I YEAR I SEMESTER B.A., LL.B. (HONS.

) DEGREE

COURSE
A detailed analysis of Eggshell Skull Theory

SUBJECT- LAW OF TORTS

DATE OF SUBMISSION
20/10/2017

SUBMITTED TO
Mrs. Golda Sahoo
(Assistant Professor in Sociology)

SUBMITTED BY
DIVYA
B.Com. LL.B. (Hons.), 1st Semester
Tamil Nadu National Law School
Registration Number: BC0170017
E-mail: divyachhabra42@gmail.com
Cell: +91 9646404262
MARKS AWARDED:

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 DECLARATION

I, Divya, do hereby declare that the project entitled “A detailed analysis of

Eggshell Skull Theory” submitted to Tamil Nadu National law school in partial
fulfilment of requirement of award of degree in undergraduate in law is a record
of original work done by me under the supervision and guidance of Professor
Mrs. Golda Sahoo, department of Law, Tamil Nadu National law school and has
not formed basis for award of any degree or diploma or fellowship or any other
title to any other candidate of any university.

DATE: 20/10/2017

PLACE: TIRUCHIRAPPALLI (DIVYA)

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ACKNOWNLEDGMENT

First of all, I take this opportunity to thank my Professor Mrs. Golda

Sahoo from the depth of my heart who has been of immense help during moments
of anxiety and extreme difficulty while the project was taking its crucial shape.

Secondly, I convey my deepest regards to the Vice Chancellor Dr (Mrs.)

Kamala Sankaran and the administrative staff of Tamil Nadu National Law
School who held the project in high esteem by providing reliable information in
the form of library infrastructure and database connections in times of need.

Thirdly, the contribution made by my parents and friends by foregoing

their precious time is unforgettable and highly solicited. Their valuable advice
and timely supervision paved the way for the successful completion of this
project.

Finally, I thank the Almighty who gave me the courage and stamina to
confront and overcome all hurdles during the making of this project. Words
aren’t sufficient to acknowledge the tremendous contributions of various people
involved in this project. I once again wholeheartedly and earnestly thank all the
people who were involved directly or indirectly during this project making which
helped me to come out with flying colours.

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TABLE OF CONTENT
1. INTRODUCTION 5-7
2. HISTORY 8
3. PRESENT LAW 9
4. WAGON MOUND CASE 10-12
4.1 Facts
4.2 JUDGEMENT
4.3 SIGNIFICANCE

5. POST WAGON MOUND CASE 13-16

6. CONCLUSION 17
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 18-19

TABLE OF CASES
1. Vosburg v. Putney
2. Dulieu v White & Sons
3. The Trust Company Limited v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act
4. Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
5. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co

6. Donoghue v Stevenson
7. Page v Smith

8. Smith v Leech Brain & Co

9. Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd

10. Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis

11. Beavis v Apthorpe

12. Stephenson v. Waite Tileman Ltd

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1. INTRODUCTION

Negligence is the most vital present-day tort. Its unifying thing is the conduct of the
defendant that is labelled negligent. This requirement turned into famously defined by using
Alderson B in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co [1856] as follows:

“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable guy guided upon those
concerns which by and large adjust the behaviour of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable guy might no longer do.”

Other torts are signified with the aid of a interest of the claimant that's blanketed –as an
instance, defamation protects recognition; personal nuisance protects use and entertainment
of land. Negligence protects many hobbies such as those of the claimant’s character,
belongings and some economic interests.

“A negligent defendant is liable to a foreseeable plaintiff even if the amount of harm the
plaintiff suffered was unforeseeable. This liability is so firmly established that it has acquired
its own name-the "thin skull" or "eggshell skull" rule. This rule adopts what, in my view,
amounts to strict liability. It is true that the thin-skull rule is nominally a rule about damages
and not about the standard of care. In thin-skull cases the defendant was negligent, but that
negligence consists of risking a foreseeable harm to the plaintiff. The dominant approach to
determining the scope of the defendant's liability in negligence is the "harm-within-the-risk
test," under which a defendant is only liable for foreseeable harm. Thin skull liability is an
exception to the notion that, because it is not negligent to risk what cannot be foreseen, there
is no liability for harm that results from risking unforeseeable harm.”1

