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Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?

Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992


Author(s): Håvard Hegre , Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, (Mar., 2001), pp. 33-48
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117627
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1 March2001

Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change,


and 1816-1992
Civil War,
HAIVARD HEGRE International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and Universityof Oslo
TANJA ELLINGSEN Universityof Oslo
SCOTT GATES International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and Michigan State University
NILS PETTER GLEDITSCH International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and Norwegian
Universityof Science and Technology
Coherentdemocracies
andharshly stateshavefewcivilwars,andintermediate
authoritarian regimes
Domesticviolencealso seems to be associatedwithpoliticalchange,
are the most conflict-prone.
whethertowardgreaterdemocracyor greaterautocracy.Is the greaterviolenceof intermediate
regimesequivalentto thefindingthatstatesin politicaltransitionexperiencemoreviolence?If bothlevelof
democracyandpoliticalchangeare relevant,to whatextentis civil violencerelatedto each?Basedon an
analysisof theperiod1816-1992, we concludethatintermediate regimesare mostproneto civil war,even
whentheyhavehad timeto stabilizefrom a regimechange.In the longrun,sinceintermediate regimesare
less stablethanautocracies,whichin turnare less stablethandemocracies,durabledemocracyis the most
probableend-pointof thedemocratization process.Thedemocraticcivilpeaceis not onlymorejust thanthe
autocraticpeace but also morestable.

are both explanationsrelevant?That is the key issue


1991; Vanhanen 2000) has raised hopes for a examinedin this article.
more peaceful world. The thesis of the demo- We link level of democracyand regimechangein an
craticpeace suggeststhat the spreadof democracywill empiricalanalysisthat uses data from 152 countriesin
promote a decline in interstatewarfare(Doyle 1986; the period 1816-1992. We also explore the implica-
Russett 1993),at least once the unsettlingeffectsof the tions of the direction and magnitude of political
transitionperiod are overcome (Ward and Gleditsch change.The statisticalmodel we formulateovercomes
1998). But does democratizationalso lead to civil some of the problems in research that is based on
peace? country-years,such as the fact that these do not
Considerableresearch has examined how regime constitute independent observations,as well as the
type or the level of democracyrelates to domestic possibilitythat the amountof civilwar in the systemof
conflict.Much of it focuses on the result that semide- states fluctuatesover time. Finally,our work adopts a
mocracies(regimesintermediatebetweena democracy multivariateframeworkwith severalcontrolvariables,
and an autocracy)exhibita higherpropensityfor civil among them socioeconomic and cultural factors, as
conflict than either extreme. Another strand of re- well as spatial and temporal contagion. A separate
search focuses on how changes in regime lead to analysis,with a more extensiveset of controlvariables,
domesticconflict.This has implicationsfor the former is performedfor the post-WorldWar II period.
finding, since semidemocraciesare more prone to
regime change. Indeed, is the greater propensityfor AND
DEMOCRACY,DEMOCRATIZATION,
violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the CIVILWAR
finding that states in political transition experience
moreviolence?Are the resultsrelatingcivilviolenceto Level of Democracy and Civil War
level andchange,in fact,one andthe samefinding?Or,
Harshlyauthoritarianstates and institutionallyconsis-
tent democracies experience fewer civil wars than
HAvardHegre is a Researcher,and Scott Gates and Nils Petter intermediateregimes(de Nardo 1985;Francisco1995;
Gleditschare ResearchProfessorsat the InternationalPeace Re- Mullerand Weede 1990),whichpossess inherentcon-
search Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Fuglehauggata11, Oslo, Norway. tradictionsas a result of being neither democraticnor
TanjaEllingsenis ResearchFellow at the Departmentof Political
Science,Universityof Oslo, Norway.Hegreis also affiliatedwith the autocratic.Semidemocraciesare partlyopen yet some-
Universityof Oslo, Gates with Michigan State University,and what repressive, a combination that invites protest,
Gleditschwith the NorwegianUniversityof Scienceof Technology. rebellion,and other formsof civilviolence.Repression
The authorsmaybe contactedat cwp@prio.no. leads to grievancesthat induce groupsto take action,
The dataandcommandfiles used in this studycan be downloaded
An earlierversionof this
from http://www.prio.no/cwp/datasets.asp. and openness allowsfor them to organizeand engage
articlewaspresentedat the InternationalStudiesAssociationannual in activitiesagainstthe regime.Such institutionalcon-
meetingin 1997.We thankthe NationalScienceFoundation(grant tradictionsimplya level of politicalincoherence,which
no. SBR 9810092), the Research Council of Norway, and the is linked to civil conflict.
DevelopmentEconomicsResearch Group at the World Bank for A number of works support the hypothesisof an
theirsupport.We also thankAda Finifter,the anonymousreviewers
at theAPSR, andthe numerouspeoplewho madehelpfulcomments invertedU-shaped curvebetween democracyand do-
on earlierdrafts. mesticviolence,but most are based on a smallnumber

33
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

of cases or a short period. For instance, Francisco Politicalchange,whetherin the form of democratiza-
(1995) examinesonly the formerGermanDemocratic tion or autocratization,can create instability.The loss
Republic,Czechoslovakia,andthe PalestinianIntifada. of legitimacyby the regimeinducesdissatisfiedgroups
The study by Muller and Weede (1990) used data to struggle against it. If the direction of change is
collected by Taylorand Jodice (1983) for 1973-77.1 toward autocracy,the deconsolidationof political in-
Ellingsen and Gleditsch (1997) confirmed the in- stitutions also implies increasingrepression(Zanger
verted U-shaped curve for a longer period, 1973-92. 2000, 225-6). Repression by a regime without well-
Using two differentmeasuresof democracy,theyfound developedpoliticalinstitutionsis likelyto promotecivil
that open regimesexperiencedcivilwarveryrarelyor, violence (Lichbach1987, 1995;Moore 1998).
in the case of First World democracies,not at all. The initial high level of uncertaintyand unrest
Moreover, by far the highest frequency of conflict caused by a regime changewill graduallydiminishas
occurred in semidemocracies,yielding a clearly in- protesters abandon their aspirationsor find ways to
verted U-shaped curve across all levels of economic obtainpartof whattheywantwithinthe new regime.In
development. the case of democratization,new and more open
institutionstake root and promote a peaceful resolu-
tion of domesticconflict.As time passes,these become
Political Change and Civil War more entrenched,and the likelihoodof regimefailure
The road to democracyis complicated and can be decreases.The patternworkssimilarlyfor autocratiza-
markedby internalviolence and even collapse of the tion. As repressiveinstitutionsstrengthen,the effectof
state (Bratton and van de Walle 1996; Casper and the regime change is less destabilizingand therefore
Taylor 1996). Autocratic countries do not become less likely to generatepoliticalviolence.
matureconsolidateddemocraciesovernight.They usu-
ally go through a rocky transition, in which mass
politics mixes with authoritarianelite politics in a One Explanation or Two?
volatile way. Political change deconsolidatespolitical
institutions and heightens the risk of civil war, as Comparedto well-establisheddemocraciesor autocra-
discussedby a numberof scholars(e.g., Sahinand Linz cies, intermediateregimeshave a higherhazardof civil
1995;Tarrow1994). war, as do regimes just emerging from a political
In a classic argument,de Tocqueville([1856] 1955, transition.Are these two findingsone and the same?
182) points out that "revolutionsdo not alwayscome Semidemocraciesmay be more prone to civil war
when things are going from bad to worse.... Usually because, on average,they have more recentlyunder-
the most dangeroustime for a bad governmentis when gone a politicalchange. Gurr (1974, 1500) finds that
it attemptsto reform itself."Huntington(1991) finds the average persistence of the highly coherent poli-
that political violence is frequentlycoupled with de- ties-democracies and autocracies--exceeds that of
mocratization.Such changes are unlikely to occur "anocracies,"or politieswith mixedauthoritypatterns.
without serious conflict, especially in countries with Below, we corroboratethis finding with newer data.
differentethnic minorities(Horowitz 1993). Commu- The implicationis that we cannot readily determine
nal groups in liberalizingautocracieshave substantial whether a high risk of civil war is due to level of
opportunitiesfor mobilization,but such states usually democracyor regimechange.The two factorsunques-
lack the institutionalresourcesto reach the kinds of tionably overlap. Does the inherent inconsistencyof
accommodation typical of established democracy semidemocraciesaccount entirely for their greater
(Gurr1993,165).Whenauthoritarianism collapsesand frequencyof civil war? Or does the youth of semide-
is followed by ineffectualefforts to establish democ- mocraciesfully explain why they are more prone to
racy,the interimperiod of relativeanarchyis ripe for conflict?Or do both factorsaffectthe riskof civilwar?
ethnonationalor ideologicalleaderswho wantto orga- We cannot satisfactorilyanswer these questions
nize rebellion. without includingboth political change and level of
Theoretically,consolidationcan occur anywhereon democracyin our analyses.If both factorsare relevant,
the autocracy-democracy spectrum. Those at either we wouldexpectto see evidenceof an invertedU-curve
extremecan be consolidatedor unconsolidated.Con- even when controlling for the time since regime
solidated autocraciesexhibit self-enforcingrules and change.By controllingfor each variable,we can assess
institutionsthat prevent protest and other activities whetherone, the other, or both are significant.
aimed against the state. Semidemocraciesalso may
become consolidated.If the centralidea of an inverted
U-curve describes the relationshipbetween regime HYPOTHESES
type and civil war, however, the inconsistent and
contradictorynature of these regimes should prevent In an attempt to distinguishbetween intermediate
them from becomingconsolidated. positionor changeas the causeof civilconflict,we posit
Political institutions also can be deconsolidated. the followinghypotheses.

