EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES – ACCIDENT
intention of causing it.”
US v. Tanedo
GR No. 5418, 12 February 1910
Moreland, J.
FACTS:
Cecilio Tanedo (accused), a landowner, went
with some workers to work on the dam on his land,
carrying with him a shotgun and a few shells. Upon
reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to
hunt for wild chickens. On his way, he met Feliciano
Sanchez (victim) and the latter’s mother and sick
uncle. The accused asked the victim’s uncle for the
best place to hunt for the wild chickens, but since the
latter was sick, the victim answered for him and
pointed to a general direction in the forest.
Upon the victim’s recommendation, the
accused then went to the forest to continue his search
for the wild chickens. When the accused saw one, he
shot it, and simultaneously heard a human cry out in
pain. After seeing that Sanchez was shot (in the heart.
NO JOKE), Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked
one Bernardino Tagamba (Tagampa) to help him hide
the body. They did so by putting it amidst the tall
cogon grass, and later burying the body in an old well
and covering it with burnt cogon grass.
Only one shot was heard that morning, and it
isn’t contested that a chicken was killed by a gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of
the crime, as well, and there is no enmity between the
accused and he victim.
Prior to the trial, the accused denied all
knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the
trial that he buried the victim’s body. The lower court
found the accused guilty of homicide, and sentenced
him to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The
accused appealed to the Court.
ISSUE:
W/n the accused is guilty of homicide
RULING:
NO. The only possible reason that the accused could
have for killing the victim would be a sudden quarrel
between them during the hunt, which is negated by
the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the
same time, there having only one shot fired. According
to Article 8 subdivision 8 of the Penal Code, “he who,
while performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without liability or
It is uniformly held that if life is taken by
misfortune or accident while in the performance of a
lawful act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. In
this case, there is absolutely no evidence of negligence
on the part of the accused. Neither is there any
question that he was engaged in the commission of a
lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is
there any evidence of the intention of the accused to
cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the
case at all suspicious on the part of the accused are his
concealment and denial, and no sufficient evidence
was found to support the judgment of conviction.
People v. Castillo
GR No. 172695, 29 June 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim,
narrated in Court that in the evening of November 5,
1993, between 9:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock, the
accused came home drunk and was in an angry mood.
The accused kicked the door and table, and then
threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by
Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not heed
the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling
and arrow from the house ceiling where he was
keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to the
adjacent house of her daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From
there, Guillermo heard the victim crying and,
afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo
concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was
happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda
obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying
the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the
accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the
hospital but to no avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the
infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was
preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused.
This spat negated the accused's version that he was
practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia was
hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the
prosecution's contention that the shooting was
intentional. To sustain the accused's assertion that he
was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of
the incident is patently absurd. The defense even
failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that
the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside
his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of
those who rushed the victim to the hospital and while
on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo
Antiporta further testified that while the victim was
being attended to by the medical personnel of said
hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital
premises, then he disappeared. He was later on
apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside
the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining
barangay. The accused's omission to surrender himself
to the authorities is a clear indication of guilt.
ISSUE:
W/n the injury caused by Castillo to his wife is
accidental
RULING:
NO. It is not accidental.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the
accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to
discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites
for this exempting circumstance, are: (1) a person is
performing a lawful act (2) with due care; (3) he causes
and injury to another by mere accident (4) without
fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of
imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling
and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act."
Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of
accident must be struck down because he was
performing an unlawful act during the incident.
Furthermore, in the instant case, the following
circumstances satisfactorily established appellant's
intent to kill his wife:
(1) The killing was immediately preceded by a
quarrel between the appellant and his wife. Leticia, the
victim's sister, testified that the deceased suffered from
the violent behavior of the appellant who would often
lay hand on the victim during their marital squabbles.
(2) It has always been said that criminal cases
are primarily about human nature. In the instant case,
appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was
rushed to the hospital. This is indeed contrary to
human nature. A husband is expected to lend comfort
to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this case,
however, appellant took flight. It is well-established
that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to
indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in
this case, is a circumstance from which an inference of
guilt may be drawn.
(3) The location of the wound and its extent
likewise proved appellant's intent to kill the victim. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a
punctured wound in the neck, a vital organ, which
fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive
hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted
on the deceased manifests appellant's intention to
extinguish life.
(4) As regards appellant's act of carrying the
body of his wounded wife and bringing her to the
hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is
merely an indication of an act of repentance or
contrition on the part of appellant.
There is likewise no merit in appellant's
contention that assuming he was the one who killed his
wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The
exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in
the instant case.
People v. Retubado
GR No. 124058, 10 December 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone
played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant's
younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone
inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and
gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and
placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner
with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded.
The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. The Cañons and
the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought
to the attention of the barangay captain who
conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit.
The barangay captain considered the matter closed.
The appellant, however, was bent on confronting
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-
year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called
it a day and decided to go home after a day's work. He
drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal
and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The
appellant, who was conversing with Marcial Luciño saw
him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my
brother?" Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The
appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He
overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab
which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored
the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his
house. His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of
their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive.
Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep.
Undeterred, the appellant continued following
Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house,
the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded
to know why he was being followed. The appellant told
Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr.,
but Emmanuel told the appellant that his son was
already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony
and placed her hand on her husband's shoulder to
pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun
from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the
forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant
walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted for
help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law
arrived. They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan
District Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter.
The appellant admitted shooting the victim but
claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act
with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable
for the victim's death. He testified that when he
insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel
went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a
handgun with his right hand. Emmanuel's trigger finger
was outside the trigger guard, and he held the firearm
with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he
would be shot, the appellant took hold of Emmanuel's
right hand with his left, and pulled the gun towards
Emmanuel's stomach. The appellant grabbed
Emmanuel's free hand with his right hand, and the old
man almost fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel
still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun to the level
of Emmanuel's forehead, and the gun suddenly went
off. The bullet hit Emmanuel's forehead.
ISSUE:
W/n the death of Emmanual was caused by mere
accident on the part of apellant without fault or
intention of causing it
RULING:
NO. The shooting was no accident.
A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the
view that the act of the accused in a state of necessity
is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article
12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state of
necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused
does not commit a crime in legal contemplation; hence,
is not criminally and civilly liable.
By admitting causing the injuries and killing the
victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution because if such evidence is
weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the
evidence of the prosecution can no longer be
disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state
of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.
The facts are clear as established by the trial
court that when Norberta heard her husband and the
appellant arguing with each other in the porch of their
house, she went down from the balcony towards her
husband and placed her hand on the latter's shoulders.
She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his
handgun and deliberately shot the victim on the
forehead. After shooting the victim, the appellant fled
from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the police
authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to
surrender the gun he used to kill the victim. The
appellant's claim that he placed the gun on the dining
table before entering his bedroom to change his
clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the
appellant informed the police authorities that he killed
the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother,
Edwin, threw the gun into the sea. The appellant never
presented the police officer to whom he confessed that
he killed the victim in a state of necessity.
Pomoy v. People
GR No. 150647, 29 September 2004
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Policemen arrested Tomas Balboa, a master
teacher of Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Concepcion, Iloilo, for he was allegedly connected
with a robbery. He was brought to the Headquarters of
the Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp
Jalandoni in Iloilo where he was detained. Roweno
Pomoy, a member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company, directed the latter to come out for a tactical
interrogation at the investigation room. Petitioner had
a gun hanging from his holster. After that, 2 gunshots
were heard. Petitioner was seen holding his .45 caliber
pistol facing Balboa who was lying in a pool of blood.
Balboa died.
The version of the defense presented by
accused Pomoy, Erna Basa (eyewitness) and Eden
Legaspi (was sitting with Basa at the time the incident
occured) is that Balboa allegedly tried to grab the
handle of Pomoy’s gun. Balboa was no able to take
actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in
preventing him. He and Balboa grappled in taking
control of his gun, then Balboa was accidentally shot.
RTC of Iloilo found Pomoy guilty of the crime of
homicide, but CA modified the RTC decision (removed
aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position),
stating that 1) the victim was not successful in his
attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in
control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2)
the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing
incident and immediately before it went off; it was
petitioner who released the safety lock before he
deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of
the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not
support the assertion of petitioner that there had been
a grappling for the gun. Thus, there is no unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased to justify self-
defense.
ISSUE:
W/n the shooting of Pomoy at deceased was accidental
RULING:
YES. In determining whether an “accident”
attended the incident, courts must take into account
the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence
of fault or negligence. It was clear from the account of
the eyewitness that the Pomoy did not have control of
the gun during the scuffle. The deceased persistently
attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while
Pomoy resolutely tried to thwart those attempts.
The elements of accident as provided in Art
12(4) are: (a) the accused was at the time performing a
lawful act, (b) with due care, (c) the resulting injury was
caused by mere accident, and (d) there was no fault
nor intent to cause the injury on the part of the
accused. All these elements are present in this case.
At the time of the incident, Pomoy was a
member of the PNP. This, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that,
under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the
victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.
It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law
enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession
of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to
remove it from his holster. He was duty-bound to
prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such
weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to
kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner
himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He
exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept
his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it
inside his holster at all times, especially within the
premises of his working area.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the
victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in
the course of the lawful performance of his duties as
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its
holster, the released of the safety lock, and the firing of
the two successive shots—all of which led to the death
of the victim—were sufficiently demonstrated to have
been consequences of circumstances beyond the
control of the petitioner.
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A
GREATER INJURY
US v. Caballeros
GR No. 1352, 29 March 1905
Mapa, J.
FACTS:
The defendants have been sentenced by the
CFI of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio
mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of
assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of
the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde
O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because,
without having taken part in the said crime as
principals or as accomplices, they took part in the
burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal
the crime.
ISSUE:
W/n the CFI was correct in convicting defendants as
accessories after the fact
RULING:
NO. They were forced by the murderers to bury
the bodies, which constitutes irresistible force.
 As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four
teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the
crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness
for the prosecution. This witness says he was present
when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi
was not a member of the group who killed the
Americans, but that he was in a banana plantation on
his property gathering some bananas; that when he
heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however,
seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band;
that the latter called to him and striking him the butts
of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any
person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force. Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are
charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio
Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in
any way in the execution of the crime with which he
has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the
contrary, since Baculi, as well as on of the witnesses for
the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that
he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the
aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of
occurrence when the burial took place. The confession
of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an
official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states
when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as
legal proof, because the same witness says that
Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who
made a confession to him voluntarily.
It appears besides, from the statements of
another witness for the prosecution, Meliton
Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros
was made through the promise made to him and to the
other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made
freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a
trial.
People v. Loreno
GR No. L-54414, 9 July 1984
Concepcion, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay
Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio
Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two
young daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single, then
14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22
years old, were preparing to attend the dance to be
held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to
wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge, was
still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-
month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other
occupants present in the house that evening were his
sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years
old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by
the name of Francisco Fabie. Cristina was then
vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband,
Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila.
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while
he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fabie
saw at first four men with flashlights approaching.
When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias
Monge saying that there was a letter from the chief
(hepe). Elias Monge asked them to come inside since
he can’t read the letter properly. When he and the man
in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked
his daughter, Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On
reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the
following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to
run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her just
what she came to know about their visitors. Cristina
Monge attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo
but she was held back by the man in dark sweater who
then announced to all those inside not to make any
scandal. When Elias Monge turned to look at him, the
man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered
all those inside to lie on the floor.
In the meantime, outside at the balcony the
man in red clothes asked Fabie for a glass of water, and
the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of water,
but Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala.
Hence, Fabie himself went inside the house to fetch the
glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he
noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie
reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes
poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp
instrument on his neck and then he was pushed to go
inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which was lighted,
Fabie saw and recognized the man in red clothes to be
Eustaquio Loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two
daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized
Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the
companions of the man in dark sweater. All the
occupants of the house were ordered by the man in
dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their
stomachs on the floor. Jimmy Marantal stayed as
lookout outside the house.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed
Loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied
them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the
baby's hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with which
he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's
hands together behind their backs.
After Loreno and Fabie returned to the sala,
the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge
and dragged her up to a room located above the
balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied.
Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the
whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there
was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The
man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly
removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her
parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite
her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and
successfully raped her. After that, he dragged Monica
back to the sala and proceeded to do the same to
Cristina.
While all of this was happening, the other men
then proceeded to ransack the house and found and
took a lot of valuables including a kulambo and
kaserola tangina nila pati yun kinuha. Thereafter,
Loreno entered the room where Cristina was still lying
on the floor and proceeded to kiss and touch her
vagina. Suddenly, he was called to hurry up because
someone was approaching the house. When he went
back, the dark shirt guy warned everyone not to tell
anyone, got their valuables, and left.
They managed to untie themselves eventually
and after positively affirming the identities of their
malefactors, along with Elias finding out the sexual
abuse his daughters suffered, filed a report against the
robbery-rape incident. After substantial examination to
his daughters and initial investigation, the accused
were detained, charged and found guilty.
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy
Marantal claimed that they acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury. They admitted that they were in the house of
Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, but they
were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and
his five companions who claimed to be members of the
New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality,
with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and
their families would be killed.
ISSUE:
W/n the accused acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and are therefore exempt from
criminal liability.
RULING:
NO, they did not act under compulsion of an
irresistible force. Tangina ang kapal ng mukha nilang
mag-invoke ng exemption from liability putulin ko pa
etits nila eh.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce
him to a mere instrument who acts not only without
will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending
and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act
is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense
in equal combat.
A perusal of the appellants statement of the
robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint
brief, showed that they admitted their participation in
the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape
against Elias Monge and his family.
The records likewise revealed that on the two
occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to
the master's room and the teacher's room where he
made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her
keys and got the contents which he brought and
poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted
alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in
dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater
consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the
teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on
the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and
touch her private parts.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate
of the house below, must have heard the shouts of
Monica Monge for help and must have known by then
that Monica Monge was being abused by his two
companions who earlier went up the house. As a
"lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his
companions effective means and encouragement to
commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no
showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest
or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary
participation and the conspiracy of the appellants.