Law on Public Officers
2. Any citizen
Law on Public Officers
What: Branch of law which deals with public office,
its creation, modification and dissolution, as well as
the eligibility of public officers, the manner of their
election or appointment and assumption of office,
their rights, duties, powers, inhibitions and liabilities
and the modes of terminating their official relations.
Constitutional Provisions
relating to Public Officers
Article 11. Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1. Re Public office
What: Public Office is a public trust.
Scope of Application: Public officers and employees.
Duty: Must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. Re Removal from office
Who: The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
Mode of removal from Office: Impeachment
Offences: Conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
Who: All other public officer and employees.
Mode of removal from Office: May be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
Section 3. Re Impeachment
Re who may promulgate rules on impeachment:
The Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section.
Re who may initiate all cases of impeachment: The
House of Representatives
As to who may file:
1. Member of the House of Representatives
How: By a verified complaint for impeachment.
Upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three sessions days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
A vote of at least one-third of all the members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
Re who may try and decide all cases of
impeachment: The Senate shall have the sole power
to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be
on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment according to law.
Prohibition: No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
Y.E.
provided by law.
1

Section 5-14. Ombudsman
Composition of the office of the Ombudsman:
1. Ombudsman or Tanodbayan
2. 1 overall Deputy Ombudsman
3. 3 Deputy Ombudsman: 1 for Luzon, 1 for
Visayas, 1 for Midanao
4. Deputy Ombudsman for military
establishments may also be appointed.
[Section 7]
Qualifications:
1. Natural born citizen
2. At least 40 years of age at the time of the
appointment.
3. Of recognize probity and independence.
4. Member of the Philippine Bar.
5. Not a candidate form any elective position
in the previous election.
N.B. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or
more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law
in the Philippines. [Section 8]
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council,
and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
thereafter.
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
NOT required. [Section 9]
Term: 7 years without reappointment. [Section 11]
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own
instance, any public official or employee of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
Law on Public Officers
3. Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official
or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating
to contracts or transactions entered into by
his office involving the disbursement or use
of public funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit
for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for
assistance and information necessary in
the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records
and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its
investigation when circumstances so
warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the cause of inefficiency, red
tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and
the observance of high standards of ethics
and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by
law.
Jurisdiction:
Disciplinary authority over all elective officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet,
Local Government, GOCCs and their subsidiaries.
Except: Officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of the Congress, and
the Judiciary.
Y.E.
2

Section 15. The right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees
Shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
Section 16.
What: No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose may be
granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-
owned or controlled bank or financial institution
Scope of Application: The President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional
Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or
entity in which they have controlling interest, during
their tenure.
Section 17.
Who: A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law.
What: Submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.
Re The President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the Armed Forces with
general or flag rank
-Declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.
Section 18.
Who: Public officers and employees
What: Owe the State and this Constitution allegiance
at all times.
Re change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure:
Shall be dealt with by law.
General Principles
Law on Public Officers
Public Office
What: The right, authority or duty, created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some
sovereign power of government to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. [Fernandez v. Sto.
Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995]
G.R. No. L-16887 November 17, 1920MIGUEL R.
CORNEJO, petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor of Rizal, and the
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, composed of ANDRES
GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGSALIN and CATALINO S.
CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:
 The petitioner in this case, the suspended
municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by
these proceedings in mandamus to have the
provincial governor and the provincial board of
the Province of Rizal temporarily restrained
from going ahead with investigation of the
charges filed against him pending resolution of
the case, and to have an order issue directed to
the provincial governor commanding him to
return the petitioner to his position as municipal
president of Pasay.
 The members of the provincial board have
interposed a demurrer based on the ground that
this court has no right to keep them from
complying with the provisions of the law.
 The provincial governor has filed an answer to
the petition, in which he alleges as a special
defense that numerous complaints have been
received by him against the conduct of Miguel
R. Cornejo, that these complaints were
investigated by him; that he came to the
conclusion that agreeable to the powers
conferred upon provincial governors, the
municipal president should be temporarily
suspended, and that an investigation is now
being conducted by the provincial board.
 Counsel for petitioner has argued, that his client
has been deprived of an office, to which he was
elected by popular vote, without having an

opportunity to be heard in his own defense.
The respondents reply that all that the provincial
governor and the provincial board have done in
Y.E.
3

this case is to comply with the requirements of
the law which they are sworn to enforce.
Issue: WON the Provincial Governor may suspend the
erring Municipal President of Pasay without due process of
law
Held: Yes, it is only fair to mention certain exceptions to the
due process of law rule, which would seem to include the
instant case.
Ratio: The fact should not be lost sight of that we are
dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a
judicial proceeding. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an
administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of
contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not
essential to due process of law.
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of
law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office
as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United
States, that a public office is not property within the sense
of the constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is
a public trust or agency.
The basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as
in the United States, is that of a popular representative
government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers
of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where
every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of
the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom
he represents.
"Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the
person suspended."
(1) The suspension of an officer pending his trial for
misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the time being, seems
to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary.
Justification: Suspension does not remove the officer, but
merely prevents him, for the time being, from performing
the functions of his office; and from the very necessities of
the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary
suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance
with the analogies of the law.
(2) Notice and hearing are not prerequisite to suspension
unless required by statute and therefore suspension
without such notice does not deprive the officer of
property without due process of law. Nor is a suspension
wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the laws because the evidence against the
Law on Public Officers
officer is not produced and he is not given an opportunity
to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses.
Justification: Griner vs.Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16
Ann. Cas., 944). The holding of the court here was that it is
within the power of the legislature to authorize the
temporary suspension of a public officer during the
pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer and
as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the
fact that the constitution has given power to remove such
officer only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and
hearing are not prerequisites to the suspension of a public
officer under a statute which does not provide for such
notice and hearing.
Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that
the provisions of section 2188 of the Administrative Code
are clear and that they do not offend the due process of
law clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is
our duty to apply the law without fear or favor.
G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ
and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON.
RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, respondents.
Facts:
 Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of
the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as
Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations
("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil
Service Commission in Quezon City,
Metropolitan Manila.
 While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No.
94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman
and Commissioner, respectively, of the
Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994.
 Petitioners then instituted this Petition. The
Court required public respondents to file a
Comment on the Petition.
 Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that
petitioners had received Office Orders from the
Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to
Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to
Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and
praying that public respondents be restrained
from enforcing these Office Orders.
Y.E.
4

 The Court, in a Resolution, granted this Motion
and issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for by petitioners.
 The Commission filed its own Comment, and
then moved to lift the Temporary Restraining
Order.
 The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
separate Comment, defending the validity of
Resolution No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of
the Petition.
Issue: (1) WON the Civil Service Commission had legal
authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it
merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards],
the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the
OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO
[Research and Development Office]
Held: Yes
Ratio: What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the
Commission do? The Commission re-arranged some of the
administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission
and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS,
OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the
"Research and Development Office (RDO)." The same
Resolution renamed some of the Offices of the
Commission. The Commission also re-allocated certain
functions moving some functions from one Office to
another. This re-allocation or re-assignment of some
functions carried with it the transfer of the budget
earmarked for such function to the Office where the
function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel,
records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the
carrying out of such functions were moved to the Offices to
where the functions were transferred.
Purpose: Effecting changes in the organization to
streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve
delivery of service to the end that the Commission and its
staff may be brought closer physically to the government
employees that they are mandated to serve.
The dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the
Regional Offices and the Field Offices attached to various
governmental agencies throughout the country makes
possible the implementation of new programs of the
Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila
It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was
moved by quite legitimate considerations of administrative
efficiency and convenience in promulgating and
implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning
petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of
the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner
Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in
Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear to
Law on Public Officers
the Court that the changes introduced and formalized
through Resolution No. 94-3710 — re-naming of existing
Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and
Sections composing particular Offices; re-allocation of
existing functions (and related personnel; budget, etc.)
among the re-arranged Offices — are precisely the kind of
internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in the
organization" of the Commission.
Issue: (2) WON Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the
"abolition" of public offices, something which may be done
only by the same legislative authority which had created
those public offices in the first place.
Held: No
Ratio: The term "public office" is frequently used to refer
to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by that individual
for the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution
No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that
term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to
note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced
by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily
involved the termination of the relationship of public
employment between the Commission and any of its
officers and employees. The legislative authority
had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out
"changes in the organization," as the need [for such
changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument
merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry
out the kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No.
94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is
necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated
to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The
legislative standards to be observed and respected in the
exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in
Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the
Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:(3) WON Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners'
constitutional right to security of tenure.
Held: No
Ratio: That security of tenure is an essential and
constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service
System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection
extends not only against removals without cause but also
against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly
Y.E.
enunciated, are tantamount to removals which are within
5

the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the
availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends,
in the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment.
Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without
consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated
upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not
merely assigned — to a particular station
We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the
Elements of Public Office
Commission are not appointments to a specified public
office but rather appointments to particular positions or
(LD-DIP)
ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of
Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV
or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or
Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case,
petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director
IV, without specification of any particular office or station.
The same is true with respect to the other persons holding
the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez
and de Lima from their previous positions in OPIA and OPR,
respectively, to the Research and Development Office
(RDO) in the Central Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment
from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in
Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory
authority and did not constitute removals without lawful
cause. It also follows that such re-assignment
did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of
petitioners to security of tenure considering that they
retained their positions of Director IV and would continue
to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new
assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head
Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila.
Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right
to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of
petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in
the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research
Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the
Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and III,
respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure.
Characteristics
1. Public office is a public trust. Employees
must at all means be accountable to the
people serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, and act with patriotism, justice
and lead with modest lives.
Law on Public Officers
2. Public office is not property. NOT being
property is not protected by the due
process clause.
3. NOT a heritable possession.
4. Outside the commerce of man.
1. Created by LAW or by authority by law.
2. DELAGATION of a portion of the sovereign
powers of the government, to be exercised
for the benefit of the public.
3. The powers conferred and the duties to be
discharged must be defined DIRECTLY or
impliedly by the legislature or through
legislative authority.
4. Duties must be performed INDEPENDENTLY
and without the control of a superior power
other than the law, unless they be those of
an inferior or subordinate office created or
authorized by the legislature, and by it
placed under the general control of a
superior office or body.
5. Must have PERMANENCE or continuity, not
temporary or occasional.
G.R. No. L-23226 March 4, 1925
VICENTESEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
Facts:
 Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the
peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907.
He continuously occupied this position until
having passed sixty-five mile- stones.
 He was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on
July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that date,
Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has
acted as justice of the peace for the municipality
of Dumanjug.
 Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public
scandal and of opposing physical resistance to
the occupancy of the office of justice of the peace
by the auxiliary justice of the peace, instituted
friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu to inquire into the right
Y.E.
of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of
6

the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to
procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of
Dumanjug.
 Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground
that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was
constitutional and because Mr. Segovia being
sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to
be justice of the peace.
Petitioner’s contention: Section 1 of Act No. 3107 is
unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of
the petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental principle that
a public office cannot be regarded as the property of the
incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.
 Section 67 of Act No. 136, wherein it was
provided that justices of the peace shall hold
office during the pleasure of the Commission. Act
No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was
originally appointed justice of the peace,
amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by
making the term of office of justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace two years from the first
Monday in January nearest the date of
appointment. Shortly after Segovia's
appointment, however, the law was again
amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that "all
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall hold office during good behavior and
those now in office shall so continue." Later
amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law
was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206
of the Administrative Code.
 Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides
that "one justice of the peace and one auxiliary
justice of the peace shall be appointed by the
Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City
of Baguio, and for each municipality, township,
and municipal district in the Philippine Islands,
and if the public interests shall so require, for any
other minor political division or unorganized
territory in said Islands." It was this section which
section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding at
the end thereof the following proviso: "Provided,
That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years." But section
206 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure
of office," and reading "a justice of the peace
having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold
office during good behavior unless his office be
lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of
some other justice," was left unchanged by Act
No. 3107.
Law on Public Officers
Issue: WON that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides,
that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age
of sixty- five years, should be given retroactive or
prospective effect.
Held: A sound canon of statutory construction is that a
statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is
made manifest either by the express terms of the statute
or by necessary implication.
Ratio: The same rule is followed by the courts with
reference to public offices. A well-known New York
decision held that "though there is no vested right in an
office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the
incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right
is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in
which the purpose is stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs.
Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new
constitutional provision as to the advanced age which
should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial offices
from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply
to persons in office at the time of its taking effect
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of
the Administrative Code, gives no indication of retroactive
effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon
existing rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section
203 of the Administrative Code, while leaving intact section
206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace
to hold office during good behavior. In the absence of
provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices
of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions
impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts
would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation
which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.
Answering the question with which we began our decision,
we hold that the proviso added to section 203 of the
Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing
that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-
five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so
is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went
into force. Consequently, it results that the decision of the
trial court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its
disposition of the case.
G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926
JULIOAGCAOILI,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.
Y.E.
7

