Human Rights Law

Human Rights Law Monday 7:00-9:00 PM
Atty. Weng Santos Pokemon Digests

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1. Sta Maria v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637, February 18, 1970 (FAYE)
Facts: Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria was the Dean, College of Education,
University of the Philippines (UP), and the the respondent Salvador P. Lopez the
University President.
Sta. Maria, a professor of English and Comparative Literature, was elected Dean of
the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents, on nomination of
the UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a five year term, "effective
May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights and
privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the position in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
In February 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of

Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a
bearing on the general academic program and the physical plant and services, with
a cluster of special demands. In response, President Lopez created a committee
which met with Sta. Maria regularly.
As a result of the dialogues and recommendations by Sta. Maria to the president,

the students were not appeased. The students went on to boycott their classes
which infected the other colleges and the newly installed members of the UP
Student Council voted to support the education students' strike. Until the day that all
academic activity in the university came to a complete stand still so that the UP
President called a meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present
gave him a vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand
as he sees fit.
Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, President Lopez issued
the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. The order, addressed
to Dean Sta. Maria and simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R.
Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College of Education, without additional
compensation.
ISSUE: whether the petitioner, Felixberto C. Sta. Maria’s transfer constitutes

removal?
RULING: Yes, A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of

equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in service." Promotion is the
"advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and
responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in
salary."
Pokémon Digests Page 1 of 69

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A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a

transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position", cannot
be done without the employee's consent. For that would constitute removal from
office. Indeed, no permanent unless the officer or employee is transfer can take
place unless the officer of the employee is first removed from the position held, and
then appointed to another position.
The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university,

being an academic position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more
exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists the President, as the title
indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative decisions. Second. The
position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in
his own name and responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of
staff position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university charter,
and cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents. That of special assistant,
upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of the university
president.
It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of Dean". In
actual administrative practice, the terms "with rank of" dean is meaningless. He is no
dean at all. He of course, basks, in the trappings of the dean. A palliative it could
have been intended to be. But actually he is a dean without a college.
ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. — Due process is

associated with the sporting idea of fair play; it shuns oppression and eschews
unfair dealing; it obeys the dictates of justice and is ruled by reason. The Scriptures
no less remind us to hear before we condemn. Fidelity to this cardinal principle must
have impelled Congress to clarify the authority to transfer subordinate officers and
employees, an authority so often misused and abused to ride roughshod over
hapless civil servants. As amended, the Civil Service Law provides that "if the
employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his
case . . . and pending his appeal and decision thereon, his transfer shall be held in
abeyance."|||
B. Purpose
2. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, May 29, 1987 (JUED)
FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public

concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner
Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had

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allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil
service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal access to government records to validate the
civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is

not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by
the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that
involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government
agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed,
this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In
case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the
government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments
against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]).
To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government

agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are
at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions.
In the instant case, while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility,
the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil

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service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case,
the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying
the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies
C. Historical Development
D. Hierarchy of Rights
3. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000 (JERALD)
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs.

HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need.
FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents
for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the
technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found
having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of

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all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample
time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the

evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in
connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna
Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding
Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of
the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition
is now at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by
a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends

is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular,
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

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One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough
that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to
pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions,
will excuse the bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority
of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere. “The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of
the local state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation
clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in
the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior

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derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution.
4. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming

Mills Co., Inc, 51 SCRA 189, June 05, 1973 (MARK)
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is

superior to property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional
right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly
and rights of petition
FACTS:
● March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming

Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration as a valid exercise of their constitutional right of freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first,
second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
● March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and
afternoon where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to
do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however,
that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation thus whoever fails to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO
STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
● March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram
to the Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
● The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is
no violation since they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass
demonstration for strike against the company.
● Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
PBMEO officers directly responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
● September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration – dismissed since 2
days late.

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ISSUE: W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment
of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly
and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the
petitioners.
● In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of

the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith
of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as
the citadel of his person
● The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those
who have no patience with general principles.
● The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition
are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people
● The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
● While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized.
❖ Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
❖ a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent
❖ Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can
never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.

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❖ injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers,

even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike
● The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason
of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in
the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
● There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the
firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground
for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
● The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of
their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay
means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet,
they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration
would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
● The dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the
policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging
and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social
and economic well-being."
● The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees
to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
rights guaranteed in Section Three."
● Violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to
enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be

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invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors
to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned.
Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced
to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer,
the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated
counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal,
bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services
● Enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic
law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an accepted
principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes
of justice require."
5. Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968 (MUSTANG)
Ponente: FERNANDO, J
Plaintiff: JESUS P. MORF, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
Respondent: AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary,
Facts:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of
morality in public service. One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its
approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every
other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare
and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar: . . ."
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the
month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets
and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the
ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination.
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy
of the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable

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search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the
allegation that the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal integrity
and official dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and
derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained
by this periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income,
and expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices
defined. . . ." It was further asserted that there was no need for such a provision as
"the income tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve
to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself
out of proportion to his reported income."
Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after
practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law
and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: "
1. That when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is
deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about
his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during
the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ."
2. The answer likewise denied that there was a violation of his constitutional
rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and seizure
and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on
the ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life
and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable
measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power."
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the
police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause
Issue:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is:
1. An oppressive exercise of police power;
2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination;
Held:
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process
Clause
● “inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
● The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits
of its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)

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● Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to

regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the
protection of due process.
● It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to
protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property.
Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as
an infringement of his liberty.
● Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due
process is observed.
● The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official
action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression.
“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call
of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets
and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There
was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
2. A. Right to privacy
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure
of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be
denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective
of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such
character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is
bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to
such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.”
B. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not
give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
C. Right against self-incrimination

We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s
conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
D. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

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6. Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996 (J. Vitug
Dissenting Opinion) (YANA)
FACTS: In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, several
pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board). These TV programs allegedly
“offend[ed] and constituted] an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations
and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC
ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV
programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The
CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV
program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack
against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary
to law and contrary to good customs.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether
or not it has acted with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by
virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of
religious freedom, the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is accompanied
with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this
presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioner’s
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It
is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court
affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioner’s TV program while it
reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of
respondent in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner.
2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:

1. Freedom to believe (absolute)

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2. Freedom to act on one’s belief – where an individual rationalizes his beliefs in

acts or omissions affecting the public, this freedom to do so becomes subject
to the regulation authority of the state.
J. Vitug Dissenting Opinion
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; The exercise of religious belief is not

without inherent and statutory limitations. I agree with those who support the view
that religious freedom occupies an exalted position in our hierarchy of rights and that
the freedom to disseminate religious information is a constitutionally- sanctioned
prerogative that allows any legitimate religious denomination a free choice of media
in the propagation of its credo. Like any other right, however, the exercise of
religious belief is not without inherent and statutory limitations.
Same; Same; The Board is empowered to screen, review and examine all television
programs. A reading of Section 3 of P.D. 1986 shows that the Board is empowered
to screen, review and examine all x x x television programs and to approve or
disprove, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the x x x television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x which, in the judgment of the BOARD
(so) applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs x x x. I believe that
the phrase contrary to law should be read together with other existing laws such as,
for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 201,
which prohibits the exhibition of shows that offend another race or religion. I see in
this provision a good and sound standard. Recent events indicate recurrent violent
incidents between and among communities with diverse religious beliefs and
dogma. The danger is past mere apprehension; it has become a virtual reality and
now prevalent in some parts of the world.
Same; Same; In order not to infringe constitutional principles, any restriction by the
Board must, of course, be for legitimate and valid reasons.·In order not to infringe
constitutional principles, any restriction by the Board must, of course, be for
legitimate and valid reasons. I certainly do not think that prior censorship should
altogether be rejected just because sanctions can later be imposed. Regulating the
exercise of a right is not necessarily an anathema to it; in fact, it can safeguard and
secure that right.
VII. FIRST GENERATION RIGHTS
A. Civil and Political Rights (LIBERTY)
7. Calalang v Williams et al., 70 Phil., 726, Dec 02 1940 (SUPRA) [Digest again
in case a new doctrine is applicable] (BRYAN)
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang

___________________________________________________________________________________
Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.

Ponente: Laurel, J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm;
and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to
the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of
the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with
the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic
on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on
August 10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
Issue: Nice to know

1. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?
Issue related to the topic

2. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an

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unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
Held:
1.NO. The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of
social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor

anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
("The welfare of the people shall be the supreme law")
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
RELATED TO TOPIC: LIBERTY
2. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with persona liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations.

