Sunteți pe pagina 1din 28

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 1

PART 1: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the individuals by whom the
government of the Islands is administered”?
I. Administrative Law in General
ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art. 292
a. Basic Principles
for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the Phil.
Island?
THE UNITED STATES vs. FRED L. DORR, ET AL.,
RULING:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense 1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the
of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. makes and carries out those rules…xxx…the government is the aggregation
of authorities which rule a society (administration)”.[1]
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of
April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts." 2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used
in an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing
political system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this
FACTS:
sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration.
1. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of writing,
3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil.
publishing and circulating scurrilous libelagainst the Government of the
Islands” is the government as a system, however, the article in questions
U.S. and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in violation of
attacks the ‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials who run it.
Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission.
4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the
2. The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated 06 April
governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is
1902 as an editorial issue.
enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men who
3. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to are entrusted with the administration of the government which the writer
important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity). wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and private
morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not constitute any
The following are part of the article: seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art. 292.

“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate Respondents are acquitted.
over a set of men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…this kind of foolish work that
the Commission is doing all over the Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and [1] ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of
turning down the men who have during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the government are for the time being.
Americans.”

“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who are
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO vs. NATIONAL COCONUT
alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character”.
CORPORATION, ET AL. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION
“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”.
Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled
4. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the policy of the Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of
CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having a tendency to the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a state of feeling hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for
obedient to the laws. the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564
to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of
5. There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil. P1 per page.
Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law and
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 2
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19, whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial or municipal
1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the branches or other form of local government. This requires a little digression on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from
the payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General issued To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that institution
an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct from the salary or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out
of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of P25 every payday and from the salary of Mateo those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
A. Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the
deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the National power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution,
Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the
Manila. judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These
functions are twofold constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely
of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
of the Rules of Court. After trial, the court found for the Plaintiffs declaring (1)
“that Defendant National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the “‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property
from violence and robbery.
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the payments already
‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and
made by said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein and received by the latter from the former children.
in the total amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic transcripts in question, are ‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
valid, just and legal; and (3) that Plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to make determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
a refund of these payments already received by them.” This is an appeal from said ‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
decision. ‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines is ‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and among these fees are ‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from
external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.’“
those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by them that
(Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.)
may be requested by any interested person (section 8). The fees in question are for
the transcript of notes taken during the hearing of a case in which the National
Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript was requested by its assistant The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education,
corporate counsel for the use of said corporation. public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” as follows: things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for
“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. (Malcolm, The
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised
Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)
throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
branches or other form of local government.” Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation may
people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or
be considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”
controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our
for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the
people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
Rules of Court.
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private
As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” refers to a enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private
government entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including corporations under the Corporation Law.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 3
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation perform certain “We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to
functions of government make them a part of the Government of the Philippines? be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a
particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local
do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for and internal concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and
instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon, Municipal
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and
the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30
chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate for each page of transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is taken and
power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but in this case the National Coconut
provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the services rendered
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It by the Plaintiffs and has not raised any objection to the amount paid until its propriety
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in was disputed by the Auditor General. The payment of the fees in question became
this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit prescribed in
“The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
make it a public corporation” (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46
Phil., 586-587). “By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the As regards the question of procedure raised by Appellants, suffice it to say that the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the same is insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to a money claim
transactions of the corporation . Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of prohibition the purpose of
without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains which is to restrain the officials concerned from deducting from Plaintiffs’ salaries the
an agency or instrumentality of government.” (Government of the Philippine Islands amount paid to them as stenographers’ fees. This case does not come under section
vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.) 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the Auditor
General. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the as to costs.
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
FACTS: Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local
government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they requested for
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for the said transcript at the
the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties rate of P1 per page, amounting to P714 in total.
and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate
charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor General
section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court. disallowed the payment of such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts paid.
Consequently, the AG required the petitioners to reimburse the amounts invoking that
“Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the National Coconut Corporation is a government entity within the purview of section
the State.” (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law). 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which states that: “‘The Government of
the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity
“‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine
organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative powers
Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
for the local, civil government and police regulations of the inhabitants of the particular
through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to
district included in the boundaries of the corporation.’ Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309,
the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of
312.”
local government.”, hence, exempted from the payment of the fees in question.
“In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include both towns
ISSUE: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the payments
and counties, and other public corporations created by government for political
in question?
purposes. In its more common and limited signification, it embraces only incorporated
villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the
So. 661.” government namely: constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 4
bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more on public Sec. 1. In construction or repair work undertaken by the Government, whether done
welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety. From such, we may directly or through contract awards, Philippine made materials and products,
infer that there are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote whenever available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose as equally well
its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an as foreign made products or materials, shall be used in said construction or repair
attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the work, upon the proper certification of the availability, practicability, usability and
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. durability of said materials or products by the Director of the Bureau of Public Works
and/or his assistants.
The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the
economic life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-
In the decision appealed from the Court of First Instance of Manila has permanently
owned and controlled corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.
enjoined the NAWASA from the procurement of the materials needed for the projects
Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it involved which, according to the appellant, are designed to alleviate the sufferings of
was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was the millions of inhabitants in said places where there is a crying need for more water
made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate and the delay occasioned by the injunctions complained of, has in no little way, further
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned. aggravated the inconvenience of the consuming public in said metropolitan areas
where acute water crises have recurred through the years. Nevertheless, it is
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the vehemently contended by the appellee that the declaration of an economic national
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that policy as envisioned in the aforequoted provision of the law which, like the original
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an Flag Law1 is impressed with the clear nationalistic policy of giving preference to locally
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political produced materials and products, has been violated; and if this is so, no amount of
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local public clamor could justify the acts of the NAWASA complained of, for above all the
government. supremacy of the law must be upheld. We have, therefore, examined the record of this
case with these considerations foremost in Our minds.
Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of
fees in question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement. Petition GRANTED.
FACTS: The case originally commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a
petition for declaratory relief for the purpose of securing a judicial pronouncement on
the interpretation of the word "practicable" as used in Republic Act No. 912, i.e.,
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COURT OF APPEALS and ABLAZA whether it means that the cheapest materials among the locally produced or
CONSTRUCTION manufactured products should be preferred and specified in construction and repair
works undertaken by the Government, was later converted into, an action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction through the process of supplemental pleadings.

THE SAN PABLO WATERWORKS SYSTEM — It was alleged that the NAWASA had
started to negotiate: for direct purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes (CCI) for the
improvement of the San Pablo Waterworks System in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 912 and the law on public biddings, excluding the C & C Commercial
Company, the plaintiff, which can supply instead asbestos cement pressure pipes
which are available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose of the said
project at a much lower cost.

