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269
In practice,the worryarisesas an objectionto external that is missing from the liberal view. But there is
measuresthat are intendedto inducea governmentto something paradoxicalabout this thought. Once we
comply with the doctrine'srequirements.Such mea- begin to describeevaluativestandardsfor social and
sures by anothergovernmentor an externalorganiza- politicalinstitutions,it is hardto explainwhywe should
tion are sometimessaid to constitutethe impositionof stop shortof a full descriptionof these requirementsas
foreignvalues upon a culturewhose historyand con- we see them. Of course, any such standardsshouldbe
ventional moral beliefs do not supportthem-in the appropriatefor the empiricalcircumstancesin which
extremecase, a kind of postcolonialimperialism. they are supposedto apply,and it is importantto add
There is a reflectionof this worryat the theoretical that this will leave some room for variation.But the
level in a tension between two conceptionsof human intent would still be to state conditionsfor the legiti-
rights that can be found in philosophical thought. macy of institutions.If this is the intent, then why
Accordingto one conception,humanrightsrepresent should we stop short of a full, liberal conception of
the common element in a range of views about social human rights? And what would be the principle of
justice or politicallegitimacyfound amongthe world's distinctionbetween the full and the restrictedconcep-
cultures. A variant of this position, which is more tions?
permissiveas to what might be counted as a human My purpose here is to explore the thinking that
rightbut is motivatedby a similaridea, regardshuman might lead someone to advocate a nonpartisanor
rightsas politicalstandardsthatwouldbe reasonableto restrictedview of humanrights.More precisely,I shall
acceptregardlessof one's (culturallyinfluenced)views take up one aspect of this subject:Does the nonparti-
about socialjustice or politicallegitimacy.This notion sanship, nonparochialism,or neutrality of a set of
mightbe expressedby sayingthat humanrightsstrive rights,in itself,providea reasonto treatthese rights,as
to be nonpartisan,nonparochial,or neutral among opposed to a more extensive set like that found in
conflictingpoliticalculturesand ideologies.4I shallcall internationaldoctrine, as having a special status in
this the nonpartisanor restrictedconceptionof human internationalaffairs?In puttingthe questionthisway,I
rights. mean to distinguishconsiderationsof ideologicaland
The other conceptionregardshuman rights as dis- culturalpluralismfromvariousother kinds of reasons
tinctive of a particularview or family of views about for givingsome politicalaimspriorityover others-for
socialjustice or politicallegitimacy.Althougha list of example, reasons of urgency, efficiency,and institu-
humanrights might not be a complete descriptionof tional competence.These other reasons are obviously
the requirementsof socialjustice for a society,on this importantand mayoften provedecisivein establishing
conceptionit wouldbe morethanthe commonelement prioritiesfor political action, but they are also more
found among, or acceptable to, otherwise divergent easily understood,so for now I lay them aside. I will
views of social justice. That is, human rights identify conclude-tentatively, because I cannot give the view
conditionsthat society'sinstitutionsshouldmeet if we an affirmativedefense here-that considerationsof
are to considerthem legitimate.But because there is ideologicaland culturalpluralismneed not, in them-
no generalreason to believe that these conditionsare selves, limit the scope of a plausibledoctrineof inter-
includedin all the viewsaboutsocialjusticeor political nationalhumanrights,althoughthey may have impor-
legitimacy that exist in the world-or even among tant bearing on reasoning about the connection
those that have achieved widespread acceptance in between humanrightsand politicalaction.
individual societies-there is no claim that human
rightsare nonpartisan.On this view, in contrastto the HUMANRIGHTSAS
INTERNATIONAL
first, the advocate of human rights takes a stand on PARTISANSTANDARDS
controvertedquestionsof politicaltheory.I call this the
liberalor full conceptionof humanrights.5 To place the theoreticalquestion in its political con-
Manypeoplewill thinkthatthe restrictedconception text, I begin with some summaryremarksabout the
is the more plausiblebecause it seems to embody a historyand content of the doctrineof humanrightsas
tolerance of culturallyembedded moral differences we find it in internationallaw and practice.
