the needs of
the country from 1944 until the late 1970s (see Chaps. 2, 3 and 5 in this
volume). The successive forecasts about nuclear foreseeable installed
capacity are shown in Table 8.1. Following MacVeigh’s forecasts, UNESA
worked on the projections for the future of the Spanish nuclear capacity
from the early 1960s. The first National Electricity Plan (PEN, by its
Spanish initials), prepared by UNESA and published by the government
in August 1969, projected 2500 MWe of nuclear installed capacity for
1975, and 8500 MWe for 1981.15 The successive projections reflected the
optimism of the electricity companies—who kept elaborating the figures
later published by the government. For their forecast, they assumed
growth rates above 6% annually for the economy and 10% for the elec-
tricity demand, which had overgrown the economy since the early 1960s.
The idea behind the PEN-1975 was the inevitability that the energy con-
sumption would continue to grow above the GDP.16 Therefore, main-
taining economic growth required an ambitious expansion of energy
supply, which had to be electric and nuclear, which resulted in a forecast
of 22.5 GW nuclear installed capacity for 1985.
The economic impact of the first oil crisis changed the economic real-
ity, and the political transition altered the role of the electricity lobby as
the de facto planner of the electricity market. The Spanish economy’s
developmentalist growth cycle had almost run its course, and the country
was entering a period of recession marked by rising energy prices, steep
industrial decline, falling power demand, a number of bank failures and
increasing inflation.17 The first democratic elections were held in July
Table 8.1 Successive historical forecasts for nuclear installed capacity in Spain
Forecasted Nuclear forecasts for different years (GW)

from year Source 1981 1983 1985 1987 1990
1957 MacVeigh (Urquijo 3.0–4.0 5.8–8.5 8.7–14
Bank)
1969 1st National Electricity 8.5
Plan (PEN-1968)
1972 Reviewed 1st PEN 8.0 15.0
1975 Concerted action plan 22.7
1975 2nd National 22.5
Electricity Plan
(PEN-1975 draft
version)
Proposals for 2nd PEN
by:
1977 UNESA 25.4
1977 Oliart 10.5–13.4
1978 Fuentes Quintana 10.5
1978 National Energy Plan 9.5
(PEN-1978)
1979 PEN 78/84 10.5
1982 PEN 81/90 10.5 12.5
1984 PEN 84 (moratorium) 5.7 7.7
Sources and notes: Own elaboration from Jaime MacVeigh, Ensayo sobre un
Programa de Energía Nuclear en España (Madrid: Banco Urquijo, 1957); Juan
Muñoz and Ángel Serrano, “La Configuración del Sector Eléctrico y el Negocio
de la Construcción de Centrales Nucleares”, Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico 63–69
(1979): 127–267; Plan Eléctrico Nacional, Orden del Ministerio de Industria de
31 de Julio de 1969, BOE 30/8/1969; Revisión del Plan Eléctrico Nacional, Orden
del Ministerio de Industria de 17 de Julio de 1972, BOE 29/7/1972; Ministerio de
Industria y Energía, Plan Energético Nacional 1978–1987 (Madrid, 1979);
Congreso de los Diputados, Plan Energético Nacional de 1983 (Spain: Boletin
Oficial de las Cortes Generales. No. 42, 1984).
1977. It is precisely that year when we can make a clear distinction

between the electricity lobby forecasts and that of part of the govern-
ment, that halved the former in the proposal brought for approval. The
rejection of the reduced plans at the Ministers Council produced a gov-
ernment crisis (see Table 8.1 and Chap. 2). The plan rejected, at its lower
estimate, still implied that 50% of the expected growth in the primary
energy consumption of the issuing decade belonged to the electricity sec-
tor.18 Eventually, the succeeding National Energy Plans kept adjusting
downwards the nuclear forecasts, aligning the expected installed capacity

to the new economic, energetic and financial reality, until the nuclear
moratorium was established by 1984 (see Chaps. 2 and 5).
From the hindsight of history, we can observe the fundamental changes
that could not be envisaged by the forecasters from 1970 onwards.
Figure 8.3 provides evidence of the electricity intensity of the Spanish
GDP (a ratio of the total electricity generation divided by the GDP at
factor costs) from 1950 to 2000. The data in Fig. 8.3 reveal that the trend
for electricity growth to unmistakably outpace GDP growth broke in
1972 and it never recovered the previous dynamism. The explanatory
causes for the breaking of the trend exceed the objectives of this chapter
but include, besides the obvious alterations to the economic activity
Fig. 8.3 Electric intensity of Spanish GDP, 1950–2000 (MWh per million $ Gheary-
Khamis of 1990)
Sources and notes: Data from Albert Carreras, Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Joan
R. Rosés, “Renta y riqueza”; and Albert Carreras, “Industria”. In Carreras and Tafunell,
Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos XIX y XX. Tables 17.18 and 5.17. Total electricity pro-
duction divided by GDP at factor costs in constant $ of 1990
brought about by the oil crisis (including the onset of deindustrializa-

tion), the completion of the mass electrification that took place from
1950 to the early 1970s. Forecasters guided themselves with the trends of
the 15 or 20 years before 1970, and consequently their predictions for
future electricity needs were exaggerated.
After having showed that the country required less electricity than the
projections forecasted for keeping economic growth unharmed, next we
contrast the claims that nuclear was the key to fight the expensive depen-
dence on imported oil, besides being the cheapest of all the alternative
technologies, with the reality that unfolded. For that purpose, we first
need to introduce some notions about the composition of the Spanish
energy matrix and its evolution.
panish Energy External Dependence

S
and the Energy Matrix
In Spain, the insufficient and dispersed national coal reserves could not
freely compete in price or quality with European coal.19 The lack of
domestic oil and natural gas in the national territory conditioned the
Spanish energy options, too. The supply limitations have been historically
overcome by massively importing energy resources, which meant an ele-
vated and growing external energy dependence since the 1940s.20 The
evolution of energy dependence in Spain during the second half of the
twentieth century is shown in Fig. 8.4 in two versions: the usual one,
which includes only modern energies (i.e. mineral coal, oil, natural gas,
hydroelectricity and nuclear) and the alternative version, which also con-
siders the important weight of the traditional energies (i.e. wood, vegeta-
ble coal, direct hydraulic, animal and human power).
The increase in energy demand, and particularly in petroleum con-
sumption (see Fig. 8.5), of which 99% was imported since the period of
the autarky, made it inevitable for the total energy dependence in Spain
to increase. From the early 1940s to late 1950s modern energy depen-
dence multiplied by 5.4 (and all foreign energy dependence by 6.8). The
economic growth during the 1950s (thanks to the moderate economic
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1974
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Foreign energy dependence (only modern energies)
Foreign energy dependence (All forms: tradional and modern energies)
Fig. 8.4 Spanish dependence on energy imports, 1950–2008 (%)

Sources and notes: Own elaboration based on data from R. Bertoni, C. Román, and M.d.M. Rubio,
“El Desarrollo Energético de España y Uruguay en Perspectiva Comparada, 1860–2000,”
Revista de Historia Industrial 41, no. 2003 (2009): 161–94. Data updated with data from
UNESA and Ministry of Industry. Energy dependence is calculated as primary energy imports
divided by primary energy consumption, in a particular period. Discrepancies with previous
estimations of energy dependence for Spain in Bertoni et al. are explained by the different
treatment of nuclear—here, it is considered 100% imported (see text)—and due to the
absence of the estimation of human and animal power
Fig. 8.5 Primary energy consumption in Spain by source, 1950–2008 (PJ)

Sources and notes: María del Mar Rubio Varas, “Energía, Economía y CO2: España 1850–2000,”
Cuadernos Económicos de ICE, no. 70 (2005): 51–76. Updated with official data from
Ministerio de Industria and Red Eléctrica. All primary electricity converted to PJ at heat value
opening of these years), along with the expansion of oil use and the devel-
opment of the electric sector, explain the fast increase in external depen-
dence and the prospects of energy growth for the coming years.
Consequently, the Spanish energy policy during the following years of
developmentalism included the objective of ensuring the electricity supply
and fulfilling the increasing energy needs. With the arrival of this new stage,
the importance of organic energy began to diminish until it practically disap-
peared at the end of the century to give way to the mineral-based economy
(see Fig. 8.5). However, one of the priorities was the development of the
Spanish nuclear program (1964–83), which included the aforementioned
promises of reducing the energy dependence,21 particularly urgent after the
oil crises of the 1970s, and alleviating the energy bill to the consumers.
Regarding the external energy dependence evolution, the sources of
energy that entered into the mix since the 1960s and the oil spreading
quickly increased the Spanish dependence on energy imports up to the
second half of the 1970s (see Figs. 8.4 and 8.5). It was during the next
decades that petroleum took the prominent role it holds today in national
energy consumption, leading to the doubling of consumption, which
reached 3000 PJ in 1979 (see Fig. 8.5). It is worth noticing that Spanish
energy consumption hardly reflected the effect of the first petroleum cri-
sis, a result of the decision not to transfer the increase in prices to
consumers.
The result is dependence on foreign modern energy resources reached
maximum levels of more than 85% (and 75%, including all energy
sources) in 1976, three years after the first oil crisis. Afterwards, the
energy dependence continuously reduced during the next ten years, espe-
cially in the early 1980s, when the effects of the second oil crisis showed.
The decrease in oil consumption (all of it imported) and the growth in
coal consumption, which almost doubled its participation in national
energy consumption between 1979 and 1985 (approximately 80% of
which was domestically produced at that time), explain the energy depen-
dence moderation during those years (see Fig. 8.4). Coal then substituted
petroleum whenever possible, especially for generating electricity in ther-
mal plants. In fact, by the end of the twentieth century, approximately
90% of coal was destined for electricity generation.22
The deceleration in energy consumption ended before the arrival of
the 1990s (see Fig. 8.5). In this decade, the continuous rise in oil
consumption and the increase in coal imports—of which 50–55% on
average was then imported, reaching peaks over 70%—led Spain to
close the twentieth century with historical maxima in dependence lev-
els on foreign modern energies, approaching 90%. Did nuclear power
play any role regarding the external energy dependence of Spain?
Nuclear Fuel and Spanish Energy Dependence

The decision to build light-water nuclear plants fuelled by enriched ura-
nium had some consequences in terms of energy dependence too. Even if
for the early loads it was agreed to use Spanish mined uranium enriched
in the US, it proved soon enough that the enriched nuclear fuel
depended crucially on a tiny number of suppliers. Until 1974 only the
US and the USSR had the capability to enrich uranium. Prior to that
year, all enriched uranium for Spanish nuclear power plants had been
provided by the US under the contracts signed for their construction.23
The Spanish government transferred all uranium-mining activities to a
public company, ENUSA, in 1972. Two years later, in April 1974, the US
Embassy in Madrid communicated to the Department of State that
ENUSA had reached an agreement with the Soviet Union through which
the latter country would supply 20% of Spain’s demand for enriched
uranium for the years 1978 through 1990.24 The telegram continued to
explain that the contract, reportedly with advantageous prices for Spain,
was part of a program to guarantee adequate supply and to diversify the
source of uranium and enrichment services necessary for Spain’s nuclear
energy expansion.25 Spain’s natural uranium demands through 1978 were
being met by contracts with Canadian sources and by local production.26
The agreement with the USSR happened in parallel to the somehow chal-
lenging negotiations for further enrichment agreements between Spanish
officials and the US held at the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
headquarters.27 A surge of requests for enriched uranium during the first
half of 1974, far in excess of the demand predicted by the surveys of for-
eign requirements, led to the acknowledgement that the three AEC
enrichment facilities were nearing capacity and to a decision to temporar-
ily suspend uranium enrichment contracting.28 The AEC halted all ura-
nium firm contracts from June 1974.29 The list of countries with fuel
requests pending at the time included Brazil, Taiwan, France, Ireland,
Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece, Iran,
Japan, South Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Thailand.30
Secretary of State H. Kissinger invited the IAEA not to raise the matter of
the AEC suspension with host governments just yet, but asked to prepare
a post to answer questions from host governments drawing upon limited
official use.31 Among the things being weighted as plausible solutions was
the expected decision by US private industry to construct private enrich-
ment plants, which may enable the private industry to enter into firm
commitments to provide enrichment services beginning in the early
1980s.32 But to move from a monopolistic supply of enriched uranium by
the AEC to a competitive nuclear fuel industry, a priority set by president
Ford, required the quick enhancement of a complex legislation.33
By 1979 Westinghouse had nuclear fuel fabrication facilities devoted