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Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
B. Right of Self-Determination
● ICCPR, Article 1 [Copy] (EDWARD)
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having

responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and
shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.
8. Portugal v. Australia: Case Concerning East Timor (EDWARD)
SUMMARY:
Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia concerning "certain activities of

Australia with respect to East Timor", on account of the latter’s alleged failure to
observe the obligation to respect the powers and duties of Portugal as the
administering Power of East Timor, as well as the right of the people of East
Timor to self-determination and the related rights. Portugal instituted proceedings

___________________________________________________________________________________
against Australia by virtue of a treaty between Australia and Indonesia regarding the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources around the Timor Sea seabed.
While the Court recognized that there is a legal dispute between the two countries, it
ultimately dismissed the case, considering that the decision would necessarily be a
determination of whether Indonesia could or could not have acquired the power to
conclude treaties on behalf of East Timor relating to the resources of its continental
shelf. Moreover, such a determination could not be made without the consent of
Indonesia, which had refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
FACTS: Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia with respect to its conduct
and activities with respect to East Timor.
[Historical Background (not found in the case)]

Portugal administered East Timor as a non-self-governing territory under United
Nations Chapter XI. On 27th August 1975, due to internal disturbances caused by
factions calling for self-determination, Portugal withdrew from East Timor. Soon
after its departure on 7th of December 1975, Indonesia invaded and occupied East
Timor; and in 1976 East Timor's “People Assembly” formally sought to be integrated
into Indonesia as part of its territorial dominion. Later, on 20th of January 1978,
Australia acknowledged de facto Indonesia's annexation of East Timor which was
then followed by de jure recognition in the following year.
A number of meetings between Portugal and Australia took place to resolve the
issue in relation to undefined continental shelf between Indonesia and Australian
known as the 'Timor Gap'. The failure to resolve the matter through talk between the
two countries resulted in a treaty between the two countries for exploration and
exploitation of natural resources around the Timor Sea seabed known as the ‘Treaty
between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the zone of cooperation in an
area between the Indonesian province of East Timor and Northern Australia.' [End
of Historical Background]
According to Portugal, Australia had failed to observe the obligation to respect (a)
the duties and powers of Portugal as administering power and the (b) right of the
people of East Timor to self-determination.
Issue Won there was a violation on the right to self determination? NO!
Held
Principle of Self-Determination
This is the issue of principle of self-determination, which literally means the right to
control one's own destiny. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of people enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all
people have the right to determine, without external interference, their political

___________________________________________________________________________________
statute and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part I, Article 1, Paragraph
established that ‘All peoples have the rights of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
Self-determination has been established a principle of customary international law

as seen in case law of Western Sahara, where the court stated that right of people
to self-determination is now a right of erga omnes.
The Court rejects Portugal's additional argument that the rights which Australia
allegedly breached were rights erga omnes and that accordingly Portugal could
require it, individually, to respect them regardless of whether or not another State
had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner.
In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to

self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice,
has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The principle of self-determination
of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the
jurisprudence of the Court; it is one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law.
However, the Court considers that the erga omnes character of a norm and the
rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things. Whatever the nature of
the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of
a State when its judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the
conduct of another State which is not a party to the case.
Conclusion
The Court recalls in any event that it has taken note in the Judgment that, for the two
Parties, the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self governing territory and its
people has the right to self-determination.
9. Mikmaq v. Canada, Communication No. 78/1980 (ERICA)- posting the full

text since short lang naman
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 29 July 1984, adopts the following,
Decision on inadmissibility

___________________________________________________________________________________
1. The author of the communication (initial letter dated 30 September 1980}

supplementary information of 9 December 1980} and further submissions dated 26
June, 3 October, 11 November 1981, 15 July 1982, 3 August 1983, 6 January and 6
February 1984) is A. D., "Jigap'ten of Santeoi Mawa'iomi" - Grand Captain - of the
Mikmaq tribal society. He submits the communication on behalf of "the Mikmaq
people" who claim as their territory the lands which they possessed and governed at
the time when they entered into a protection treaty with Great Britain in 1952, and
which are known today as Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and parts of
Newfoundland, New Brunswick and the Gasp, peninsula of Quebec.
2.1 The author alleges that the Government of Canada has denied and continues to
deny to the people of the Mikmaq tribal society the right of self-determination, in
violation of article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is
further submitted that Canada has deprived the alleged victims of their means of
subsistence and has enacted and enforced laws and policies destructive of the
family life of the Mikmaqs and inimical to the proper education of their children.
2.2 It is stated to be the objective of the communication that the traditional

Government of the Mikmaq tribal society be recognized as such and that the
Mikmaq nation be recognized as a State.
3. Responding to a request by the Committee for clarification (decision of 29

October 1980) A. D., in a letter dated 9 December 1980, reaffirms that the
communication is concerned essentially with the violation of article 1 of the
Covenant (... "article 1 is our goal, our vision" ...) and rejects categorically the
applicability of article 27 (concerning the rights of persons belonging to
minorities). He also submits that he has been authorized by the Grand Council of
the Mikmaq people to represent his kinsmen before the Committee.
4. By its decision of 9 April 1981, the Human Rights Committee transmitted the
communication under rule 91 of the provisional rules of procedure to the State party
concerned, requesting information and observations relevant to the question of
admissibility of the communication.
5.1 In its submissions, dated 21 July 1981 and 17 May 1982, the State party objects
to the admissibility of the communication ratione materiae, on the ground that article
1 of the Covenant cannot affect the territorial integrity of a State, a principle asserted
in United Nations declarations such as the 'Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' (General Assembly resolution
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), the 'Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations' (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24
October 1970) and stated in a great number of legal opinions.

___________________________________________________________________________________
5.2 The State party further submits that the communication does not fulfil the
requirements of articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol. It is argued that, in the
circumstances of the case, A. D. cannot claim either that his own rights have been
violated, since according to article 1 (1) of the Covenant the right of
self-determination is a collective right, or that he is duly authorized under the
relevant provisions of the Optional Protocol to act on behalf of the Mikmaq nation.
5.3 The State party also maintains that the remedy sought in the case, namely the.
recognition of statehood, goes beyond the competence of the Committee.
5.4 Referring to allegations advanced by A. D. relating to self-government,

education, enfranchising of aboriginal people, property rights, and
subsistence, the State party rejects the claims, with one exception, as
inadmissible, contending that these issues derive from the principal issue of
the communication, the right of self-determination. The exception in this
connection related to the situation of Indian women who marry non-Indians
and thereby lose their status as Indians. The State party refers to the Indian
Act 1970, which provides for limited self-government of the aboriginal peoples
to laws and procedures governing their land claims and to the recently
amended Canadian constitution, the Constitution Act 1982, which in its
Charter of Rights and Freedoms envisages equal protection of the human
rights of everyone and in its section 25 contains specific provisions as to the
protection of rights and freedoms of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
5.5 The State party does not consider the issues raised by the author concerning the
legal aspects of the relationship between the United Kingdom, the Mikmaq tribe and
Canada to be relevant in the present case, since it considers the communication
inadmissible on the issue of self-determination.
6.1 By letters, dated 3 October 1981, 11 November 1981 and 15 July 1982, A. D.
submitted his comments to the State party's submissions under rule 91 of the
provisional rules of procedure. He refutes the State party's contention that the
communication is inadmissible. With regard to the State party's argument based on
territorial integrity, he contends that this is inapplicable in the circumstances of the
case 'because it assumed a disputed fact, viz. whether the territory of the 'Mikmaq
Nationimouw' ever lawfully became part of the territory of Canada'. The author
asserts in this connection that the territory never was ceded or surrendered to Great
Britain and, therefore, not to Canada.
6.2 A. D. disagrees with the State party's contention that the right of
self-determination constitutes only a collective right, citing in substantiation the
United Nations study on the Right of Self-Determination,'1980, b/prepared by Mr.
Hector Gros-Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. A. D. submits that this study shows that

___________________________________________________________________________________
the Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly invoked self-determination as the

right of individuals as much as a right of peoples collectively.
6.3 The author further challenges the validity of the State party's submissions on the
substance of "subsidiary violations of human rights", commenting in detail on the
issues of self-government, involuntary enfranchisement, education rights, property
and human rights issues relating to the Constitution Act, 1982. He suggests,
however, that before more evidence is Submitted on these matters, the question of
the admissibility of the communication should be decided.
6.4 A. D. finally suggests that the Committee should, if it finds that the present
communication calls outside its competence, bring the Mikmaq people's case to the
attention of the Economic and Social Council with the recommendation that an
advisory opinion be sought from the International Court of Justice.
7.1 Before considering a communication on the merits, the Committee must

ascertain whether it fulfils all conditions relating to its admissibility under the Optional
Protocol.
7.2 Articles 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol provide for the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be
victims of a violation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
7.3 The communication poses in particular the question whether Canada has
violated article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A.D.
claim not to represent a minority within the meaning of article 27, but a people within
the meaning of article 1 of the Covenant. In this context he also alleges that the right
of parents and families provided for in article 23 in connection with article 18 has
been violated, most particularly with regard to the religious education of the children.
7.4 The Committee agreed to clarify first the standing of the author in so far as he
claims to represent the Mikmaq tribal society.
7.5 While seeking to clarify the standing of the author, the Committee received a
'communique' dated 1 October 1982 from the Grand Chief of the Grand Council of
the 'Mikmaq tribal society, D. M., stating that nobody was authorized to speak on
behalf of the Mikmaq nation or on behalf of the Grand Council or the Grand Chief,
unless the latter "will give this authority in writing to the person or persons for each
separate correspondence". Consequently, the Committee requested the Grand
Council of the Mikmaq to comment on or clarify A. D.'s authority to act on behalf of
the Mikmaq tribe and to provide the relevant information not later than 1 February
1983. In response, R. B., legal counsel for A. D., informed the Committee by
telegram of 31 January 1983 that the Mikmaq Grand Council had reaffirmed the
authority of A. D. to pursue communication No. R.19/78 before the Committee and

