2.
MORILLO v PEOPLE
A. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL
1. ISIP v PEOPLE
2. LANDBANK v BELSATA
3. ILUSORIO v BILDNER
4. NAVAJA v DE CASTRO
5. UNIONBANK v PEOPLE
B. JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
1. BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO
S. BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent MTCC Judge issued a "hold departure order" against
complainant charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pending
with his sala. This became the basis of an administrative complaint against
him for gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave
misconduct in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. AcICHD
MTCC, a first level court, under Circular No. 39-97, has no authority to
issue hold-departure orders in criminal cases, the same being lodged within
the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, second level courts.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; CIRCULAR
NO. 39-79; REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, WITH EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE "HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS"; FIRST
LEVEL COURTS LIKE MTCC, WITHOUT AUTHORITY. — Circular
No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the
said circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be issued
only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first
level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error
on the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
C. JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF
THE COMPLAINT
1. FOZ v PEOPLE
D. JURISDITION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
1. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
2. SERRANA v SANDIGANBAYAN
3. ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY
ESQUIVEL, petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents.
Matias Pangilinan Bamsale Tan Feliz Alberto Hernal Buazon & Associates
Law Offices for petitioners.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners herein are public officials; Antonio is a municipal mayor, while
Mark Anthony is a barangay captain. Acting on various charges filed against
them, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution
recommending petitioners' indictment, and thereafter, proper Informations
were filed against them in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners assailed in a
petition for certiorari the resolution of the Ombudsman and the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan cDICaS
Petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman for failure
to consider exculpatory evidence in their favor. The Court ruled that it
would not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of
investigatory and prosecutory powers without compelling reasons, as in the
case at bar. The exculpatory evidence alleged is best to be passed upon in
trial. Hence, certiorari is not the proper remedy. On the issue of jurisdiction,
the position of municipal mayor which is within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is carried over to his co-accused, the Barangay Captain.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; OMBUDSMAN;
INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY POWERS; WILL NOT BE
ORDINARILY INTERFERED WITH BY THE SUPREME COURT. —
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme
Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons
to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his
constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an
information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. Thus, in
Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, we held that: This Court, moreover, has
maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of
the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there
is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. CaDSHE
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
NOT PROPER IN THE DETERMINATION OF PROBATIVE VALUE OF
EVIDENCE. — The admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is
but a matter of evidence best addressed to the public respondents'
appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be best
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Given these
circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but
now bears stressing: . . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its
function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence
presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order.
3. POLITICAL LAW; SANDIGANBAYAN; JURISDICTION;
WHERE A CO-ACCUSED IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN. — Petitioners would have this Court review the
Sandiganbayan's exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-
78. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons
as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions
of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they
claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Petitioners' claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,
we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is
outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused
(italics supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27'
or higher" that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." Note
that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary
grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade
27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No.
24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in
petitioners' favor. IEHDAT
4. DUNCANO v SANDIGANBAYAN
E. JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN
1. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY
HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO,
STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL M.
LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners, vs.
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Fortun Narvasa & Salazar for P. Lacson and M.R.B. Aquino.
SYLLABUS
2. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ); AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. — The authority of the DOJ to
conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the
DOJ, which states: Section 1. Declaration of policy. — It is the declared
policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law agency
which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system; . . . Section 3. Powers and
Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following powers and functions: . . . (2) Investigate the commission of
crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction
system; . . . Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275,
effective April 11, 1978, provides: Section 1. Creation of the National
Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. —
There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service
under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be
composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice
and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and
City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving
violations of penal laws.
3. ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989; POWERS, FUNCTIONS
AND DUTIES. — Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.
— The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases; . . . . AHCaED
4. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; DISCUSSED. — Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary
power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of
public officers or employees. To discharge its duty effectively, the
Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features
which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies.
First and foremost, it extended independence to the Ombudsman and
insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution
provided for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the
Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born citizens, of
recognized probity and independence and must not have been candidates for
any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman
and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions,
with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of
office. They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.
Upon their cessation from office, they are prohibited from running for any
elective office in the immediately succeeding election. Finally, unlike other
investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman
fiscal autonomy. Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the
principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved
layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it
was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested
with the power to investigate complaints against a public office or officer on
its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it. It can
inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on
reports in the media and those which come to his attention through sources
other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the
Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be
required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal or
improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become
increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal expense and
difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman
of its power to investigate public officials is given preference over other
bodies.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO EXCLUSION
OF THE DOJ, ELABORATED. — Congress itself acknowledged the
significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it enacted
Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the
investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
co-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman
can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power. While
the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of
cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against
public officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a
constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive
department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman. Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the
body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming there is
concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the
conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as
an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be
viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the
investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the
complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote
an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is
not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific
charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation
immediately exposes the respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation
and expense. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before
two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who
would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body
where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a
loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is yet
another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the
two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents. Finally, the
second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public
funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, in a
duplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
2. LAZATIN v DESIERTO
3. PRESIDENTIAL ADHOC v. DESIERTO
4. CASTRO v. DELORIA
F. REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
1. ANTONINO v DESIERTO
2. DOJ v. LIWAG
G. PROCEDURE BEFORE OMBUDSMAN
1. PETER L. SESBREÑO, complainant, vs. JUDGE GLORIA B.
AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna,
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; WHEN REQUIRED. — A preliminary investigation is
required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day without regard to the fine. Thus, a preliminary investigation is
not required nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177
of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED
DIRECTLY WITH THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, IT IS MERELY
DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE TO ISSUE A
WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED EVEN AFTER
HAVING PERSONALLY EXAMINED THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS
WITNESSES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTS. — [I]f a complaint or information is filed directly with
the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in Sec. 3 (a), Rule 112
of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information.
Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused had already been arrested, and hold the latter for trial. However, the
judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead of a warrant
of arrest if he does not find it necessary to place the accused under custody.
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating
judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused even after having
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions for the determination of whether probable cause exists.
Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judge's sound judgment. Moreover,
the judge is not required to transmit the records of the case to the prosecutor
for review.
4. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN; SHALL TAKE APPROPRIATE FINAL ACTION ON
THE RESOLUTIONS IN OMBUDSMAN CASES AGAINST PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES PREPARED BY A DEPUTIZED
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR. — "[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases
against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistant
prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned
who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area
with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The
Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon, including
the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the dismissal of the
complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or
lower, or fine of not more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving
offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be
forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to
the Office of the Ombudsman."
H. POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE OVER
PROSECUTORS
1. ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER
PUNZALAN, petitioners, vs. DENCIO DELA PEÑA and ROBERT
CAGARA, respondents.
Perlas De Guzman Antonio & Herbosa Law Firm for petitioners.
Prudente M. Soller, Jr. for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent Robert Cagara filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation
against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of petitioner Rainier
Punzalan, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing
distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng
mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng
trabaho." In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged
defamatory statements. The Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan, holding that Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory
statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him.
Respondents Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department
of Justice. Then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution
modifying the Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering,
among others — (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the
charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be
downgraded to Attempted Homicide. Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and
Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed separate motions
for reconsideration. The Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of the
Informations against the movants. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied. Respondents
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered judgment granting the petition and set aside the order of
the Secretary of Justice directing the withdrawal of informations for slight
oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against
the respondents. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition. cHaADC
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals and reinstated the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
attempted homicide against the petitioners. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
"Supervision and control" includes the authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct
the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision
of subordinate officials or units. Thus, the question of whether or not to
dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor
and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice
then did not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals. The Court reiterated the settled rule that it will not
interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and
leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender.
Moreover, the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. DTEAHI
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REVISED
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
EXERCISES POWER OF DIRECT CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
OVER DECISIONS OR RESOLUTIONS OF PROSECUTORS;
QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT IS
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR
AND, ULTIMATELY, THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. —
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises
the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions
of the prosecutors. "Supervision and control" includes the authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or
modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units. In the case of
People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of
Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we declared that: A public prosecutor, by the
nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information
where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive
function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under
no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has
the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting
officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the
persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested
with discretion in the discharge of this function. Thus, the question of
whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions
of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. cDCHaS
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
DISTINGUISHED. — A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in the
judge's findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law
and fact, appeal is the remedy. Lack of jurisdiction and excess of
jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction
if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps
his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of
his jurisdiction. In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan, it was
held that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It
is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its
discretion; such abuse must be grave.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW UNLESS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN
MADE WITH GRAVE ABUSE. — The Secretary of Justice did not commit
grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. It
is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona that the Court
will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude
of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information
against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless
shown to have been made with grave abuse. SaAcHE
PART II
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (RULE 110)
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDGARDO
DIMAANO, appellant.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
Narzal B. Mallarres for appellant.
SYLLABUS
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION; WHEN SUFFICIENT; CASE AT BAR. — However, we
acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted
rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of
attempted rape. For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Notably, the complaint
upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts or
omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it
constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e.,
Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant "tr[ied] and
attempt[ed] to rape" the complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency
of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one
who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court
from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating
the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him. cDEHIC
MELBAROSE R. SASOT AND ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, and REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 1, Manila, respondents.