to foreign orders located in Columbia, South Carolina.34 When UEM
pressed for a commitment to supply the remainder of Zorita’s useful life,
approximately 15 reloads, it found that the conditions in the US had
changed from the initial reloads.35 Since July 1976, the Eximbank did not
provide direct credits for fuel reloads. There were several reasons for such
a decision: (1) nuclear fuel useful life of three years represented a term
within the providence of the private banking sector; (2) because of
Eximbank’s heavy involvement in financing nuclear power projects on a
worldwide basis, a commitment to provide financing for fuel reloads for
American reactors could call for a multi-billion-dollar allocation of
Eximbank’s lending authority for many years to come; (3) traditionally
the nuclear fuel was bought from the manufacturer of the reactor vessel,
providing an ongoing call on the manufacturer if any troubles developed,
thus, fuel reloads were an export that would go forward without the need
for official support.36 Yet, the request by UEM for its remaining reloads
pushed Eximbank to reconsider its “non-financing-nuclear-fuel” policy.
Eximbank’s officials recognized that a nuclear plant required a reliable
source of fuel for approximately 30 years. They knew that the Spanish
were concerned about the reliability of the US as a long-term fuel sup-
plier and about the “politicizing” of the nuclear issue and the possible
interruption of their future supply, and thus their willingness to listen to
third-country overtures. Besides, the magnitude of the reload orders
might put them beyond the appetite of commercial banks, especially with
the private bank’s internal country and industry concentration limits.
And then there were the other contracts that might be affected by deny-
ing help to finance the nuclear reloads: chances for securing future nuclear
plant equipment orders in Spain and the tender for the Narcea coal-fired
plant (owned and operated by UEM) for which the Eximbank was aggres-
sively bidding at the time.37 Moreover, UEM had an offer from the French
to supply the remaining loads for Zorita, which had official support. The
French recognized the enormity of the nuclear fuel reload market as much
as the Americans did. What remained unclear from the American per-
spective was whether the French believed they had the capacity to handle
it, or they were going to selectively pick and choose reload cases. Therefore,
Eximbank staff concluded that the public bank should respond positively
to officially supported competition for nuclear fuel reloads because with-

out them they would be lost to competing countries, and “it should also
serve to discourage the French from thinking they could operate with
impunity and complete freedom of action in the market place”.38 The
UEM reload for Zorita got an Eximbank credit in 1981. It was the last of
the Spanish nuclear credits financed by the Eximbank.
ENUSA became the single fuel supplier to Spanish nuclear plants from
1979, except for Trillo nuclear power plant (NPP) supplied from Germany
(see Chap. 7). In 1985, the ENUSA factory of Juzbado (Salamanca) was
commissioned to manufacture combustible elements for the Spanish
nuclear reactors departing from imported enriched uranium—some
1600 tons per year. Since then, the ENUSA factory produces high-den-
sity, accurately shaped ceramic UO2 pellets, and loads the fuel pellets into
fuel rods (made mainly from a zirconium allow, which are imported from
Westinghouse), sealing them and assembling them into the final fuel
structure (imported too, except for few bits produced at ENSA (Equipos
Nucleares S.A.) premises in Spain).39
As said before, the market of nuclear materials is characterized by very
few suppliers and highly rigorous national and international regulation. If
we break down the energy dependence by geographic origin (country
supplier) we find that nuclear materials imports are the most geographi-
cally concentrated of all the primary energy sources imported in Spain
(based on data from the UN Comtrade database).40 Except for the
above-mentioned episode of 1974–76, this high concentration does not
appear to have entailed any risk for the security of supply of Spain. But it
is worth insisting that nuclear energy has contributed to the overall con-
centration of suppliers of the Spanish energy imports basket during the
past century.41
Despite this dependence on imported enriched uranium and the ele-
ments required to assemble nuclear fuel rods, the Spanish official statis-
tics insist on considering nuclear power a domestic source of energy along
with hydropower, solar, wind and national mined coal, apparently fol-
lowing the criterion established by the IEA of considering domestic all
nuclear power.42 This made sense during the brief period when Spanish
uranium was used to power Spanish nuclear power plants, but not after-
wards. Despite the stubbornness of official statistics to maintain o therwise,
nuclear energy does not contribute to reducing Spain’s external energy

dependence. A different matter is that, for some time now, the industrial
sector linked to this type of energy contributed to improving the coun-
try’s external current account through the export of equipment and
nuclear fuel, an issue we briefly explain in the last section of the chapter.
uclear Power: Oil Dependence, Energy

N
Diversification and Electricity Prices
Another question is the extreme dependence of the Spanish economy on
petroleum imports and whether nuclear power helped to reduce it. To
answer that question, we need to turn our attention to the Spanish elec-
tricity generation by sources. The role of nuclear energy in the primary
energy and the electricity mixes did not start to be noticeable until the
1980s, when its generation capacity became relevant. The maximum
participation of nuclear energy in the Spanish primary energy mix peaked
in 1989, with a share of 6.4% in the modern energies basket, and 6% in
the energy mix including all the sources—modern and traditional ones
(see Fig. 8.5 above). Nevertheless, this share was higher than 5% only
from 1987 to 1998.
In the electricity mix nuclear power has a more prominent role (see
Fig. 8.6). The last of the 10 nuclear reactors ever plugged to the network
in Spain was Trillo NPP in 1988. A year later a fire broke out in the zone
of the turbo-generators of the nuclear power plant of Vandellós I; it was
classified as a level 3 incident on the International Nuclear Event Scale.
The high costs required by the Spanish regulatory agency (the Nuclear
Safety Board, CSN, by its Spanish initials) to mend the irregularities
which were discovered induced the operating company to shut it down
for good and to decommission it. So in fact, the 10 reactors were plugged
in at once for less than a year. From the 1980s to the present, nuclear
electricity contributed an average of 23.9% to electric generation in
Spain. With the turn of the century, wind, solar power and biomass
joined the electricity mix, as shown in Fig. 8.6.
How much oil was burned to produce electricity and how much was
saved thanks to nuclear power? The annual activity report of UNESA
350
Wind
Solar Tide Wave

300
Oil
Nuclear
250
Hydroelectric
Gas
200
Coal
Twh
Biomass and Waste

150
100
50
0
1980
1981
1982
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
1983
1996
Fig. 8.6 Electricity generation in Spain by source, 1980–2014 (TWh)

Source: own elaboration based on data from TPS data portal, The World Bank—World
Development Indicators Historical Electricity Generation Statistics (2017)
provides some evidences directed toward answering the question with

certain precision. Liquid fuels burned at conventional thermal plants
gained importance in the Spanish electricity mix from the 1950s.
Before the oil crisis hit, it was the technology with the largest installed
capacity of the country, and fuel-oil plants generated about half of the
electricity in Spain.43 More tonnes of oil were burned for electricity
generation in Spain from 1970 to 1980 than the ones burned in the
reminder of the country’s history. The year 1976 marks the maximum
of petroleum burned at thermoelectric plants in Spain with some
10 million metric tonnes. That amount represented less than 2.5% of
the oil consumed in the country, and for the whole decade the average
was below 2%. The two oil crises made burning petroleum products
for electric purposes unaffordable. Figure 8.6 shows the considerable
progress made in coal use for electricity generation until the arrival of
the XXI century, and the retreat of petroleum-based electricity from
1980. This was a result of the entry into service of the installations
included in the plan for accelerated construction of coal thermal power
plants.44 Oil had almost been abandoned as a fuel before the bulk of
nuclear power went operative, as can be observed in Fig. 8.6. The
“unnecessary external indebtedness by the import of petroleum”45 by
the electricity sector came to an end with only marginal help from
nuclear power. And in all events, the electricity sector had a minor role
to play in the mater since 98–99% of the oil consumption would fall
out of its realm.
Figure 8.6 shows that nuclear helped to diversify the electricity sources,
and provided a reliable—although inflexible due to its high concentra-
tion—baseload to the electricity system. For the overall Spanish energy
system, however, the diversification impact is smaller. As said before,
Spain has been (and is) heavily dependent on energy imports. However,
it has one of the most diversified energy mixes of the countries around in
terms of the geographical origin of its energy imports and the variety of
energy sources.46 In order to determine the role of the nuclear power in
the diversification of the energy system, we can observe the impact of the
insertion of nuclear energy in the Spanish energy mix, comparing the
concentration of the mix with and without nuclear energy. For this pur-
pose we use the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI).47 It is calculated
by the sum of the squares of the market shares of each energy source in
any given period. Figure 8.7 shows that the contribution of nuclear power
is significant but not high in the diversification of the Spanish energy
mix. For the last 20 years, nuclear power has contributed, on average, to
reduce the concentration of the mix by 9%; and the maximum contribu-
tion to the energy diversification was in 1989 when the concentration of
the mix reduced 11.1% thanks to the participation of nuclear power.
Therefore, we can deduce its role in this matter has not been irrelevant,
but it has not been decisive to fulfil this energy policy objective. In other
words, nuclear power contributed to the energy diversification strategy,
but it was insufficient, especially if we bear in mind the optimistic initial
promises.
Scarcity in the supply of energy resources in the territory has burdened,
to an extent, the capacity of the country to continue the pace of more
advanced countries. However, some countries were able to overcome
their energy limitations and moved forward on the path towards develop-
ment at great speed (Japan, Sweden, Switzerland).48 This fact appears to
0.6
0.5
1= maximum concentrationn
0=minimum concentration
0.4
0.3
0.2
EMCI (including nuclear power) EMCI (excluding nuclear power)
0.1
0.0
1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Fig. 8.7 Energy Mix Concentration Index (EMCI) in Spain with and without
nuclear power, 1959–2009
Sources and notes: own elaboration based on data from Astrid Kander, Paolo Malanima and
Paul Warde, Power to the People: Energy in Europe over the Last Five Centuries, 2014. It
includes traditional and modern energy sources (i.e. food for men and working animals,
firewood, traditional wind and water used in wheels and mills, peat, mineral coal, petro-
leum, natural gas and the primary forms of generating electricity-hydroelectricity, nuclear
and renewable energies such as wind power, solar, geothermal etc.). Energy Mix
Concentration Index (EMCI) measured by a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, calculated as the
sum of the squares of the market shares of each energy source in any given period. The
smaller (larger), the more diversified (concentrated) the energy mix
indicate that energy policy imposed more limits on the availability of

inexpensive energy in Spain than the scarcity of resources.49 The Spanish
energy policy, based on restrictions to the free trade of energy, offered
consumers limited free access to the worldwide energy market, with its
resulting effect on the level of prices.
Nuclear energy arose as an opportunity of producing not only a more
diversified electricity mix but moderating the electricity prices. However,
the electrical energy price increased from the mid-1980s. This is precisely
when seven reactors in Spain were already connected to the grid50 and
when, for the first time, more than 20% of Spanish electricity was gener-
ated by nuclear energy (see Fig. 8.6).
If nuclear energy was more economical than that obtained by other

systems, therefore constituting a key factor for the competitiveness of our
industry, then France with over 80% of its electricity having nuclear
power, the world’s largest, should be able to supply the cheapest electric-
ity. And yet, Spanish industrial electric prices withstand the comparison
with the French industrial electricity prices, with the exception of the
years around 1990, and particularly from the mid-1990s (see Fig. 8.8).
Moreover there are no big differences between the Spanish and the EU-15
prices. Not only are industrial and domestic prices similar, but even
domestic prices are lower most of the time. Of course, price formation
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% 2007S2 (3)
1985S1
1985S2
1986S1
1986S2
1987S1
1987S2
1988S1
1988S2
1989S1
1989S2
1990S1
1990S2
1991S1
1991S2
1992S1
1992S2
1993S1
1993S2
1994S1
1994S2
1995S1
1995S2
1996S1
1996S2
1997S1
1997S2
1998S1
1998S2
1999S1
1999S2
2000S1
2000S2
2001S1
2001S2
2002S1
2002S2
2003S1
2003S2
2004S1
2004S2
2005S1
2005S2
2006S1
2006S2
2007S1
Industrial prices EU-15 vs. France=100 Domesc prices EU-15 vs. France=100
Industrial prices Spain vs. France=100 Domesc prices Spain vs. France=100
Fig. 8.8 Spain(1) and EU-15(2) vs. France(3) electricity prices comparison for indus-
trial and domestic consumers* in Euros/kWh (excluding taxes and levies),
1985S1–2007S2
Source: own elaboration based on data from Eurostat database (2017). Notes: (1) Spain
2004S2, 1985S1–1990S1: There is no available data for Spain in these semesters; therefore,
we use the data of Madrid as a proxy, since the prices in the capital have been the same as
in Spain during the period 1991S1–2004S1. (2) EU-15: 2007S2 provisional data. (3) France
1985S1–1990S1: The same than in the note (1) applies to the case of France and Paris, in these
semesters. * Domestic consumers refer to the band-DC, for medium households (annual con-
sumption: 3500 kWh of which night 1300). Industrial consumers refer to the band IE, for
medium industries (annual consumption: 2000 MWh; maximum demand: 500 kW; annual
load: 4000 hours)
depends on many factors. It is a heavy regulated market, but data show

that the promise of moderating electricity prices was never fulfilled for
Spanish consumers.
The Industrial Boost