___________________________________________________________________________________
that a document signed to this effect by the Grand Council would be transmitted by
registered mail.
7.6 Six months later, on 3 August 1983, a letter mandating the legal counsel of A.
D., Mr. R. B., to represent the Grand Council was received. This 'Commission' was
signed by the author of the communication himself and by the Assistant Grand
Chief. The content of the 'Commission' shows clearly that it is not the Grand Council
in its legal entity which authorizes A. D. to act but that it is the author himself who
confirms his self-authorization.
7.7 Later submissions of the author dated 6 January and 6 February 1984 referred
to the substance of his complaints without providing evidence on his standing in the
case of the Mikmaq people
8.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights
Committee shall, in accordance with rule 87 of its provisional rules of procedure
decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
8.2 The Human Rights Committee observes that the author has not proven that he is
authorized to act as a representative on behalf of the Mikmaq tribal society. In,
addition, the author has failed to advance any pertinent facts supporting his claim
that he is personally a victim of a violation of any rights contained in the Covenant.
9. The Human Rights Committee therefore decides:
The communication is inadmissible.
APPENDIX
Individual opinion
Mr. Roger Errera, member of the Human Rights Committee, submits the following
individual opinion relating to the admissibility of communication No. 78/1980 (A. D. v.
Canada):
A. D.'s communication is based primarily on a violation of article 1 of the Covenant

relating to the right of all peoples to self-determination. The examination of the
admissibility of this communication accordingly raises the following questions:
(1) Does the right of "all peoples" to "self-determination", as enunciated in article 1,

paragraph 1, of the Covenant, constitute one "of the rights set forth in the Covenant"
in accordance with the terms of article 1 of the Optional Protocol?

___________________________________________________________________________________
(2) If it does, may its violation by a State party which has acceded to the Optional
Protocol be the subject of a communication from individuals?
(3) Do the Mikmaq constitute a "people" within the meaning of the above-mentioned
provisions of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Covenant?
The inadmissibility decision adopted by the Committee does not answer any of
these three questions, even though they are fundamental to the interpretation of
article 1, paragraph 1, of the Covenant and article 1 of the Optional Protocol, and to
the jurisprudence of the Committee relating to individual communications 'alleging.
violation of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. To my deep regret, therefore, I
cannot endorse this decision.
10. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (FAYE)
FACTS: Chief Bernard Ominayak of the Lubicon Lake Band brought a

communication under Art. 2 of the Optional Protocol against Canada, a state party to
the protocol. He alleged a denial of the “right to self-determination” of the Band,
including the right to “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources” (Art. 1
ICCPR).
Individual Band members’ right to hunt, trap and fish in traditional lands is
recognized under the Indian Act and Treaty 8 of 1899. These activities are essential
to maintain the subsistence economy underpinning the Band’s distinctive culture,
spirituality and language. Oil and gas development in traditional lands threatened
the environmental and economic base of the Band, including the potential loss of
natural resource revenues in lands subject to a land title dispute.
The complaint was brought to the Human Rights Committee after the Supreme
Court of Canada refused to hear an appeal from a decision of the Alberta Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal refused an injunction prohibiting all oil and gas
development in the disputed lands, as the Band failed to show ‘irreparable injury’ to
its interests in the land claims negotiations. The land claim and other legal
proceedings remained unresolved when the ‘View’ was issued.
ISSUES:
1) Did the individual exhaust ‘all available’ domestic remedies, or was the application
of the remedies ‘unreasonably prolonged,’ according to Art. 5 of the
Optional Protocol?
2) Did the individual claimant establish a violation of the ICCPR by the state party of
(a) a people’s right to self-determination under Art. 1?

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(b) any of the other enumerated rights?
REASONING:
1) Exhaustion of Remedies
The Band submitted that the interim injunction was the only “effective and available”
remedy because by the time a final judgement recognizing aboriginal rights might
achieved, further resource development would effectively undermine the ability of
the Band to enjoy these rights.
Canada submitted that the Band was responsible for delays in the litigation.
‘Domestic remedies’ means ‘all local procedures of redress,’ including concluding
the unresolved land claims process.
The Committee noted that the “road of litigation would [not] have represented an
effective method of saving or restoring the traditional or cultural livelihood” of the
Band.
2) Violations of the ICCPR
It was submitted that the destroying the economic base imperils the Band’s survival
as a ‘people.’
Canada submits the Band is not a ‘people,’ and that this right cannot be invoked by
an individual.
The Committee found that it cannot pronounce upon the existence of a ‘people’
under Art. 1. The claim instead engaged the rights of persons under Art. 27
(minorities), “to engage in economic and social activities which are a part of a culture
of the community to which they belong.” Individuals may invoke minority rights under
Art. 27 but not the collective right to under Art. 1.
HOLDING: The Committee found “historical inequities . . . and recent developments

threaten the way of life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band” and found Canada in
violation of Art. 27.
APPLICATION: The Optional Protocol is silent as to the binding nature Views
issued by the Human Rights Committee. This phrase ”in accordance with its
constitutional processes” in Art. 2(2) of the ICCPR indicates that the implementation
of treaty norms is a matter of domestic law.
DISCUSSION: The dualistic nature of Canadian law means that explicit

implementing legislation is necessary to invoke treaty norms in domestic courts.
While this restrictive approach to treaty interpretation may have delayed the

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implementation of the principles of the Lubicon Lake in Canada, the Courts have
developed a body of case-law to address these claims.
In particular, the ‘duty to consult and accommodate’ provides aboriginals with

“positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective
participation . . . in decisions which affect them” (General Comment No. 23: The
Rights of minorities (Art. 27) (CCPR/C/21) par. 7).
The government’s duty to consult arises where there is a potential infringement of

aboriginal rights and requires the government reasonably accommodate these
interests into decision-making. Only recently have Canadian courts recognized the
uniqueness of aboriginal title and the need for reconciliation with State sovereignty
(Delgamuukw, 1997 CanLII 302 (S.C.C.)).
Canadian courts have been greatly influenced by the decision of the High Court of
Australia in Mabo ((1992) 66 A.L.J.R. 408). Brennan (now C.J.) invoked the
Convention on the Elimination Racial Discrimination (CERD) to reverse the 150 year
old practice of terra nullis (discovery by a European state establishes sovereignty) in
Queensland. He found that continuing to deny the existence of aboriginal title would
“’destroy the equality’ of all Australian citizens before the law.”
The Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation and Taku River (released
simultaneously 2004 SCC 73 (CanLII), 2004 SCC (CanLII) 74) in practice elaborated
on the rationale from Lubicon Lake and Länsman cases to develop a framework for
the duty to consult. In Haida, the Court ordered the government to reconsider its
decision to grant a tree harvesting license for an old growth forest subject to an
unresolved aboriginal title claim. McLachlin C.J. wrote for the Court:
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to consult and
accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins
with the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims
resolution. Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense.
Rather, it is a process flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown's
duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn
from the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de
facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of that
people. . .
To limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating reconciliation as a

distant legalistic goal, devoid of the "meaningful content" mandated by the
"solemn commitment" made by the Crown in recognizing and affirming
Aboriginal rights and title . . . It also risks unfortunate consequences. When the
distant goal of proof is finally reached, the Aboriginal peoples may find their

