Republic of the Philippines Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting
incident, were already there conducting their own
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in
Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found
all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and
not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral
damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44,
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon
could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for
parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00.
In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling
in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain
of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and
thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used
in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of
his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As
instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the
municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on
duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to
Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto
proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly
occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the
immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to
conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same
day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his
companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara,
investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were
likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on
cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd
anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right,
posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an
exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound
exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the
sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the
thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th
rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right
thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th
intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit
directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left
deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior
aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial
aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of
large intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder,
right, directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial
portion of the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior
aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior
portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
 2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe
of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the
lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the
large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the
right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO
MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED
(sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED
WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are
fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-
station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st
P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons,
conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided at the
time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on
different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the record of
this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd
D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3,
1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as
earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force;
Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara,
Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of
Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound.
In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused
all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to
the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments
were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the
aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie
Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband
while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well
as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy,
Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a
short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place
where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself
behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in
stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said
he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further
recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted
his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his
house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of
his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly
witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the
victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related
to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased
attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-
appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted
that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the
trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the
appellate court held that:
 . . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-
appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The
claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance
of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the
accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who
was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving
around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that
Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-
51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural
reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.
As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this
country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness
to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has
been judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known
Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and
had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that
he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34)
Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court,
however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said
the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant
to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The
penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal
should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity
for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la
Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984);
People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731,
Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to
convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the
commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to
the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on
where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more
definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing
transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains
inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would
provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other
hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the
truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police
Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February
23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon
likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the
killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales,
to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds
described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he
admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr.
Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone
was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive
testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen
described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness.
Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take
turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February
21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of
banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to
him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by
the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the
hacking and the stabbing, at that distance by the herein
accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please
tell this Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were
in constant movement, I could not determine who did the
hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or
"bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their
arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was
hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and
the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who
really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
 Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable
Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even
identify the weapons used because according to you it was
just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct
part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court
of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means
of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what
act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who
"stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not
whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act
was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test
laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that
the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above,
while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused
could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant,
granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And
why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the
father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay
even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal
wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible,
nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been
dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly,
there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came
out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February
21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime
he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of
coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it
should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what
he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his
life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by
the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then
still free and around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed
danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He
admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons
why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the
time you saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd
Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what
happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because
I was haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim
was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of
the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes
the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the
land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek
ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services
as a purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction
of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into
the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to
be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial
distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he
volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings
of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his
family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an
unreliable witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children
from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused
who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the
participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary,
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence
was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went
there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta),
not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even
if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant
case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as
exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The
former as principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day
of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as
accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced
to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the
fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio, after delivering his
argument, prayed for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin Atienza,
and makes the following assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime
charged in the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from the information upon the
ground of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her
codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol, municipality of
Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin,
filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by
affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same date, May 16, 1930,
the said accused were arrested on a warrant issued by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of the
month, they were released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary
investigation of the case, the two defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong,
Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the
complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation, and promising not to
live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The
municipal president transmitted the defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it his
support. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of
his complaint. In consideration of this petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the
adultery case commenced against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them, with the
costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in the same
municipality of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage,
Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa
leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin
Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the
home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his
wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin
Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to
it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered
that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin
Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even Romana
Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had
said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura
Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms'
length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran
back to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the
schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-in-
law, took up the furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire
destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and
Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61
years of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from
the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the accused-appellant de
oficio, prays for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference to defendant Martin
Atienza. The facts related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing, justify this
petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond a reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of
arson as charged, as principal by direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against her
are: That, being married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married
man; that both were denounced for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's second
husband; that in view of the petition of the accused, who promised to discontinue their life together,
and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices of the municipal president of
Paombong, the complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of
their promise, both of the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in the same
municipality; that under pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her former marriage, Nicolas
de la Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Niño, Romana Silvestre followed him to his house
in the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that her codefendant, Martin
Atienza followed her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same house; that on the night of
November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were gathered together at home after supper,
Martin Atienza expressed his intention of burning the house as the only means of taking his
revenge on the Masocol resident, who had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for
adultery against them, which compelled them to leave the barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre
listened to her codefendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the
latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below found her guilty of
arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be
one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce
other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson
committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas
de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he was going to set fire to
their house as the only means of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her passive presence
when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation,
and her failure to give the alarm when the house was already on fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through
advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the
accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and
none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they
are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or
nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and penalized in
article 550, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people
are accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or not such building or house
was occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage caused in such
cases shall exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre,
there was nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted
merely arson less serious than what the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as that house was
the means of destroying the others, and he did not know whether these were occupied at the time
or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited house, when the incendiary does not
know whether there are people in it at the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are
exposed, not less serious is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by means of
another inhabited house which the firebrand knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act,
if he did not know whether there were people or not in the others, inasmuch as the same danger
exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have been
convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal
Code, if the information had alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the defendant knew
that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio residents are accustomed to
retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the
Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing
whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which
results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference
to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines The law must be applied as laid down in the above quoted excerpt.
SUPREME COURT
But the court, in view of the nature of the crime and considering the circumstances attending the
Manila
same, recognizes the extreme severity of the penalty; therefore we apply the remedy afforded it by
EN BANC article 2, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, when a strict application of the provisions of the code
would result in an excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
G.R. No. 5126 September 2, 1909
caused by the crime.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
For the reasons above set forth the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against
vs.
the appellant. Ten days from date let a confirming judgment be entered, and ten days thereafter let
CATALINO APOSTOL, defendant-appellant.
the case be remanded to the lower court of action.
Francisco Ortigas for appellant.
Without prejudice to the immediate execution of the judgment, let the clerk of this court, as provided
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
in the said article 2 of the Penal Code, respectfully address a communication to the Honorable, the
ARELLANO, C.J.: Governor-General of these Islands, giving the result of this decision and the sentence, requesting
him, should he so desire, to make use of the prerogative with which he is invested in order to
The judgment entered in this case by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finds that on the
reduce or mitigate the penalty imposed. So ordered.
16th of December, 1907, five individuals, among them being the accused herein, went to the house
where Pedro Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul were living, and there inquired Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
after some carabaos that had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned inmates
answered that they knew nothing about the matter, ordered them to leave the house, but as the
three men named above refused to do so the accused Catalino Apostol, set fire to the hut and the
same was burnt down.
In the opinion of the trial court the responsibility of the accused has been fully established by the
testimony of the injured parties. And inasmuch as, according to the same, the act comes within the
provisions of article 549 of the Penal Code, Catalino Apostol was sentenced to sixteen years and
one day of cadena temporal, to the accessories of the law, to indemnify the value of the burnt hut in
the sum of P1, and to pay the costs.
An appeal having been taken to this court, the defense claimed, on behalf of the offender: (1) The
absence of proof of criminal intent; (2) that in view of the fact that the burnt hut was situated in an
uninhabited place, it is not proper to apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal Code.
Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the
person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (Art. 1,
Penal Code.)
As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the hut Pedro Tabilisima testified that he and
his friends were in the same; that the accused and his companions arrived at 8 p.m. and
questioned them about carabaos that they said had been stolen from them; that after they replied
that they knew nothing, the former set fire to the house and they jumped out of it; that the witness
and two companions lived in the house; that it was situated in an uninhabited place, surrounded by
fields; that the nearest houses were far away, and cries could not be heard from one house to
another; and that the burnt house was not worth more than P1, because it was a small one, the
witness himself having constructed it.
Celestino Vergara says that several individuals arrived at 8 o'clock at night, asked them for
carabaos that they claimed to have lost, wounded Tranquilino Manipul, who was asleep, and Pedro
Tabilisima, forced them to leave the house, and as they did not want to do so for fear of being
assaulted the accused set fire to the same; they tried to put out the fire as long as they could, but
when no longer able jumped out of the house. The house was in an uninhabited locality, in the
fields, the nearest house being a small store to which the cry of a person night carry, and the
neighboring houses could be seen.
Tranquilino Manipul testified in almost the same terms as this last witness. The argument which the
defense advances, based on article 554, which in connection with 553 punishes the setting fire to a
building intended for habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply, because the article
question refers to an edifice intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place at a time when
the same is unoccupied. It is article 549, which punishes with the very severe penalties of cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to any edifice, farmhouse, hut, shed, or
vessel in port, with knowledge that one or more persons were within the same," that must be
applied.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.
B. Pobre for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cagayan, Hon.
Charles A. Low presiding, convicting the defendant of the crime of malversation of public funds and
sentencing him to two months' imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold public office or
public employment of any kind, and to the payment of the costs.
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace of Baggao,
Province of Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before him sixteen separate civil cases
commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages resulting
from a breach of contract; that said cases were all decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff;
that each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the justice of the peace
and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50, each one of which
was approved by the court; that on the 12th day of said month the plaintiff in said cases presented
a writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds
were insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the appellant; that thereupon the
latter ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of the
appellants to file another bond within fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the appellants in said
causes presented new bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in said causes applied to the
appellant, as said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the said sixteen
cases and commanding the execution of the same, at the same time asking that the sums
deposited by the defendants in said actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to
him in satisfaction of said judgments; that the accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff,
ordered said sums attached and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the
plaintiff a bond of P50 for each attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the damages
which should result from such attachment.
After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen cases presented
a complaint against the appellant to the Court of First Instance, by virtue of which said court
ordered that the plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of the Court of First Instance the sums
deposited by the defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the court and made the
delivery as required.
Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the accused. We are in
entire accord with that recommendation. The case made against the appellant lacks many of the
essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The
accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he
feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the
belief that he was acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his
hands by the defendants — appellants in the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of
the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed and the judgments in his court
had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment
which he held in those cases, can not be considered an appropriation or a taking of said sums
within the meaning of Act No. 1740. He believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of
the peace, he had a perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to
him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings, giving the
parties ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were not
filed, and to declare the judgment final. He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and
said judgment had become final, the sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the
judgments in the actions in which said sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially
and legally in making such applications.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of justice of the
peace. He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to require
the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper undertaking with solvent
sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases,
he may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction
and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far as appears from the record,
at most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state of facts. Giving the
act complained of the signification most detrimental to the appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply
the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not an intention to deprive any
person of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not
to embezzle property. He acted that honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally
and justly due, and not to enrich himself or another by criminalmisappropriation. It was an error
committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a
criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act
charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for the
accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such
presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may
have been an error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been
declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It may well
be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly to subject
him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of record, it was not
criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act.
Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even though it
be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in
Act No. 1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding
section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person described in said
section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds and property
properly in his charge on the demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person,
office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds
or property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends by such person within the
meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and
constitutes only a prima facie case against the person accused. If he present evidence showing
that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an
end and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the accused to offer
any such evidence, for the reason that the people's own pleading alleged, and its own proofs
presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had
not been put to personal uses or used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution
demonstrated, both by the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs
on the trial, that the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the
accused, thus affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted,
arises from the absence of the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts
which were presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by other
facts which absolutely prevented its creation.
On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as defined in paragraph 5
of article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to does not arise. Mere
absence of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused
to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. (U.
S. vs. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be
affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion
necessarily follows. (U. S. vs. Morales, supra.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody
forthwith.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information;
or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for
ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then
private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y
MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a
judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO
PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both
sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual
damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them
under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2)
in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said
presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved
which is necessarily included in the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement
of facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo,
documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we
note are without any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13,
1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue,
Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just
as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo
Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then
away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the
bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to
Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will
temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got
into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After
the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-
10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and
went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at
her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag
and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00
and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro
agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in
Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa
area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun
was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He
said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy
as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma.
Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30
thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but
she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind
and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her,
jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and,
after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish
vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her
dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p.
27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash
Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp.
10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except
that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw
that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe
while running across the highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando,
Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and
divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried
to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his
ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been
advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the
crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the
nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine
the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance
of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his
official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason
of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to
or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her
"Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where
such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and
consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away
of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and
ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does
not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of
her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant
Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already
when the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the
checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it
that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after
all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she
signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa
(sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at
Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given you the
checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to
my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place
along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So
when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we
will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of
ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally.
Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly
be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun
point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered
by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants.
Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the
Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway
robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the
allegation in the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for
more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from
Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that
along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she
had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash,
drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is
that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion
the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section
5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate
an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532
on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a
modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion
thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and
brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to
cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more
than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation
is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by
violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the
band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand,
if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime
would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that
it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is
required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is
only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree
No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and
is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless
elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by
the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering
on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the
Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses
stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if
committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons
forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they
use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the
essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are
directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same
manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old
Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of
liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for
the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if
not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to
a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the
trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at
the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree
No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large
cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely
disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present
case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case
does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article
293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of
confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor
of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the
penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former
offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are
charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which,
as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom
from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed
as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any
of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 142773 January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG" (At Large), ROBERT DELIM
(At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias "BONG", accused-appellants.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,1 dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and
Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias "Bong" and Robert, all
surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
"That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with
intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth,
brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in
the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the
latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no
avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from Modesto's
house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives
returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to
find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida
Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was
already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor.
Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately
rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modesto's cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio
Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes.
Pictures were taken of the cadaver.5 Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names
and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible
for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto
and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.6 Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but
failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of
Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which
reads:
"SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. - Body - both upper extremities are flexed
7659."2
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were - both lower extremities are flexed
apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-large.
- (+) body decomposition
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. - (+) worms coming out from injuries
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts 3 —
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald
Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname - 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
Delim after he was "adopted" by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto's
wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their - 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their
relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to - 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila,
Sison, Pangasinan. - 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto — occipital area (POEx)
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to
have their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Rita's two young grandchildren, - 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald
suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed
and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. 4Marlon, Robert and - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto
and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio
Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of - #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed would, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
- GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD."7
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The
police investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no
licenses for their firearms.8
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon
had pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No.
16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional
Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.9
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi. 10
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and
sisters were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from
Modesto's house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing
him. He theorized that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier
who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita
Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after
leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a
hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon's alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his
hometown in Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred
that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the
distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus.
Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City from January
1998 up to February 1999.11
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to
January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to
Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied
setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby
rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of
Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald
Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner
as provided for by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to
indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to
the Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail,
Urdaneta City is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all
surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of
this decision.
SO ORDERED."12
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of
superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief,
assail the decision alleging that:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' DEFENSE OF ALIBI."13
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime
charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished
members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged
with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated
form in light of the allegation therein that the accused "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed),
h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while)
Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son
of Modesto Delim from helping the latter." They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the
act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend
that the fact that the Information went further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should
be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from the caption or
the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated
— these being conclusions of law — but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of
Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but
only for kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material
inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated
are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged
such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade
ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,14 that for kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of
his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further held:
"x x x Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated
thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by
the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate
purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims'
liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention."15
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of
the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the
killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. 16 The crime committed
would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or
criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of murder
or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an
essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which
exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal
consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act.17 Specific
intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the
prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a
prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.18 Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred
from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.19
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of
a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for
the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive
does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder. 20 The history of
crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. 21 Crime is
rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is
to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be
convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the
victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in
barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with
the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was
merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in
the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or
liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then, the crime
charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not
Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil
of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. 24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the
act.25 Wharton says that corpus delictiincludes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes.26 In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal
act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide;
and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death.27 To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with
malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use
of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the
victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.28
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti.
Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds, 29 defensive
in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives,
in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by
said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences
flowing therefrom.30 As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:31
"This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally
act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of
blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary
appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances
of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it
is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden
of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise."
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It
relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants
of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.32 What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes
referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if
the following requisites concur:
"x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."33
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of
circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all
without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the
offense charged.34 For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.35 If the prosecution adduced the requisite
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to
prove that accused-appellants, in confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill
Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed
with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then
seized Modesto and herded him out of his house:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual
that happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who,
when his name was asked answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a
person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he
answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm
were they carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short
firearms, what did they do then when they entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, 'Stay in your house,' and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
36
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir."
Randy's account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:
"PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at
around 6:30 in the evening while preparing for your supper three (3) armed men entered
inside your house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer,
Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong
entered your house, are these three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is
Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir."37
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun,
acted as a lookout when he stood guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat
until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three
persons, what did you and your mother do while these three persons were taking out of
your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three
persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were
guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
 Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who
when his name was asked, answered, Leon Delim)." 38
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the
house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January
24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto
was found under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters
away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the state of
decomposition:
"Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?
A The same place and at 3:00 o'clock P.M., we were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for
your father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 o'clock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then
when you saw him dead?
A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic)."39
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of
Modesto was in a state of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that
his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and defensive
wounds on the left arm and forearm:
"PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper
extremities are flexed and both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the
victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and
there were so many worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the
victim was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition that they will bury immediately. Whether
they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was
also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml.
GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW,
mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm.
stabbed wound, axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect
M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1
cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed
wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir."40
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and
the distention of his scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of
putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to six
days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact death of the victim. An
equally persuasive authority states:
"Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
48 hours Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters
present. Moving maggots seen
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair and nails loose. Tissues
soft and discolored."42
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23,
1999 to the discovery of his cadaver which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon
of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent with and confirmatory of
the contention of the prosecution that the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who
seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the
coop and were nowhere to be found:
 "COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison
Delim? is strong circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the
commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is
A Yes, sir.
admissible in evidence against them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects? their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed Modesto. 45
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill
his brothers, sir. Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or
grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on
Q What are the names of the brothers? the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir. to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or persons other than
Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at
investigation? all.46 In this case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a
A No, sir. handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hog-tied, put a piece of cloth in his
mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three
Q Why? gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the bushes and already in
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot
be found, they all left the place, sir. wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection
of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been proved by the prosecution beyond
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim? reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some
A Within the vicinity, sir. causes or influences moving the mind.47 The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the
prosecution should not be trashed simply because the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Q In what place?
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the and Leon to rebut the same and explain what happened to the victim after taking him from his
place where the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir. house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after taking him,
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers? or the victim may have been able to escape and that thereafter a person or some other persons
may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead,
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir. they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.
Q Wherelse (sic)? Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he
A Labayog, Sison, sir. conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing
the victim.
Q Wherelse?