JOHNSON, J.:
N.B. Same Ratio in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil.,
543)
Facts:
 Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the
peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the
Province of Ilocos Norte, by Francis Burton
Harrison.
The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee
was "subject" at the time of his appointment, are found in
section 1 of Act No. 2041. Said section is amendment to
section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides among other things
for the "appointment and term of the justices of the
peace." It provides that one justice of the peace and one
auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-
General, etc., for each municipality organized according to
the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office
during good behavior.
 That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the
Philippine Legislature, adopted Act No. 3107,
which was "an Act to amend and repeal certain
provisions of the Administrative Code relative to
the judiciary in order to reorganize the latter;
increasing the number of judges for certain
judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges
of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary
of Justice with authority to detail a district judge
temporarily to a district or province other than
his own; regulating the salaries of justices of the
peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice
of the peace court of the City of Manila and
creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with
three branches; regulating the salaries of clerks
of court and other subordinate employees of
Courts of First Instance, and for other purposes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No.
(3107), so far as the same relates to justice of the peace,
provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the
peace," said Act in section 203 provides for "the
appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with
the proviso in said section ". . . That justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they
have reached the age of sixty-five years." Attention is here
called to the fact again that there is nothing in the title of
the Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that said
Act contains provisions for "appointment of justices of the
of the peace" nor as to the period during which they may
serve after appointment. Attention is here called to the
provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day of August,
1916, and to section 3 thereof, which provides "That no bill
Law on Public Officers
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject, and that the subject shall be expressed in the
title of the bill."
 That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the
Undersecretary of Justice sent a letter to the said
Julio Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Third Judicial District, of the
Province of Ilocos Sur to cease to be a justice of
the peace by operation of said amendment of the
Administrative Code.
 Agcaoili entered a protest stating that Has this
amendment retroactive effect? In the first place
the legislature could not give or have given this
Act such a character, and if it had intended to do
so, it would have so stated; and in the second
place, because not only is such express
declaration lacking in the law but Act No. 3107
very clearly provides that the justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace to be
appointed shall hold office until they attain the
age of 65 years.
 Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a
resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the
protest which he presented; and not having
received any reply to his protest, filed a petition
for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
Issue: WON the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it
provides that "justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid
and constitutional, when applied to justices of the peace
appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during
good behavior?
Held: No
Ratio: Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the
orderly procedure marked out by Act No. 190 is not
explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even his
protest, couched in most humble and respectful language,
fell upon deaf ears. Absolute indifference was shown to the
respectful protest and the able argument given in support
thereof. The only answer to his protest was a threat of a
criminal prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His
humility was met with austereness. His humble petition
was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his
protest was ended by a demand that he be prosecuted for
refusing to comply with an order by one who was not
willing to follow the well-defined and well-beaten road of
"due process of law" by preferring charges and giving the
appellant an opportunity to be heard and to defend his
right. Nothing of that character took place. The whole
procedure, from beginning to end, in ousting the appellant
from an office to which he had been legally appointed and
Y.E.
8

against whom no complaint has been made, is anomalous
in the jurisprudence under the American flag.
The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a
judgment should be entered ordering the restoration of
the appellant to the office from which he was illegally
rejected. We should follow the effect of the doctrine
announced solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs.
Noel (47 Phil., 543). So ordered.
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
 Plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a
reasonable requirement for employment that a
public officer make of record his assets and
liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby
make it possible thereafter to determine
whether, after assuming his position in the public
service, he accumulated assets grossly
disproportionate to his reported incomes, the
herein plaintiff [having] filed within the period of
time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order
No. 334 the prescribed sworn statement of
financial condition, assets, income and liabilities,
maintained that the provision on the "periodical
filing of sworn statement of financial condition,
assets, income and liabilities after an officer or
employee had once bared his financial condition,
upon assumption of office, is oppressive and
unconstitutional.
 Protection of due process and the assurance of
the privacy of the individual as may be inferred
from the prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure and self-incrimination were
relied upon. There was also the allegation that
the above requirement amounts to "an insult to
the personal integrity and official dignity" of
public officials, premised as it is "on the
unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that
they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus
restrained by this periodical submission of the
statements of "their financial condition, income,
and expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist
from committing the corrupt practices defined.
Law on Public Officers
 It was further asserted that there was no need
for such a provision as "the income tax law and
the tax census law also require statements which
can serve to determine whether an officer or
employee in this Republic has enriched himself
out of proportion to his reported income.
Answer of the then Executive Secretary: That when a
government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position,
he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to
give information about his personal affair, not only at the
time of his assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life. . .
." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a violation of
his constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as
unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the
provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the
ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate
enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision
merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring
the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police
power.
Lower Court: Declared "unconstitutional, null and void
Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial
conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee
of the government after he had once submitted such a
sworn statement upon assuming office
Issue: (1) WON not by virtue of the above requirement for
a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the
due process clause.
Held: No
Ratio: Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of
policy, and definition of terms, there is an enumeration of
corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law which includes “the requirement of a statement of
assets and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical
submission being challenged here”.
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft
Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was precisely aimed
at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the
public service. It is intended to further promote morality in
public administration. A public office must indeed be a
public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to
be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions
Y.E.
9

then prevailing called for norms of such character. The
times demanded such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is
comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and
explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were
prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was
made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to
avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is the
challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more
difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their
positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the
police power of the state to promote morality in public
service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom.
" In accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed
embraced in the concept of liberty. This Court in the same
case, however, gave the warning that liberty as understood
in democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good, the peace and order of society and the
general well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. In the words
of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom
to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and
the upright and honorable conscience of the individual."
Liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or
safety, of general welfare, in other words through the
proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated.
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn
statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one
upon assumption of office beyond the power of
government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged
provision, a public officer would be free from such a
requirement. To the extent then that there is a compulsion
to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be
denied however that under the Constitution, such a
restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an
observance of due process.
"There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any action for
Law on Public Officers
that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and
political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring
a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases." 56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to
ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service
with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed
and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed on public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities every two years after having done so upon
assuming office. The due process clause is not susceptible
to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.
Issue: (2) WON the right to privacy of petitioner has been
violated by challenged provision
Held: No
Ratio: Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot
be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational
relationship such a requirement possesses with the
objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say
that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is
bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize
that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts and sources of income, the
amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year,
there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.
Issue: (3) WON as the challenged provision requires the
Y.E.
periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial condition,
10

it would be violative of the guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure and against self-
incrimination
Held: No
Ratio: Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through
Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the
constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with,
and that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order"
to convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without
reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its
scope as "one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed
in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted —
to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown
to exist by such requirement of further periodical
submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the
Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater
plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation
of the non-incrimination clause. According to the
Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the
accused immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to
make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to
furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess,
but only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts
but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent,
and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to
talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may
be documentary. Neither then could the accused be
ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may
constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. Moreover, there
can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or effects
for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. Even if a
constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to
invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this
particular case, the constitutional privilege justified the
refusal to give the information exacted by the statute, that
question can be raised in the defence to the pending
prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called
upon to decide in this proceeding.
Issue: (4) WON provision can be nullified on the allegation
that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and
official dignity" of public officials.
Held: No
Law on Public Officers
Ratio: On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its
being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court,
in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not
the province of the courts to supervise legislation and
keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to
the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws
do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to
Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate
policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law."
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of
powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective
authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction
to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law,
as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal
norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the
challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot
be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19,
1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7,
Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical
submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions,
assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
government after he had once submitted such a sworn
statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.
Public Officer
Who: A public officer is an individual vested with
some portion of sovereign functions of the State to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
[Alba vs Evangelista, Gr Nos. L-10360 and L-10433,
January 17,1957]
As Distinguished from
other Laws
Y.E.
11

E.O. 292
Administrative Code of
1982, Sec. 2 (14)
Public Officer
A person whose duties, not
being of a clerical or manual
nature, involves the exercise
of discretion in the
performance of the functions
of the government. When
used with reference to a
person having authority to do
a particular act or perform a
particular function in the
exercise of governmental
power, “officer” includes any
government employee, agent
or body having authority to
do the act or exercise that
function.
As to Scope
Delegation of some of the
sovereign functions of the
Government.
Involves exercise of
discretion
As to Requisites
Required to take an oath or
official bond.
Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code
Any person who, by direct
provision of law, popular
election or appointment by
competent authority, shall
take part in the performance
of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in
said Government or in any of
its branches, public duties as
an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any
rank or class, shall be
deemed to be a public
officer.
Section 3 of R.A. 6713
or The Conduct of
Ethical Standards
"Public Officials" includes
elective and appointive
officials and employees,
permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-
career service, including
military and police personnel,
E.O. 292
Administrative Code of
1982, Sec. 2 (15)
Clerk or Employee
“Employee” when used with
reference to a person in the
public service, includes any
person in the service of the
government or any of its
agencies, divisions,
subdivisions or
instrumentalities.
No exercise of portion of the
sovereign power of the
Government.
Duties are clerical or manual
nature.
Oath and bond are not
required.
Section 2 of R.A. 3019
or The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
Public officer includes
elective and appointive
officials and employees,
permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified,
unclassified or exempt
service, receiving
compensation, even nominal,
from the government.
Section 1 of R.A. 7080
or The Act defining the
crime of Plunder
Public Officer means any
person holding any public
office in the Government of
the Republic of the
Philippines by virtue of an
appointment, election or
contract.
Law on Public Officers
whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of
amount
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Although the National Internal Revenue Code authorizes
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to effect a constructive
distraint by requiring any person to preserve the distrained
property, there is no provision constituting such person as
a public officer by reason of such requirement. The
Sandiganbayan, therefore, has no jurisdiction over the case
involving such a person
Facts:
 Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated
an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore.
His services were contracted by the Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP)
at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur.
Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-
contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were
left at the formers premises. From this set of
circumstances arose the present controversy.
 A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was
issued by the Main Office of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional
Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized
representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan
City commanding the latter to distraint the
goods, chattels or effects and other personal
property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused
Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by taxpayer
Ancla
 Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for
Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under
Authority of the National Internal Revenue,
assumed the undertakings specified in the
receipt the contents of which are reproduced as
follows: (Blue Isuzu dump truck)
 The petitioner reported the taking of the truck by
Ancla to the security manager of PICOP, Mr.
Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this
truck from being taken out of the PICOP
Y.E.
concession. By the time the order to bar the
trucks exit was given, however, it was too late.
12

 Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter
stating that Azarcon voluntarily assumed the
liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit
in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Indicated in the provisions of the Warrant of
Garnishment and Azarons’s failure to observe
said provisions does not relieve the latter of his
responsibility.
 The Sandiganbayan found that the revenue
document processor of region 10 sent a report to
the collection branch regarding the taking of the
truck and that Ancla was renting it to a certain
Oscar Cuevas at PICOP. She suggested that a
warrant of garnishment be issued to Cuevas but
instead she filed a letter complaint against
Azarcon and Ancla.
 Fiscal Montenegro forwarded the complaint to
the Office of the Tanodbayan. He was granted
authority to conduct preliminary investigation.
 Azarcon and Ancla were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation
before the Sandiganbayan alleging that 1) the
petitioner never appeared in the preliminary
investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a
public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he
was being charged with malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Sandiganbayan: rendered a decision a finds Azarcon Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of malversation. Ancla, on the
other hand has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction
of this Court up to this date, let this case be archived as
against him without prejudice to its revival in the event of
his arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this
Court.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private
individual who is charged with malversation of public funds
as a principal after the said individual had been designated
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of
distrained property.
Held: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
Ratio: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
Law on Public Officers
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees.
The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction
over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges
the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:
Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the
provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a
public officer.
Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the
receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by
popular election.The next logical query is whether
petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct
provision of law, or by competent authority. We answer in
the negative.
However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting
such person a public officer by reason of such
requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private
individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to
include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The
prosecution argues that Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code x x x defines the individuals covered by the term
officers under Article 217[39] x x x of the same Code.[40] And
accordingly, since Azarcon became a depository of the
truck seized by the BIR he also became a public officer who
can be prosecuted under Article 217 The Court is not
persuaded.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court
thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused
Y.E.
Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously
charged before and convicted by Respondent
13

Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The
Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of this case is of no
moment since (j)urisdiction cannot be conferred by x x x
erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction.[44] As
aptly and correctly stated by the petitioner in his
memorandum:
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the
petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he
agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump
truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and
Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of
public funds or property, the prosecution was in fact
charging two private individuals without any public officer
being similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently,
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below
as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995
ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The terms “classified, unclassified or exempt service” were
the old categories of the positions in the Civil Service, which
have been reclassified into Career and Non-Career service
by P.D. 807. Petitioner, as Project Manager of a
government building construction project, falls under the
Non-Career service category, and is, thus, a public officer
under the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over him.
Facts:
 Petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019.
 Accused, a public officer, being then the Project
Manager of ITDI which is an agency of DOST
wherein the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction
undertook the construction of the building in
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, with a total cost
(P17,695,000.00) jointly funded by the Philippine
and Japanese Governments, and while the said
construction has not yet been finally completed,
accused either directly requested for another,
the sum of (P200,000.00), claimed as part of the
expected profit (P460,000.00) in connection with
the construction of that government building
Law on Public Officers
wherein the accused had to intervene under the
law in his capacity as Project
Manager/Consultant of said construction — said
offense having been committed in relation to the
performance of his official duties.
 During arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not
guilty" to the charges against him.
Sandiganbayan: Found Claro Preclaro y Jambalos GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance
of the case, instead of dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction,
the petitioner not being a public officer.
Held: No
Ratio: R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof
"includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government
The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec.
2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The
terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were
the old categories of positions in the civil service which
have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service 11 by PD 807 providing for the organization of the
Civil Service Commission 12 and by the Administrative Code
of 1987.
From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that
petitioner falls under the non-career service category
(formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of
the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by
Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019).
The fact that petitioner is not required to record his
working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not take an
oath of office became unessential considerations in view of
the above-mentioned provision of law clearly including
petitioner within the definition of a public officer.
Y.E.
14

JOSE JINGGOY E.
ESTRADA, petitioner,vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Facts:
 5 criminal complaints were filed by the
Ombudsman against former President Estrada,
his family, associates, friends and conspirators.
 One of the Informations was for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among
the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
 The Information was amended and the case was
assigned to respondent Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused
was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for
petitioners provisional liberty was fixed.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend
the Amended Information on the ground that
R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it
charged more than one offense.
 Petitioner also filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor
Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A
Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.
Sandiganbayan: issued a Resolution denying petitioners
Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion. Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail was set
for hearing after arraignment of all accused.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion
and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner
refused to make his plea prompting respondent
court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: (1) WON R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face
and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection
of the laws
Held: No
Law on Public Officers
Ratio: The contention deserves our scant attention. The
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law,
has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.
Issue: (2) WON the Amended Information charged him
with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute
plunder
Held: No
Ratio: A careful examination of the Amended Information
will show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first
paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with
the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda
Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in
general terms how the accused conspired in committing
the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts
constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1)
to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused
who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in
sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. Contrary
to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or
collected money from illegal gambling on several
instances. The phrase on several instances means the
petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist
that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with
the commission of only one act or offense despite the
phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay,
pretzel interpretation. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the
Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under
Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with
Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda
Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the
aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections of
the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit
Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to
argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable
cause against him for plunder. The respondent
Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the
petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest
against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is
now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable
cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue
cannot be resurrected in this petition.
Issue: (3) WON the plunder law provide sufficient and
complete standards to guide the courts in dealing with
accused.
Y.E.
15

Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he
labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged
with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired
with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d)
of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable
on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to
death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the
imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he
is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second
paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to
have conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation
consists in the commission of the predicate acts specified
in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these
allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be
unclear. It will be no different from that of the former
President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the
other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, viz:
Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with the members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million
pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
Issue: (4) WON the Sandiganbayan erred in sustaining the
charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with
alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that
criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the
denial of substantive due process
Held: No
Ratio: From the foregoing allegations of the Amended
Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired
with former President Estrada to enable the latter to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended
Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether
the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass the
Law on Public Officers
subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered
into by the other accused with the former President as
related in the second paragraph of the Amended
Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We
hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the
predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were
allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to
more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent
Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate
acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate
Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will
show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and
folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law
was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former
President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the
multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed
by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.[20] They
also found that under the then existing laws such as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other special laws, the acts involved different
transactions, different time and different
personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate
crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal
and graft charges. The preparation of multiple
Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-
nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the
Sandiganbayan.[21] R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder
Law[22] was enacted precisely to address this procedural
problem.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire
nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of
crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case
at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality to help the former President
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that
each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares
of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
Y.E.
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of
16

them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at
bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is
former President Estrada while the spokes are all the
accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
Issue: (5) WON petitioners plea for bail be granted
Held: Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to
warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
Ratio: Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr.
Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed
to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the
medical condition of the accused requires that he be
confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed
to post bail.[58]
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt
is strong, to wit:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[59]
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of
bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires
that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the
prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence. The
Law on Public Officers
burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong
evidence of guilt.[60]
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner
as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be
conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which
respondent court based its Resolution of December 20,
2001involved the reception of medical evidence only and
which evidence was given in September 2001, five months
ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioners
guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent
Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if
the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the
granting of bail to petitioner.
Issue: (6) WON the charge against the petitioner should
dismissed on the ground that the allegation of conspiracy
in the Amended Information is too general.
Held: No
Ratio: The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are
different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in
the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is
not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy
is significant only because it changes the criminal liability
of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
their participation in the crime.[49] The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be
equally responsible for the acts of others,[50] for the act of
one is the act of all.[51] In People v. Quitlong,[52] we ruled
on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the
offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime
charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused
persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of
an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy,
or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused
for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order
to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent
of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or
others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy
exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts
done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
Y.E.
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the
17
 Law on Public Officers

others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused 1. A person no matter how qualified cannot be
must know from the information whether he faces a appointed to an office which is not vacant.
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the 2. One who is legally dismissed from office is,
acts of his co-accused as well. by fiction of law, deemed not to have
vacated his office.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended
Information alleged in general terms how the accused
Permanent Vacancy Occurs when an elective local
committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in
official: [Sec. 44, LGC]
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the
ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the 1. fills a higher vacant office
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in 2. refuses to assume office
committing the crime of plunder. 3. fails to qualify
4. dies
5. is removed from office
6. voluntarily resigns
Modes of Creation of 7. otherwise permanently incapacitated from
discharging the functions of his office
Public Offices The position of Local Chief Executive becomes
1. By the Constitution (e.g., Office of the vacant
President) Vacancy Successor
2. By Statute (e.g., Office of the Insurance In case of permanent vacancy
Commissioner) Governor or Mayor Vice Governor; Vice Mayor
3. By Authority of Law (e.g., the Davide Governor, Vice-Governor, Highest-ranking Sangguinang
Commission) Mayor, Vice-Mayor member
Punong Barangay Highest-ranking Sangguniang
Barangay Member
Modes of Acquiring Title In case of a tie between highest
ranking Sangguninan Member,
then lots shall be drawn
to Public Office In case of permanent inability
1. Election - An officer occupies the office by Highest-ranking Sangguniang Second highest-ranking
Member (as the successor of Sangguniang Member (subsequent
virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
the Governor, Vice-Governor, vacancies filled according to their
They are elected for a definite term and Mayor, Vice-Mayor) rank)
may be removed therefrom only by
stringent conditions. Sanggunian becomes vacant
2. Appointment – Selection, by the authority Position Appointing Not member Member
vested with the power, of an individual who authority of a political of a
is to exercise the functions of a given office. party political
3. At times by contract party
4. Succession or other modes of allowed by Sangguniang President Recommendation Nomination
law. Panlalawigan through the of the and
Executive Sangguniang Certification
Secretary Panlalawigan of the
Succession of Elective Sangguniang
Panlungsod
Recommendation
of the
political
party of the
(of highly Sangguniang member who
Officials urbanized Panlungsod caused the
vacancy
and
Vacancy independent
component
issued by the
highest
It occurs when a position is empty and without a cities) official of the
legally qualified incumbent appointed or elected to it political
party
with a lawful right tom exercise its powers and
Sangguniang Governor Recommendation Nomination
perform its duties. Panlungsod of Sangguniang and
(of Panglungsod Certification
Y.E.