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land and resources changed and denuded. This is not reconciliation. Nor is it
honourable (par. 31 and 32).
Similar to the reasoning in Länsman, the decision notes ‘the scope of the duty is
proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the
existence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect
upon the right or title claimed’ (par. 39).
The decision indicates that negotiation is the preferable way ‘to reconcile aboriginal
and state interests.’ Applications for temporary injunctions halting development ‘may
diminish incentives on the part of the successful party to compromise’ and lead to
protracted disputes (par. 14).
The duty to consult now provides individual claimants with an effective domestic
remedy before the Courts and in regulatory proceedings where the enjoyment of
aboriginal rights is infringed.
11. Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985 (JUED)
FACTS: Ivan Kitok (author of communication), a Swedish citizen of Sami ethnic

origin, born in 1926. He claims to be the victim of violations by the Government of
Sweden of articles 1 and 27 of the Covenant.
Ivan Kitok belongs to a Sami family which has been active in reindeer breeding for
over 100 years. On this basis the author claims that he has inherited the "civil right"
to reindeer breeding from his forefathers as well as the rights to land and water in
Sörkaitum Sami Village. It appears that the author has been denied the exercise of
these rights because he is said to have lost his membership in the Sami village
("sameby", formerly "lappby"), which under a 1971 Swedish statute is like a trade
union with a "closed shop" rule. A non-member cannot exercise Sami rights to land
and water.
In an attempt to reduce the number of reindeer breeders, the Swedish Crown and
the Lap bailiff have insisted that, if a Sami engages in any other profession for a
period of three years, he loses his status and his name is removed from the rolls of
the lappby, which he cannot re-enter unless by special permission. Thus it is
claimed that the Crown arbitrarily denies the immemorial rights of the Sami minority
and that Ivan Kitok is the victim of such denial of rights.
With respect to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author states that he has
sought redress through all instances in Sweden, and that the Regeringsrätten
(Highest Administrative Court of Sweden)decided against him, although two
dissenting judges found for him and would have made him a member of the sameby.

___________________________________________________________________________________
Thereafter, the Working Group of the Human Rights Committee transmitted the
communication to the State party concerned, requesting information and
observations relevant to the question of the admissibility of the communication. The
Working Group also requested the State party to provide the Committee with the text
of the relevant administrative and judicial decisions pertaining to the case.
In its submission. Sweden recognized the complaint of the author for alleged
breaches of Article 1 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Sweden observes that it is not certain whether Ivan Kitok claims that the
Sami as a people should have the right to self-determination as set forth in article 1,
paragraph 1, or whether the complaint should be considered to be limited to
paragraph 2 of that article, an allegation that the Sami as a people have been
denied the right freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources. However, as
can be seen already from the material presented by Ivan Kitok himself, the issue
concerning the rights of the Sami to land and water and questions connected hereto,
is a matter of immense complexity. For the time being the Government refrains from
further comments on this aspect of the application. Suffice it to say that, in the
Government's opinion, the Sami do not constitute a 'people' within the meaning
given to the word in article 1 of the Covenant . . . Thus, the Government
maintains that article 1 is not applicable to the case. Ivan Kitok's complaints
therefore should be declared inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as being
incompatible with provisions of the Covenant.
ISSUE:
WON Ivan Kitok is indeed included to the Sami People
WON Sweden violated Article 27 of the ICCPR for depriving Ivan Kitok of his rights
for self-determination
HELD:
Indeed, the Swedish Constitution goes somewhat further. Chapter 1, article 2, fourth
paragraph, prescribes: "The possibilities of ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities to
preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own should Chapter be
promoted. Chapter 2, article 15, prescribes: No law or other decree may imply the
discrimination of any citizen on the ground of his belonging to a minority on account
of his race, skin colour, or ethnic origin. The matter to be considered with regard to
article 27 is whether Swedish legislation and Swedish court decisions have resulted
in Ivan Kitok being deprived of his right to carry out reindeer husbandry and, if this is
the case, whether this implies that article 27 has been violated? The Government
would in this context like to stress that Ivan Kitok himself has observed before the
legal instances in Sweden that the only question at issue in his case is the existence

___________________________________________________________________________________
of such special reasons as enable the authorities to grant him admission as a

member of the Sijrkaitum Sami community despite the Sami community's refusal . ..
The reindeer grazing legislation had the effect of dividing the Sami population of
Sweden into reindeer-herding and non-reindeer-herding Sami, a distinction which is
still very important. Reindeer herding is reserved for Sami who are members of a
Sami village (sameby), an entity which is a legal entity under Swedish law. Reindeer
husbandry was considered necessary to protect and preserve the whole culture of
the Sami . . . It should be stressed that a person who is a member of a Sami village
also has a right to use land and water belonging to other people for the maintenance
of himself and his reindeer. This is valid for State property as well as private land
and also encompasses the right to hunt and fish within a large part of the area in
question. It thus appears that the Sami in relation to other Swedes have
considerable benefits. An appeal against a decision of a Sami community to refuse
membership may, however, be granted only if there are special reasons for allowing
such membership (see sect. 12, para. 2, of the 1971 Act). According to the
liegislative history of the Act, the County Administrative Board's right to grant an
appeal against a decision made by the Sami community should be exercised very
restrictively. How ever, the circumstances are not quite the same as in Ivan Kitok's
case . . . The case that Ivan Kitok has brought to the courts is based on the contents
of section 12, paragraph 2 , of the Reindeer Husbandry Act. The County
Administrative Board and the Courts have thus had to make decisions only upon the
question whether there were any special reasons within the meaning of the Act to
allow Kitok membership in the Sami community. The County Administrative Board
found that there were no such reasons, nor did the Administrative Court of Appeal or
the majority of the Supreme Administrative Court.
When deciding upon the question whether article 27 of the Covenant has been
violated, the following must be considered. It is true that Ivan Kitok has been denied
membership in the Sami community of Sörkaitum. Normally, this would have meant
that he also had been deprived of any possibility of carrying out reindeer husbandry.
However, in this case the Board of the Sami community declared that Ivan Kitok, as
an owner of domesticated reindeer, can be present when calves are marked,
reindeer slaughtered and herds are rounded up and reassigned to owners, all this in
order to safeguard his interests as a reindeer owner in the Sami society, albeit not
as a member of the Sami community. He is also allowed to hunt and fish free of
charge in the community's pasture area. These facts were also decisive in enabling
the Supreme Administrative Court to reach a conclusion when judging the matter.
The Government contends that Ivan Kitok in practice can still continue his reindeer
husbandry , although he cannot exercise this right under the same safe conditions
as the metiers of the Sami community. Thus, it cannot be said that he has been
prevented from 'enjoying his own culture'. For that reason the Government maintains
that the complaint should be declared inadmissible as being incompatible with the
Covenant." Should the Committee arrive at another opinion, the State party submits
that: "As is evident from the legislation, the Reindeer Husbandry Act aims at

___________________________________________________________________________________
protecting and preserving the Sami culture and reindeer husbandry as such. The
conflict that has occurred in this case is not so much a conflict between Ivan Kitok as
a Sami and the State, but rather between Kitok and other Sami. As in every society
where conflicts occur, a choice has to be made between what is considered to be in
the general interest on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the other.
A special circumstance here is that reindeer husbandry is so closely connected to
the Sami culture that it must be considered part of the Sami culture itself. In this
case the legislation can be said to favour the Sami community in order to make
reindeer husbandry economically viable now and in the future.
According to the State party, the purposes of the Reindeer Husbandry Act are to
restrict the number of reinder breeders for economic and ecological reasons and to
secure the preservation and well-being of the Sami minority. Both parties agree that
effective measures are required to ensure the future of reindeer breeding and the
livelihood of those for whom reindeer farming is the primary source of income. The
method selected by the State party to secure these objectives is the limitation of the
right to engage in reindeer breeding to members of the Sami villages. The
Committee is of the opinion that all these objectives and measures are reasonable
and consistent with article 27 of the Covenant.
It can thus be seen that the Act provides certain criteria for participation in the life of
an ethnic minority whereby a person who is ethnically a Sami can be held not to be
a Sami for the purposes Of the Act. The Committee has been concerned that the
ignoring of objective ethnic criteria in determining membership of a minority, and the
application to Mr. Kitok of the designated rules, may have been disproportionate to
the legitimate ends sought by the legislation. It has further noted that Mr. Kitok has
always retained some links with the Sami community, always living on Sami lands
and seeking to return to full-time reindeer farming as soon as it became financially
possible, in his particular circumstances, for him to do so.
In resolving this problem, in which there is an apparent conflict between the

legislation, which seems to protect the rights of the minority as a whole, and its
application to a single member of that minority, the Committee has been guided by
the ratio decidendi in the Lovelace case (No. 24/1977, Lovelace v. Canada), namely,
that a restriction upon the right of an individual member of a minority must be shown
to have a reasonable and objective justification and to be necessary for the
continued viability and welfare of the minority as a whole. After a careful review of all
the elements involved in this case, the Committee is of the view that there is no
violation of article 27 by the State party. In this context, the Committee notes that Mr.
Kitok is permitted, albeit not as of right, to graze and farm his reindeer, to hunt and
to fish.
C. Right to Life

___________________________________________________________________________________
● 1987 Phil. Consti. Article 3, Section 1 (JUED)
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
● UDHR, Article 3 (JUED)
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
● ICCPR, Article 6 (JERALD)

Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgement rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of
the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be
granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
● CRC, Article 6 (JERALD)
Article 6
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child.