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir. it.48 Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
Q What was the result? specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the
A Negative result, sir."43 malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. 49 To establish conspiracy, it is not
Modesto and Rita: essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. 50 It is
sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and
"COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It
23, 1999? matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim. 51 This is based on the
A Yes, sir, I know them. theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:

Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999? "x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are
considered and treated as the acts and declarations of his principal. 'What is so done by
A They are my neighbors, sir. an agent, is done by the principal, through him, as his mere instrument.' Franklin Bank of
Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). 'If the
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23,
conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its
1999?
existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and
A I know them, sir. whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he does as the agent of the co-
conspirators.' R. v. O'Connell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710."52
Q Why do you know them?
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice,
A They used to go to our house, sir.
they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all. 53
your husband's name is Modesto Delim are they related with each other?
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed
A Yes, sir."44 with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door
thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned
Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of
January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors were so
synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the
malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks
assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were — (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that
Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police
authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait accompli as
well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty of the
killing of Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by
Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation. 56 If part of a crime has
been committed in one place and part in another, each person concerned in the commission of
either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if
they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in
furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if
there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime. 57
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same
were marred by inconsistencies.
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father.
Later however, Randy claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into
their house. She later changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together
with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she
testified that after the three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered
the house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25,
1999, and she was accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that he
was alone when he looked for his father from January 24 to 26, 1999.58
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the
demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court.
In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were
moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other accused;
hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight. 59 The inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative
weight. It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a
person's sense of observation is impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime.
A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse
of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes
on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses' credibility nor the
veracity of his testimony.60 Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect
to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the
prominent facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 62
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms
and the true meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained
by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto. 63
Randy's testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent
with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Randy may not have known the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the
direction to which they went. While it may be true that when asked to identify the three who barged
into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been consistent
throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon's
counsel never cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as
one of those who barged into their house to give her an opportunity to explain her perceived
inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13, of the Revised Rules of Evidence which
reads:
"Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to
him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If
the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put
to him concerning them."64
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired
impeachment of her.65 As to whether Rita and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon
merely stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact is
that Leon stood guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for
the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita
bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they
responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge
of the shocking events which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to
disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving
credence and probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their
collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in
criminal prosecution because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even
those not related to the offender.66 It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit
approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with
clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the time of
the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said
crime.67 They failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and
spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald, where he
claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of
Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any documentary evidence to
prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he was a resident of Laoag City
does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime. With
respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he
resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of
superior strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The
Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of
Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined in and penalized by Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and
proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions
are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime.68 As this Court held:
"No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot
produce the effect of aggravating the condition of defendant." 69Article 14, paragraph 16 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Vitug.
prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution Gutierrez, J., joins Justice Vitug in his dissenting opinion.
which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of
execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.70 Although the victim may have been defenseless
at the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted
and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.71 In this case, the victim was
defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any
witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he
was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was
seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the
malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.72 What is primordial, this Court
held in People v. Rogelio Francisco73 is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength. 74 In this case,
the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of
their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors
outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the
three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and
stabbed.75
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during
the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to
possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of
violation of PD 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating
circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.76 Neither can dwelling, although proven,
aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by
Rule 110, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of Court.77 Although this rule took effect on December 1,
2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive
effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.78
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon
should be meted an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety
of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and
one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The
sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.79 The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order. 80 In
addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof,
likewise in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. 81
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the
crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accused-
appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Wilfred D. Asis for defendant-appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:
That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused conspiring, and confederating with one another with
Anecito Ellevera who is at large, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot with
firearms one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital parts of the body
thereby inflicting mortal wounds, causing the direct and instantaneous death of
the said Julius Cagampang.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties thereof under
Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980,
while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to their
house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente
Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang
was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell
on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband
had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later Identified as
the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that she
brings out her husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they
shouted. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the
"maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused
who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station
by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the man who killed
her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December
30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until
8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's Army)
were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other members-
followers of the New People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during
the mass surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the
Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name. That
circumstance allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of her
husband's killing, insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the
widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him inside the store
which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside.
Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness — a tricycle driver, Claudio
Sabanal — who was a long-time acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He
saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December 30,
1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim
sustained three (3) gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber
Company's Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of
Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his
father, but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock
in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this piece of
rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the
killer of the deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively Identified as the killer of Cagampang?
The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is
generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their
conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the
case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).<äre||anº•1àw>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not
diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively Identified the accused as her
husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is
credible, probable and entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification made
by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime.
Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that
the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated
beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was
admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in
Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony
of the witnesses who had positively Identified him could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi.
(People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which
opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to
kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of
acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but
elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of
motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively Identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145
SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and
taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied
admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil
indemnity payable to the heirs of the Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth
Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y
AYUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, and
pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the
said accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory penalties; to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the
costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single,
and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was
employed as manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan
was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied with
more jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein
accused-appellant, belongs to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was
poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence, following the
odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area to another in order to escape the
ravages of internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's
existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His
existence in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the
Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the importance of
registering births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and
the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio
Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified
for the prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman
Hassan must, therefore, be set free.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married,
and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and
gravel business of the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief
on February 3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23,
1981; that he was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit
Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he
saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about
two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the
assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB
Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him
by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the
motorcycle with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed
him from behind on his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he
was able to see the assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a
petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7
meters from the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he
did not see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but
"he did not exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said
he brought the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you
came to know that he was already dead, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
A They just asked the description of that person as to his
attire and his appearance.
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the
description of the one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La
Merced?
A Yes, sir,
Q Can you recall what time was that?
A I do not know what time was that.
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the
accused?
A...
Q For Identification?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
A Yes he was alone.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business,
do you have any blood relationship with them?
A Yes. sir. 6
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two
days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four
days after the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information
was practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his
cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the following questions and answers:
xxx xxx xxx
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own
words, the incident you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw
unidentified person whom I can recognize by face if seen
again embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while
the latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the
area. That this person without much ado, and armed with a
knife suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That by coincidence
to this incident, our eye met each other and immediately
thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a
semi-long hair, dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve),
maong pants height to more or less 5'5, Dark Complexion.
That as this unidentified person fled the area I immediately
came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and
rushed him to Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a
Tricycle. That may companion (Ramon) did not whispered
(sic) any words to me for he was in serious condition and
few minutes later, he expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion
when he attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who
attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.,
that evening in question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at
the Office of La Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were
confronted with one Usman Hassan, whom this Officer
brought along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.
Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed
your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and
stabbed my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening
in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance
were fully noted by me and this I cannot forget for the rest
of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that
had ensued while in the process of buying some mangoes
in that area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by
said Usman Hassan in stabbing your companion, Ramon
Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have
anything more to say, add or alter in this statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if
needed in the future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as that
embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit
"2." This exhibit for the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an
unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without any provocation, the
latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case
Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose
Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal
Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter
Trade, wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this
City, was arrested in connection with the above stated incident. That this
Officer and companions arrested this person Usman due to his physical
appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson.
During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade
was confiscated in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought
along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims
companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson positively
Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub
and admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used
said knife for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof —
beyond reasonable doubt — required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to
convict an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us
to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the
deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him
into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the
denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally
guaranteed presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are
weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the
constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to
the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the
inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence,
as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the two
policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the
evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the
expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin
Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one
eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant
stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer Identified
two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another
stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical expert also concluded
from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause of death, that the same was
inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police
Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be
desired. For one, we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the
Identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was
"presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police investigator and prosecution witness, Police
Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes in
Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure
adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman.
Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was
brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio
made a turnabout by saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this
tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-
examination, augmented by the leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if
not sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the
funeral parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated
confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability
as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts
against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man,
and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed
eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the
investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification
of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and
decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged
accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to
witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is
as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally
entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime
and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and
superficially. Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As
previously mentioned, his statement was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of
Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the
record to show that the fruit vendor—from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes
that fateful evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was investigated, or
why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the
accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00
P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime,
was not also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the killing or of the
innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23Confiscated by Carpio from
Usman (tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to
any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared
with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test — had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal,
or even the trial judge, insisted on it — would have revealed whether or not the knife in question
(confiscated from the accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had
indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead nonchalantly
dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife could have been cleaned or the bloodstain
could have been taken away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of
bloodstains is tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate
case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo
Murillo, which clearly reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a
similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect
in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police
character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said
the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death
and the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The said resolution
further states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible
reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a
policeman on August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor armed
with a knife (was) molesting and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making
trouble." 28 The records of the case at bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio,
or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of
Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character that made the police officers disregard the
possible connection between the slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of
the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the killing
of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that vital link to the resolution of
Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should the police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan
was already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a
victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his
innocence. And he is so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough,
and fair police investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific,
conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him to
counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at the
former barter trade, which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit
Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore strange that on the very evening of the stabbing
incident he was still at the barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes
to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes home at past 5:00 o'clock and
sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation — that, at around 7:00 o'clock
P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take him home — was found by the trial court as 'flimsy
and weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that evening." 32 But the whole
trouble is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any single question to the accused,
and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if only to put on record
what the mother and son could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy,
the mother and son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to the
prosecution witnesses during their examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading
questions. In that sense and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the importance
of which was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused near the scene
(about 100 to 150 meters away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although
Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his pushcart with a
companion. If he were the assailant, he would have fled. But the trial court instead indulged in
conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of security in
returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police officers immediately responded and
appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the past where criminals
return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist can explain." 33 It must have
escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not
be generally classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial court's rationalization ignores the WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is
biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with approval by this Court that "(T)he ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is
wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34 held for another legal cause. With costs de oficio.
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive SO ORDERED.
ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule,
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of
mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of
guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused
plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the
Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court
disregarded the claimed young age of Usman Hassan.
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such
claim on the testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who
declared that her son Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was
born in the year 1967. She testified that she was just told by a person coming
from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman. However on
cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the date or year
of birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the
date or year of birth of her children is of course understandable, considering
that she is unschooled and she belongs to a tribe that does not register births,
deaths or marriages, however, it is strange that she only took pains to find out
the year of birth of her son Usman. For this reason, the Court granted a motion
of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein accused examined
by a competent dentist to determine his age. However, the findings of the
dentist of Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows
the following: "age cannot be determined accurately under present mouth
conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age." This simply
means that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of
age, or any age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of
this court, the accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time
he committed this crime and this observation is based on his personal
appearance, his size and facial features and other personal characteristics,
hence he can not be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189 of
Presendential Decree No. 603, as ammended by Presedential Decree No.
1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs. Reyes and
Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by
the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit is at issue as a
basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon
the accused to establish that circumstance ad any other elements of
defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the
suspension of his sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if
found guilty, more meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific
sources, and less reliance on the observation of the judge as had happened in this case. The
preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty
one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate determination due to Hassan's mouth
condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that there is the probability that the accused
might be exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing indicates that the
accused had not been granted the concern and compassion with which the poor, marginalized, and
disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when judicial and police processes and procedures are
thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied the poor are
heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment now, considering the acquittal of the
accused herein ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of
the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house
boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from
the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No
one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear
of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered
by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished
with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook
or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small
window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no
other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be
a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back
into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen
knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down
on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers
who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano
Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The
three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room
at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated,
Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual
sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No.
28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and
sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he
was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the
exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold
that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which
he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law,
sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met.,
500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that
contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes
and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice
or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of
article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying
the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even
these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree,
between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore
carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be
looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is
greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the
guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the
thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption
was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a
lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in
his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can
be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be
the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may
be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and
in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or
criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty
of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a
necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of
the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of
the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a
less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime
is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the
courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any
criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one
case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the
intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases
cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one
of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was
done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind.
So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on
this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus
me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;"
and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So
also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention,
we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty
simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The
calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement,
when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure,
he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates
him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad
intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence
that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only
the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law,
superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds,
that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered
in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized
the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to
make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if
it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe
them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life
of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to
the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on
the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning
them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be
the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no
occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up"
his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his
head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent
of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the
real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime
of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act
punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart,
Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as
he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in
his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of
the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real
design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that
he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such
doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop
and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the
essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no
danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom
he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking
him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the
unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his
father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and
who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the
blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations
with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over
the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted
in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal
Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal
aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity
for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the
Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty
and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under
the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been
proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife
who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and
when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown,
he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was
attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were
not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the
one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish,
and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there
existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4
of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain,
February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice
of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding
the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and
observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared
exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the
means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight
years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his
appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and
excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under
the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada,
Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the
mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at
one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man
be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with
all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a
majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve
months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme
court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who
attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was
acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23,
1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months
to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan
get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he
be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio
Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping
containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to
follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of
police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was
asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of
the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of
his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see
anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into
two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal
street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's
house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked
her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that
Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room
which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then
went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but
a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector,
informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter
brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot
wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused
his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by
the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy.
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter
asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to
the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis
went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are
Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was
about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis
receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after
having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his
bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed
Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at
him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because
they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was
apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other
hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of
the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but
their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of
Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed
when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both
appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson
when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and
considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we
believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all
indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these
circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial
court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back
towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively,
believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry
as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible
for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of
fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was
Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so
declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion,
however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder
through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the
case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant
therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped
from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment,
he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned
out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who
was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and
with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and
property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the
no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to
justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the
the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as shall, in such case, be imposed.
they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder
if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p.
612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable
force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot
claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest
(5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a
notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the
community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in
effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234,
242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his
right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of
official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of
notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety
rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the
mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939).
In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya
mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el
hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un
mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed.
pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54
Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955
FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo and Pedro S. David for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for
respondents.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal
complaint against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless
imprudence, the value of the damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a motion to quash on the
ground that, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be imposed on
the accused would be a fine or from P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be
imposed by the justice of the peace court. The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, but the latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the
justice of the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant appealed from this ruling of the Court of
First Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.
Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:
Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:
Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows:.
Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:
(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:
(6) Malicious mischief;.
In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Peñas Y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas, 86
Phil., 596; andNatividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87 Phil.,, 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in
Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to justices of the
peace and judges of the municipal courts is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first
instance, when the penalty to be imposed is more than six months imprisonment or a fine of more
than P200.00.
The question, therefore , is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the court of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless
negligence or imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125.
We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court
has jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has
jurisdiction over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of
the latter. This assumption is not legally warranted.
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately
cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next
preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief.
It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the
general intention to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful crimes) but that he
should act under the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho
concurra animo especifico de dañar"(Cuello Calon, Der. Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of
Tribunal Supreme of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909; 12 Feb. 1921).
El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho
dañoso y de la conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de
dañar. Si no existe semejante animo el hecho no constituey delito. (II Cuello Calon,
p.870-871).
The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the
requirement of Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender
"shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the
next preceding chapter", i.e., not punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things,
malicious mischief can not be committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence) andmalice (
or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions
of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5 Oct. 1942, has expressly recognized that this
crime is one of those that can not be committed by imprudence or negligence.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent . There are crimes that by their structure can not
be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
international crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use
of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the
strict technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property".
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of
malicious mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations above outlined. Our
conclusion is that "malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has
exclusive reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised
Penal Code, and to no other offense.
A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87
of the Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at
offenses punishable with not more than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00
or both. To this traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act added eight (8) specific exceptions in the
form of felonies triable in said courts without reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious
mischief is one of these exceptions, while imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of
them.
For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies
exclusively in the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated October
22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla)
guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information, 4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Malabon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of
Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
make a false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by
stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official document,
which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to
Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the
accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97, entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In
Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby
perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of
Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). 6 That in answer to the
question of whether there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault
upon an agent ofa person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch
55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520,
was likewise filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document
and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio,7the Court, in the Resolution dated June
23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s administrative
liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer vis-à-visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred
that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a
member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his
house. Ataround two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to
accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five
o’clock that afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his
PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by
Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries
therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending
criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City
Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on
July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they
would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza
preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision,8 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public
Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
hereby imposes upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of
prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not
appear to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public
document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would not have
accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the
PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his
PDS that there was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and
recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 11 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal
case against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable
Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he had
not been a candidate in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran and
served ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question
29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to
1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation of the
PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with
malicious intent to falsify the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the
veracity of narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the
PDS without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a
government officer, who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a councilor
of the same city. Thus, he should have been more mindful of the importance of the PDS and should
have treated the said public document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless
Imprudence, as defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x.12
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution13 dated
October 22, 2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the
felony of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the
Information that was filed against him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional
felony, i.e.falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be
convicted of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the
RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge
against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under
Article 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly
committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence,
punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document.
However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC
are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early
as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat
quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot
be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what isprincipally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People,16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerousrecklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like;
when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or
‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed
penaltyfor the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. 17 (Emphasis ours) Thus,
the proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now
weighs the merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between
the offense charged in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the
prosecution. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4
and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof
the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that
proved by the prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of
public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be
resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is
necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4)
of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative.
Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough
falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful
act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be
said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily includedin the
offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent SO ORDERED.
with the idea of negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in
our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was
charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals
found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of checks inquestion,
appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to
assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other
words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not
willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal. 19(Emphasis ours)
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the
intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful
act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that
the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In Sarep,
the petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information
was then filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the
accused of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the
accused therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some
person. The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he
did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs.
Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed
the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment
were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for
falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza,
14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses,
furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to
a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from
criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in
order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise
offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude
orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such
mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660,
May 24, 1966).21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in
falsification of public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four
( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21)
days of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 137268 March 26, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA
SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga, ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO
NUÑEZ @ Rey Nuñez, accused-appellants.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, finding
accused-appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia
Sibonga @ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuñez @ Rey
Nuñez guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
The information2 against accused-appellants alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 o'clock p.m., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy Luntayao which injuries caused the death of
the said Randy Luntayao.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of
January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were playing
takyan in front of the house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when suddenly
they heard a child shout, "Tabang ma!" ("Help mother!"). The cry came from the direction of the
house of accused-appellant Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood as Mother
Perpetuala. The two children ran towards Mother Perpetuala's house. 3 What Honey Fe saw on
which she testified in court, is summarized in the decision of the trial court, to wit:
While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one Randy
Luntayao, . . . being immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga
was holding the waist of the body while accused Reynario Nuñez held the hands of the
boy at the back. Accused Eutiquia Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were
pushing down the boy's head into the water. She heard the boy shouting "Ma, help" for
two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario or Rey Nuñez tie the boy on the bench with
a green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from]
a plastic container (galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to
raise his head, accused Alexander Sibonga banged the boy's head against the bench [to]
which the boy was tied down. She even heard the banging sound everytime the boy's
head hit the bench. For about five times she heard it. According to this witness after
forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia Fabie alias
Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boy's chest with their clenched fists. All the time
Rey Nuñez held down the boy's feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia
Fabie dropped her weight, buttocks first, on the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia
Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga to get a knife from the kitchen. Eutiquia
Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the left side of the boy's body and with
the use of a plastic gallon container, the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia
Carmen [caught] the blood dripping from the left side of the boy's body. Honey Fe heard
the moaning coming from the tortured boy. Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander
Sibonga, Reynario Nuñez, Delia Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie, and Eutiquia Carmen carry
the boy into the house.4
Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom, Randy,
was 13 years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a "nervous
breakdown" which Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy
with him to the farm. According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On
January 26, 1997, upon the suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuñez, Eddie and his wife
Perlita and their three children (Randy, Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuñez
to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and spent the
night in Nuñez's house in Tangke, Talisay.
