.R. No.

204419, November 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO, SR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN AND JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y
TALOZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA,** J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court dated November 12, 2012 of
petitioner People of the Philippines as represented by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B.
Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and set aside the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan)
Joint Resolution1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private
respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.

The facts follow.

On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant
No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows:
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath SPO1 RONEL P. SATURNO
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

of the Regional Intelligence Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the
applicant herein, and his witness that there is probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A. 9165
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is being committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri, Cagayan
has in his possession or control the following items, to wit:

SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS you are hereby ordered to make an immediate search
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

at any time of the day or night but preferably at daytime at the afore-stated residential place of JEOFREY JIL
RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-described items
to immediately bring him, thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at Gattaran, Cagayan.2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was conducted by elements of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one
(1) sachet containing residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private
respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional
Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the test gave
positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3 chan robles law

Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent Rabino for violation of
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and within, the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal authority thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody one
(1) big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance, one sachet with traces of said substance gave POSITIVE results to the tests for
the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as Shabu, a dangerous drag, while the
other sachet gave negative results to said tests, the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is
prohibited for any person to possess or use any dangerous drug regardless of the quality of the purity
thereof, unless authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan,
presided by respondent Judge Castillo.

Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent Rabino filed a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence with the following grounds: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched; No
compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant

xxxx

No probable cause to issue Search Warrant

xxxx

No searching question elicited from deponent

x xx x

No particularity in the places to be searched

xxxx

Irregularity in the implementation of the search

x x xx

Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper5 chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry

The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint Resolution dated May 14,
2012, which partly reads as follows: ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, which
penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and
void. [Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds relied upon by the accused to buttress
his motion and the opposition interposed by the public prosecutor are deemed mere surplusage.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered
QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of Search Warrant No. 45 are likewise
ordered SUPPRESSED. There being no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the above-
captioned cases are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.6 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its Joint Order7 dated
September 24, 2012.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent Judge Castillo with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is patently erroneous. It is respectfully
submitted that the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue Search Warrant No.
45 earlier mentioned to search and seize the shabu stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within
the same second judicial region in violation of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power to hear
and try the offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated January 25, 2016, claims that the petition
was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also argues that the petition should have been
filed by the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Carlos B, Sagucio. Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition does not show that the
assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

This Court finds merit to the petition.

Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the petition, certain procedural
issues have been pointed out by private respondent that need to be tackled. According to the private
respondent, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck
down as it violates the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Private respondent further argues that petitioner did
not provide any compelling reason that would merit the direct filing with this Court of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. It is also averred that the petition should have been filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and not the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor because the petition is in the nature of an
appeal and the former is vested with the power of representing the people before any court.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding.9 Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross.10 On the other hand, a remedy is considered "plain, speedy and
adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment the acts of the
lower court or agency.11 Its principal office is only to the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.12
chan roble slaw

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in questioning the quashal
of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered
the said quashal. In his allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts
authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the search warrant was
patently and grossly done. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse to this Court13 or to the
Court of Appeals14 via a special civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search
warrant.15 The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. Howevever, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by petitioner
involves an application of a rule promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under
the Constitution17 regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, this Court
deems it proper to resolve the present petition.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be relaxed in the interest of
justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and
lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.18 It is a far better and
more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the
case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to
the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if
not a miscarriage of justice.19 In certain cases, this Court even allowed private complainants to file petitions
for certiorari and considered the said petitions as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. In United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 this Court ruled that an exception exists to the general rule that the proper party
to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant
proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, thus: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse
order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG.
However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private
corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one
filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in
lieu of the OSG: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is
that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed
by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the
Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned
order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases,
the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition,
considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.21 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private complainants and deemed
them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, there is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant
involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides: ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn
or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based
on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not
those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant.23 chanrobleslaw

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search wan-ant and eventually dismissed the case
based merely on the fact that the seerch warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding
from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the private
respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be
remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the
Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where
the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan
has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the
application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the
search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application
after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant
must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has
jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action
has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated November 12, 2012, of
petitioner People of the Philippines is GRANTED. Consequently, the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued by
the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 11-
10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor

FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN,
MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and
MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of
the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.[1] Said judgment dismissed the Peoples
petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch 80
of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28,
1996 denying the Peoples motion for reconsideration.[3] Those orders were handed down
in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives after the accused
had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the
Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano
I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on
December 15, 1995,[4]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court
within five (5) days to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner
considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search
Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set
out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for
search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and
explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay
Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068
(95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at
Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail Variety Store resulting in
the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches,
pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags
including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US
$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The
sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order
of the court on respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are
one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type
and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in
the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4)
gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients
for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a
return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers
and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There
was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged; ** and on the same date, submitted
their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to
Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated
comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular
inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent
Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the
order dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1
which is adjacent to the Abigails Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building as
it is correspondingly called only Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and 4;
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety
Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own
respective doors used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the
Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant **;[5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant
motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order
quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the
motion for reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the
motion for reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
 Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred
to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the
Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11,
1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:[6]
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial
Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected
to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30,
1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners)
were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit and adjacent
to, Abigails Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge
Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant, actually
depicted the particular place to be searched -- was effectively confuted
by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH was not dated,
not signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the
Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead **
directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in the
Order ** dated December 15, 1995 -- this, too, being the address given
in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995
requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team
Leader. The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the
Peoples admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth not attached to the
application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for
reconsideration.[7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of
Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:[8]
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from
the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason
why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco
Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED,
CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and
who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to
OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say in TAGALOG with Honorable
Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words KATABI, or
KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
 papasukin namin or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking
POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to
WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS RESIDE or ADJACENT or
BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they
are going to raid.**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of
the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the
living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the
law.[9]
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required
by the warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from
service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[10]
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash
search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the
Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court
or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search
warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search
warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has
the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent
Judge, in light of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not
the special civil aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the
Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be
searched;
 2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to
the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a
substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at
bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule; and
6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove
the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly
resolved without informing petitioner thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant
was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then
actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been
specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC
for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. It claims tha tone of said officers, infact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of
four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the
same police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had
personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to make a
sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but
unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the
warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search
warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of
the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended,
they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the
Judge reproduced in the search warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt
1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And
the scope of the search was made more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges
admonition in the warrant that the search be limited only to the premises herein described.
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5)
distinct places in the area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety Store, and four
(4) separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single
structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors
through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of
the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its
individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5)
places, but only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that
immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration
of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge
Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having
received the warrant -- which directs that the search be limited only to the premises herein
described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding the apartment units at
the rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem
to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly
indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla
in support of their application -- was sufficient particularization of the general identification
of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v.
Chief of Staff, AFP,[11] allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior knowledge
as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity
in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon
perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said
case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at No.
19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82
[b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because both search warrants apparently
indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where
the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this
Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that
the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact
that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that
in fact the address, 784 Units C&D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the
second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the obviously
typographical error, the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the
official court file.[12]
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious
typographical erro involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in
Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity
identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was
immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there
is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising
from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that
the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair
nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant
on the claim that the place actually searched -- although not that specified in the warrant
-- is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated
in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment
units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in
support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in
the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant to officers
executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed
from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may
properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge
Bacallas finding of probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A perusal of the
record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out
inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant
itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. [13] In
Judge Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in
doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was
founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable
cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be
conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant -- which,
of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof -- was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that
what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that
stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly
issued as regards Abigails Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 -- the first
of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which
the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:[14]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
 or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be serched, and the things to be
seized.,
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable
cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention being that the search be
confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that
a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained
in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.[16]
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points
sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch
of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be
searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was
diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals
had improperly refused to receive evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied
opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special civil action
of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of
these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and
seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is different
from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that
anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge,
and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office opines that
where a search warrant has been issued by the court other than the one trying the main
criminal case, the proper recourse of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it
before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject
of the warrant is afterwards filed.[17] In support, it cites the second of five (5) policy
guidelines laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[18] concerning possible
conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the
criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court
for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case.
Said second guideline reads:[19]
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the
main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without
 prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, other
they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced
in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed
for the first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal
action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first
taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings
thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-
shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a
search warrant and a motion to supress evidence are alternative and
not cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be
raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the
court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appopriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other
hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed
in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash
the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise
contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was
ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC
that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case
thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court
must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of
September 11, 1996 -- which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996
and May 28, 1996 in the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out in the
foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA
ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on
our society, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in
apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently,
drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act. The information reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and
five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos. [1]

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto

Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo
City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found
the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following
day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt.
Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the
afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline
station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello,
P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the
other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters
BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at
around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got
off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who was
then carrying a travelling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa
about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a
plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-
appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt
of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a
Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above
technical report, the prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging
the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-
appellants constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as
their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court
ruling on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility
in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As
expected, her version of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She
claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice
Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road,
an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the
road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to
the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the
identity of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found
after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was
shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a
Comment and/or Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence
contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product
of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and
five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in
violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. [2]

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a
warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the
requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be
specifically designated and described.