1 Krain and Myers HYPOTHESIS 1. Semidemocracies are more likely to ex-


(1997) find that democracies are less prone to civil
war than autocracies, but they do not account for semidemocracies perience civil war than either democracies or autocra-
and only provide a bivariate analysis. cies.

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

HYPOTHESIS 2. Institutionallyconsistentdemocracies ing peace, but then nothing would remain of the
and starkautocraciesareequallyunlikelyto experience country-yearstructure.If we do not censor at all, we
civil war. have a poor basis for estimatingthe statisticalsignifi-
cance of the parameterestimates.
HYPOTHESIS 3. Countriesthat have undergonea recent
Analytical techniques for country-yeardata also
political transitionare more likelyto experiencecivil assume a constant baseline probabilityof civil war,
warthancountrieswhosepoliticalsystemhas remained
stable. regardlessof other variables.One could imaginethat
the amountof civilwar in the interstatesystemfluctu-
HYPOTHESIS 4. The two relationships describedin hy- ates over time, followingglobal political, ideological,
potheses 1 and 3 are both valid and reinforceeach and economic variations.If this fluctuationis corre-
other.Thus,the likelihoodof civil warin semidemoc- lated with trendsin the independentvariables,there is
raciesremainshigherthanin otherregimetypes,evena a potential problem, and to solve it Raknerud and
long time a
after regimechange. Hegre (1997) formulatedan applicationof the Cox
regressionmodel.3We modifytheir model to applyit
Hypothesis 1 reflects the invertedU-curve regarding to civil war. The main idea of Cox regressionis the
the relationshipbetween level of democracyand do- assumptionthatthe hazardof civilwarXA(t)for country
mestic violence, and hypothesis3 states that regime c can be factoredinto a parametricfunctionof (time-
change leads to a heightened risk of civil war in the dependent)risk factorsand a nonparametricfunction
short run. Both have found supportin previouswork. of time itself, the baseline hazard:
Hypothesis2 states that the invertedU-curve is sym-
metric,as demonstratedby Mullerand Weede (1990)
and in contrastto Krainand Myers(1997). Hypothesis
4 accountsfor the possibilitythat hypotheses1 and 3 Xc(t)= ot(t)exp 13kXc(t)
k=l1
are complementary.A rejectionof hypothesis4 would
mean that either hypothesis 1 or 3 is a sufficient a(t), the baseline hazard, is an arbitraryfunction
explanation of the probabilityof civil war. reflecting unobservedvariablesat the systemlevel. The
baseline hazardwill accountfor any time trend in the
data.Xkc(t) is a (possiblytime-dependent)explanatory
RESEARCHDESIGN variablefor countryc; 3kis the correspondingregres-
sion coefficient;and p is the number of explanatory
The Cox Regression Model variables.All legitimatevariablesare knownbefore t;
they mustbe a partof the historyup until immediately
Comparablestudiesin this field have made use of data before
sets with country-yearsas the unit of observation(e.g., pointt. Note thatt is calendartime, the number
Auvinen 1997; Ellingsen 2000; Zanger 2000), but if of days since a specific date. This differs from the
common use of survivalmodels, in which t is time at
regime change causes civil war, we expect conflict to which in this contextwouldbe the numberof days
follow shortlyafter regime change. The relevanttime risk,
framerangesfrom a few daysto a few years.To model since the last civilwar or since the countryenteredthe
civil war as a consequenceof regime change,we have study.
to relate conflict to regime informationup to the last To execute an analysiswith this model, we need a
data file constructedin the followingway. For each t,,
day before the civil war breaks out. A country-year that each
approach is unsuitable for modeling swift changes, take a
is, day a civilwar breaksout somewhere,we
because it makes sequential events in the same year "snapshot" of the internationalsystem. We
be include the values of the explanatoryvariableson that
appearto simultaneous.Also, the Correlatesof War for all countries that are system
(COW) data on civil war are coded by date, and the particularday,
members and nottw,
already at war.Whenwe do not have
PolityIIId data set exactlydates regimechangesto the data on a such as for the ethnic heteroge-
extent possible.Such precisionallowsus to controlfor daily basis,
whethera conflictrepresentsdiffusionof international neity and development variables, we enterthe valuefor
the year in which the event occurred.4 The Cox regres-
war or of civil war in a neighboringcountry.
As argued in a study of interstate war (Raknerud and sion model compares the country that eruptedin warat
Hegre 1997), the country-year structure has disadvan- t, to all countries at risk of doing so. Thus, all
information for the time between different war out-
tages of a more statistical nature.2 Country-years do
not constitute independent observations. If a civil war breaks is ignored (except when estimating the baseline
continues for some time, war data for the subsequent hazard).
country-yearswill be highly dependent on the first year. Using the Cox regression model, civil war may be
modeled as a function of events as recent as the day
Removing (censoring) country-years with continuing
civil war may ameliorate this problem. Correspond- before the outbreak, unlike the country-year frame-
work. Since all that happens between the outbreaks of
ingly, however, consecutive years of peace in a country
are just as dependent on the first year of peace. If we
3A good description of the Cox (1972) model can be found in
censor continuing war, we also should censor continu-
McCullagh and Nelder 1989 and Collett 1994.
4 Ideally, these variables also should have been coded on a day-to-
2 Raknerud and Hegre (1997) were concerned with the dyad-year day basis. This is not a substantial problem, however, since their
structure, but most of their arguments apply equally to country-years. values usually do not change dramatically over a short time.