The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot, Pardo,5 where all
of the accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regarding his
son's condition. He was told that the boy was possessed by a "bad spirit," which accused-appellant
Carmen said she could exorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it
was best to conduct the healing prayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the
house, while Eddie and his wife and two daughters were locked inside a room in the house. 6
After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout "Ma, tabang!" ("Mother, help!"). Eddie tried to go out
of the room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an
hour, the Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door of
the house.7
A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the
prayer room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy's face was
bluish and contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his
son was already dead. He wanted to see his son's body, but he was stopped from doing so by
accused-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter would
be resurrected at 7 o'clock that evening.8
After 7 o'clock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the
funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would
be transferred to the house of accused-appellant Nuñez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family,
accompanied by accused-appellant Nuñez, took Randy's body to Nunez's house in Tangke,
Talisay. The following day, January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuñez told Eddie to go with him to
the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report Randy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might
not be able to get the necessary papers for his son's burial. Nuñez took care of securing the death
certificate which Eddie signed.9
At around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to
Tangke, Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred
to bring their son's body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by
accused-appellant Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants
might be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay.10
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from
the Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder
against accused-appellant Nuñez and the other members of his group.11 He also asked for the
exhumation and autopsy of the remains of his son. 12 As the incident took place in Cebu, his
complaint was referred to the NBI office in Cebu City.
Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the case. He testified
that he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the body of Randy
Luntayao.13 Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and after admitting that
she and the other accused-appellants conducted a "pray-over healing" session on the victim on
January 27, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. Cajita noticed
a wooden bench in the kitchen of Carmen's house, which, with Carmen's permission, he took with
him to the NBI office for examination. Cajita admitted he did not know the results of the
examination.14
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy
Luntayao, testified that he, the victim's father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victim's body on
February 20, 1997 at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted the
autopsy on the same day and later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F): 15
FINDINGS
 Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in
printed blanket (white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground
about 4 feet deep.
Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.
Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.
Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle
cranial fossae right to left down to the occipital bone, left side.
Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.
Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.
Cranial vault almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic
head injury and/or traumatic chest injury.
Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victim's chest was caused by contact with a hard
blunt instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the base of
the skull followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have been
caused by the forcible contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden
bench.16
On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victim's
body but explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhumed and
examined, it was already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present,
unrecognizable.17
Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged
eyewitness to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing,
alleged former "patients" of accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal
health officer of Talisay, Cebu and; (d) Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office.
Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant
Carmen, whom she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 27, 1997, while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw
Eddie Luntayao talking with the latter regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to
the kitchen and given a bath prior to "treatment." After water was poured on the boy, he became
unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen to decide not to continue with the "treatment," but the
boy's parents allegedly prevailed upon her to continue. As the boy continued to resist, accused-
appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga and Celedonia Fabie to help her
(Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie Luntayao allegedly told
the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga got hold of a nylon rope
which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Fabie prayed over
the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the bench, Carmen asked Nuñez to place
his hands under the boy's head to cushion the impact of the blow everytime the child brought down
his head. To stop the boy from struggling, accused-appellant Fabie held the boy's legs, while
accused-appellant Nuñez held his shoulders. After praying over the boy, the latter was released
and carried inside the house. Accused-appellant Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry
the boy inside. After this, Blase said she no longer knew what happened inside the house as she
stayed outside to finish the laundry.18
Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the "pray-over" of their son from
beginning to end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victim on
his chest with their fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the boy. She
claimed that Randy was still alive when he was taken inside the house. 19
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39,
who testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying
over them and without applying any form of physical violence on them. 20
Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense to
testify on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of
pneumonia. According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask for the
issuance of a death certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough
and fever.21
On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she
merely relied on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs.
Revina Laviosa, who examined the victim's body.22
The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to
identify the resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)23 on the re-investigation of the case in which he
recommended the dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was
dispensed with, however, as the prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify
with the qualification that Solima's recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo
Miro.24
The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase and
Dr. Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his son. He
reiterated his earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and two
daughters were locked inside a room. He disputed Blase's statement that his son was still alive
when he was brought into the prayer room. He said he saw that his son's head slumped while being
carried by accused-appellants.25
As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-
appellant Nuñez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that
his son was suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown.
He took exception to Dr. Carloto's statement that he was alone when he went to her office because
it was Nuñez who insisted that he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the death certificate. 26
On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced]
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law;
to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of
P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are, however, credited in full during the
whole period of their detention provided they will signify in writing that they will abide by
all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.27
In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:
Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death
occurs, it is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since
the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the
voluntary presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil.
530). All the accused in the case at bar had contributed different acts in mercilessly
inflicting injuries to the victim. For having immersed the head of the victim into the barrel
of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible for all the consequences even
if the result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed
out that in P. v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting
physical injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder. In
murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the attack, and
this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted. Under the guise
of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed upside down
the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench;
pounded his chest with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would
come out for these acts would surely cause death to the victim. . . .
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which
may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of
his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is
 criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious acts are not intended by him.
...
....
Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal
intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this
presumption. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated
with one another in inflicting physical harm to the victim (an illegal act). These acts were
intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death of their victim. Hence, they are
liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate
result had not been intended.28
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of
murder.29
First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual
performed over the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission of the
victim's parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded
to subject the boy to a "treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body.
Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants
had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because
they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared
to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or
intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of
skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which,
because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the
latter's death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner,
belong to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in
faith healing.
In United States v. Divino,30 the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure
the victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum
around the victim's feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The
Court held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted
that the accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,31 the Court ruled that the proper charge to file against a
non-medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not possess the
necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was homicide
through reckless imprudence.
The trial court's reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the
contrary.32 The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the
accused-appellants. Indeed, the trial court's findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of
the case are ignored and the Court limits itself to the time when accused-appellants undertook their
unauthorized "treatment" of the victim. Obviously, such an evaluation of the case cannot be
allowed.
Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no
treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the
safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim. 33 Viewed in
this light, the acts which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by
accused-appellants to restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.
On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants' contention that the testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of
Honey Fe's credibility. Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached
or contrived. She was only a few meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants
conducted their "pray-over" healing session not to mention that she had a good vantage point as
the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her testimony was corroborated by the autopsy
findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fe's testimony, noted fractures on the third left
rib and on the base of the victim's skull. With regard to Dr. Mendez's failure to find any stab wound
in the victim's body, he himself had explained that such could be due to the fact that at the time the
autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an advanced state of decomposition. Randy
Luntayao's cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been buried. Considering the length of time
which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very likely that the
soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to determine
whether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract the
credibility of Honey Fe's testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of Frances
Claire Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the prosecution's
evidence. We do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable. 34
Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge
Renato C. Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over the
case after the prosecution and the defense had rested their cases. 35 However, the fact that the
judge who wrote the decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less
competent to render a decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the
transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses. 36
Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We
hold that they can.
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Samson v. Court of Appeals,37 the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the
accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the
appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the
information charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the
Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct
crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said
that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser
offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with
willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals
found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and
adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary
 prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by
the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Fernando,38 the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial court.
On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.
Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.39 In addition, they
should pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants' gross
negligence in attempting to "cure" the victim without a license to practice medicine and to give an
example or correction for the public good.40
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs
of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which
reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation,
taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to
kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and
with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn
the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial
court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of
the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson
y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by
direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and
appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is
sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the
accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral
damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal
penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED
BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION
BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE
MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief,
p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a
town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride
and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the
group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased
dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can
of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the
former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the
gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police
officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who
were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and
Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police
officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building
for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two
accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for
the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a
can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the
accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his
statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on
fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness
Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on
Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis
for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even
without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony
which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay
and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case.
They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their
testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In
fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes
and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of
gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in
open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that
their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption
does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to
decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was
the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his
absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an
unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never
talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried.
Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other
accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion
had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline
on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote
Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the
deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was
on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination
that you were reading comics when you saw Pugay
poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by
Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while
you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw
what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with
gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with
Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I
was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you
had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him
not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you,
if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass,
do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour
gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour
gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his
ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then
later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay
tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he
was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I
thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a
stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the
time you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick
up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline
he was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the
body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion
stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw
Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay
was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him
not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay
or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the
deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by
him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having
taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on
the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of
this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he
failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from
any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the
deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs.
Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
 A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is
his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of
his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief
contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased
on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the
victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p.
57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the
deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was
merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack
must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body
of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act
of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act,
however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would
cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must
be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of
a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused
Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp.
16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence,
the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as
moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court 2of Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. 3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and
petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia,
Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray,
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring
with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and
unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six
thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes
in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said
municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to
one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by
Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a
difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of
evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the
votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this
finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6)
YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty
is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not
entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she
is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to
commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision,
thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification,
increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning
the following as errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT,
NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE
VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE
PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS
BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES
DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO
ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh.
"7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL
OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part
to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is
not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. 10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases,
or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who
refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered
votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to
be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to
happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals
the burden of proving its existence. are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both
the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.21
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows: Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board
of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive
canvassing;
election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998. 23
the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures
appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921
secretary of the Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The
appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of
candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan. 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it
cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered
mere transfer of totals from one document to another.
by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused
Palisoc and de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes
instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in
the precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal SO ORDERED.
in the proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and
de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was
reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the
figure read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes. 14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each
precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in
SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at
the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423. 15The
grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead
of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This
error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and
Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure
of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7),
though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an
intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea
how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes
instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was
to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum
efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a
matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. 19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant,
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a
candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.20
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and
perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-
Hazing Law of 1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal,
Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049,
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information4 against the petitioners before the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on
or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity
is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information5 which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
name accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte
thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause, 6 but it was denied
by the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence.
When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal
Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat.
Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not
respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion
hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further
attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer running through his
body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions
on both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or
back of the knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that
they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and
brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them answered
that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned them on how
they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said
that they were headed somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with
hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also
because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he
performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his findings
in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found various external injuries in the head,
trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various severity and
nature. He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury
contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his previous
examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related. During
the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi
Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba
City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at
around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney with
more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person seated
beside the driver of the jeepney.11 She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to be
between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white long-
sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced each
other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like
they were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least three
(3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was shown
photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to her
store.12 It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen visiting
the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the
comer of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the
resort needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed a
ride. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very weak,
like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed
it was cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside the
emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home.
Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards on
duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in
the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who signed
on the logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless body of
a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the security guards did not
allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police station .so that an
investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his testimony,
Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in
the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of
a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse
with contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions then
brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what happened, but they
invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and the
caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños)
students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added
that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting
the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic
year of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB Biological
Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away from her. She
identified the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo. 14 They were wearing black shirts with the
logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their heads
bowed, approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon water
container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did not report to him when he
was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept quiet with
his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates at
the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision,
Los Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva introduced him to Daryl
Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to undergo final initiation
rites on January 13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and Sibal
were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for initiation
or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a B.S.
Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of
record.16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP
Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against the
APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa Novaliches
Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the
complainant.17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified that
he met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to
convince her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her
safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked
and vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son, her
family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate
amount of ₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts. 18 Her husband also incurred travel
expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his son's wake and
burial, as supported by a plane ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced mental anguish,
sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a result of her son's
death.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006, around
4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo
asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the negative
because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio again
met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo
Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he would
attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he and his girlfriend had
something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around 1
:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo
Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School
and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there from 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo Restaurant for
dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her boarding house,
they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and slept at her
boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they were roused
from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba City.
Dungo then left the boarding house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at
the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements for
a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked about
their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera
then reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00
o'clock in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near Crossing Junction,
Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half hours. Then they
walked back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again at the
Burger Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would attend their fraternity's
final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the negative. Dungo and Rivera reached the
boarding house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep
because Sibal was palling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to
Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led him
inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva,
who was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all
agreed, and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself
before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real name.
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the
tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that night.
Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los
Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on
the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the
resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in
the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and
accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and
went back to UP Los Baños.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up B.S.
Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of
fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood donations.
On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's tambayan for
the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the initiation rites, Sibal,
together with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow fraternity
brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face. Thereafter, they boarded a
jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort,
he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes later, he went down
and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with
Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told
him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal
wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on
the second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked
unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false
name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of
the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos
Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga and
(2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the
testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the
prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP Los
Bafios student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were
members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal, together
with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and two
other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation
rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of
darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and
the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle
and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced
dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily
assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final
initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but
they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend
Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the
defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of
Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect because
they had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of violating
Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of Deceased Marlon
Villanueva the following sums of money:
1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the prosecution
failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also
assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in the
hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them
guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to
convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The
CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in the venue
of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final
initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE
OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE
THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049
because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present" 24during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by
inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus,
they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information. By reason
of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against them has been violated.
In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that
Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and convicted
for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members and
officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the
hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the victim to be present thereat
and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others. 26 In their Reply27 filed on September
10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance between the, offense charged of
"actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the offense "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat."28 The prosecution, moreover,
failed to establish conspiracy because no act or circumstance was proved pointing to a joint
purpose and design between and among the petitioners and the other twenty accused.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher
court authority.29The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It
is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when
the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 31 According to the said
provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter
of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties.32Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.33
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall
raise only questions of law.34Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons. 35 In other words,
when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file
a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before
the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of
law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the
existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an
examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty
of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review. 37Substantive
Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due to
hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and
pounded arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare
undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony, cries
and ordeal of their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter how
modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities,
sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of the academe.
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of
Villareal v. People.38 It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing
were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. 39 Thus, a study of the
laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current predicament
of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and
Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states. 40 In the case of
People v. Lenti,41 the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining
hazing on the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would have
been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of
hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally
abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.42
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts
of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may
include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing
have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does not only
result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic
stress.45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception of
Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing
laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to six
years.48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in
death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony.49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident, was
enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or she
intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily injury
or death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is
categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law of
New York.51
Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas,
the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing. 52 In fact, in Alabama, no person is
allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the offense of
hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission.53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim. 54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a
hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have
removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts to
effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases.56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned. 57 Hazing, which threatens
to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible. 58
In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for
complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their
heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and head. The
Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v. Grand
Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of aspirating
his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation ritual. The
defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the victim. The
court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively contributed to the death of
the victim as part of their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District, 61 a tenth-grade
wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a ritual
where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with his buttocks
exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the incident
despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the parties in the
amount ofUS$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old
freshman, who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi
Kappa Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a
chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity
because, even if the student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its
activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain redress
before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the distinct
dilemma of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the
rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa.63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos
of the San', Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the Philippines -
Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for an answer: is
R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts
which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita.
This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule
on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public
welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be
mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.67
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
.omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute.68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would
show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows:
SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of
the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity
or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these
specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without
being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts
that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it
may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very
same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes,
Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-
recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong
kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin
talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na:
"Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang
penalty sa inyo."
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I
am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that
resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in
proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create
the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any
crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to
have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because
there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will
admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting
physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. x x x
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether it is
mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to
go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.69
[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se
adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. 70 In Vedana v.
Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken, through
the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same
to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is
immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its
prosecution.73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte
or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition
of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities. 74 In fact, the second
paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even
the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as
a requirement for employment are covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical,
mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance
the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the
PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission, duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be
considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that initiation
rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites
are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school
authorities or head of organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of
such initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate:
a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during
such initiation rites. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the
head of the school or organization or their representatives that they must
assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to be present
during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative ,is to see to it that
no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or
applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations
that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization
administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law,
which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to
hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the
officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein.76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the victim. 77 The
penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious physical
injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the penalties for hazing increased one
degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would aggravate the imposable
penalty.79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical or
psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical
harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the victim.
Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there
is still a prescribed penalty.80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization,
group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. 81 Although these planners were not
present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals.
The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as their
former officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the
infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to
attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but
also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group,
or organization.84The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The
parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any
action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including
faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices. 85 Likewise,
the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the
crime.86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the same. Recognizing the malum
prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with the said crime
shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a
wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense
in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable act under the
law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent
of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because
the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent
of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering.
He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is,
by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears
none; the same is approved.88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. n '.'provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or
citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the
person or the persons charged under this provision even before their conviction. 89 Necessarily, the
offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the offenders. 90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and
contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties
imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be
offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be
effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1
contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte
thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly.92
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included
the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood
to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had
different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the
petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only
induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled
their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing
would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim
to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.93 To require the
prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of
the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task,
if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad
impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which
has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed
the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.96Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. 97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President.98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence
at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of
actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof
provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation
as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique
because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing,
which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the
hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the
CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still
to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely
prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce." 100
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders
are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives
rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug; 101 (2) the dishonor of the check for
insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit;102 and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing.103
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the
crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that
could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the
victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually
participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of
their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during
the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She testified that
she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this
group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.
xxxx
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?
xxxx
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can
you please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said visited
your store is here?
xxxx
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on the
first row.
xxxx
ATIY. PAMAOS:
For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness has
been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to
Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case…104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the
night of the hazing, to wit:
COURT
Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how
would you know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?
WITNESS
A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong
nagyakapan po ... "
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that
you could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng
driver bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod
nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila
iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver came
out and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that
your testimony?
105
A: Yes, your Honor.
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight
because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their
actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and
overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce
the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on the
prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the
petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing, the
petitioners? guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on
prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 108
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct
evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on
under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.109 Needless to state, the crime of hazing is
shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in
nature and their members are reluctant to give any information regarding initiation rites. 110 The
silence is only broken after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is
required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become
public.111 Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution
to resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 112 To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such
as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused.
Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of
events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate
Joey Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at
their tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters
way from her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did
not know the third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of the
Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing
arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim,
Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two
fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took
back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant
Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him
why he did not report to him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously
punched the victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with
his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards the Entomology
wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the
evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation
right [sic]. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw
more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a
jeepney.1âwphi1 She estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years
old. Three (3) persons riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who
looked like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went
to her store to buy some items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their
faces. After she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified
as Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio
Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at
the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told him that
someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the
two (2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the
body of the man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a
vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal
Hospital and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad
and hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency
room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away
from said tricycle. He identified two of the passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and
Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the passengers unload a body inside the tricycle
and brought it to the emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied that
they did not bring with them any I.D. or wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true names,
the appellants listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y
Lanzon and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling
them that they secretly called the police to report the incident which was their standard
operating procedure when a dead body was brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency
room, observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter
did not respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms
and legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both
legs which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or
the back of the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that
he was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having
undergone hazing when he was a student and also because of his experience treating
victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV,
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on
the cadaver of the victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt
head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of
the two (2) persons whose deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons
sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of their body, particularly on
the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons died of brain
hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr.
Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those
two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and contusions on his body,
he opined that these injuries were hazing-related.114
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the
weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate. 115 As properly held by the
RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would
stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers,
likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses to
substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the
guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the
CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took
part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical
injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries
eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven, the
moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049
was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing
the crime of hazing.
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of R.A.
No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is
not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be
overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate
the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider
hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence
of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the discussion
earlier, this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should be a penalty or
liability for noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and with Section 3, or
the representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should also consider the
psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No. 8049, the
movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response to the uproar
against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should, be another way of fostering
brotherhood, other than through the culture of violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of
these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the candles of their
graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance
for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and
3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
SUPREME COURT Region, Branch 52, Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
Manila
R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75812-
EN BANC 13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R. No. 75789.
G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986 Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 71654.
vs.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-49.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42, G.R. No. 71654, G.R.
B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for
petitioner in G.R. No. 75789.
G.R. No. L-66839-42 December 18, 1986
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON petitioner,
vs. YAP, J.:
HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Executive Judge, Branch V,
Region IV, Regional Trial Court, sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
BATANGAS, and MARIA LUISA TORDECILLA, respondents. Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these
petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
G.R No. 71654 December 18, 1986
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners, defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts
vs. charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII, by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein
HONORABLE ClTY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents. the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected have come to us for relief.
G.R. No. 74524-25 December 18, 1986
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General in his comment on the petitions, maintained the
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner,
posture that it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the orders denying their
vs.
motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory. While this is correct as a general rule, we have
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑ;O Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII,
in justifiable cases intervened to review the lower court's denial of a motion to quash. 1 In view of
HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
the importance of the issue involved here, there is no doubt in our mind that the instant petitions
G.R. No. 75122-49 December 18, 1986 should be entertained and the constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the
other, in order to put to rest the doubts and uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner,
general public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the disposition of cases involving the
vs.
enforcement of the statute.
THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 139, Makati and FEDERICO L. For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not find it necessary to
MELOCOTTON JR., in his capacity as Trial Fiscal Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, delve into the specifics of the informations involved in the cases which are the subject of the
Makati, respondents. petitions before us. 2 The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether
present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in
G.R No. 75812-13 December 18, 1986
mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ, spouses, petitioners,
I
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but temporarily presided by BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI Branch 153, Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
Manila, respondent. for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
G.R No. 75765-67 December 18, 1986
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The
LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner, penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year
vs. or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case
HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. 3
Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE JUDGE ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge, Regional
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL NOLI T. CATHI,
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
G.R. No. 75789 December 18, 1986 period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank. 4
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check
of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment.
Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute
provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank
or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the
introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay
"stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima
facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on
such dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to
the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e.
checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is
proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to t public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our statute books which penalize the
issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has dealth with the problem within the context
of crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud and deceit. The focus of
these penal provisions is on the damage caused to the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 1887 until it was replaced by
the Revised Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions penalizing, among others, the act of
defrauding another through false pretenses. Art. 335 punished a person who defrauded another "by
falsely pretending to possess any power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency or
business, or by means of similar deceit." Although no explicit mention was made therein regarding
checks, this provision was deemed to cover within its ambit the issuance of worthless or bogus
checks in exchange for money. 7
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the Philippine Legislature, which added a new clause
(paragraph 10) to Article 335 of the old Penal Code, this time referring in explicit terms to the
issuance of worthless checks. The amendment penalized any person who 1) issues a check in
payment of a debt or for other valuable consideration, knowing at the time of its issuance that he
does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover its amount, or 2) maliciously signs the check
differently from his authentic signature as registered at the bank in order that the latter would refuse
to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check and, at the date set for its payment, does not have
sufficient deposit to cover the same.8
In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code was superseded by the Revised Penal
Code. 9 The above provisions, in amended form, were incorporated in Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code defining the crime of estafa. The revised text of the provision read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commis sion of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the
offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds
deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the cheek without
informing the payee of such circumstances.
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in payment of pre-
existing obligations. 10 The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit causing the
defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. In issuing a check
as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive any material benefit in return or as
consideration for its issuance. On the part of the payee, he had already parted with his money or
property before the check is issued to him hence, he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or
"simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him by the drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and solving the problem of how to bring checks issued
in payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of Art. 315, an amendment was introduced by the
Congress of the Philippines in 1967, 11 which was enacted into law as Republic Act No. 4885,
revising the aforesaid proviso to read as follows:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be puma facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
However, the adoption of the amendment did not alter the situation materially. A divided Court held
in People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover
checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the concept underlying the
crime of estafa through false pretenses or deceit—which is, that the deceit or false pretense must
be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of those
issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended provision evidently failed to cope with the
real problem and to deal effectively with the evil that it was intended to eliminate or minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents as a backdrop, the then Interim Batasan
confronted the problem squarely. It opted to take a bold step and decided to enact a law dealing
with the problem of bouncing or worthless checks, without attaching the law's umbilical cord to the
existing penal provisions on estafa. BP 22 addresses the problem directly and frontally and makes
the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. 14
The question now arises: Is B P 22 a valid law?
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law on estafa
did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the
equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its
enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional
provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and thorough
scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of
what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial
department of the government." 15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch
of the government, we need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor
of its constitutionality. This is not to say that we approach our task with diffidence or timidity. Where
it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution we
should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is
contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No
person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist that, since the
offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it
is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check
law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is
claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal
sanction.
First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition invoked by
petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the
various states of the American Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the cruel and
inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors to cause the
incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arising
from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced
against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ,
a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the
satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous
practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the
constitutions of various states of the Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of t0he
century and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our fundamental law outlawed not only
imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail
for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial definition,
both by our Supreme Court 20 and by American State courts.21 Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for
the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen, 22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the
constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment
for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from
actions ex contractu The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex
delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into
between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are
considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings
as punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
(1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant in a civil case on grounds akin to those which
justify the issuance of a writ of attachment under our present Rules of Court, such as imminent
departure of the defendant from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, or concealment,
removal or disposition of properties in fraud of creditors, etc. The Court, in that case, declared the
detention of the defendant unlawful, being violative of the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt, and ordered his release. The Court, however, refrained from declaring the
statutory provision in question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes,23 wherein a statutory provision which made
illegal and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his
employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday every week, was
challenged for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The
constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by the Court, it being within the authority of the
legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It was held that "one of the
purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers who hire laborers
or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them
financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an obligation,
although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a practice considered harmful to public
welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the
question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the
failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless
check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of
the issue before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to conceptualize.
But precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of those who challenge the
validity of BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a
debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain
acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which
the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence,
not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the
state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and
welfare." 25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable
nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the
adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its
enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close
to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged
between 50 minion to 80 million pesos a day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 27 It is a
written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all
events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable
on demand. 28 Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of
money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has
funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its
presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument wig be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted
as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to
be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of
checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of the country,
no unreasonable or arbitrary. 34
roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two. 29 These de
deposit thirds consists of currency in circulation. ma deposits in the banks constitute the funds It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on
against which among others, commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to
amount involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment
banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like pouring garbage into the but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the
bloodstream of the nation's economy. meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or
the power to make laws. 35 which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed,
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold,
no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute
can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched.
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated — 30
Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of
violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. This constitutional provision
business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same
prohibits the introduction of amendments to a bill during the Third Reading. It is claimed that during
category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the
its Third Reading, the bill which eventually became BP 22 was amended in that the text of the
constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was
second paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as adopted on Second Reading was altered or changed in
intended as a shield and not a sword.
the printed text of the bill submitted for approval on Third Reading.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to
A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that,
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading. 36 Part of the confusion was
United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless to warn that due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment
foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor,
substantial differences exist between our statute and the worthless check acts of those states hence, some members might not have gotten the complete text of the provisions of the bill as
where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records that the text of
from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider that judicial decisions must be read in the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the body on
the context of the facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social economic and Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes for that day. In any
political environment—in short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize the wisdom event, before the bin was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the Interim Batasan
of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander. created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report, which was
approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was ... an
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies
authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in
of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a question as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore, find no merit in the petitioners' claim
constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional that in the enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. 32 Whether the
were violated.
police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we
do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting aside the
order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419, 66839-42,
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby dismissed and the temporary
V restraining order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs against private petitioners.
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the examination of the other constitutional objections SO ORDERED.
raised by petitioners, some of which are rather flimsy.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the
laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be
no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and Gale for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine
Commission, which reads as follows:
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his
own premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his
own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion
against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any
time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of
public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in
the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society,
or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five
hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than
three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of
September, 1908. After hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of
the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine
currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time
and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that
judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico
displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a
number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in
miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against
the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the
stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under
authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the
appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in
so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions described.
The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in
question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.
The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:
First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the
accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices,
or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the
United States.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal
intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits
the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the
act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to
avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result
whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect
illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the
enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection
against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with
the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is
quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which
the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating
the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends,
not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were
discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been
injured and its security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then
society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. The
reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he becomes a
person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves
make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the
evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who
displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one
case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —
The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a
crime without regard to the intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts
must give it effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a
given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by
considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute,
and thus ascertaining the intention of the legislature.
In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of
adulterated milk under a statute reading as follows:
No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure,
unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome milk.
It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk
which was shown to contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the
statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was that he
was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the
question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which made his
intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew
it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act
alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
xxx xxx xxx
It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so
enormous as to menace the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with
greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To
redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson
that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's
knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish
their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the
 entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to
know and certain.
In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which
provided that an inspector of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office
except "after notice in writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly
and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person who removed such
an officer without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was
removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of a
misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from
which the following quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice
Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:
In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The
court ruled out the evidence offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited
constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would
relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent
to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not
excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in
acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated?
xxx xxx xxx
The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it
is sufficient to prove that the act was knowingly and intentionally done.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had
been given to the inspector, although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the
offense, because the intention to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True,
we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law permitted it.
This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.
xxx xxx xxx
If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal;
while a rule requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an
intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many
cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure.
In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:
In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there
is a large class of cases in which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made
punishable without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character to
his act.
In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his
act comes within the legislative prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical
methods available for the enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light
upon the meaning of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is
whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential
element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his
contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.
In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal
intent arose under a statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if
any township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys
in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be
guilty of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in
excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the
quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:
When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in
the passage and effectuation of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did
so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and
that he therein exercise due care and caution.
xxx xxx xxx
As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal,
irrespective of the knowledge or motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity,
no judicial authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such
knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to
find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to
such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that
in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide.
In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for
unlawfully transposing from one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the
statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said:
There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The
words of it are, 'Shall transpose or remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or
removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential
ingredient in every criminal offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is
no offense; this is especially true as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids
an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty
intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he
violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend
upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by
the defendant from a judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the
State which provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell,
or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the
trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence,
that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of there
furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine
butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the charge as
requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.
The court says:
The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit
and comprehensive. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying
that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed
purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain,
that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set
up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.
The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374);
Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489); Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199);
Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The
State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich.,
577).
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend
that a criminal intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the
offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The
wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he
did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent and
all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime.
The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the
crime.
We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable
only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of
those banners, can be sustained.
It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags
actually used in the insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving,
perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display of a
certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The
rules governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not destruction. To give the
interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the statute
altogether.
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those
in armed rebellion against the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the
insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but to
a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that type
of flag. While different words might be employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the
method of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known by which that
flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative
enactment, to describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in
the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and the only
characteristic which it had upon the which the Commission could seize as a means of description
and identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely
no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and
how it was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words and phrases used,
was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a flag
used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army — a flag under
which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in
whatever form it appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a
particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and
significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than
one sense, and the literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently
fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the
principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the
intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the
intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed as to advance the remedy
and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487;
State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp,
13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108
N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)
The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in
judicial construction, are to control the literal interpretation of particular language in a
statute, and language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense
which will harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the
enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)
Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.
The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the
legislature, it is considered in the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is
ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one meaning, and there is no
doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be
used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143
U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5
Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310;
People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The
People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)
The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully
safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention
of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words
of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in
favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will
endeavor to effect substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U.
S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)
It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the
intention of the lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other
statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a
modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes are to
be construed strictly, they are not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious
purpose of the legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R.
4, Q. B. Civ., 228.)
In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any
sort of carriage" a person could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.
It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as
will render then operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating
them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to
carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)
In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:
The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving
effect to it. The court should place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain
the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then give such construction to the
language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can be
ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U.
S., 72, 79.)
We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses
should be taken from the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to
give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are in the
statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used,
requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.
The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, 1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges
as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7,
1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS
(₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not
have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo
Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the
check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already
been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱8,496.55.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in
1989, spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop
business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743,
post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and
during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount
of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED
ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands,
he filed a criminal complaint against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only
to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when
they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof.14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias
Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal
cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to
imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them,
and a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year
and a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them
and a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses
incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount
of ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.16 On the other hand, petitioner brought the case
to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with
her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. 18 It held that the
provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of
the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws
unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does
not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not
exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part
in every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that
in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated November 16, 1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER
OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND
UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE
SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P.
BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the
three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would
enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the
lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or
issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court
of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are
made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second
makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory,
a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with
regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of
statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. 24 Lex specialis
derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and
purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special
laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under
the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article
2228 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive
effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article
1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of
the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs.
Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments
used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC.
Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which,
by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case
of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application
of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant
Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check
subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also
did not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct
inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act
that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued.
However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is
a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be
established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and
convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of
conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court ruled
thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco,
merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to
us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of
the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The
proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to
a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in
order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility --
determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is
weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite
quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its
evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting
the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 99838 October 23, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ y ROSALES and WILFREDO ROSALES y YUCOT, accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Ernesto Enriquez y Rosales and Wilfredo Rosales y Yucot were charged with having violated
Section 4, Article II, of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
in an information that read:
That on or about June 5, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug,
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale six (6) kgrms of dried
flowering tops of marijuana stuffed in a plastic sack, which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.1
The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the information, according to the prosecution, are
hereunder narrated.
At around eleven o'clock in the morning of 05 June 1990, Sgt. Pedro I. Cerrillo, Jr., the Officer-in-
Charge of the Intelligence and Drug Law Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 2 (located in
Tondo, Manila) of the Western Police District, was in the vicinity of North Harbor routinely scouting
for information from his civilian informants. Near the gate fronting Pier 10, "Danny," a porter and
member of the Anti-Drug Abuse Movement ("ADAM"), approached and informed Sgt. Cerrillo that a
free-lance porter at the North Harbor, a.k.a. "Bulag," was looking for prospective buyers of
marijuana. Sgt. Cerrillo instructed Danny to say that he had come across a couple who would be
interested in buying the prohibited drug. Sgt. Cerrillo had then in mind a possible buy-bust
operation.
The buy-bust plan was broached to Patrolwoman Shirley Maramot who was manning Police Station
No. 2. Fellow police officers were at the time on duty at the U.S. Embassy where a "rally" by certain
activists was in progress. Using his own owner-type jeep, Sgt. Cerrillo repaired to his house at 727
Moriones St., Tondo, Manila, to procure ten (10) pieces of one hundred peso bills 2 to be used in the
projected buy-bust operation.3 He thereupon had, at a store near the police station, xerox copies
made of the bills that can readily show the serial numbers which he had also noted down in his
personal notebook.4
Back at the police station, Sgt. Cerrillo handed the buy-bust money to Pat. Maramot. Since there
were no other "operatives" at the station available for the operation, Sgt. Cerrillo sought the
assistance of ADAM members Joseph Mendoza, Amado Betita and Alex Trinidad. The team,
including "Danny," were briefed by Sgt. Cerrillo. The plan called for Pat. Maramot and Mendoza to
pose as the couple interested in buying marijuana and for Trinidad, Betita and Sgt. Cerrillo to act as
the "back-up" men. Pat. Maramot was to nod her head as soon as the sale was consummated. 5
At about 11:35 a.m., the group, using two vehicles, proceeded to the vicinity of Pier 10 at the North
Harbor At the corner of Moriones Street and Radial Road 10, Pat. Maramot and Mendoza sat on a
bench by a store to wait for the return of "Danny," who had meanwhile left to fetch "Bulag, while
Sgt. Cerrillo, Trinidad and Betita strategically positioned themselves at a billiard hall, mingling with
spectators and pretending to be bystanders. The billiard hall was only about ten meters away from
Pat. Maramot's group, and it afforded a good view of the place. 6
Moments later, Danny arrived with accused Wilfredo Rosales, a.k.a. "Bulag." Rosales talked with
the poseur-buyers. After about five minutes, the poseur-buyers, Rosales and the informant entered
an alley, walking along shanties, until they reached a house numbered 1349.
A half-naked man in green shorts emerged from one of the doors of the house. The man, later
identified to be accused Ernesto Enriquez, a.k.a. "Nene," asked Pat. Maramot in Visayan accent,
"Dala mo ba ang pera?" Pat. Maramot took out from her pocket the bundle of the marked money
and showed it to Enriquez. The latter allowed Maramot's group to enter the house. 7 Minutes later,
as so pre-arranged, Sgt. Cerrillo followed and proceeded to house No. 1349. Finding the door
closed, he went around the house. Sgt. Cerrillo saw Pat. Maramot, Mendoza and the informant exit
through the back door. Rosales, carrying a plastic bag, was with them. Again, Sgt. Cerrillo's group
followed Pat. Maramot and Rosales until the latter reached a nearby waiting shed for jeepney
passengers. At this point, Pat. Maramot announced that she was a policewoman. Sgt. Cerrillo held
Rosales and took his bag. Sgt. Cerrillo opened the sack, and inside it was another sack containing
marijuana wrapped in plastic.