Two Principles on Vacancy of the

18
 Law on Public Officers

component political the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such

cities) party of the temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an
member who
caused the inability on the part of the presiding officer (Vice
vacancy Gov) to preside during the SP sessions; which thus
issued by the calls for the operation of the remedy set in ART 49
highest (b) of the LGC on the election of a temporary
official of the
political presiding officer. [Gamboa v. Aguirre (1999)]
party
Sangguniang Recommendation
Bayan of Sangguniang
Bayan
Sangguniang City or Recommendation
The President
Barangay Municipal of Sangguniang Death or Vice-President-
Mayor Barangay permanent elect shall
disability become
President
fails to Vice-President-
Temporary Vacancy Occurs when the local chief qualify elect shall act as
executive is due to: President until
the President-
1. leave of absence elect shall have
2. traveling abroad qualified
3. suspension from office No President Senate President In the event of
and Vice- or, incase of his inability of the
President inability, Speaker SP and
Re extent of duty of temporary successor Vacancy at chosen nor of the House of Speaker,
General rule: The successor shall automatically the shall have Representatives, Congress
exercise the powers and perform the duties and beginning qualified, or shall act as shall, by law,
functions of the local chief executive. of the both shall President until a provide for
have died or President or a the manner in
term become Vice-President which one
Exception: The power to appoint/suspend/dismiss permanently shall have been who is to act
employees can be exercised only if the period of disabled chosen and as President
incapacity exceeds 30 working days; or if the qualified. shall be
selected until
successor is appointed in writing, if the authorization a President or
specifies such powers to the successor. Vice-President
shall have
If the local chief executive is traveling within the qualified.
Vacancy
country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a
President Vice-President-
period not exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may shall not have elect shall act as
designate in writing the officer-in-charge. been chosen President until a
President shall
have been
Vacancy Successor chosen and
Governor Vice-Governor qualified
Mayor VIice-Mayor Death, Vice-President
Punong Barangay Highest-ranking Sanggunian permanent shall become
Member disability, President
Local Chief Executive is 1) The person designated in removal from
travelling within the country writing by the local chief office, or
but is outside the territorial executive 2) Vice-Governor, resignation of
jurisdiction for a period not ViceMayor, or highest- the President
exceeding three consecutive ranking Sanggunian Member Death, Senate President Congress, by
days. on the 4th day of absence, if Vacancy permanent or, in case of his law, shall
local chief executive fails or during the disability, inability, the provide for
refuses to designate a
successor;
term removal from Speaker of the the manner in
office, or House of which one is
resignation of Representatives, to act as
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of President shall act as President in
the Governor creates a corresponding temporary And Vice- President until a the event of
Y.E.

President President or inability of the

vacancy in the office of the Vice Governor whenever VicePresident

19
 Law on Public Officers

shall be elected SP and

When
and qualified.
Such powers and
Speaker CLASSIFICATION OF
Temporary
disability President
transmits to
duties shall be
discharged by
PUBLIC OFFICES AND
the Senate the Vice-
President and
the Speaker
President as
Acting President,
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Creation Constitutional
of the House until the
Statutory
his written President
Public body served National
declaration transmits to
that he is them a written Local
unable to declaration to Department of Executive
discharge the the contrary Government to which Judicial
powers and Legislative
their functions pertain
duties of his
Nature of functions Civil
office
When a The Vice- Military
Majority of President shall Exercise of judgement Discretionary
all the immediately Ministerial
members of assume the
Legality of title to De Jure
the Cabinet powers and
transmit to duties of the office De Facto
the Senate office as Acting Compensation Lucrative
President and President until
Honorary
the Speaker the President
their written transmits to the
declaration Senate President
that the and Speaker his
President is
unable to
written
declaration that
De Facto Doctrine
discharge the no inability What: That a person who is admitted and sworn into
powers and exists. office by the proper authority is deemed to be
duties of his rightfully in such office until:
office
a. he is ousted by judicial declaration
If after the Congress Congress shall
President determines by a convene, if in a proper proceeding; or
transmits his 2/3 vote of both not in session, b. his admission thereto is declared
declaration houses, voting within 48 void.
of his ability separately, that hours. And if Ratio: The acts of the de facto public officer, insofar
to discharge the President is within 10 days
his office, unable to from receipt as they affect the public, are valid, binding and with
and a discharge the of the last full legal effect. The doctrine is intended not for the
majority of powers and written protection of the public officer, but for the
members of duties of his declaration or, protection of the public and individuals who get
the Cabinet office, the Vice- if not in
transmit President shall session, involved in the official acts of persons discharging
within 5 days act as President; within 12 days the duties of a public office.
to the Senate otherwise, the after it is
President and President shall required to De Facto Officer
Speaker their continue assemble.
written exercising the Who: One who has the reputation of being the
declaration powers and officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not a good
that the duties of his officer in point of law [Torres v. Ribo, 81 Phil 44]. He
President is office must have acted as an officer for such length of
unable to
discharge the time, under color of title and under such
powers and circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the
duties of his public and public authorities, as to afford a
office, presumption of election or appointment, and induce
Congress
shall decide people, without inquiry, and relying on the
the issue. supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be,
to submit to or invoke his action.
Y.E.

20

A person is a de facto
officer when:
1. There is no known appointment or election,
but people are induced by circumstances of
reputation or acquiescence to suppose that
he is the officer he assumes to be.
Consequently, people do not to inquire into
his authority, and they submit to him or
invoke his action;
2. He possessed public office under color of a
known and valid appointment or election,
but he failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or condition (e.g., taking an
oath or giving a bond);
3. He possessed public office under color of a
known election or appointment, but such is
VOID because:
(a) He’s ineligible;
(b) The electing or appointing body is
not empowered to do such;
(c) His exercise of his function was
defective or irregular;
(d) Important: The public does NOT
KNOW of such ineligibility, want of power,
or defect being.
4. He possessed public office under color of an
election or an appointment by or pursuant
to a public, unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such.
ELEMENTS OF A DE
FACTO OFFICE
1. A validly existing public office;
2. Actual physical possession of the
office in good faith;
3. Color of title to the office:
a) Reputation or acquiescence;
b) Known and valid appointment
or election but the officer
failed to conform to a legal
requirement
c) Known appointment or
election but void because of
ineligibility of the officer, or
want of authority of the
appointing or electing
authority, or because of an
irregularity in his appointment
or election, such ineligibility,
want of authority or
irregularity being unknown to
the public
d) Known appointment or
election pursuant to an
Law on Public Officers
unconstitutional law before
declaration of
unconstitutionality
De Jure Officer
Who: Is one who has the lawful right to the office in
all respects, but who has either been ousted from it,
or who has never actually taken possession of it.
Usurper
Who: One who take possession of the office and
undertakes to act officially without any color of right
or authority, either actual apparent.
An intruder / usurper may be presumed a de facto
officer with the passage of time, when the public
presumes in their minds IN GOOD FAITH that the
intruder is rightfully acting as a public officer.
DE JURE vs. DE FACTO
De Jure De Facto
As to basis of authority
He has the lawful right / title He possesses office and
to the office
performs its duties
under color of right,
but he is not technically
qualified to act in all
points of law
As to how ousted
Cannot be ousted In a direct proceeding (quo
warranto);
As to validity of acts
Valid, subject to exceptions Valid as to the public until his
(e.g., acting beyond his scope title to the office is adjudged
of authority, etc.) insufficient.
As to payment of compensation
Rightfully entitled to Conditionally entitled to
compensation; receive compensation: only
The principle "No work, no when no de jure officer is
pay" is inapplicable to him. declared;
He is paid only for actual
services rendered
DE FACTO vs. Usurper
De Facto Usurper
As to mode of acquiring possession of office
4 circumstances mentioned He possesses office and
above performs official acts without
actual or apparent authority.
As to color of authority
Color of right or title to office None. Neither lawful title nor
Y.E.
color of right to office.
21
 Law on Public Officers

As to validity of acts G.R. No. L-14569 November 23, 1960

Valid as to the public until his Absolutely void; His acts can
title to the office is adjudged be impeached at any time in BENITO CODILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
insufficient any proceeding (unless and
vs.
until he continues to act for a
long time, creating a JOSE L. MARTINEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
presumption of his right to
act) BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
As to payment of compensation
Entitled to receive Not entitled Facts:
compensation only when no
de jure officer is declared and
only for actual services  Hermenegildo C. Baloyo, mayor of Tagum,
rendered. Davao, left for Negros Occidental to attend to a
sick brother.
 Thereupon, he designated the vice-mayor to act
LEGAL EFFECT OF ACTS OF in his place effective January 25, 1956 until
further advice on his part.
DE FACTO OFFICERS  The vice-mayor in turn fell sick of certain lung
trouble in view of which he designated ranking
With respect the officers themselves: A party suing
councilor Macario Bermudez as acting mayor
or defending in his own right as a public officer must effective January 25, 1956 until notice to the
show that he is an officer de jure. It is not sufficient contrary.
that he be merely a de facto officer.  Councilor Bermudez was not also in good health
so he designated the third ranking councilor Jose
With respect to the public and third persons: The L. Martinez to act as mayor effective on the same
acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third persons date.
and the public until his title to office is adjudged  Martinez accepted the designation and assumed
insufficient. the office on January 25, 1956, his first official act
Rationale: The doctrine is intended not for being to separate from the service the
petitioners as policemen of the municipality.
the protection of the public officer, but for
 Petitioners immediately filed their protest
the protection of the public and individuals invoking the right to continue in office under the
who get involved in the official acts of provisions of Republic Act 557, but far from
persons discharging the duties of a public heeding their protest, Acting Mayor Martinez
office. appointed Eduardo M. Duaso municipal
policemen in lieu of Benito Codilla who
De Facto Officer’s Official Acts are not subject to immediately qualified by taking his oath of office.
collateral attack: A de facto officer’s and his acts’ Martinez also appointed Juanito Redoble vice
validity cannot be collaterally questioned (in Perfecto Melendres.
 The appoinments were approved by the
proceedings where he is not a party, or were not
President of the Philippines and the
instituted to determine the very question).
Commissioner of Civil Service.
 Policarpio Lagura was also appointed vice
Leonardo Castor, his appointment having been
issued by incumbent Mayor Baloyo who in the
meantime returned to office. He also
immediately qualified by taking the oath of
office.

Petitioners: filed a petition for mandamus before the

Court of First Instance of Davao against Acting Mayor
Martinez and incumbent Mayor Baloyo alleging that their
separation from the service of municipal policemen was
illegal because being civil service employees their
employment cannot be terminated except for cause, and
so they prayed that respondents be ordered to restore
Y.E.

them to their former positions with payment of their back

salaries. They also prayed for their moral and exemplary

22

damages to the tune of P7,000.00 and for attorney's fees
in the amount of P1,000.00. They included as co-
respondents the policemen who were appointed in their
places.
Respondents: set up the defense that the appointments of
petitioners having been made under Section 682 of the
Revised Administrative Code in a temporary capacity,
because they are not civil service eligibles, the same were
valid only for three months and so their continuance in
office after the expiration of that period was illegal; that
even assuming that Acting Mayor Martinez had no
authority to terminate their employment, his action was
validated when incumbent Mayor Baloyo endorsed and
ratified the same by his subsequent official actuation; and
that, not being civil service eligibles, petitioners may be
separated from them service under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 557 upon the expiration of the term of
three months given to them in their appointments.
Issue: (1) WON the designation of Martinez as acting mayor
who was only then the third ranking councilor of the
municipality was not made in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code
Held: Court did not consider the designation of Martinez as
acting mayor entirely void, or one that would make him a
usurper, but at most a de facto officer whose acts maybe
given validity in the eye of the law.
Ratio: Although his designation was irregular, still he was
acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a
usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right
of an office." . . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore
official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the
scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the
mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here
present.
Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity
of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact
that all his official acts done under his designation were
subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent
mayor when he returned to office. This ratification served
to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor
Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular
designation.
Issue: (2) WON termination of employment of petitioners
as municipal policemen was made contrary to the law
which safeguards the rights of an employee to his office in
the government service.
Held: No
Law on Public Officers
Ratio: We cannot escape the fact that they were merely
given temporary appointments for the reason that they do
not have civil service eligibility thus making their status as
employee wholly dependent upon the grace of the ruling
power. And this we say because, as we ruled in a series of
cases, "A temporary appointment is similar to one made in
acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary
character and its terminability at the pleasure of the
appointment power." We also postulated that "The
replacement of non-eligibles is lawful under and pursuant
to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Petitioners cannot, therefore invoke in their favor the
provisions of Republic Act No. 557 because this Act only
guarantees the tenure of office of police who are eligibles.
Non-eligibles do not come under its protection. Hence,
much as we sympathize with the petitioners, our hand is
stayed by the inexorable provisions of the law.
Eligibility & Qualifications
Eligibility
What: The state or quality of being legally fitted or
qualified to be chosen.
Eligible
Who: A person who obtains a passing grade in a civil
service examination and whose name is entered in
the register of eligibles from which appointments
must be made.
Qualification, as understood in two senses:
1. As an ENDOWMENT – refers to the
qualities or attributes which make an
individual eligible for public office. It must
be possessed at the time of appointment or
election and continuously for as long as the
official relationship continues
2. As an ACT – refers to the act of entering
into the performance of the functions of
the office.
Power of Congress to
Prescribe Qualifications
1. When the qualifications are prescribed by
the Constitution - They are generally
exclusive, except where the Constitution
Y.E.
23

