Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670

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Reliability Engineering and System Safety

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

Integrating risk analysis and multi-criteria decision support under

uncertainty in electricity distribution system asset management
M.D. Catrinu n, D.E. Nordgård
SINTEF Energy Research, N-7465 Trondheim, Norway

a r t i c l e i n f o abstract

Available online 12 January 2011 Asset managers in electricity distribution companies generally recognize the need and the challenge of
Keywords: adding structure and a higher degree of formal analysis into the increasingly complex asset manage-
Risk analysis ment decisions. This implies improving the present asset management practice by making the best use
Multi-criteria decision analysis under of the available data and expert knowledge and by adopting new methods for risk analysis and decision
uncertainty support and nevertheless better ways to document the decisions made.
Electricity distribution system asset This paper discusses methods for integrating risk analysis and multi-criteria decision support under
management uncertainty in electricity distribution system asset management. The focus is on how to include the
different company objectives and risk analyses into a structured decision framework when deciding
how to handle the physical assets of the electricity distribution network.
This paper presents an illustrative example of decision support for maintenance and reinvestment
strategies based, using expert knowledge, simplified risk analyses and multi-criteria decision analysis
under uncertainty.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Asset management, promoted by several international man-

Electricity distribution networks are the last in the chain of
electricity supply, providing electricity from the main transmission
system to the end-users. Typically these networks include a large
number of assets: medium and low voltage installations like over-
head lines, underground cables, substations, transformers and
auxiliary equipment.
Traditionally, the main concern of distribution companies has
been to offer access to the network to all potential end-users
and maintain an adequate reliability of power supply. Today
additional challenges must be considered, which complicate the
system management process.
In many countries, following the deregulation of the electricity
sector, distribution companies became independent companies
(state and privately owned). These companies maintain and
operate distribution infrastructures under specific concession
rights and, as natural monopolies, are under state regulatory
control. Although the regulatory practice is different in each
country, the goal is generally the same: to keep distribution
companies costs and profits under control, while imposing high
service quality (reliability and security of supply) and efficiency
requirements.
n
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: maria.d.catrinu@sintef.no (M.D. Catrinu).
agement quality standards [1–3], is a relatively new concept for
electricity distribution companies in Norway and elsewhere.
The concept is gaining momentum as a way to cope with
the challenges distribution companies are facing in managing
relatively aging infrastructures under increasing requirements
from stakeholders—owners, authorities, regulators, customers.
However, the implementation of an asset management system
imposes significant changes in how distribution companies are
managed and, in particular, the way to address the risks their
networks and businesses are exposed to. Current asset manage-
ment practices – and related research activities – focus primarily
on quantifying risk in monetary terms, on distribution system
reliability, reliability centred maintenance (or asset management)
combined with estimations of components’ condition (lifetime
estimations, etc.) [4–11]. The analyses of other risk aspects like
for example the risk of personnel safety, the risk of environmental
damage or the risk of a negative public acceptance are usually
‘decoupled’ from the more ‘quantifiable’ risk analyses. Often these
aspects are taken care of by following for example safety regula-
tions or investing in publicity campaigns focusing on the good
sides of the electricity distribution business (especially in coun-
tries where the distribution business is done by multi-utilities).
Generally, asset managers (AMs) in electricity distribution
companies recognize the need and the challenge of adding structure
and a higher degree of formal analysis into the increasingly complex
asset management decisions [12]. This implies improving the