The group hurriedly returned to house No. 1349 only to find that Enriquez had by then left the
premises. The team boarded the police service jeep and moved on to Kagitingan Street at the
Lakandula detachment. Sgt. Cerrillo interviewed Rosales. Upon being informed that Enriquez would
usually visit the Pier 10 area, Sgt. Cerrillo proceeded to the place. After scouring the area, a
security guard supervisor at the pier, who accompanied the group, spotted Enriquez walking near
the pier. Sgt. Cerrillo "picked up" Enriquez and brought him to the Lakandula detachment for
investigation. Later, Minda, the wife of Enriquez, arrived. Someone, at the request of Enriquez, had
fetched her to "bring the money. Enriquez told her to return the amount to Sgt. Cerrillo. She took
out from her wallet its contents three of which were the 100-peso marked bills.8 Minda became
hysterical. She embraced Sgt. Cerrillo and begged him to forgive her husband. Sgt. Cerrillo told her
to instead see the station commander.9
Sgt. Cerrillo apprised Enriquez and Rosales of their constitutional rights. Sgt. Cerrillo advised
Enriquez, in front of the latter's wife, that he should look for a lawyer so that his statement could be
taken. Sgt. Cerrillo prepared the request for the examination of the evidence taken from the
accused and the affidavit10 of the latter's arrest.11
On the evening of 05 June 1990, Minda and other relatives of Enriquez approached Sgt. Cerrillo for
the possibility of "settling" the case. During the trial, another relative, a senior supervising agent of
the Napolcom, also approached and requested Sgt. Cerrillo to help out.12
Patrolwoman Shirley Maramot, 37 years old, assigned at Police Station No. 2, corroborated Sgt.
Cerrillo. She testified that she was requested by Sgt. Cerrillo to be the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation conducted in the morning of 05 June 1990 along Alinian Street, Tondo, Manila. After Sgt.
Cerrillo had conducted a briefing and provided her with the buy-bust money, Pat. Maramot went
with Mendoza, who portrayed the role of her husband, and the informer to Radial 10 at Pier 14.
When Wilfredo Rosales turned up, he asked if she had cash with her. After being shown the
money, Rosales led her to a house numbered 1349. The poseur-buyers were made to wait
momentarily while Rosales talked to Ernesto Enriquez. Rosales later signaled Pat. Maramot, who
was around four (4) meters away, to again show her money. Forthwith, Pat. Maramot was led to the
house of Enriquez. Once inside a small room, Enriquez locked the door. Enriquez asked Pat.
Maramot how much money she had. She replied that she only had P1,000.00 since she was not
sure that she could get as much as the one-half sack of the contraband shown to her. Pat. Maramot
was told she could get the lot for P4,500.00. She said she was willing to get the lot if she could be
trusted with the balance of the price. Enriquez agreed. Pat. Maramot handed over the P1,000.00 to
Enriquez. The latter was about to hand over the marijuana when he decided to, instead, have
Rosales personally deliver the marijuana.
Pat. Maramot followed Rosales until Maramot finally introduced herself as a policewoman. Rosales
posthaste attempted to board a passing passenger jeep but Pat. Maramot and Sgt. Cerrillo, who
had rushed in, were able to timely get hold of Rosales.13
NBI Forensic Chemist George J. de Lara issued, on 06 June 1990, a certification to the effect that
the specimen submitted to him was positive for marijuana.14 Sgt. Cerrillo prepared a case
report15 and the respective booking sheet and arrest report. 16 The official report of the NBI forensic
chemist, dated 07 June 1990, disclosed the following findings:
Weight of specimen = 6.00 kilograms (before examination)
5.999 kilograms (after examination)
Microscopic, chemical and chromatographic examinations made on
the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for MARIHUANA.17
On the same day, Station Commander Benjamin de Jesus endorsed the case against Enriquez and
Rosales to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings. The inquest fiscal recommended 18 that the
two accused be charged with violation of Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The defense gave a different version of the incident.
Accused Rosales testified that he had come from Bohol to Manila in April of 1990 and stayed with
accused Enriquez, his cousin, while working as an extra porter of William Lines. At around 11:30 in
the morning of 05 June 1990, he was on his way home from work when a male person whom he
recognized only by face sought his assistance in carrying a sack to a place where jeepney
commuters would take their ride. The sack was colored white and emitted the smell of dried fish. He
was promised P20 in exchange for his help. At a junction, a security guard whom he later identified
to be Homer Ciesta, blocked and pushed him inside a vehicle where he was promptly handcuffed.
During the commotion, the owner of the sack disappeared. 19 Rosales was brought to a house near
the slum area in Parola where P20,000 was quoted for his release by Sgt. Cerrillo. 20 When Rosales
did not heed the demand, he was brought first to the Lakandula detachment and then to Station No.
2 of the Western Police District.
On his part, Enriquez, a resident of 1349-C Alinian Street, Tondo, Manila, claimed that he was in
the business of purchase and sale of oil at the North Harbor, under the business name of Nie-Men
R. Enriquez Enterprises,21 being the grantee of a permit to operate an oil sludge collection
service.22 He was under contract by the Lorenzo Shipping Corporation from January 1983 to April
1984. He was also the Vice-President of the "Kapisanan ng Maralitang Naninirahan ng Tondo, Inc."
a civic organization and a recipient of a certification of merit from the National Steel Corporation. 23
Recounting his whereabouts in the morning of 05 June 1990, Enriquez said he left his house at
around 11:45 a.m. for Pier 10 of the North Harbor, barely a thirty-minute walk away from his
residence, to meet his brother, Victor Enriquez, at the pier. He had with him P2,000 in P100
denominations stacked in his wallet. Robinson Lumbis, a neighbor who was road testing his cab
along North Harbor, saw and greeted Enriquez.24 Betty Quimbo, another neighbor, later saw
Enriquez with his brother.25 Appellant took his lunch at home and thereafter hurriedly returned to
the pier. He was not able to spend the night in his house. The following day, 06 June 1990, at
around two o'clock in the afternoon, Enriquez went to the maintenance section of the Lorenzo
Shipping Lines to pay for the oil he had obtained from its vessels. Homer Ciesta, the officer-in-
charge of the security guards of the shipping line, invited Enriquez, and the latter agreed, to join him
(Ciesta) earn some "extra money." The two left for the squatter's area in Parola and, once there,
Ciesta told Enriquez to approach a certain person, later identified to be Sgt. Cerrillo, who instantly
handcuffed him. Sgt. Cerrillo demanded P20,000 in exchange for his freedom. When he refused to
give in to the demand, Enriquez was brought to the Lakandula detachment where the P2,000 he
had in his wallet was taken and presented in evidence as the amount used in the buy-bust
operation. He was brought to Station No. 2 of the WPD for investigation. 26 Homer Ciesta went to tell
Arminda, the wife of Enriquez, to bring some money to the Lakandula police detachment. Arriving at
the detachment, someone approached Arminda and asked her whether she had the money. She
replied in the affirmative. The person then grabbed her wallet; took its contents and later returned
the empty wallet.27
On 24 January 1991, the trial court, giving credence to the evidence submitted by the prosecution,
found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced each of
them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.
In their appeal to this Court, Rosales and Enriquez have filed separate briefs.
Appellant Enriquez insists on his innocence and faults the trial court for giving too much credence
to the testimony of Sgt. Cerrillo and Pat. Maramot who, Enriquez asserts, have merely framed them
up for selfish motives. He theorizes that it would seem incredible for either Pat. Maramot or Sgt.
Cerrillo to have left and abandoned Station No. 2 considering that the Station Commander and his
men have all been posted in the then on-going rally at the U.S. Embassy. He downgrades the
prosecution's asseveration that Pat. Maramot, being unarmed, could not effect his immediate
arrest, and that Sgt. Cerrillo has so used his personal funds as marked money. Enriquez also
questions the six-day delay in the filing of the information.
The Court is scarcely impressed.
Simply said, appellant Enriquez would assail the credibility of the two prosecution witnesses.
Almost always, the evaluation made by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is viewed with
respect. The trial judge, who has the distinct advantage of being able to observe closely the
demeanor and deportment of witnesses on the stand as well as the manner in which they testify,
undoubtedly can better determine than anyone else if such witnesses are telling or are not telling
the truth. He is in an ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies and unless, as so repeatedly
said, he has obviously discarded or missed certain facts of substance and significance that,
otherwise, would have altered his judgment, an assessment on credibility made by him should
indeed deserve approbation by an appellate court.28
The Court, in the case at bench, has scrutinized the records, and it finds no justification for holding
differently from the findings made by the trial court.
In drug related cases, particularly in a buy-bust operation, the contention that the accused has
merely been framed up by law enforcement personnel for selfish motives is quite often raised by
the defense. For this claim to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing29 in
order to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a
regular and proper manner.30 Appellant, regrettably, has miserably failed to substantiate his
allegations in this respect.
Enriquez questions the six-day delay in the filing of the information against him which he attributes
to an extortion attempt made on him. Like an alleged frame-up, a supposed extortion by police
officers has, too, been a standard defense in drug cases. Appellant's failure to offer evidence,
independently of his bare claim of extortion, suggests that this defense could either be a fabrication
or an afterthought. If, truly, the arresting police officers have tried to extort money from him, it
should have behooved Enriquez to come forward with the proper charges against the erring police
officers.31 No criminal or administrative charges appear to have been filed by him. It is equally
strange that the supposed extortions neither appeared in appellant's counter-affidavit32 nor in his
affidavit33 both prepared by his counsel of choice. In any event, the Court does not see any real
undue delay on the part of the police. The station commander filed the case with the prosecutor on
07 June 1990, the same day that the NBI forensic chemist's official report was released. The
transmittal letter,34 of the station commander, bears the recommendation, likewise dated 07 June
1990, of the inquest fiscal finding a violation of Section 4, Article II, of R.A. No. 6425.
Appellant Enriquez surmised that it was strange for Sgt. Cerrillo and Pat. Maramot to have left the
police station unmanned just to conduct a buy-bust operation. Sgt. Cerrillo explained that, being the
Intelligence Officer in Station No. 2, he would spend most of his duty hours in the field. 35 He chose
Pat. Maramot to be the poseur-buyer because she was not well known in the place of operation.
While she had a desk job she could also be assigned elsewhere when the situation would demand.
Furthermore, the buy-bust operation was conducted in an area not far from the police station
(testified to be at an approximate distance of between the Manila City Hall and the Luneta Park 36).
On cross-examination, Pat. Maramot explained why she could not arrest Enriquez when he
received the money. She testified:
ATTY. ESMERO:
During the time that you were in that room together with Enriquez
and you said that Enriquez took up a half sack of marijuana under
the table, did it not occur to your mind to arrest him immediately
during that time and introduced yourself as a policewoman together
with your husband?
WITNESS:
If you will place yourself in my situation, I am so small to arrest a
person and I am not so big so I have to wait for my companions, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the Accused.
ATTY. ESMERO:
How about your supposed husband?
WITNESS:
Besides we did not bring anything even a gun because they are
outside, sir.
ATTY. ESMERO:
 You could have immediately went (sic) out of the door and after that
contacted Cerrillo. You could have told him immediately because he
was about seven (7) meters from that room?
WITNESS:
The door was locked, sir.
ATTY. ESMERO:
You could have knocked at the door if you want to call him?
WITNESS:
It could not be heard because in that alley there were adjacent
rooms, sir, "kuwarto-kuwarto".
ATTY. ESMERO:
Now, you said that you went out through the back door. Who was
together with you when you went out at the backdoor?
WITNESS:
Joseph, the one who pretended to be my husband, sir.
ATTY. ESMERO:
How about Rosales?
WITNESS:
He passed through the front door together with the informant, sir.
ATTY. ESMERO:
And the front door was where Pat. Cerrillo was positioned?
WITNESS:
No, sir. Cerillo was positioned at the side. He could not meet them
immediately because when you go out at that door, it is already a
street.37
The use of Sgt. Cerrillo's own money in the buy-bust operation could be expected. Police Station
No. 2 was "not logistically funded."38 In the buy-bust operation, only three 100-peso bills of the
marked money were recovered which, unfortunately, were lost to thieves when Sgt. Cerrillo had
momentarily parked his jeep within the vicinity of the police station on 11 July 1990. 39 He reported
this loss along with the loss of an ammunition belt pack with six (6) live cal. .38 bullets and his
Parker ballpen.40 At any rate, the non-presentation of the buy-bust money could not adversely affect
the case against appellants.41
Alibi is definitely a weak defense although it may occasionally prove to be a good plea. In order to
be effective, however, this defense requires proof that it would be physically impossible for the
accused to be at the locus criminisat the time of the commission of the crime. Where there is even
the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the alibi seldom will hold
water.42 Most significantly, the defense of alibi crumbles in the face of a positive identification of the
malefactor.43
In his case, appellant Rosales argues that to sustain a conviction for the crime of selling marijuana,
the sale must be clearly established which, he asserts, the prosecution has failed to do.
The Court cannot sustain the argument.
Under Section 4, Article II, of R.A. No. 6425, 44 as amended, the law penalizes not only the sale but
also the delivery of prohibited drugs.
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof,
the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Selling is only one of the acts covered by the statutory provision. The law defines the word "deliver"
as "a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and
by any manner with or without consideration." "Delivery," although not incidental to a sale, is a
punishable act by itself; while "sale" may involve "money or any other material
consideration,"45 "delivery" may be "with or without consideration."
Appellant Rosales contends that while criminal intent need not generally be proved in crimes that
are mala prohibita, knowledge that the sack in his possession contained a prohibited drug must
nevertheless be established. Indeed, Section 2(f) of the Dangerous Drugs Law requires that a
person who delivers a prohibited drug must "knowingly" pass such contraband to another person.
Thus, in one case, the Court has said:
. . . . While it is true that the non-revelation of the identity of an informer is a standard
practice in drug cases, such is inapplicable in the case at bar as the circumstances are
different. The would-be buyer's testimony was absolutely necessary because it could
have helped the trial court in determining whether or not the accused-appellant had
knowledge that the bag contained marijuana, such knowledge being an essential
ingredient of the offense for which he was convicted. The testimony of the poseur-buyer
(not as an informer but as a "buyer") as to the alleged agreement to sell therefore
became indispensable to arrive at a just and proper disposition of this case. 46
In this case, the trouble appears to be that appellant Rosales incorrectly assumes to be, or gives an
impression of being, unaware of the prohibited drug involved in the questioned transaction with
appellant Enriquez; in point of fact, however, it is sufficiently shown that Rosales has known all
along that the deal between Enriquez and the poseur-buyers had only to do with marijuana.
Appellant Rosales believes that his act of carrying the sack of marijuana is a mere attempt to
deliver the prohibited drug. In other words, the sack being still within his control, he could, he states,
have easily refused to deliver the item to the poseur-buyer. Here, he seeks to capitalize on his
being supposedly still in the subjective phase of the crime. Appellant Rosales thus submits that, if
found guilty, he should only be held accountable for attempted deliveryof a prohibited drug.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies, as
well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The subjective phase in the commission of a felony is that portion of its execution starting from the
point where the offender begins by overt acts to pursue the crime until he is prevented, against his
will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which would produce the offense. If the
subjective phase has not yet passed, then the crime is only attempted. If that phase has been done
but the felony is not produced, the crime is frustrated. 47 The crime is consummated if, following the
subjective phase, the last of the elements of the felony meets to concur. These rules are
inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws.48
Unfortunately for appellant, the crime with which he is being charged is penalized by a special law.
The incomplete delivery claimed by appellant Rosales, granting that it is true, is thus
inconsequential. The act of conveying prohibited drugs to an unknown destination has been held to
be punishable,49 and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination of the prohibited drug is
reached.50
In sum, the facts proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case were that: (a) Two police officers,
one of them a woman, conceived of and executed a buy-bust operation; (b) the operation led to the
red-handed apprehension of appellant Rosales just as he delivered the illegal drug; and (c)
appellant Enriquez who had peddled the same to the poseur-buyer was himself later arrested
shortly thereafter. The sale and delivery of marijuana constituted punishable acts under Section 4,
Article II, of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Appellants Enriquez and Rosales should bear the
consequences of their trifling with the law. The two evidently confederated towards the common
purpose of selling and delivering marijuana. Conspiracy could be inferred from the acts of the
accused, whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime would show its
existence.51 It was appellant Rosales who brought the poseur-buyer to appellant Enriquez for the
purchase of marijuana. It was upon the instruction of appellant Enriquez, apparently to retain
control of the unpaid portion of the six-kilogram contraband, that appellant Rosales was to carry the
sack to the supposed residence of the poseur-buyers. In conspiracy, the act of one conspirator
could be held to be the act of the other.52
R.A. No. 7659, amending the Dangerous Drugs Law, now provides that if the quantity of drugs
involved in any of the punishable acts is more than any of the amounts specified in the law, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death53must be imposed. Considering that the marijuana involved
here weighed more than 750 grams, the maximum specified amount for marijuana, appellants,
ordinarily, are to be meted that penalty. An amendatory law, however, may only be applied
retroactively if it proves to be beneficial to the appellants. In this case, it would not be that favorable
to them; hence, like in People vs.
Ballagan,54 the Court could only impose the penalty of life imprisonment upon appellants. The
penalty of reclusion perpetua would mean that the accused would also have to suffer the
accessories carried by that penalty, as well as the higher fine, provided for by R.A. No.
7659.55 Appellants must, accordingly, still bear the penalty imposed on them by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of 21 January 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
finding appellants Ernesto Enriquez and Wilfredo Rosales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime punished by Section 4, Article II, of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing on them the
penalty of life imprisonment and the payment of the fine of P30,000 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO,
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN
y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nepnew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance ofCamarines Norte, Branch II[1] convicting them of the
crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latter's death and P256,960
representing the victim's unrealized income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against
Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog:
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality
of Vinzons, province of CamarinesNorte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a
sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal
injuries on the latter's face which resulted to (sic) the death of said EmeraldoQuiñones.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on January
12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and EdmundoAsis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented the following version of the commission of the crime:
At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto.
Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of
a certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and
Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box
him.[2] Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire to
fight.[3] Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and
hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for
about half an hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing
that they were no longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two
to accompany him to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work
as a bus conductor.[4]
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his bolo
hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. [5] Horrified,
Felix Lukbanand Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they heard
shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na."[6]
On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead
with his head busted.[7] They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to their house.[8]
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at
the Funeraria Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer,
Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death
certificate reveals that Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the
following injuries:
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the
frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the brain
tissue.