2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for
by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason
that the same would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest
of accused-appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet
the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.

These submissions are impressed with merit.

In People v. Ramos, this Court held that a search may be conducted by
[3]

law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge
as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all

searches and seizures as it operates only against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one
sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time
prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are
normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by
the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand
the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to
issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. [4]

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and

seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced
in Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III,
[5]

Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:

Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude
indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the
person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an
impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests
and other forms of restraint. [6]
 Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or
allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and
would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication
yet often violated. [7]

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;[9]

6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for
law enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and
more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and
seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise
refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. [12]

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average

man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies
on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance.
The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause
relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being
connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to
be searched. [13]

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for

probable cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized
could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person
arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has
become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure.
In People v. Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers, police
[14]

officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in

San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors
and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At
9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling
bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to
open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified
themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night
of his arrest.
 In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from
their informant regarding Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were
confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the
Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business
address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations
and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that
Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication
that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt, the Narcom agents received reports
[15]

that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant,
especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily
ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers
conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to
deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search
without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In
present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a
search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta
was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving
vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement.Aruta, on the
other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop
[16]

and search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view
of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search
accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is
admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as
this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers
erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search
warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, the policemen conducted
[17]

a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that

drug addicts were roaming therein.Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon
a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
manner.Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to
resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana.The Court held that
the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine
if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with
the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became
the bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional
factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the
information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless
searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of
probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have
been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law
enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that
a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988
and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988,
accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag
even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The
law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her
travelling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they
found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received
information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be
arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle
was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had
received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant
first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought
before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from
Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise
received confidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from
their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on
board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of
probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of
1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The
failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating
Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed
with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure
of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly
arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

xxx xxx xxx.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither

was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-
appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger
of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there
was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the
Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was
there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable
cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to
effect a warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no
probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully
arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows
that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a
lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the
articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to
Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken,
and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such
search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. [18]

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin where, [19]

this Court observed that:

x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless

arrest, the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag would also not be
justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the second exception. The
marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that
the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to
ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified
as a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in
the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of
the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao, applied the stop and frisk principle which has been
[20]

adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals. In said case, Solayao attempted to

[21]

flee when he and his companions were accosted by government agents. In the
instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused
the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk
accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-
appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter
identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity
of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-
appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized
under exigent and emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De
Gracia. In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was
[22]

being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance

team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated
requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the
building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder
prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was
being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless
search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless
search and seizure would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the
warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The
Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to
search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui where this Court ruled:
[23]

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or
premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt.
Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what
happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her
with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag
she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
 A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside. [24]
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the
Malasugui case is inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was
probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful. On the contrary, the
[25]

most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is

wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and
illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was
likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-
appellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein
accused-appellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not
be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the
unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v.
Encinada, where this Court held:
[26]

[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing
the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right
against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonias testimony.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that
he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will

validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on
the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias
search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken
as consent to such search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted
irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely
on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)
 Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount
to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search. As this Court held in People v. Barros: [27]

x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search

conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object-

x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion
Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to
the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.[28] (Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to

relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng, where [29]

prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:

PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.
Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).
Q - When he said that, what did you do?
A - We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?
 A - He said you can see it.
Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?
A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that
was contained in the bag.
Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and
showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it
was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)

In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search

which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would
be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance
of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the
Court. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to
have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with
Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General
next argues that the police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing
a search warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellants name was
known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in
the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within
which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to
limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in
the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made. [30]

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have
secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the
Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized
and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained
to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be
accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely
positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload
their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search
warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this
Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible. (Emphasis supplied)
[31]

While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by

actively participating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have
waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:

1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea
of not guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the
courts jurisdiction.[32]The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of
the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does
not extend this far.