As in many other parts of the world, the Spanish government also made
the nuclear program a central piece of its industrialization strategy. The
nuclear system was to become a major driving force for the national
industry, first as a generator of the much-needed electricity for industry
but also to drive the industrialization of the country by developing the
capabilities to build nuclear power plants. Learning-by-doing was key for
the Spanish nuclear program and the local companies that joined in. We
have argued elsewhere that Spain became the world’s nuclear laboratory.51
In Chap. 5 we have seen how some of the elements to which Spain’s first
nuclear plant, Zorita, stood as a learning experience for all parties
involved, including many aspects that would have continuation. Of all of
them, the one issue that had slipovers beyond the nuclear sector itself was
the upgrade of the Spanish industry to the level appropriate for matching
the manufacturing standards required for an atomic project. The contrac-
tors building a nuclear power plant needed some minimum level of
industrial base to contribute to the non-critical elements of the project
(civil and auxiliary engineering) they were entrusted with by law. But
even the less critical of the elements demanded the implementation of
quality controls that were nonexistent in Spain before nuclear plants.52 In
most cases, the local firms also maintained close contacts with interna-
tional firms leading the projects which facilitated the transfer of know-
how and human capital formation (both by formal and informal means).
The quality control mechanisms, the transfer of know-how and the accu-
mulation of human capital would impact numerous industrial sectors
from the petrochemical or electric components sector, to metal-mechanics
or building materials, but also engineering services and so on. The skills
they acquired because of their involvement with the atomic projects
helped in raising large branches of Spanish industry to international lev-
els, contributing eventually to modernize the country.
The progression of the Spanish nuclear sector as such has been rela-
tively successful. Evolving from the initial turnkey projects, the Spanish
industry gradually achieved higher levels of participation, fostered by the
construction and authorization issued by the Ministry of Industry and
Energy which included requirements about the degree of national par-
ticipation. To verify compliance, the Ministry engaged the Nuclear
Energy Board (JEN, by its Spanish initials) to follow and appraise the
participation of the domestic industry in the projects. The first nuclear
projects barely reached 40% of domestic participation while, by the
1970s, it increased to around 60%. In the later projects, up to 80% was
achieved. By the early 1980s with their own growing technical sophistica-
tion, the Spanish did not feel as dependent on foreign equipment manu-
facturers for help as previously.
The nuclear sector continued to grow to provide services for the nuclear
plants as they entered in operation, switching from low-value building
working hours to higher-value-added technological services working
hours. Companies such as Tecnatom had to restructure their business
from project management and building to servicing and operating
nuclear power plants. They prepared themselves for serving 16 to 20 reac-
tors for the coming 40 years, a comfortable scenario for their business.
The most optimistic within the sector cherished the idea of completing
the whole process of building a domestic reactor as South Korea did. The
moratorium abruptly finished with it all in 1984. Perceived at the time as
the coup de grace to the Spanish nuclear sector, the moratorium eventually
became its growth opportunity. In the absence of a sufficiently large
domestic market, and after some serious difficulties during the second
half of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Spanish nuclear cluster managed
to rise above the moratorium competing internationally. As shown in
Fig. 8.9 from 1998 onwards the Spanish nuclear companies became net
exporters of nuclear equipment, fuel and services.
The industrial cluster that developed around the nuclear power plants
from the 1960s, following the textbook rules of an infant industry,
matured with the hard consequences of the moratorium. Table 8.2 pres-
ents a summary of the sectors and number of companies involved with
nuclear industry in Spain by 2011 according to their own accounts (see
also Appendix B).
350
300
250
200
million dollars of 1982
150
100
50
0
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
–50
–100
–150
Fig. 8.9 Spanish net trade of nuclear equipment and fuel elements 1965–2010
(million real US dollars)
Sources and notes: own elaboration from UN Comtrade Data (SITC v.2 and v.37187) on
imports and exports of nuclear reactors, and parts thereof, fuel elements, non-irradiated for
nuclear reactors. Original series in current dollars were deflated by the “Machinery and
equipment price index” of the Bureau of Labour Statistics
Table 8.2 Spanish nuclear cluster by Sectors (2011)

Number Percentage
Electrical utilities 4 8.5
Nuclear fuel 1 2.1
Nuclear equipment 4 8.5
Engineering and services 25 53.2
Lobbies 5 10.6
Nuclear power plants 8 17.0
Total 47 100.0
Source: Foro de la Industria Nuclear Española, 2011. ICEX, Madrid
Table 8.2 makes evident that the engineering companies specializing in

industrial installations, maintenance and safety services represent most of
the sector today. Those companies were born between the first and second
generation of nuclear power plants, and in many cases, were linked to the
electricity companies with a strategic lobbying role today as yesterday.
The other feature of continuity is that technological dependence has set
the course. The nuclear cluster remains located in Madrid, Bilbao and
Barcelona (true to its origins).
Some Concluding Remarks

Were the principal promises that pushed the Spanish nuclear program
since its inception accomplished? On the energy field our review of his-
torical evidence provides some rebuttals. The ever-growing electricity
demand expected that portrayed nuclear as the only way forward, met
with the reality of smaller growth both in the economy and on electricity
demand. Moreover, the proponents overlooked the break in the underlying
relationship between electricity consumption and economic output. After
1972, electricity production continued to outgrow GDP, but at a much
smaller pace than before. Thus, the country required less electricity than
the forecasted projections for keeping economic growth unharmed.
The evidence presented reveals that nuclear energy has not contributed
to reducing Spain’s external energy dependence, neither by reducing the
dependence on oil, which had almost been abandoned as a fuel before the
bulk of nuclear power went operative, nor by itself. Despite the technical
decision to count nuclear power as a domestic source, the dependence on
third parties for enriched uranium increased energy security concerns.
Yet, nuclear helped to diversify the electricity (and overall energy) mix,
and provided a reliable—although inflexible—base load to the electricity
system, with a stable share just above a fifth of the Spanish energy genera-
tion since the 1980s.
Did the reduction of the planned nuclear installed capacity strangle
the industrial development of the country as whole? It is hard to assess
given that the advent of deindustrialization coincides with the oil crises,
which seems to endow energy prices with some responsibility for the
matter. Yet, industrial electricity remained as expensive as before the

introduction of nuclear power in Spain. Furthermore, Spanish industrial
electric prices withstand the comparison with the industrial electricity
prices of the champion of nuclear production in the world, France. We
find difficult to argue that more nuclear power would have implied
cheaper electricity for Spain given the historical evidence. Further research
may help to clarify the matter.
On the additional explicit and implicit potentials associated with the
deployment of nuclear power in the previous decades, we produced some
evidence about how nuclear power helped to modernize the country by
contributing to the procurement of high-quality know-how and human
capital, raising Spanish industry to international levels.
There are broader implications of the nuclear programs which we did
not address in this chapter, most notably whether it boosted the eco-
nomic development of the regions where power stations were built (either
through the construction of the power station or the associated infra-
structure). Plenty of questions remain open for further research. Despite
this, we hope to have shed some historical light onto the promises made
and the realities that followed to the implementation of nuclear power in
Spain.
Notes
1. ASEPI. President speech before Sevillana de Electricidad General
Shareholder meeting, 13 April 1978 (Archivo SEPI, Presidencia, Caja
552).
2. Jaime MacVeigh, Ensayo sobre un Programa de Energía Nuclear en España.
Madrid: Banco Urquijo.
3. Ibid., 13.
4. See Chap. 5 in this volume and Appendix 1.
5. ABC, 11 April 1956, p. 41.
6. MacVeigh, Ensayo sobre un Programa de Energía Nuclear.
7. José Cabrera held the presidency of the board of directors of UEM, and
was also first president of Tecnatom. He happened to be the authentic
and enthusiastic promoter of the construction of the first nuclear power
station in Spain, which would end up taking its name. MacVeigh would
also sit in Cenusa’s council.
8. Ministerio de Industria Dirección General de Industria, Estadística de la

Industria de Energía Eléctrica, Resumen del Año 1960, 16–17.
9. Ministerio de Industria, Energía Eléctrica. Estadística 1975 (Madrid:
Servicio de Publicaciones, 1977).
10. Manuel Gutiérrez Cortines, “Las Centrales Atómicas en los Programas
de Construcción de las Empresas Eléctricas,” in Conferencia Pronunciada
al Círculo de la Unión Mercantil e Industrial de Madrid (Madrid: Círculo
de la Unión Mercantil e Industrial de Madrid, 1958), 6.
11. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Some
Economic Implications of Nuclear Power for Under-Developed
Countries,” in The Economics of Nuclear Power, Including Administration
and Law, ed. J. Gueron et al. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1957), 106–8.
12. Sam H. Schurr and Jacob Marschak, Economic Aspects of Atomic Power
(York, PA: Princeton University Press, 1950), http://cowles.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/pub/misc/specpupb-schurr-marschak.pdf
13. Manuel de Torres Matínez, Energía Nuclear e Industrialización de España
(Madrid: Ateneo, 1954), 13.
14. Miguel Cuerdo, “Evaluación de los Planes Energéticos Nacionales en
España (1975–1998),” Revista de Historia Industrial 15 (1999): 161–77.
15. Plan Eléctrico Nacional, Orden del Ministerio de Industria de 31 de
Julio de 1969, BOE 30/8/1969.
16. Cuerdo, op.cit. 164.
17. Joseba De la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a
Dictatorship: State and Business Involvement in the Spanish Atomic
Program, 1950–1985”. Journal of Contemporary History 51, no. 2 (2016):
385–411.
18. Ministerio de Industria y Energía, Plan Energético Nacional 1978–1987, 47.
19. The first part of this section largely relies on previous work by the authors
published in Spanish in Beatriz Muñoz Delgado and M.d. Mar Rubio-
Varas, “La Dependencia Energética Exterior de España 1900–2010” in
Historia de la Política Exterior Española en los Siglos XX y XXI, ed.
J.M. Beneyto and J.C. Pereira (Madrid: CEU, 2015), 423–52.
20. Energy dependence is defined as the portion of the energy consumed in
a country that is supplied by other countries; therefore, we can refer to
import dependence, as well.
21. It has been a recurring theme throughout history, at least in political and
economic discourse, to resort to the reduction of energy dependence to
improve energy security in countries. However, “security of supply does
not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence,
but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence” (European

Commission, Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of
Energy Supply, Adopted by the European Commission on 29 November
2000 (Brussels: Publications of the European Communities, 2001), 2).
This statement rests on the idea that dependence is not in itself harmful
or inefficient in economic terms. If there is diversity in the sources of
supply (referring to a wide variety of supplying countries as well as diver-
sity in the energy mix) and the economic bill can be assumed, it really
does not constitute a problem in terms of supply security.
22. Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo. La Energía en España (sev-
eral years).
24. NARA, Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Madrid to State Department,
National Archives and Records Administration. 23 April 1974. Document
Number: 1974MADRID02523.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. NARA, Telegram from the U.S. Mission at EC Brussels to AEC. 8 April
1974. Document Number: 1974ECBRU02115.
28. NARA, Telegram from U.S. State Department to IAEA, 1974 July 15,
Document number: 1974STATE152033_b.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. NARA, Digitized from Box 42 of The John Marsh Files at the Gerald
R. Ford Presidential Library, Collection GRF-0067: John O. Marsh Files
(Ford Administration), 1974–1977 Series: John Marsh’s General Subject
Files, 1974–1977 File Unit: Uranium Enrichment—General.
34. EXIM, Memorandum to the Board of Directors, Europe and Canada
Division, June 28, 1979 Re: Zorita nuclear power reloads—P.C. No.
4510—Spain. Box H119. Folder 3722. Ex-Im Bank Archives.
36. EXIM, Memorandum to the Board of Directors, Europe and Canada
Division, June 28, 1979 Re: Zorita nuclear power reloads—P.C. No.
4510—Spain. Box H119. Folder 3722. Ex-Im Bank Archives.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. ENUSA, Our History, http://www.enusa.es/en/conocenos/historia/