C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND


On 23 September 1965, the plaintiff and the NAWASA entered into a partial stipulation
SEWERAGE AUTHORITY
of facts, on the basis of which and the additional evidence adduced at the hearing, the
ISSUE: Whether or not the call for bids for the supply of steel and centrifugal cast iron court rendered a partial decision on 31 January 1966, dismissing the complaint insofar
pipes for the waterworks projects in Manila and suburbs, and in the cities of Davao as the San Pablo Waterworks System was concerned and dissolving the preliminary
and Iloilo, the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) violated the injunction issued thereunder. This partial decision has become final.
provisions of Republic Act 912, section 1 of which provides as follows:
THE DAVAO METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS — On 22 January 1965, the
NAWASA called for bids for the furnishing of labor and the supply of materials for the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 5
construction of the proposed improvement of the Davao Metropolitan Waterworks from holding the bidding scheduled on 14 December 1965, or on any subsequent
System. In the call for bids, the bidders were required to submit proposals for the date, until further orders from the court.
supply of 24-inch steel pipes, asbestos, cement pressure pipes, and cast iron pipes.
On 15 March 1965, the committee on award of the NAWASA recommended to the Pending the case in the court a quo, the NAWASA filed three separate motions
board of directors that the bid be awarded to the lowest bidder, Tirso del Rosario, praying for the dissolution of the preliminary injunctive writs issued in
under his proposal to supply steel pipes. connection with the Davao, Iloilo and Manila projects, pleading to the court to
consider the crying need for a more adequate supply of water in those cities,
On 10 August 1965, the plaintiff filed a (First) supplemental complaint seeking to particularly in the City of Manila and its suburbs, where the lack of adequate supply of
restrain the NAWASA from proceeding with the award of the project in Davao, alleging potable water has been a recurrent crisis which affected to a dangerous extent, the
that in specifying steel pipes for the project, which is admittedly imported material, health and the life of the inhabitants, and that the continuation of the injunctive writs
without giving preference to locally produced asbestos cement pressure pipes may bring about the cancellation of the $20,200,000.00 loan of the NAWASA from the
manufactured by the plaintiff, violates the provisions of Republic Act 912. On 14 World Bank, which would result from the failure of the NAWASA to comply with the
August 1965, the court admitted the supplemental complaint; and as prayed for formulated work schedule of the waterworks projects, which under the agreement with
therein on, 17 September 1965, the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. the World Bank, has to be completed in the month of October 1967; but the court
failed to take any action on the motions. Parodying Shakespeare, "Set honor in one
THE ILOILO WATERWORKS SYSTEM — As early as on 26 November 1962, the eye, and death in the other, and I will look on both indifferently."
NAWASA called for bids for the supply of 18-inch steel pipes for the improvement of
the Iloilo Waterworks System. The bidding was conducted on 27 December 1962. C & After a trial of the case, on 15 August 1966, the court rendered a decision finding and
C Commercial Co. participated in the bidding offering to supply the needed 18-inch concluding that the act of the NAWASA in specifying steel pipes for the project of the
steel pipes for the project, but lost in the bidding. The lowest bidder for the supply of city of Manila and its suburbs, and in awarding the contracts for the supply of steel
the specified 18-inch steel pipes was the Regal Trading Corporation, and the bid was pipes in the cases of the Davao and Iloilo Waterworks System, constituted a violation
awarded to it. of the provisions of Republic Act 912;