2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible

upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-
appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecutions
Formal Offer of Evidence.

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros, which stated:[33]

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid

warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused
person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest,
or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for
and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning
the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a
preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter
necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that the
Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility
of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and
seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In
the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to
the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were
formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellants
objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and
that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises
can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis
supplied)

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure
a search warrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do
so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous
tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-
exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. [34]

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure
may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most
jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based
on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. [35]

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government. [36]

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay
for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself. [37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For
lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal
grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN
MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22,
1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality
of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and
deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered
prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the public interest. [1]

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not
guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held
on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the
trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on
appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay
the costs of the proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at
around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both
members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in
Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28
marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks
had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the
arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them
the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said
informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias
from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer
who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a
passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He
claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he
traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any
luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier
offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return
to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting
and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite,
he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of
the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's
testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a
supervisor,[5] although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document to
prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was
legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective
and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the
factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower court on
the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and
its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in
nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the
basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried
marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of
Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is
supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's
fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a vital
personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting
testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof,
as amended, is as follows:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
some of the various modes of commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section
4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to
other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus
be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination
thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching
in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the
transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered,
delivered, and transported marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an offense which
may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment
would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes
specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the
information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness. [7] In appellant's case,
the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from
Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had
already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations
must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer
should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his
presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him. These
assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of
appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was
justified and cannot be faulted as error.
For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial
court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had
personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by
the prosecution,[8] more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of
law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal
presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the
need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses,
and not for the defense to dictate that course.[10] Finally, appellant could very well have
resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before
the court below,[11] but which remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course
of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to
the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police
authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending
arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the
requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and
seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once
again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
said constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionaryrule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs
searches;[13] (2) searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[15] (4) consented searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and
(6) "stop and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay
Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20,
1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside
the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and
not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search
warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do
not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject
of the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know
to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there
would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's
arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs
were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being brought
by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly
applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court
that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on
which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity
for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the
coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural
areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the
possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip
regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to
reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time
when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how
he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for,
as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source
in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and
passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly
and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-
offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the
courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies,
it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of
the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant
invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the
consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that
provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the
arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.[19] On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the
instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).[20] These instances have been
applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional
view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must
be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man
to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure
for the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless
arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and
jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or
quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even
in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept, probable
cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of
facts warranting the proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state of facts found to
exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent
man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime. [24]
 Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at
least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which
provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the
fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. [25] It has the
same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is,
that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a
probable cause exists."[26] It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect
a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the
informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him
from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was
carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply
carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly,
they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to
open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and
readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs,
so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to
their headquarters for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a
carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since
that is normal.But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being
illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from
view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion
since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in
appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd
under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the
risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the
point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts,
it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and
the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the
evidence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves
as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that
they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling
bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that
the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily
submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be
waived either expressly or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the
accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search
but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the law, [28] the case
of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative
acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so,
which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. [29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally,
properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated
from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in
court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized
from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that the
prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks
of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were
contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper
safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for
examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs
taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1
Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of
the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where
he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the
veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than
that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio
City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the
marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for
transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming
that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could
possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438[30] which defines certain
rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties
of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding
penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower
court will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed
anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature
of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would
otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt
of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and
object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on
appellant. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous
Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied
if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams
or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said
penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of
Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a
quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous
drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall
be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a
conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code,[31]the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was
also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty
where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph
of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause
of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. [32] While the
minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts
do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the
imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either of
such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties
in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor victim nor
a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-
appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Martinez, JJ, concur.
Melo, and Puno, JJ., join Panganiban J., separate opinion.
 Vitug, J., concur but reserve his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search of
appellant as his incidental to a lawful arrest.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186529

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,
Appellant. August 3, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Joint
Decision[3] dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the
transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of
member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence
group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the
appellant.[4] The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed
him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime
of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the
same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having
alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that
would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of
carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out
his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when
opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.[5]

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera
who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[6]

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the
same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero
one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
as Shabu, a regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities
to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
 That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler,
Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully
transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without
any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to
visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the
charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van,
blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze
Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for
investigation.[9]

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[10] convicting appellant of

Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the
charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision.[11]

Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately
after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the
legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He
questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the
fruit of the poisonous tree.