"2. Other findings - Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in
length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and right side of the
neck."[9]
The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral
hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident."
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was committed.
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house to
fetch his visitors at the dance hall.[10]Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis, whom he
presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall. However, they
were not able to reach their destination because Edmundo was boxed by somebody whom he
(Edmundo) sideswiped.[11] Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home.[12] On their way, they
were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan invited to his house to help him
cook.[13] After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano Mendoza proceeded
to Iligan's house and arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the same
day.[14]
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan's testimony. He testified that while they were walking in front of
the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize because there were
several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed his apology
boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later, Iligan accompanied him to
his home in Lico II.[15] After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his house, he slept and woke up at
7:00 o'clock the following morning.[16]
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect
that Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the
lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986, said:
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death have
shown that the victim's death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding, the
Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has not
been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr., (the) father of the victim, testified that
Dr. Abastold him that if his son was hacked by a bolo on the face and then run over the entire head
by a vehicle's tire, then that hacking on the face could not be visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp.
16-17, October 13, 1981). Third, Exhibit '2' (the photograph of the victim taken immediately after
his body had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head
was not crushed by any vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face and head, was
damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge horizontally. There are contusions and
abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards has none of it,
while on the right forehead there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is
simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half portion of his head and downward
part of his body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which there are none."[17]
The lower court also found that Iligan's group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group
of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly
convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the
aforementioned penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which they
were convicted. For the second time,they attributed Quiñones, Jr.'s death to a vehicular accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The
defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple
fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident[18] which opinion was
earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas justified his
conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on the victim's left shoulder and the right side of his
neck.[19] He also testified that the incised wound located at the victim's right eyebrow could have
been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it could not have caused the victim's
death.[20]
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the
vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that when
he helped bring home the body of Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim's
father, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle,
he was hacked by Fernando Iligan."[21] When asked why he mentioned an automo-
bile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his
(Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted."[22] It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had
actual knowledge of said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to declare it in
court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that
when he went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim scattered across the
road where he also saw tire marks.[23]
For its part, the prosecution, through the victim's father, presented evidence to the effect
that Iligan authored the maceration of half of the victim's head. Quiñones, Sr. testified that from
their house, which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iliganholding a
"sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased someone. During
the second time that he saw the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan."[24] Hence,
the lower court concluded that the victim's head was "chopped" resulting in the splattering of his
brain all over the place.[25] It should be emphasized, however, that the testimony came from a
biased witness and it was uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an
appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or
omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. [26] In this instance, the lower court erred in finding
that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence
on record point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed,
after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over
by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death
of Quiñones, Jr.
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), [27] the essential requisites of Article 4
are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender.[28] We hold that these requisites are present in this case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it
was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What
is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of
the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it
was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head.[29]
The hacking incident happened on the national highway[30] where vehicles are expected to pass any
moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and
having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones,
Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a
vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan's hacking of Quiñones, Jr.'s head might not
have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter's death. Proximate legal cause
is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom."[31] In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan's assault on
him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time
between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because
he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses.[32]
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view
of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however,
does not by itself show treachery.[33] There must be evidence that the mode of attack was
consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself.[34] In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of
the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile
attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any
subsequent attacks against them.[35]
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their
determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[36]
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary
to the lower court's finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to
hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan's co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in
the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr. which led to his running over by a vehicle
and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the
scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably
biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of
the former'scriminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough toconstitute one a party to a
conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose.[37] Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the
crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated
by Iligan.[38] Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstances, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal
medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium
as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim's unrealized
income and therefore, the same is disallowed.
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for
which he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)day of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime charged
against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated
by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There
were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were
Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of
Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called
Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named
Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same
morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others
had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not
get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road,
heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara,
who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not
the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls
or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled
with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped
inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and
the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered
the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in
her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600
as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City
for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the
claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and
their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire,
the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay
City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the
bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one
of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a
distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in
order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question
is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including
himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We
disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned
bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,
and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death
was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of
the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and
the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver
and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the
fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly,
Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial
court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them,
the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in
the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she
overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been
telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be
true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in
front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have
already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the
driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers,
physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the
criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed,
because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the
complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us
shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court
to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of
passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of
Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and
from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and
for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 117954 April 27, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.
On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant Orlando Acuram
guilty of murder.
On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant with the
crime of murder, allegedly committed as follows:
On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador;
Misamis Oriental, which is within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill and treachery did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one Orlando 1Manabat who
was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus, hitting and
wounding the latter on the right leg or thigh, which caused his death the following day.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge.3 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved by the prosecution,
the accused, ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and is meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO MANABAT the
jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.4
The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando
Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work,
proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at
that time, they decided to head for home instead. They went to the national highway, stood at the
right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and waited for a ride there. They
flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, however, swerved dangerously towards
them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man
kamo" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back
"Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out
in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando
shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the direction of
Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the
Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed blood
transfusion and so they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional
Hospital in the same city.
Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found the
victim's blood pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was heavily
bandaged. He decided to operate on the victim when the latter's blood pressure stabilized. At about
5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the victim died at around
11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's death was "secondary to huddle
respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive
loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal circumstances, the wound would
not necessarily cause death but in this case where the wound transected the major part of the leg,
the wound was fatal. He clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered
at the front portion of the right knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds. 5
The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that appellant
Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated at
the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one among its passengers who was carrying a
firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective July 1, 1991, upon orders of
his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra.6 Appellant was later surrendered by his
commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of arrest issued by
MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.7 On motion by the prosecution and without objection from the defense,
the trial court suspended appellant from the service and ordered his detention at the provincial jail.8
During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a gun at
that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time
since he was sitting at the front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter's
father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the rifle was locked and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel
was even pointed towards the driver. 9
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis of
the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on
his innocence, appellant readily filed his notice of appeal. 10 In his brief, appellant raises the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED
APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT
THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED
WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND THE ALLEGED
WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE
POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE
EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. 11
We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and sufficiency of
the evidence for the prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and credibility of his defense.
To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find that his
behavior proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the
shooting happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the unusual incident should
have at least elicited his curiosity and he should have inquired about it. However, he chose to
ignore the incident and go his way. 12 That a policeman could display such indifference to a crime
committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true that he reported for duty the day
after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his commanding officer restricted within the
camp pending investigation of the case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his
commanding officer had received a radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the trial
court noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of his men involved, such a grave charge.
Despite these, appellant did not present himself before the police in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.
Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found.
Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, in our view, is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and
the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 13 In this case, it was appellant's commanding officer
who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within
the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to
voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant's favor.
On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit.1âwphi1 Appellant asserts
that the trial court erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we
agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the
accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk
to himself. 14 In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As observed by the trial
court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the passengers of the jeepney. The
shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant correctly claimed. 15 Treachery
cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous
impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will. 16
Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of the
crime. He claims he was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively
tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun
at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 17It is settled that conviction may
be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 18Circumstantial evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct evidence.
From direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led intuitively,
or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some other
facts may be validly inferred. 19 No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime. 20
As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is replete with
details, duly proven by the prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the defense, enough to
sustain the guilt of appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former member of the Philippine
Constabulary and, during the incident, was a member of the Philippine National Police. He was
skilled in handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a firearm (armalite rifle) by his command,
which he was then carrying with him before, during and after the incident; (3) At the particular date,
time and place of the incident, appellant was carrying his duly issued armalite rifle inside the
jeepney from where the gunfire came from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-
side of the jeepney where the sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the witnesses. (5)
There were no other persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except the appellant. (6) The empty
shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the place where the fatal shooting occurred. (7) The
appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present himself until after a warrant of arrest was
issued and, in fact, until his actual arrest. 21
The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim's death. They
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the offense. It is the
height of desperation on appellant's part to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the precise
moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and completely unexpected shooting of the
victim. 22 Here, circumstantial evidence suffices.
Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in our
view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not
conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be explained if a
person discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter. 23
Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the lack of
prompt and proper medical attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper medical
attendance to the victim constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts him from criminal
responsibility. This assertion is disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant never introduced proof to
support his allegation that the attending doctors in this case were negligent in treating the victim.
On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro
Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying bandage on the injured leg to prevent
hemorrhage. He added that the victim was immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern
Mindanao Regional Hospital when the doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood
pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as
the main blood vessel of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss of blood. The
surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the
attending doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment
to the victim does not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the appellant
and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The
proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the appellant. It is settled that
anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death
that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive proper
medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the
practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just
consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could avoid just
accounting for their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death. 24
To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime committed is
only homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for
homicide is only reclusion temporal. As there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
found by the trial court or shown after a review of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed
in its medium period of reclusion temporal, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion
temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1
day to 12 years. The span of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to
17 years and 4 months.
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the medium period
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years and 10 months and 1 day of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180219 November 23, 2011
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic (Talampas) seeks the review of the
affirmance of his conviction for homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the
Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007. 1
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Biñan, Laguna (RTC) had rejected his pleas of self-defense
and accident and had declared him guilty of the felony under the judgment rendered on June 22,
2004.2
Antecedents
The information filed on November 17, 1995, to which Talampas pleaded not guilty, averred as
follows:3
That on or about July 5, 1995, in the Municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused VIRGILIO TALAMPAS, with intent to kill,
while conveniently armed with a short firearm and without any justifiable cause, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Ernesto Matic y Masinloc with the
said firearm, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound at the back of his body which directly
caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The State presented as witnesses Jose Sevillo, Francisco Matic, Jerico Matic, Dr. Valentin
Bernales, and Josephine Matic. The CA summarized their testimonies thuswise: 4
Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the incident in question, testified
that on July 5, 1995 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo)
and Ernesto Matic (Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road in Zona Siete (7), Wawa,
Malaban, Biñan, Laguna, repairing his tricycle when he noticed the appellant who was riding on a
bicycle passed by and stopped. The latter alighted at about three (3) meters away from him, walked
a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver, and poked the same to Eduardo and fired it
hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired his gun three (3) times,
one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground
with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back (patihaya).
Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to the
hospital. On June 6, 1995, Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Biñan Police Station.
Another witness, Francisco Matic, testified that prior to the death of his brother Ernesto who was
then 44 years old, he (Ernesto) was driving a tricycle on a boundary system and earned ₱100.00
daily, although not on a regular basis because sometimes Ernesto played in a band for ₱100.00 per
night.
Jerico Matic, eldest son of Ernesto, alleged that he loves his father and his death was so painful to
him that he could not quantify his feelings in terms of money. The death of his father was a great
loss to them as they would not be able to pursue their studies and that nobody would support them
financially considering that the money being sent by their mother in the amount of ₱2,000.00 to
₱2,500.00 every three (3) months, would not be enough.
Dr. Valentin Bernales likewise, testified that he was the one who conducted the autopsy on the
body of Ernesto and found one gunshot in the body located at the back of the costal area, right
side, sixteen (16) centimeters from the spinal column. This shot was fatal as it involved the major
organs such as the lungs, liver and the spinal column which caused Ernesto’s death.
The last witness, Josephine Matic, wife of Ernesto, testified that her husband was laid to rest on
July 18, 1995 and that his untimely death was so painful and that she could not provide her children
with sustenance. She asked for the amount of ₱200,000.00 for her to be able to send her children
to school.
On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been
Eduardo Matic (Eduardo), not victim Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with
Ernesto at the time of the incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the
blow; that he and Eduardo had then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled,
he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control
of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during their struggling with each other;
that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then seized the revolver
and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people had started
swarming around.
Ruling of the RTC
On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found
Talampas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,5 and disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide, with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT ranging from TEN (10) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years and EIGHT (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Matic y
Masinloc the following sums, to wit:
1. ₱50,000.00 – as and for death indemnity;
2. ₱50,000.00 – as and for moral damages;
3. ₱25,000.00 – as and for actual damages; and
4. ₱30,000.00 – as and for temperate damages.
Furnish Public Prosecutor Nofuente, Atty. Navarroza, the private complainant and accused with a
copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the CA
Talampas appealed to the CA, contending that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF
ERNESTO MATIC WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ACTED IN DEFENSE OF HIMSELF WHEN HE GRAPPLED WITH
EDUARDO MATIC.
Still, the CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTC’s factual and legal conclusions, and ruled
that Talampas, having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had thereby
assumed the burden of proving the elements of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing
evidence, but had miserably failed to discharge his burden. 7
The CA deleted the award of temperate damages in view of the awarding of actual damages,
pointing out that the two kinds of damages were mutually exclusive. 8
Issue
Hence, Talampas is now before the Court, continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
accidental death.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES the
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself.9 indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of SO ORDERED.
Talampas’ attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality,
neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus,
Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering
his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense.
Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,10 the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a
situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence
and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the
least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. 11 Indeed, accident is
an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act
of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. 12 In short, accident
presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at
Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that
point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and
caused Ernesto to fall face down to the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing
Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful, being a criminal
assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse
his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence
of Talampas’ felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio
ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility
nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). 13 Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code,14 criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 14 years and eight months, as maximum, legally erroneous.
The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.1avvphi1 Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 15 the court, in imposing a
prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is
mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14
years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.16 It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only
14 years and eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
for such penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must
add one day to the maximum term fixed by the lower courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the
minimum term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Yet, the addition of one day to the 10 years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of
Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be time for the penal administrators
concerned to consider and determine whether Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation of the minimum
penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment from the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of
the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided
over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The
court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any
mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by
medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the
report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National
Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading
"Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a
single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was
successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only
reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive
behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr.
Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from
wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to
suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative
thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those
of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a
decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission
of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some
overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee
in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-
wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time
he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times.
He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno
was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him
deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship
especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not
insane but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion
of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled
that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the
date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the
Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between
the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present
criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in
1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According
to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges
and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after
the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas,
the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by
the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered
his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be
gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the
same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost
said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by
an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of
whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to
Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas
(now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on
the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare
for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-
parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote
hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original
Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried
it out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking
to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
 I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to
spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which
was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of
their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes
were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all
this: he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to
entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations.
For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as
compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life
too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will
show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance
of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his
nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which
reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper
bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot
located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the
chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the
grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by
Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without
losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an
open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering
the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell
to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of
the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as
the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who
was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away
towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was
the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding
him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia
pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the
explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the
Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the
information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he
(Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each
other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after
the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform
the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at
the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1)
the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police,
who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement,
we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand
during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code
in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in
the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused,
shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two
hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he
knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President
Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and
intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96
of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his
purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some
people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those
persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In
other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he
felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious
physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that
he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum
total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it
has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held
by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done,
a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain: applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar to death. (Art. 248.)
tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it
ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby
calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of
matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero JJ., concur.
debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa.
es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el
procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio
declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del
articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo
disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a
tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues,
claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se
infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy
principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta
de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case
before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a
throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave
felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang
were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case
of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner
put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the
person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by
over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the
four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the
provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards
the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his
electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the
nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with
the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the
single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem
it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4935 October 25, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAMES L. BROBST, defendant-appellant.
Kincaid and Hurd for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work on a
mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native
laborers. Mann discharged one of these number of native laborers. Mann discharged one of these
laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the premises, and told the
defendant not to employ him again, because he was a thief and a disturbing element with the other
laborers. A few days afterwards, some time after 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July, 1907,
Saldivar, in company with three of four others, went to the mine to look for work. The defendant,
who at that time was dressing himself inside his tent, which was erected on the mining property,
when he caught sight of Saldivar, ordered him off the place, exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue,
Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move to leave, and although the order was repeated, merely
smiled or grinned at the defendant, whereupon the latter became enraged, took three steps toward
Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs,
at the point where the handle of Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended.
On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered. (dio vueltas — spun around helplessly)
and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's house, which stood about 200
yards (100 brazas) away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached the door
of the house, and was buried some two or three days later.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide (homicidio), marked with
extenuating circumstances, defined in subsections 3 and 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, in that the
defendant "had no intention of committing so grave an injury as that which he inflicted," and that he
struck the blow "under such powerful excitement as would naturally produce entire loss of reason
and self-control." Sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor was imposed, and from this
sentence defendant appealed to this court.
Counsel for the appellant, relying mainly on appellant's claim that he did not strike Saldivar, and
that he merely pushed him lightly with the black of his open hand, and relying also on the lack of
satisfactory proof of the existence of lesions or external marks of violence on the body of the
deceased, contend: first, that the evidence fails to sustain a finding that the deceased came to his
death as a result of injuries inflicted by the defendant; and, second, that even if it be a fact that the
defendant, in lying his hand upon the deceased, contributed to his death, nevertheless, since the
defendant had a perfect right to eject the deceased from the mining property, he can not be held
criminally liable for unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of this right.
Two witnesses, Dagapdap and Yotiga, who were standing close by the time, swore positively that
the blow was delivered with the closed fist, from the shoulder (de dentro para fuera), and that it was
a hard blow; Dagapdap testifying that, "Al pegar el puñetazo, Simeon dio vuelta, y despues se
marcho (when the blow was struck, Simeon staggered and afterwards went away); and Yotiga
that "despues de dar el golpe se retrocedio y levanto los brazos"(after the blow was struck, he
backed away and threw up his arms). The testimony of these witnesses is clear, positive, and
definite and is wholly uncontradicted, excepted for the improbable story told by the accused in his
own behalf, when he testified that seeing Saldivar standing outside his tent, he told him twice to go
away and then stepped up to him and pushed him lightly with the back of his hand, which came in
contact with the handle of Saldivar's bolo, but not with sufficient force to push him back or do him
any injury. If it had been necessary to use force to compel Saldivar to leave the place, it is at least
highly improbable that the accused approaching him from the front would have lightly placed
the back of his open right hand on Saldivar's left side, without attempting to seize him, or to compel
him to give around.
Pedro Leocampo, the only other witness called at the trial who appears to have been present when
the incident occurred corroborated the testimony of the witness Dagapdap and Yotiga as to all that
occurred prior to the actual infliction of the blow, which he did not see. He testified that at the time
when the accused, standing in his tent, ordered the deceased to leave, he, the witness, was eating
his breakfast, with his back to the accused and the deceased; that hearing the order, he turned his
head and saw the accused start toward the deceased with his arm outstretched, but that at that
moment he turned away and did not see the accused actually come up to, strike or touch the
deceased; that when he saw the accused approaching the deceased, the accused did not have his
fist clenched, but that he could not say whether the blow was struck with the open hand or the
closed fist, because at the moment when it is said the accused came up to and touched or struck
the deceased, the witness's head was so turned that he could not and did not see what took place.