___________________________________________________________________________________
12. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, Jan 19, 1999 (including
separate opinions) (JERALD)
Ponente: Justice Puno
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC
not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of
the executive to grant reprieve.
NOT PART OF FACTS STATED IN THE CASE - For background purposes only:
(Excerpt from independent.co.uk)
A CHILD RAPIST escaped death by lethal injection with three hours to spare
yesterday when the Philippines supreme court postponed his execution. Leo
Echegaray, 38, would have been the first man executed in the Philippines since
1976.
The Philippines abolished the death penalty in 1987, but restored it in 1994 because
of a resurgence in crime.
The reprieve was granted because the Philippines Congress is due to reconsider its
stand on the death penalty. By a majority of eight to five the judges decided that in
such circumstances it was unreasonable to carry out the execution.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of
judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable
Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function. -NO
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to suspend execution of convicts
after final judgment has been rendered. -YES
HELD:
Respondents cited sec 19, art VII of the Constitution which provides that “Except in
cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress."
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by
the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the

___________________________________________________________________________________
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power
of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance,
a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed
while in a state of insanity. As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed
that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution. The suspension of
such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same -- the
temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing
the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States,
laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend
execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that
they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear
that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will
preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at
stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some
partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not
change the circumstance of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that
law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take
the life of one its citizens.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that "x x x the question
of capital punishment has been the subject of endless discussion and will probably
never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." In our clime and time
when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral
predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism

___________________________________________________________________________________
because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than
an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate
deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger
threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this
Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully
hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us "x x x it is the very purpose of the Constitution
- - - and particularly the Bill of Rights - - - to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." Man has yet to invent a better
hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom
only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds
of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the
rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in
rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when
they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of
the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules
of Court, without further delay.
Vitug J., SEPARATE OPINION:
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm
set forth by the Constitution.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and
executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the
Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations. The rule
notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of
the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court
has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by
the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that
the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution
of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice
or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot
be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at
stake.

___________________________________________________________________________________
"The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial
instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines,
subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That
there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death
penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime. It
appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple reimposition of
the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised
Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term compelling reasons
would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu
from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute
prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most
importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the heinous nature of
the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death
penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review
given the circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the
crime would become heinous within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify,
the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the
crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed
by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow
constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent
standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally be required in
criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the great
prejudice of victims and society.
Panganiban J., SEPARATE OPINION:
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar
as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the
requirements of heinousness and compelling reasons prescribed by the Constitution
of the Philippines.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift the TRO, because to do so would mean the
upholding and enforcement of a law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit
with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also
reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 (the Death
Penalty Law) is to be implemented.
13. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1, Oct 07, 2008 (MARK)
- pinaitan ko po. Sorry ngayon lang nagawa.

___________________________________________________________________________________
Facts:
CA Decision being appealed
1. The Manalo Brothers filed, on August 23, 2007, a petition for prohibition,
injunction, and temporary restraining order (TRO) against petitioners and their
officers from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
- A Writ of Amparo was approved on August 24, 2007 and petitioners

filed Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition.
2. CA Rendered a decision in favor of the Manalo brothers and ordered the current
petitioners to:
- Furnish the Manalos and CA of all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already
on file.
- To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of certain AFP

personnel.
- To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the petitioners, to include a list of personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14. 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five
days from notice of this decision.
3. On February 14, 2006 – Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers and herein
respondents, were abducted by elements of the military (AFP and Citizen Armed
Force Geographical Unit or CAFGU) from their house.
4. The abductors were looking for members if NPA and suspected the Manalo
Brothers as such.
5. They took them and drove them to a military camp through a L300 van. They
were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about their knowledge of the
NPA.
6. Sometime in the Third week of detention, Raymond attempted to escape. He
discovered that they were in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija. He was however
recaptured and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for 3 and half
months.
7. The Manalo Brothers was detained and tortured for a long time. After sometime,
the brothers planned their escape and were able to do so and board a bus bound
for Manila.

___________________________________________________________________________________
8. The respondents were able to corroborate each other`s affidavits. A certain Dr.
Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo brothers. He
conducted medical exam on the respondents.
9. Some members of the CAFGU implicated in the abduction denied the
allegations. They had alibis. Later on it was discovered through the investigation
that the member of the NPA that they were looking for was actually Rolando
Manalo, elder brother of the respodnets.
10. Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE(s): WON the privilege of Amparo was properly given

Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by
existing laws.
HELD: Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed.
The Writ was properly granted.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the tow-day National Consultative
Summit on Extra Judicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the
Court on Jily 16-17, 2007. It was an exercise for the first time of the Court`s
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people`s constitutional rights.
Amparo literally means protection in Spanish. Amparo thus combines the principles
of Judicial review derived from the US with the limitations on judicial power
characteristics of the civil law tradition, which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to
enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.
This concept evolved into the (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the
judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial
review of the constitutionality and legality of judicial decidion; (4) administrativo for
the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants` rights derived from the agrarian reform. In Latin American
countries, except Cuba, the Wirt of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted for the
protection against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas.
In the Philippines while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ
of Amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter
specifically under the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
constitution.

___________________________________________________________________________________
Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court exercised its
expanded power in Constitution to promulgate rules to protect the people`s
constitutional rights (Life, liberty, property).
Coverage of which confined to: Extralegal Killings and Enforced disappearances.

The writ provides for swift relief because of the summary nature of its proceedings.
Only substantial evidence is required. There is still a threat to the life, liberty and a
violation of their right to security of the Manalo brothers because their captors, whom
they escaped from, still remain at large.
There are Three ways of exercising the right to security:
1. reedom from fear - Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

F
Article 3 which states that; Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “
freedom from fear”. It is even enunciated in the ICCPR or the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9 (1).
2. Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security – Article III, section II
of the Constitution guarantees against search without warrant. ELKs and EDs
involve Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
integrity. It constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as
the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will.
3. Guarantee of protection of one`s right by the government – The writ of amparo,
this right is built into guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III
section 1 of the constitution and the right to security of person under Article III,
Section 2.
The continuing threat to life of the Manalo Brothers is apparent. This threat
vitiates their free will because they are forced to limit their movements and
activities. Threats to liberty, security, and life are actionable through a petition
for a writ of amparo. The military failed to provide protection for the
respondents. They were even the ones who actually tortured them. In sum, we
conclude that respondents` right to security as “freedom from threat” is
violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person.
Their right to security as guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of
the military.
D. Prohibition Against Torture
● Phil. Consti., Art 3, Sec 12 (2) (MARK)

___________________________________________________________________________________
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
● UDHR, Article 5 (MARK)
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment.
● ICCPR, Article 7 (MUSTANG)
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation.
● CRC, Article 37 (MUSTANG)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 37

States Parties shall ensure that:
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age;
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest,
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be
used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;
(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the
needs of persons of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall
be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do
so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances;
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to
legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality
of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent
14. Hadhoum Hmeed Mohamed v. Libya, Communication No. 2046/2011

(MUSTANG)

___________________________________________________________________________________
Testimony of Hadhoum Hmeed Mohamed, a Libyan national living in Tripoli:

Saleh Salem Hmeed, who stood accused of adultery and of being an accessory to
the murder, was also arrested. Saleh Salem Hmeed was held in a tiny isolation cell
for one month, despite the fact that the law sets a maximum of 48 hours. While in
custody, he was tortured by the authorities in order to extract a confession and
incriminate him for the murder. As a result, Saleh Salem Hmeed experienced
psychiatric problems with severe long-term effects.
During the proceedings, Saleh Salem Hmeed had the assistance of a lawyer
appointed by the Prosecutor-General, but only for the trial phase. Following an
expedited hearing, he was convicted of rape and murder and was sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life. The ruling was based chiefly on the testimony of the
victim’s wife — who, as co-defendant, had been acquitted — and of her brother.
Saleh Salem Hmeed then signed a form and an official register with a view to
appealing the ruling. However, the People’s Advocacy Department, which should
have transmitted the appeal to a higher court, did not complete the necessary
procedures and the appeal did not take place, making the ruling definitive.
As soon as an independent lawyer could be retained, and because of the judicial

authorities’ categorical refusal to review the case on appeal, an application for a
retrial was filed with the public prosecution service of the Criminal Court of Tripoli
with a view to having the case reconsidered and ensuring that Saleh Salem Hmeed
was given a fair trial. The family also made various informal approaches to the
judicial and political authorities, resulting in a decision by the Ministry of Justice to
reopen the case in 1994 after the detectives heading the investigation found new
evidence that justified a retrial. Although suspects were arrested and questioned,
they were eventually released when the country’s highest political authorities
intervened, and the case was once again closed.
The family initiated legal proceedings in the Appeals Court of Tripoli against the
secretary and the director of the General People’s Committee for Justice, no action
has been taken in these proceedings.
In response to the violations suffered by Saleh Salem Hmeed, the author (his wife)
and their sons appealed to non-governmental organizations and activists in the field
of human rights while he was still detained.
On 15 February 2007, some 50 security officers under the command of the director
of the criminal investigation service of Tripoli, dressed in plain clothes and armed,
stormed the family home, breaking doors and windows. They looted the premises,
taking all of the family’s valuables, then removed those family members present
and set fire to the house. In the process, the complainant who was elderly and ill,
was beaten, and her youngest son, Fredj Saleh Hmeed, was also beaten and
arrested without a warrant.