The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings
when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the case.[13]

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure
of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is
noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by
the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence
against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon
by the trial and appellate courts.

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not
raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the
case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in
keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed
innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[14]

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his
arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search
is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue.
Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case,
we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal. [15]
 As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for
us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband
was lawful.[16]

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17] Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in plain view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure

is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he
was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime
in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing
with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the warrantless search was
considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the

arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.[21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether
the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.[22]

The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates

a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of
the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00
a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus
arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he
was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants
pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug.[23] The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a

warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another
question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to
effect a valid warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.[24] We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
 The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v.
Tudtud,[26] and People v. Nuevas.[27]

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large
volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed
themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus
positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two
females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the
woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team
approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her
bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found
to contain dried marijuana leaves.[28]

The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a
certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for
the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence
Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned
that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset
informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that
day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers
approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which
yielded marijuana leaves.[29]
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male
person, more or less 54 in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper
right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of
marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal
drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag.
The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers.
Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape
charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery
of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo
Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as
police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the
contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.[30]

In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely

because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of
some overt act indicative of the criminal design.

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or
about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from
the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers
to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime.
Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have
been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the
sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud,these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v.
Lising,[34] People v. Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would
indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except
in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches.[38]
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them
to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio
Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the tipped information
on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants
physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be
there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply
for a warrant.[39]

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2)
of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on

the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of
appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his
active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A
waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.[40]

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41]

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have

no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on
the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges
may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the
methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-
breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the
more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the
efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate
care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly,
the end never justifies the means.[42]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated

May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
 The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to
inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within
ten (10) days from notice.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to
serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the
purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document
and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of
suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25,
1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1-
a"—another plastic container; "C"—Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings:
Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of
accused with Pat. Daniel Obiña and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"—
Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obiña, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"—date of of the request; "L"—Certificate of Field Test dated July 22,
1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses
of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obiño, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco,
Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.

Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of
1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task
Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana
submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a
marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").

The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981
(Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination,
the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer
chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo
Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.

The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obiña
testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He
was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then
was among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and
apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-
NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in
Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His
family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second
seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same
bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven
buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of
the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her
he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana
inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at
home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right
hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obiña, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana
weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with
Pat. Obiña and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified
photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness
was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs.
"B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and
pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and
time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The
marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.

To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented
the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs.
"F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because
as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981

and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for
medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic
bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside
her seat. Witness Obiña became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus
stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers
inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to
settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had
to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine
that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside
the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the
bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981,
he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty
Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obiña arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obiña reported to him that he apprehended Anita
Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic
wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness
Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obiña
which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date
which was placed by Pat. Obiña after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected
marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he
interviewed apprehending officer Obiña and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl.
Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obiña (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on
a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused
whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused.
Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified
by Pat. Obiña, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat.
Obiña and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.

Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East
Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was
stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he
was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a
kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted
a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").

In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can
be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag
of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago,
the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.

The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo
City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to
the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty
was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.

He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City
along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obiña alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obiña he approached
him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obiña told him he apprehended a
certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus.
Pat. Obiña then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with
her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while
Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle
to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and
he was there when Pat. Obiña reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the
woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the
Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the
taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obiña in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana
when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not
 well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and
bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri
bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obiña,
(Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.

While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to
Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery
of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-
21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature,
stands for Daniel Obiña. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution
rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)

Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE

OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.

II

CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF

THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.

III

APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS

WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.

The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.

The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is
unknown.

This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.

The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being
an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of

policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De
La Cruz, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same
evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June
25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed
to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three
kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who testified
that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this
finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the
marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been
any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a
result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the
other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he
said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that
he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-
appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his
release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the

coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days

before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of

Idel Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of

information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo

with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was

coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was

mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?
 A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?

A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject
to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited
drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to

as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a
late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
Plate number AVC 902.1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set
up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed
that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his
lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.3 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
 imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.

SO ORDERED.4

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed
inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.