40. See Muñoz Delgado and Rubio-Varas, “La Dependencia Energética
Exterior de España 1900–2010”.
41. For a more detailed analysis of the geographic dependence of Spanish
energy imports, see Muñoz Delgado and Rubio-Varas, “La Dependencia
Energética Exterior de España 1900–2010”.
42. A footnote to the National Energy Plan of 1983 explains that “for the
calculation of the degree of energy self-sufficiency, as in previous
occasions, it has followed the criterion of the International Energy
Agency of considering as national all the nuclear production”. Congreso
de los Diputados, Plan Energético Nacional de 1983.
43. UNESA, Memoria Anual (various years).
44. UNESA, Memoria Anual 1986.
45. ASEPI, op.cit.
46. For a more detailed analysis of the geographic dependence of Spanish
energy imports, see Muñoz Delgado and Rubio-Varas, op.cit. For the
diversification of the energy mix, M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas and Beatriz
Muñoz Delgado, “200 Years Diversifying the Energy Mix? Diversification
Paths of the Energy Baskets of European Early Comers vs. Latecomers,”
Economic History Working Papers Series, 2017.
47. The paternity of this index is shared by the economists Orris C. Herfindahl
and Albert O. Hirschman. In 1945, Hirschman (in Albert O. Hirschman,
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade—Albert O. Hirschman—
Google Books (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945)) proposed
an index of trade concentration consisting of the square root of the sum
of the squares of the market share of each country in the market. For his
part, in 1950, Herfindahl (in his doctoral dissertation later published as
Orris Clemens Herfindahl, Concentration in the Steel Industry—Orris
Clemens Herfindahl—Google Books (Columbia University Press, 1950))
proposed an index for measuring the firms’ concentration in the steel
industry, which was computed the same as the Hirschman index, but
without the square root i.e. the sum of squares of firm sizes, all measured
as percentages of total industry size. In Hirschman (1964) he claimed
the authorship of the index.
48. The literature on the restriction that energy poses to Spanish economic
development is abundant: Carles Sudrià, Jordi Nadal, and Albert Carreras,
“Un Factor Determinante: La Energía” (Barcelona: Ariel, 1987); Carles
Sudrià, “Energy as a Limiting Factor to Growth,” ed. Pablo Martín
Aceña and James Simpson (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995); Carles

Sudrià, “La Restricción Energética al Desarrollo Económico de España,”
Papeles de Economía 73 (1997): 165–94; Carles Sudrià, “Un Bosquejo
Histórico de la Energía en la Industrialización de España,” in Energía:
Del Monopolio al Mercado. CNE, Diez Años en Perspectiva, ed. José Luis
García Delgado (Cordovilla: Aranzadi, 2006); Nadal J. (dir.), “Atlas de la
Industrialización de España, 1750–2000,” 2003.
49. As stated by Gabriel Tortella Casares, The Development of Modern Spain:
An Economic History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Harvard
University Press, 2000), 347, “if the energy sector was an obstacle to
industrial growth, it was the energy policy that was problematic, not the
resource endowment itself ”.
50. Almaraz-1, Almaraz-2, Ascó-1, Cofrentes, José Cabrera, Santa María de
Garoña and Vandellós-1 (see Appendix A).
51. Joseba de la Torre and M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas, “Learning by Doing: The
First Spanish Nuclear Plant,” Busines History Review, n.d.
52. Manuel López Rodríguez, “La Situación Española de la Energía Nuclear,”
Energía Nuclear 139 (1982): 334.
Beatriz Muñoz-Delgado (beatriz.munoz@uam.es) is Assistant Professor at the

Department of Economic Analysis: Economic Theory and Economic History at
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), Spain. She holds a PhD in
Economics from Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED). She
has carried out pre- and postdoctoral research stays at Lund University (Sweden),
the Institute for Energy and Transport—Joint Research Center of the European
Commission (Netherlands), Politecnico di Torino (Italy) and Istanbul University
(Turkey). Her research topics are energy security, energy policy, energy history
and energy economics. She has participated in research projects financed by the
7th Framework Program of the European Commission, the Spanish Economic
and Social Council (2007s Research Prize) and the National Program of R+D+i
Projects of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Her most
recent publications include articles in Energy (Elsevier), Revista de Economía
Mundial (World Economy Society), International Journal of Energy Sector
Management (Emerald) and chapters of books with Routledge, Alianza Editorial
and others.
M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (mar.rubio@unavarra.es) is an energy economist and

economic historian. She holds a PhD from the London School of Economics
(United Kingdom), a Master’s from the same institution and is a graduate in
Economics from the University Carlos III of Madrid. Her academic training was
completed during a year of stay (Fulbright funding) in the Department of
Economics at the University of California at Berkeley (California, US). Her
research interests focus on the long-term relationships between energy and eco-
nomic growth. Recently her research effort focused on the economic and finan-
cial history of the Spanish Nuclear Program. She is the PI of a national research
project on the matter and she is the person in charge of the Scientific Secretariat
of the European consortium that investigates the “History of Nuclear Energy
and Society” (HONESt). Her more recent publications include articles in
Journal of Contemporary History, Energy Journal, Energy Policy, Economic History
Review and Business History Review.
Appendix A. List of Nuclear Projects
in Spain since 1959 to Present

Spain, Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59867-3
Application dates
250
Name of Ownership Manufacturer Pre- Main creditor & Date Date

nuclear power on & Reactor Capacity Utilities’ authorization authorization construction connection to
plant application Type MWe application (government) date (1st credit) began grid
José Cabrera 100% UEM W-PWR 153 1/2/62 27/3/63 Eximbank 1965 1968
(Zorita) 27/8/1964
Garoña 50% GE-BWR 460 1/11/59 9/8/63 Eximbank 1966 1971
Iberduero 29/6/1967
50% Viesgo
Irta 100% W-PWR-3 L 500 1/7/65 11/11/66 – – –
Hidrola
Vandellós I 25% EDF EDF-GCR 480 2/10/64 21/4/67 France/EDF 1966 1972
23% FECSA 2/2/1967
23% HECSA
23% ENHER
6% FHS
Almaraz I 33% W-PWR-3 L 930 1/11/70 29/10/71 Eximbank 1973 1982
Hidrola 27/1/1972
33% UEM
33%
Sevillana
Ascó I 100% W-PWR-3 L 930 15/6/70 21/4/72 Eximbank 1974 1985
FECSA 3/2/1972
Ascó II 40% FECSA W-PWR-3 L 930 15/6/70 21/4/72 Eximbank 1975 1986
40% ENHER 16/4/1973
15% HEC
5% FHS
(continued)
Appendix A. List of Nuclear Projects in Spain since 1959 to Present
Application dates
Almaraz II 33% W-PWR-3 L 930 2/12/71 23/5/72 Eximbank 1974 1984
Hidrola 27/1/1972
33% UEM
33%
Sevillana
Lemóniz I 100% W-PWR-3 L (500) (4/1/1968) (12/2/1969) Eximbank 1973 S-1981/M-1983
Iberduero 930 9/12/1971 23/5/1972 20/1/1972
Lemóniz II 100% W-PWR-3 L (500) (4/1/1968) (12/2/1969) Eximbank 1973 S-1981/M-1983
Iberduero 930 9/12/1971 23/5/1972 20/1/1972
Cofrentes 100 % GE-BWR/6 975 1971 13/11/72 Eximbank 1975 1985
Hidrola 10/5/1973
Trillo I 60% UEM KWU- 1030 10/5/72 4/9/75 Kreditanstalt für 1980 M-1983
20% ERZ* PWR-3 L Wiederaufbau
20% EIA* (KfW)
18/11/1975
Trillo II 60% UEM KWU- 1030 10/5/72 4/9/75 1975 1988
20% ERZ* PWR-3 L
20% EIA*
Sayago 100% W-PWR 1000 27/11/73 4/9/75 Eximbank 1975 A-1982
Iberduero 18/12/1975
Valdecaballeros 50% GE-BWR/6 1000 28/5/74 4/9/75 Eximbank 1975 M-1983
I Sevillana 15/9/1975

50%
Hidrola
**
251
(continued)
Application dates
252

Valdecaballeros 50% GE-BWR/6 1000 28/5/74 4/9/75 Eximbank 1975 M-1983
II Sevillana 15/9/1975
50%
Hidrola
**
Vandellós II 54% ENHER W-PWR-3 L 930 2/5/74 27/2/76 Eximbank 1976 1988
28% HEC 6/7/1976
10% FHS
8% FECSA
Vandellós III 100% W-PWR-3 L 930 2/5/74 27/2/76 Eximbank – A-1979
FECSA (PC 3845) 1976
Regodola 60% KWU- 900 10/11/73 2/8/76 1979 A-1982
(Xove) FENOSA PWR-3 L
20% Viesgo
20% HIC
Santillan 100% GE-BWR 930 9/4/73 Eximbank 1975 A-1978
Viesgo (Letter of
intent) 1976
Punta Endata I 100% W-PWR 930 27/9/73 Eximbank 1975 A-1978
(Deba) Iberduero 18/12/1975
Punta Endata II 100% – 930 27/9/73 1975 A-1978
(Deba) Iberduero
Tudela 100% – 1000 27/9/73 – A-1978
(Bergara) Iberduero
Ea-Ispaster 100% – 1000 27/9/73 – A-1978

I(Orguella) Iberduero
(continued)
Application dates
Ea-Ispaster 100% – 1000 27/9/73 – A-1978
II(Orguella) Iberduero
Tarifa II 100% W-PWR-3 L 1000 5/12/73 – A-1979
(Bolonia) Sevillana
Tarifa I 100% W-PWR-3 L 1000 5/12/73 – A-1979
(Bolonia) Sevillana
Asperillo I 100% – 1000 5/12/73 – A-1979
(Almonte) Sevillana
Cabo Cope 100% GE-BRW 1000 20/12/73 1975 A-1979
(Aguilas) Hidrola
Sástago I 25% ERZ – 1200 22/12/73 – A-1978
(Aragon) 25% EIA
25% FECSA
25% UEM
La Zaida 25% ERZ – 1200 22/12/73 – A-1978
(Aragon) 25% EIA
25% FECSA
25% UEM
Asperillo II 100% – 1000 4/1/74 – A-1979
(Almonte) Sevillana
Escatrón I 37.5% W-PWR-3 L 930 7/3/74 Eximbank 1977 A-1982
ENDESA 8/4/1977

37.5%
ENHER
25% ERZ
253
(continued)
Application dates
254

Escatrón II 50% EHNER W-PWR-3 L 930 7/3/74 Eximbank 1977 A-1982
50% (PC 3331) 1976
ENDESA
L’Ametlla II 100% BRW 900 7/3/74 – A-1978
FECSA
L’Ametlla I 100% BRW 900 2/5/74 – A-1978
FECSA
El Páramo I 50% EHNER BRW 1000 25/3/75 – A-1978
(Leon) 50%
ENDESA
Chalamera 50% EHNER – 1000 26/3/75
(Bajo Cinca) 50%
ENDESA
In italics are dates that require further investigation
Sources: Application and pre-authorization dates compiled from, BOE, Revista Energía Nuclear (No. 103, 1976, pp. 390–1), and
Memorias Nuclenor. Financial data from Eximbank Archives and Chaps. 5, 6 and 7 in this volume.
Notes:
* Originally only UEM applied for the project of Trillo. EZR and EIA entering the project right before authorization (see Chap. 7)
** Originally UEM participated in Valdecaballeros I and II but renounced to concentrate on Confrentes, leaving Sevillana and
Hidrolla on their own
Abbreviations: S: suspended; A: abandoned; M: moratorium; BWR: boiling water reactor; EDF: Electricite de France; EIA:
Energía e Industria Aragonesas, S.A; ENDESA: Empresa Nacional de Electricidad; ENHER: Empresa Nacional Hidroelectrica del
Ribargozana; ERZ: Electricas Reunidas de Zaragoza; Eximbank: Export Import Bank of the United States; FECSA: Fuerzas
Electricas de Cataluña, S.A.; FENOSA: Fuerzas Electricas del Norte, S.A.; GCR: gas cooler reactor; GE: General Electric; Hidrola:
Hidroelectrica Española; KWU: Kraftwerk Union AG; PWR: pressurised water reactor; UEM: Union Electrica Madrileña; W:
Westinghouse
Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry
(2011)
Date Merge Classification Firms