itself provides otherwise as when only
minimum or no qualifications prescribed
2. When office is created by a Statute –
Congress is generally empowered to
prescribe the qualifications for holding
public office. Provided;
a) It does not impose conditions
of eligibility inconsistent with
Constitutional provisions.
b) Qualifications must have a
rational basis. The
qualification must be germane
to the position
c) Qualifications must not be so
detailed as to practically
amount to making a legislative
appointment
Limitation in Prescribing Qualifications:
1. Congress may not reduce or increase the
qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution.
2. May only prescribe general qualifications.
3. The qualification must be germane to the
position.
Duration of Qualification
-Qualifications are continuing requirements which
means that they must be possessed not only at the
date of selection or assumption but for the full
duration of the incumbency.
-The prescribed qualifications must be possessed at
the earliest on the date indicated by the Constitution
or the law. If there is no similar indication, it suffices
if the qualifications are possessed at the time of
assumption of office.
-The reckoning point in determining the
qualifications of the appointee is the date of
issuance of the appointment not the date of its
approval by the CSC.
-No estoppel in ineligibility. Knowledge of ineligibility
of a candidate and failure to question such
ineligibility before or during the election is not a bar
to questioning such eligibility after such ineligible
candidate has won and been proclaimed. Estoppel
will not apply in such a case. [Castaneda v. Yap
(1952)]
Law on Public Officers
G.R. No. L-6898 April 30, 1954
LUIS MANALANG, petitioner,
vs.
AURELIO QUITORIANO, EMILIANO MORABE, ZOSIMO G.
LINATO, and MOHAMAD DE VENANCIO,respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
At any rate, petitioner's record as a public servant — no
matter how impressive it may be as an argument in favor
of his consideration for appointment either as
Commissioner or as Deputy Commissioner of the Service —
is a matter which should be addressed to the appointing
power in the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion,
and does not suffice to grant the Court, whose duty is
merely to apply the law, the power to vest in him a legal
title which he does not have.
Petitioner Luis Manalang contests, by quo
warranto proceedings, the title of the incumbent
Commissioner of the National Employment Service, and
seeks to take possession of said office as the person
allegedly entitled thereto.
Facts:
 The original respondent was Aurelio Quitoriano,
who, at the time of the filing of the petition held
said office by virtue of a designation made, in his
favor, as Acting Commissioner of the National
Employment Service, by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. Petitioner included,
as respondents, Emiliano Morabe, who was
designated Acting commissioner of National
Employment Service, and Zosimo G. Linato, the
Collecting, Disbursing and Property Officer of
said National Employment Service in order to
restrain him from paying, to respondent Morabe,
the salary of the Commissioner of said Service.
Still later, Mohamad de Venancio, who was
designated Acting Commissioner of said Service,
and assumed said office was included as
respondent.
 Petitioner, Luis Manalang, was Director of the
Placement Bureau, an office created by Executive
Order No. 392.
 Republic Act No. 761, entitled "An Act to Provide
for the Organization of a National Employment
Service,"
 The then Secretary of Labor, Jose Figueras,
recommended the appointment of petitioner
Luis Manalang as Commissioner of the Service.
On June 29, 1953, respondent Aurelio
Y.E.
Quitoriano, then Acting Secretary of Labor, made
24

a similar recommendation in favor of Manalang,
upon the ground that "he is best qualified" and
"loyal to service and administration." Said Acting
Secretary of Labor even informed Manalang that
he would probably be appointed to the office in
question. However, on July 1, 1953, Quitoriano
was the one designated, and sworn in, as Acting
Commissioner of the Service. Such designation of
Quitoriano — like the subsequent designation,
first, of Emiliano Morabe, and the, of Mohamad
de Venancio — is now assailed by Manalang as
"illegal" and equivalent to removal of the
petitioner from office without cause.
Issue: (1) WON the designation of Quitoriano illegal and
equivalent to removal of Manalang from office without just
cause
Held: No
Ratio: This pretense cannot be sustained. To begin with,
petitioner has never been Commissioner of the National
Employment Service and, hence, he could not have been,
and has not been removed therefrom. Secondly, to remove
an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration
of his term. As removal implies that the office exists after
the ouster. Such is not the case of petitioner herein, for
Republic Act No. 761 expressly abolished the Placement
Bureau, and, by implication, the office of director thereof,
which, obviously, cannot exist without said Bureau. By the
abolition of the latter and of said office, the right thereto
of its incumbent, petitioner herein, was necessarily
extinguished thereby. Accordingly, the constitutional
mandate to the effect that "no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law" (Art. XII, Sec. 4, Phil. Const.), is
not in point, for there has been neither a removal nor a
suspension of petitioner Manalang, but an abolition of his
former office of Director of the Placement Bureau, which,
admittedly, is within the power of Congress to undertake
by legislation.
Issue: (2) WON Republic Act No. 761 abolished the
Placement Bureau is one of legislative intent
Held: Yes
Ratio: Par. (2) of section 1 of said R.A. 761 provides: Upon
the organization of the Service, the existing Placement
Bureau and the existing Employment Office in the
Commission of Social Welfare shall be abolished, and all
the files, records, supplies, equipment, qualified personnel
and unexpended balances of appropriations of said Bureau
and Commission pertaining to said bureau or office shall
thereupon be transferred to the Service.
Law on Public Officers
Incidentally, this transfer connotes that the National
Employment Service is different and distinct from the
Placement Bureau, for a thing may be transferred only
from one place to another, not to the same place. Had
Congress intended the National Employment Service to be
a mere amplification or enlargement of the Placement
Bureau, Republic Act No. 761 would have directed
the retention of the "qualified personnel" of the latter, not
their transfer to the former. Indeed, the Service includes,
not only the functions pertaining to the former Placement
Bureau, but also, those of the former Employment Office in
the Commission of Social Welfare, apart from other
powers, not pertaining to either office, enumerated in
section 4 of Republic Act No. 761.
Issue: (3) WON National Employment Service
Commissioner is not new and is occupied by the petitioner"
and that the petitioner is entitled to said office
"automatically by operation of law,"
Held: No
Ratio: This contention is inconsistent with the very
allegations of petitioner's pleadings. Thus, in paragraph 11
of his petition, it is alleged "that increasing the item and
elaborating the title of a civil servant,
although necessitating a new appointment, does not mean
the ousting of the incumbent or declaring the item vacant."
In paragraph 12 of the same pleading, petitioner averred
that "on or about June 25, 1953, two days before the
departure of President Quirino to Baltimore, petitioner
wrote a confidential memorandum to His Excellency
reminding him of the necessity of appointing anew the
petitioner as head of the National Employment Service."
Having thus admitted — and correctly — that he needed
a new appointment as Commissioner of the National
Employment Service, it follows that petitioner does not
hold — or, in his own words, occupy — the latter's item,
inasmuch as the right thereto may be acquired only by
appointment. What is more, Republic Act No. 761 requires
specifically that said appointment be made by the
President of the Philippines 'with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments." How could the President
and the Commission on Appointments perform these acts
if the Director of the Placement Bureau automatically
became Commissioner of the National Employment
Service?
Y.E.
25

G.R. No. L-16263 July 26, 1960
DR. JOSE CUYEGKENG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, as member of Board of Medical
Examiners, respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts:
 The petitioners are doctors Jose Cuyegkeng,
Pedro N. Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday,
Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita
Rivera-Ramirez.
 Their alleged cause of action is predicated upon
the fact that their names appear in a list of
qualified physicians, approved and submitted, to
the President of the Philippines, by the Executive
Council of the Philippine Medical Association of
the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of
section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for
appointment as members of the Board of
Medical Examiners, and that respondent Dr.
Pedro M. Cruz, whom the President appointed to
said board was not named in said list.
 Officers and members of said Council of the
Philippine Medical Association, were allowed to
intervene and then filed a petition in
intervention, joining the petitioners in praying
for the relief sought by them.
 The Council, acting in conformity with section 13
of Republic Act No. 2382, otherwise known as
The Medical Act of 1959, approved and
submitted to the President a revised list of
qualified physicians, including petitioners herein,
for appointment to the aforementioned Board.
 By a letter of the Assistant Executive Secretary
dated November 18, 1959, said Council was
advised that the President had decided to
appoint, as member of the said Board, Dr. Cesar
Filoteo, Dr. Oscar Chacon, Dr. Edgardo Caparas,
Dr. Jose Cocjin, Dr. Antonio Gutyingco and Dr.
Pedro M. Cruz.
 The first five (5) persons mentioned in this letter
were included in the list aforementioned, but the
name of the last, namely, that of respondent
herein, did not appear in said list. Petitioner
herein, as well as the intervenors, maintain that,
pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382,
the President cannot appoint to the Board of
Medical Examiners any person not named in the
list submitted by the Executive Council of the
Philippine Medical Association, and that,
accordingly, the aforementioned appointment of
respondent is null and void.
Law on Public Officers
Respondent: alleged in his answer that three(3) of
petitioners herein are, pursuant to section 14 of Republic
Act No. 2382, not qualified for appointment to the Board
for Medical Examiners, they being members of the
professional staff of certain private medical colleges.
That there is no cause of action against him none of the
petitioners and intervenors claim to be entitled to the
office in question.The aforementioned list, submitted by
the executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association,
is merely recommendatory in nature and, as such, not
binding upon the President Insofar as Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 2382 may be construed as limiting the
choice of the President, in a mandatory manner, in the
selection of members of the Board of Medical Examiners,
to the list aforementioned, said legal provision is
unconstitutional and void; Inclusion in the list above
referred to is not one of the qualification prescribed in
section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382 for appointment to said
Board.
Issue: WON respondent has a valid title to his office
Held: Yes
Ratio:
One group of members of this Court is of the opinion that
the provisions of this section are mandatory in character;
that, although Congress may, by law, prescribe the
qualifications for appointment to a public office created by
statute, such as membership of the Board of Medical
Examiners.
Inclusion in the list submitted by the Executive Council of
the Philippine Medical Association, in compliance with
section 13 of the same Act, is not one of the qualifications
enumerated in said section 14; that by confining the
selection of the six (6) members of the Board of Medical
Examiners to the twelve (12) person included in said list,
the framers of the law have evinced the intent, not merely
to prescribe the qualifications for eligibility to said Board,
but, also, to limit and curtail, and, hence, to reduce and
impair the power of appointment vested in the President
by the Constitution, which authority connotes necessarily
a reasonable measure of freedom, latitude or discretion in
the exercise of the power to choose the appointees (67 C.
J. S. 157-158); and that, consequently, the pertinent
portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is
unconstitutional and the appointment of respondent
herein lawful and valid.
Another group adheres to the view that said portion of
section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is merely directory in
nature. Indeed, in their respective pleadings, the
Y.E.
petitioners, as well as the intervenors, refer to the persons
26