Although the contemporaryinternationaldoctrine
of humanrightshas manyantecedents,bothphilosoph-
4 In an articlewhose title ("HumanRightsas a NeutralConcern") ical andpolitical,it is principallya legacyof WorldWar
inspiredthe title of this paper,Scanlon(1979, 83) describeshuman II. It arose, on the one hand, from the statement of
rightsas "agroundfor actionthatis neutralwithrespectto the main
politicaland economicdivisionsin the world"and as standardsthat alliedwar aims in the AtlanticCharter(1941) and, on
"arenot controversialin the way that other politicaland economic the other, frompersistentpressurebroughtby individ-
issues are."He does not suggest,as do some of the writersconsid- uals and groupsoutside governmentfor a declaration
ered below, that human rights aspire to be neutral among all of political principles for the postwar world. The
conceptionsof justice or legitimacy.Rawls (1999a, 65, n. 4 and Preambleto the United Nations Charter(adopted in
accompanyingtext) cites the Scanlon article as a source for the
conceptionof humanrightsin TheLaw of Peoples. 1946)affirms"faithin fundamentalhumanrights,"and
s Donnelly (1999, 81) characterizeshumanrightsas "a distinctive, Article 1 commits the organizationto encouragere-
historicallyunusualset of socialvalues and practices."Otherswho spect for "humanrightsand for fundamentalfreedoms
haveespouseda liberalviewof humanrightsincludeWaldron(1993,
10-24), Nino (1991, passim), and Rorty (1993). Needless to say,
for all." (By contrast,there was no mentionof human
agreementabout the scope of humanrights can coexist with dis- rights or any analogousidea in the Covenantof the
agreementin other dimensions. League of Nations [Lauren 1998, chaps. 5-6].) The
270
charter does not give content to the idea of human cultural differences in a way that would make the
rights and fundamentalfreedoms, however. For that content of a person's human rights depend upon
one mustreferto the UniversalDeclaration(1948) and featuresof that person'sculture.The last majorinter-
two internationalcovenants,one on civil and political national conference on human rights, conducted in
rightsand the other on economic, social, and cultural Vienna in 1993,consideredthese issues at length.The
rights (both 1966). It bears rememberingthat the final act of the conference declined to set priorities
declarationis just that, a declarationof the General among categories,holding that "all human rights are
Assemblywithout the force of law, whereasthe cove- universal,indivisibleand interdependentand interre-
nants are treatiesto which nationalgovernmentshave lated."Althoughit recognizedthat "thesignificanceof
acceded. Together these documents,which often are nationaland regionalparticularities... mustbe borne
referred to collectively (and, as I suggested earlier, in mind," it declared that "it is the duty of States,
misleadingly)as the InternationalBill of Rights, con- regardless of their political, economic and cultural
stitute an authoritativecatalog of internationallyrec- systems,to promoteand protect all humanrightsand
ognized humanrights. fundamentalfreedoms" (United Nations 1993, sec.
There are variouswaysto classifythe rightsenumer- 1.5).
ated in these documents.For our purposesit is useful Human rightsare sometimesthoughtto set a mini-
to think of internationallyrecognizedhumanrightsas mal standard,but it is not obviouswhat this can mean.
falling roughlyinto five categories,althoughit is less The rights of the declarationand the two covenants,
importantto agree aboutcategoriesthan to appreciate taken in their entirety,includerequirementsthat bear
the scope and detail of the enumeratedrights. on nearly every significantdimension of a society's
1. Rights of the person refer to life, liberty, and basic institutionalstructure,rangingfrom protections
security of the person; privacy and freedom of against the misuse of state power to requirements
movement; ownership of property; freedom of concerningthe politicalprocess,welfarepolicy,andthe
thought, conscience, and religion, including free- organizationof the economy. In scope and detail,
dom of religious teaching and practice "in public internationalhumanrightsare not more minimalthan,
andprivate";andprohibitionof slavery,torture,and say, the requirementsof Rawls'sprinciplesof social
cruel or degradingpunishment. justice. And those principlesare not minimal in any
2. Rightsassociatedwith the rule of law includeequal very interestingsense.
recognitionbefore the law and equal protectionof Still, one can acknowledgethe scope and detail of
the law;effectivelegal remedyfor violationof legal internationallyrecognizedhumanrightswithoutgiving
rights;impartialhearing and trial; presumptionof up the idea that they are or shouldaspireto be neutral
innocence;and prohibitionof arbitraryarrest. or nonparochialstandards.So it may be useful to
3. Political rights encompassfreedom of expression, recall, briefly and without critical comment, some
assembly,and association;the right to take part in recent instancesin which it has been said that human
government;and periodicand genuine elections by rightsare not neutralbecause they conflictwith prac-
universaland equal suffrage. tices endorsedby one or anotherof the world'smajor
4. Economic and social rights refer to an adequate conventionalmoralities.All of these are familiarin the
standardof living;free choice of employment;pro- human rightsliterature.
tection againstunemployment;"justand favorable One exampleis the disputeabout"Asianvalues."In
remuneration";the rightto join tradeunions;"rea- the last decadesome East Asian politicalleaders (e.g.,
sonable limitationof workinghours";free elemen- Lee KwanYew of Singaporeand MahathirMohamad
tary education; social security; and the "highest of Malaysia)arguedthat some of the politicaland civil
attainablestandardof physicaland mental health." rightsfoundin the internationaldoctrine-mainly free-
5. Rights of communitiesinclude self-determination dom of expression and political participation-are
and protectionof minoritycultures. incompatiblewith traditionalAsian political beliefs,
I note, but shall not discuss,that other international which value socialharmonyoverpublicdisputeandthe
collectivepursuitof sharedinterestsoverthe individual
agreementshave elaboratedand enlargedthe scope of
human rights in the areas of genocide, slavery and pursuitof privateinterest.The civil and politicalrights
forced labor,racialdiscrimination,apartheid,discrim- of the declarationwere distinctively"Western"values.
