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Table of Contents
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... 1
MODULE 6 RESPONDING TO PRE-DET. INCIDENTS Administration Page ............ 2
Duration ....................................................................................................................... 2
Scope Statement ......................................................................................................... 2
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO) ............................................................................ 2
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)............................................................................ 2
Resources ................................................................................................................... 2
Instructor to Participant Ratio ...................................................................................... 2
Reference List ............................................................................................................. 3
Assessment Strategy ................................................................................................... 3
ICON MAP ...................................................................................................................... 4
MODULE INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 5
PRE-DETONATION ACTIONS ..................................................................................... 12
THE INCIDENT BEGINS .............................................................................................. 14
INCIDENT VALIDATION .............................................................................................. 30
EVACUATION CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................. 41
SEARCH DECISION ..................................................................................................... 61
BOMB TECH RESPONSE DECISION ......................................................................... 69
EVIDENCE COLLECTION ............................................................................................ 71
RESUME STEADY STATE ........................................................................................... 73
PRE-DETONATION ACTIONS REVIEW ...................................................................... 75
CASE STUDY: TIMES SQUARE BOMBING ATTEMPT .............................................. 76
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 96
PERFORMANCE EXERCISE - Administration Page ....... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Duration ....................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Reference List
See Appendices.
Assessment Strategy
• Observation of the level and quality of classroom participation.
• Participation and quality of performance on the performance exercise.
• Administration of the post-test to assess mastery of module objectives (TLO and
ELOs).
ICON MAP
Question: Used when there is an opportunity to ask a question or start a class
discussion.
First Responder Safety: Used to highlight information that relates directly to the
personal safety of first responders.
MODULE INTRODUCTION
This slide contains the Terminal Learning Objective for the module.
If first responders feel that the rules that govern first responder
action are lacking or in error, it is their responsibility to suggest
change and provide the rationale to support the change.
PRE-DETONATION ACTIONS
ELO 6-1
Identify priority actions required when responding to pre-
detonation incidents.
This slide shows a framework that first responders may use to work
through a pre-detonation incident.
Incident Validation
Evacuation Decision
Search Decision
Evidence Preservation and Collection
Resume Steady State
Along with these six actions, we will also discuss the role of bomb
technicians and the need for continual assessment throughout a
response to a pre-detonation incident.
Despite the fact that many bomb threats are a hoax, as a first
responder, you must approach a bomb threat with the
preconception that the threat is real until proven otherwise.
Each threat must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Additionally, first responders must always assume that
multiple devices may be placed in the area to target first
responders.
1
FBI and DHS Office for Bombing Prevention, “Bomb Threat Guidance” brochure, 2013.
Examples
Four examples of suspicious items that were unobserved until they
turned out to contain bombs are:
The backpack left under a park bench in the 1996 Atlanta
Olympics bombing.2
The delivery truck parked unattended outside the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in
1995.3
The unattended truck left running in front of Times Square in
the 2010 unsuccessful car bombing attempt by Faisal
Shahzad.4
Two backpacks left unattended near the finish line of the
Boston Marathon on Patriot’s Day, April 15, 20135.
2
Sack, K. (1996, July 28). Bomb at the Olympics: The Overview; Olympics Park Blast Kills One, Hurts 111; Atlanta
Games Go On. The New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/28/us/bomb-
olympics-overview-olympics-park-blast-kills-one-hurts-111-atlanta-games-go.html?pagewanted=all
3
After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing. The Oklahoma Department of Civil
Emergency Management.
3
Criminal Complaint: United States of America V. Faisal Shazad, (2010). United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York
5
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings, (2014). Massachusetts
Emergency Management Agency.
6
FBI and DHS Office for Bombing Prevention, “Bomb Threat Guidance” brochure, 2013.
7
(2003, Aug. 1). Turkey Bomb Injures Police. BBC News. Retrieved from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3116183.stm
If the Bomb Threat Checklist has not been completed when first
responders arrive at a pre-detonation incident, the first responders
should work with the individual who received the threat to obtain
information that would have been on the Bomb Threat Checklist,
had it been utilized.
• Location of bomb(s)
• What it looks like
• Type and size of bomb(s)
• Time of detonation
• How it will detonate: time, actions, command, etc.