35
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

war is ignored, dependence between units caused by is important,because a period of low-level domestic
consecutiveyears of peace is not a problem.Finally, turmoilbeforehandmay underminethe political sys-
possibleconfoundingtime trendsin the probabilityof tem, but this is unlikelyto affecta largenumberof civil
civil war are handled by the nonparametricbaseline wars.
hazardfunction.
The parameterPk can be interpretedas a relative Regime Type and Regime Change
probabilityof civil war. Assume that countriesi andj For regime type, we use the Polity IIId data set
have the same values on all explanatoryvariables
except for Xk(t). Then, from equation 1, the ratio (McLaughlinet al. 1998),whichcoversour spatialand
betweenthe hazardof civilwarof countryi andcountry temporal domain. The democracy-autocracyindex
used by Jaggers and Gurr (1995) and others is our
j becomes measure of Democracy: -10 = most autocratic, 10 =
2 most democratic. We add Democracy Squared, the
hi(t) t
xj(t)At
A_ ()) (2) square of this variable, to allow modeling of the
exp [k(Xk(t)- U-curve relationshipbetween level of democracyand
Hence, we have conflict.6
To model the relationshipbetween the time since
In - (3) regime change and the risk of civil war, we defined
Xk(t) Xk(t), Proximity of Regime Change as x = exp(-days since
i(t)-At= =k
regimechange/ao), wherea is some chosendivisor.This
where X(t)At is approximatelythe probabilityof a
transition (from peace to war) in the "small"time exponentialfunctionhas the value 1 when the regime
interval (t, t + At). In the ratios above, the time interval change is proximateand is close to zero when the
At cancels out, and the parameter 3k is the log of the change occurreda long time ago. It reflects the as-
relativeprobability(or the relativerisk) between two sumption that the effect of regime change on the
countriesthat differby one unit on the variableXk(t) probabilityof civil war decreasesat a constantrate.
A weaknessof the Politydata set is that an on-going
and are otherwiseidentical. civil war or other politicalviolence in the countrymay
be reflected in the coding of regime characteristics,
Time Frame notably in the indicatorsthat characterizeregulation
and competitivenessof participation.A countrywith
Our core analysiswith all the variablesmakes use of extensivepoliticalviolence is unlikelyto be coded as a
data for 1946 to 1992. A more limited analysiswith full democracyor a full autocracy.Because there may
fewer variables is carried out for the entire COW be an overrepresentationof political violence in the
period, 1816-1992. regimes coded intermediate,our results may be con-
founded somewhat,since a civil war as defined in the
The Dependent Variable COW project (1,000 deaths) may have begun earlier
with a lower level of violence. We return to this
The dependentvariableis the outbreakof civil war as
recordedin the COWproject(Singerand Small1994). question in the analysissection.
The Polity III data set (Gurr,Jaggers,and Moore
Civil war is defined as an internalwar in which:"(a)
1989; Jaggers and Gurr 1995) codes regime change
militaryaction was involved,(b) the nationalgovern- only annually.This makes it difficultto pinpoint a
ment at the time was actively involved, (c) effective
resistance(as measuredby the ratio of fatalitiesof the change relativeto the outbreakof civil war. In Polity
weakerto the strongerforces) occurredon both sides, IIId the regime change is recordedto the exact day
wheneverpossible,so if one occurredin the same year
and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted"(Singer as the outbreak of a civil war, the newer data set
and Small 1994, part 3). The COW project does not enablesus to code the regimescore for the daybefore
distinguishbetween differentconflictswithinthe same the outbreak.With these data we could also count the
country;if a civilwar breaksout while anothercontin- numberof dayssince the last regimechange(if anyhad
ues in a different region of the country, this is not
reflected in the data set. occurred) for all countries for each time-point with
outbreak of civil war A regime change is defined
The criteria for coding the start of a COW civil war as an alteration in an(tw).
existing state greater than or
are potentially problematic. Coders have dated the
equal to 2 in the democracy-autocracy index, or as the
start to the year in which the threshold of 1,000 deaths creation of a new state.' Because the range is 20 points,
was reached, which means that previous months or
even years of some wars would not count.5 Most wars 6 A square term is the simplest model of a curvilinear pattern. We
escalate quickly from the first shots to the peak level of also fitted models with democracy as a 7-category and 21-category
severity, but we cannot exclude the possibility that variable, as well as a model with a cubic term. All these suggested
some commence before the regime change that we very similar relationships between the level of democracy and the risk
of civil war. According to likelihood ratio tests, however, none
code as the most recent. The definition of the start day
performed better than the model reported in Table 2.
7 If the country just entered or left a period of transition (coded in
5 We have not found precise coding criteria for war starting dates. Polity IIId as -66, -77, or -88), the event is not coded as a regime
Our source here is a personal communication from Melvin Small, change, regardless of what kind of regime the country had before the
June 16, 1998. transition.

36
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

this definition is very inclusive, and it captures all since the last civilwar ended/a). For a countrythat has
politicalchangesthat mightbe related to civil war. never had a civilwar, the variableis assigneda 0.8
War againstanotherstate mayengenderwarwithin.
An internationalwar may provide an opportunityfor
ControlVariables dissident groups to attack a weakened regime, or
Our model does not attempt to present an inclusive anothercountry'sgovernmentmay incite a revolt.Yet,
theoryof civilwar,but level of democracyand political internationalwar may reduce the probabilityof civil
change do not providea completeexplanation.There- war because the populationunites againsta common
fore, we identify a number of control variables- enemy. We remainneutral as to the directionof this
Development,Ethnic Heterogeneity, Proximityof Inde- relationship.To test it, we include a dichotomous
pendence, and International War in Country-whose variable, International Warin Country,which is coded 1
omissionmight bias the resultsfor the regime change if the countrywas involved in an interstatewar (as
variable.The remainingcontrolvariables-Proximityof defined in the COW InterstateWar data set) the day
Civil Warand NeighboringCivil War-are includedto before the day of observation.
model how the hazardof civil war depends on earlier Likewise,civil war may spreadfrom one countryto
events in the country and the neighborhood.With nearby areas. The variable Civil War in Neighboring
these controls,we may assumethat the units of obser- Countryhas the value 1 if there was a civil war in a
vations are conditionallyindependent (cf. Raknerud neighboringcountrythe day before the day of obser-
and Hegre 1997, 386-8). vation.
Civilwar occurs more frequentlyin poor, underde- Finally, we have added the variable Proximityof
veloped countries(Hauge and Ellingsen1998). Refer- Independence,which equals exp(- time in days since
ring to modernizationtheory, Hibbs (1973, 21-3) re- day of independence/o).Political institutionsin new
lates the decline in internalviolence to the reduced states are assumed to be poorly consolidated,which
class conflict in all affluent societies, which renders may have implicationsfor their regime type as well as
negotiatedoutcomesand conciliationmore acceptable for their modes of conflictresolution.Since the decla-
to all groups.Yet, since class conflictsincreasein the ration of nationalindependenceis coded as all coun-
earlystage of industrializationin traditionallyagrarian tries' first regime change, this variable is correlated
societies, the relationshipbetween level of develop- with proximityof regime change, but not very highly
ment and politicalviolence maybe curvilinear.For the (see Appendix A for the correlationmatrix for the
poorest countries,developmentmay actuallystimulate independentvariables).A newly independentcountry
violence. Hibbs does find evidence for a moderate may have many changes of governmentthat are not
curvilinearpattern,as do Collier and Hoeffler(1998). regime changes in the sense defined here. Another
To control for the level of development,we use aspectof the unsettledcharacterof new nationsis that
EnergyConsumption per Capita(measuredas coal-ton theirborders(e.g., if they are inheritedcolonialbound-
equivalents).The variableis log-transformed,since we aries) may be in dispute and out of alignmentwith
expect the effect of a unit increaseto be largerfor a ethnic or religiousgroupings.This could lead to inter-
country with a low level on the variable than for a state war or to a war of secession, which would be
countrywith a high level. Log-transformingalso re- classified as a civil war in the COW data set. We
duces the skewness of the variable. In addition, we include this variableto distinguishbetween these ef-
enter the squaredterm of this variableto capturethe fects and the effectsof regimechange.
curvilinearpatternfound by Hibbs (1973). We expect We allowedthe proximityof independence,civilwar,
negativeestimatesin both cases,whichwould indicate and regimechangevariablesto haveindependentvalues
that the riskof civilwargrowswith developmentin the for ot.We ran the basicmodel for all possiblecombina-
poorestcountriesand decreasesin the more developed tionsof a rangeof valuesin this interval.9The combina-
ones. The data were taken from the COW National tion of a half-lifeof one year for proximityof indepen-
Capabilitiesdata set (Singerand Small 1993). dence, sixteenyearsfor proximityof civilwar, and one
Civil war seems to occur more frequentlyin coun- year for proximityof regime change maximizedthe
tries with a substantialpopulation of one or more likelihoodfunctionfor the period 1946-92. The corre-
ethnic, linguistic,or religiousgroups (Ellingsen2000; sponding values for 1816-1992 were half a year and
Vanhanen 1999). We measure Heterogeneityby (1 -
S2),wheres is the shareof the populationin the country 8 A half-lifeof 16 yearsmeansa reductionof the initialeffectto 1/8
that belongsto the largestgroup.We createdindepen- after48 yearsandto 0.015after100years.We haveno COWdatafor
dent variables for Linguistic Heterogeneity, Religious conflicthistorybefore 1816.This is potentiallyproblematic,since a
Heterogeneity, and Ethnic Heterogeneity based on the civil war in 1815 could have a considerableeffect on the risk of
anotherin that countryfor most of the nineteenthcentury.Without
data set assembledby Ellingsen(2000). data for the precedingyears,the countryis assigneda 0 until we
The probabilityof civil war also depends on the knowthat it has experienceda civil war.The result is a systematic
country's conflict history. Hibbs (1973, 163) found underestimationof the variableas a whole, such that the temporal
internalwar (but not collectiveprotest) to be strongly dependenceis not fully accountedfor in the first 50 years of our
influencedby earlierinternalwar.We expect,however, analysis.This problemis negligibleafter the 1860s.
that time heals all wounds and constructa variable 9 To be interpretableas dynamiceffects, the half-life times were
restrictedto valuesbetween0.5 and 16years.Thesevalueswere a =
along the lines of the proximityto regime change 263.5 (0.5 years), a = 526.9 (1 year), a = 1053.9 (2 years), a = 2107.8
variable: Proximity to civil war = exp(- time in days (4 years),a = 4215.6(8 years),and a = 8431.1(16 years).