On 8 September 1965, almost three (3) years after the date of the bidding, the C & C From the decision, NAWASA appealed to this Court.
Commercial Co. filed a (Second) supplemental complaint; seeking to restrain the
NAWASA from formalizing or implementing the award on the aforesaid Iloilo Appellant contends that the provisions of Republic Act 912, are applicable only to
project for the supply of 18-inch steel pipes, alleging that in specifying steel pipes for construction or repair works undertaken by the Government. It argues, that since the
the particular project, the NAWASA has violated the provisions of Republic Act 912 NAWASA, though a public corporation, is not a municipal corporation or agency of the
which requires the purchase of Philippine made materials and products which State empowered to regulate or administer the local affairs of a town or city, 2 nor one
are available, practicable and usable locally, like plaintiff's product — asbestos cement of the various arms of the government through which political authority is made
pressure pipes — in construction and repair undertaken by the government. On 24 effective in the Islands, consequently, the NAWASA should not be included within the
September 1965, over the objection of the NAWASA, alleges second supplemental meaning of the term "Government" as used in the law.3 It is to be noted, however, that
complaint was admitted by the court. The record is not clear when the restraining Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defining the term "Government" which is
order under the second supplemental complaint was issued, although the NAWASA heavily relied upon by the appellant recognizes an exception: "when a different
alleges that a restraining order was issued under date of 10 September 1965, which meaning for the word or phrase is given a particular statute or is plainly to be collected
fact has not been traversed by the plaintiff. from the context or connection where the term is used." The observation that
Commonwealth Act 138 expressly includes purchases by Government-owned
THE MANILA AND SUBURBS WATERWORKS SYSTEM — On 13 September 1965, companies, while Republic Act 912 merely relates to construction or repair work done
the NAWASA advertised for bids for the supply of 30 to 42-inch steel pipes for the use by the Government, is no argument for the proposition that government-owned or
and improvement of the interim waterworks project in the City of Manila and suburbs, controlled corporations have been excepted from the operation of the latter law, for it
the bidding to take place on 14 December 1955. On 10 November 1965, the C & C is clear that Commonwealth Act 138 also ordains that the Purchase and Equipment
Commercial Co. filed a (Third) Supplemental complaint seeking to restrain the Division of government-owned companies authorized to purchase or contract for
NAWASA and its representatives from holding the balding under the aforementioned materials and supplies for public use, buildings, or public works, shall give preference
notice to bid, averring identical facts as those alleged in the previous supplemental to locally produced materials or products. Being statutes in pari materia they should be
complaints, that the call for bid for steel pipes for the Manila project and suburbs construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy.
violates the provisions of Republic Act 912. Over the objection of the defendant
NAWASA, the supplemental complaint was admitted; and as prayed for therein, on 20
November 1965, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued restraining the NAWASA
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 6
The main objective of the Government is to develop our domestic industries so that Works. We really do not see Our way clear how herein appellee could have charged
the country will be economically self-sufficient. And both Commonwealth Act 138 and that the NAWASA had discriminated against its products under the circumstances
Republic Act 912 aim to contribute to the realization of the aforesaid nationalistic when its own president admits that it has supplied the NAWASA before locally
policy by requiring, the use of Philippine made products or materials, produced asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches diameter only and all those
whenever available, practicable and usable in government construction work or repair with diameters above 12 inches were of foreign manufacture. The evidence, therefore,
projects. The alleged conflict between the two laws is more apparent than real, and is conclusive that locally produced asbestos pipes above 12 inches in diameter were
should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of these laws. We have to declare, not available for purposes of claiming any preference under the provisions of Republic
therefore, that the NAWASA, like any other corporation exercising proprietary or Act 912. And this conclusion becomes even more cogent if We are to consider the fact
governmental functions should be deemed embraced within the term "Government" that C & C Commercial Corporation failed to produce the necessary certification from
found in Republic Act 912, and in the repair or construction of their works or projects the Director of Public Works to show that its products were already certified as
or the purchase of materials therefor, local materials should be given preference when available, practicable and usable at the time that the call for bids for the supply of
available, practicable and usable. materials for the Davao, Iloilo and Manila Interim projects were made to give some
semblance of the right it claims to have been violated.
The next issue for consideration is: Did the NAWASA violate the provisions of
Republic Act 912? For all the foregoing, We find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors
assigned by the appellant.
Appellant vehemently denies the charge and decries the holding of the lower court
appealed from that in specifying steel pipes in the call for bids for the supply of WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, with costs against the
materials for the waterworks projects under consideration it had defied the mandate of appellee. The writs of preliminary injunctions issued by the lower court are set, aside,
the law. Appellant insists that at the time it called for bids for the Davao project, and declared null and void.
followed by the call for the supply of materials, for the Iloilo project, herein appellee's
plant was only capable of producing asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches ARATUC VS COMELEC
diameter; while at the time the call for bids for the supply of materials for the Interim
Project of Manila and suburbs was advertised, the largest size of asbestos cement Facts: Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of
pipes available were of 24 inches being produced at the time by another local respondent Comelec. A supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted
manufacturer, the Eternit Corporation, which never protested against the bids in hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the election
question. records. In order for the Commission to decide properly. It will have to go deep into the
examination of the voting records and registration records and it will have to interview
We have reexamined the record of the case with painstaking solicitude and, instead, and get statements from persons under oath from the area to determine whether
We find the facts indubitable and conclusive that the C & C Commercial Corporation actual voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in
had not therefore and even up to the present time ever produced pipes larger than 12 these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.
inches in diameter. Said appellee corporation has implicitly admitted this as a fact; and
although it claims to have a complete plant that is equipped with the necessary Issue: Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion
machinery, technicians and skilled laborers capable of producing pipes in the sizes amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
called for in those bids (18 to 42 inches in diameter) had the NAWASA specified them
in asbestos cement, the weakness of the argument is at once exposed by a mere Ruling: No. Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 “ the
examination of the pertinent evidence adduced during the trial of the case on this commission on elections shall have direct control and supervision over the board of
particular point. canvassers”. In administrative law, a superior body or office having supervision or
control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have
done. The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.
From the foregoing testimony of witnesses, and in the light of other evidence
submitted by the parties, the following may be deduced: that it is the practice of the FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
NAWASA — which we find both practical and logical — to send out its own men to the Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the
various local manufacturing plants for the purpose of knowing the availability of results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
materials needed for its projects; that at the time it specified 18 and 24 inches Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of
diameter steel pipes for the Davao and Iloilo waterworks projects, there were no Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass
locally produced materials in said sizes; and that with respect to those sizes that were then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in
already available, the NAWASA has actually specified and used them in various other which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107voting centers in the whole region had already
construction and repair works even without the certification of the Director of Public been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 7
Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the On February 6, 1958 the petitioner, thru its agent, requested the Commissioner of
complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6
of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers which was to expire the following day, giving the following as the reasons for its failure
issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year: (a) typhoons and
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was severe floods; (b) picketing of the Central railroad line from November 6 to December
taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec 21, 1957 by certain union elements in the employ of the Philippine Railway Company,
issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB which hampered normal operations; and (c) delay in the arrival of the vessel aboard
candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board which the petitioner was to ship its sugar which was then ready for loading. This
of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the request was denied by the Commissioner per his letter of April 15, 1958.
present petition.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
jute bags within one year from their importation, the Collector of Customs of Iloilo, on
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
March 17, 1958, required it to pay the amount of P28,629.42 representing the customs
HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, duties and special import tax due thereon, which amount the petitioner paid under
the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as protest.
by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.”
“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from In its letter, the petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the
any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and
provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct that its failure to export the jute bags within the required one-year period was due to
control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in delay in the arrival of the vessel on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing
administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation of the Central railroad line. Alternatively, the petitioner asked for refund of the same
here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may amount in the form of a drawback under section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of
do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. the Tariff and Customs Code.

After hearing, the Collector of Customs of Iloilo rendered judgment on January 21,
1960 denying the claim for refund. From his action, appeal was taken to the
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CTA
Commissioner of Customs who upheld the decision of the Collector. Upon a petition
for review the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Petitioner Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of Customs.
centrifugal sugar for exert, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as
jute bags. In 1957 it made two importations of jute bags. The first shipment consisting 1. The basic issue tendered for resolution is whether the Commissioner of Customs
of 44,800 jute bags and declared under entry 48 on January 8, 1967, entered free of is vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then applicable law, with
customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's filing of Re-exportation and discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Act.
Special Import Tax Bond no. 1 in the amounts of P25,088 and P2,464.50, conditioned Section 23 reads:
upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation. The
second shipment consisting of 75,200 jute bags and declared under entry 243 on
February 8, 1957, likewise entered free of customs duties and special import tax upon SEC. 23. That containers, such as casks, large metal, glass, or other
the petitioner's filing of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 in the receptacles which are, in the opinion of the collector of customs, of such a
amounts of P42,112 and P7,984.44, with the same conditions as stated in bond no. 1. character as to be readily identifiable may be delivered to the importer
thereof upon identification and the giving of a bond with sureties satisfactory
to the collector of customs in an amount equal to double the estimated
Of the 44,800 jute bags declared under entry 48, only 8,647 were exported within one duties thereon, conditioned for the exportation thereof or payment of the
year from the date of importation as containers of centrifugal sugar. Of the 75,200 jute corresponding duties thereon within one year from the date of importation,
bags declared under entry 243, only 25,000 were exported within the said period of
under such rules and regulations as the Insular Collector of Customs shall
one year. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags provide.1
were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were
exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their
importation.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 8
Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation are not favored, 9 and that tax
applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or statutes are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
executive departments of the state.41awphîl.nèt favor of the taxing authority, 10 then we are hard put to sustain the petitioner's stand
that it was entitled to an extension of time within which to export the jute bags and,
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an consequently, to a refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.
ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other
agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered view that the one-year period
consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be prescribed in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 is non-extendible and
accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, compliance therewith is mandatory.
especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and
uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or Facts: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of
when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.5 centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute
bags. In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and
The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with the intention of special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax
the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one bond, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date
year, without extension, from the date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff of importation.
and Customs Code to supersede the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would
have amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the long-standing view of However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only
the Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not 25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In
extendible. other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported
within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after
the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.
Implied legislative approval by failure to change a long-standing administrative
construction is not essential to judicial respect for the construction but is an element Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-
which greatly increases the weight given such construction.6 exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day,
citing reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one
The correctness of the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.
administering its provision is indicated where it appears that Congress, with full
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of
knowledge of the agency's interpretation, has made significant additions to the
statute without amending it to depart from the agency's view.7 86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the Petitioner was required to
pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax
due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the refund
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with of the amount it had paid.
implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the
construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight. Issues: a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to
extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical 1909.
construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases
b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute
of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
by the Executive Department or other Administrative Agencies be given
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the
consideration? In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.
respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that Held:
they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the
one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of
out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the
with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said
inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute; period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued
Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 9
how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to the purchase of one (1) computer unit costing P120,000.00 acquisition by
consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible. personal canvass which is in violation of Secs. 362 and 367 of R.A. 7160, thereby
causing undue injury to the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan.6
b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine
Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code)have not been the
On 16 January 2002, prior to the scheduled arraignment, petitioners filed with the
subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
"judicial respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation alleging the discovery of new evidence which will
Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide
change the outcome of the case if presented and appreciated. The alleged newly
a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially
discovered evidence consists in the reassessment by the auditors of the Commission
known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
on Audit (COA) that, though the prices between the subject computer and that
extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
canvassed by the COA are different, such difference is "not really that material." 7
Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule
applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or Complying with the 6 September 2002 Resolution, petitioners formalized their Motion
executive departments of the state. for Reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman.