named in the list aforementioned as "recommendees".
They are identically referred to in the communication
transmitting said list to the President of the Philippines,
which communication is, in turn, described in said
pleadings as a letter of "recommendation". By their very
acts therefore, the intervenors have clearly expressed the
belief, which was shared by the President, that the function
of the former under said section 13 is purely
recommendatory. Needless to say, a "recommendation",
as such, implies merely an advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character,
not binding upon the party to whom it is made. The
members of the Court constituting this group feel,
therefore, that, although section 13 of Republic Act No.
2382 is constitutional, respondent herein has a valid title to
his office as member of the Board of Medical Examiners.
The third group, which is bigger than any of the two (2)
groups already adverted to, deems it unnecessary, either
to inquire into the constitutionality of said section 13, or to
determine whether the same is mandatory or directory.
The members of said group opine that it is not absolutely
necessary that the person reappointed under this provision
be included in the list mentioned in section 13 of Republic
Act No. 2382, for, in case of conflict between two (2)
provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position
is frequently held to prevail (82 C. J. S. 718), unless it clearly
appears that the intent of congress is otherwise, and no
such intent is patent in the case at bar. Furthermore, the
purpose of section 13, in requiring the favorable
indorsement of the Philippine Medical Association,
evidently, to reasonably assure that the members of the
Board of Medical Examiners are among the best in their
profession, and one who has already held, or who still holds
a position in said Board, is presumed to belong to such
class, in the absence of proof to the contrary. There is not
even the slightest suggestion that respondent does into
live up to the standard required for membership in said
Board.
In conclusion, although none of the groups already
adverted to have sufficient votes to constitute the requisite
majority, the members of this Court are unanimous in the
opinion that respondent herein has a good and valid title
to his office.
Law on Public Officers
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T.
PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and
MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and
RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Relative to public offices created by statute,
Congress has virtually plenary powers to prescribe
qualifications, provided that (i) the qualifications are
germane to the objective/s for which the public
office was created; and (ii) the qualifications are not
too specific as to fit a particular, identifiable person,
because that would deprive the appointing
authority of discretion in the selection of the
appointee
Facts
 Paragraph (d) reads: Chairman administrator —
The President shall appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the Subic Authority
with a compensation to be determined by the
Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of
the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority
 Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers,
employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic,
Zambales, and officers and members of the
Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S.
Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the
proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the
following constitutional and statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "[n]o elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public officer or position during
his tenure," 3 because the City Mayor of
Olongapo City is an elective official and the
subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art.
VII, of the Constitution, which provides that
"[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to
Y.E.
appoint", 4 since it was Congress through the
27

questioned proviso and not the President who
appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;
Issue: (1) WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
which states, "Provided, however,That for the first year of
its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates
the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses
the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer or
employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an
affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a
public officer or employee, like the head of an executive
department should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental duties or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which
may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
The basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local
elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the
President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this
is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to
conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise
of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher
interest of the body politic is of no moment.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be
appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec.
7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the
government post, except as are particularly recognized in
the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the
economic and planning agency; 9 the Vice-President, who
Law on Public Officers
may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; 10 and, a
member of Congress who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to
appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extended to elective officials who are governed by the first
paragraph.
Issue (2) WON SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the
position of Mayor of Olongapo City
Held: No
Ratio:Congress did not contemplate making the subject
SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed"
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make
the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at
least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex
officio" would have been used.
Issue: (3) WON the Proviso limits the appointing power of
the President
Held: Yes
Ratio: Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of
issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other
words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the
power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the
same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on
the President, such conferment necessarily carries the
discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of
prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may
not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority,
directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own
choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed
by Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject
posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227,
Y.E.
the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to
28

only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo
City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question,
the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to
choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of
appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no
power at all and goes against the very nature itself of
appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and
no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of
the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid
legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is
certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon
again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He
then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree
No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a
Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court
had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run
as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed
Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the
President [Sec. 2, Art. VI, Constitution]
newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE: WON Frivaldo has acquired his citizenship; thus,
making him eligible to run
Held: Yes
RATIO: Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and
Vice President [Sec. 3, Art. VII,
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other
Constitution]
than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official
begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon
his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his
term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day32 the term of
Law on Public Officers
office of governor (and other elective officials) began he
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that
time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give
spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from aliteral (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section
39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of
candidates. Why then should such qualification be
required at the time of election or at the time of the filing
of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally,
such qualifications unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should
thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official"
begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and
at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li
Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do
not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing
the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his
term.
QUALIFICATIONS
PRESCRIBED BY
CONSTITUTION
1. Natural-born citizen
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least 40 years old on election day
5. Philippine resident for at least 10 years
immediately preceding election day
1. Natural-born citizen
2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least 40 years old on election day
5. Philippine resident for at least 10 years
immediately preceding election day
Y.E.
29
 Law on Public Officers

4. Bar member engaged in practice of law for

Senator [Sec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution] at least 10 years
1. Natural-born citizen 5. Not candidates for any elective position in
2. Registered voter election immediately preceding
3. Able to read and write appointment.
4. At least 35 years old on election day
5. Philippine resident for at least 2 years
immediately preceding election day Appointment
What: Selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the
Congressmen[Sec. 6, Art. VI, functions of a given office.
Constitution]
1. Natural-born citizen Nature of Appointment: Essentially a discretionary
2. 25 years old on election day power and cannot be delegated; it must be
3. Able to read and write performed by the officer upon whom it is vested
4. Except party list representatives, a according to his best lights, the only condition being
registered voter in district in which he shall that the appointee is should possess the
be elected qualifications required by law.
5. Resident thereof for not less than one year
immediately preceding election day Requisites for a Valid Appointment (V-PA-Qu-C-A)
1. The position is Vacant
2. Appointing authority must be vested with
Civil Service the Power to Appoint at the time of the
appointment is made.
Commissioners [Sec. 1 [1], Art. IXB. 3. The appointee must possess all the
Constitution] Qualifications and none of the
1. Natural-born citizen disqualifications.
2. 35 years old at time of appointment 4. Appointment has been confirmed by the
3. proven capacity for public administration CSC or Confirmed by the COA.
4. not a candidate for any elective position in 5. The appointee Accepts the appointment by
election immediately preceding taking the oath and entering into discharge
appointment of duty.

COMELEC Commissioners Designation

[Sec. 1[1], Art. IXC] What: The imposition of additional duties, usually by
1. Natural-born citizen law, on a person already in public service.
2. 35 years old at time of appointment
3. college degree holder
4. not a candidate for elective position in Appointment vs.
election immediately preceding
appointment Designation
5. chairman and majority should be members Appointment Designation
of the bar who have been engaged in the Definition
practice of law for at least 10 years Appointing authority selects Imposition of additional
an individual who will occupy duties upon existing office
a certain public office
COA Commissioners [Sec. 1[1], Comprehensive
As to extent of powers
Limited
Art. IXD]
As to security of tenure
1. Natural-born citizen Yes No
2. 35 years old at time of appointment 1st office abandoned when
3. CPA with - 10 year of auditing experience or
Y.E.

A 2nd designated position is A 2nd designated position is

assumed? assumed?

30

Usually yes No
Citizenship
WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS?
1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;
3. Those who elected to be citizens. This is
available only to:
a) those born before January 17,
1973;
b) to Filipino mothers; AND
c) elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
d) Those naturalized in accordance
with law.
MODES OF ACQUIRING
CITIZENSHIP
1. By Birth
a) Jus Soli - “right of soil;” person’s
nationality is based on place of birth;
b) Jus Sanguinis – “right of blood;”
person’s nationality follows that of his
natural parents. The Philippines
currently adheres to this principle.
2. By Naturalization
HOW MAY CITIZENSHIP
BE REACQUIRED?
1. Naturalization
2.
3. Repatriation:
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. Therefore, if he is a natural-born citizen
before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
[Bengson III v. HRET (2001)]
Mere filing of certificate of candidacy is not a
sufficient act of repatriation. Repatriation requires
an express and equivocal act. [Frivaldo v. COMELEC
(1989)]
In the absence of any official action or approval by
proper authorities, a mere application for
repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an
Law on Public Officers
automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine
citizenship. [Labo v. COMELEC (1989)]
4. Legislative Act
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
DUAL ALLEGIANCE
DUAL CITIZENSHIP: Allows a person who acquires
foreign citizenship to simultaneously enjoy the rights
he previously held as a Filipino citizen. By sanguinis
and jus soli.
DUAL ALLEGIANCE:
1. Aliens who are naturalized as Filipinos but
remain loyal to their country of origin
2. Public officers who, while serving the
government, seek citizenship in another
country
“Dual citizens” are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE,
sec. 40[d]); this should be read as referring to “dual
allegiance”
Once a candidate files his candidacy, he is deemed to
have renounced his foreign citizenship in case of
dual citizenship. [Mercado v. Manzano (1999)]
Citizenship requirement should be possessed on
start of term. The Local Government Code does not
specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess the required citizenship,
unlike for residence and age. The requirement is to
ensure that no alien shall govern our people and
country or a unit of territory thereof. An official
begins to govern or discharge his functions only
upon proclamation and on start of his term. This
liberal interpretation gives spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with its purpose.
[Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)]
Purpose of requirement:
The purpose of the citizenship requirement is to
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance
to another nation, shall govern our people and
country or a unit of territory thereof. [Frivaldo v.
COMELEC (1996)]
POWER OF
Y.E.
APPOINTMENT
31

The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions or boards. [Art.
VII, Sec. 16]
There are 4 groups of officers whom the President
may appoint:
1. Heads of the Executive Department,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain and
other officers whose appointments are
vested in him;
2. All other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided
by law;
3. Those whom the President may be
authorized to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTEES
WHO CAN BE NOMINATED AND APPOINTED ONLY
WITH THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS’
CONSENT? [Art. VII, Sec. 16, 1987 Const.]
1. Heads of the executive departments
2. Ambassadors;
3. Other public ministers and consuls;
4. Officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain;
5. Other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution, including
Constitutional Commissioners [Art. IX-B,
Sec. 1 (2) for CSC; Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2) for
COMELEC; Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2) for COA].
WHO CAN THE PRESIDENT APPOINT WITHOUT CA’S
APPROVAL?
Law on Public Officers
1. All other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
2. Those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint;
3. Members of the Supreme Court;
4. Judges of lower courts;
5. Ombudsman and his deputies
Kinds of Appointments
1. Regular appointment:
a) Made by the President while
Congress is in session
b) Takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (COA)
c) Once approved, continues until the
end of the term of the appointee.
2. Ad-interim appointment:
a) Made by the President while
Congress is not in session
b) Takes effect immediately, BUT
ceases to be valid (1) if
disapproved by the CA or (2) upon
the next adjournment of Congress.
[Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2] (3)
c) Ad interim appointments are
permanent appointments. Ad
Interim appointment to the
Constitutional Commissions (e.g.
COMELEC) are permanent as it
takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that
it is subject to the confirmation of
the CA does not alter its
permanent character.
Efficient. Recess appointment power keeps in
continuous operation the business of government
when Congress is not in session. The individual
chosen may thus qualify and perform his function
without loss of time.
(b) Duration. The appointment shall cease to be
effective upon rejection by the Commission on
Appointments, or if not acted upon, at the
adjournment of the next session, regular or special,
of Congress.
Y.E.
32