“The “eggshell skull” rule is named after the example frequently used in law schools. The
example describes an imaginary person who has an extremely thin skull that is as fragile as
an eggshell, even though he looks completely normal. This person is hit in the head by
someone else. A normal person would only have been bruised by the hit, but the person with
the eggshell skull dies. The “eggshell skull” rule says that the person who hit the eggshell-
skulled person is responsible for the much greater harm caused by the death, not just the
amount of harm that a normal person would have suffered.”2

1
Kenneth S. Abraham, STRICT LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE, 61 DePaul L. Rev. 271 2011-2012
2
What is the "eggshell skull rule"?, 22:00,10 Oct 2017, http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-is-the-
eggshell-skull-rule/

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“A client slips and falls during a store, suffering an extraordinarily rare and severe fracture of
his thighbone. He sues the shop for negligence. though the shop admits its negligence, it
argues it mustn't be to blame for the weird and unpredictable scope of the injury. To support
its argument, the shop introduces proof suggesting that the client may have done additional to
stop the severity of his injuries. The proof shows that a treatable illness has dramatically
weakened his bones for over a decade, partially because of his ne'er discomposed to
hunt identification. The court rejects this argument out of hand, however, merely noting that
“defendants take plaintiffs as they notice them.” 3

In doing thus, the court depends on the shell complainant rule, “the principle that
a litigant is to blame for a plaintiff’s unpredictable and uncommon reactions to the
defendant’s negligent or intentional act.” beneath the rule, a litigant guilty is to blame for the
complete extent of plaintiff’s injuries, although the complainant possesses pre-existing
conditions that dramatically worsen the damage. Most alarmingly, liability attaches
even once the plaintiff’s vulnerable condition and the scope of the ensuing injuries
were utterly unpredictable. the sensible consequence is that a litigant is on the hook for
extraordinary damages arising from comparatively standard conduct.

“Wagon mound also leaves the “Eggshell Skull” cases unaffected. A tort-feasor takes his
victims as he finds him. If the plaintiff suffers personal injury from the wrongful act of the
defendant, it is no answer to the claim that the plaintiff would have suffered less injury “If he
had not unusually weak heart”. The principle is illustrated by Smith v. Leech Brain & Co.
Ltd. where a workman of the defendants because of their negligence suffered a burn injury on
his lower lip which promoted cancer at the site of burn resulting in his death. But for the
burn, the cancer might never have developed, though there was a premalignant condition and
there was a likelihood that it would have done so as at some stage in his life. In an action by
the widow of deceased workman, the defendant was held liable for his death on the principle
that the tort-feasor must take his victim as he finds him.”4

3
STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & DUSTIN E. BUEHLER, Eggshell Economics: A Revolutionary Approach to
the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 74:3, pg. 377, (2013)
4
RATANLAL & DHIRALAL, The Law of Torts, LEXIS NEXIS, Ed. 26, pg. 187, (2010)

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The eggshell plaintiff rule has its origin in nineteenth-century case law, when American
British courts started imposing liability on defendants for all the damages caused to
physically vulnerable plaintiffs. In the beginning, courts limited the rule to cases which
involved victims whose pre-existing conditions were purely physical. Over the period, many
courts started applying the eggshell plaintiff rule to cases involved in mental as well as
economic injury. Considerably debating regarding the scope of the rule continues even in
present scenario, despite its universal acceptance in American jurisdictions and its
reinforcement in state laws.

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2. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE RULE
“The eggshell plaintiff rule turned into born in concept, if no longer in call, in 1891. That 12
months, the Wisconsin very best court docket decided the seminal case of Vosburg v. Putney.
In a not unusual formative years altercation, twelve yrs. antique George Putney kicked
fourteen 12 months vintage Andrew Vosburg within the shin in a study room in Waukesha,
Wisconsin. Unbeknownst to Putney, Vosburg had injured his leg the month earlier than in a
sledding twist of fate. The kick annoyed the preceding damage and in the end caused
Vosburg’s everlasting incapacitation. The court determined Putney chargeable for all
damages bobbing up because of the kick, even though he did now not intend the harm, nor
changed into he aware of Vosburg’s preceding harm. consistent with the courtroom, “the
perpetrator is chargeable for all of the injuries ensuing at once from the wrongful act, if they
could or could not have been foreseen by means of him.””5