The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or


uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged with its Accordingly, the Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation.
administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from
the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of As earlier found, the acquisition of the unbranded computer set was questionable on
the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and the following grounds:
uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the
enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency. 1. There was no public bidding and the mode of procurement was by canvass.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and
enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it 2. Under Sec. 367 of the Local Government Code, procurement through Personal
thereon should be given controlling weight. Canvass requires approval of the Committee on Awards. There was no committee
approval to speak of in this case because none has been constituted. This committee
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical is supposed to be composed of:
construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases
of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
a. Local General Services Officer or the Municipal Treasurer;
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the b. Local Accountant;
respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their c. The head of office of department for whose use the supplies are being procured.
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they 3. Purchases under this section allows municipalities outside Metro Manila with the
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on following limits:
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the Second and Third Class – Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique Fourth Class and Below – Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute. These limits are applicable for all items procured by any one (1) month period only.
The local government of San Manuel, Pangasinan, incidentally, is a fourth class
municipality.

SALVADOR M. PEREZ and JUANITA A. APOSTOL vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN It must be noted that the canvass made on all the stores/suppliers were done by
(2nd Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES accused Treasurer Juanita Apostol and attested by Mayor, Salvador Perez. To attest
means to affirm to be correct, true or genuine.
SALVADOR PEREZ, being then the Municipal Mayor and JUANITA APOSTOL,
ZAPANTA, Municipal Treasurer of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with In the earlier memorandum, there is no unanimity of conclusion as far as the
one another, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage reasonableness of the purchase price of the computer set is concern[ed]. However,
of their official functions, and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross the circumstances of its acquisition clearly indicate that the public officials involved
inexcusable negligence, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause gave the supplier, Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center, a private party,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 10
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
faith or gross inexcusable negligence by paying much more than the prevailing price created under this Constitution." (Art. XI, Section 7) (Italics ours).
for a comparable computer set in the market.
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the
This conclusion is derived from accused’s deliberate disregard of the rules on incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and
procurement discussed above. The Information must, therefore, be amended to reflect who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is
the manner of the commission of the offense. In regard to Prosecutor Elvira Chua’s clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of
recommendation which is endorsed by the Special Prosecutor, the issue of overpricing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This
must be referred to the appropriate office for further fact-finding and probable right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been
administrative investigation for violation of COA rules and RA 7160 otherwise, known divested of such authority.
as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Under the present constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Information be amended instead of subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute
withdrawing the same. Further, the case of overpricing be referred for fact-finding and cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate
possible administrative investigation for violation of Secs. 362 and 367 of RA 7160, the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 11 Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under
Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may,
Petitioners assail the foregoing Resolutions before this Court, presenting the following however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered
issues for resolution: to investigate.16

1. Whether or not there is a denial of procedural due process on the part of the The following year, Republic Act No. 6770,17 otherwise known as The Ombudsman
petitioners when the Special Prosecutor filed the Amended Information without Act of 1989, was passed into law. Among other things, said law:
authority from or the approval of the Honorable Ombudsman, and against the latter’s
specific instruction; 1) expressly included the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman; 18

2. Whether or not the Amended Information is valid in the absence of such authority or 2) gave the Special Prosecutor the power, under the supervision and control and upon
approval of the Ombudsman under the circumstances; and the authority of the Ombudsman, to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and to perform such other
3. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman;19 and, most importantly,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it admitted the Amended Information
which bears no approval of the Honorable Ombudsman, and against the latter’s 3) granted the Ombudsman the powers to:
written instruction to submit to him for approval the result of the re-study before the
filing of said Amended Information.15 Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the incumbent omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to: over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
"Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any Government, the investigation of such cases.20
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13, par. 1) A few years later, several persons charged in a complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman (in connection with the alleged summary execution of Kuratong Baleleng
The Constitution likewise provides that: gang members) instituted petitions for certiorari with this Court, claiming that it is the
Special Prosecutor which has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation and
file the proper information against them. In the oral arguments, the parties agreed to
"The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special limit the issues, with petitioners praying for the re-examination of the Zaldivar ruling on
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter the argument that the Constitution did not give the Ombudsman prosecutorial
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 11
functions, and contending that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as (4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and
among the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of Republic Act upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
No. 6770 is unconstitutional.
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
In upholding Zaldivar, we held that while there was indeed an intention to withhold jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
prosecutorial functions from the Ombudsman, the legislature nevertheless
recommended that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other (b) To enter into plea-bargaining agreements; and
powers, functions and duties to the Ombudsman.21 Thus, paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution, provides that the Ombudsman may exercise other
functions and duties as may be provided by law.22Pursuant to this authority, the (c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. 38
Legislature enacted Republic Act No. 6770, which granted prosecutorial powers to the
Ombudsman. This Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
The determination of this question is necessary in the case at bar, where it is the of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." 39 The
petitioners’ central contention that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of power of supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction when it admitted the Amended of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties." 40 Under the
Information which, according to petitioners, bears no approval of the Ombudsman, Administrative Code of 198741:
thus, constituting denial of procedural due process.24
Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
Particularly, petitioners allege that the amendment of the Information and the function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of
admission of the Amended Information is premature, since the Ombudsman has not duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
yet acted with finality on the 23 October 2003 Memorandum. 25 The Ombudsman, by decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans
stating in the marginal notes of the 23 October 2003 Memorandum that "(t)he and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. x x x
resolution of this case is deferred," and "(k)indly submit your recommendation
soonest," allegedly decreed that the reinvestigation stage would not be completed Springing from the power of control is the doctrine of qualified political agency,
until his final determination.26 wherein the acts of a subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless
actually disapproved by the latter.42 Thus, taken with the powers of control and
Respondent People’s defense is that compliance with the specific instructions of the supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in the performance of their duties are
Ombudsman is merely an internal matter and the alleged failure to heed the specific presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until the President alters,
instructions of the Ombudsman is speculative.27 modifies, or nullifies the same. By arguing that "[w]hat is important is that the
amended Information has not been withdrawn, and or recalled by the Honorable
Ombudsman, [a] clear showing that the latter acknowledged/upheld the act of the
The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in Special Prosecutor in signing the Amended Information,"43 respondent People claims
a marginal note is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of that the doctrine of qualified political agency should be applied as well to the
respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely abused their relationship between the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.
discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to
dismiss or withdraw the case against petitioner. x x x. 31
Petitioners counter that the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply to the
Office of the Ombudsman, since the latter is an apolitical agency, and is far different
Was there, as petitioners assert, a violation of the orders of the Ombudsman as stated from the bureaucracy to which said doctrine applies.44
in his marginal note?