0951-8320/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2010.12.028
664 M.D. Catrinu, D.E. Nordgård / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670
present asset management practice by making the best use of
available data and expert knowledge about the system and the
assets. This in turn requires adopting new methods for risk analysis
and decision support and nevertheless better ways to document the
decisions made.
Based on the work presented at the ESREL conference in 2009
[13], this paper focuses on the issue of offering decision support in
distribution system asset management by discussing methods
and illustrating an approach for integrating risk analysis and
multi-criteria decision support under uncertainty.
In this paper, the use of such methods is motivated by a dis-
cussion on the criteria, risks and uncertainty aspects in distribution
system asset management decisions. Section 3 briefly presents
some of the available theoretical approaches for risk and multi-
criteria decision support, the focus being on how different methods
allow the representation of uncertainty in modelling the decision
problem and decision maker’s preferences. This paper brings
forward a little explored application domain for these methods.
In Section 4 a case study is presented to illustrate the use of an
integrated approach for risk and multiple criteria assessment in
designing maintenance and reinvestment strategies for 12 kV MV
air insulated switch-disconnectors. The case illustrates common
decision situations encountered by asset managers in distribution
companies. Their challenge is to make decisions based on rather
limited information and modelling possibilities and mostly rely-
ing on expert opinion and limited statistical and economic data.
The focus is on emphasising various aspects relevant for practical
decision support using different methods, rather than discussing
theoretical background conditions for value (choice) modelling.
Section 5 offers a discussion of the limitations, advantages and
challenges of the approach proposed, and some conclusions.
2. Decision criteria and uncertainty in distribution system
asset management
2.1. Decision criteria in distribution system asset management
Distribution system asset management (DSAM) is a complex
process comprising the lifecycle management of a large number
of geographically distributed assets. DSAM activities include for
example: asset operation and maintenance, capital planning and
project investment analysis [1].
DSAM decisions are, in general, of a multi-criteria nature. In most
decision situations, asset managers must be able to balance several
criteria, for example, economy (costs and profits) system reliability,
quality of supply and personnel safety. These criteria are in line with
the overall objectives of a distribution company that are established
by its owners (and under the influence of company’s stakeholders
(the state/regulator, system’s users, and society)).
However, asset managers seldom make decisions taking into
account, in a structured way, all relevant criteria in the same time.
Economic analyses of course prevail in all distribution system
asset management decisions. When other criteria – safety for
instance – are also relevant in specific asset management deci-
sions, usually the analyses tend to be ‘decoupled’. In general
adequate safety measures are adopted and their respective costs
are accepted, without an in-depth integrated safety-economic
analysis of alternative decisions. Moreover, the documentation
about how such decisions are made tends to be spread over
various internal, custom-made company reports.
2.2. Aspects of uncertainty in distribution system asset management
As in any other field, many decision elements in distribution
system asset management are inevitable uncertain. Several
classifications exist for uncertainty in decision making. For
example, in [14] two uncertainty aspects are discussed: ‘external’
uncertainty and ‘internal’ uncertainty.
The ‘external’ uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge about
the consequences of a particular choice (decision). In this paper, we
consider that external uncertainty resides in the estimation of the
problem ‘data’, for example: probabilities and consequences. In this
category we would like to include two sub-types:
(a) Uncertainty that arises because of natural, unpredictable
variations associated with the system or the environment—
aleatory uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is outside
the control of the decision maker, e.g. the 100 years big
storm, variations in the material fatigue in specific system
components, etc.
(b) Uncertainties that stems from lack of knowledge about
different phenomena—epistemic uncertainty. This uncer-
tainty resides from the lack of data to characterize the system
or component failure, the lack of understanding and proper
modelling of asset deterioration processes, the poor under-
standing of failure interdependencies in the system (physical
or other phenomena) or the poor understanding of initiating
events.
The ‘internal’ uncertainty can be described as ambiguity or
imprecision in decision making and most of it is due to the
uncertainty in problem ‘data’. It reflects the imprecision in human
judgements: preferences, values and risk attitudes. This uncer-
tainty can stem from insufficient problem understanding, insuffi-
cient data, insufficient modelling, little acceptance of modelling
assumptions, etc.
Under many circumstances it is difficult (if not impossible) to
draw a boundary between external and internal uncertainties, but
this differentiation is necessary because each uncertainty aspect
has different implications for the decision support process, and
the design of decision support tools as it will be discussed further.
3. Theoretical approaches for multi-criteria decision support
under uncertainty
Most decisions involve several criteria based on which alter-
native actions are evaluated. The most common representation of