No evidence was introduced at the trial which in any wise tends to put in doubt the truth of the
testimony of these witnesses as to the fact that they were present at the time when the place where
the incident occurred; and of this fact we are satisfied that there can be no reasonable doubt,
although, as frequently happens when ignorant witnesses are testifying in the courts in these
Islands, their evidence is conflicting as to the precise hour by the clock when it took place.
Some attempt is made to discredit the testimony of Yotiga, because it appears from the record that
in answer to certain questions on his examination-in-chief, he stated that when the blow was struck
he was some hundred brazas(200 yards) away. It developed, however, on examination by the trial
judge, that this answer was given under the impression that the question asked was the distance
from the mine to the house of the sister of the deceased, as to which considerable testimony was
taken; and it is very clear from all the testimony that both these witnesses were standing within a
few yards of the defendant when he struck the blow.
The testimony of Dagapdap is also criticized because, in answer to the opening questions on the
examination-in-chief, he spoke of the blow inflicted as a bofetada (a slap with the open hand on the
cheek), which, later on in his testimony, he changed to the word puñetazo (a blow with the fist), as
a result, it is intimated, of suggestive questions by counsel for the prosecution. We do not think this
criticism well founded, or that the language of the witness on which it rests sustains the inference
sought to be drawn therefrom. In the first place, it must be forgotten that the witness was manifestly
an ignorant man, unskilled in the use of words, and testifying in a remote province in a native
dialect; and that his testimony was interpreted into the Spanish of the record by an interpreter who
might well have been mistaken in selecting the precise Spanish equivalent of the word or words
actually used by the witness, and whose use of Spanish throughout the record does not
demonstrate such precision and nicety in the use of words as to justify the laying of too much stress
on the phrasing adopted by him in the haste of interpretation in the course of a trial: so that, in our
opinion, the detailed description of the manner in which the blow was inflicted, as given by the
witness without suggestion or assistance of any kind, is much more decisive as to its nature than
the word by which reference to it was made. And in the second place, as appears from
the Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua Castellana and the Diccionario de la Lengua por la
Academia Española, the word "bofetada," when used strictly, connotes not merely a blow with the
open hand, but such a blow struck on the cheek or side of the face, a meaning which the whole
testimony of the witness clearly discloses it was not his intention to give to whatever word he did
actually make use of in referring to the act. The definition of the word "bofetada," as given in the
former dictionary, is "a blow which is given on the cheek (mejilla) with the open hand," and in the
latter is "a blow given with the open hand, on the side of the face (carillo) or cheek (mejilla) of
another."
It has also been suggested that the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is inherently
improbable, because, as it is said, if the blow had been struck as described by them, the injured
person would necessarily have "doubled up or over," and not, as appears from their testimony,
thrown up his hands and staggered away. No expert testimony was introduced at the trial upon this
point, and while it may, perhaps, be admitted that if the blow took effect in the abdominal region,
common experience would justify us in expecting as a result of the blow, that the injured person
would "double up or over," it must not be forgotten that the blow having been delivered over the ribs
on the left side, it may as well have taken effect in the region of the heart; in the absence of expert
testimony we do not think that in the event, evidence that the injured person threw up his hands and
staggered away is necessarily in conflict with the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution as
to the weight of the blow and the place where it was inflicted.
We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the
defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that whatever authority the
defendant may have had to eject the deceased from the mining property and to use physical force
to that end in case of need, the blow thus struck was far in excess of such authority, and was,
therefore, unlawful, and can not be excused or justified as an exercise of necessary force in the
exercise of a right. The defendant's own testimony does not indicate that there was any danger to
be apprehended from Saldivar, and there is nothing in the record which would indicate that the
defendant had reasonable ground to believe that he would offer a violent or even a substantial
resistance to an attempt to expel him from the mining property.
We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his death as a result of the blow inflicted by the
defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a laborer in defendant's mine;
his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he left her house in apparent good health
and went to the mines to look for work; a short time afterwards he received a violent blow on his
lower left side, a region of the body where many of the vital organs are located; and immediately
thereafter, he stared up the short trail leading to his sister's house, and died as he reached the
door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening cause, we think there can be no reasonable
doubt that his death resulted from the blow.
Counsel for appellant suggest that death may have been the result of some cause unknown, such
as a fall, an assault by robbers, or perchance a suicidal frenzy, intervening between the time when
the accused was last seen starting up 200-yard trail to his sister's house, and the time when, as she
testified, he died just as he reached her door on his way back from the mine; and that the accused
is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But the doubt which must be decided in favor of an accused
person in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, and not a mere whimsical and fanciful doubt, based
upon imagined but wholly improbable possibilities, unsupported by evidence; and while we do not
hold that it is absolutely and morally impossible that some other cause could have intervened to
bring about the death of Saldivar, we do hold that there can be no reasonable doubt in the mind of
a reasonable man that death was in fact brought about by the blow inflicted by the accused, and
was not the result of some independent cause intervening during the very short period of time prior
to his death, during which he was not under observation by witnesses called at the trial.
Counsel for the appellant enlarge on the fact that accepting defendant's statement that he sent the
deceased away from the mines about a quarter past six, it would appear from the testimony of the
sister of the deceased that about two hours may have elapsed between that time and the time
when he arrived at her house. The sister fixed the time of the arrival of her brother at from 7 to 8
o'clock or possibly a little later; but she appears to have been an ignorant woman who did not know
how to read the face of a clock, and it is quite clear that hers was no more than a rough estimate,
based on the height of the sun, and the most that can fairly be inferred from the testimony is that
the deceased was struck early on the morning in question, and that not long afterwards on the
same morning, he died at the door of his sister's house 200 yards away. But even if it be granted
that two hours actually did elapsed from the time the deceased left the mines, until he reached his
sister's house, this interval is not long enough to materially weaken the inference that the death
resulted from the blow.
It is true that no autopsy was had on the body of the deceased, and that a medical officer called in
by the accused who saw the body, but who does not appear to have examined it very closely,
certified that he found no outward lesions or marks of violence; but this evidence is not sufficient to
negative the existence of internal lesions, for the medical authorities inform us that death may and
often does result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the
fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; and there is evidence in the record of the
discovery on the cadaver of two suspicious black spots, one about the place where the blow was
struck, and another at or near the umbilicus, though the evidence fails to disclose the precise
nature of these discolorations. (Medical Jurisprudence, Taylor, 12th Am. Ed., pp. 310 and 388;
Moulin's Treatise on Surgery, Hamilton, part 2, chap. 1, p. 151; Tratado de Medicina Legal por
Legran de Sulle, Vol. II, pp. 206, 207.)
It has been suggested that the deceased may have had a weak heart or some other diseased
organ, and that but for such physical defect death might not have ensued from the mere force of the
blow inflicted by the defendant. There is no evidence to this effect, and on the contrary there is
testimony in the record that on the morning before he died he was in apparent good health; and the
fact that a few days before, he was able to work in the mines, and that he came to the mines that
day in search of work, renders it highly improbable that he was suffering at the time from any grave
organic weakness. But however this may have been, it has been frequently and justly decided that
where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the
illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. (U. S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. Rep., 96; U. S. vs. Montes, 6
Phil. Rep., 443; see also decisions of supreme court of Spain, March 10, 1871, and June 26, 1980.)
Counsel for appellant also contend that even if it be granted that in unlawfully exercising force upon
the person of the deceased, the appellant caused for contributed to his death, nevertheless he
should at most be convicted of homicidio por imprudencia temeraria (homicide as a result of
reckless negligence), because, manifestly, the unlawful act was not committed with the intent to kill,
and as counsel contend, the striking of the blow by the appellant was not an act adapted, or likely
(idóneo) to inflict a death wound under ordinary circumstances, or reasonably calculated so to do.
In support of this contention counsel cite decisions of the supreme court of Spain of November 9,
1885, February 10, 1876, July 5, 1888, and July 12, 1890, and appears to rely especially on the
former decision wherein sentence of homicidio por imprudencia temeria was imposed, the court
holding "que es condición esencial del delito de homicidio, que el hecho material de que resulte
sea impulsado por voluntad libre encaminada por acto idóneo a causar la muerte ó algun mal fisico
que por consecuencia natural la produzca."
In the case, however, it was proven, and the court found that not only did the defendant not intend
to kill the deceased but also that he did not intend to do him any physical injury whatever; but in the
case at bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and unlawful infliction
by the accused of a severe blow on the person of the deceased; and while it is true that the
accused does not appear to have intended to take the life of his victim, there can no doubt that in
thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some injury, at least to the extent of inflicting
some degree of physical pain upon him, and he is therefore, criminally responsible for the natural,
even if unexpected results of his act, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, which
prescribes that —
Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural
consequences of hi illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such consequences,
but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge in
this case.
What has been said sufficiently disposes of all errors assigned by counsel for appellant, except
certain alleged errors of procedure in the court below which we do not think it necessary to discuss,
because even if it be admitted that such errors were committed, they do not appear to have in any
way wise prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court be and are hereby affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his
SUPREME COURT right arm on account of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of
Manila the neck.
EN BANC Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death
G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933 of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in
vs. favor of the appellant.
GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant. Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant. legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping out
and brandishing his penknife.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers
to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused, should be
applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been interpreted
AVANCEÑA, C.J.: as applicable only in cases where the crime befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme
The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is not the case herein.
homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one day The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249 of
of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with costs. the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of three
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living children, mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree,
has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and has lost control that is prision mayor, should be imposed.
of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
paralysis. One of his daughters was named Maria and another, are married, while still another one the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years and (1) day
is a nun. With the exemption of the other married daughter and the nun, of all of them, including the of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the costs. So
appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend for support. ordered.
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that the
appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. The
relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant
did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such extremes, that he
had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong,
when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the
truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared sad
and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because the child
meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some time the
appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times entreating the
deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child.
Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never
complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the
deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went
downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that
occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the appellant
that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that the latter
refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude, the deceased
tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the face with the said
penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of
the neck of the deceased.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the
deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant
emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar on
the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two
but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or,
at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to the
deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter.
That the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32066 March 15, 1903
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
GONA (Mansaca), defendant and appellant.
Jose Ma. Capili for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with the
crime of homicide, the information reading as follows:
That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district of Pantukan, Province of
Davao, Philippine Islands, as within the jurisdiction of the court, the said accused
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted
the Mansaca Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that
as a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul died.
Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and taking into
consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication, sentenced him to suffer
twelve years and one of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties prosecuted by law to
indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to the costs. From this sentenced
the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26, 1928, a number
of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been
liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated, with the result
that a quarrel took the place between the Mansaca Dunca and the defendant. Dunca and his son
Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one Award. The defendant left
the house about the same time with intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the
evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, the mistook Mapudul for Dunca and
inflicated on him a mortal wound with a bolo.
There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime charged, but
his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased
and committed the crime by mistake, he should have been found guilty of homicide through
negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of
intentional homicide.
This contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. In these case of United
State vs. Mendieta(34 Phil., 242), the court said:
Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro
Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter, in no way
could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing
one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully,
cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact that he
made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating
circumstances.
The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 213886
JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December
6, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac
Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Facts
In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the
Regional Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one ELNER ARO y
LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death
thereafter.
That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
April 11, 2004, he was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay,
Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus
was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at
Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital. 5
At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the
jejunum" and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his
ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and
that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However,
Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.6
Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and
eventually, died the next day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his
death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis
secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death
was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries." 7
In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They
averred that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly
and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but
Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not
for Quibac' s intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground.
Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered
and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and
told Wacoy to go home.8
The RTC Ruling In a Judgment9 dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of
the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay Aro's heirs the
amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.10
The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy
and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in
stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his death. 11
In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to
show the extent and effect of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to
his death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in
a Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide.12
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of
Homicide under A1iicle 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one ( 1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six percent ( 6%)
per annum on the damages awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 15
In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this
relation, it observed that the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his
credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was driven by any ill motive. 16 However,
contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be convicted of the
crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm
on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were
convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to
maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.17
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18 In a Resolution19 dated July
21, 2014, the CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration;20 hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and
Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac'
s conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained
hereunder.
Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as
follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons
shall be punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall
have used violence upon the person of the victim.
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several
persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. 22Based on
case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.23
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC,
which reads:
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of
Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying
circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was
not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or
Infanticide.24
In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of
which Aro died.1âwphi1 On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two
(2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion
and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful
incident.25 Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the
latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. 26 Therefore, the CA
correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause27 of the latter's
death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of
Homicide.
On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to
inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore
in its maximum period,28pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC. The said provision reads:
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that
intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended
to commit, the following rules shall be observed.
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to
the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to
the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another
crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case
the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the
maximum period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different
from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae);
and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his
felonious act (praeter intentionem),29
as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed. 30 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to
the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.31
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due
to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA.
In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a
mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his
conduct and external overt acts.32 In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to
Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching
Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely
maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of ₱50,000.00 each
are increased to ₱75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 33 All other
awards, as well as the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid, are retained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution
dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to
pay the heirs of Elner Aro the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the likewise can be no
SUPREME COURT doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in obedience
Manila to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to
EN BANC him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the
G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921 same circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a man
creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle, escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
vs. responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in
Angel Roco for appellant. the brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual,
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee. after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the
STREET, J.: injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is drowning. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the
under discussion in the present appeal are these: wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person, supposing that he
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the had received no succour, and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from
Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into submersion. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged upon
the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of
the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio frustrated homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine:
Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as "That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and
helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow. necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he
placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary,
accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel
in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult them.
injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the
The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved
aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased,
towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the
by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the
accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great
decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide,
and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen
did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the
no more.
accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored to the shore, but between
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as
these and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full
an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong
midday, and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of
as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced
Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively shows that, owing to his possible inability to
the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer
swim or the strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and was drowned.
the corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped into the water, pay the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law; and it being understood that the
the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is
reason they made no movement looking to rescue; but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Venancio did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact
Mapa, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
that the accused at his juncture threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment
except tho show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to
watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered.
Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a
bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings have been delivered to a
representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is
needless to say, take it for granted that he is dead.
The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility
that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding
that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The
proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers
could see; and this circumstance, coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be
extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility that he might
have swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we consider too
remote to be entertained for a moment.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37507 June 7, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM PAGE, defendant- appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
William Page appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 21, 1973,
convicting him of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo an indemnity of P12,000 plus P20,000 as moral
damages (Criminal Case No. 5396). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:
According to Page's confession (Exh. C), at around four o'clock in the afternoon of February 13,
1972 Crisanto Camposano, alias Boy Sangkay, a resident of Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, Parañaque ,
Rizal, went to the house of William Page y Ubina located at 143 Pildira Street, near the Manila
International Airport, Pasay City, They were friends since boyhood. Page was an eighteen-year old
third year high school student at the Arellano' University in Pasay City (Exh. H).
From Page's house, the two went to Camposano's house, where they met the latter's father who
was drinking with a companion. Camposano's father gave Page some liquor to drink. Page and
Camposano stayed at the latter's house up to ten o'clock in the evening (Exh. C).
At past ten o'clock, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda or intersection of Taft Avenue and F.
B. Harrison Boulevard, where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with
a balisong knife. Camposano had a revolver.
According to Page's confession, he seated himself beside a male passenger who was near the
driver on the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney where two female
passengers were seated. (The male passenger turned out to be Randolf Scot, a thirty-year old
employee of the Hyatt Regency Hotel who was on his way to work. The female passengers were
the sisters, Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo and Cesarean Villaverde).
With the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and
Camposano told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M. Roxas Boulevard, and then to
turn left going to Parañaque . There, they held up the driver and the three passengers. They got the
money and pieces of jewelry of the passengers and the driver. From the rear view mirror of the
jeepney, Page saw Camposano dumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard in front
of Casa Marcos. Then, the two directed the driver to proceed to the airport. They left the jeepney at
Pildira Street (where Page resided). Camposano gave Page a watch and a woman's ring as his
share of the loot.
Page admitted that he had been charged with theft but the case was dismissed in the municipal
court. He knew certain hoodlums named Remy, Manoling, Cuerson and Edgar whose specialty was
holding up taxicabs (Exh. C).
Scot gave a slightly different version of the holdup. He testified that when the jeepney reached that
portion of Harrison Boulevard in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank, Page pressed a knife at the
neck of Scot and shouted: "This is a holdup. Don't move." Page got Scot's diary book containing a
one peso bill. Page ordered the driver, Eduardo Dilla, to shut off the lights of the jeepney, to turn left
on Russel Avenue, and to proceed to Roxas Boulevard. Page and Camposano covered their faces
with pieces of cloth.
Camposano told the women passengers to bring out their money and not to shout "or else there will
be shots". They replied that they had already given everything to Camposano.
When the jeepney was in front of Casa Marcos and El Presidente Hotel, one of the women jumped
out of the jeepney. (The husband of one of the women was a waiter at Casa Marcos). The other
woman shouted. Camposano kicked her, thus causing her to fall out of the jeepney. Camposano
noticed that a car was following the jeepney. Believing that it was a police car, he ordered Villa
(Dilla) to drive at full speed.
According to Scot, at an isolated place called Baltao Street near the airport, Page and Camposano
told the driver to stop. Page robbed Scot of his other one peso bill and divested the driver of his
earnings after boxing him for making some resistance. Then, the two malefactors fled to a dark
alley. Scot and the driver reported the holdup to the police of Parañaque . It was already eleven
o'clock.
Lieutenant Casiano Eugenio the precinct commander, showed them a photograph of Camposano.
Dilla and Scot Identified him as one of the two hoodlums. Eugenio and the two robbery victims
repaired to the residence of Camposano at Bagong Ilog Baclaran. They saw Camposano, whom
Dilla fingered, but Camposano fired shots at them and was able to elude pursuit due to the
darkness of the night. He was killed by the Pasay City policemen while he was committing another
crime.
The next day policemen went to Page's residence near the airport to apprehend him. He was not
there. His father, in the presence of his aunt, promised to surrender him.
Page was arrested in the morning of February 24, 1972 at the Jose Abad Santos High School of
the Arellano University in Pasay City. In the afternoon of that day, his statement was taken down by
Patrolman C. Prepena and sworn to before the municipal judge (Exh. C).
The woman, who jumped from the jeepney (according to Scot's story), was Veronica Balacapo. She
was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by a good Samaritan, Manolo Daval, Santos. She
was already dead when she reached the hospital.