37
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

sixteenyears.'1To ensure comparability, we employed


the set of half-lifeparametersthatoptimizedthe shorter TABLE1. Kaplan-MeierEstimateof the
MedianLifefor DifferentRegime Categories,
periodand appliedthem to the longerperiodas well.A 1800-1992
half-lifeof one year impliesthat the contributionto the
hazardfunctionis halvedin one year,is 1/32(or 0.03) in Median 95%
fiveyears,andis 0.001in ten years.Codingthe proximity Life Confidence
variablesfor a given date requiresthat we know the Regime Type (years) Interval N
Autocracies 7.9 (6.7; 9.0) 445
historyof the countryfor somepreviousyears.The Polity
dataset goes backto 1800andallowsus to knowat least Semidemocracies 5.8 (4.9; 6.6) 452
sixteenyears of regime historybefore 1816. Since the Democracies 10.0 (7.9; 12.1) 232
half-lifeparameterassumesthat the influenceof any Note:Anautocracyis a politywitha score inthe range-6 to -10 on the
regimechangeis reducedto a minusculefractionof its democracy-autocracyindex. A democracy is a politywithinthe 6-10
interval.A semidemocracyhas a score in the range -5 to 5.
originaleffectaftersixteenyears,the proximityof regime
changevariableis adequatelycoded.

ANALYSIS The negative estimate for democracysquared re-


flects an invertedU-shaped relationshipbetween de-
Level of Democracy and Political Change mocracyand civilwar.The estimatefor the democracy
variableis virtually0. In other words, the estimated
We first tested whether intermediateregimes have a inverted U is symmetrical,with the apex at 0 (the
shorterexpecteddurationthandemocraciesand autoc- intermediateregime),and regimesat the very low end
racies. We computed the Kaplan-Meierestimate of of the democracy-autocracy scale are estimatedto be
mediansurvivaltime for politiesbelongingto the three as unlikelyto experiencecivilwaras regimesat the very
regimetypes.The survivaltime is definedas the period high end. This supportshypothesis 2: Institutionally
from one regimechange to another.As noted earlier, consistent democracies and stark autocracies are
regime changeis definedas an alterationgreaterthan equallyunlikelyto experiencecivilwar.An intermedi-
or equal to 2 in the democracy-autocracy index, or as ate regimeis estimatedto be four times moreproneto
the creationof a new state. Table 1 shows that semi- civil war than a consistent democracy.The estimates
democracieshave a significantlyshorter median sur- for the proximityof regime change variableare posi-
vival time than the other two types. On average,less
time has passed since the last regime change in the tive, large,andclearlysignificant.For bothperiods,the
estimatesshow clearlythat the riskof civilwar is high
averagesemidemocracythan in the other categories. after a regime change. Translatedinto relative risk
Semidemocraciesare the least stable type of regime,
whichcorroboratesthe point made by Gurr(1974). terms,the partialeffectof regimechangeon the hazard
of civil war for the 1946-92 period was estimated at
Autocraciesare estimatedto have a shortermedian 3.55 timesthe baselinethe dayafterthe regimechange,
life than democracies,but the differenceis not statis- at 1.89 times the baseline after one year, and at 1.02
tically significant.Gates et al. (2000) provide a much times the baseline after six years.12
more elaborateand extensiveinvestigationof the du- Both democracysquared and proximityof regime
rationof differentregimetypes.Theyfinddemocracies
to be significantlymore durablethan autocracies,and change are statisticallysignificant,which supportshy-
both more stable than semidemocracies.This also pothesis4: Both level of democracy(hypothesis1) and
holds when controllingfor development,the political regimechange (hypothesis3) are necessaryto provide
a full model of the relationshipbetween regime type
composition of the neighborhood, and changes in and the riskof civilwar.In Figure1, the estimatedrisk
regime transitionrate over time. of civilwarrelativeto the baselineis plotted (alongthe
We then tested hypotheses 1-4. The results are vertical axis) as a functionof the level of democracy
presentedin Table 2. We conductedparallelanalyses (the horizontalaxis) and the time passed since the
of the COW civil war data for 1946-92 with all latest regime change.The figureshows that the maxi-
explanatoryvariables,and for 1816-1992 without the mum effect of intermediacyand political change are
ethnic heterogeneity and development variables. We roughly equal when regarded separately.A regime
only included the days with an outbreak of civil war changeimpliesboth a deconsolidationand a changein
when we had data for all variables for the country that level of democracy.The combinedeffectcan be seen in
experienced the outbreak.11The number of countries the figure.For instance,a shift from an old autocracy
and the number of outbreaks that contribute to the to a new semidemocracy(a move, say, from -10 to 0
different analyses are reported in the bottom lines of on democratizationand from 15 to 0 on years since
the tables. These figures vary with the availability of
data for the different variables. 12 To obtain this estimated relative hazard one
year after the regime
change, we first computed the value for proximity to regime change:
10 For the
long period, we obtained even higher likelihood values exp (-365 days/527) = exp (-0.692) = 0.50. This value was
when trying half-life times shorter than 0.5 years and longer than 16 multiplied by 3: 0.50 x 1.27 = 0.62, which is this variable's
years. This was not the case for the short period. contribution to the linear expression. The exponential of this is exp
I1A complete list of the civil wars is given in Appendix B. Additional (0.62) = 1.89, which gives the hazard relative to countries that have
information is available at our website (http://www.prio.no/cwp/ not experienced a regime change in a long time but are equal in all
datasets.asp). other respects.

38
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

TABLE2. Risk of Civil War by Level of Democracy and Proximity of Regime Change
ExplanatoryVariables 3 s.e. p-value Exp(3)
A. 1946-92
Proximityof regime change 1.27 0.47 0.004 3.55
Democracy -0.002 0.021 0.92 1.00
Democracy squared -0.012 0.0051 0.009 0.99
Proximityof civil war 1.16 0.97 0.078 3.19
Proximityof independence 1.51 0.97 0.060 4.55
Internationalwar in country 0.86 0.59 0.075 2.36
Neighboringcivil war 0.097 0.33 0.38 1.10
Development -0.48 0.16 0.001 0.62
Developmentsquared -0.066 0.036 0.031 0.94
Ethnicheterogeneity 0.80 0.39 0.019 2.22
-292.17
Log-likelihoodnu,1model
Log-likelihoodmodel -254.76
Likelihoodratio index 0.13
Numberof countries 152
Numberof events 63
B. 1816-1992
Proximityof regime change 0.98 0.37 0.004 2.68
Democracy -0.010 0.019 0.29 0.99
Democracy squared -0.013 0.0027 <0.0005 0.99
Proximityof civil war 1.66 0.25 <0.0005 5.27
Proximityof independence 1.86 0.68 0.003 6.41
Internationalwar in country 0.24 0.42 0.28 1.28
Neighboringcivil war 0.27 0.27 0.16 1.31
model
Log-likelihoodnu,1
-535.69
Log-likelihoodmodel -484.82
Likelihoodratio index 0.095
Numberof countries 169
Numberof events 129
Note:The exponentialof the parameterestimate, exp( ), is the estimatedriskof civilwar relativeto the baselinehazardif all otherexplanatoryvariables
are zero (cf. equation3 above). Ifsome of the variablesare nonzero, is the hazardrelativeto othercountrieswithsimilarvalues for all the other
exp(/) model) (Greene1997, 891). Forthe democracyvariable,the p-value refers
riskfactors. The log-likelihoodratioindex is computed as 1 - (LLmodel/LLnuI,
to a two-tailedtest;3 # 0. Fordemocracysquared,development,and developmentsquared, 3< 0 is tested. Forthe restof the variables, 3> 0 is tested.
Allestimates are in the expected direction.

change)increasesthe riskof civilwaralmostnine times 1992 (Table 2B).13In contrastto the common use of
(from 0.30 to 2.68) relative to the risk before the survivalanalysis,the time variable (the x-axis in the
regime change. figure)is calendartime. This providesa roughpicture
In a Cox regression, all parameter estimates are of trendsin the probabilityof civilwar afteraccounting
interpretedrelativeto the baseline.The baseline haz- for the explanatoryvariables. The increase in the
ard X(t) is the nonstationaryprobabilityof civil war baselinehazardafter WorldWar II demonstratesthat
withina shortintervalin countriesfor whichall covari- assuminga constantbaselineprobabilityof civilwar is
ates equal zero, that is, countrieswith a democracy not tenable. As discussed by Raknerud and Hegre
scoreof 0 thathavehad no regimechangesor civilwars (1997, 388-9), statisticalmodels that require the as-
for the last fortyyears,are not involvedin international sumptionof a constantbaselineprobability(e.g., logis-
wars and have no neighborswith civil wars, and have tic regression)are problematicwhen there are trends
development = 0. In Figure 1, the baseline case is both in the explanatoryvariables (as evident in the
found at the forwardend of the figure, at the point level of democracyvariable)and in the baselineprob-
marked"baselinecase." ability.In some cases, the problemmay lead to spuri-
In Figure 2, the estimated baseline hazard-the
probabilityof an outbreakof civilwar duringone year 13 The baseline was estimated using the procedure described in
for the baseline case-is plotted for the period 1816- Collett 1994, 95ff.

39
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

FIGURE1. RelativeRisk of CivilWaras a Functionof Democracyand Timesince Most Recent


Regime Change, 1816-1992

RelativeRisk
of CivilWar

Years Since Most


Recent Regime Change J Low

Levelof Democracy

High Baseline Case


Note: The figureis based on the parameterestimates in Table2B. The baseline case is an observationwith democracy = 0 and proximityof regime
change = 0 (15 years since regimechange).Allrisksare plottedrelativeto this case. Forinstance,an observationwithdemocracy= 0 and years since
most recent regimechange = 0 is estimatedto have a riskof exp(-0/527) + 0p2) = exp(3p)= 2.68 relativeto the baseline (cf. note 12).
exp(p,•

ous results.The Cox regressionmodel employedhere The Effect of the Control Variables
avoidsthese problems.
Using the morepreciselydatedPolityIIIddatahelps Some of the controlvariablescontributesignificantlyto
address a question raised earlier regardingthe se- the model. For 1946-92, the developmentvariableand
quenceof events.Evenwith PolityIIId,however,there its squaredterm have highlysignificanteffects on the
is a dangerthat the eventsmaybe reversed,so that the
probabilityof civil war. For that period, values under
civil war precedes ratherthan follows regime change. -5 (7 kgs coal-equivalent)are rare.Bhutanin 1946 is
To test to what extent the estimatesfor proximityof the definitivelyleast developedcountry,with a scoreof
regimechangeare influencedby suchindividualobser- -6.7. The estimatedrelativeriskof civilwar increases
vations,we ran the model reportedin Table 2A using with developmentup to somewhere above -4 (e.g.,
only outbreaksthat occurredmore than60 daysaftera Paraguayor Thailandin 1950,or Mali and Ugandain
new regime. The variablewas still significant,with a
1990). When the level of development passes -3
p-value of .035 (one-tailedtest). A dropin significance
is to be expected,since we removedthe five outbreaks (Bhutanor Haiti around1990), the relativerisk starts
with the highestvalue for proximityof regimechange. decreasing,and it is halvedat -0.5 (e.g., CostaRica in
Consequently,we thinkour resultsare quite robustto 1990). The industrializedcountries in Europe and
the problemof a reversedsequenceof events. North America have values around 2 (7.4 coal-ton
A reversedsequencecreates anotherpotentialdiffi- equivalents)on our developmentvariable. For such
culty.In such cases, the values we use for the level of values,the estimatedrelativeriskis one-eighththat of
democracyat the time of the war will be incorrect.To the most conflict-pronelevel of development. The
make sure that the analysisis not sensitiveto this, we curvilinearrelationshipis consistentwith the findings
ran the model in Table 2A for all outbreaks that of Hibbs (1973).
occurredless than one year after a new regime and The proximityof independencevariableis significant
used the democracyscorebefore the change.Although for the longer period, from 1816-1992. For 1946-92,
only 18 civilwarsremainedin this analysis,the estimate the estimatedp-value is .060. Ethnic heterogeneity
for democracy squared was close to significance does increasethe probabilityof civil war;it is roughly
(p = .065). twice as high in countries where the largest ethnic