ination againstwomen, and the rightsof children.6 For this reason, it was said, internationalpressurefor
There has been a long-standingdispute in official domestic political reform (exerted, e.g., by means of
internationaldiscourseabouthumanrightsdoctrineon the attachmentof politicalconditionsto international
two majorpoints:whetherthe internationalcommunity financial arrangements)was inappropriate(Kausikan
should recognize any priorities,either moral or prag- 1993).
matic,amongcategoriesof rights(particularlybetween Or consider the question of the subordinationof
civilandpoliticalas againsteconomicand socialrights) women in traditional Islamic doctrine, elements of
andwhetherhumanrightsdoctrineshouldtake note of which are carriedover into some authoritativemodern
interpretations.There is, for example,no presumption
of equal treatment or equal protection of law, no
6 These as
agreements, well as the Universal
Declaration
andthe two protection againstforcedmarriage,and eitherrequired
covenants,are convenientlycollectedin Brownlie1992. or permitted forms of gender discrimination(e.g.,
271
272
thought to imply that society has an obligation to I believe the reasonmanypeople aspireto a nonpa-
ensure the accessibilityof health care for all, then the rochialor culturallyneutraldoctrineof humanrightsis
existence of disagreementabout distributiveresponsi- connected to this interference-justifying role. Those
bilities outside of familiesor local communitieswould who objectto interferenceto protecthumanrightsmay
presumablyexcludethis right as well.12 claimthat the interferenceis unjustifiably paternalistic.
The narrownessof the resultingconception might It would be paternalisticin that it limits libertyon the
encourageus to think that this interpretationof neu- groundsthat those whose libertyis limited (the "sub-
tralityrelies excessivelyon the metaphorof a "core"of jects")will be better off as a resultof the interference,
rights common to the world'smain conventionalmo- and it wouldbe unjustifiedeitherbecause the subjects
ralities.Perhapsthis is too restrictive;afterall, the idea are capable of makingchoices for themselvesor be-
of a rightis itself culturallyspecific.So one mightshift cause the intervenorjudges "betteroff" by standards
to a more elaborateconceptionthat sees humanrights the subjectshave no reason to accept. A doctrine of
as fallingwithinan "overlappingconsensus"of political humanrightsthat satisfiesa neutralityconstraintmight
moralities.13On such a view, nonparochialhuman seem to offer the best prospectof meetingthe antipa-
rightswould not necessarilybe part of a commoncore ternalism objection because, if the human rights at
in the sense of being recognizedby all conventional stake are neutralin an appropriateway,then it can be
moralities;instead,they would be rightsthat could be replied that the aims of interferenceare ones that its
accepted by a reasonable person consistently with subjects themselves would accept if they were in a
acceptanceof any of the main conceptionsof political positionto bringtheirown moralbeliefs to bearon the
and economicjusticein the world.The idea here is that matterat hand.
human rights should be the objects of a possible The antipaternalismobjection,as interpretedabove,
agreement among the world'spolitical cultures;they faces the followingproblem.When we are concerned
are norms for the conduct of governmentsand inter- abouta violationof humanrightsin anothersociety,we
nationalorganizationsthat anyonewho belongsto one are usually not confrontedwith a situation in which
of these culturescan acceptwithoutrenouncingother people are unanimousin endorsingstandardsof con-
importantpoliticalprinciples.14Such a view would be duct that justifythe behaviorof concern to us.15The
narrowin comparisonwith the present international picture of a "we"who believe in human rightsand a
doctrine,but presumablyit wouldbe broaderthan the "they"who do not is badly misleading.Among the
"commoncore": A value could count as a genuine "they"are oppressorsand victims,and usuallythere is
human right even if it were not explicitlypresent in little reason to believe that the victims all share the
every culture, just in case members of each culture values that the oppressorsthink justifytheir conduct.
