Submitted by: Ramanjeet Singh

(1416419) VIII BBA LLB ‘B’

Interpretation of Statutes- CIA III

Topic- Retrospective operation of statutes relating to succession, transfer

and contracts

Presumption against retrospectivity:

As a general rule, every statute is deemed to be prospective unless by an express provision it

shall have a retrospective effect. The Supreme Court in Ram Dayal vs. Ganga Prasad 1
observed that all laws which affect the substantive rights generally operate prospectively and
there is a presumption against their retrospectively. The effect of retrospectively may be
given only if the words expressly states or the language used clearly implies that such
retrospective effect is intended. Hence, the question whether a statutory provision is
retrospective or not clearly depends upon the language. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, effect will be given to the provision in question, but if the language is unclear
and unambiguous, the Court has to decide whether on the lights of the circumstances such a
provision should be given a retrospective effect or not.

As we know it is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have
retrospective operations unless the language plainly requires having so.

Statutes relating succession-

 Statutes enacted for the purpose of regulating succession do not have a

retrospective effect. The law is applicable only for successions that are to
take place after the statute has been enacted/ those successions that have
opened after the statute has been enacted.
 In a leading case law of Lala Dunichand vs. Anarkali2, it was held that the
Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment), 1929 would be applicable where
a female heir died even though the male heir whom she succeeded had
died prior to the commencement of the Act. The Act was not given a
retrospective effect as it would deprive person from the right that had
already been vested in him.
 Applicability of provisions of the Hindu Successions Act, 1956 is not
applicable to successions that had opened before the commencement of the
Act. But in the case of Daya Singh vs. Dhan Kaur3, provisions of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 have been applicable where a female limited
owner had died after the commencement of the Act but the male from

1
(1982) AII LJ 255
2
AIR 1946 PC 173
3
AIR 1974 SC 665
 whom she had succeeded had died before the commencement of the Act.
In such cases of limited owners, succession would open again to find who
the legal heir is; law at the time of the death of the limited owner has to be
seen.
 Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which speaks any property
possessed by a female heir whether acquired before or after the
commencement of this Act shall be treated as a full owner and not as a
limited owner. This section if read in isolation is retrospective in nature,
but the section has a qualification which states that the Hindu female
should have the possession of the estate when this Act came into force.
The clear purpose of this Section is to ameliorate the status of women in
the society and possession would include actual as well as constructive
possession. But, in Kotturuswami vs. Veeravva4, it had been held that if a
female Hindu alienated a property before the Act came into force, then
neither she nor the alienee would get full rights over the ownership of the
property. But, s. 14(1) also states that if the alienee reconveys the
possession to the female heir after the commencement of the Act, then the
female heir would get complete control over the estate or property.5
 In Abdus Samad vs. kurban Hussain6, Murtaza Baksh, a talukdar of Oudh
died on 18th January, 1865 leaving behind his mother, two widows and
some cousins. The name of his mother was entered in the Collector’s book
in substitution of his own name with consent of his two widows and the
cousins. in 1869, the Oudh Estates Act was passed which regulated
succession to the estates of the taluqdars whose names were entered in
certain prescribed lists. After the death of the mother in 1870, the names of
the widows were substituted in the Collector’s book. The heirs of the last
surviving widow claimed the estate when she dies. The heirs of the first
widow also claimed the estate. The Court held that the entry of the name
of Murtaza Baksh in the book after his death was ultra vires and void. His
mother held the estate as an absolute owner and after her death, the two
widows were the absolute owners in equal shares. On the death of the first
wife, the one- half share of the estate descended to the heirs of the first
wife and similarly in case of death of the second wife.
(The judgement was delivered by Lord Lindley. This judgement was based on the
maxim- nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis which
means that every new enactment should affect the future and not the past times.)

4
AIR 1958 MP 160
5
Jagannathan Pillai vs. Kunjithapadam Pillai (1987) 2 SCC 572
6
31 IA 30
 Statutes regulating transfers and contracts:
 Statutes which regulate transfers do not operate retrospectively. Earlier
transactions that continue under the old legislations will not have any
effect after the new legislations have come into force. The Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 is nit retrospective in nature and does not affect any
legal right or liability that arose before the Act came into existence.
 In Ahmed Raza vs. Abid Hussain7, it was held that an oral mortgage that
was created before the Act came into force would be enforceable even
after the Act is passed. The provisions of the Act that mainly deal with
matters of procedure cannot be availed for reviving a right which had
become extinct before the Act came into force.
 Leases that were executed before the commencement of this Act would not
be governed by the rules if this Act, but defence of part- performance
(Section 53A) can be applicable available to the transferee even though the
transfer was made before the Act came into force. Section 53A does not
speak of any substantive rights of the parties but is merely procedural in
nature.
 Validity of existing contracts cannot be challenged on the grounds that the
posterior Act made the contract of that nature void. In the case of
Doolubdass Pettamberdass vs. Ramloll Thackorseydas8, where wagering
contracts for gaming and wagering was null and void as per Act No. 21 of
18489 and were not enforceable. This did not affect the validity of the
wagering agreements that were made after the Indian Contracts Act came
into force. Similarly, a transfer which is a valid one does not become an
invalid transfer when a new legislation invalidates that.
 In cases of lease, a lease would have been said to extend where the
landlord had issued a notice to the tenant before the lease actually expired
and before the Act came into force.

7
ILR 48 AII 494
8
(1850) 5 MIA 109
9
An Act for avoiding wagers