a multi-criteria decision problem is in a matrix form as shown in
Fig. 1, where a set of alternatives (A1,y,Am) is mapped against a
set of criteria (C1,y,Cn).
Making a decision in this setting means choosing an alter-
native based on an evaluation of consequences or outcomes aik
(i¼ 1,y,m; k¼1,y,n).
Criteria
C1 C2 Cn
A1 a11 a12 a1n
A2 a21 a22 a2n
Alternatives
Am am1 am2 amn
Fig. 1. The decision matrix.
 M.D. Catrinu, D.E. Nordgård / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670
Essential in multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) is the assump-
tion that the decision maker (DM) has a set of values or preferences
for the decision at hand, and that these values can be modelled.
When there is no uncertainty about the consequences, aik are
deterministic and there is a direct correspondence between
alternatives and consequences in terms of the criteria.
One of the most used theories for decision support in this
setting is the multi-attribute value function theory (MAVT)
described for example in [15]. MAVT provides the background
for modelling decision maker’s preferences through a value
function V(Ai) that can be constructed based on a comparison of
consequences in each criterion (scores/partial value functions)
and a comparison of criteria (weights). In its simplest form, this
value function is additive and can be written as in the following:
X
n
VðAi Þ ¼ wk vk ðaik Þ
k¼1
where vk(aik) are the scores and wk are the weights. The value
function is then used to calculate overall values for each alter-
native and the alternative having the ‘highest’ value is recom-
mended to the decision maker.
Under uncertainty, there may exist many possible values for
the outcomes aik at the time of decision (external uncertainty)
and often the values (scores and weights) can be difficult to
express (internal uncertainty). Under uncertainty aik can be
described quantitatively (through probabilistic, fuzzy quantities),
or qualitatively (through verbal descriptions—when outcomes are
not fully known or understood). Very often scenarios are con-
structed in order to simulate the consequences (quantitative or
qualitative) the decisions alternatives might have in terms of the
different criteria. In the construction of scenarios, a number of
methods can be used to model chains of events and phenomena
that lead to different outcomes with associated probabilities.
Widely used are the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods
such as fault and events trees, Bayesian networks, Monte Carlo
simulations, etc.
There are two main approaches to resolve uncertainty in
multi-criteria decision support [14]. One approach is to resolve
first the uncertainty in outcomes by somehow reducing the set of
possible aik to single values and then solve the MCDA problem in a
‘deterministic’ setting. This can be done by using a decision
paradigm such as: expected values, utilities, MaxMin, MinMax,
MinRegret, etc., or to define risk as a separate decision criterion.
The other approach is to define scenarios with associated prob-
abilities of occurrence and evaluate alternatives in each
scenario—however, the theoretical background for integrating
MCDA and scenario planning is not yet fully developed [14].
The most used method for modelling preferences under uncer-
tainty is the multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT). In its simples
(additive) form, a multi-attribute utility function resembles a
multi-attribute value function. The way to find parameters of a
utility function is however different. While in the case of MAVT
the scores and weights can be determined based on direct
comparison of consequences, in the case of MAUT these compo-
nents are found through lottery types of questions [16].
The practical application of MAUT is often complicated because
the axioms underlying the existence of utility functions and the
methods for their construction can be easily violated during the
real decision support process [14]. Moreover, MAUT measures
‘complete’ preferences under uncertainty, when outcomes are
precisely described (usually quantitatively). However, preferences
may not always be completely specified (internal uncertainty) and
therefore alternative methods have been developed to deal with
preference value intervals, qualitative estimations and incomplete-
ness in judgements.
665
For example, the evidential reasoning (ER) approach [17]
relaxes the demands of probability theory by invoking concepts
from Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence. The approach provides
a modelling framework for both complete and incomplete assess-
ments. Rule and utility based techniques are used to transform
various types of information into a unified format, so that both
quantitative and qualitative information can be handled in a
consistent manner.
The purpose for this short overview of methods was to
emphasise that dealing with uncertainty in multi-criteria analysis
in practise requires to
 understand, represent, and model uncertainty in problem
data, and
 model preferences and risk attitudes.
The main advantage of such methods is that all relevant
elements of a decision (criteria, uncertainties) problem can be
systematically taken into account in a transparent and justifiable
decision process.
Multi-criteria decision support generally relies either on effec-
tive facilitation by a decision analyst or on the ability and
willingness of the decision maker to make use of such an
approach—often without being experts in the field of multi-
criteria analysis. In both cases the main challenge is to be able
choose a method that can provide relevant decision support in
each decision situation, i.e. a method that is suitable for the
information, modelling tools and expert knowledge available.
4. Case study
This section presents an example on how the evaluation of
maintenance and reinvestments strategies for 12 kV MV air-
insulated switch-disconnectors can be carried out, using risk