(c) Permanent. It takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. [Matibay v. Benipayo (2002)]
(d) Not Acting. An ad interim appointment is
distinguishable from an “acting” appointment which
is merely temporary, good until another permanent
appointment is issued.
(e) Applicable to COMELEC Commissioners, being
permanent appointments, do not violate the
Constitutional prohibition on temporary or acting
appointments of COMELEC Commissioners.
(f) By-passed Appointee may be Reappointed.
Commission on Appointments’ failure to confirm an
ad interim appointment is NOT disapproval. An ad
interim appointee disapproved by the COA cannot
be reappointed. But a by-passed appointee, or one
whose appointment was not acted upon the merits
by the COA, may be appointed again by the
President.
(g) The grant to the President of the power to
appoint OICs in ARMM does not violate the
Constitution – The appointing power is embodied in
Sec. 16, Art VII of the Constitution, which pertinently
states that the President shall appoint all other
officers of the government whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint. Since the
President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from
RA 10153, it falls under this group of officials that
the President can appoint. Thus, the assailed law
rests on clear constitutional basis [Datu Michael
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (2011)]
3. Acting/Temporary appointment:
Can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. The
appointee does not enjoy security of
tenure.
N.B. President constitutionally prohibited from
making such appointments to the Constitutional
Law on Public Officers
Commissions (in order to preserve the latter’s
independence).
No need for CA confirmation even if Congress is in
session. Also, Congress cannot impose on the
president the obligation to appoint an incumbent
Undersecretary as [the President’s] temporary alter
ego.
EFFECTIVITY OF APPOINTMENT: Immediately upon
appointing authority’s issuance [Rule V, Sec. 10,
Omnibus Rules]
EFFECTS OF A COMPLETE, FINAL AND IRREVOCABLE
APPOINTMENT
General Rule: An appointment, once made, is
irrevocable and not subject to reconsideration.
1. It vests a legal right. It cannot be taken
away EXCEPT for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing (due process).
2. It may be issued and deemed complete
before acquiring the needed assent,
confirmation, or approval of some other
officer or body.
Exceptions:
1. Appointment is an absolute nullity
2. Appointee commits fraud
3. Midnight appointments.
General Rule: A President or Acting
President shall not appoint 2 months
immediately before the next presidential
elections until his term ends. (Art. VII, Sec.
15, 1987 Const.)
Exception: Temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or
will endanger public safety.
Steps in the Appointing
Process
As to Regular Appointments:
1. Nomination by the President
2. Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
3. Issuance of the commission
4. Acceptance by the appointee.
As to interim Appointments:
The nomination, issuance of the appointment and
acceptance by the appointee precede the
Y.E.
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
33

As to Appointments which do not require
Confirmation by the COA:
1. Appointment by appointing authority
2. Issuance of the commission
3. Acceptance by the appointee.
As to Appointments in Career Service:
Appoinment is not complete until attestation or
approval by the CSC.
Limitations on appointing
power of the President
1. Art. VII, sec. 13, par. 2 - The spouse and
relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the 4th civil degree of the President shall
not, during his "tenure", be appointed as:
(a) Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
(b) Member of the Office of
Ombudsman;
(c) Secretaries;
(d) Undersecretaries;
(e) Chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
2. Recess (Ad Interim) appointments:
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress. (art. VII,
sec. 16[2])
G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990
RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner,
vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira
seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to
have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.
Law on Public Officers
Facts:
 The petitioner bases his claim on the following
communication addressed to him by the
Minister of Tourism, designating as General
manager of the PTA.
 Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed
office on the same date.
 Minister Gonzales sought approval from
President Aquino of the composition of the
Board of Directors of the PTA, which included
Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as
General Manager. This approval was given by
the President on the same date.
 Binamira claims that since assuming office, he
had discharged the duties of PTA General
Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of
Directors and had been acknowledged as such
by various government offices, including the
Office of the President.
 He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990,
his resignation was demanded by respondent
Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.
President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho
sent a memorandum stating that the PTA was
then one who designated Binamira not by the
President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as
amended, but only by the Secretary of
Tourism, such designation is invalid.
Accordingly, you are hereby designated
concurrently as General Manager, effective
immediately, until I can appoint a person to
serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.
 Garrucho having taken over as General
Manager of the PTA in accordance with this
memorandum, the petitioner filed this action
against him to question his title. Subsequently,
while his original petition was pending,
Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging
that on April 6, 1990, the President of the
Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as
additional respondent.
Issue: WON the appointment of petitioner is valid
Held: No
Ratio: Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the
Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and
Tenure. — The General Manager shall be appointed by
Y.E.
the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term
34

of six (6) years unless sooner removed for
cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he
shall serve as such until his successor shall have been
appointed and qualified.
Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the
Philippines but only designated by the Minister of
Tourism. There is a clear distinction between
appointment and designation that the petitioner has
failed to consider
Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the
designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim
that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the
decree clearly provides that the appointment of the
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority
shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by
any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for
Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President. The
appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a
merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in
this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of security of
tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation
being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential
prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to
the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it
could be and was authorized, the designation signified
merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be
legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for
a different reason). In either case, the petitioner's claim
of security of tenure must be rejected
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who
apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of
Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible
authority to do so at the time the designation was made.
This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino
later approved the composition of the PTA Board of
Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General Manager of
the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the
categorical appointment required to be made by the
President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under
Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule therefore that the
petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
Law on Public Officers
The Civil Service
APPOINTMENTS TO THE
CIVIL SERVICE
Scope: Embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters [Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-
B, Constitution]
General Rule: Made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, by
competitive examination.
Exceptions:
1. Policy determining – where the officer lays
down principal or fundamental guidelines
or rules; or formulates a method of action
for government or any of its
subdivisions;e.g. department head.
2. Primarily confidential – denoting not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office but primarily
close intimacy which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings or betrayals on
confidential matters of state ; OR one
declared to be so by the President of the
Philippines upon the recommendation of
the CSC.
3. Highly technical – requires possession of
technical skill or training in supreme
degree.
Disqualifications:
1. No candidate who has lost in any election
shall within 1 year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government
of any GOCC or in any of its subsidiaries.
(art. IX-B, sec. 6)
2. No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his
tenure. (art. IX-B, sec. 7[1])
3. Unless otherwise allowed by law OR by the
primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision agency or instrumentality
Y.E.
35

thereof including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries. (art. IX-B, sec. 7[2])
4. No office or employee in the civil service
shall engage directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political activity.
(art. IX-B, sec. 2[4])
Classes of Service
a) Career Service – Characterized by entrance
(a) based on merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, by
competitive examinations, OR(b) based on
highly technical qualifications; with
opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions and security of tenure.
I. Open career positions – where
prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is
required.
II. Closed career positions – e.g.
scientific or highly technical in
nature;
III. Career Executive Service – e.g.
undersecretaries, bureau
directors
IV. Career Officers – other than
those belonging to the Career
Executive Service who are
appointed by the President,
e.g. those in the foreign
service
V. Positions in the AFP although
governed by a different merit
system
VI. Personnel of GOCCs with
original charters
VII. Permanent laborers, whether
skilled, semi-skilled or
unskilled.
b) Non-career Service – characterized by
entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests utilized for the career service;
tenure limited to a period specified by law,
or which is co-terminus with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration
of a particular project for which purpose
the employment was made.
I. Elective officials, and their
personal and confidential staff;
II. Department heads and officials of
Cabinet rank who hold office at
Law on Public Officers
the pleasure of the President, and
their personal and confidential
staff;
III. Chairmen and members of
commissions and bureaus with
fixed terms;
IV. Contractual personnel;
V. Emergency and seasonal
personnel.
PINEDA V. CLAUDIO
FACTS:
 In 1968, the Chief of Police of Pasay City died.
Then Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed State
Prosecutor Francisco Villa as the replacement.
The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda,
assailed the appointment of Villa as he
claimed that he has preferential rights over
Villa because he is next in line. Pineda’s
position is supported by the Civil Service
Commissioner Abelardo Subido who held in
abeyance the appointment of Villa. Subido
further stated that according to the Civil
Service Act as well as in a previous Supreme
Court decision (Millares vs Subido, August 10,
1967), in filling up vacancies in local offices
the order of priority is as follows:
1. Promotion (next in rank)
2. Transfer (lateral movement)
3. Reinstatement/Reemployment
4. Certification (usually certified
outsiders)
 That in case the next in line cannot be
promoted due to “special reasons”, only then
can someone be promoted in the subsequent
order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification. Subido pointed out that Claudio
did not provide a special reason why he chose
Villa over Pineda.
 Claudio replied by stating that Pineda’s track
record shows that he was not able to solve
the sagging inefficiency of the local police
organization.
 The DOJ Secretary supported Claudio’s
position and he pointed out that in as far as
filling up a vacancy in the police department is
concerned, what governs is the Police Act of
1966 and in said law, it is provided that it is
within the mayor’s discretion as to who he
should appoint to said office.
ISSUE: WON Pineda, as Deputy Chief of Police, has a
preferential right to the said public office.
Held: No
Y.E.
36

RATIO: The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive
because such case has different circumstances. It must
be clarified though that as far as practicable, in case of a
vacancy, the next in line shall be promoted by the
appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be
filled either by transfer, reinstatement, reemployment
or certification — not necessarily in that order. There is
no rule which states that the mayor must appoint the
next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it
mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether
to appoint by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, or
certification (as what Claudio did in this case). It is
necessary for effective public administration that the
mayor appoints men of his confidence, provided they
are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are
possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is
the local executive, more than anyone else, who is
primarily responsible for efficient governmental
administration in the locality and the effective
maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly
answerable to the people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only
time that an appointing power is required to provide
specific reasons on why a next in rank is not appointed
is that if the appointing power chose promotion as the
method to fill up the vacancy. (This is illustrated if say,
there are two next in rank persons and the person lower
in rank is chosen instead of the other higher in rank).
GESOLGON V. LACSON
FACTS
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were deprived of the
increase in salary
HELD: No
RATIO: We are aware of no law, rule or regulation, and
are pointed to none, which grants to a civil service
employee the right to automatically enjoy the salary to
which his item has been increased while occupying the
same. That an increase in the salary attached to a
position is considered a promotion, has to be conceded.
Section 256 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Where a new position is created or the salary
of an existing position is increased,
appointment to such new position or
promotion to the increased salary shall not be
effective, unless expressly so provided, prior
to the enactment of the law creating the new
position or authorizing the higher salary; and
aside from exceptional cases approved as such
by the proper Head of Department, an
appointment or promotion shall not be
effective as of a date prior to that upon which
Law on Public Officers
the appointment or promotion is actually
made. (Emphasis supplied)
But while petitioners have shown themselves
entitled to promotions (except Campillo and Gonzales
whose ratings in many semesters fall below 85%), we
see no reason for ordering the payment to them of back
salaries. Section 256 of the Revised Administrative Code
is explicit in laying down the appointments are not to
take effect prior to the date of appointment, unless so
provided by the Head Department for exceptional
reasons. Moreover, petitioners themselves aver that
these appointments have yet to be passed upon and
approved by the Office of the President thru proper
channels. To order payment of back salaries is to
impose on a co-equal branch of the government.
CUEVAS V. ATTY BACAL
FACTS
This case involves the appointment and
transfer of career executive service officers
(CESOs). More specifically, it concerns the
“appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who
holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public
Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES
Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made
without her consent, to the Office of the Regional
Director of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty.
Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender
(formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a
petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court
of Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
(1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure
considering that she belongs to Career Service;
(2) security of tenure in the Career Executive
Service is acquired with respect to the
position or to the rank the officer is holding;
(3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to
another without violating their security of
tenure;
(4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting
Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director
constitutes a demotion;
RATIO
(1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs
to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not
possess the required qualifications. Such right will have
to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person
who does not have the requisite qualifications for the
Y.E.
position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or,
37

