G.R. No.

150723 July 11, 2006

MANABAN vs. CA

Facts :

- Joselito Bautista, who was a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who
complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center.

- The doctors prescribed certain medicines to be purchased. Bautista then proceeded to the BPI
Kalayaan Branch to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM). Bautista was
allegedly intoxicated. When Bautista could not withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding the
machine. Hence, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached Bautista.

- Bautista said that the machine captured his card and that he did not get the money he badly needed.
Manaban said that the PIN entered was incorrect that is why the card was captured. Bautista
continued raging and striking the machine.

- Failing to pacify the victim, petitioner fired a warning shot. Bautista confronted Manaban. Manaban
then fired another shot, which fatally hit Bautista.

- Manaban claimed that he acted in self defense. Manaban said that he feared that Bautista would pull
his gun first and might kill him so he fired his gun and shot Bautista.

- The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. This
decision was later affirmed by the Court of

Issue: Is the act of Manaban meritorious of self-defense?

Held: No. Ramonito Manaban did not act in self defense; Manaban is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homiciderties

Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-
defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending
himself. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense. Self-defense is founded on the
necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. Thus,
without prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical
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injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
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aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to
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cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which
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puts the defendant’s life in real peril.

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 In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at
the back as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was
still inside a locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban,
Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances clearly belie
Manaban’s claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part.

The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at
Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when
the latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering that
Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a
policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to draw his gun
which was still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that
Bautista was about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by
shooting his arm or leg considering that Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at Bautista.

Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril
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sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent such actual or imminent peril to
one’s life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries
on another.

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G.R. No. 107874 August 4, 1994

PEOPLE vs. DECENA

Facts

Testimony-Side of the victim: Witness: Daughter and Wife

- On Christmas Day of 1990, Luzviminda Ballesteros, a 14-year old daughter of the victim, i., was
playing with her siblings at home. when her mother, Teresita Ballesteros, asked her to fetch her
father, Jaime Ballesteros, who was then watching a game in the basketball court.
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- On her way to the hardcourt, Luzviminda met her father walking home in an intoxicated state.
Suddenly, she saw George Decena rushing towards her father and stabbed him with a long
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bladed weapon. The victim was declared dead on arrival in the hospital.

Testimony-Side of the Accused (Witness: Relatives)

Jaime Ballesteros went around the basketball court, walking in a wobbly manner due to
drunkenness and for no reason, he held the Decena by the neck with one arm and, at the same
time, poking a fork against it with the other arm. BarangayTanod Romeo who was also on the
court intervened, then advised Decena to go home. Decena left and was followed later by Jaime.
Jaime then attached Decena with a balisong but Decena was able to parry the stabbing blow and
a struggle ensued between them. Decena overpowered Jaime and succeeded in twisting the
wrist of the victim and thrusting the knife into the latter's body.

Trial court convicted Decena of murder.

Issue: Whether or not appellant acted in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros?

Held: No. The case is not a self- defense. Decena is guilty of homicide

The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there was an unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. It must be positively shown that there was a previous
unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict
more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said
attack.

Long has it been accepted that for the right of defense to exist, it is necessary that one be assaulted or
that he be attacked, or at least that he be threatened with an attack in an immediate manner, as, for
example, brandishing a knife with which to stab him or pointing a gun to be discharged against him. So
indispensable is unlawful aggression in self-defense that, without it, there is no occasion to speak of the
other two requisites for such a defense because both circumstances presuppose an unlawful aggression.

The theory of the defense is that the unlawful aggression started in the basketball court, when the victim
tried to poke a fork on the neck of appellant, and continued thereafter. Even on the elementary rule that

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when the aggressor leaves, the unlawful aggression ceases, it follows that when appellant and Jaime
heeded the advice of the barangay tanod for them to go home, the unlawful aggression had ended.
Consequently, since unlawful aggression no longer existed, appellant had no right whatsoever to kill or
even wound the former aggressor. The supposed continuation of the unlawful aggression which could
have justified self-defense would have been the circumstance that Jaime persisted in his design to attack
appellant while the latter was already in front of his house. This fact, however, the defense ruefully failed
to establish.

It is an old but a respected and consistent rule that courts must determine by a balance of probabilities
who of the participants in a fight had, in the natural order of things, the reason to commence the
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aggression. When appellant claimed that Jaime suddenly and without any provocation tried to strangle
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him and poked a fork against his neck, in front of so many people in the basketball court, then he must
necessarily have been deeply offended, if not insulted, and this fact undoubtedly fired him with a desire to
get even with the deceased.

The case at bar calls to mind the scenario and logical view that when a person had inflicted slight physical
injuries on another, without any intention to inflict other injuries, and the latter attacked the former, the one
making the attack was an unlawful aggressor. The attack made was evidently a retaliation. And, we find
this an opportune occasion to emphasize that retaliation is different from an act of self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused
attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or
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disabled by the person making a defense. We find these observations apropos to the situation
presented by the instant case.

SC rejected the trial court's holding that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. Any
circumstance which would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.
Here, the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated, for none of the prosecution's
arguments can uphold its allegation that, in the language of the law, appellant committed the crime by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tended directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
It is true that the attack was sudden, but that fact per se does not bespeak the circumstance of alevosia.

https://www.scribd.com/document/357593661/Justifying-Circumstances-Case-Digests

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SENOJA v. PEOPLE

Case: Petition for review on certiorari of the CA Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision.

Facts:

-On April 16, 1997, Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin in
the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora.

-Suddenly, an angry Leon Lumasac arrived holding a bolo and looking for his brother Miguel.

-They tried to pacify Leon but when Senoja approached him, Leon tried to hack him with the bolo. They
then reconciled.

-Leon walked out of the hut followed by Senoja. About 10 meters from the hut, Senoja stabbed Leon at
the back. He continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground, causing Leon's death.

-An Information was filed charging Senoja of homicide.

-Senoja admitted the killing but invoked the defense of self-defense with his own version of the incident.

-RTC charged him with homicide.

-Senoja appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue: W/N the self-defense can be invoked by Senoja in the case at bar.

Ruling:

No. In ruling, the SC mentioned Par. 1 of Art. 11 of the RPC.

Further, it states that the right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The right begins
where necessity does, and ends where it ends. There is, however, a perceptible difference between
necessity and self-defense, which is that, self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies
the invasion of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should be a defense against a present
unlawful attack.

Self-defense is an act to save life; hence, it is right and not a crime. There is a need for one, indeed, for it
is a natural right for one to defend oneself when confronted by an unlawful aggression by another. It is a
settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his

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life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Absent
such an actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is nothing to repel; there is no necessity to take
the life or inflict injuries on another.

But then what is the standard to use to determine whether the person defending himself is confronted by
a real and imminent peril to his life or limb? We rule that the test should be: does the person invoking the
defense believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? After all, the rule of law
founded on justice and reason: Actus no facit remin, nisi mens sit rea. Hence, the guilt of the accused
must depend upon the circumstances as they reasonably appear to him.

The question that must be resolved in the present case is whether or not the victim was the unlawful
aggressor as the appellant’s testimony pictures him to be. The Court rules in the negative. The victim had
already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it. There is no showing that the victim, who was
drunk, was aware that appellant was following him, or that the appellant called out to him so that he (the
victim) had to turn around and notice him. It is clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply
walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was the appellant who, smarting from
the earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him "hindi ka tatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong
mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas" repeated three times, wanted a confrontation. Appellant
stabbed or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned
around, successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim
suffered nine (9) wounds.

It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor
after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second
phase of their confrontation. It bears mentioning that appellant contradicted himself with respect for (sic)
the reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon and the second reason was that he was going
home.