1828 Engineering & Bureau Veritas
Services
1883 1891 (1998) Engineering & ABB SA (ASEA & Brown Boveri)
Services
1886 2007 Engineering & Westinghouse Electric Spain SAU
Services
1892 2007 Engineering & GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy
Services International Ltd
1895 Engineering & Siemens SA
Services
1901 1907, 1944, Electrical IBERDROLA SA
1992 Utilities
1912 1943, 1969, Electrical Gas Natural Fenosa SA
1992, 2009 Utilities
1920 Engineering & Konecranes Ausió SLU
Services
1935 Engineering & Grupo Dominguis
Services
1937 1996 Engineering & Applus SLU (Carlyle Group)
Services
(continued)

256 Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry (2011)

1941 Nuclear Instalaciones Inabensa SA
Equipment
1944 Electrical ENDESA, SA
Utilities
1944 Lobby UNESA, Asociación Española de la
Industria Eléctrica
1956 Engineering & SENER SA
Services
1956 Engineering & Tamoin
Services
1957 Engineering & IDOM.Ingeniería, Arquitectura y
Services Consultoría
1957 Engineering & TECNATOM SA
Services
1957 Lobby SEOPAN Asociación de Empresas
Constructoras y Concesionarias de
Infraestructuras
1958 Engineering & Areva
Services
1959 Engineering & Grupo COPISA
Services
1959 Engineering & Técnicas Reunidas SA
Services
1960 Engineering & Grupo Eulen
Services
1962 Lobby Foro de la Industria Nuclear Española
1964 Lobby SERCOBE Asociación Española de
Fabricantes de Bienes de Equipo
1968 NNP José Cabrera/Zorita (pre-dismantled)
1971 Engineering & Empresarios Agrupados (EA) AIE
Services
1971 NPP Santa María de Garoña, Nuclenor SA
1972 NNP ENUSA Industrias Avanzadas SA
1973 Nuclear Equipos Nucleares SA (ENSA)
Equipment
1976 Electrical HC ENERGÍA, GRUPO EDP
Utilities
1976 Engineering & Virlab SA (Grupo Urbar Ingenieros SA)
Services
1981 NPP Almaraz I and II
1982 Engineering & Global Energy Services Siemsa sa
Services
(continued)
Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry (2011)
257

1984 Engineering & PROINSA Cª Internacional de
Services Protección, Ingeniería y Tecnología
SAUGr Eulen
1984 NNP Ascó I and II
1985 NNP Cofrentes, Iberdrola SA
1988 NNP Trillo
1988 NNP Vandellós II
1989 Engineering & SOCOIN SA (gas Natural Fenosa)
Services
1994 Engineering & Iberdrola Ingeniería y Construcción
Services SAU
1995 Engineering & Grupo Automatismos, Montajes y
Services Servicios SL (AMS)
1996 Engineering & Medidas Ambiantales SL
Services (50%Nuclenor50%GrupoEulen)
1997 Engineering & COAPSA Control SL
Services
1997 Lobby ANCI Asociación Nacional de
Consultores Independientes
2000 Nuclear Ringo Válvulas SL
Equipment
2002 Nuclear Vector & Wellheads Engineering SL
Equipment
Source: Foro de la Industria Nuclear Española, 2011. ICEX, Madrid. Editors’s
elaboration
Bibliography
Archives and Libraries

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Archives du Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères [AMAE-F]
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Archives of Federal Reserve Bank of New York [AFRBNY]
Archivo Alfonso Álvarez-Miranda [AAAM]
Archivo Histórico de la Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales [ASEPI]
Archivo Histórico del Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria [AHBVVA]
Archivo Histórico del Banco de España [AHBE]
Archivo Linz de la Transición Española [ALTE]
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Service d’Archives du Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique [SACEA]
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The National Archives and Records Administration [NARA]
The National Archives of United Kingdom [NAUK]
Periodicals, Newspapers and Magazines

ABC
Actualidad Económica
Boletín Oficial de Cortes (BOC)
Boletin Oficial del Estado (BOE)
El Noticiero Universal
El País
El Plural
La Vanguardia
Mundo
New York Times
Nuclear Engineering
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Index1
A Akokan uranium mine, 172

Accidents Akouta uranium mine, 172
fire in the turbines, xiv, 165, 166 Algeria, 157
International Nuclear Event Scale, Alkem, 205
182n45, 234 Allende, José, 51
Vandellos, accident, xiv, 43 Almaraz NPP, 130
See also Accidents, fire in the Alonso Santos, Agustín, 204
turbines Alsthom, 47, 158, 159, 163, 171,
ADN news agency, 196 181n38, 185n74
Advisory Commission for Industrial Altos Hornos de Vizcaya SA, 40
Reactors (CADRI), 74, 76, America, 76, 128
90n27 American Chamber of Commerce,
AEG, 191, 192, 197–199, 213n55 73
Africa, vi, 9 American Congress, 70, 120
Aguas y Saltos del Zadorra SA, 82 American Congress of the
Aguirre Gonzalo, José María, 205 Association of Manufacturers,
Ailleret, Pierre, 164 94n69
Air Liquide, 158 Andalusia, 52, 77
Note: Page Numbers followed by ‘n’ denote notes.

1

280 Index
Andújar, 30n64 B
Antinuclear, vii, viii, x, xiv, 2, 52, Babcock & Wilcox, 40, 83, 93n56,
95n88, 138, 161 95n90, 128, 158
Antinuclear movements, vii, viii, x, Babcock & Wilcox Española de
52, 138, 161 Construccione, 46
Aragón, 52, 134, 215n79 Babcok-Brown Boveri Reaktor
Arbi reactor, xiii, 105 GmbH (BBR), 192
Areilza, José M., 163 Balance of payments, 35, 53, 202
Argentina, vi, 12, 29n60, 65n83, Balogh, Brian, 23n6, 26n21, 30n62
89n16, 197 Banca March, 142
Argonne, 73 Banco Central, 79
Argos reactor, xiii, 105 Banco de Crédito Industrial, 167
Armenia, 12 Banco de España, 30n63, 147n33
Ascó NPP, 133, 201, 202 Banco de Santander, 129
ASEA, 213n55 Banco Español de Crédito, 142
ASELÉCTRICA, 172 Banco Hipotecario de España, 79
Asfaltos y Portland Asland, 167 Banco Hispano-Americano, 126
Asia, vi, 10 Banco Ibérico, 171
Asturias, 221, 222 Banco Urquijo, xiii, 59n17, 84, 142,
Ateliers et Forges de la Loire, 181n38 167, 205, 219, 220, 225
Atomic Energy Act, 71, 89n12 Bank of Vizcaya, 70, 81–87, 92n48,
Atomic Energy Control Act, 70 93n58, 93n61, 95n87, 95n90
Atomic Industrial Forum, 39 Bankinter, 167
Atomic optimism, x, 35 Barcelona, xiii, 80, 88n5, 99, 108,
Atomics International, 192, 195 137, 164, 221, 222, 242
Atoms for Peace, Conference Barthelt, Klaus, 211n41
(Geneva), 37, 70, 71, 191 Basque Country, 52, 138
Atucha NPP, 197 Bayer AG, 193
Austria, 9, 27n29, 91n33 Belgium, 12, 127, 145n5, 146n9,
Autarkic plans, 39 185n77, 190
Autarkist policy, 42 Berlin Wall, 9
Autarky, 35, 36, 39, 40, 113, 125, Betchel Engineering, 131
156, 218, 227 Biblis A NPP, 205
Authorizations, xiii, 94n73, 126, Bilbao, xiii, 39, 40, 73, 79–83,
130, 132, 133, 141–143, 92n45, 92n48, 129, 137, 142,
147n21, 149n56, 200, 204, 150n69, 242
240 Bismarck, 6
Auxiesa, 47, 61n43, 131, 185n74 Bonet Castellana, Antoni, 170, 184n65
Index
281
Bonn, 195, 196 Caro, Rafel, 69, 116n25, 116n30,

Borssele NPP, 205 116n31, 177n7
Boston, 131 Carrero Blanco, Luis, 102
Boyer, Miguel, 56, 64n79 Cartagena, 80
Brandt, Willy, 196 Cassey, W. J., 49
Brazil, vi, 6, 12, 37, 89n16, 205, 231 Castejon thermal plant, 131
Breakdown, ix Castilla-León, 52
See also Failure or fault Catalonia, 52, 77, 85, 133, 162
Bretton Woods, 5, 8, 156, 202 Catalana de Gas y Electricidad, 79
Britain, 192 Cementos Hontoria, 82
British Nuclear Design and Centrales Nucleares del Norte S.A.
Construction Ltd (BNDC), (Nuclenor), 39, 41, 44, 125,
213n55 128, 129, 221, 222
British Nuclear Fuel Ltd (BNFL), Centrales Nucleares SA (Cenusa),
193 39, 41, 44, 45, 221
British Nuclear Policy, 77 Centralized Temporary Storage, 174
Brown Boveri/Krupp Reaktorbau Centro de Investigaciones
GmbH (BBK), 192 Energéticas, Medioambientales
Brown, Boveri & Cie (BBC), 205 y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT), 105
Bulgaria, vi, 12 Cervera, J., 90n27
Burns & Row, 47 Chalamera project, 166
Chantiers de l’Atlantique, 181n38
Chase Manhattan Bank, 126, 150n65
C Chernobyl accident, v, 2, 9–11, 144,
Cabrera, Blas, 99 161
Cabrera, José, 125, 193, 243n7, Chicago, 37, 89–90n18, 106, 131
247n50 Chicago University, 1
Cadarache, research centre, 163 Chile, 202
Calder Hall, 6, 75 China, vi, 9, 11, 12, 15, 157, 161
California, 106, 192 Chinon 1, 2 and 3 NPPs, 158
Cambridge, 75 Chooz NPP, 158
Campenon-Bernard, 181n38 Ciudad Rodrigo, 196
Canadian AECL, 121 Civil uses
Cantabria, 52, 221, 222 medicine, 21
Capital and foreign business of nuclear energy, 36, 41, 71,
organizations, 125 90n21
Careaga, Pedro de, 86 radioactive isotopes in
Carle, Rémy, 178n10 pharmacology, 200
282 Index
Civil War, 38, 80, 98, 99, 104, 107, Conseil Européen pour la Recherche
155 Nucléaire (CERN), 107, 111,
Climate change, v, 10 112, 114, 190
Coal, 6, 25n18, 53, 74, 77, 194, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
223, 227, 230, 233, 235, 237 Científicas (CSIC), 72, 89n13,
Cofrentes NPP, 133 98, 99, 104, 106, 112
Cold War, x, 3, 9, 12, 50, 72, 156, Conservative governments, 50
159 Construcciones Nucleares SA
Colin, Claude, 163 (CONUSA), 40
Colino, Antonio, 90n27 Constructora Pirenaica (COPISA),
Columbia, 89n16, 232 165
Combustion Engineering (CE), 131, Consultancies, 39, 40
209n18 Controls, 38
Comité franco-espagnol d’Échanges Coral I reactor, 171
Techniques, 163 Costa Morata, Pedro, 51, 63n62
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique Cowles Foundation report, 223
(CEA), 13, 29n56, 158–164, Crédit National, 167
166, 168–172, 175, 177n9 Cuba, 8
Compagnie de Constructions Czech Republic, 12
Mécaniques Procédés Sulzer,
181n38
Compagnie d’Entreprises Électriques D
Mécaniques et de Travaux De la Torre, Joseba, 1, 29n57,
Publics, 181n38 29n58, 29n60, 30n61, 30n63,
Compagnie Electro-Mécanique, 32n72, 33–57, 69, 87n1,
181n38 88n3, 88–89n6, 89n9, 91n30,
Compagnie Générale d’Electricité, 92n46, 119–152, 207n3,
158, 181n38 213n57, 220, 244n17, 247n51
Compagnie Générale des Matières Degrémont, 165
Nucléaires (COGEMA), 172 Degussa, 191, 192, 194–196
Compagnie Générale de Télégraphie Demag AG, 192
Sans Fil, 181n38 Democracy, transition period, viii,
Compagnie Industrielle de Travaux, 49, 51, 52, 157, 173, 207
181n38 Denmark, 89n16
Confederation of Small and Developmentalism, 40–45, 53, 197,
Medium-Sized Enterprises 229
(CEPYME), 54 Development Plan, 20, 45, 60n28,
Congo, 101 201
Index
283
Development Plan, the Fifth, 167 Electric utilities