could reasonably accept it as consistent with their What this shows is that the perceptionof interference
culture'smoral conventions. to defendhumanrightsas a formof paternalismcan be
There are other forms of this basic idea, but rather a misapprehension.Paternalismis an interventionin a
than proliferateinterpretationsI shall turn instead to person'sself-regardingchoices on the groundsthat the
the questionwhy we should care about a doctrineof interventionis good for that person. The individual
human rightslimited to either a common core or an whose libertyis interferedwith is the same person as
overlappingconsensus.In answeringthis question,we the one whose good the interferenceis intended to
shouldrememberthat one functionof humanrightsin advance. In typical cases of interference based on
internationalpolitics is to justifyexternalinterference human rights, however, some people's liberties are
in a society aimed at changing some aspect of the infringed in order to protect the human rights of
society'sinternallife. Such interferencemightaim, for others. The justificationappropriatelyappeals not to
example,to stop genocide or forcefulpoliticalrepres- paternalisticconsiderationsbut to the desirabilityof
sion, to protectthe innocentagainstcivilviolencewhen preventinga harm or securinga benefit for someone
local authoritiesare unwillingor unable to do so, to threatened by another agent's wrongful actions or
restore a democraticgovernmentremovedby force of omissions.(Althoughnot always:Interferenceto per-
arms, or to deliver humanitarianassistanceto those suade a younggirl not to undergoan FGM procedure
imperiledby naturaldisasteror politicalcollapse. is genuinely paternalistic,but noncoercive interfer-
ence-such as providinginformationand so respecting
12 In Walzer's
(1994, 28-31) view, distributivejustice generally is part
the girl's capacityfor choice-affords a differentde-
of thick but not thin morality; see his suggestive and interesting fense.) That this should not be immediatelyobviousis
remarks on "the cure of souls and the cure of bodies in the medieval evidence of the continuing grip of the analogy of
and modern West." person and state, whichtemptsus to treat the state as
13 The idea of an overlapping consensus is due to Rawls, but he does if it had the moral attributesof an individualrather
not use it in the analysis of human rights. See Nussbaum 1997, 286,
and 1999, 37-9 and passim, for the application of this idea to human than as an aggregateof separatepersonswith wills and
rights. interestsof their own.
14 I think this is consistent with Scanlon 1979, but it does not seem to
In most cases, then, what I have called the antipat-
be consistent with his view in What We Owe to Each Other (1998, ernalismobjection,if it pertainsat all, must be inter-
348). The position taken there allows judgments about the (un)rea-
sonableness of culturally influenced beliefs about value to enter into preted elliptically.It must hold that, for purposesof
bottom-line judgments about right and wrong; there is no guarantee
that these judgments would satisfy the condition in the text. The 15 The point has often been noted. See, e.g., Nussbaum 1999, 10-2;
latter seems to me to be closer to the truth. Scanlon 1979, 88.
273
274
Rawls'sview has been criticizedfor being too toler- a populationthat shares a decent politicalmoralityis
ant of illiberal regimes (e.g., Buchanan2000; T6son different from the earlier example of a genocidal
1994). This may turn out to be correct,but there is a governmentin a racist society. But the possibilityof
danger of overstatement:The scope of international variationdoes not affectthe basicpoint that a doctrine
toleration in Rawls's theory depends on the idea of such as Rawls'smightjustifyinterferencein nondecent
"decency,"which as he understandsit is more restric- societies that could not easily be defended against
tive than it may seem. A decent regime renounces complaints that it imposes alien values. Something
aggressivewar as an instrumentof policy; follows a more needs to be said to respondto such a complaint.
"commongood conceptionof justice,"in whichevery- The responsemight have to do with the normative
one's interests are taken into account (althoughper- idea of decencyitself,which servesto characterizethe
haps not on an equal basis);and respectscertainbasic minimumrequirementsof legitimacy.Where does the
rights, including subsistence rights, for all (so that, force of this idea come from? The answeris not clear
among other things, official discriminationagainst to me. The underlyingthoughtis that a societyshould
womenis not permitted)(Rawls1999a,64-7). It is true not have to satisfyliberalprinciplesof justice in order
that decency is compatiblewith a state religion and to be regardedby othersocietiesas legitimate;a society
with undemocratic,but not nonparticipatory, political may be deficientby liberalstandardsyet still embody
institutions:decencyis, and is intendedto be, a weaker elementsthat distinguishit from a bandof thieveswho
requirementthan liberal justice.18Even so, the con- have achieved a modus vivendi. These elements in-
straintsof decencyare hardlyundemandingand, taken clude the rule of law, an acceptancethat all persons
seriously,probablywould exclude many of the non- have legal personalityand the capacityto participatein
democraticregimes in the world today and possibly publiclife, and a "commongood idea of justice"that is
some ostensiblydemocraticones as well. In the end this shared, at least, by judges and other public officials.
may not be enough to meet the criticism,but it helps Such a society might be said to embody a form of
avoid a distortedpictureof the theory. reciprocityeven if, from a liberalperspective,it is not
It is importantto see that, unlike the commoncore the preferredform.19Unlike liberal societies, such a
or overlappingconsensusviews, Rawls'sview does not society might embodyand promote a single, compre-
requirethe content of the humanrightsdoctrineto be hensiveview of the good life; but it would do so under
restrictedby the arrayof political-moralconceptionsin conditions(includingrespect for "humanrightsprop-
the world. The content is determinedfrom the begin- er") that renderthe society tolerableas a cooperating
ning by the normativeidea of decency;human rights partnerfor liberalsocieties in the internationalorder.