Michael P. Moralde for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI;
IMPROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH
AN INFORMATION; PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE GONE TO TRIAL
AND REITERATE THE SPECIAL DEFENSES CONTAINED IN THEIR
MOTION TO QUASH. — The Court has consistently held that a special
civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for
the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to
present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if
after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead,
they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in
their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in
the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for
certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH;
ALLEGED DEFECT IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE
FISCAL AND THE COMPLAINANT'S CAPACITY TO SUE
PETITIONERS ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR A MOTION TO QUASH. —
The Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the Information
filed against petitioners. For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to
quash the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused, their arguments focused on an alleged defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal, complainant's capacity to sue and
petitioners' exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair competition.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was
then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed,
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, . . . Nowhere in the
provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the
fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to
quash.
3. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF OATH IN THE COMPLAINT DOES
NOT NECESSARILY RENDER IT INVALID; WANT OF OATH IS A
MERE DEFECT OF FORM, WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT ON THE MERITS. —
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known
address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant's affidavit and
his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have
been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney
Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath
in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a
mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the
defendant on the merits.
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, petitioners, vs. HON.
MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76,
QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; REQUISITES. — To
invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction
to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. SEHTAC
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION
OF OFFENSES; INFORMATION; WHEN VALID; CASE AT BAR. — An
information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of
the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if
the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It
is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which
the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied
with.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE AMENDED AFTER THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION HAS ATTAINED FINALITY. — In
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, the Court affirming the finality of a
decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, stated: A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of
the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed a judgment
[of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied
for probation. Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to
have the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having
attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that
amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; VIOLATED WHEN
AN INFORMATION IS AMENDED BY MOTION OF THE
PROSECUTION AFTER THE ACCUSED HAD ALREADY BEEN
CONVICTED; CASE AT BAR. — The Constitution is very explicit. Article
III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that the
accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in the
stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the
prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try
again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed
under the Constitution. There is, therefore, no question that the amendment
of an information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the
accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and
violative of the rights of the accused. DSAICa
B. SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
SALUDGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
C. AMENDED INFORMATION
BONIFACIO v RTC
D. FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS A PENDING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
RAMSICAL v SANDIGANBAYAN
E. PRESCRIPTION
PANAGUITON v. DOJ
F. CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
PINOTE v AYCO
CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE (RULE 111)
A. RULE IN CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT
TIONG v BALBOA
B. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
C. DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
D. ACQUITTAL
E. SUBSTITUTION
F. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
JOSE v. SUAREZ
PELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMUNITY RURAL BANK OF GUIMBA (N. E.), INC.,
Represented by OLGA M. SAMSON, complainant, vs. Judge TOMAS
B. TALAVERA, Regional Trial Court (Branch 28), Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija, respondent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; ACTIONS OF PROSECUTORS ARE SUBJECT TO
REVIEW BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. — Inasmuch as the
Resolution of the provincial prosecutor has been affirmed by the secretary
of justice, the existence of probable cause to hold the accused for trial may
be deemed to be the finding of the secretary himself, not merely of the
prosecutor who had first investigated the case. Therefore, what the
prosecutor reviewed and overruled in the reinvestigation was not the
actuation and resolution of his predecessor, but of the secretary of justice no
less. . . . The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they are subject to
review by the secretary of justice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their actions or opinions. Consequently the secretary may direct
them to file either a motion to dismiss the case or an information against the
accused. In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision
and control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides
which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents
should be believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the
personality nor the legal authority to review or overrule the decision of the
secretary. This principle is elementary. ATcIAS
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION ON THE
GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MUST BE FILED
BEFORE RESOLUTION OF APPEAL BY THE JUSTICE SECRETARY.
— Consistent with this administrative superior-subordinate relationship
between them, Section 7 of Department Order No. 223 (the rules governing
appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations)
provides: Sec. 7. Motion for Reinvestigation. — At any time after the
appeal has been perfected and before the resolution thereof, the appellant
may file a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that new and material
evidence has been discovered which appellant could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered during the preliminary investigation and which if
produced and admitted would probably change the resolution. From the
above-quoted provision, a motion for reinvestigation on the ground of
newly discovered evidence must be filed before the justice secretary rules
on an appeal from a resolution in a preliminary investigation.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; NOT THE OCCASION FOR A FULL AND
EXHAUSTIVE DISPLAY OF THE PARTIES' EVIDENCE. — It must be
stressed here that a preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and
inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except to determine whether a crime has been committed, and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive
display of the parties' evidence, which needs to be presented only to
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
6. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANT THEREOF RESTS
SOLELY WITH THE COURT. — Settled is the legal doctrine that the
discretion to accede to a Motion to Dismiss filed by the prosecutor rests
solely with the court. Mere approval of the position taken by the
prosecution is not equivalent to the discretion required in cases like this.