“Different courts began adopting comparable guidelines. as an example, in a Minnesota case

decided eight years after Vosburg, a salesman sprained his ankle at the same time as exiting a
train, evolved inflammatory rheumatism due to the sprain, and died from irritation of the
coronary heart. The courtroom concluded that plaintiff’s predisposition to rheumatism
became immaterial and held the defendant accountable “even though he could not have
foreseen the unique outcomes which did in truth follow.” “The time “thin cranium” plaintiff
sooner or later emerged in 1901, when an English court decided Dulieu v. White & Sons. In
Dulieu, a negligently driven horse van crashed right into a pub. A pregnant female running at
the back of the bar suffered excessive shock due to the crash, have become severely unwell,
and gave untimely.”67

5
Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (Wisc. 1891)
6
STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & DUSTIN E. BUEHLER, Eggshell Economics: A Revolutionary Approach to the
Eggshell Plaintiff Rule, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 74:3, pg. 378-379, (2013)
7
Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669

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3. PRESENT LAW
“In recent years, the popular interest in this area of the law has grown due to the widespread
media coverage that has been given to high-profile cases. The current state of the law owes
much to litigation arising out of the Hillsborough disaster in Sheffield on 15 April 1989 when
the police allowed a crowd of supporters into an area of the already overcrowded football
ground. The match was stopped after six minutes as the weight of numbers of people had
created such pressure that spectators were being trapped against the high fences separating
the pens from the pitch. Ninety-five spectators were crushed to death and hundreds more
were injured. Those on the other side of the football field could see this happening, and
thousands more were at home watching an edited version on television. Claims for
psychiatric illness were brought by relatives of those killed or injured in the disaster and by
police officers who attended at the scene.” 8

“I decide that no duty of care was owed to any of these claimants, the House of Lords
developed and applied a set of rules that are hard to justify in terms of logic and morality.
The area has been subject of the abovementioned report by the Law Commission, whose
recommendations are considered below. In this part the present law on liability for
negligently inflicted psychiatric injury is discussed. First, we look at the requirement for a
recognised psychiatric illness. We then consider which claimants may recover, and look
particularly at the distinction which case law has drawn between so-called primary and
secondary victims.”9

8
The Trust Company Limited v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [1989] NSWLEC 73
9
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1997] 1 All ER 550, appealed to the House of Lords under
the name of White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 1 All ER 1

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4. Wagon Mound Case

4.1 Facts
“Overseas Tankship had a ship, the Wagon Mound, docked in Sydney Harbour in October
1951. The crew had carelessly allowed furnace oil (also referred to as Bunker oil) to leak
from their ship. The oil drifted under a wharf thickly coating the water and the shore where
other ships were being repaired. Hot metal produced by welders using oxyacetylene torches
on the respondent's timber wharf at Sheerlegs’ Wharf fell on floating cotton waste which
ignited the oil on the water. The wharf and ships moored there sustained substantial fire
damage. In an action by Mort's Dock for damages for negligence it was found as a fact that
the defendants did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the
oil was capable of being set alight when spread on water. The dock owners knew the oil was
there, and continued to use welders.

The leading case on proximate cause was Re Polemis, which required that the harm be the
direct result of the conduct regardless of how remote. As this case was binding in Australia,
its rule was followed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The defendant appealed to
the Privy Council.”10

10
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co(1959) 61 SR (NSW) 688 (3 December
1959), Court of Appeal(NSW, Australia).

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4.2 JUDGEMENT
“The Privy Council found in favour of the defendant, agreeing with the expert witness who
provided evidence that the defendant, despite the furnace oil being innately flammable, could
not reasonably expect it to burn on water. The Board indicated Morts would probably have
been successful if they had claimed damages for direct damage by the oil to the slipway but
this was minor and not part of the damages claimed (although success on this count may have
saved Morts Dock and Engineering the costs of all the litigation for both parties across all
three levels of court). Viscount Simonds, in his delivery for the Privy Council, said that the
Counsel for Morts had discredited their own position by arguing that it couldn't have been
bunkering oil because it wouldn't burn on water. The Privy Council's advice soundly
disapproved the rule established in Re Polemis, as “being out of the current of contemporary
thought” and held that to find a party liable for negligence the damage must be reasonably
foreseeable. The council found that even though the crew were careless and breached their
duty of care, the resulting extensive damage by fire was not foreseeable by a reasonable
person, although the minor damage of oil on metal on the slipway would have been
foreseeable.”