analysis and multi-criteria decision support techniques.
The case is built upon research previously reported in [18,13]
and focuses on the risk of personnel injury during the operation of
the switch-disconnector.
The case illustrates real decision situations in which both
internal and external uncertainty exist. The main input to the
decision process described consists of expert knowledge and
limited statistical and economic data. Risk and uncertainty in
both decision problem formulation and in decision maker’s
judgements are addressed. The example focuses on how asset
managers’ judgements with respect to the decision criteria can be
modelled and how these judgements contribute to the final
decision. The tools for decision support used are simplified risk
assessment supported by risk matrices [19] and a multi-criteria
decision support software being able to deal with both quantita-
tive and qualitative description of criteria (consequences).
4.1. Description of the case
Distribution networks contain large numbers of 12 kV MV air-
insulated switch-disconnectors. These assets are located in med-
ium/low voltage (MV/LV) substations and their function is to
break the load current when sectioning the MV grid. In the
transient period after the opening of the switch – when there is
no longer physical contact between the switches’ poles – the
current will continue to flow through an electric arc until
the natural zero-crossing of the alternating current. Normally the
electric arc will then extinguish in a controlled manner, and the
breaking of the current is successful. In some cases, with slow
movement of the switch during operation, the arc will re-ignite
and the current will continue to flow through, generating energy
666 M.D. Catrinu, D.E. Nordgård / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670
Table 1
Safety risk assessment of air insulated switch-disconnectors regarding the undesired event slow operation of switch-disconnector.
dispersion through heat (with accompanying pressure rise). In such
cases the switch-disconnectors may pose a risk for personnel injury.
Further in this paper we will refer to this risk aspect as ‘safety risk’.
The risk of a slow operation of the switch-disconnector is
relevant when designing maintenance and reinvestments strate-
gies for these assets. The analysis in the next section focuses on
revealing whether all switches can be treated in the same way or
if some kind of differentiation in the maintenance and reinvest-
ment activities is needed for specific types of switches.
4.2. Safety risk analysis
Distribution companies’ experts estimated that a slow opera-
tion of the switch and possible accidents in operation may happen
while working with specific assets [18].They found that the most
relevant factors for differentiating these assets are:
1. The age of the switch-disconnector:
 New assets, age r25 years, further denoted as (N).
 Old assets, age4 25 years, further denoted as (O).
2. The operating environment
 Assets placed in an exposed environment, further denoted
as (E).
 Assets placed in a clean environment, further denoted
as (C).
3. The encapsulation of the switch-disconnector1 :
 Fully encapsulated—steel plate covered cubicles, with
pressure relieving outlets in safe directions, further
denoted as (F).
 Semi-encapsulated—steel plate cubicle fronts, top and
bottom open, further denoted as (S).
 Wire fence encapsulated, further denoted as (W).
The age and operating environment are factors influencing the
likelihood of occurrence of the undesired event, while the
encapsulation type influences mostly the consequence of the
undesired event for the operator.
Further, several asset types have been defined considering
a combination of the above risk factors, e.g. a switch of type
1
The reason for having different encapsulations is that the substations have
been built over quite a long period of time, during which the technical solutions
have improved from the wire fence solution to the full encapsulations.
(N; E; W) is a new switch in an exposed environment, with wire
fence encapsulation.
Each asset type was then characterized in terms of safety risk,
as illustrated in the risk matrix in Table 1. The risk matrix is
divided into three zones, marked with different shadings: the
‘‘Acceptable’’ zone (lower left), the ‘‘On-the-limit’’ zone (middle)
and the ‘‘Unacceptable’’ zone (upper right).
The experts asked to characterize the assets in terms of risk
evaluated that usually the fully encapsulated assets should not
pose high safety risk. Then, among the semi-encapsulated assets,
the ones placed in exposed environment ((N;E;S), (O;E;S)) pose
medium safety risk. Generally all wire fence switches were
characterized to pose a middle to high safety risk.
In this example, risk assessment is based on a qualitative risk
evaluation based on expert knowledge. This exercise is easy to
perform in practise since risk matrices are common tools for risk
analysis in distribution companies. However, in the construction
of risk matrices additional quantitative analyses can also be used,
in addition to expert opinion. For example, detailed quantitative
risk analysis, modelling for example the potential loss of life (PLL),
as done in [18,13] can be used in the definition of consequences
(and probability) scales.
4.3. Risk based asset categorization
The study focuses on a ‘test’ distribution network having in its
structure approximately 5000 switch-disconnectors:
 2500 units of fully encapsulated switch-disconnectors.
 1850 units of semi-encapsulated switch-disconnectors.
 650 units of wire fence encapsulated switch-disconnectors.
These assets are of different age and operate in a clean or
exposed environment. The number of assets of different types is
presented in Table 2.
The assets evaluated to pose medium and unacceptable risk, as
illustrated in the risk matrix in Table 1, are highlighted with the
respective colors in Table 2.
4.4. Strategies for maintenance and reinvestment