are said to be nonparochialin relation to all decent The question,however,is not whethera societythat
societies, not all societies simpliciter. This is why satisfiesthese criteriaof decencyis to be preferredto
Rawls's view is not open to the objection that it one that does not; so muchis clear.At issue is whether,
deprivesthe human rights doctrine of its capacityto and if so why, decent but not just societies should be
serve as a basis of social criticism.But there is a price regardedas legitimateand, therefore,as qualifiedfor
to be paid. As Rawls (1999a, 80-1) observes,human treatmentas "membersin good standing"of the inter-
rights must be consideredas "bindingon all peoples national order. Why-for the (limited) purposes of
and societies, including outlaw states" that violate international political life-should decency be re-
these rights.But because humanrights are conceived gardedas on a par with liberaljustice?20
so that they are necessarilycommon only to decent At one point Rawls (1999a, 67) writes that the
societies, it cannot be argued that interference to definitionof decencyis simplystipulatedfor the pur-
protecthumanrightsin othersocietieswouldalwaysbe poses of the theory,andthe readermustjudge"whether
consistent with the conventionalmoralities of those a decent people.., .is to be tolerated and accepted."
societies. But it is a seriousquestionwhetherwe have enoughto
Of course, much depends on the facts of the case, go on intuitivelyto makesuch a judgment.Do we have
particularlyon the relationshipbetweenthe natureof a a clear enough common-senseidea of decency, as a
governmentand the content of its society's conven- standardfor institutionsdistinct from that of social
tionalmorality.The case of a roguetyrannyoppressing justice, to judge other than arbitrarily?At another
point he suggests that the content of the idea of
Rawls's sense, only if its scope is interpreted more narrowly than
decencyis relatedto the functionthis idea playsin the
what some believe to be the intent of Article 18 of the Universal conductof liberalforeignpolicy.Liberalstates should
Declaration. The human right to freedom of religion, as Rawls tolerate decent nonliberalstates (which respect "hu-
understands it, forbids the persecution of minority religions, but it man rightsproper")becausethey are so structuredand
allows for a state religion that enjoys various political privileges, such
as public offices open only to its members (1999a, 65, n. 2), and the governed as to be peaceful, cooperatingmembersof
state religion may, "on some questions, be the ultimate authority internationalsociety and therefore do not threaten
within society and may control government policy on certain impor- internationalstability,whereasinterferenceis permis-
tant matters" (p. 74). sible in "outlaw"states (which do not respect these
18 In the political sphere, for example, a decent regime need not be
democratic, but it must provide regular opportunities for all citizens
to communicate their views and preferences to those authorized to 19
I am grateful to Amy Gutmann for help in clarifying this thought.
make political decisions. Rawls (1999a, 64) calls such an arrange- 20The restriction to international political life is important. Rawls
ment a "decent consultation hierarchy."The details are complex, and need not (and does not) claim that decency and justice are "on a par"
I pass over them here. for any other purpose.
275
rights) because their internalfeatures cause them to minimallylegitimate,in the sense of being, for pur-
threaten internationalorder (p. 81). As a practical poses of its internationalrelations,morallyon a par
matterthis may be true, but it cannot give a plausible with a liberallyjust society,then it wouldbe possibleto
accountof the basis of humanrights,becauseit would understand"humanrightsproper"as necessarycondi-
locate the justificationin the wrong place, not in the tions of minimal legitimacy.There would be a clear
significanceof humanrightsfor the rightsholdersbut sense in which these humanrights,as againstthe full
in the beneficialconsequencesfor internationalorder catalog of internationallyrecognized human rights,
of reducingthe numberof regimesthat do not respect could be defended as nonparochial.If the ethical
them.21 significanceof decency derives from that of liberal
Rawls's most perspicuousargumentfor tolerating justice, however-for example, if its normativeforce
decent but illiberal regimes appeals to the conse- dependson the hypothesisthat decent societies,left to
quences of toleration for these societies themselves. their own devices, are likely to develop into liberal
Decent societies, by definition,are open to internal, ones-then the hypothesismightyield a reasonnot to
nonviolentchange, and Rawls (1999a, 61-2) believes interfere in decent societies, but there would be no
that the evolution of their institutions in a liberal deep distinctionbetween "humanrightsproper"and
directionis more likely if they are treated "withdue other humanrightsthat are part of liberaljustice but
respect" as equal members of internationalsociety. not of decency.Indeed,it is hardto see anydistinction
Thisis an empiricalhypothesisaboutpoliticaldevelop- of principleat all.