40
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

FIGURE2. EstimatedBaseline Hazardof CivilWar,1820-1992

0.025

0.020

S0.015-
(U

S0.010
Co

< 0.005

0.000

1820 1860 1900 1940 1980


1840 1880 1920 1960 1992
Year
Note:The figureplots the hazardderivedduringthe estimationin Table2B forthe baseline case. The hazardis partlya functionof the frequencyof civil
wars relativeto numberof countriesthatare system members,and partlyof the distributionof values forthe explanatoryvariables.Thelow hazardaround
1940 reflectsthe relativelylow numberof civilwars in that period(see AppendixB). The high hazardin the 1980s reflectsa fairlyhighfrequencyof civil
wars despite relativelylow average values for explanatoryvariablesthat are estimatedto increasethe riskof civilwar.The baseline is only definedfrom
the firstoutbreakof civilwar in our data set (i.e., from 1820)

group constituteshalf the populationas in countries internationalwarmaybe an opportunityfor dissenting


where it accounts for 95% of the population.14This groupsto rebel, but it is also a means for the govern-
result is significantat the .05 level. For both periods, ment to unite the countryagainstan externalenemy.
countrieswith a recent civil war have a propensityfor The neighboringcivil war variableis even less impor-
renewedviolence. For instance,exactlyone year after tant. We find no clear evidence for the hypothesized
the previousconflict,the countryis estimatedto have a diffusion of nearby conflict. Civil war occurs more
hazardof civil war 1.8 times higher than the baseline frequentlyin some parts of the world than in others,
for the 1946-92 period. The parameter estimate is but this is due to the clusteringof other factorsin the
clearlysignificant,even more so in the longer than the model, mainlydevelopmentand regime type.
shorterperiod.
We found only weak support for the idea that
countries involved in an internationalwar have a Direction and Magnitude of Regime Change
higherprobabilityof civil war (p = .090 for 1946-92 We have establishedthat the relativeriskof civilwaris
was the strongestestimate). This weak result reflects
the ambiguousfindingsof the literatureon the inter- alteredas the resultof a regimechange,but whichtype
nal-externalconflictnexus(Heldt 1997;Levy1989).An of shifthas most effect,that is, towarddemocratization
or autocratization?And is a large change more dan-
14 Thisfigureis calculatedby computingthe heterogeneityindexfor gerous than a small one? The implicationsof the
the cases: 1 - 0.52 = 0.0975, and 1 - 0.952 = 0.75. The risk of the
earlier resultsare not straightforward for the issue of
first relative to the second is the exponentialof the difference direction and magnitudeof regime change. Table 2
betweenthe two:exp (0.79 x (0.75 - 0.0975)) = 1.92. demonstratesthat a new regime increasesthe risk of

41
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

civil war when controllingfor the level of democracy, change.The parameterestimatesfor the other control
but the model assumesthat all types of regimechange variablesare unchanged,as is the estimatefor democ-
have the same effecton the probabilityof conflict.This racysquared.Distinguishingthe differentdirectionsor
is not necessarilythe case. magnitudesof regimechangeadds verylittle informa-
To explorethis issue,we dividedproximityof regime tion to the overallmodel.
change into five proximityvariables:Small/LargeDe- Figure 3 portraysthe combined effect of a regime
mocratization,Small/LargeAutocratization,and Other changeand an alteredlevel of democracyon the riskof
RegimeChange.A large change is defined as an in- civilwar.The relativeriskis plottedas a functionof the
crease or decrease of six units or more, and a small democracyscoresbeforeandexactlytwoyearsafterthe
change as two to five units. For instance,if the most regimechange.The darkerthe shade,the higheris the
recent shift was towarda much lower level of democ- estimatedrisk.In the "valley"alongthe maindiagonal,
racy(i.e., 6 or more unitson the scale), the Proximityof from the lowerleft to upperrightcornerof the figure,
LargeAutocratizationvariablewas set to exp(- days are countriesthat have had no regime changes. For
since regime change/a), and the others were set to 0. them, the inverted U-curve at the forward end of
Throughout,we assume that the parametera in the Figure 1 describesthe relativeriskof civilwar. Just to
formulafor the five proximityof regime change vari- the right of this valley are polities that have experi-
ables is independentof the initial risk, such that the enced small democratizations.Fartherright are those
half-lifeof the effecton the riskof civilwar is the same with large democratizations.The figure demonstrates
for all regime change types. We also assume that the our estimatethat the risk of civil war is increasedthe
influenceof a specific type of regime change is inde- most by changes that lead to a semidemocracy,in
pendentof the level of democracybefore the change.15 particularif the shift is a large autocratization(the
A small degree of democratizationin an autocracyis darkestarea, to the left of the valley).17
assumedto have the same effect as a small degree of The example of South Korea illustrates how to
democratizationin an intermediateregime, after we interpret the figure. Until March 1981, Polity IIId
control for the effect of changingfrom one level to reportsSouthKoreaas an autocracy,with a democracy-
another. autocracyscore of -8. Apart from a couple of minor
Table 3 reports the results of replacingthe simple alterations,the regimehad existedfor more than eight
regimechangevariablein Table 2 with the subdivided years.For our purposes,we treat a polityof this age as
variable.In Table3B, proximityof otherregimechange equal to one that has existedfor an infinitenumberof
is the onlyvariablethat is not positiveand significantly years. We indicatethat locationin the figureas South
largerthan zero. This is not surprising,since most of Korea1981.The estimatedriskof civilwarwas then .47
those "other"changesare minoror are accountedfor relative to the baseline. On March 4, 1981, a small
by proximityof independence.In Table 3A, proximity democratizationfrom -8 to -6 took South Korea to
of large democratizationis also not significant.Of the the location labeled South Korea 1983, with an esti-
remainingvariables,large autocratizationseems to be matedriskof civilwarof .87 relativeto the baselinetwo
associatedwith the largestchange in risk of civil war, years after the change.In 1985, democratizationfrom
but in neitherperiod are the four parameterestimates -6 to -2 movedthe locationto SouthKorea1987.The
for proximityof change toward either democracyor relativerisk of civilwar two years later is estimatedto
autocracy significantlydifferent from one another. be 1.3. Finally, for February 26, 1988, Polity IIId
Thus, when controllingfor the regime type toward reports South Korea changed from -2 to +10. This
which the change leads, there is no significantdiffer-
ence betweenthe effectsof democratizationand auto- large democratizationmoved the countryto the loca-
tion labeledSouthKorea1990,withthe riskof civilwar
cratization.16As before, the contributionof regime reducedto .45 relativeto the baseline.
changeto the hazardfunctionis greaterfor the shorter
than the longer period. A comparisonwith Table 2
showsthat the estimatesfor democracyand democracy A DEMOCRATICCIVILPEACE?
squaredremainvirtuallyunchanged. Our analysisclearlyconfirmsthat the U-curvedefines
Because gaining independence is coded as "other
the relationship between democracy and civil war
regime change,"there is a high correlationbetween
that variableand proximityof independence(cf. Ap- (hypothesis1). Regimesthat score in the middlerange
on the democracy-autocracy index have a significantly
pendixA). The estimatesfor the latterare substantially
higherin Table3 thanin Table2. This is a resultof the higherprobabilityof civilwar than either democracies
or autocracies.As expected, we found no significant
separationbetween the differentcategoriesof regime differencebetween the riskof civilwar in harshautoc-
15This is consistent with our interest in racies and in strong democracies(hypothesis2). We
assessing the relative effects have also shown that regime change clearly and
of intermediate position and political change.
16 We also estimated a model with three
regime change categories: stronglyincreases the probabilityof civil war in the
proximity of democratization, proximity of autocratization, and short run (hypothesis3), using the same controlvari-
proximity of other regime change. The estimates for 1946-92 were ablesfor the longerandthe shorterperiod.Yet, regime
1.84 for democratization and 1.49 for autocratization. The corre-
sponding figures for 1816-1992 were 1.14 and 1.52. The merging of
change alone does not explainthe higherlevel of civil
categories reduced the estimated standard errors but not sufficiently
to assert that autocratization is more conducive to civil war than 17The difference between parameter estimates for autocratizations
democratization. and democratizations were not statistically significant, however.