The other woman, Cesarea Villaverde (the sister of Veronica), who was pushed by Camposano out
of the jeepney, was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. The record is not clear as to whether she
survived.
The postmortem examination of the body of Veronica Balacapo, a forty-two year old married
woman, revealed that she suffered (1) abrasions on the left eyebrow, left shoulder, left elbow and
sacral region; (2) bilateral severe hematoma on the occipital region of the scalp; (3) fractures on the
base of the cranial fossa and the fourth and fifth ribs along the midclavicular line, and (4)
hemorrhage in the posterior cranial fossa. Death was caused by the severe and traumatic
meningeal hemorrhage (Exh. A and F).
On February 15, 1972 or before Page was arrested, the chief of police filed a complaint for robbery
with murder in the municipal court of Parañaque against Camposano and John Doe (Criminal Case
No. 30039). The complaint was based on the investigation of Dilla and Scot. Page did not present
any evidence at the preliminary investigation. The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance
where the fiscal filed an information for robbery with homicide against Page and Camposano.
After trial, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned.
In this appeal, appellant Page contends that the trial court erred (1) in relying on his repudiated
confession, (2) in convicting him although he was not Identified by Randolf Scot, the prosecution's
eyewitness, and (3) in convicting him on the basis of weak circumstantial evidence.
1. Patrolman Prepena who took Page's confession, testified on its voluntariness. Lieutenant
Eugenia the precinct commander, and Patrolmen Manolito Miranda and Jose Elquiero, the arresting
officer, denied that Page was maltreated while he was in the custody of the police.
Page admitted that when he was brought before the municipal judge for the administration of the
oath on his confession, he could have complained to the latter about the alleged maltreatment. He
did not complain.
His aunt, Prudencia Alupit, and his own lawyer visited him in jail. He allegedly confided to them that
he was maltreated. He requested them to take action against the policemen. They did not complain
to the proper authorities about the alleged maltreatment.
The learned trial court made a searching and conscientious analysis of appellant's evidence on the
alleged duress employed by the police in extracting his confession. It concluded that the confession
was voluntary.
We find no error in that conclusion. Page's confession, having been taken before the new
Constitution took effect, is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of article IV were not
observed (Magtoto vs. Manguera, L-37201-2, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4).
Certain details found in the confession are strong indicia of its authenticity. Page specified therein
that his residence was at 143 Pildira Street, an address which jibes with the address in his school
record (Exh. I); that his maternal surname is Ubina; that he met Camposano at four o'clock in the
afternoon of February 13, 1972; that they went to Camposano's residence, where he (Page) was
given liquor by Camposano's father; that he directed the driver to follow a certain route; that
Camposano was from Sorsogon; that Page was acquainted with some hoodlums, and that he
(Page) was charged with theft. These details would not have been embodied in the confession had
not Page freely disclosed them to the police.
2. It is true that Scot during the trial did not point to Page as the person who sat beside him on the
front seat of the jeepney and who pressed an open knife at his neck. Testifying nine months after
the occurrence, Scot could not remember the face of Page. He recalled only that Page's hair was
thick.
Patrolman Ruben Crue Santiago, one of those who investigated Page, testified that the latter was
sporting long hair and looked like a hippie at the time of the investigation (2 tsn November 21,
1972). The photographs of Page taken in July, 1971, or about seven months before the holdup,
when Page was booked for theft, show that he had long hair (Exh. G).
Scot's failure to identify Page during the trial is of no moment because the crucial fact is that Page
in his own confession admitted his participation in the holdup. Page stated in his confession:
Iyong jeep na pampasahero na aming sinakyan sa may Rotonda ng Baclaran
patungong Maynila, biaheng Harrison, ay may sakay na dalawang babae sa
hulihan at isang lalaki sa unahan sa tabi ng driver at ako ay naupo sa harapan
katabi ko iyong lalaki at si Boy Sangkay (Camposano) ay sa gawing hulihan.
Pagdating namin sa may tapat ng San Antonio Bank ay hinoldup namin iyong
jeep pati ng mga pasahero at pinaliko namin sa Russel Avenue patungong M.
Roxas Blvd. Pagdating namin sa M. Roxas Blvd., ay pinakaliwa namin
patungong Parañaque at noong kami'y nasa M. Roxas Blvd. na, ay kinuha
namin ang mga pera at alahas noong mga pasahero at tsuper ng jeep at
matapos noon any nakita ko na lang sa salamin na inihulog ni Boy Sangkay
iyong dalawang babae sa may tapat ng Casa Marcos sa M. Roxas Blvd.
At pagkatapos ay nagpahatid kami patungong MIA at bumaba kami sa Pildira
sa Pasay City. (No. 13, Exh. C).
Scot's testimony and the necropsy report (Exh. A) prove the corpus delicti or the fact that robbery
with homicide was committed. Page's extrajudicial confession was corroborated by the evidence on
the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
3. Appellant's third contention that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, because the
prosecution's evidence is mainly circumstantial, is not meritorious.
Once it is conceded that his confession is voluntary then there cannot be any doubt as to his guilt.
We have already shown that his confession was not vitiated by compulsion or constraint.
The alibi, which Page interposed during the trial and which his counsel did not bother to discuss in
his brief, appears to be a complete fabrication. Page testified that at the time of the commission of
the holdup, he was residing with his aunt at 26 Simbo Street, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Rizal and that
he was sick.
That testimony was squarely belied by Page's school record (Exh. 1) which shows that, when the
holdup was perpetrated, he was residing with his father at 143 Pildira Street, Pasay City near the
airport (or at 101 Interior Rivera Village near the airport, Exh. H) and that on February 11, 1972, or
two days before the holdup was committed, he was not sick because on that date he was not
absent from school.
In any event, even if he was a Makati resident at the time of the holdup, that would not have
precluded his participation in the commission of that offense at Baclaran, Parañaque , which is not
very far from Fort Bonifacio.
To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was in another place for such a period of time
that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time
of its commission (People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350, 354).
Page's alibi does not satisfy that requirement.
The more important point to consider is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Page, as a fellow
conspirator of Camposano, could be held liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only. In his
letters to this Court, Page, not being a lawyer and not knowing the rules on conspiracy, insisted that
he had nothing to do with the death of Veronica Villaverde Balacapo.
Of course, it was Camposano alone who directly brought about Veronica's death. Whether
Veronica jumped from the jeepney, as testified by Scot, or whether Camposano kicked and pushed
her and her sister, Cesarean out of the jeepney, as stated by Page in his confession, Camposano's
culpability for that flagitious deed cannot be disputed.
If Veronica jumped out of the jeepney, it must have been because she was in mortal dread that
Camposano would shoot her. As fear gripped Veronica, she, in desperation, thought of scampering
out of the moving jeepney. Her head struck the pavement. It was broken. A hemorrhage ensued.
She died before medical assistance could be extended to her.
The rule is that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger, which
causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries (People vs. Toling, L-27097,
January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17,33).
We find that the trial court's conclusion as to conspiracy is borne out by the evidence. Page and
Camposano were boyhood friends. About six hours before the crime was committed, they were
already together. They were in the Baclaran rotonda at around ten o'clock in the evening or shortly
before the holdup was committed. They boarded the jeepney in that place. Inside the jeepney, they
coordinated their actions. They directed the jeepney driver to go near the airport or in the vicinity of
Page's residence, a place which was well-known to the two malefactors. They left the jeepney
together and fled in the same direction.
There is not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit robbery existed between Page and
Camposano. The fact that the two armed themselves with deadly weapons, a knife and a revolver,
signified that they were determined to kill their victims in order to consummate their nefarious
objective.
The conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of Page and Camposano. Those acts reveal that they
had agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). This Court
may take judicial notice that that kind of robbery has been frequently committed since the liberation
when the jeepney came into existence as a public conveyance.
Page and Camposano implemented their agreement when they waited for a passenger jeepney at
the Baclaran rotonda and boarded it at the same time. If they had no evil intention, they could have
sat together at the back. But, they did not do so. Obviously, as previously planned by them, Page
took the front seat so that he could control the driver and at the same time extort money from him
and the other passenger in the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney so
that he could rob the two female passengers.
The behavior of Page and Camposano inside the jeepney disclosed a synchronization of their
actions, evincing a prior concert and plan to commit robbery with violence against and intimidation
of persons. Page should answer for all the consequences of the conspiracy, including the homicide
which was intertwined with the robbery committed by his conspirator. The homicide was committed
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.
The rule is that where the conspirarcy to commit robbery was conclusively shown by the concurrent
and coordinate acts of the accused, and homicide was committed as consequence, or on the
occasion, of the robbery, all of the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they
actually participated in the killing (People vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5; People vs. Puno, L-31594, April 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 659, 663).
Generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven. all those who had taken part int the robbery
are guilty of the special complex crime unless it appears that they endoevored to prevent the
homicide (U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1). tha same rule is followed is Spanish jurisprudence.
Son resonsables de este delito (robo con homicidio) en concepto de autor no
solo todos los que cooperen a la muerte, siquiera sea con supresencia, sino
tabien todos los que intevienen en la ejecucion del robo aun cuando no temon
parte en el homicidio: (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 Edition, p. 976).
Cuestion II. Comedio un robo con violencia e intimidacion e las personas por
dos sujetos, uno de los cuales dispara un trbuco, dejando muerto en el acto a
un tercero que acude en auxilo de llos rabalos, el que no disparo sera solo
responsable del robo, o al igual que su consorte, incurrira en la pena del robo
con homicido, previsto en el numero 10 del art. 516 que comentamos?
 El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que siendo ambos procesados autores del Barredo, Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.
robo, lo son igualmentedel homicido que ocurrio en el ultimo delito esta de tal Fernando (Chairman), J., concurs in the result.
manera enlazado con el de robo, que a no prestarselo el tercero hubiese sido
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
muerto como lo fue; y que por ambos procesados, son autores uno y otro,
segun el art. 13 del Codigo penal, y por lo lmismo responsables los dos de Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
todas las consequencias de su accion." (Sentencia de 30 de Abril de 1872; 3
Viada, Codigo Penal 347).
El propio Tribunal Supremo ha resulto; 'que si resulta probado la delincuencia
del procesado en el hecho generador, que es el robo, con ocasion del que se
cometio un homijcidio, basta esto, en conformidad a lo dispuesto en, el num.
1.º del art. 516, para conderearle tambien responsable de homicidio;
resolucion cuya justicia evidencia aun mas al parrafo segundo del art. 518, en
el que se declara que los malchechores presentes a la ejecucion de un robo
en despoblado y en cuadrilla so autores de cualquera de los atentados que
esta cometa. si on constare que procuraron impedirios. (Sentencia de 23 de
Febrero de 1872; 3 Viada, Codigo Penal, Cuarta Edicion, p. 347).
It may be added that the presence of Page in the front seat, armed with a balisong, must have
emboldened Camposano to threaten Veronica Balacapo and to cause her death with impunity.
The lower court failed to order the accused to pay the sum of P95 as the value of the things taken
by Camposano from the deceased victim.
The case of Page, a former high school student, now twenty four years old, the child of estranged
parents (he lived with his father), who, at the age of eighteen years, was implicated in robbery with
homicide, undoubtedly by reason of poverty, should ordinarily excite some sympathy and might
evoke compassionate justice.
Pressed by his lawyer to examine his conscience and to state truthfully whether he was implicated
in the holdup, Page cried and said: "Before the eyes of God, I really do not have anything to do with
it. That is why I am very sad, sir. I am being charged for a crime which I have not done. I have been
in jail. I have nothing to do with it" (19 tsn December 19, 1972).
Of course, he did not kill the victim. But, under the rules of conspiracy, he is deemed to be a co-
principal in the robbery with homicide.
He testified that he was single, However, Rosita Lareza, claiming to be his wife, and Teresita
Cordero, posing as his girl friend, filed written requests for the early disposition of his case (pp. 125
and 140, Rollo).
We have already mentioned that he was charged with theft in the municipal court but the case was
dismissed. At the time the instant case was filed in 1972, he was charged also in the municipal
court with simple robbery and two cases of robbery with murder (Criminal Cases Nos. 30000,
30001 and 30038) (p. 12, Expediente of Criminal Case No. 5396). He was also charged in Criminal
Cases Nos. 5395 and 9765 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. (See I. S. No. 73-5054 for
robbery filed in the fiscal's office at Pasig, Rizal, pp. 63, 70 and 78 of Rollo). What happened to
those cases is not shown in the record.
His behavior in prison has not been exemplary. On October 7, 1975 Page and five other prisoners
comandered the truck, which was delivering foodstuffs at the prison compound, held as hostages
the driver and the kitchen supervisor, and tried to escape. Page and four others were recaptured (p.
119, Rollo).
Page in his letter to the Chief Justice dated April 14, 1977 manifested that, inasmuch as he could
not endure the discomforts of prolonged confinement, he was amenable to be electrocuted (he was
only sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the trial court).
This is a case where considerations of leniency are out of place. The full force of retributive justice
should be brought to bear upon the accused. Many persons have been victimized in extortions or
holdups committed in buses, taxicabs and jeepneys. The court should cooperate with the agents of
the law in making these public conveyances a safe means of travel.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with slight modification that appellant should
further pay-the heirs of the victim the sum of P95 representing the value of the watch, earrings and
necklace taken from her. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1896 February 16, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA, defendant-appellant.
Felixberto B. Viray for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the following information
filed against him in the Court of First Instance of Manila:
The undersigned accuses Rafael Balmores y Caya of attempted estafa through
falsification of a security, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt acts,
to wit; by then and there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a
genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real
unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left
side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said
number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
draw last June 29, 1947, and presenting the said ticket so falsified on said date,
September 22, 1947, in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of
exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number has won, fraudulently
pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket
is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said
ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29, 1947, but the
said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the
crime of estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some
causes other than this spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to
whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was falsified and
immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said
accused right then and there.
Contrary to law.
(Sgd.) LORENZO RELOVA
Assistant City Fiscal
and was sentenced by Judge Emilio Pena to suffer not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor and not more than 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, and to pay a fine of P100 and
the costs.
From that sentence he appealed to this court, contending (1) that the facts and (2) that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of guilty because, being illiterate, he was not
assisted by counsel.
In support of the first contention, counsel for the appellant argues that there could be so could be
no genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket for the June 29, 1947, draw; that this
court has judicial notice that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office issued only four 1/4 units for
each ticket for the said draw of June 29, 1947; that the information does not show that the true and
real unidentified number of the ticket alleged to have been torn was not and could not be 074000;
that the substitution and writing in ink of the said number 074000 was not falsification where the
true and real number of the ticket so torn was 074000.
This contention is based on assumption not borne out by the record. The ticket alleged to have
been falsified is before us and it appears to be a 1/8 unit. We cannot take judicial notice of what is
not of common knowledge. If relevant, should have been proved. But if it is true that the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office did not issue 1/8 but only 1/4 units of tickets for the June 29, 1947,
draw, that would only strengthen the theory of the prosecution that the 1/8 unit of a ticket which
appellant presented to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office was spurious. The assumption
that the true and real unidentified number of the ticket alleged to have been torn was the winning
number 074000, is likewise not supported by the record. The information to which appellant
pleaded guilty alleged that the appellant removed the true and real unidentified number of the ticket
and substituted and wrote in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number
074000. It is obvious that there would have been no need of removal and substitution if the original
number on the ticket was the same as that which appellant wrote in ink in lieu thereof.P
The second contention appears to be based on a correct premises but wrong conclusion. The fact
that appellant was illiterate did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction assisted by counsel. The
decision expressly states that appellant waived the right to be assisted by counsel, and we know of
no law against such waiver.
It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as
that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of
the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in
relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly
was not punishable but is now under article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following: (1)
When one tries to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic
when in fact it is common salt; and (2) when one tries to murder a corpse. (Guevara, Commentaries
on the Revised Penal Code, 4th ed., page 15; decision, Supreme Court of Spain, November 26,
1879; 12 Jur. Crim., 343.) Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not
prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of
estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not
exercised due care.
The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of "treasury or bank notes or
certificates or other obligations and securities" is reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a
fine not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an
obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. This being a complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Philippines, the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period in accordance with article 48. Taking into consideration
the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to
12 years. It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone
and would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-
winning number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit
estafa (punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer
for the serious crime of falsification of a government obligation. We realize that the penalty is too
severe, considering all the circumstances of the case, but we have no discretion to impose a lower
penalty than authorized by law. The exercise of clemency and not in this court.
We are constrained to affirm the sentence appealed from, with costs against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and
asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya
that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room.
It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that
before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially
Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner
seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible
crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible.
Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.
Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent
pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to
a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void
in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that
the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality,
and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically
possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts
did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by
the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which
were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate,
would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to
punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or
(2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the
act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There
must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the
man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed
to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the
accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be.
It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to
achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined
where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an
attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that
where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of
an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are
unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him
liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became
impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the
murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it
becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside
interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to
commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the
 case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
of the party. impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit: Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended
requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be
out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
committed. accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. attempted and frustrated felonies.
The court convicted the accused of attempted murder. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and
American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes. degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes
and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal costs.
Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes SO ORDERED.
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability
for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters
into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without
knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without
the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the
transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the
accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of
the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as
suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the
overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes
did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility
until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will
not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to
commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore,
that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the
other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held
liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is
that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes
impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December
16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution 2 dated
March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the
crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC.,
herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the
aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No.
0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer
Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid
stated amount of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the
events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of
₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land
Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of
petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted
to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the
checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to
make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also
received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the
bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia,
because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor
and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to
ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the
cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline
Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner
of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed
handed petitioner a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner
also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. 5 Verification from company
records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby
Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his
bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman
arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted
with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the
woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked
out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco
were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to
Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then
holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to
proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push
through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was
only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went
on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of
Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she
actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her
by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each
to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who
had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft
against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following
scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997,
but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before
her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca
came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany
her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the
Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in
their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why
Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino,
and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested
them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the
morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could
accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do
so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino
resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother,
rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they
arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten
minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even
asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y
Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto
mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner
Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision
and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the
crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector
for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and, instead,
appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby
Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain
– this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was
deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s
consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's
customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things – the check was voluntarily
handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6)
it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of
payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused
is to gain from the thing stolen.This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides
that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on
whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59,
both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime.
Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
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2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means
employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense
has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not
produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to
produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or
(2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the
act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must
be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
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The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e.,
a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but
gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof,
which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value
of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the ₱5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held
in Valenzuela v. People12 that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
"there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal
property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of]
personal property of another without the latter’s consent."
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x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position
that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from
such acts of execution. x x x
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x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the ₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for
the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was
hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is
not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash
by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was
not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment
on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that
fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in
Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice