Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
POLITICAL LAW
THE CONSTITUTION
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[Quisumbing])
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat
petitioners-contractors’ right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted
benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors’ honest toil
and labor.
Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant
case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the
Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
Respondent’s argument is misplaced inasmuch as the principle of State immunity finds
no application in the case before us.
Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, considering
that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not
absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances.
Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which
shields the state from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of
Cebu that “the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.” It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the State’s
immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this
Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the
instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to
uphold, in this particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court – as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare –
cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility
against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly
compensated – on the basis of quantum meruit – for construction done on the public works
nd
housing project. (EPG Construction Co. v. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566, Mar.16, 2001, 2 Div.
[Buena])
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PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
X x x
Procedural Issue
X x x
Academic Freedom
Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. (Sec. 5[2], Art.
XIV, 1987 Constitution)
1. Legislative Scrutiny
2. Legislative Investigation
3. Legislative Supervision
Congressional Investigations
Senate v. Ermita
X x x
More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim
appointment is permanent in character. In Summers v. Ozaeta, decided on October 25, 1948,
we held that:
Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the
President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that
Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain
the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar v. Court of
Appeals, where the Court stated:
“We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is
temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the
appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private
respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation
as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s appointment as Executive
Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment
is synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any
time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent appointment but their
terms are only until the Board disapproves them.”
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment
a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional
protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.” (Section 2[3], Article IX-B of the Constitution) Thus, an ad
interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office. X x x Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is
protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause,
after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process. (Matibag v.
Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
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Held:
“X x x
X x x
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Police Power
Held:
X x x
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X x x
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Abdula v. Guiani
Valmonte v. De Villa
People v. Doria
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
espondents
R (COMELEC officials) cite the
Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not
have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
X x x
X x x
No law. . .
X x x
X x x
X x x
Freedom of Assembly
Freedom Parks
Freedom of Religion
Held:
Div. [Kapunan])
[Panganiban])
[Mendoza])
“X x x
CITIZENSHIP
Natural-born Citizens
X x x
Held:
Naturalization
[Callejo, Sr.])
Flores v. Drilon
Caveat:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office; and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
Preventive Suspension
Div. [Carpio-Morales])
The Doctrine of Condonation
The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is
Caveat:
This Doctrine of Condonation was abandoned by the Supreme Court in the more recent
case of Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), GR Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe). However, the abandonment of the doctrine
was given prospective application only.
X x x
X x x
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision
promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the
context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with
respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public
office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935
Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office
is Section 2, Article II which states that “[t]he defense of
the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service.” Perhaps owing to
the 1935 Constitution’s silence on public accountability,
and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the
matter, as well as the variance in the policy
considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting
the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine
that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the
approach in dealing with public officers underwent a
significant change. The new charter introduced an entire
article on accountability of public officers, found in Article
XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized,
acknowledged, and declared that “[p]ublic office is a
public trust.” Accordingly, “[p]ublic officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of
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ELECTION LAWS
Held:
Makalintal v. COMELEC
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Autonomous Regions
Held:
X x x
The State
Territory of States
Refugees
These are:
Background Information
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