Viscount Simonds delivered the judgment of the Board and said:

“It is, no doubt, proper when considering tortious liability for negligence to analyse its
elements and to say that the plaintiff must prove a duty owed to him by the defendant, a
breach of that duty by the defendant, and consequent damage. But there can be no liability
until the damage has been done. It is not the act but the consequences on which tortious
liability is founded. ... Who knows or can be assumed to know all the processes of nature?
But if it would be wrong that a man should be held liable for damage unpredictable by a
reasonable man because it was "direct" or "natural," equally it would be wrong that he should
escape liability, however "indirect" the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably foresee the
intervening events which led to its being done.”11

“It is a principle of civil liability, subject only to qualifications which have no present
relevance, that a man must be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To
demand more of him is too harsh a rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilised order
requires the observance of a minimum standard of behaviour.”12

11
Ibid (Footnote no. 10)
12
Ibid (Footnote no. 10)

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3.3 SIGNIFICANCE
Up until this time the leading case had been Re Polemis, where the central question was that
of the directness of the chain of events between the triggering act being examined for
negligence and the result. The Council decided that rather than go with precedent they would
determine a principle from a range of cases, in a similar way as Lord Atkin did in Donoghue
v Stevenson, and their principle was primarily a single test for foreseeability which they
argued was a logical link between the damage and the liability. Stated
differently, foreseeability was the logical link between, and the test for, breach of the duty of
care and the damages. This is the supreme test, and may be rephrased as “the liability of a
consequence ... was natural or necessary or probable.” 13The Lords referred to hindsight,
indicating it is nothing like foresight and should play no role in assessing negligence. There is
authority to challenge this view of hindsight; in Page v Smith14, Lord Lloyd stated: “In the
case of secondary victims, i.e. persons who were not participants in an accident, the
defendant will not be liable unless psychiatric injury is foreseeable in a person of normal
fortitude and it may be legitimate to use hindsight in order to be able to apply the test of
reasonable foreseeability.”15

13
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 (26 May 1932)
14
Page v Smith [1995] 2 All ER 736 (p 767 j, post)
15
Ibid (footnote no. 14)

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5. The Rule Post Wagon Mound
“The first indication of the continued status of the rule came from Smith v Leech ~rain'l a
case decided one year after the Wagon Mound decision was handed down. The plaintiff
sought damages from the defendant employer for injuries that were consequential on an
initial injury. At issue for the court was what effect the recent Wagon Mound decision should
have on a case of this nature concerning personal injury. In the judgment, Lord Parker
indicated that he was “...quite satisfied that the Judicial Committee in the Wagon Mound case
did not have.... the thin skull cases in mind.” “Justification for this lay in the belief that it had
always been part of English law that the tortfeasor takes their victim as they find them.
Therefore, it was indicated in the present case that the egg-shell skull rule was to remain part
of English law despite the existence of the rule set out in the Wagon Mound”16

More important was the pronouncement of how the rule should operate and it was held that
the test of reasonable foreseeability would apply to the initial injury only and that any
subsequent injury was merely an extension of the initial injury. Further in the judgment,
Lord Parker indicated:

“the question is whether these employers could reasonably foresee the type of injury he
suffered, namely the burn. What, in the case, is the amount of damage which he suffers
because of that burn, depends upon the characteristics and constitution of the victim.”

This appears to indicate that the kind of damage relevant to the question of foreseeability
was the burn. Considering that the subsequent damage was of quite a different nature to a
burn, it is clear in this case that the extent of injury included damage of a different kind to the
initial injury. Furthermore, “. . .it is conceivable that some degrees of injury may differ so
widely from what could be expected as to differ in kind." Some may suggest that damages
were not too remote in this case because they were part of a broad category of physical injury
to the person. In adopting this position, it is possible to reconcile the decision with the Wagon
Mound. However, the court did not adopt this reasoning and it is clear in the judgement of
Lord Parker that the egg-shell skull rule was to be considered an exception to the Wagon
Mound rule. His Lordship further indicated: "if the Judicial Committee had any intention of
making an inroad into that doctrine, I am quite satisfied that they would have said so.” And