42
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

TABLE3. Risk of CivilWarby Levelof Democracyand SubdividedProximityof Regime Change


Variable
ExplanatoryVariables /3 s.e. p-value Exp(^3)
A. 1946-92
Proximityof small democratization 1.54 0.67 0.011 4.66
Proximityof large democratization 1.22 0.95 0.10 3.39
Proximityof small autocratization 1.22 0.73 0.048 3.39
Proximityof large autocratization 2.63 0.75 <0.0005 13.9
Proximityof other regime change 0.29 0.62 0.32 1.33
Democracy 0.0016 0.024 0.47 1.002
Democracy squared -0.012 0.0051 0.011 0.99
Proximityof civil war 1.14 0.34 0.001 3.13
Proximityof independence 2.52 1.06 0.009 12.4
Internationalwar in country 0.85 0.53 0.11 2.35
Neighboringcivil war 0.16 0.33 0.31 1.18
Development -0.48 0.16 0.001 0.62
Developmentsquared -0.066 0.036 0.032 0.94
Ethnicheterogeneity 0.80 0.40 0.022 2.23
Log-likelihoodnull,model -292.17
Log-likelihoodmodel -252.00
Likelihoodratio index 0.14
Numberof countries 152
Numberof events 63
B. 1816-1992
Proximityof small democratization 1.04 0.61 0.044 2.84
Proximityof large democratization 1.37 0.71 0.028 3.93
Proximityof small autocratization 1.44 0.57 0.006 4.21
Proximityof large autocratization 1.91 0.84 0.012 6.73
Proximityof other regime change 0.12 0.46 0.40 1.13
Democracy -0.010 0.020 0.29 0.99
Democracy squared -0.013 0.0027 <0.0005 0.99
Proximityof civil war 1.61 0.25 <0.0005 5.00
Proximityof independence 2.52 0.56 <0.0005 12.4
Internationalwar in country 0.25 0.41 0.27 1.28
Neighboringcivil war 0.30 0.27 0.14 1.35
Log-likelihoodnull,model -535.67
Log-likelihoodmodel -482.00
Likelihoodratio index 0.10
Numberof countries 169
Numberof events 129
Note: See note to Table 2.

war in intermediateregimes.The two factorsare partly were supportedby those data and for the post-World
overlapping, yet complementary. The democracy War II period (1946-92) with additionalcontrols for
squaredvariable,which models the U-curve relation- economic developmentand ethnic heterogeneity.The
ship between level of democracyand the risk of civil relationshipswere tested using a more appropriate
war, is clearlysignificant,even when controllingfor the statisticalmodel than in previous studies, with more
time elapsed since the most recent regime change reliableestimatesfor statisticalsignificance.
(which supportshypothesis4). The directionof changehas no discernibleinfluence
The hypotheses were tested with long-term data on the probabilityof civil war. This is not to say that
from the COW project (1816-1992), controllingfor democratizationis as conduciveto conflictas autocra-
proximityof independence,civilwar,and international tization.The short-termeffects are the same, but the
war, as well as civilwar in a neighboringcountry.They long-term effects are different.As shown above and

43
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

FIGURE3. Relative Risk of Civil War as Function of Democracy Index before or after Regime
Change, 1816-1992

RelativeRisk
of CivilWar
SouthKorea1990
S•\

DemocracyIndex High
BeforeRegimeChange

D
oSouth Korea1987
Democracy Index
AfterRegimeChange

SouthKorea1981 Low O
, Low SouthKorea1983
Note: The figureis based on the parameterestimates in Table3B. The relativerisks calculatedfor a time two years afterthe regimechange. The
variousshadings correspondto differentranges of values along the verticalaxis. The•re
darkerthe shading,the higheris the estimated riskof civilwar.

noted by Gurr (1974), countries that have moved zone, it will take a long time before there is a net
toward the middle category are the most likely to decrease in violence. A full assessment of the long-
experience further regime change. Table 1 demon- term effect of democratizationrequires a study of
stratesthat politicalstabilityincreasesas the democra- whethersequencesof regimechangeandcivilwarform
cy-autocracyscores approachboth ends of the scale. certainpatterns.
Amongcountriesthathavemovedtowardthe ends, the Does the thirdwaveof democracyreducethe specter
analysisin Gates et al. (2000) indicatesthat autocracies of violent domestic conflict? The effect of political
are somewhat less stable than democraciesand are change dependsheavilyon the point of departure.In
more likely to experience further change, which ex- the shortrun, a democratizingcountrywill have to live
poses them to the more risky middle position. The throughan unsettlingperiodof change.But if we focus
most reliablepath to stable domesticpeace in the long on countriesthat are at least half-waytowardcomplete
run is to democratizeas muchas possible.A changein democracy,the prospectsfor domesticpeace areprom-
that direction ensures the strongest ratchet effect in ising. There is a democraticcivil peace, and it may be
terms of consolidatingpoliticalinstitutionsand makes achievedin the shortrunin some countries.In the long
it less likelythat the countrywill slide backinto a state run most states, possiblyall, may reach this condition,
in which it is more prone to civilwar. especially if we take into account the higher survival
Eventually,then, countriesare more likelyto end up rate of open societies, which are less likely to move
at the democratic end of the scale. The conflict- once again through the doubly dangerous zone of
generating effect of democratizationwhen moving intermediatedemocracyand political change. While
from autocracyto intermediacyproduces violence in totalitarianstates may achieve a domestic peace of
the shortrunonly.In the long runthese states,too, will sorts,whichmaybe characterizedas the peace of a zoo,
attaincivil peace, but if semidemocraciesexperiencea a democraticcivil peace is likely not only to be more
succession of transitionsin and around the middle just but also more durable.

44
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n 45
Democracy,PoliticalChange,and CivilWar, 1816-1992 March2001