Diplomatic services, 196 electrical-banking oligopoly, 67
See also Economic diplomacy electrical-banks, 80
Dirección General de Energía electrical companies, 73–76, 132
Nuclear (General-Directorate electrical engineering, 197
of Nuclear Energy), 222 electrical networks, 13
Dollar electric lobby, 69, 70, 77, 224
appreciation, 140 electro-nuclear lobby, ix, 57
devaluation, 8, 10 lobbying electricity, 19
devaluation of the Peseta, 174 Électricité de France (EDF), 158
exchange rate of, 5, 140 Electricity
suspension of the convertibility, 135 electrical restrictions, 38, 78
DON project, 111 electricity demand, 6, 12, 14, 17,
Douro, river, 52 53, 217, 218, 222, 224, 242
Dragados y Construcciones SA, 79 electricity interconnection lines,
Duran Farell, Pere, 164 87
Düsseldorf, 191, 209n19 electricity utilities, privatization, 9
electrification, 4, 227
El Páramo project, 133
E Eltwiller Program (the first five-year
Eastern Europe, 9, 10, 27n31, 123 nuclear programme), 191
East Germany, 12, 20, 121 Empresa Nacional de Electricidad SA
Ebasco, 47 (ENDESA), 78, 90n19,
Ebro river, 44, 52, 125 95n87, 133, 134, 145,
Economic assistance programme, 73 152n91, 172
Economic crises, 8, 125, 138, 139 Empresa Nacional de Residuos
Economic diplomacy, ix, 48, 125–138 Radiactivos SA (ENRESA), 166
Economies of scale, 13 Empresa Nacional del Uranio SA
Edison Electric Institute, 131 (ENUSA), 21, 46, 47, 49, 55,
EEC Memorandum (European 172, 202, 213n61, 231, 233
Economic Community Empresa Nacional Hidroeléctrica del
Memorandum), 206 Ribagorzana (ENHER), 134,
Egypt, vi, 9 162, 164, 167, 180n26,
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1, 19, 23n1, 181n33, 185n74
37, 71, 89n11 Empresarios Agrupados S.A., 21, 47,
Eléctrica del Viesgo, 39 171, 205
Eléctricas Reunidas de Zaragoza, S.A Energía e Industria Aragonesas, S.A.
(ERZ), 134, 206, 215n79 (EIASA), 195, 206
284 Index
Energy Europe, 6, 9, 27n29, 44, 51, 52,

dependency of fossil fuels, 6, 7, 100, 101, 114, 123, 128, 168,
221 172, 198, 205
crisis, 10, 53, 56, 224 European Association of Nuclear
energy growth, 4, 229 Scientists, 37
energy industry, 26n26, 68, 224 European Atomic Energy Society
energy mix, 22, 218, 234, 236, (EAES), 190, 200
237, 245n21 European Atomic Forum (Foratom),
energy planning, 4, 13, 217–247 190
energy policy, 3, 8, 22, 34, 35, 39, European Economic Community
49, 53, 56, 68, 229, 236, 237 (EEC), 157, 168, 206
energy supply, 224 European Nuclear Energy Agency
external energy dependence, 218, (ENEA), 5, 29n56, 190
227, 229, 230, 234, 242 European Treaty of Rome, 5
primary consumption, 5, 225, European Union (EU), v, 5, 9
228, 229 Euskadi ta Askatuna (ETA), xiv,
See also Oil crisis xxvii, 53, 138, 157
England, 41, 75, 81, 93n62 Experimental reactor, xiii, 40, 83, 158
Entrecanales y Tavora, 165 Experts, viii, ix, 3, 16, 33, 34, 38,
Entrepeñas, Buendía and Bolarque, 45, 48, 50, 60n26, 63n65, 78,
201 94n73, 111, 163, 171, 173
Entrepose, 165 Export Credit Agreements (ECAs), 17
Environment and Development, Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), ix,
United Nations Conference, 10 xiii, 9, 37, 48, 49, 68, 120,
Environmentalism, 8 124, 126–129, 132, 136–138,
Eptisa, 47, 199, 205 140–144, 164, 167, 201, 202,
Equipamientos Nucleares SA, 47 205, 232, 233
Equipos Nucleares S.A. (ENSA), xvi, Exporting nuclear facilities, 124
21, 46, 47, 95n90, 171, 202, Extremadura, 52
206, 233
Erice, José Sebastián, 91n33
Escatron thermal plant, 132, 133, F
136 Failure, 14, 55, 157, 161, 193, 203,
Escombreras, thermal plant, 92n40 224
Essen, 202 See also Breakdown
Euratom, 5, 45, 77, 127, 171, 190 Federal Ministry for Scientific
Eurochemic project, 190 Research (West Germany),
Eurodif, 55, 172, 173, 213n61 189, 199
Eurokopter, 203 Fessenheim NPP, 159, 160, 179n16
Index
285
Fierro Group, 171 Foro Atomico Espanol (FAE), 40,

Financial and military agreements of 59n14, 64n75, 86
1953, 125 Framatome Proyectos Industriales
Financial Protocol, French-Spanish, S.A., 171
163 Franc devaluation, 174
Financial rescue, xiv, 57, 144 France, vi, ix, x, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18,
Financing 20, 26n20, 37, 48, 61n34,
amortizations, 138, 141, 143 62n52, 100, 145n5, 146n9,
costs, external, 17, 124, 141–143 189, 190, 198, 231, 238, 243
credit terms, 59n22, 124, 140 Franco-Américaine de Constructions
financing agreements, 188 Atomiques (Framatome), 160
financial assistance, 113, 136, Franco, Francisco, 78, 184n61
195, 201, 203 Franco’s dictatorship, xiii, 146n15,
financial conditions, 164, 167, 184n68, 202
201 Franco-Américaine de Constructions
financial credit, 17, 33, 129, 143, Atomiques (Framatome), 160
144, 201, 233 Francoism, 38, 49
financial facilities, 17, 68, 120–124 Francoist policy, 73
financial limitations, 42, 69, 141, French National Assembly, 161
195 French Nuclear Programme, 103,
financing agreements, 80, 125 104
financing of nuclear power French Technological Exposition, 163
plants, 3 French Treasury, 167
financing of nuclear power Frewer, Hans, 187, 188
projects, 17 Friedman, Milton, 9
nuclear budgets, 55, 189, 190 Fuel imports, 73
repayment, 129, 138–145 Fuel production cycle, 202
subsidized loans, 9 See also Integral fuel production
Finland, 8, 12, 124 cycle
Fives-Cail-Babcock, 171 Fuentes Quintana, Enrique, 54,
Fives-Lille-Cail, 158 63n66
Fluido Eléctrcio SA, 79 Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña
Ford, Gerald, 48, 231 (FECSA), 133, 134, 162, 164,
Foreign capital, 38, 41, 126, 156 165, 167, 180n26
Foreign currency, 40, 41, 59n22, 80, Fuerzas Eléctricas del Noroeste SA
202, 223 (FENOSA), 134, 135
Foreign technology, vii, 41, 44 Fuerzas Eléctricas del Segre S.A.,
Forges et Ateliers du Creusot, 180n26
181n38 Fukushima, accident, v
286 Index
G Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung

Galicia, 52 von Kernbrennstoffen mbH
Gallego Málaga, Martín, 56, 57, (GWK), 193
64n80, 65n82, 80, 138, 139, Ghesa, 47, 205
151n76, 151n78, 151n85, Gibbs& Hill Inc., 47, 128, 205
152n91 Goded, F., 90n27
García Vinuesa, A., 90n27 Golden age, viii, 5–8, 10
Garnica Echevarría, Pablo, 93n61 Goldschmidt, Bertrand, 90n22,
Garoña, Santa María de NPP, xiv, 43, 177n9
44, 47, 48, 128, 129, 133, Gómez-Mendoza, Antonio, 69, 89n7
162, 164, 166, 167, 182n42, Gortázar, Manuel, 83, 90n27,
197, 222, 247n50 95n90
Gas, 6, 25n18, 25–26n20, 159, 227, Gösgen-Däniken NPP, 205
237 Göttingen, 104, 106, 190, 193
Gaulle, Charles de, 156, 158, 159, Graphitwerk Kropfmühl AG, 194
166, 190, 192, 193 Great Depression, 5, 8
Gaviría, Mario, 51, 63n62 Greece, 231
Gaztelu, José María, 86 Groupement Atomique Alsacienne-
Gelsenberg AG, 193 Atlantique (GAAA), 158,
General Agreement on Tariffs and 181n38
Trade (GATT), 5, 146n16 Groupement pour les Neutrons
General Electric Company, 37 Rapides, 171
General Electric Technical Services Grundremmingen NPP, 197
(Getsco), 129 Grupo Interuniversitario de Física
General Eléctrica Española, 83 Teórica (GIFT), 108, 111,
Generations of nuclear power, 43, 112, 114
45, 132 Guipúzcoa, 221, 222
Geneva, 29n56, 39, 70, 71 Gutiérrez-Cortines, Manuel, 41, 42,
Geological and Mining Institute of 92n42, 222, 223
Spain, 193 Gutiérrez Jodrá, Luis, 71, 90n18,
German Atomic Commission, 191 106
German consortium, 137
Germany, v, vi, ix, x, 6, 13, 15,
21, 48, 61n34, 62n52, 68, H
100, 129, 157, 171, 173, Harrisburg, accident, 3, 55
174, 185n77, 187, 231, Harwell, NPP, 73, 75
233 Hayek, Friedrich, 9
German Institute for Reactor Safety, Heisenberg, Werner Karl, 104, 105,
204 191
Index
287
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, The, Ibernuclear SA, 199, 200

236, 237 IMI for SELNI, 127
Hernández Rubio, Julio, 199, 202, Import Substitution Industrialization
205, 206 (ISI), 13, 37
Hetch, Gabrielle, 2 Indatom, 158, 181n38
HIC, 134, 135 India, vi, 12, 14, 15, 29n57, 49,
Hidroeléctrica de Cataluña S.A. 145n5, 147n23
(HECSA), 162 Industrial Atomic Institution, 83
Hidroeléctrica del Chorro, 82 Industrial engineers, 36, 39
Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola), INI Economic Studies Service, 56
39, 52, 82, 83, 130, 197, 221 Installing nuclear reactors
Hidro-Nitro SA, 90n19 (localization), 51
High-voltage grid, 54 Institute for Reactor Safety (West
Hiroshima, 100, 114n1 Germany), 204
Hispanic-German meeting on Institute of Nuclear Power
nuclear safety, 203 Operations (INPO), 10
Hispano-Francesa de Energía Instituto de Crédito a Medio y Largo
Nuclear S.A. (HIFRENSA), Plazo, 167
164, 165, 184n64 Instituto de Física Teórica de Altas
Hoechst, 191, 193 Energías, FTAE, 110
Hoechst AG, 193, 208n12 Instituto Energía Nuclear (IEN),
Holland, 205 107, 108
Horowitz, Jules, 159 Instituto Español de Moneda
Huesca, 195 Extranjera (Foreing Currency
Human capital, training, 103–109, Institute, IEM), 59n14
112, 113 Instituto Nacional de Industria
See also Learning by doing (National Institute of Industry
Hungary, vi, 12 (INI), 101, 172
Hydro-electrical resources, 73 Interatom (Internationale
Hydrological production, 180n28 Atomreaktorbau GmbH), 192,
195, 203, 205, 210n29
International Atomic Energy Agency
I (IAEA), vi, 5, 23n2, 108,
Iberdrola, 89n7, 172 182n45, 190
Iberduero SA, 30n66, 39, 45, 72, International banks, 142, 144
81–85, 90n20, 95n87, 129, International General Electric Co.,
131, 133, 134, 138, 148n33, 92n47
148n47, 149n59, 210n30, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
221 5, 125, 146n16
288 Index
Iran, 12, 48, 146n9, 185n77, 205, Karlsruhe, 210n25