• Information about terrorist and motivation
8
Bomb Threat Call Procedures and Threat Checklist. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Gather and Protect: The first responder should advise the person
who received the call not to hang up the phone and, if possible, to
keep the caller on the line. If the threat is communicated by
telephone or fax, instruct the caller to complete the Bomb Threat
Checklist (especially information related to vocal characteristics and
any background noises or activity). If the person receiving the
threat did utilize some sort of Bomb Threat Checklist, the first
responder should go over the checklist with them to ensure all
items were covered and to possibly gather more specific
evidentiary detail.
Preserve: If the phone has not been hung up, do not hang up the
phone or dial any numbers in an attempt to recover caller
identification until information is gathered regarding the
phone’s capacity. If the phone has a display, copy and/or
photograph the information on the display. The connection must be
protected, therefore isolating the phone as evidence is essential.
Even if the caller has hung up, the person receiving the call should
not hang up, in order to prevent any other calls from coming in on
the line, and allow for the potential use of the Star 69 (*69) feature,
which will give the telephone number of the last incoming call, for a
small charge. If this procedure is not followed, the information might
be lost. Check with the IT person on the premises or phone service
provider to ascertain if this feature is available. Another potential
action is to contact the telephone service provider from a different
phone, advise them that you have an open line, and ask if they can
retrieve the origination of the previous incoming call. If a cell phone
was used, the telephone service provider may be able to use
triangulation to locate the phone from which the bomb threat was
received. The same procedure of contacting the telephone service
provider should be followed with the fax-dedicated telephone line, if
the bomb threat was received by fax. In cases where threats are
received via text message, the text message can be obtained from
the phone itself and/or through the phone service provider based
upon the time and date call was received.
In-Person
Mode: In person means a person has come into a facility and
advised a member of facility that there is a bomb in the facility and
Gather and Protect: If the letter has been opened, the first
responder should treat the letter as evidence and handle it following
the appropriate procedures for securing evidence by protecting the
letter and envelop from contamination. The first responder should
ascertain who has handled the letter and envelope, and document
and interview those individuals if possible. If readable, the letter
could contain valuable information concerning the type of device,
time, date and location of bomb detonation.
Facsimile
Mode: Threats received by fax. A person receiving a bomb threat
electronically should safeguard the threat by taking a photo of the
screen and leave the window open until a first responder can view
the evidence.
Gather and Protect: If the fax has been received, the first responder
should treat the fax as evidence and handle it following the
appropriate procedures for securing evidence by protecting the fax
and the facsimile device from contamination, until it has been
processed for evidence. The first responder should ascertain who
has handled the paper fax and machine and document those
individuals as such. If readable, the fax could contain valuable
information concerning the type of device, time, date and location of
bomb detonation, in addition to the number from where the fax may
have been sent.
9
Decarr, Kristin. (2015, April 10). Anonymous Social Media Generating School Bomb Threats. Retrieved from
http://www.educationnews.org/k-12-schools/anonymous-social-media-generating-school-bomb-threats/.
10
(2013, September 3). The Crime of ‘Swatting’. Retried from https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2013/september/the-
crime-of-swatting-fake-9-1-1-calls-have-real-consequences.
INCIDENT VALIDATION
When interviewing, the person receiving the threat and any other
witnesses should be questioned concerning the route or ingress
and egress of the terrorist and if they touched anything like the
desk, front counter, door frames, door knobs, papers, any
equipment, etc. Any audio or video recordings from security
cameras should be located and reviewed for possible
contemporaneous identification of the terrorist and secured for its
evidentiary value.
Of course all bomb threats are taken seriously and every step
should be taken to validate the authenticity of the threat. When any
suspicious package or device is found, it should be isolated through
evacuation measures away from the device or package, and the
area not repopulated until a bomb technician clears the scene. A
standard minimum evacuation distance is 1000 feet; greater
distance is always better, if possible. Evacuation recommendations
are discussed in greater detail later in this module.
This slide lists information that can help validate a bomb threat.
ELO 6-2
Identify best practices for first responders regarding multiple
devices.
EVACUATION CONSIDERATIONS
ELO 6-3
Identify considerations that affect evacuation decisions,
including shelter-in-place options, time, distance, shielding,
and structural surroundings.
Time
In most cases, you cannot be one hundred percent certain about
the time of detonation. Even when a terrorist communicates the
The key concept to remember is: The less time you are around the
device, the odds of survivability go up, while the longer you are
around the device, the odds of survivability go down.
Distance
When determining distance, first responders should always assume
the worst and figure that more distance is better.
Reminder: First responders should move the people away from the
bomb, not the bomb away from the people.
Shielding
For evacuation decisions, more shielding is always better. Greater
distances mean fewer injuries. As a rule of thumb, first responders
should evacuate citizens to a point where they cannot see the
device. When considering shielding, always use the largest and
densest structure you can find to place between you and the
device. A thin sheet of plywood or other objects where shrapnel
and fragmentation could pass through is not considered appropriate
shielding. Additional structural considerations related to shielding
will be discussed later in this module.
The two boys were caught soon afterward. In their possession were
thirteen fully loaded firearms, including three semi-automatic rifles,
and 200 rounds of ammunition. It is believed that the two boys
knew the routes of evacuation from previous fire drills.11
11
A School Shooting in Jonesboro, Arkansas, Kills Five. History.com. Retrieved from
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-school-shooting-in-jonesboro-arkansas-kills-five
ELO 6-4
Utilize the Bomb Threat Stand-off Card to determine safe
evacuation distances for pre-detonation scenarios.
This slide shows two photos to illustrate the scenarios for the
evacuation distances activity.
Vehicles are often present at a bomb scene and can provide some
shielding, after a quick non-invasive scan for multiple devices or
other hazards. However, this video depicts fragmentation and
shrapnel piercing a van, providing an example of the level of
protection (or non-protection) a vehicle can provide.
Slide 6-27 If you can see the BOMB, the BOMB can see
YOU!
12
Smith, J. (2009). A Law Enforcement and Security Officers’ Guide to Responding to Bomb Threats. Charles C
Thomas Publisher.
The photo on the right shows the building as it looked after the
detonation. Notice how some glass was blown into rooms during
the positive pressure phase. Notice, however, that there is also
glass on the ground in front of the building. This glass was pulled
out of the building during the negative pressure phase. A number of
calculations were done during this test—one involved the velocity of
the shock front, which was calculated at 1,405 feet per second.
Glass was measured flying from the window at up to 37 feet per
second.
Standard glass will shatter into thousands of small shards from the
impact of a blast pressure wave. In this video, the laminated glass
is 7.5 mm thick, of a special composition designed to withstand the
shatter effect. Obviously, glass windows pose a significant potential
hazard to people within a room.
This slide shows a graphic depicting the three safety zones for
falling glass.
Common sense would dictate that people move as far away from a
window as possible. However, in a confined space, the ability to
shield behind a wall may not be an option. Furthermore, an attempt
to back up to wall opposite a window to create distance might be
even more deadly, as the wall is likely to sustain the most effects of
an explosion as glass shards and pieces of the window are
propelled into a building’s interior area. The safest place to be is
called the “Break Safe” area, which is 0-3 feet from the window and
on the floor. Although common sense would suggest that people be
moved as far away from windows as possible, that clearly is not the
case in situations where a wall is likely to withstand the effects of
an explosion, but window glass is likely to be propelled into a
building’s interior areas.
The videos you just watched were part of tests to reveal the safest
areas to stand in relation to windows during explosive blasts. The
test results revealed three window-shard-hazard zones: high
hazard, low hazard, and break safe.
SEARCH DECISION
ELO 6-5
Determine effective procedures for conducting a search.
are out of place. Because they know what is normal, they are more
likely to detect something that is abnormal.
Likewise, they are probably better able to discount items that would
appear suspicious to an outsider, as not suspicious. Consider, for
example, the presence of two briefcases in an office. A first
responder might assume that the presence of more than one
briefcase is suspicious. However, an employee might recognize
both briefcases as belonging to the individual assigned to the office.
13
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms United States of America. (1976). Bomb Threats and Search
Techniques [Abstract]. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Abstract retrieved from
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=60899
This slide shows a logic tree that illustrates the thought and reaction
processes that first responders will go through when the decision
has been made to search a location.
Conduct Search
Once the need to search a facility has been identified, the first
decision is to determine who will conduct the search. There are
three divisions or groups of possible searchers:
14
National Incident Management System, (2004). U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
There are two priorities during render safe operations: (1) safety
and (2) preservation of evidence. During render safe operations,
the first responders on scene will be responsible for scene security,
ensuring that the units working inside the perimeter are safe. An
efficient and secured perimeter accomplishes both objectives of
safety and evidence preservation.
EVIDENCE COLLECTION
This slide lists some of the criteria that first responders will evaluate
before reoccupying a location after a bomb threat. This slide also
contains an image of evacuated office workers at Adventist Health
Roseville in California after a bomb threat.