The analysis of the asset population as represented in Table 2
show that approx. 6% of the switches (280 units) are of high risk
and approx. 25% are in the medium risk zone (1240 units).
 M.D. Catrinu, D.E. Nordgård / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670
Table 2
Test population of 12 kV MV, air-insulated switch-disconnectors.
Experts indicated that this situation may require reinvestments or
changes in the maintenance strategy of specific switch-discon-
nectors in order to reduce the safety risk. The following technical
solutions are available:
 For the wire fence switch-disconnectors (W), accounting for 13%
of the total population: reconstruct the encapsulation or
replace them with new SF6 switches.2
 For the semi-encapsulated switch-disconnectors (S) accounting
for 37% of the population: improve the maintenance (cleaning,
lubrication, etc.).
Considering the above technical solutions, the following main-
tenance and reinvestment strategies have been considered for
further analysis:
Strategy 1: Maintain as usual.
Strategy 2
(a) Replace all wire fence encapsulated switch-disconnectors
with SF6 insulated switches—650 units.
(b) Improve the maintenance of semi-encapsulated switch-dis-
connectors, in exposed environment (O;E;S) older than 25
years—400 units.
Strategy 3
(a) Replace all wire fence encapsulated switch-disconnectors in
an exposed environment ((N;E;W) and (O;E;W)) with SF6
insulated switches—280 units.
(b) Redesign the encapsulation of all wire fence encapsulated
switch disconnectors in a clean environment ((N;C;W) and
(O;C;W))—370 units.
(c) Improve the maintenance of all semi-encapsulated switches
in an exposed environment ((N;E;S) and (O;E;S))—870 units.
4.5. Decision support
This section illustrates an approach for analysis and decision
support in choosing a maintenance and reinvestment strategy for
the studied switch-disconnectors. A decision support software is
used to illustrate and model decision maker’s preferences based
on the theoretical background briefly described in Section 3.
The criteria considered in the analysis of alternatives are the
potential for reducing the safety risk and the associated mainte-
nance and investment costs necessary to achieve the risk reduction.
2 a
Switches filled with the non-flammable sulphur hexafluoride gas.
667
The example was constructed using expert knowledge, expressed
qualitatively and simplified economic calculations of maintenance
and investment costs. The uncertainty in decisions modelling is of
both external and internal type, as discussed in Section 2.2 and
concerns mainly the safety criterion.
The safety risk was assessed qualitatively for each switch-
disconnector type as illustrated by the risk matrix in Section 4.2.
The other two criteria considered—the maintenance and investment
costs are assessed quantitatively and depend on the number of
assets being considered for either maintenance or reinvestment.
Table 3 shows estimates of the relative maintenance costs and
investment costs associated with Strategies 2 and 3, comparing with
the base case—Strategy 1.
To provide decision support in this decision setting, the soft-
ware IDS multi-criteria assessor has been used. IDS is a general-
purpose multi-criteria decision analysis tool developed based on
the evidential reasoning (ER) theory [20]. The software deals with
multi-criteria problems having both quantitative and qualita-
tive information with uncertainties and subjectivity Qualitative
evaluations or ‘degrees of belief’ can be included in a formal
analysis, together with quantitative criteria. IDS can thus be used
to resolve both the external uncertainty (in data) and internal
uncertainty (imprecision in judgments) as discussed in Section 2
of this paper. Applications of the ER approach in decision support
for power system management are reported for example [21,22].
The first step in using the software is the definition of the
decision problem, i.e. the definition of alternative strategies and
their impact on the three decision criteria: safety, maintenance
cost, investment cost. This is equivalent with the risk matrix in
Section 3 only that IDS allows the definition of a belief decision
matrix of which the conventional decision matrix (discussed in
Section 3) is a special case.
In this example, the criterion safety risk is a qualitative measure
while the maintenance and investment costs are quantitative mea-
sures, depending on the number of assets being subject to a strategy.
IDS allows preferences in terms of safety risk to be defined as
the asset manager’s beliefs regarding the probability (Fig. 2) and
possible safety consequences (Fig. 3) given a strategy.
For example, the probability of injury, considering Strategy 1
(status quo) can be modelled through the ‘belief’ distribution:
{[Improbable, 60%], [Less probable, 20%], [Probable, 20%]}; the
impact of safety given Strategy 1 can be evaluated as: {[Small,
70%], [Medium, 20%], [Very serious, 10%]}. Note that this is a
‘cumulative’ risk evaluation of a strategy, over all asset categories
concerned, while the risk matrix (in Table 1) was developed for
generic assets in each category. The two ways of characterizing
safety risk are purely based on expert opinion, in this example.
The initial risk evaluation for different assets types can be said to
have contributed to the overall understanding of risk, in the
evaluation of strategies.
Further, IDS allows the combination of these beliefs into a total
safety risk evaluation for each strategy, as shown in Fig. 4. This
figure can be considered an equivalent of the risk matrix in
Table 1, but showing the ‘cumulated’ risk perception for all asset
groups, given Strategy 1.
Table 3
Cost estimates for different maintenance strategies.
Increase in maintenance Investment
cost (kNOK)a cost (kNOK)
Strategy 1 0 0
Strategy 2 800 52,000
Strategy 3 1745 29,800
NOK—Norwegian krone.
668 M.D. Catrinu, D.E. Nordgård / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670