231 Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre
Iron Curtain, 2, 8, 124 (Kernforschungszentrum
Irta NPP, xiii, 44, 52, 130, 135, 198 Karlsruhe, KFK), 187, 191
Islero, Project, 114n1, 116n31, KECO, 127
184n62 Kindelan, Juan Manuel, 65n82
Israel, 12, 89n16 Kissinger, Henry, 136
Italy, 27n36, 37, 89n16, 103, 104, Know-how, vi, 192, 207, 239, 243
115n3, 121, 141, 145n5, Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU AG),
146n9, 157, 178n10, 185n77, 187
198, 231 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
(KfW), 201, 206
J
Japan, vi, 2, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 29n55, L
37, 50, 62n52, 100–102, 113, La Hague nuclear fuel reprocessing
121, 122, 129, 145n5, 178n10, plan, 169
198, 231, 236 La Latina NPP, 178n10
JAPC, 127 Laboratorio de Investigaciones
JEN-1 reactor, 105 Físicas, 99
JEN-2 reactor, 105 Latin America, 9, 13, 171
Jeumont-Schneider, 181n38 Learning by doing, 7, 126, 165, 239
Júcar-Turia project, 203 learning curve, 44
Jülich, 196 learning effects, 14
Jülich Research Centre learning process for technicians,
(Kernforschungsanlage 36, 47
Jülich, KFA), 191 process of globalization of
Junta de Energía Nuclear (Board of knowledge-based services, 204
Nuclear energy, JEN), 40, training course, 37, 107, 108
58n4, 103, 163, 189, 193, training programmes, 105
210n23, 215n77 training school, 175
Junta para Ampliación de Estudios training staff and workforces, 137
(JAE), 98, 99 training technicians, 72, 113, 194
Juzbado factory, 21, 233 Lebanon, 89n16
Lemoniz NPP, 45, 47, 53, 57, 130,
133, 137, 140, 148n47, 173,
K 201
Kahl am Rhein NPP, 191, 197 Les Floristán, Alfredo, 202, 206
Kansai Eletric Power Co., 127 Les Verts Ecologist Party, 161
Index
289
Leybold, 194 Marcoule nuclear complex, 158,

Libya, 8 163, 169, 174, 179n17
Lithuania, 12 Martín-Artajo, José Ignacio, 58n2,
Load of fuel, 167 102
LOCA, 204 Massachusets Institute of Technology
Local authorities, 54 (MIT), 107
Local opposition, 51, 170 Massip, José María, 90n21
Lodge, John Davis, 73 Max Planck Institute for Physics
Loire River, 168 (West Germany), 190
López Bravo, Gregorio, 34, 40, Mecánica de la Peña SA, 46
42–45, 60n26, 163–165, Mediterranean Sea, 44
181n35, 196, 198, 211n42, Mendoza, Carlos, 85, 86
212n43 Merlin et Guerin, 181n38
López de Letona, José María, 45 Mertz & McLean, 47
Lugano, 200 Messmer Plan, 160
Mestre, Carmen, 56, 57, 64n80
Metallgesellschaft AG, 192
M Mexico, 12, 65n83
Mac Veigh, Jaime, 41, 42, 59n22, Middle East, 171
86, 219–221, 224, 225, Military uses
243n7 learning curve, 44, 45, 128
Madrid, xiii, xiv, 26n26, 43, 49, 51, learning effects, 14
72, 86, 93n49, 99, 104, 105, learning process for technicians,
111, 112, 125, 136, 137, 128
148n36, 150n68, 150n70, process of globalization of
150n71, 171, 189, 193, 194, knowledge-based services, 204
196, 199, 203, 211n38, training course, 104
212n43, 212n44, 214n64, training programmes, 104
214n67, 221, 222, 231, 238, training school, 105, 128
242 training staff and workforces, 137
Magaña, Luis, 56, 63n65 training technicians, 37
Magnox reactors, 121, 178n10 Moderators, 25–26n20, 159, 191
Manchester, 75 Mol, 190
Mandel, Heinrich, 192, 208n12 Moncloa facilities, xiii, 203
Manhattan project, 1, 36, 100 Moncloa Pacts, xxvi, 53, 54, 63n66
Manzanares, incident, xiv, 51 Monetary fluctuations, 202
See also Accidents Monopsony, 15
Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima SA, Moreno, Andrés, 93n49
47 Muguruza, Ignacio, 81
290 Index
Multinationals, ix, 6, 41, 44–49, Not-perfectly-competitive-market, 15

165, 202 NPP, xiii, xiv, 27n36, 136
Municipalities, 51, 52, 162, 170, NRG, 205
205 Nuclear business, ix, 67–96, 121
Muñoz Grandes, Agustín, 184n61 Nuclear ecosystem, 3, 189–193
Muñoz, Juan, 64n74, 70, 89n10, Nuclear Energy Law, 43
225 Nuclear exceptionalism, 2
Murcia, 52 Nuclear fuel reload market, 232
MZFR, 197 Nuclear industry, vii, xiii, 13, 14, 37,
43, 92n37, 108, 120, 150n64,
151n80, 156, 157, 161, 165,
N 190, 193–197, 207, 219, 240
Nagasaki, 100, 114n1 Nuclear legislation (WG), 191
Narcea coal plant, 232 Nuclear management
National defence, 101 bidders, 128, 131
National Electricity Plan, The First, bidding process, 130, 136, 137,
130, 224 171
National electricity plans, xiv, 18, bidding Trillo, 136
60n28, 131, 200 decision-making process, ix, 4, 5,
National Energy Plans, 54, 224, 225, 12, 17, 34, 206
246n42 delays, 14, 49, 55, 77, 132, 217,
Nationalization of the electric sector, 218
78 domestic industrial participation,
Nationalization of the high-voltage 132
line, 54 engineering services, 33, 199, 239
Navarra, xiv marketing of plants, 203
Neutron economy, 189, 200 nuclear cluster, 240–242
New York, 39, 131 public nuclear budget, 3, 189
New York Times, The, 93n49 Nuclear moratorium, vii, xiv, 21, 22,
Neyrpic, 163, 181n38 33, 55, 57, 76, 120, 144, 173,
Niederaichbach NPP, 197 226
Niger, 157, 172 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Nixon, Richard, 48 (NPT), xiv, 49, 169, 196, 207
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear optimism, 219–227
(NATO), 90n21, 160 Nuclear pessimism, 2
North Korea, 12 Nuclear pioneering countries, 13
Not in my backyard, 50 Nuclear Power Group of England,
See also Antinuclear movements 128
Index
291
Nuclear programs, vi–x, xiii, 2, 6, NUCLENOR, 39, 44, 78, 84–86,

10, 13, 17–23, 29n60, 33, 125, 128, 129
65n83, 67–70, 75, 76, 86, 87, See also Centrales Nucleares del
89n6, 119–121, 125, 132, Norte
135, 137, 140, 142, 189–191, Nucleocrats, 161
193–196, 198–200, 202, NUCNET, v
218–221, 229, 239, 242, 243 Nukem, 192, 193, 195
Nuclear reactors
boiling light water reactors (BWR
or SWR), 26n20, 159, 192 O
boiling-water reactors, 121 Oak Ridge, facilities, 37
gas-cooled reactors, 120, 128 Obninsk NPP, 6
heavy water reactor (HWR) Obrigheim NPP, 197
(Schwerwassereaktor), 192, Oil crisis, 202, 224, 227, 230, 235
196, 197 Oil prices, v, 8, 135
light water reactor, 7, 26n20, 43, Oliart, Alberto, 54, 63n65, 64n70
120, 121, 125, 169, 192 Oligopoly, 15, 16, 40, 55, 67
moderators for the reactors, 191 Organisation for Economic
pressurized water reactors (PWR Cooperation and Development
or DWR ), 159, 166, 171, 192 (OECD), 29n56, 190
Rapsodie fast-breeder, 161 Organisation for European
sodium cooled fast breeder, 198 Economic Co-operation
swimming-pool reactor, 194 (OEEC), 5, 24n9, 29n56, 37
test reactor, 191, 194, 195 Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Countries (OPEC), 8
(NRC), 205–207, 214n75 Oriol y Urquijo, José Mª, 64n78
Nuclear Research Society, 203 Orsay, research centre, 163
Nuclear Safety Council (Consejo de Ortiz Fornaguera, Ramón, 105, 106
Seguridad Nuclear (CSN), xiv, Ostpolitik, 202
55 Otero y Navascués, José Mª, 31n67,
See also Spanish regulatory agency 36, 58n3, 58n4, 102, 104–107,
Nuclear Suppliers Group, 48–49 110, 113, 115n15, 115n16,
Nuclear technology, expansion of 115n17, 116n21, 116n22,
western countries, 120 116n29, 163, 180–181n30,
Nuclear weapons, 12, 49, 91n35, 193, 196, 210n23, 210n25,
184n63 210n29, 213n58
See also Military uses Outlier, 18
Nuclear-powered nations, 11, 12 Oyster Creek, facilities (NJ), 7, 121
292 Index
P Private Funding Corporation

Pacific ocean, 50 (PEFCO), 150n65
Pakistan, vi, 12, 14, 65n83, 202 Pro-market, 6
Palewski, Gaston, 163, 182n48 Propaganda, 35, 50, 51, 190
Palomares, bombs, xiii, 51 Proyectos Industriales S.A., 171
See also Accidents Public opinion, 41, 49, 56, 162
Paris Treaty, 190 Public opposition, 14, 139
Participation of Spanish industry, 20, Public trust, 138
77, 164, 165, 167 Pueyo, Javier, 58n11, 69, 89n7,
Pascual Martínez, Francisco, 206, 207 210n30
Patents, 16, 71, 160, 165, 172 Punta Endata NPP, 132, 140,
Peacefull uses, agreements for 149n59
co-operation in, 12, 19, 91n35 Pyrenees, 163, 172, 174
Péchiney, 158, 181n38
Peñíscola, 52
Pennsylvania, 44, 106 R
Petroleum, 26n26, 74, 139, 218, Radioactive isotopes, 200
227, 230, 234–237 See also Civil uses
Peyrefitte, Alain, 163, 181n34, Radioactive water, accident, xiv, 51
183n55 See also Manzanares, incident
Phénix fast-breeder reactor, 161, 171 Ramón y Cajal, Santiago, 98, 99
Philippines, 17 Rapsodie experimental fast-breeder
Pierrelatte isotope separation plant, reactor, 161
159 Raw material, 26n26, 72, 76, 159
Pinay, Antoine, 163 Reactor Safety Commission, 191
Pioneers, vi, 18, 22, 35, 48 Reactors manufacturers, 15, 16, 20,
Pittsburgh, 37, 62n50 125, 128, 149n61
Planell, Joaquín, 36, 37, 42, 72, 73, Reaktor-Brennelement Union
76–78 (RBU), 205
Plettner, Bernhard, 212n47 Red Eléctrica de España, 163
Plumer, Brad, 16, 28n46, 28n49 Redonet, José Luis, 90n27
Plural Left coalition, 162 Regodola NPP, 137, 173
Poblat d’Hifrensa, 184n65 Regulations, xiv, 8, 14, 91n36, 189,
Poland, vi, 9 206, 233
Pompidou, Georges, 159 Reloads, 182n47, 233
Portugal, 14, 131, 166, 231 nuclear fuel reload market, 232
Pre-authorized projects, vii, 18, 128, Rheinisch-Westfälisches
130, 132, 133, 135 Elektrizitätswerks AG
Pretsch, Joachim (Dr), 195 (RWE), 191, 192
Index
293
Rio de Janeiro, 10 Sánchez, Luis, 63n62, 69, 87n1,