The trial judge must be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused. Such a conclusion can be arrived at only after
a thorough assessment of the prosecution evidence. For a valid and proper
exercise of judicial discretion, accepting the prosecution's word that the
evidence is insufficient is not enough; strictly required of the order
disposing of the motion is the trial judge's own evaluation of such evidence.
Once a complaint or an information is filed in court, the judge — not the
prosecutor — assumes full control of the controversy. Thus, a grant of the
motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself, a subject
clearly within the court's exclusive jurisdiction and competence. ASTcEa
9. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; "PARTY" IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS; ELUCIDATED. — In criminal proceedings, the word
"party" is held to mean not only the government and the accused, but also
other persons who may be affected by the orders issued and/or judgment
rendered therein.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINANT HAD AN INTEREST IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; CASE AT BAR. —
Undoubtedly, complainant had an interest in the maintenance of the
criminal prosecution. Its right to intervene therein was practically beyond
question, as it neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or
waived the right to do so. Thus, as the party injured by the crime, it had the
right to be heard on a motion that was derogatory to its interest in the civil
aspect of the case. Due process necessitates that it be afforded this
opportunity, especially because of a conflict between the positions of the
public prosecutor and of the offended party. HSDaTC
11. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS MUST BE ACCORDED NOT ONLY
TO THE ACCUSED BUT ALSO TO THE OFFENDED PARTY. —
Respondent judge does not deny that no notice was given to complainant.
Neither was a hearing conducted before the issuance of the subject Orders.
By such failure of notice and hearing, he effectively deprived complainant
of the opportunity to appear and to oppose the said Motions. That the
offended party, not only the accused, must be accorded due process was
explained by the Court in Dimatulac v. Villon, which ruled thus: ". . .
Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his
exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but
rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the
State and offended party to due process of law. "Indeed, for justice to
prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have
been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a
triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it
could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and the offended party, on the
other."
SERAG v CA
SORIANO v PEOPLE
LEE v KBC BANK
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE
LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay
City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA
MARUYAMA, respondents.
Jesus M. Bautista for petitioner.
Aristotle T. Dominguez for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging petitioner with estafa. Finding
probable cause, the investigating prosecutor filed an Information against
petitioner. The trial court thereafter issued a warrant for her arrest.
Petitioner, however, alleged that respondent judge could not have
determined the existence of probable cause for her arrest solely on the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the undated affidavit-
complaint of Maruyama. She posited that respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying her motion for a determination of a probable
cause in her arrest. Further, she argued that she did not waive her right to
assail the infirmities in the issuance of the warrant when she posted a
personal bail bond. IECcaA
The Court affirmed the contention of petitioner. Under Section 26 of Rule
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, applicable in case at bar,
bail is not a bar to objections on illegal arrest. Thus, the Court ruled,
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it found probable cause for petitioner's arrest absent
copies of pertinent documents and evidence adduced during preliminary
investigation before the investigating prosecutor.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NOT A
BAR TO OBJECTIONS ON ILLEGAL ARREST, LACK OF OR
IRREGULAR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. — We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the
appellate court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz.: SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on
illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. — An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. It bears
stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court
that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest
on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the
ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without
express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their
effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the
petitioner's petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
ISEHTa
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO QUESTION PROBABLE
CAUSE REQUIRES SUFFICIENT PROOF OF INTENTION. —
Considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail
bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding
of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by
the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the
existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what
a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with and indicative
of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST MAY ISSUE;
PERSONAL DETERMINATION OF JUDGE ON THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE. — Before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest
under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal
determination of the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. The duty to make such determination is personal and
exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the
certification of the investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a
preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as
amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information. If the
judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause
on the basis of the records submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there
would no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the records of
the case. However, if the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted
by the investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal
of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more
evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, to
enable him to discharge his duty. The judge may even call the complainant
and his witness to themselves answer the court's probing question to
determine the existence of probable cause. The rulings of this Court in
Soliven v. Makasiar and Lim v. Felix are now embodied in Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, with modifications.
AaHDSI
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION OF PROBABLE GUILT NOT
SUFFICIENT BASIS TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST
OF ACCUSED. — Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for the
purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial. If the
investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the
Information against the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom an Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the
of the Information that from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together
ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the with the other supporting evidence of the resolution. TECcHA
accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating
prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor
may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE

ARREST OF ACCUSED; ELUCIDATED. — The task of the presiding
judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the
very start those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial. In determining the existence or non-existence
of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the RTC judge may rely on
the findings and conclusions in the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor finding probable cause for the filing of the Information. After all,
as the Court held in Webb v. De Leon, the judge just personally reviews the
initial determination of the investigating prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. However, in
determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report. The judge
should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also
the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the
counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information. The rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8 (a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that