This slide contains a traffic camera picture of the dark blue Nissan
Pathfinder as it pulls into Times Square.
15
Criminal Complaint: United States of America V. Faisal Shazad, (2010). United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
This slide shows an aerial view of Times Square in New York City.
Let’s consider the location and circumstances of this threat. The car
bomb was first spotted on May 1, 2010, on the corner of 45 th Street
and 7th Avenue. It was early evening between the matinee and
evening shows in the Times Square Theater District, and there
were a large number of pedestrians present. Because tourists from
around the world visit Times Square, it was a multi-national crowd.
The car bomb was first spotted in the early evening of May 1, 2010,
on the corner of 45th Street and 7th Avenue.
SUNDAY, May 2
3:00 a.m. Guests of the Marriott Hotel in rooms facing West 45th
Street are allowed to return to their rooms after being evacuated
hours earlier.
16
Criminal Complaint: United States of America V. Faisal Shazad, (2010). United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
17
Criminal Complaint: United States of America V. Faisal Shahzad, (2010). United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
This slide lists some of the facts in the investigation of the Times
Square Bombing incident.
FACTS:
The vehicle (Pathfinder) was abandoned at the scene and left
running with keys in the ignition and hazard lights flashing.
The public VIN plate was removed from the Nissan’s dashboard
but not removed from engine compartment. License plates from
a junkyard car had been put on the Pathfinder.
The engine compartment VIN led investigators to a woman in
Bridgeport, CT, who had sold the Pathfinder for cash
approximately three weeks prior to bombing attempt. She said
the man had purchased the car in a supermarket parking lot
without paperwork or receipts, had explained that a bill of sale
was unnecessary, and had seemed uninterested in the vehicle’s
condition or long-term prospects.
The seller of the car provided the phone number from which the
buyer had contacted her. That led investigators to a prepaid
phone activated April 16, which had also received four phone
calls from a Pakistani number in the hour before he made the
final calls to arrange the purchase of the vehicle. The prepaid
phone had also made a call to a rural Pennsylvania fireworks
store that sold M-88 fireworks, the type that were located in the
Pathfinder.
A sketch artist worked with the seller of the car to develop a
sketch of the suspect. That sketch and other information led to
the selection of photographs of six men. From that photographic
lineup, the seller of the car identified Faisal Shahzad as the
buyer.
Verizon Wireless phone records also established that Mr.
Shahzad was the buyer of the Pathfinder.
On Monday, May 3, FBI agents spoke to Shahzad’s landlord in
Bridgeport, CT and began surveillance of Shahzad. It was
confirmed that one of the keys left in the Pathfinder unlocked
Shahzad’s apartment.18
18
Criminal Complaint: United States of America V. Faisal Shahzad, (2010). United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
19
Criminal Complaint: United States of America V. Faisal Shahzad, (2010). United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
Pre-attack Indicators:
Faisal Shahzad appeared on a Department of Homeland
Security travel lookout list/watch list between 1999 and 2008
because he brought approximately $80,000 cash or cash
instruments into the United States.
Alienation from family.
Money problems.
Multiple trips to Middle East.
Attended terrorist training in Pakistan.
Purchasing of material used in the construction of IEDs.
Purchased vehicles and paid cash.
Purchased airline ticket to Dubai and paid cash.
20
(2010). Taliban Video of Faisal Shahzad. Times Video. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/video/nyregion/1248069111343/taliban-video-of-faisal-shahzad.html
The two photos show the inside of the Nissan Pathfinder used by
Faisal Shahzad at Times Square. The top photo shows a 20-ounce
container wrapped in duct tape filled with (40+) M-88s with a wire
connecting to it, sitting next to two five-gallon containers filled with
gasoline. The bottom photo shows a clock with wires extending out
of it.
The photos on this slide depict the actual scene and provide some
realism concerning what might have been visible to the first
responding officer at the scene.
21
If You See Something, Say Something. U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from:
http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/about-campaign
SUMMARY
2. Responder Notification
3. Incident Validation
(Bomb Threat Report Form, interviews, audio/video recordings)
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4. Evacuation Decision
(Shelter-in-place, safe routes/locations, time, distance, shielding)
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5. Search Decision
(Search team composition, prioritize search areas)
__________________________________________________________________________
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7. Collect Evidence
__________________________________________________________________________
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ELO 6-6
Determine an appropriate operational/tactical response for a
pre-detonation incident based on situational variables.
This slide outlines key information about the bomb threat called in
to dispatch.