APPENDIXB. List of Civil Wars from the Correlates of War Data


Days Since Proximityof
COW Democracy Regime Regime Ethnic
Number Country Event Date Index Change Change Development Heterogeneity
329 Two Sicilies 07.02.1820 -10 1,644 0.04 (Availableonly after
325 Sardinia 03.10.1821 -10 1,895 0.03 WorldWar II)
230 Spain 12.01.1821 -4 699 0.27
640 OttomanEmpire 06.14.1826 -10 3,817 0.00
235 Portugal 07.01.1829 -3 2,217 0.01
220 France 07.25.1830 -1 69 0.88
70 Mexico 01.02.1832 -1 366 0.50
230 Spain 07.15.1834 -6 3,970 0.00
100 Colombia 07.15.1840 2 3,059 0.00
230 Spain 05.15.1847 -2 720 0.26
329 Two Sicilies 01.12.1848 -10 9,790 0.00
220 France 02.22.1848 -1 6,490 0.00
300 Austria-Hungary 03.13.1848 -6 9 0.98
220 France 01.01.1851 6 1,042 0.14
155 Chile 09.15.1851 -5 4,640 0.00
135 Peru 12.21.1853 -1 5,241 0.00
100 Colombia 04.17.1854 2 8,083 0.00
135 Peru 10.31.1856 -1 6,286 0.00
70 Mexico 02.15.1858 -3 3,665 0.00
101 Venezuela 02.01.1859 -5 6,605 0.00
710 China 01.01.1860 -6 21,914 0.00
100 Colombia 05.15.1860 2 10,303 0.00
2 UnitedStates 04.10.1861 8 2,506 0.01
160 Argentina 04.02.1863 -3 3,622 0.00
160 Argentina 12.15.1866 -3 4,975 0.00
101 Venezuela 01.11.1868 -5 9,871 0.00
160 Argentina 05.20.1870 -3 6,227 0.00
230 Spain 04.20.1872 1 401 0.47
160 Argentina 09.01.1874 -3 7,792 0.00
2 UnitedStates 02.01.1876 10 1,676 0.04
100 Colombia 11.15.1876 8 3,463 0.00
740 Japan 01.29.1877 1 3,313 0.00
160 Argentina 06.15.1880 -3 9,906 0.00
100 Colombia 11.15.1884 8 6,385 0.00
155 Chile 01.07.1891 5 920 0.17
140 Brazil 02.02.1893 -3 1,174 0.11
140 Brazil 09.06.1893 -3 1,390 0.07
135 Peru 10.15.1894 2 3,059 0.00
140 Brazil 10.01.1896 -3 823 0.21
100 Colombia 09.01.1899 -3 4,775 0.00
165 Uruguay 01.01.1904 -3 8,034 0.00
365 Russia 01.22.1905 -10 32,528 0.00
360 Rumania 03.15.1907 -6 2,448 0.01
600 Morocco 08.01.1907 -6 22,126 0.00
70 Mexico 11.20.1910 -9 10,945 0.00
600 Morocco 01.15.1911 -6 23,389 0.00
150 Paraguay 07.15.1911 -3 2,570 0.01
710 China 10.11.1911 -6 17,998 0.00
710 China 07.12.1913 2 488 0.40
365 Russia/USSR 12.09.1917 -1 44 0.92
375 Finland 01.28.1918 8 53 0.90
310 Hungary 03.25.1919 -7 3 0.99
91 Honduras 02.09.1924 5 1,318 0.08
700 Afghanistan 03.15.1924 -6 1,680 0.04
710 China 07.01.1926 -5 4,443 0.00
70 Mexico 08.31.1926 -3 791 0.22
700 Afghanistan 11.10.1928 -6 3,381 0.00
710 China 03.01.1929 -5 5,417 0.00
710 China 11.15.1930 -5 6,041 0.00
92 El Salvador 01.22.1932 -9 50 0.91
230 Spain 10.04.1934 7 1,029 0.14
230 Spain 07.18.1936 7 1,682 0.04
710 China 02.28.1947 -5 64 0.89
150 Paraguay 03.07.1947 -9 2,577 0.01 -4.08 0.14
94 Costa Rica 03.12.1948 10 10,320 0.00 -1.56 0.04
775 Burma 09.15.1948 8 255 0.62 -4.28 0.48
100 Colombia 09.15.1949 -5 524 0.37 -1.58 0.71
850 Indonesia 05.31.1950 3 155 0.75 -2.71 0.82

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1

APPENDIXB. (Continued)
Days Since Proximityof
COW Democracy Regime Regime Ethnic
Number Country Event Date Index Change Change Development Heterogeneity
840 Philippines 09.01.1950 5 62 0.89 -2.29 0.04
145 Bolivia 04.09.1952 -5 5,805 0.00 -2.09 0.86
850 Indonesia 09.20.1953 0 1,131 0.12 -2.36 0.82
90 Guatemala 06.08.1954 2 1,275 0.09 -1.62 0.69
160 Argentina 06.15.1955 -9 2,382 0.01 0.03 0.15
850 Indonesia 12.15.1956 0 2,313 0.01 -1.93 0.82
660 Lebanon 05.09.1958 2 4,268 0.00 -0.62 0.14
40 Cuba 06.15.1958 -9 1,095 0.13 -0.23 0.47
645 Iraq 03.06.1959 -5 234 0.64 -0.70 0.45
817 Vietnam,Rep. of 01.01.1960 -3 1,528 0.06 -2.94 0.24
812 Laos 10.15.1960 -1 288 0.58 -4.02 0.66
615 Algeria 07.28.1962 -8 25 0.95 -1.44 0.00
678 Yemen Arab Rep. 11.15.1962 0 56 0.90 -4.79 0.19
625 Sudan 10.01.1963 -7 1,778 0.03 -2.76 0.76
517 Rwanda 11.15.1963 -5 501 0.39 -4.29 0.19
42 DominicanRepublic 04.25.1965 -3 480 0.40 -1.58 0.47
90 Guatemala 10.01.1966 3 208 0.67 -1.57 0.68
710 China 01.15.1967 -9 259 0.61 -1.49 0.12
475 Nigeria 07.06.1967 -7 536 0.36 -2.61 0.65
775 Burma 01.01.1968 -7 1,645 0.04 -2.84 0.48
663 Jordan 09.17.1970 -9 4,935 0.00 -1.08 0.04
90 Guatemala 11.15.1970 1 258 0.61 -1.36 0.68
770 Pakistan 03.25.1971 3 2,272 0.01 -1.85
780 Sri Lanka 04.06.1971 8 313 0.55 -2.13 0.50
516 Burundi 04.30.1972 -7 1,978 0.02 -4.79 0.29
840 Philippines 10.01.1972 -9 7 0.99 -1.27 0.04
552 Zimbabwe 12.28.1972 4 2,553 0.01 -0.32 0.10
770 Pakistan 01.23.1973 3 2,942 0.00 -1.81
660 Lebanon 04.13.1975 5 1,699 0.04 -0.02 0.14
90 Guatemala 03.12.1978 -5 6 0.99 -1.46 0.68
700 Afghanistan 06.01.1978 -7 1,779 0.03 -2.79 0.75
630 Iran 09.03.1978 -10 8,582 0.00 0.24 0.71
93 Nicaragua 10.01.1978 -8 15,460 0.00 -0.84 0.51
811 Kampuchea 01.08.1979 -7 1,013 0.15 -6.06 0.15
92 El Salvador 07.01.1979 -6 860 0.20 -1.34 .0.19
541 Mozambique 10.21.1979 -8 1,579 0.05 -2.27 0.31
475 Nigeria 12.18.1980 7 443 0.43 -1.98 0.63
630 Iran 06.06.1981 -6 855 0.20 -0.06 0.71
135 Peru 03.04.1982 7 583 0.33 -0.49 0.75
93 Nicaragua 03.18.1982 -5 378 0.49 -1.28 0.52
520 Somalia 04.21.1982 -7 4,564 0.00 -2.27 0.19
775 Burma 02.01.1983 -8 945 0.17 -2.76 0.48
780 Sri Lanka 07.25.1983 3 214 0.67 -1.95 0.45
625 Sudan 11.17.1983 -7 4,418 0.00 -2.49 0.74
475 Nigeria 02.02.1984 -7 32 0.94 -1.52 0.63
100 Colombia 03.15.1984 8 3,507 0.00 -0.20 0.71
750 India 01.01.1985 8 2,741 0.01 -1.38 0.48
645 Iraq 01.01.1985 -9 1,995 0.02 -0.41 0.45
680 Yemen Peoples Rep. 01.13.1986 -8 2,573 0.01 0.26
780 Sri Lanka 09.01.1987 3 1,713 0.04 -2.08 0.45
516 Burundi 08.18.1988 -7 7,932 0.00 -4.02 0.29
450 Liberia 12.01.1989 -6 1,976 0.02 -2.00 0.10
360 Rumania 12.21.1989 -8 4,712 0.00 1.50 0.23
517 Rwanda 09.30.1990 -7 6,295 0.00 -3.51 0.19
365 USSR 04.30.1991 0 321 0.54 1.91 0.73
345 Yugoslavia/Serbia 05.01.1991 -1 465 0.41 0.55 0.87
640 Turkey 07.10.1991 10 607 0.32 0.05 0.26
516 Burundi 11.23.1991 -4 68 0.88 -3.82 0.29
372 Georgia 12.25.1991 2 260 0.61 0.00 0.51
702 Tajikistan 05.01.1992 3 235 0.64 0.00 0.58
540 Angola 10.28.1992 -6 602 0.32 -2.40 0.86

47
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