ment, and I suspectthat some versionof it is true in a
significantrangeof cases (althoughI am not surewhat
would count as evidence for it). Yet, although the PURPOSES AND LIMITSOF
political developmenthypothesisbears clearlyon the INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTS
questionof howwe shouldact towarda society,it does Notwithstandingthese doubts about Rawls'sinterpre-
not bear so obviouslyon the question of the ethical tation of humanrights,reflectionabout his view sug-
significanceof a society'spolitical decencyor, deriva- gests two relatedpreceptsfor anyplausibleconception.
tively, of the proper scope of a doctrine of human I shall tryto formulatethese preceptsin a generalway
rights.Perhapsthe connection,in Rawls'sview, is that and then explainwhy they seem plausible.22
humanrightsshouldbe understoodas a class of moral First, a satisfactoryphilosophicalconceptionof hu-
considerationwhoseonlyrole in politicaldiscourseis to man rightsshouldbe suited to the publicrole that we
justifycoerciveinterventionin a society'saffairs.If that need humanrightsto play in internationalaffairs.The
is correct,then the fact that a value is not sufficientto doctrine of human rights is a political construction
justifycoerciveinterventioncounts againstidentifying intended for certain political purposes and is to be
the value as a humanright. understood against the backgroundof a range of
But whetherRawlsholds this view or not, there are general assumptionsabout the characterof the con-
two reasonsnot to acceptit. First,it is not true that the temporaryinternationalenvironment.23
only role of humanrightsin internationaldiscourseis Second, the conception should interpret human
to justify coercive intervention.As I observedat the rightsas "common"in a specialsense, not as the area
beginning,humanrightsare also, for example,invoked of agreementamong all existingpoliticaldoctrinesor
to justify noncoerciveinterferenceby outsiders (gov- comprehensiveviews, but as principles for interna-
ernments,internationalagencies,nongovernmentalor- tional affairs that could be accepted by reasonable
ganizations) and to justify programs of reform by personswho hold conflictingreasonableconceptionsof
compatriots.We shouldconceptualizehumanrightsin the good life.
a way that is adequateto this largerrole. Second, as Here are some points of clarification.First, to say
before, the argument against interference does not that internationalhuman rights compose a doctrine
easily extend to an argumentfor limitingthe scope of adoptedfor certainpoliticalpurposesis to rejectsome
humanrights.Grantingthe political developmenthy- traditionalviews about the characterof humanrights,
pothesisgrantsnothingaboutthe moralstandingof the such as those that interprethumanrightsas a contem-
values expressed as human rights; the hypothesis is poraryrestatementof the (or a) theoryof naturallaw
about the best means of realizing these values, not or naturalrights,or as a statementof a singlecompre-
about their standingas values. Indeed, the best argu- hensiveview aboutpoliticaljusticeor the politicalgood
ment againstreform interventionin a decent society, that is supposedto applyto all humansocieties at all
assumingthat the hypothesisis correct,is that inter- times and places.24Human rights are standardsin-
vention is more likely to retard than encourage the tendedto playa regulativerole for a rangeof actorsin
society's movementfrom decency to (liberal)justice.
But such an argumentdependson ratherthan repudi- 22 Thomas
Pogge's comments on an earlier draft helped me formu-
ates the claim that the liberalconceptionis an appro- late these precepts.
priate standardfor the society in question. 23
Jones (1996, 183-204) emphasizes the political character of
What is the upshot for humanrights?I believe it is Rawls's interpretation of human rights. Note, however, that Rawls
this. If it were possible to regarda decent society as (1999a, 81, n. 25) has reservations about this interpretation.
24 For
example, Finnis (1980, 198) believes human rights are "a
contemporary idiom" for natural rights (see pp. 210-30 for his view
21
I do not mean to say that Rawls himself gives such an account of of the content and limits of the doctrine of international human
human rights. rights).
276
277
278
In that case the justificationof paternalisticinterfer- ceded that there is no universal(and hence no human)
ence mustfall backon a judgmentaboutwhat it would right to democracy?The answeris that we have not.