and investment cost of 50,000 kNOK (Strategy 3) is likely to

contribute to a lower risk exposure. More difficult is however to
differentiate in this way advantages with Strategies 2 and 3.
Higher investment cost (Strategy 2) means that more wire fence
encapsulated switch-disconnectors (approx. 400 units) are
replaced with safer switchers. However, this may only contribute
marginally to the perceived reduction of safety risk and thus the
difference in preferences for the two alternatives can be small.
This may not be the case when evaluating maintenance cost.
Strategy 2 implies intensified maintenance and redesign of con-
siderable fewer units (400 compared to over 1200 units in
Strategy 3) which may not lead to the same perception for risk
reduction as for Strategy 3.
When all strategies are defined in IDS following the described
procedure, the next step is to define criteria weights.
Fig. 5 shows the normalised weights used in this case study.
Naturally, safety is considered the most important criterion,
Fig. 2. Degrees of belief for ‘Probability of injury’ given in Strategy 1.
followed by maintenance and investment costs which depend
on the number of assets being subject to each strategy.
The results from IDS consist in a ranking of the perceived
potential for risk reduction. The ranking is based on average
degrees of beliefs calculated based on preference and belief
information about criteria and weights.
The results in this case study are shown in Fig. 6 and indicate
Strategy 3 as the highest rank based on preference information

Fig. 3. Degrees of beliefs for ‘Consequences’ in terms of safety risk given in

Strategy 1.

Fig. 5. Criteria weights.

Fig. 4. Degrees of beliefs for ‘Safety risk’ given in Strategy 1.

In the same way, the total safety risk picture for Strategies
2 and 3 can be described.
In addition to the above evaluation grades, rules have to be
defined in IDS, to show how each criterion grade may contribute
to the overall objective – the potential for risk reduction – based
on which the alternatives will be ranked. For example no invest-
ments (Strategy 1) is likely to induce higher risk exposure while Fig. 6. The ranking of strategies in terms of risk exposure.
 M.D. Catrinu, D.E. Nordgård / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 663–670
used, with the following degrees of belief {[Same risk expo-
sure, 19.8%], [Higher risk exposure, 7.2%], [Lower risk expo-
sure, 73%]}.
The result is rather intuitive since this strategy is proposing
improvements for the largest number of assets and has the lowest
investment cost. The second ranked alternative is however not
too far behind in terms of preferences although it proposes the
replacement of all wire fence encapsulated risk-disconnectors
believed to pose unacceptable risk at some point.
The purpose with this example was mainly to show possibi-
lities for illustrating and modelling preferences under uncer-
tainty. The results exclusively reflect a given set of preference
information under the decision setting described. These results do
not have any informative value otherwise.
5. Discussion and conclusions
This paper addresses the challenges in providing decision
support into an increasingly complex distribution system asset
management.
It discusses available theoretical approaches for multi-criteria
decision analysis under uncertainty and illustrates its use in
decision support, building upon available information in distribu-
tions companies. A case study addressing the process of main-
tenance and reinvestment strategy making for air-insulated
switch-disconnectors is presented. The study illustrates how
simplified risk assessment together with quantitative economic data
can be used in a unified, software-based multi-criteria decision
support process.
The software IDS multi-criteria assessor was used for decision
analysis and support. Although the case study presented was
rather small (in terms of the number of assets and alternatives
being analysed), the approach can be used for larger cases.
However, the effort in categorizing assets based on risk will
increase together with the number, type and complexity of the
physical distribution system components analyzed. Moreover,
the qualitative, overall evaluations of risk for different strateg-
ies will become more difficult as the number of asset groups
will increase.
The amount of information supposed to be available to support
the decision in this case was rather limited. The case focuses on
distribution system components that are rather overlooked from
a system perspective. They are rarely analysed in details and
limited failure statistics and condition monitoring information is
available. They only count because of their large number in the
distribution systems. When parts of the asset fleet is approaching
end of life, or when the technical solution used is no longer
acceptable, then large numbers of assets have to be replaced in
the same time—a situation which can be challenging, at times, for
distribution system managers.
The case studied mainly relied upon expert opinion for
analysing safety risk and categorizing, and also on qualitative
multi-criteria evaluations (as degrees of belief). The proposed
decision support approach can also be used when more informa-
tion is available: better statistical data, more in-depth, quantita-
tive risk assessments and simulations that better reflect the risk
and uncertainties involved.
The case presented is a constructed case—it simulates com-
mon decision situations for a distribution system manager. More-
over, we used ‘average’ expert knowledge and we did not involve
a decision maker with responsibility for the decision. Further work
is necessary in order to test and implement such approaches in
practice. Real life implementations should also include sensitivity
analysis with respect to the preferences/choices of the decision
maker(s) involved.
669
The focus in this paper was on the decision support process
and to show that such a process can be conducted by integrating
different analyses and decision simulation tools, which in princi-
ple are available to the electricity distribution system manager.
The link between different tools for risk analysis and the final
decision is often missing in real life decision making in distribu-
tion companies and this paper illustrates possibilities for integra-
tion of different types of analyses. One of the main advantages of
using decision support techniques such as discussed in this paper
is that it allows decision maker’s judgments at a given moment in
time to be described and modelled. This can contribute to
improving the way asset management decisions are recorded
and documented, and thus improving communication within the
company’s internal decision levels or between distribution sys-
tem asset managers and external stakeholders.
Acknowledgements
The work reported in this paper has been performed as part of
the research project ‘Risk Based Distribution System Asset Man-
agement’ at SINTEF Energy Research. More information can be
found on www.energy.sintef.no/prosjekt/RISKDSAM.
The authors thank the partners in the project consortium for
funding the project activities.
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