Petitioners are correct.


There being no express delegation of the power to prosecute, we are constrained to
go back to our main query: Is there an implied delegation of the power to prosecute
under Republic Act No. 6770, such that Special Prosecutors are presumed to have The doctrine of qualified political agency was adopted in our system of government on
been delegated such power, in the absence of a prohibition from the Ombudsman? the following pronouncement of this Court in Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior45:

Republic Act No. 6770 provides: After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government
in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 12
type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES, JAIME HERNANDEZ, SR., and JAIME
organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, HERNANDEZ, JR. vs. HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ
of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, relative to
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is the orders of respondent Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the July 30, 1969 and October 6, 1969, which in effect held that the determination of
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative whether or not a charge of unfair labor practice, investigated by the Prosecution
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive Division of said court, should be dismissed outright because of any fatal defect of form
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and or substance is the exclusive prerogative of said Presiding Judge, to the exclusion of
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated the court en banc, on the theory that the function involved in such determination is not
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. judicial but purely administrative and hence entrusted to his exclusive administrative
authority as head of said court. law library
While we do not underestimate the quantity of work in the hands of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the same simply does not measure up to the workload of the Office of On June 17, 1969, respondent University of Nueva Caceres Guardians Union filed
the President as to necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the with the Bicol branch of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an unfair labor
Ombudsman. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman could very well make a practice charge against petitioners accompanied by the joint affidavit of Benito de la
general delegation of powers to the Special Prosecutor, if it is so desired. An Paz and George Offemaria. At the hearing of said charge before the prosecutor of the
examination of the office orders issued by the Ombudsman, however, reveal that there CIR, petitioners moved to dismiss the same on the grounds: (1) it is not verified; (2) it
had been no such intention to make a general delegation. does not specify the particular provisions of Section 4 (a) of the Industrial Peace Act,
RA 875, as amended, supposed to have been violated, and (3) the supporting joint
Indeed, a statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be affidavit contains "falsities, misstatements and improbabilities on points otherwise
liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it material to the charge." Instead of dismissing the charge, the prosecutor, although
was created.47 Yet, the Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his finding the grounds of the dismissal motion to be more or less plausible, granted
power of control if we are to allow the Special Prosecutor to authorize the filing of respondent Union five (5) days "to file an amended charge and amended affidavit,"
informations in the first instance. This is because while the Ombudsman has full which said Union did on July 8, 1969. On July 14, 1969, petitioners moved to
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the reconsider the ruling of the prosecutor, but on July 30, 1969, respondent Presiding
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, Judge denied the same, admitted the amended charge and directed the Court
and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the Prosecutor to set the said amended charge for preliminary investigation. On August
informations may not be dismissed, without the approval of the said court. 48 16, 1969, petitioners moved again for reconsideration of the order of July 30, 1969.
Apparently, petitioners assumed their motion for reconsideration would be acted upon
We, therefore, resolve to grant the Petition. We realize that, once transmitted to the by the court en banc, for when on October 6, 1969, respondent Judge issued an
new Ombudsman, she can so easily approve the 8 March 2004 Supplemental order, signed by him alone, denying it, the present petition was filed charging said
Memorandum of Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao, and the same Amended respondent with having acted in excess of jurisdiction in acting on a matter addressed
Information can be filed in no time. However, when the law entails a specific to and within the jurisdiction of the CIR en banc and of grave abuse of discretion in not
procedure to be followed, unwarranted shortcuts lead to the violation of the sacred ordering the dismissal of the charge upon the grounds invoked by them. law library
right to due process, which we cannot countenance.
The assertion by respondent Judge, implicit in his order of October 6, 1969, of
Finally, as regards other informations authorized by the Special Prosecutor to be filed jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the court en banc, over the matter herein involved
without the approval of the Ombudsman, we also recognize that the former prevailing cannot be sustained. It is Our considered view that unlike the preliminary investigation
interpretation of the law may shield these informations from illegality. Such reliance of criminal cases by fiscals which are under the supervision and control of the
upon the operative fact, however, would cease upon the finality of this Decision. Secretary of Justice, 1 the peculiar procedure prescribed by law in unfair labor
practices partakes of the nature of judicial investigations, since they are conducted, to
quote the language of the law, by "the Court or any agency or agent designated by the
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Court", (Section 5 (b), Rep. Act 875) similarly to the preliminary investigations
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan admitting the Amended Information is SET ASIDE. undertaken by courts of first instance in election cases 2 and charges of violation of the
Let the 8 March 2004 Supplemental Memorandum of Assistant Special Prosecutor III Anti-Subversion Act. 3 Surely, no one can pretend that in such preliminary
Warlito F. Galisanao be TRANSMITTED to the Office of the Ombudsman for approval investigations, the courts of first instance are performing administrative or non-judicial
or disapproval. functions. In such cases, the courts act in the same judicial capacity as they do in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 13
trying the cases on the merits and cannot, in any respect or measure, be controlled by WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition insofar as the assailed order
the Secretary of Justice. The fact that the law authorizes the CIR to delegate the of July 30, 1969 is concerned is denied, without prejudice to the appropriate action on
investigation to "any agency or agent designated by the Court" does not alter the petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof by the CIR en banc, but the petition for
nature of the court's function in the premises, just as the appointment of certiorari and mandamus relative to the impugned order of respondent Presiding
commissioners by the courts under Rule 34 does not make the procedure Judge of October 6, 1969 is granted, the said order is hereby declared null and void
administrative or less judicial. Indeed, under the provision aforementioned, the and set aside, as in excess of jurisdiction, and respondent Presiding Judge or
investigation could very well be assigned to one of the judges of the CIR, and in that whoever is acting in his stead is ordered to refer the motion for reconsideration of
event, how can it be maintained that the function is administrative? Withal, it is implicit petitioners dated August 16, 1969 to the CIR en banc for appropriate action. The writ
in this procedure that the work of the "agency or agent designated by Court" is as of preliminary injunction issued by the Court on November 24, 1969 is made
much the responsibility of the court as if it were the court itself that were acting permanent, without prejudice to the resolution by the CIR of petitioners' motion for
directly. law library reconsideration just referred to. The manifestation of Acting Presiding Judge Ansberto
Paredes to the effect that he has desisted and continues to desist from following the
The contention of respondent Judge that the function of overseering the Prosecution practice of former Presiding Judge Martinez declared illegal in this decision is noted.
Division of the CIR in its work of filing and dismissing charges of unfair labor practice Costs against private respondents.
is purely administrative in nature and falls within his exclusive competence is without
merit. It is true that reference to the court in the law must be construed to mean the LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
Presiding Judge and not the court en banc when the action contemplated is purely
administrative in character, but, precisely, the point missed is that, as already It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public
explained, the Industrial Peace Act does not consider the investigation by the CIR, in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals.[1]The failure to
either by itself or thru an agent, as an administrative matter but a judicial one like the perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when a person can show
preliminary investigations in election and anti-subversion cases. law library that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he
has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-
Maybe the development in the United States recounted by respondent Judge whereby performance.[2]
the Taft-Hartley Law transferred from the National Labor Relations Board to its
General Counsel the exclusive function and power to determine with finality whether The legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took
or not an unfair labor practice charge should be filed with the Board is good, in the effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion,
sense of avoiding that the Board be the accuser, investigator and judge all rolled into Hope, and More were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem
one, but there is nothing in either Commonwealth Act 103 or the Industrial Peace Act tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before
indicating that the American experience has influenced the enactment and RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion,
phraseology of the pertinent provisions of our laws. Quite on the contrary, as already Hope, and More as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
pointed out, Section 5(b) of RA 875 very explicitly confers the function of investigating brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected
unfair labor charges upon the CIR itself, albeit it allows the court to designate any Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654,