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It was not until 25 July 2007, i.e. five months after their imprisonment, that the ban
on medical treatment was lifted, following a complaint by the author’s five sons to
the National Security Court. The subsequent medical check-up revealed marks of
torture, and owing to the seriousness of their condition, the doctor ordered an
emergency examination and hospital supervision for Ali Saleh Hmeed and Fredj
Saleh Hmeed. He also ordered the hospitalization in a psychiatric facility of Al
Sadek Saleh Hmeed, who was badly traumatized.
They were all released on 7 December 2008 after the Head of State’s son, Saif
al-Islam Gaddafi, personally intervened.
When Adel Saleh Hmeed was released following his acquittal on 6 April 2008, he
lodged a criminal complaint regarding the burning and burglary of the family home.
On 14 December 2008, in response to the complaint, a public prosecutor of Soul el
Jom’a requested the chief of the local police to promptly provide information on
these events. The public prosecutor also wished to know the date on which the
burned-down house was placed under surveillance and the names of the agents
tasked with the surveillance. However, the author has not been informed of any
action taken in response to the request.
On 25 November 2009, Saleh Salem Hmeed, the author’s husband, was released
after 23 years in prison, following an amnesty on medical grounds.
The author first cites articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant, claiming that her husband,
Saleh Salem Hmeed, was subjected to acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. While in detention, he was held in isolation for a long period,
causing depression and leaving serious psychological scars. Inflicting such mental
anguish infringes article 7 of the Covenant. As to the rest of the family, the author
herself was physically assaulted. Her sons were brutally beaten, held in isolation,
tortured and denied medical care. Lastly, the author claims that setting the family
home on fire, at a time when the family was particularly vulnerable, also amounted
to the cruel and inhuman treatment of the entire Hmeed family.
Consideration of the merits

As the State party has not replied to the author’s allegations, due weight must be
given to those allegations to the extent that they have been sufficiently
substantiated.
Treatment of Al Sadek Saleh Hmeed, Al Mahdi Saleh Hmeed, Fredj Saleh

Hmeed, Ali Saleh Hmeed and Adel Saleh Hmeed (the author’s sons) and of
the author herself
The Committee has taken note of the author’s allegations that, on 15 February
2007, after her sons had accepted the invitation of human rights defenders to

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attend a peaceful sit-in, some 50 security officers came to the family home, brutally
beat the author and her son Fredj Saleh Hmeed and arrested him without a
warrant; that, on 16 February 2007, security officers came to the homes of her sons
Al Sadek Saleh Hmeed, Al Mahdi Saleh Hmeed, Ali Saleh Hmeed and Adel Saleh
Hmeed and arrested them without a warrant and without informing them of the
grounds for their arrest; that, following their arrest, her sons were held in complete
isolation in tiny cells and deprived of all contact with the outside world; that they
were tortured, brutally beaten and kept tied up; and that they were deliberately
denied medical treatment for five months, despite being in a serious condition
requiring monitoring in hospital, as was later observed. In the absence of any
information from the State party, the Committee finds that the information
provided to it demonstrates that the State party violated articles 7 and 9 of
the Covenant with regard to Fredj Saleh Hmeed, Al Sadek Saleh Hmeed, Al
Mahdi Saleh Hmeed, Ali Saleh Hmeed, Adel Saleh Hmeed and the author
herself.
Having found a violation of articles 7 and 9 of the Covenant, the Committee will not
consider the author’s claims under articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant separately.
Treatment of the family home

The Committee has taken note of the author’s allegations that, on 15 February
2007, security officers under the command of the director of the criminal
investigation service of Tripoli, dressed in plain clothes and armed, stormed the
family home, breaking doors and windows; that they beat the author, who was
elderly and ill; that they looted the premises, taking all the valuables, then removed
all those family members present and set fire to the house. The author notes that
the family was devastated by the loss of their common living space, repository of
family history and means of subsistence. The Committee recalls its general
comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, in which it was not considered necessary to draw up a list
of prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of
punishment or treatment; since the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and
severity of the treatment applied. The Committee also considers that the prohibition
in article 7 relates not only to acts that cause physical pain but also to acts that
cause mental suffering to the victim.
The Committee notes that, in this case, it was the authorities of the State party that
destroyed the family home; that, during this operation, the author, who was elderly
and vulnerable, was beaten and her youngest son, Fredj Saleh Hmeed, was also
beaten and arrested without a warrant; and that this deliberate destruction appears
to have been carried out without a warrant. Under the circumstances, the
Committee considers this act of destruction to amount to reprisals and intimidation,
causing severe mental anguish to the author and her family and constituting a
separate violation of article 7 of the Covenant with respect to Fredj Saleh Hmeed,

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Al Sadek Saleh Hmeed, Al Mahdi Saleh Hmeed, Ali Saleh Hmeed, Adel Saleh
Hmeed and the author.
With regard to the alleged violation of article 17 of the Covenant, the Committee
notes once again the author’s claims that, on 15 February 2007, security officers,
dressed in plain clothes, armed and without a warrant, stormed the house, breaking
doors and windows, and that they looted the premises, taking all the valuables,
then set fire to the house. The Committee notes that the State party has made no
comment on these claims and that due weight must therefore be given to the
author’s allegations, provided that they have been sufficiently substantiated.[1] The
Committee concludes that the entry of State officials into the home of the author
and her family in such circumstances, as well as the destruction of the house,
constitute unlawful interference with their privacy, family and home, in violation of
article 17 of the Covenant, with regard to the author and the family members who
lived there
Lack of an effective remedy

In this case, following the operation of 15 February 2007, during which the author
and her son, Fredj Saleh Hmeed, were beaten and the family home was ransacked
and burned, the author lodged a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor-General on
16 February 2007. No action has been taken on her complaint. Lastly, Adel Saleh
Hmeed lodged a criminal complaint for arson and robbery of the family home upon
his release from prison in April 2008, but no action has been taken.
In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant, the State party is
under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy by, inter alia,
prosecuting, trying and punishing those responsible for the violations, and to award
adequate compensation to the author and her family. The State party is also under
an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future.
Bearing in mind that, by becoming a party to the Optional Protocol, the State party
has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether or not
there has been a violation of the Covenant and that, pursuant to article 2 of the
Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its
territory or subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to
provide an effective and enforceable remedy when a violation has been
established, the Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 180 days,
information about the measures taken to give effect to the present Views. The State
party is also requested to publish the present Views and to have them widely
disseminated in the official languages of the State party.
15. Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 721/1996 (YANA)
FACTS:

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In this case, Clement Boodoo, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, has been
sentenced to be imprisoned for 10 years in Carrera Convict Prison Trinidad and
Tobago. Before his conviction, he has already been serving his pre-trial detention for
almost 33 months. During that time, a map of the prison and a hand-made weapon
have been found inside his cell. As a punishment, he has been transferred to
another cell with a special high security cellblock for escapees. Such confinement
also consists of being locked in his cell for 23 hours a day. While he is serving his
jail time inside his new cell, he is only allowed to go out from his cell once in a day.
His airing place is the inmate’s urinary and fecal area (bathroom). In the meantime,
the other inmates are allowed to do any recreational activities while Boodoo is
restricted to do anything except to have his airing time in a dirty bathroom.
Consequently, his health deteriorates as time passes by. He is going to be blind. His
doctor has recommended at 3 hours of sunlight a day for him, however, the Prison
personnel has never implemented it. Other cruelties that he has experienced while
inside the jail include: (1) the shaving of his beard (he is a muslim and this act is
against their religion); (2) he has been assaulted by the Prison wardens for several
times on the ground that he is being accused of absconding the prison; (3) he has
been forced to strip naked and pull back the foreskin of his penis; (4) he is forced to
squat 3 to 4 times in front of the prison guards; and lastly, (5) he has received some
threats from the warders in connection with his intention to file a complaint to the
UN. On the list given above, Boodoo alleges that his human dignity has been
violated.
ISSUE: WON Boodoo’s right to life has been violated.
HELD: YES.
The Committee finds that the delay in bringing the author to trial, in the absence of
any explanation from the State party, entailed a violation of article 14, paragraph
3(c) of the Covenant (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights):
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be

entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (c) To be tried
without undue delay;
The Committee notes that because of the negligence of the prison ward in not
attending with Boodoo’s health, their negligence has resulted to the deterioration of
Boodoo’s eyesight. In the Committee’s opinion, the conditions described therein are
such as to violate his right to be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person and are therefore contrary to article 10,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant (International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights):