be rationalfor people to wantif theywere in possession The question tradeson the idea that there can be no
of full informationand able to reasonfreely,and here right without a remedy, or no right without some
we have no choice but to engage the substantive feasible strategyfor its realization.But the fact that
questionof the value of democracy.Telescopinga long interventionis unlikelyto succeedin establishingdem-
argument, suppose there is reason to believe that ocratic institutionsin a dividedpolitical culture does
democraticinstitutionsare instrumentalto the enjoy- not implythat nothingever will;institutionalchangeis
ment of certain(nonpolitical)humanrights,including a complexhistoricalprocess, usuallyaccompaniedby
the rights of the person and subsistencerights.Then, changesin politicalbelief as well. Moreover,a human
assumingthese other rightsare not themselvescultur- rightto democracymay have practicalforce otherwise
allycontroversial,there is an argumentthat it wouldbe thanby licensingcoerciveintervention.For example,it
rationalto wantdemocraticrightsas meansof ensuring might call for efforts at persuasionand education or
the satisfactionof urgent human interests,whatever supportfor the developmentof elements of a demo-
the presentpoliticalvaluesin a culture.27(Thereis also craticsocial infrastructure(associations,labor unions,
the counterargumentthat some otherconfigurationsof and so on). Of course, to accept this as a reply to the
politicalinstitutions,like Rawls's"decentconsultation objection,one must accept a conception of a human
hierarchy,"would be equallyeffectivein securinghu- right as something different from a legal right or
man rights. Which is correct depends on a historical certain moral rights; for example, although it may
and politicaljudgment,not an ethical one.) generate duties for various agents, a human right
Second, the reply considersonly the perspectiveof cannot alwaysbe a groundfor insistingon immediate
the nondemocraticportion of the population.What compliance.But if humanrightsare regardedas polit-
aboutthe democraticinsurgentswho askedfor outside ical constructionsin the way I have described,this is
help? Again,one needs more information,but presum- unremarkable.
ably the insurgencyhas local causes and respondsto
local grievancesand aspirations.From the perspective
of this group,interferenceis not a matterof paternal-
ism at all but of avoidingor reducingharmor protect- CONCLUSION
ing againstinjustice.It is hardto see how this issue can The discourse on internationalhuman rights suffers
be addressedother than by examiningthe urgencyof from a strangejuxtaposition.In majorarenasof inter-
the interestsat stake in relation to the costs of inter- nationalpoliticsconcernsabouthumanrightsare more
ference and its probabilityof success. Once again, it prominentlyexpressedthan ever before, and there is
seems that the justifiabilityof interferenceto support some reasonto believethat these concernsincreasingly
the democraticreformersshould be faced as a free- motivate action. Yet, within contemporarypolitical
standingissue in politicalethicsin whichthe valuesthat thought human rights are often regardedwith suspi-
interferencemay achieveare comparedwith the costs cion. These suspicionsare diverse.Some people think
and risksof makingthe attempt.There is no categor- there is no such thing as universalhuman rights (i.e.,
ical conclusionpossible about the sufficiencyof demo- rights that may be claimed by anyone). Some think
craticreformas a justificationof interventionin a case there is no such thing as universal human rights
like this. (possessed by human beings independentlyof their
These reflectionssuggest an alternativeexplanation relationshipswith others and their institutionalmem-
of the ethical significanceof local disagreementover berships).Some thinkthat "internationally recognized
political values. It may be that this bears on the human rights"are not rights(at least not in any sense
feasibilityof constructiveinterference,or on its pros- that wouldbe familiarto someone influencedby Hoh-
pects of success in the long run, rather than on the feld). Some thinkthe internationaldoctrineof human
nature or scope of human rights themselves. If a rights is a good idea corrupted by overextension:
significantportion of the populationlacks democratic Although there may be such a thing as a universal
sympathies,then it is not likely that democraticinsti- human right, some (perhapsmany) of the rightsspe-
tutions will be sustained even if a democraticinsur- cificallyenumeratedin the internationalinstruments
gency attains its immediateobjectives.In that case it fail to qualify.And some believethe doctrineof human
could be true both that there is a human right to rightsis a cloak for liberalpoliticalvalues,an instance
democraticinstitutionsand that interferencein sup- of partisanshiprather than a neutral basis for global
port of a prodemocraticinsurgencywould be wrong. agreement.
Why,then, shouldwe saythere is a rightat all? If the I have only addressedthe last of these suspicions
acceptabilityof interference to promote democratic directly, although I have adverted to some of the
institutionseffectivelydependson the extent of demo- others. I have observed that the doctrine of human
craticcommitmentwithin a culture,have we not con- rights,regardedfor the momentas part of the positive
law of internationalsociety, cannot plausiblybe con-
27The argumentis madein Shue 1996,74-8, andSen 1999,178-86. sideredculturallyor politicallynonpartisan.And I have
I made a similarargumentabout the value of democracy,concen- arguedthat this fact, in itself, does not count against
tratingon the circumstancesof developingsocieties,in Beitz 1981, the doctrine.Whatis distinctiveabouthumanrightsas
177-208. a categoryof normativestandardis not their suppos-
279
edly symmetricalrelationshipto the conceptions of but this hardlymeans that the accountwould exclude
politicaljusticeor legitimacyto be foundin the world's moral considerations;in fact, it would depend upon
culturesbut, rather,the role they play in international them.