other agency or agent for the purpose. law library specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes
As regards the other impugned order of July 30, 1969, the result of the foregoing an advalorem tax of 55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less
discussion and ruling is that the same should first be submitted to the CIR en banc for than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
appropriate action. Much as the writer of this opinion feels that the objections thereto
raised by petitioners are rather strained and are not very consistent with the interests On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.
of justice, which would not permit the throwing out of an unfair labor practice charge Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but
merely because of non-jurisdictional defects which can anyway be corrected, the it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune
Court would not pre-empt the power of the CIR en banc to make the corresponding Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-
ruling relative thereto in the first instance 93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July
30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax
Before closing, it might be stated that, to be sure, the creation of the National Labor deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC
Relations Commission, may have altered the procedure in cases involving alleged 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.
unfair labor practices, but that point is not and cannot be raised anymore in this On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
proceeding and We do not consider it necessary to pass on it now. law library Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 14
enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular individual of the
10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and community.
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency
tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner they are sufficient to define the general doctrine.
of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that
RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative 2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to
issuance. includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a
proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an
under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an
Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their
act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them.
38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability
of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a
governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a
alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting
RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the
by the submission of the corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of official good
its counsel to execute the same.[4] conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular
individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due
The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, performance.[12]
and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in
departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-
decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is
from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, [t]he liability of a
228 of the National Internal Revenue Code. public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with
his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing to the public one he can incur no liability.[13]
collectively (the body politic), and the duty owing to particular individuals, thus:
Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an
1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even
those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case,
the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform
at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes
no duty to him as an individual.[14] The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.[15]
The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are
numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers
owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that a particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper performance or
fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill- non-performance of his public duty. An individual can never be suffered to sue for an
considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which he
and many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. [16] A contrary precept
large and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an
were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-
to the public to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if
pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway one man might have an action, all men might have the like the complaining individual
commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by has no better right than anybody else.[17] If such were the case, no one will serve a public
considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 15
a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds relevant and material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible
upon which all actions are founded.[18] therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor
Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice.[29]
rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious
of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. [30]
wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Courts pronouncement in
its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioners motion for reconsideration) that Article The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without
32, in fact, allows a damage suit for tort for impairment of rights and liberties.[20] any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondents complaint (specifically,
paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code would be
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Appeals (CIR v. CA),[33] where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her
is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had fallen short of a valid and effective
issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, administrative issuance. This is a logical inference. Without the decision in CIR v.
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,[24] we declared as having CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondents rights to due process of law
fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.[25] A public officer, such as and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the petitioners administrative
the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner
public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid in her motion to dismiss.
administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the
entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02
rule. of respondents complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action
against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the allegation that only
Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the respondents Champion, Hope and More cigarettes were reclassified.
petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on
account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the
of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the
to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase financial and business respondents claim of due process infringement.
difficulties[26] mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and
cannot translate into a particular injury. In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the
demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed
pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37- by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit
93. against the State.[46]

With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioners motion for
wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY respondents motion for
primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case No. CV-97-341-MK,
the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED.
the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an against Liwayway as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall
or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued
maintain an action for recovery of damages.[28] a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
set up this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based
on the failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of
of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 16
process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right;
that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the intent.
case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did
not act with malice or bad faith. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and
within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that
may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal
capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate
public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V.
CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his
acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the
office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2)
where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious
act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without
right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property
or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 17
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OF THE PHILIPPINES V COMELEC
- June 6, 2003: COMELEC chairman speaking through his legal representative rejected
the protest.
SUMMARY:
This Petition seeks ISSUES:
(1) to declare null and void Resolution No. 6074 of COMELEC, which awarded “Phase 1. WON petitioners have Locus standi
II of the Modernization Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC);” 2. WON the instant petition is premature
(2) to enjoin the implementation of any further contract between Comelec and Mega 3. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the bidding process and the
Pacific Consortium and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI); awarding of the contract to MPC.
(3) to compel Comelec to conduct a re-bidding of the project.
HELD:
FACTS: 1. Petitioners have standing as taxpayers. They have interest in seeing that the funds
- June 7, 1995: Congress passed RA 8046 authorizing COMELEC to do a demo of are lawfully used. Other circumstances qualifying for taxpayer’s standing:
Automated Elections and do the pilot test in ARMM in the March 1996 elections a. Illegal disbursement of public funds
b. Funds employed for any improper purpose
- December 22, 1997: Congress enacted R.A. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an c. Wasting public funds by enforcing an invalid law
automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in Petitioners also have standing as voters/citizens. Bidding process has direct impact
subsequent national and local electoral exercises, providing funds therefore and for other on electoral process. Thus case at bar is of transcendental importance and of paramount
purposes. public concern.