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Article 10 1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
With respect to the physical assaults on the Boodoo’s integrity, the threats of
violence against him, and the treatment he received on being searched by the
warders, the Committee decides that, in the absence of an explanation from the
Tobago and Trinidad, such treatment amounts to a violation of article 7 of the
Covenant (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights):
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
As to the Boodoo’s claims concerning attacks on his privacy and dignity, in the
absence of any explanation from the State party, the Committee concludes that his
rights under article 17 were violated.
Article 17 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference

with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.
As a State Party to the ICCPR, the Committee wishes(take note) Tobago and
Trinidad to within 90 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to its
Views. The Tobago and Trinidad is requested to publish the Committee’s Views.
E. Prohibition Against Slavery / Forced Labor
● 1987 Phil Consti., Article 3, Section 18 (2) (YANA)
Section 18.
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
● UDHR, Article 4 (YANA)
Article 4 “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade
shall be prohibited in all their forms.”
● ICCPR, Article 8 (BRYAN)

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1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall
be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment
with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of
hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall
not include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subparagraph (b), normally required of a
person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a
person during conditional release from such detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious

objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious
objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or
well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.
● CRC, Article 19 (BRYAN)
Conventions of the Rights of the Child (CRC)
Article 19.
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures

for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for
the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other
forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation,

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treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described

heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.
16. People v. Casio, 744 SCRA 113, Dec 03, 2014 (BRYAN)
SUMMARY:
Human Trafficking / Slavery
This case involves RA 9208, or the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
“Chicks mo, Dong?”
This case resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice.
Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even though the minor
knew about the consented to the act of trafficking.
FACTS:
On or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or
recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for money,
profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6,
Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
On May 2, 2008, the International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental

organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in
human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino
Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as
decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM
provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room
24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police
team.
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay

Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the accused noticed them and
called their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the signal, the accused was
arrested and the two minors were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
Narration as follows (baka ipa-demo ni sir hehe)

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Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa
motel. (Are they new? They must be young because we have guests waiting at the
motel.)
Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get them.)
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a
prospective subject.
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in
this case.
Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in
sex?)
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired
how much their services would cost. Accused replied, “Tag kinientos” (P500.00).
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland
Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to
accused.
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This
was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested
accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the
marked money from accused. Meanwhile, AAA and BBB “were brought to Room 25
and placed in the custody of the representatives from the IJM and the DSWD.”
Accused contended that as a laundrywoman, she was out to buy supper on the
evening of May 2, 2008; she was stopped and asked if she new someone named
Bingbingd, to she she replied to be Gingging but not Bingbing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
RULING:
Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have
been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,

transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;”

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(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of

others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when
their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at
the time that accused peddled her services to work as a prostitute because she
needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s
vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of
the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No.
9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for

the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in
persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:
When the trafficked person is a child;

When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as
the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale
if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;
When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of

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the military or law enforcement agencies;

When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended
party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).
17. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro., 39 Phil. 660, Mar 07, 1919 (EDWARD)
“AO requires Mangyans to live within the reservation provided for them”
Facts: More on liberty but related to slavery

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected
as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans
may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were
ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary

measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection
of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by
the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held
on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of
his liberty of abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

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Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the
non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their

liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
Additional notes
SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment
to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine
Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall
involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since
reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in
the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption,
with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States
Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The

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term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely
for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the
State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right
to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and
the public interest.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it
has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."
The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare.
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by

law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license.
"Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government;
second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that
it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
18. Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851, Jan 1, 1949 (ERICA) oks na ba? - edward
DOCTRINE
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective

employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The

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fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the
respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one's
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element
that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
(Decision signed by only one Justice: Perfecto, J.)
FACTS
Estelita Flores, 21, orphan of father and mother, illiterate, was brought from her
native torni, Buruanga, Capiz, by Estrella Justo, maid recruiter, to Manila, where
she arrived on December 24, 1948, and stayed in the house of Julia Salazar at 1343
Felix Huertas St., where the latter is running the Far Eastern Employment Bureau.
On December 26, 1948, when her cousin Bartolome Caunca went to pay her a visit,
Estelita manifested her earnest desire to go along with him, but was prevented by
Julia Salazar and Estrella Justo, both demanding the condition that the sum of
P83.85 advanced for the fare and other transportation expenses of Estelita from
Buruanga to Manila be paid first before she could leave the house of Julia
Salazar.
Although there is no evidence that any physical force has been used to prevent
her from leaving the house, Estelita failed to leave it. Bartolome testified that,
although Estelita was embracing him in her desire to go with him, he/was unable to
take her with him because of respondents' opposition and of the many peoolo in the
house. Considering the crass ignorance of Estelita, her low mentality, her apparent
undernoursihment and weak vitality, her pusillanimous character, she is so timid that
she hardly dared to speak during her testimony, given in Hiligaynon, the only
language she knows,--there should not be any doubt that by sheer mental anu social
superiority. respondent Julia Salazar is an able and very intelligent
businesswoman, respondents exerted moral compulsion strong enough to
have effectively deprived Estelita of her personal liberty and of the freedom to
go along with her cousin.
Bartolome promised Estelita to take steps to seek her release and filed the petition
giving rise to this proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus.
The writ was issued on the very morning when the petition was filed on December
31, 1948, ordering respondents to bring to this Court the person of Estelita at 2

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o'clock that afternoon, the hour set for the hearing of the case. At said hearing both
Estelita and respondent Julia Salasar failed to appear. The latter, according to
Estrella Justo, brought Estelita that morning to Silang, Cavite, and would not return
until the evening. Continuation of the hearing was set for January 1, 1949, at 9
o'clock in the morning.
Julia Salazar appeared at said hour and explained that she had no sufficient time to
bring Estelita, because the latter was left in Silang, and requested for time to bring
the girl to this Court, She was granted time to bring the girl at 5 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 1, 1949, and at the hearing which started at said hour the
testimonies of Estelita and Julia Salazar, as the last witnesses, were taken.
ISSUE:
WON an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave? NO!
HELD:
Upon the evidence, there is no question that Estelita is restrained of her

personal liberty and not free to go with her cousin at her will. The fact that no
physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of Julia Salazar, at 1343
Felix Huertas St., or to stay in Silang, Cavite, in the house of Julia Salazar's cousin,
a place that Estelita could not identify better than just describing it as a place very
far from Manila, does not make less real the deprivation of Estelita's personal
freedom which includes the freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one's residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless

fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual
effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the
victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who
is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
On the hypothesis that Estelita is really indebted in the amount of P83.85, such is
not a valid reason for the respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with Estelita's
desire to leave the house of Julia Salazar and to live in the residence of his cousin
Bartolome. Said indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions, but would
not in any way subtract an iota from Estelita's fundamental right to have a free
choice of abode.

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An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective

employee has absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said
employee. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective
means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for
jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business can not be
controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a
merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental
freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.
In the scale of values, there is no acceptable equivalence between matters involving
human dignity and those belonging to the domain of business. The latter are
characterized by transience and precariousness, while the former are the nearest
things to what are everlasting, if ever there are any, in humanity. Human dignity and
human freedoms are essentially spiritual, notwithstanding their material
manifestations in the external world, and the universal concept of the spirit is
inseparable from the idea of the eternal, of the unlimited by space or time. Money,
power, domination, satisfaction of the pleasures of the flesh, like all lusts, belong to
the ephemeral and perishable, an order of things which has no possible equation
with the moral values of the spirit, among which are human freedoms.
The petition is granted and it is accordingly ordered that Estelita Flores be

allowed to go with her cousin Bartolome Caunca or to any place of her choice,
and respondents are ordered not to impede, obstruct or, in any way, interfere with
such freedom of Estelita Flores.
F. Liberty and Security of Persons
● 1987 Phil. Consti., Article 3, Sections 2, 12, 14, 15 (FAYE)
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

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(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary,incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.cralaw
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.cralaw
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
● UDHR, Article 3 (FAYE)
Article 3.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
● ICCPR, Article 9 (FAYE)
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be

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subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on
the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.
19. Gov’t of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia., Jr., 521 SCRA
470, April 19, 2007 (SUPRA) (FAYE)
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown
Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and
Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muñoz
Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation
of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.
He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of
Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC,
Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After
hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent

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judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk
and should be granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed
to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential

extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative
in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for
the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping
with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of
his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a
new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

___________________________________________________________________________________
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to

show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.
20. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro., 39 Phil. 660, Mar 07, 1919 (SUPRA)
(JUED)
FACTS:
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end
and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a
Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was
later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from
the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and
other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived
of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:

___________________________________________________________________________________
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else
was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the
provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as
circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of
civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a
way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being re-concentrated in
the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their semi-nomadic lifestyle. This will
ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was
neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one
cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law
has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.”
21. People v. Cogaed 731 SCRA 427, July 30, 2014 (JERALD)
Ponente: J. Leonen
Summary:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy
and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise
with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the
compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have
been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge
of society.
Squarely raised in· this appeal is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result
of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through
facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the
accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accused who never
acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the

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contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without

the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable
search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion
that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by
the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or
coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent
with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible
evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police
Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian
informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana" from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI Bayan
ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San
Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San
Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy
arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying
marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later
identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin. After this
exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam
ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag." "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the
police station." Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" inside
the station.
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit
(PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s
sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," and inside
Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.