16
Smith v Leech Brain & Co, [1962] 2 QB 405

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considering that two different kinds of injury existed in this application of the rule when it
was open to the court to adopt a broad category of physical injury (bringing the decision
within the Wagon Mound), it seems that the intent of the court was to maintain an operation
of the rule where foreseeability was not a necessary requirement in regard to consequential
damage. This view is supported by comments made by Professor Jackson in his well-known
article. In discussing the varying methods of classification of kinds of damage, which is
addressed later, Professor Jackson considers the decision in Smith v Leech Brain. He states
that:

“if the sole test of liability is foreseeability of cause, unless the predisposition cases are an
exception, there would be no liability regarding the cancer and death. However, a
requirement of foreseeability of a broad heading of damage only, with foreseeability of cause
required only until the area of the broad heading is reached would bring the predisposition
cases within the general principle.”

“Failure to establish broad categories at this earlier stage suggests that the principle was to
continue operating as an exception to the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ test. Smith v Leech
Brain has become an influential decision and has been followed in numerous jurisdiction.”17
“In England this operation of the rule has been affirmed in subsequent cases. In Warren v
Scruttons, the plaintiff suffered a pricked finger which resulted in poison being spread
throughout his body. Subsequently he developed an ulcer in his eye partly due to a latent
susceptibility and suffered a deterioration of his eyesight.” 18“At first instance Paul1 J stated,
relying on the decision in Smith v Leech Brain, “...the type of damage here is a pricked
finger, and once it is found that that damage could have been reasonably anticipated then any
consequence which results because the particular individual has some peculiarity is a
consequence for which the tortfeasor is liable.” This application of the rule reinforces the
belief that foreseeability was not relevant to the further harm. Robinson v Post was a case
involving injury consequential on an initial injury and Smith v Leech Brain was applied, the
court holding that the defendant Post Office was liable for the initial injury and also the
consequential injury, “...even though they could not have reasonably foreseen those
consequences or that they could be serious.” There are some recent cases that have provided
some discussion of the principle and it appears the operation (reasonably foreseeable initial

17
Ibid (footnote no.16)
18
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1961] UKHL 4, [1962] AC 446

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injury and causally link consequential injury) has been maintained especially considering
there has been no recognisable rejection of the decision in Smith v Leech Brain.”19

The situation in Australia has not been so straightforward. “In Beavis v. Herron CJ gives
considerable attention to the operation of the principle and its existence along-side the Wagon
Mound rule and states: “the real question is, is the extent of bodily damage to be limited [by
the decision in the Wagon Mound Case] to foreseeable consequences.” Ultimately the Full
Court believed all physical injury should be confined to one category and thus the egg-shell
skull principle could be reconciled with the 'reasonable foreseeability' test.”20As in Smith v
Leech Brain the consequential injury was considered as going to the extent of the initial
injury. However, in this case the court openly adopted a broad category of physical injury
thus holding that the consequential damage was not different in kind from the initial injury. In
addition to this Herron CJ, with whom MacFarland J concurred, was adamant that there must
still be proof of factual causation through to the final consequences. He stated: “the plaintiff
must still prove a causal connexion between the negligent act and his bodily injuries. Once
there was evidence connecting the two, the question whether the consequent incapacity
resulted from the fracture of the leg was in the present case a question of fact.” Further,
Herron CJ suggested with some caution as to over-simplification:

"it could be said that as to personal injury cases, as distinct from property damage, all direct
consequences will be treated as foreseeable and that in personal injury cases Polemis still
prevails."21

This indicates support for no requirement of foreseeability regarding further harm although
ultimately it was held that liability would depend on the further harm being of a type that was
foreseeable. In considering Smith v Leech Brain the court here seems to equate Lord Parker's
comments on extent of injury with a suggestion that they fall within the same category. With
respect, this was not specifically stated and it was open to Lord Parker in that case to state
that the type of injury was physical injury generally and not the burn as was indicated.

“The reasoning in Beavis v Apthorpe was questioned in the New Zealand case of Stephenson
v Waite and it was suggested that although the case purported to follow Smith v Leech Brain
it was in some respects inconsistent with the reasoning of Lord Although Beavis v Apthorpe

19
Ibid (Foot note no. 16)
20
ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.
21
Ibid (Footnote no. 16)

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was applied in Sayers v Perrin and others (No. 3)43, in this case there was no indication in
the reasoning that the further harm should be part of a foreseeable kind. The case concerned
an award of damages to a plaintiff who had polio virus present within the body and,
following an electric shock, developed a paralytic form of poliomyelitis. In deciding that the
consequential damage was not too remote to be recoverable the Full Court held “the liability
of the defendants depended not upon the reasonable foreseeability of the actual result which
ensued but upon whether they could reasonably foresee an injury of such a type which might
directly result in the condition giving rise to the action.””22 “The reasoning in these cases was
revisited and discussed in the previously mentioned case, Stephenson v Waite Tileman, of
which it is said: "the modem status of the rule is fully considered. The New Zealand Court of
Appeal, particularly Richmond J, provides a lengthy discussion of previous application of the
rule and again suggests that: "the central issue… is the correct application of the decision of
the Privy Council in... (The Wagon Mound No I) . . .to actions for damages for bodily
injury." In the judgment of Richmond J, with which Turner P concurred, consideration is
given to decisions in various Commonwealth jurisdictions. Indeed, it can be suggested that
the case represents the most current and in-depth analysis of the principle and its operation.
Ultimately it was held, and this accords with the previous views discussed above:

“in such cases the question of foreseeability should be limited to the initial injury… the
necessary link between the ultimate consequences of the initial injury and the negligence of
the defendant can be forged simply as one of cause and effect.”

This indicates an unqualified expression of the rule supported by the court's analysis of
authority in relevant jurisdictions and it is argued here that this represents the traditional and
intended operation of the rule.”23

Following the previous analysis, one could reasonably accept this pronouncement of the
principle to be an operative part of the law in Australia as well as some other Commonwealth
jurisdictions. Furthermore, its operation, which appears to be generally agreed upon, indicates
that in these situations involving personal injury, compensation is dominant in determining
the question of remoteness.

22
Beavis v Apthorpe [1963] NSWR 1176; (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 852
23
Stephenson v. Waite Tileman Ltd., [1973] 1 NZLR 152

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6. CONCLUSION
Eggshell Skull Theory or Thin Skull Theory is that negligent defendant is liable even if
damage is unforeseeable to the plaintiff. This specifies that despite the damage due to the act
is less due to the act and it is more due the existing consequences still defendant will be liable
to the plaintiff. This theory specifies no doubt a normal person would have less injury but
defendant is liable for the total injury that occurred to the plaintiff. Despite the judgement in
the wagon mound case Eggshell Skull Theory was part to law because it is not that injury is
foreseeable or unforeseeable but it is about the damage caused by defendant to plaintiff which
might have caused less damage to the normal person but caused more damage to the person
who is more sensitive but action amounted to cause damage. So, defendant will be liable for
the total damage. The modern version of the theory is considered applicable both in the cases
of tort and crime depending upon the intensity of the liability.

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7. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Kenneth S. Abraham, STRICT LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE, 61 DePaul L. Rev. 271
2011-2012
2. What is the "eggshell skull rule"?, 22:00,10 Oct 2017, http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-
library/what-is-the-eggshell-skull-rule/
3. STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & DUSTIN E. BUEHLER, Eggshell Economics: A
Revolutionary Approach to the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL,
Vol. 74:3, pg. 377, (2013)
4. RATANLAL & DHIRALAL, The Law of Torts, LEXIS NEXIS, Ed. 26, pg. 187, (2010)
5. Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (Wisc. 1891)
6. STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & DUSTIN E. BUEHLER, Eggshell Economics: A
Revolutionary Approach to the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL,
Vol. 74:3, pg. 378-379, (2013)
7. Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669

8. The Trust Company Limited v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [1989]
NSWLEC 73

9. Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1997] 1 All ER 550, appealed to the
House of Lords under the name of White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
[1999] 1 All ER 1

10. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co(1959) 61 SR (NSW) 688
(3 December 1959), Court of Appeal(NSW, Australia).

11. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 (26 May 1932)

12. Page v Smith [1995] 2 All ER 736 (p 767 j, post)

13. Smith v Leech Brain & Co, [1962] 2 QB 405

14. Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1961] UKHL 4, [1962] AC 446

15. Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67

16. Beavis v Apthorpe [1963] NSWR 1176; (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 852

17. Stephenson v. Waite Tileman Ltd., [1973] 1 NZLR 152

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