- October 2002: COMELEC adopted Resolution 02-0170 to modernize the 2004 2. Not premature. Administrative remedy invoked by respondent cannot be exercised by
elections, to conduct biddings for three phases: the petitioners. COMELEC awarded the contract to MPC (April 16) before the Bids and
I. voter registration and validation Awards Committee released its report (April 21).
II. automated counting Moreover, petitioner’s letter to Abalos (May 29) to protest the award is sufficient
III. canvassing, and electronic transmission. compliance with the administrative remedy prescribed in Section 55, RA 9184. Also,
absent the protest letter, petitioners are still excused from exercising all administrative
- January 24, 2003: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order 172 remedies as illustrated in Paat vs. CA (instances when rule on exhaustion of
allocating P2.5 billion for the AES. An additional P500 million was released later. administrative remedies may be disregarded)

- January 2003: COMELEC issued an invitation to bid for said program 3. COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion throughout the entire process.
a) MPC was not a valid bidder.
- February 17, 2003: COMELEC released the Request for Proposal (RFP) to procure the i. MPC was not the bidder, but Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.. No proof was shown
election automation machines. The Bids and Awards (BAC) committee convened a pre- that MPEI was pre-authorized by the “Consortium” members to represent them
bid conference on February 18, 2003, and gave prospective bidders until March 10, 2003 collectively as MPC.
to submit their bids. ii. Despite the existence of several memoranda of agreement between MPEI, SK
&C and WeSolv (as joint undertakings), and Election.com and ePLDT (as
Of the 57 bidders, the BAC found Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) and subcontractors), the terms of the agreements did not specify the investments that
the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) eligible. Said entities were referred to the BAC’s each entity was to make, nor the scopes and limitations of their duties to MPEI.
Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) iii. The Commissioners themselves had no proof that there was a consortium.
for technical evaluation. b) The ACM machines did not pass the technical tests of the DOST.
i. Both bidders’ machines failed the DOST’s tests, yet the TWG noted that MPC’s
In its report on Phase II proposals, the DOST said both entities obtained a number of machines failed due to software errors which could be corrected by
failed marks in said evaluation. Nevertheless, COMELEC en banc promulgated reprogramming; such corrections would mean that the machines tested would still
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC on April 15, 2003. Said body publicized be different from the ones that would be ordered for an election.
this on May 16, 2003. ii. Comelec cited that the standard used was unrealistic.
iii. The software’s failure to detect previously-downloaded data was also a cause
- May 29, 2003: Five individuals and entities including petitioners ITFP, represented by its for concern, as this could lead to cheating during the elections.
President, Alfredo M. Torres, and Ma. Corazon Akol wrote a letter protesting the award of iv. The inability to print the audit trail was not met by the software, and this was
the contract. mandated by Sec. 7 of RA 8436 itself.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY SARMIENTO 18

v. Comelec let MPC present a “trial” version of the software, still subject to • In deciding the instant case, the Court shall consider only the undisputed or admitted
revisions, a luxury not afforded the other bidders. facts and resolve only the specific questions raised by the parties. The Court is not a
c) COMELEC disclosed that three types of software were to be used in the undertaking: repository of remedies or a “super-legal-aid bureau.” We cannot grant relief for every
i. for evaluation of technical bids perceived violation of the law or worse, on the basis of prophetic wisdom.
ii. testing and acceptance procedures
iii. Election Day use • It is not the Court’s function to actively ensure that the automation is successfully
In effect, different software would be used at every stage, constituting different implemented or that the elections are made free of fraud, violence, terrorism and other
purchases, which defeated the purpose of public bidding, by allowing the winner to alter threats to the sanctity of the ballot. This duty lies primarily with the COMELEC.
what should have been the final product immediately. • The Court has constantly underscored the importance of giving the COMELEC
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment
RULING: Petition granted. The award of the contract to MPC was declared null and void. of the objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
The Contract executed between COMELEC and MPEI was declared null and void. The credible elections.
COMELEC was ordered to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement
with regard to the project. • As correctly pointed out by the respondents, at no time during the entire bidding process
did the petitioners question the determination of the COMELEC Bids and Awards
RATIO: Committee (BAC) finding Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) eligible to bid. Under R.A.
Respondent’s Contention: Petitioners do not possess locus standi because they are not 9184, decisions of the BAC should be appealed to the COMELEC en banc.
challenging the validity or constitutionality of RA 8436. Consequently, the determination of the BAC that MPC was eligible to bid, adopted
subsequently by the COMELEC, became final.
Supreme Court: No law has been actually violated by awarding the Contract.
Respondents added that the petitioners will be injured or prejudiced on account of the • Considering the circumstances, the premature invocation of this Court’s judicial power is
award. Petitioners have standing as taxpayers. They have interest in seeing that the funds fatal to the petitioners’ cause of action.
are lawfully used.
• Whatever perceived deficiencies there are in the supplementary contracts entered into
Petitioners acted prematurely.: Petitioners had no opportunity to avail of administrative by MPEI and the other members of the consortium as regards their joint and several
remedies, as the COMELEC awarded the project on the same day that the BAC allegedly undertaking were cured, or better still prevented from arising, by the above-quoted
gave a verbal report, and six days before the publication of the results. Letter-protest was provisions from which it can be immediately established that each of the members of MPC
sufficient compliance, however unnecessary, citing points from Paat v. Court of Appeals is solidarily liable with the lead company, MPEI, albeit only for the particular contract or
(1997), that administrative remedies may be disregarded, when exhaustion of said aspect of the joint venture of which it is in charge.
remedies are unreasonable, rule does not provide plain, speedy, and adequate remedy,
and the urgency of judicial intervention. • The paper requirements should yield to the reality that, collectively, the members of the
consortium have furnished the COMELEC with sufficient information to enable it to
DISSENT: Tinga, J. judiciously gauge MPC’s eligibility and qualifications. The strict and inflexible adherence to
the bidding requirements by each and every component of the consortium advanced by
• … no constitutional provision or letter of a statute was alleged to have been violated. The the petitioners would negate the salutary purpose of R.A. 8436 and frustrate the long-
Court nullified the contract for an automated election system (“AES”) simply on the ground anticipated modernization of the electoral system.
that in making the award the COMELEC has allegedly violated its bidding rules and an
unfounded apprehension that the counting machines would not work on Election Day. On • Reckoned from the standpoint of the established legal presumptions of validity of official
the other hand, not one of the losing bidders has joined the petition; neither did the acts and regularity in the performance of official duty, it is unjustified to speculate, as the
petitioners question the fairness of the price tag for the machines. ponencia does, on the good or bad motives that impelled the COMELEC to award the
Contract to MPC
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 19
b. Classification of Administrative Bodies Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB. Hereby ruled that Beja and Villaluz
are exonerated from the charge against them; Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. service; That he be disqualified from re-employment in the government service; That
REYES Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.

The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its rendered a decision 4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
Administrative Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an "appeal
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports by certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order."
Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.
Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due
FACTS: Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by the PPA as arrastre process; (b) the PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension
supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port order without the necessary approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA
Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him to the
PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor. DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and
DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the administrative
case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and
Administrative Case against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General
dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and Manager.
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and
Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of
P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to
for the charges. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for a preventive suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential
Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit." Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:

On December 13, 1988, another Administrative Case was filed against Beja by the (d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint
PPA General Manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (Emphasis supplied.)
for being notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different
specifications of administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the
amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant PPA General Manager is the "proper disciplining authority. 6
to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates
The case was redocketed and thereafter, the PPA general manager indorsed it to the "preventive suspension" as a remedial measure with "suspension" as a penalty for
AAB for "appropriate action." At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a government
the ground that he needed time to study the charges against him. The AAB proceeded employee charged with an administrative offense is subject to the following provision
to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, Beja of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental. 2 Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may
motion to suspend the hearing of Administrative Case on account of the pendency of preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
the hearing of the administrative case. involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
file before this Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive
suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 20
employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered
his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. 7 Thus, preventive institutions attached to a Department. 12
suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as
the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former may be imposed on a Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental
which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides:
disposition of the case.

Sec. 8. Management and Staff. — a) The President shall, upon the


The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and recommendation of the Board, appoint the General Manager and the Assistant
without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an General Managers.
administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned,
not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807
granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving (b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and
disciplinary actions against officers and employees" in the PPA. appointed on the basis of merit and fitness based on a comprehensive and
progressive merit system to be established by the Authority immediately upon
its organization and consistent with Civil Service rules and regulations. The
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the
the disciplining authority has not finally decided the administrative case provided the Authority, including temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit
ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has been system.
exhausted. The employee concerned may then be reinstated. 8 However, the said
ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that
any fault, negligence or petition of a suspended employee may not be considered in (c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board,
the computation of the said period. Thus, when a suspended employee obtains from a determine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel of the Authority,
court of justice a restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments.
an administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in the For professional and technical positions, the General Manager shall
reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive suspension. 9 recommend salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar
positions in other government-owned corporations, the provisions of existing
rules and regulations on wage and position classification notwithstanding.
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB
may initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA Personnel below the
rank of Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of (d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint
petitioner. and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that Law, the Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an
corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors,
the power "to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the the law impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the
technical staff of the Authority and other personnel." rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During
such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only after
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the approval of the PPA
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and Board of Directors. 14
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an
attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by
the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors,
from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Head or
actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission.
Administrative Code of 1987. 11 Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 21
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the
to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the
herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of
could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case. presidential control over the executive departments

The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and recommend to him exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive
"all cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
the Department." Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came into
being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the President on May 25, Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
1987. 15 Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
AAB is not exempt from the observance of due process in its proceedings. 16 We are judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of
not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents protestation that petitioner control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the
waived his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads
of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just
upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to subject petitioner to preventive exercising his power of control over executive departments.
suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or
the AAB to act on Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and rules that due The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits
process has been accorded the petitioner. and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case in incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
reinvestigation. benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.
BLAQUERA VS ALCALA
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control
of executive departments.
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each
official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a
maximum amount equivalent to 30% of theemployee’s one month basic salary but
which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of
incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
Olongapo vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO
agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any
comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial
and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a
then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with
for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and
under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and
prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 22
vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been
Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People
for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded, think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to
the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people
for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and
prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out
any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely
their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an been lowered." 11
undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the 2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas
determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the
very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No.
faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1.
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall
1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President
morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all
were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and
the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On
petition was deemed submitted for decision. October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the
all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for
sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the
members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial
not unconstitutional. measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of
no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to
say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that
Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the
Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by
of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and
court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in
matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has
Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the
as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as
as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat,
to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be
was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t
public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this century are
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 23
likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact
social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the
primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of
asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely,
inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the
added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and
for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously
has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special
comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next
stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of
past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by
growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967,
National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same
economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true Instance. 34
meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the
government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts 4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the
towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background
call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's
mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the
then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the
challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the
pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set
policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction
progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference
concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to
utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of
Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary
late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice,
in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee
continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa
the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of
judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on
what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on
had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the
essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted
of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some
options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some
the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the
be the most thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the
Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals,
only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on
Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that
Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more
of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 24
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly
suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that
the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of
devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the
well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle
1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in
is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I
undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power
inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature. and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of
tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily
The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the
doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the
separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and
abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well- plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to
incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the
to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was
merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of
the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the
approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity
similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at
government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine
good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express
Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case
apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should
Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization 6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice
Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of
Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all
First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. branches of the government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the
Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation.
District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was
Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the
being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel
in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on the that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital
other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well
district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason
constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 25
Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65Moreover, it is
response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935
could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive
power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the
opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La 1973 Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of
puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the
derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the
State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the
reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The
principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of
Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang
Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime
le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom
case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of
statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority. the system of government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the
strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may
Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the
however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all- majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that
embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion
misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section between the executive and the legislative branches." 74
on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The 8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges
and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the
presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization power to supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em
provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove
cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court
provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 26
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but
ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon,
conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental
discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of
statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there
principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any could be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.
constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last
January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could 10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would
have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges
opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg.
of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the
on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate
to be committed. It commends itself for approval." 80Nor would such a step be Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the
of this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a
ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-
Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83 delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to
make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To
or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental
that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
"the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and
the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude,
and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone
jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to
one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be
government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation
relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach"
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 27
which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice
from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions
therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has
objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate
time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct
of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial
days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to
be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding 12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who
section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain
Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue powers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The
that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public
faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may
functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions
as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added
office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
named anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which
service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely
the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in
their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in
will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by
observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer
ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those
shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to
Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law
other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the
motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the
members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v.
Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who
legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with
was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial
There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108 There
has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It
Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result
Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or
legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES ATTY. SARMIENTO 28
good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive.
It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the
credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental
principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and
to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There
is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila
Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half
a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying
our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to
MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to
the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of
this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and
judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges
and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their
offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

S-ar putea să vă placă și