only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it
merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of
CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The
appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated.
(2) Security of tenure in the career executive
service is acquired with respect to rank and not to
position.The guarantee of security of tenure to
members of the CES does not extend to the particular
positions to which they may be appointed a concept
which is applicable only to first and second-level
employees in the civil service but to the rank to which
they are appointed by the President. Here, respondent
did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that
she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public
Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to
the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that
position as required by the rules of the CES Board.
(3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive
Service may be reassigned or transferred from one
position to another and from one department, bureau
or office to another;provided that such reassignment or
transfer is made in the interest of public service and
involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided,
further, that no member shall be reassigned or
transferred oftener than every two years. If a CESO is
assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade
than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the
salary of the CES position. Should he be assigned or
made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary
grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached
to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty.
Bacal to the Regional Office as it was made in the
interest of public service and she is still compensated
according to her CES rank.
(4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the
position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary
and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the
position of Regional Director of the same office, which
corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a
demotion, much less a violation of the security of
tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that
outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security
of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed –
not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such a rule
does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to
periodically reassign the employees and officers in order
to improve the service of the agency.
Law on Public Officers
SANTOS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS
Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to
Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a
discounted ticket which provided that she could bring
someone with her so she brought with her her adopted
daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because
they thought that Santos used government fund to
finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that
the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the
amount that was given to Santos to be used for her
expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her
refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was
found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the
Office of the President and after review, then president
Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122
which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was
then removed from her post and was replaced.
ISSUE
WON Santos should BE reinstated to her
office.
RATIO
NO. Even though the Supreme Court found
evidence which showed that Santos was not guilty of
misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of
securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what was
allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was
beneficial to the government (for she helped save and
lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to
reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be
reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal
power of the president is solely her prerogative.
Further, the position held by Santos is primarily
confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the
president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she
is not actually removed from her position or office but
rather her term merely expires. Also, her position
involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the
executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or
unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the
assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are
prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the
exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the
nation may from time to time dictate.
Election protest is a contest
between the defeated and winning candidates on
the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting
and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of
the returns. It raises the question of who actually
obtained the plurality of the legal votes and
therefore is entitled to hold the office.
Y.E.
An election contest consists of either:
38

1. an election protest or a
2. quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in
view: to dislodge the winning candidate
from office.
In an election protest, the protestee may be ousted
and the protestant seated in the office vacated.
General Rule: the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent
filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts
to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire
into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once
the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of
an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all
questions relative thereto will have to be decided in
the case itself and not in another proceeding. This
procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of
authority. Conformably, we have ruled in a number
of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a
preproclamation case before the COMELEC is no
longer viable.
Exceptions:
1. the board of canvassers was improperly
constituted;
2. quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
3. what was filed was not really a petition for
quo warranto or an election protest but a
petition to annul a proclamation;
4. the filing of a quo warranto petition or an
election protest was expressly made
without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
5. the proclamation was null and void.
NATURE: Summary proceeding of a political
character
PURPOSE: To ascertain the candidate lawfully
elected to office
WHO MAY FILE: A candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for.
WHEN: Within 10 after the proclamation of the
results of the election.
1. It is suspendeded during the pendency of a
preproclamation controversy
Law on Public Officers
2. It should be decided within 15 days from
filing in case of barangay officials
WHO HAS JURISDICTION
1. COMELEC – over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials
[Sec. 250, BP 881]
2. RTC - over contests involving municipal
officials [Sec. 251, BP 881]
3. MeTC or MTC – over election contests
involving barangay officials [Sec. 252, BP
881]
GROUNDS:
1. Fraud
2. Terrorism
3. Irregularities
4. Illegal acts committed before, during, or
after the casting and counting of votes
QUO WARRANTO
What: A petition for quo warranto under the
Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty
or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a
proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but
not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place.
In a quo warranto proceeding, the petitioner is not
occupying the position in dispute. Moreover, under
the Omnibus Election Code, quo warranto is proper
only for the purpose of questioning the election of a
candidate on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility.
It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person
from office but not to install the protestant in his
place. In this sense, it is strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy.
While the respondent may be unseated, the
petitioner will not be seated.
WHO MAY FILE: Any voter
WHEN: Within 10 days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.
WHO HAS JURISDICTION:
 COMELEC – over petitions for quo warranto
involving regional, provincial and city
officials [Sec. 253, BP 881]
Y.E.
39

 RTC - over petitions for quo warranto
involving municipal officials [Sec. 253, BP
881]
 MeTC or MTC – over petitions for quo
warranto involving barangay officials [Sec.
253, BP 881]
GROUNDS:
1. Ineligibility
2. Disloyalty to the Republic
LAPINID V. CSC
FACTS
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed
by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International
Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by
private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his
earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the
PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the
Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He
contended that he should be designated terminal
supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view
of his preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case,
the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It is thus
obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79)
have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and
Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that
Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be
appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice
protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo
respectively who may be considered for appointment to
any position commensurate and suitable to their
qualifications, and that the Commission be notified
within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
ISSUE
WON the CSC can oust Lapinid from his
position
RATIO
NO. the Civil Service Commission has no
power of appointment except over its own personnel.
Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to
ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among
aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority
and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow
an appointment because it believes another person is
better qualified and much less can it direct the
appointment of its own choice.
Law on Public Officers
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that
even this Court cannot compel.1âwphi1 While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of
mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee—taking
into account the totality of his qualifications, including
those abstract qualities that define his personality—is
the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a
matter addressed only to the discretion of the
appointing authority. It is a political question that the
Civil Service Commission has no power to review under
the Constitution and the applicable laws.
LACSON V. ROMERO
FACTS
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946,
appointed by the President of thePhilippines, provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was
confirmed by theCommission on Appointment on
August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August10,
1946, and thereafter performed the duties of that
office.Upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice, on May 17, 1949, the Presidentnominated
petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of
Tarlac. On the samedate, the President nominated for
the position of provincial fiscal of Negros
Orientalrespondent Romero. Both nominations were
simultaneously confirmed by theCommission on
Appointments on May 19, 1949.Lacson neither accepted
the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of
Tarlac.But respondent Romero took his oath of office
(the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) inManila on June
16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at
Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental,he notified
Lacson of his intention to take over the office the
following day, but Lacsonobjected. Hence this petition
ISSUE
WON Lacson is entitled to the positioN
RATIO
YES. The appointment to a government post
like that of provincial fiscal to be completeinvolves
several steps. First, comes the nomination by the
President. Then to makethat nomination valid and
permanent, the Commission on Appointments of
theLegislature has to confirm said nomination. The
last step is the acceptance thereof bythe appointee by
his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination
andconfirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They
are acts of the Executive andLegislative departments of
the Government. But the last necessary step to make
theappointment complete and effective rests solely
with the appointee himself. He may or he may not
accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the
case of Borromeo vs.Mariano, 41 Phil. 327,"there is no
Y.E.
Power in this country which can compel a man toaccept
40

an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to
accept his appointmentas provincial fiscal of Tarlac and
no one can compel him to do so, then he continuesas
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in
said office was created,unless Lacson had been lawfully
removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental.
BORROMEO V. MARIANO
FACTS
ISSUE
WON petitioner can be removed from the 24th
RATIO
NO. A judge may not be made a judge of
another district without his consent. Appointment and
qualification to office are separate and distinct things.
Appointment is the sole act of the appointee. There is
no power which can compel a man to accept the office.
CSC V. DACOYCOY
FACTS
Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational
school administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades in Northern Samar. After formal investigation by
the CSC, he was found guilty of nepotism on two counts.
CSC imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service.
Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring
on the the argument that he was not the appointing or
the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's
resolution ruling that the respondent did not appoint his
2 sons, therefore he is not guilty of nepotism.
ISSUE
WON Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
RATIO
YES. "Sec. 59. Nepotism. - (1) All
appointments to the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned
or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative
of the appointing or recommending authority, or of
the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
prohibited.
"As used in this Section, the word "relative" and
members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of
affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of
the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
Law on Public Officers
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to
the Commission."
Yes. The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines nepotism as
all appointments to the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned
or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of
the
1. appointing or
2. recommending authority, or of the
3. chief of the bureau or office, or of
4. the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him.
The word "relative" and members of the
family referred to are those related within the
third degree either of consanguinity or of
affinity.
CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism as a
result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver and
Ped, a utility worker, as they are under his immediate
supervision and control as the school administrator.
Compensation
Salaries: The salaries of Senators and
Representatives shall be determined by law.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. [Art. VI,
Sec. 10].
The ex-officio position being actually (i.e. merely
additional duty) and in legal contemplation part of
the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in said position.
[National Amnesty Commission v. COA (2004]
There is no violation when another office is held by a
public officer in an ex officio capacity (where one
can’t receive compensation or other honoraria
anyway), as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of his office. [National Amnesty
[Commission v. COA (2004)]
RIGHT TO SALARY
Y.E.
41

Salary: personal compensation to be paid to the
public officer for his services, and it is generally a
fixed annual or periodical payment depending on the
time and not on the amount of the services he may
render.
Distinguished from wages in that salary is given to
officers of higher degree of employment than those
to whom wages are given
The power to fix the compensation of public officers
is not inherently and exclusively legislative in
character.
Unless the Constitution expressly or impliedly
prohibits Congress from doing so, it may delegate
the power to other government bodies or officers.
The salary of a public officer may not, by
garnishment, attachment or order of execution, be
seized before being paid to him and, appropriated
for the payment of his debts.
Rationale behind this doctrine: consideration of
public policy. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. [De la Victoria v. Burgos,
(1995)]
BASIS OF RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
The relation between an officer and the public is not
the creation of contract, nor is the office itself a
contract. Hence, his right to compensation is not the
creation of contract. It exists as the creation of law
and belongs to him not by force of any contract but
because the law attaches it to the office.
The right to compensation grows out of the services
rendered. After services have been rendered, the
compensation thus earned cannot be taken away by
a subsequent law.
As a general proposition, a public official is not
entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered
any service. [Acosta v. CA, (2000)]
Right of a de facto officer to salary: where there is
no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good
faith, has possession of the office and has discharged
the duties thereof, is entitled to salary
Law on Public Officers
RIGHT TO BACK SALARIES: Back salaries are payable
to an officer illegally dismissed or otherwise unjustly
deprived of his office, the right to recover accruing
from the date of deprivation. The claim for back
salaries must be coupled with a claim for
reinstatement and subject to the prescriptive period
of 1 yr
To fall under this exception 2 conditions must be
complied with:
1. the employee must be found
innocent of the charges
2. his suspension must be unjustified.
Right to Vacation Leave and Sick Leave with Pay:
Under Sec. 81 of the LGC, elective officials shall be
entitled to the same leave privileges as those
enjoyed by appointive local officials, including the
accumulation and commutation thereof.
Government officers and employees are entitled to
commutation of all leave credits without limitation
and regardless of the period when the credits were
earned provided the claimant was in the service as
of Jan. 9, 1985 [Presidential Memo Circular No. 54]
RIGHT TO RETIREMENT PAY: given to government
employees to reward them for giving giving the best
years of their lives in the service of their country.
Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of
the retieree.
It may not be withheld and applied to his
indebtedness to the government
Y.E.
42