Rio Tinto Zinc Co, 192 88n4, 95n87, 95n88
Rockefeller Foundation, 99 Sánchez-Sánchez, Esther M., 30n66,
Rodríguez Sahagún, Agustin, 64n71 69, 89n8, 176n4, 176n5,
Romania, 12 177n8, 180n27, 181n31,
Romero Ortiz de Villacián, José, 181n32, 182n40, 185n80,
193, 210n26 208n4
Rotaeche, Jesús María, 83 Santander, 105, 129
Rubí–La Gaudière interconnection Santillan NPP, 136
line, 169 Sayago NPP, 140
Rubio, Ricardo, 72 Scandone, Francesco, 102
Rubio-Varas, M.d. Mar, 1–23, Schimmelbusch, Heinz, 193–195,
25n12, 29n57, 29n58, 29n60, 210n25, 210n29, 213n58
30n61, 30n63, 32n72, 62n55, Schneider group, 160
69, 87n1, 88n3, 88n6, 89n9, Schnell-Brüter-Kernkraftwerks
91n30, 92n46, 119, 217, 220, Gesellschaft mbH (SBK),
244n17, 244n19, 246n41, 202
246n46, 247n51 Schnurr, Wahlter, 202
School of Industrial Engineering of
Bilbao (EIIB), 78, 84, 94n73
S Schwartz-Hautmont, 165
Saclay, research centre, 163 Scientific system, 2, 50, 98
Safety, v, 40, 43, 48, 149n56, 162, Second World War, 36, 100, 113
170, 197, 198, 200, 203, 204, Segura river, 201
207, 242 Sener, 47, 65n83
radioactive waste, 160 Sercobe, 44, 47
radioactivty, 50, 101, 182n45 Serrano, Ángel, 64n74, 70, 89n10,
risks, 2, 55 225
waste issues, 16 Sevillana de Electricidad SA, 39,
Saint Gobain Nucléaire, 158 90n19, 130, 149n52, 221
Saint Gobain Techniques Nouvelles, Seville, 80, 108
172, 181n38 shippingport facilities, 6, 44
Saint Laurent des Eaux 1 and 2, Siemens, 62n51, 188, 192, 197, 199,
NPPs, 158, 168 201, 205, 213n55
Salamanca, 21, 233 Siemens Industria Eléctrica, 62n51,
Salomon Brothers Agency, 57 188, 192, 197, 199, 201, 205,
San Francisco, 131 213n55
Sánchez del Río, Carlos, 90n18, 105, Siemens, Peter von, 205
106, 193 Siemens-AEG, 131, 188, 199
294 Index
Siemens-Schuckerwerke AG (SSW), Spanish Confederation of

212n47 Entrepreneurs'Organizations
Simons Ltd, 47 (CEOE), 54, 152n88
Slovakia, 12 Spanish reactors, vii, 21, 73, 126,
Slovenia, 12 136, 179n17
Smith & Barney C, 167 Spanish regulatory agency (CSN),
Socialist government, vii, 56, 144 234
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Spanish-French Nuclear Conference,
Obrero Español, PSOE), 50 163
Sociedad Ibérica de Construcciones Spent fuel, v, 126, 172, 174
Eléctricas, 82 Stabilization plan, 125
Société d'Etudes et d'Entreprises Standard Eléctrica, 93n55
Nucléaires (SEEN), 158 Standardization, 14, 15, 17
Société Hispano-Alsacienne, 181n38 State intervention, 6, 15, 38
Société Industrielle Delattre-Levivier, State owned enterprises (SOE), 9
181n38 Stein & Roubaix, 95n90, 158,
Société Parisienne pour l’Industrie 181n38
Electrique, 181n38 Stein & Roubaix Española SA, 47
Société pour l'Industrie Atomique Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 196, 198,
(SOCIA), 164, 165 209n13, 211n42, 212n43
Society for the Study of Physics Strauss, Franz Josef, 191, 193
(Physialische Suanzes, Juan Antonio, 36, 38,
Studiengesellschaft, PSG), 191 58n6, 60n25, 77, 81, 83, 85,
SOFRELEC, 172 89n13, 90n19
Solana, Javier, 62n56 Suárez Candeira, Daniel, 86,
Solchaga, Carlos, 56 90n19
Soria, 172 Sub-Saharan Africa, 171
Sortir du Nucléaire, 180n24 Sudrià, Carles, 58n11, 69, 89n7,
See also Antinuclear movements 210n30, 246–247n48
South Africa, 12, 231 Superphénix fast-breeder reactor,
South Korea, vii, 12, 13, 15–18, 20, 161, 171
29n60, 48, 122, 141, 231, 240 sustainability, 10
Soviet Bloc, 13 Svedberg, Theodor, 89n13
Soviet Union, vi, 1, 6, 8, 10, 12, 45, Sweden, 12, 13, 15, 16, 37, 185n77,
100, 121, 158, 159, 174, 231 236
Spanish Atomic Forum (FAE), 40, Swimming pool reactor, xiii
86, 95n88, 144 Switzerland, 12, 39, 89n16, 104,
Spanish Banking Board, 80 122, 124, 205, 236
Index
295
T Torrontegui, Alejandro, 83, 85,

Tagus River, 201 90n27, 93n54, 93n56,
Taipower, 127 93n59
Taiwan, vii, 12, 13, 48, 127, 231 Tricastin facilities, 172
Tarragona, 162 Trillo (Guadalajara), 200
Technical assistance Trillo NPP, x, 21, 136, 187, 233,
technological alternatives, 6, 234
189 Truman, Harry S., 89n12
technological learning, 14, 36 Turnkey contracts, 44, 47, 125
Technicatome, 185n74 Turnkey projects, xiii, 7, 16, 18, 20,
Technological content, vii, 167 29n57, 121, 126, 147n23,
See also Technical assistance 164, 240
Technological equipment, 44
Technology transfer
technological dependence, 80, U
242 Ugine Kuhlmann, 181n38
technological leaders, ix, 22, 129 Ukraine, 9, 12, 15
transfer of nuclear technology, 17, Ultracentrifuge Netherland N.V.,
37, 53 193
Technopolitics, 2 UNGG technology, 159, 160, 162,
Tecnatom SA, xiii, 21, 40, 41, 48, 165, 166, 175, 178n10
84, 86, 125, 128, 221, 240, Unidad Eléctrica SA (UNESA), 38,
243n7 45, 54, 61n43, 77–81, 87,
Técnicas Nucleares SA, 40 92n38, 93n51, 130, 144, 162,
Técnicas Reunidas SA, 47 220, 223, 224, 228, 234
Tepco, 127 Unión Eléctrica Madrileña S.A.
Thailand, 231 (UEM), 34, 45, 81, 85, 125,
Thermal energy, 26n26, 73 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134,
Third Reich, 190 193, 195, 199, 201, 202,
Third World, 159 205–207, 221, 232, 233,
Thomson-Houston, 158 243n7
Three Mile Island (TMI), accident, Uniquesa, 40
2, 8, 10, 11, 161 United Kingdom (UK), vi, 1, 6, 12,
See also Harrisburg, accident 16, 20, 26n20, 37, 41, 61n34,
Tihange NPP, 160 62n52, 73, 100, 101, 121,
TMI effect, 8 146n9, 156–158, 165,
Tokai NPP, 178n10 178n10, 179n14, 185n77,
Torres, Manuel de, 90n18, 244n13 190, 191, 198, 231
296 Index
United Kingdom Atomic Energy enriched uranium, xxv, 21,

Authority (UKAEA), 13, 38, 25n20, 35, 37, 43, 46, 55, 83,
165, 189 92n37, 121, 125, 126, 129,
United Nations (UN), 1, 10, 70, 159, 166, 167, 172, 173,
156, 223 178n13, 189, 192, 196–198,
United States Atomic Energy 200, 202, 206, 230–234, 242
Commission (AEC), 70, 126, enriched uranium cycle, 126
205 enriched uranium, monopoly,
United States of America (USA), vii, 121, 202
ix, xxvi, 1, 6–8, 12, 14–16, 20, enrichment plant, 76, 231
21, 27n36, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, monopolistic supply of enriched
45, 46, 48, 52, 55, 68, 76, uranium, 231
120–122, 124–126, 132, natural uranium, x, xiii, 21, 38,
135–138, 188, 190, 191, 193, 76, 103, 159, 166, 167, 172,
195–198, 202, 206, 230–232 174, 178n13, 192, 195–198,
Uranit, 193 200, 231
Uranium natural uranium moderated,
Andujar, mining, 30n64, 196 26n20, 195

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF

More information about this series at

Palgrave Studies in Economic History

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017954913

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover illustration: Cultura Creative (RF) / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

Perhaps South Korea and Taiwan are examples of greater similarity to

quantitative evidence for explaining how a young democracy assimilated

Chapter 3 explains the origins and the behavior of the electro-nuclear

obtain contracts in the very active Spanish nuclear market, as discussed

analysis and conceptualization that incorporates, from a dual macro- and

1948 A secret nuclear energy program (EPALE) started by Franco dictatorship.

1968 Zorita NPP by Westinghouse becomes the first to supply commercial

2017) have served as a meeting point to present results and to discuss

1 Seeking the Perennial Fountain of the World’s Prosperity 1

2 Who was Who in the Making of Spanish Nuclear

3 The Nuclear Business and the Spanish Electric-Banking

4 Human Capital and Physics Research for the Spanish

5 How did Spain Become the Major US Nuclear Client? 119

6 An Alternative Route? France’s Position in the Spanish

7 The Long Road to the Trillo Nuclear Power Plant:

8 Energy Planning, Nuclear Promises and Realities 217

 ppendix A. List of Nuclear Projects in Spain

Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry (2011) 255

BOE Boletin Oficial del Estado (Official State Bulletin, the

ENUSA Empresa Nacional de Uranio SA (National Company

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

Fig. 1.1 World’s nuclear reactors by construction start date and

Fig. 5.4 Nuclear capacity planned by Spanish utilities 1959–1975  135

Table 1.1 Production of electricity, contribution of nuclear power

M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (*) • J. De la Torre

© The Author(s) 2017 1

fountain of world prosperity.”2 Forecasted applications of atomic power

graphical currents show the value of historical actors to understand such

 950s–1971: Hyper-growth After World War II—The

developed countries.18 Energy demand surged around the world for

Slowdown and Oil Crisis

1982–1990s: Restructuring the World Economy

Figure 1.1 also makes evident a paradox: a technology that aspired to

 conomic Policy, Industrial Economics

Building nuclear power plants required strong governments. The risks

related costs (like evacuation plans), getting specialized equipment and

or a third party—the state, investment funds—may be the principal

countries such as South Korea, the Philippines, Spain, and Yugoslavia to

the chapter provides a general introductory background to the Spanish

 he Spanish Nuclear Program: Pioneer

Table 1.1 Production of electricity, contribution of nuclear power in non-­

low–medium technological bits. Yet the Spanish nuclear sector continued

movements have garnered little attention by the historians too, although

ment of nuclear energy. The actual dimension of the Spanish nuclear

University of California Press, 1989); John Krige, American Hegemony

12. Zsuzsanna Csereklyei, M.d. Mar Rubio-Varas and David I. Stern,

reactor using natural uranium as its fuel, moderated by graphite and

39. Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress, “U.S. Nuclear Non-­

55. Scott Victor Valentine and Benjamin K. Sovacool, “The Socio-Political

61. De la Torre and Rubio-Varas, “Nuclear Power for a Dictatorship”: 409.

M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas (mar.rubio@unavarra.es) is an energy economist and eco-

Joseba De la Torre (jdelatorre@unavarra.es) is Professor of Economic History

In 1964, the leading Spanish electricity companies began an ambitious

© The Author(s) 2017 33

1 Seeking the Perennial Fountain of the World’s Prosperity 1

2 Who was Who in the Making of Spanish Nuclear

3 The Nuclear Business and the Spanish Electric-Banking

4 Human Capital and Physics Research for the Spanish

5 How did Spain Become the Major US Nuclear Client? 119

6 An Alternative Route? France’s Position in the Spanish

7 The Long Road to the Trillo Nuclear Power Plant:

8 Energy Planning, Nuclear Promises and Realities 217

ppendix A. List of Nuclear Projects in Spain

Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry (2011) 255

Fig. 5.4 Nuclear capacity planned by Spanish utilities 1959–1975 135

950s–1971: Hyper-growth After World War II—The

Slowdown and Oil Crisis

1982–1990s: Restructuring the World Economy

conomic Policy, Industrial Economics

he Spanish Nuclear Program: Pioneer

Table 1.1 Production of electricity, contribution of nuclear power in non-

39. Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress, “U.S. Nuclear Non-

cientists and the Military in the Autarkic

ntrepreneurs and Engineers: The Challenge

romoters and Technocrats: The Triumph of Nuclear

lanners, Consultants and Multinationals: Nuclear

The Power of Democracy

ctivists and Defenders of the Territory: The Anti-

L obbyists and Politicians in Transition: The Status

he Journey Towards the Commercialization

uclear Trade-Off: National Interests

ower in the Background: The Technical

company—with minimum levels of public participation—which

he Atomic Bombs in Japan and Their

The Beginnings of Nuclear Research in Spain

J osé María Otero-Navascués, Architect

JEN as Revitalizer of Spanish Physics

JEN as a Promoter of Theoretical Physics