relations.Human rights state conditionsfor political Second,in some waysa contrastingobjectionis that
andsocialinstitutions,the systematicviolationof which a partisanconceptionof humanrightsis insufficiently
may justify efforts to bring about reform by agents realistic.Accordingto this objection,unless a doctrine
externalto the society in which the violation occurs. of humanrightsis culturallyneutralit cannotpossibly
This interference-justifying role may limit the content playthe role thatwe need a doctrineof humanrightsto
of the doctrine,but there is no reason to suppose the play in internationalaffairs.The reason is that if a
limitationswill yield a neutral or nonpartisanview. violationof human rightsis not regardedas a shared
Indeed,it is hardto see how thingscouldbe otherwise. basis for political action, then the capacityto enlist
In the wordsof the Vienna Declaration,humanrights internationalsupport when it is most needed will
specify conditions that institutionsshould satisfy in deteriorate, and the doctrine of human rights will
orderto respect"thedignityandworthinherentin the become little more than a sectarianhope. The latter
human person" (Preamble); but the concept of a propositionseems true enough, but the point about
personwith inherentdignityandworthis a substantive neutralitydoes not obviouslyfollow from it. It is an
moralidea andwill almostcertainlybe more congenial empiricalquestionwhethera politicaldoctrinemustbe
to some thanto otherconceptionsof justiceor political neutralin orderto enlist enoughinternationalsupport
good. to be influential,a claim that not only has not been
Is this kind of partisanshipproblematic for the provedbut also is most likelyfalse. The growthof the
doctrine? I believe not, provided that each of its global humanrightsregime itself may be evidence to
elementscan be defendedby an appropriatelygeneral the contrary.
argument, as I suggest is possible for the right to Third, there is a residualworry that an expansive
democraticinstitutions.Sucha defensewouldhold that doctrineof humanrightscan too easily be used as an
human rights are "common"in a morallysignificant instrumentof neocolonial domination, as a way to
way without being, so to speak, empiricallynonparo- rationalizethe use of coercionby a hegemonicpower
chial. This, of course, is not to say that culturaland to advanceits own interests.Of course, there is one
political differences do not come into deliberation sense in whichthis is a legitimateworryif not almosta
about how to act. These differencesmay enter in a
necessary truth. If an expansive doctrine of human
variety of ways-for example, as factors determining rights embraces liberal political values, and if the
the feasibilityand cost of a contemplatedinterference
or the risksof collateralharm.They may also enter at hegemonic power identifies its interestswith the ad-
vance of these values, then coercion that is soundly
a more basic level, as factors influencinga judgment
about the rightnessof using coercive means of inter- justifiedby human rights considerationsalso will ad-
vance the interests of the hegemonic power. What
ference, particularlywhen the purposeof the interfer- troublespeople, however,seems to be not this kind of
ence is genuinelypaternalistic.
This conceptionof human rightsfaces a varietyof case but one in whichhumanrightsconsiderationsare
abused or distorted in order to make self-interested
objections.Here I note three of the most prominent
and simplygesture at the kind of reply that might be politicalaction seem to be justifiedby other-regarding
considerations.The fear is that an expansivedoctrine
offered to each. First, it may seem excessivelyprag-
matic to regardhuman rights as a "politicalconcep- will be more open to this sort of abusethan a minimal-
tion."Whateverelse they are, humanrightsare surely ist one.
moral standards,standardswhose authorityrests on This is not an abstractfear. The historyof interven-
tion (e.g., by the United States in CentralAmerica)
recognizablymoral considerations.To suggest other- includesmanyinstancesof what plausiblycan be seen
wise, the objectionholds, fails to take seriouslyboth
the characterand the history of the idea of human as analogousabuses of the values of self-government
and individuallibertyas rationalesfor self-interested
rights.I believe,however,thatthe objectionstartsfrom
a faulty premise. To say that the doctrine of human interference.Let us thereforeconcede the hypothesis
rights is a political conception is not to deny that its that an expansivedoctrineis more open to abuse by a
authorityrests on moral considerations;humanrights hegemonicpowerthan a more narrowlydrawnconcep-
are political,not in the sourceof theirauthority,but in tion. Whatfollows?Since we are conceivingof human
their role in public ethical life. As I have described rightsas a public,politicaldoctrine,it cannotbe replied
them,humanrightsare standardsto whichit is reason- that the possibilityof abuse is irrelevantto the content
able to hold political institutionsaccountablein the of the doctrine.If this possibilitywere significant,and
processesof contemporaryworldpolitics.Theyoperate if unilateral interventionwere the only mechanism
as primafacie justificationsof transnational(although realisticallyavailableto promotehumanrights,then a
not only transnational) political action aimed at narrowingof the doctrine'scontentmightbe appropri-
bringingabout change in the structureand operation ate. But there is an alternative:It is to establish
of domestic (and international) institutions. Any multilateralinstitutionsto protect human rights doc-
account of the authorityof human rights must take trine from unilateralabuse. This is one source of the
note of the political contexts in which they operate, argumentfor a world humanrightscourt, and it may
280
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