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PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI Bayan
personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the
tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. The marijuana
collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams The marijuana
from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. The marijuana collected from Dayao’s
bag weighed 5,092 grams. A total of 17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaed’s
and Dayao’s bags.
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union,

"waiting for a jeepney to take him" to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy
pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s
friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted
from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things,
which included a travelling bag and a sack." Cogaed agreed because they were
both going to the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and
when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied
that he did not know. SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was
not privy to their conversation. Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and
Cogaed and brought them to the police station. These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where
Cogaed was apprehended.
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." The
bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao
were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No.
9165.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the
appellant. -NO
(2) Whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted. -NO
HELD:
1st Issue:
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through
the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether
searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with

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a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a
judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after
asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage can only
exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the
searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the
place and the things to be searched.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed
even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the "uniqueness
of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured." The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches
and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop
and frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests
under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime
be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and
withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as
well as to preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals was
similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the identity
of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information." This court stated that the "stop and frisk"
search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . .
a search warrant."

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The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary
for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to
prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that
the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading
to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In cases where stop and frisk were valid, the police officers using their senses
observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and
walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person
who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably
hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by
the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave
the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it
was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have
been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search
warrant.

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None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to
be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful
arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a
lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present
when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not
committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v.
Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer." Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no
overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in
possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
2nd Issue:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits
the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing

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expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as

evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the
fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly
infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the
search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there
is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this
menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform
their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s
fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as
slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando
City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for
some other legal grounds. No costs.
22. Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 721/1996 (SUPRA)

(MARK)
Facts: In this case, Clement Boodoo, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, has been
sentenced to be imprisoned for 10 years in Carrera Convict Prison Trinidad and
Tobago. Before his conviction, he has already been serving his pre-trial detention for
almost 33 months. During that time, a map of the prison and a hand-made weapon
have been found inside his cell. As a punishment, he has been transferred to
another cell with a special high security cellblock for escapees. Such confinement
also consists of being locked in his cell for 23 hours a day. While he is serving his
jail time inside his new cell, he is only allowed to go out from his cell once in a day.
His airing place is the inmate’s urinal and fecal area (bathroom). In the meantime,
the other inmates are allowed to do any recreational activities while Boodoo is
restricted to do anything except to have his airing time in a dirty bathroom.
Consequently, his health deteriorates as time passes by. He is going to be blind. His
doctor has recommended at 3 hours of sunlight a day for him, however, the Prison
personnel has never implemented it. Other cruelties that he has experienced while
inside the jail include: (1) the shaving of his beard (he is a muslim and this act is
against their religion); (2) he has been assaulted by the Prison wardens for several
times on the ground that he is being accused of absconding the prison; (3) he has
been forced to strip naked and pull back the foreskin of his penis; (4) he is forced to
squat 3 to 4 times in front of the prison guards; and lastly, (5) he has received some

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threats from the warders in connection with his intention to file a complaint to the
UN. On the list given above, Boodoo alleges that his human dignity has been
violated.
Issue: WON Respondent violated certain provisions under the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Held: Yes.
The Committee finds that the delay in bringing the author to trial, in the absence of
any explanation from the State party, entailed a violation of article 14, paragraph
3(c) of the Covenant.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled
to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (c) To be tried without undue
delay;
The Committee notes that because of the negligence of the prison
ward in not attending with Boodoo’s health, their negligence has resulted to the
deterioration of Boodoo’s eyesight. In the Committee’s opinion, the conditions
described therein are such as to
violate his right to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person and are therefore contrary to article 10, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant.
Article 10 1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. With respect to the
physical assaults on the Boodoo’s integrity, the threats of violence against him, and
the treatment he received on being searched by the warders, the Committee
decides that, in the absence of an explanation from the Tobago and Trinidad, such
treatment amounts to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant.
Article 7. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation. As to the Boodoo ’s claims
concerning attacks on his privacy and
dignity, in the absence of any explanation from the State party, the Committee
concludes that his rights under article 17 were violated.
Article 17 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his

privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.
As a State Party to the ICCPR, the Committee wishes(take note) Tobago and
Trinidad to within 90 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to its
Views. The Tobago and Trinidad is requested to publish the Committee’s Views.


___________________________________________________________________________________
23. Harden v. Director of Prisoners (MUSTANG)

Ponente: TUASON, J.
Nature: Petitioner was confined in prison for contempt of court for failure to comply
with a court order arising from a civil case between him and his wife.
Petitioner: Fred M. Harden
Repondent: Director of Prisoners
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar
for respondent.
Claro M. Recto for the intervenor
Facts:
The petitioner, Fred M. Harden, is being confined in prison for contempt of court for
not complying on order of the court.
In a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the petitioner and another
person as defendants, commenced on July 12, 1941, and involving the
administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting.
A preliminary injunction was issued restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or

alienating, except with consideration and consent of the court, all assets (money,
shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name, her name or both) in
the partnership with Mrs. Harden.
On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in
Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia Recreation Center, Long
Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000.
In the course of two years, he received orders from the SC to return the amounts but
Mr. Harden kept filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to jail
because of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of producing the
amounts) and held there until he can produce said amounts.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s detention violates constitutional right against cruel and
unusual punishment.
Held:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U. S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that "punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies

___________________________________________________________________________________
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and
adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court
which provides that "when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which
is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it.
Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is something that he
himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the
contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the
accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he
performs it)
The petition is denied with costs.

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Atty. Weng Santos Pokemon Digests

1. Sta Maria v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637, February 18, 1970 (FAYE)

In February 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of

As a result of the dialogues and recommendations by Sta. Maria to the president,

ISSUE: ​whether the petitioner, Felixberto C. Sta. Maria’s transfer constitutes

RULING: ​Yes, A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of

Pokémon Digests Page 1 of 69

A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a

The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university,

ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. — Due process is

FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public

Pokémon Digests Page 2 of 69

HELD : ​The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is

To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government

Pokémon Digests Page 3 of 69

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs.

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

Pokémon Digests Page 4 of 69

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the

RULING:​ Petition dismissed.

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends

Pokémon Digests Page 5 of 69

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

Pokémon Digests Page 6 of 69

4. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming

Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is

● March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming

Pokémon Digests Page 7 of 69

● In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of

Pokémon Digests Page 8 of 69

❖ injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers,

Pokémon Digests Page 9 of 69

5. Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968 (MUSTANG)

Pokémon Digests Page 10 of 69

Pokémon Digests Page 11 of 69

● Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to

B. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

C. Right against self-incrimination

Pokémon Digests Page 12 of 69

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely​:

Pokémon Digests Page 13 of 69

2. Freedom to act on one’s belief – where an individual rationalizes his beliefs in

J. Vitug Dissenting Opinion

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; The exercise of religious belief is not

VII. FIRST GENERATION RIGHTS

A. Civil and Political Rights (LIBERTY)

Petitioner: Maximo Calalang

Pokémon Digests Page 14 of 69

Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.

Issue: Nice to know

Issue related to the topic

Pokémon Digests Page 15 of 69

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

RELATED TO TOPIC: LIBERTY

Pokémon Digests Page 16 of 69

THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

● ICCPR, Article 1 [Copy] (EDWARD)

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having

8. Portugal v. Australia: Case Concerning East Timor (EDWARD)

Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia concerning "certain activities of

Pokémon Digests Page 17 of 69

ISSUE: whether the petitioner, Felixberto C. Sta. Maria’s transfer constitutes

RULING: Yes, A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is

RULING: Petition dismissed.

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:

[Historical Background (not found in the case)]

FACTS: Chief Bernard Ominayak of the Lubicon Lake Band brought a

DISCUSSION: The dualistic nature of Canadian law means that explicit

FACTS: Ivan Kitok (author of communication), a Swedish citizen of Sami ethnic

Ponente: Justice Puno

ISSUE(s): WON the privilege of Amparo was properly given

HELD: Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed.

1. reedom from fear - Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights