POST MID SEMS :

jus ad bellum(international law governing the interstateuse of force) and jus in bello
(internationallaw applicable in armed conflict).
The primary rules under jus in bello are found inthe law of armed conflict, which today is
widelytermed international humanitarian law (IHL).
The rule of distinction in attacks is a norm of customary international law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts as it is in international armed conflicts. Accordingly, any
weapon that is incapable of distinguishing between civilians/civilian objects and military
targets is considered inherently indiscriminate and its use Is always unlawful.
A supporting rule, that of proportionality in attacks,
Nicaragua case :
n armed attack need not, however, necessarily take the form of action by regular armed
forces. In its judgment in the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ held that:
an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces
across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted
by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein

OIL PLATFORMS CASE : (Iran v. US)

- Use of force and self-defence discussed.
- The Court also re-expressed the principles of necessity and proportionality to show the legal
limits on the use of force and it reassessed the definition of armed attack in depth.
- The Court especially touched on the gravity of armed attack; it stressed that to be called
self-defence the armed attack had to reach a high level
- revolved around the legality of the use of force with relation to two specific attacks
against Iranian interests by US forces during the course of the Iran – iraq war.
- US argument : responding to a perceived threat --attacks were only in the interest of
security in the region.
- the ambit of article 2(4) is limited to actual use of military force and “threats” to impose
economic or political sanctions are beyond it. According to the UN Charter a state is not
allowed to use force as a response to any intervention that falls short of an armed attack.
- The criterions established for the exercise of such retaliatory force include requirements
that the force used must be necessary to repel the armed attack; it must be absolutely
unavoidable and the force used must be proportionate.
1. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIMES :

 1950s - generation of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose advocated.

 Clean energy was accorded top most priority.
 However, problem : the issue of nuclear accident
 Led to – International framework – justice- victims outside countries as well as long
as they are party to the conventions.
  The Intl Lab Regime embodies primarily in 2 instruments ;
 OECD’s Paris Convention, 1960 - All western Europe except certian
 the IAEA’s Vienna convention, 1963 - All outside western Europe –
includins KSA, uae
2. The 1986 Chernobyl accident led to release of radioactive material into the atmosphere
and its spread regardless of geographical boundaries. The incident impacted surrounding
countries like Belarus, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
3. Post the Chernobyl incident, there was need felt for a regime that was viable to bring about a
balance between the two regimes that is the Paris convention (1960) and the Vienna
convention (1963) to unite the nations under an umbrella of a single liability regime.
4. As a result there was a Joint Protocol signed in 1988. and enabled those members who
were a party to it benefit from both the conventions. Consequently the Vienna convention
was amended in 1997 and Parris convention in 2004.
5. PRINCIPLES – LIST
6. MENTION 1963 BRUSSELS SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION
7. Amendment to Vienna – set the lt and broadened the def of nuclear damage
8. 1997 IAEA PARTIES also adopted CSC ..Convention on supplementary Compensation for -
Nuclear Damage – addnl dmge beyond to be contributed by state parties.

9. he Indian Civil Nuclear Liability law

10. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, (CLNDA) 2010 provides for compensation
arrangements in case of any events of accidents, it also provides for a claims commission which
decides the amount of compensation.

11. Two of the sections of the bill that is sections 6 and 17 (B) have been a
bone of contention by the suppliers
12. However, two of the sections of the bill that is sections 6 and 17 (B) have been a bone of contention
by the suppliers. These sections give the operator the right to recourse making the suppliers liable for
material that is defective or latent. This provision of the Act has stalled the various deals and transfer
of reactors, including from Russia and France. The international community perceives these sections
as a contradiction to the provisions of CSC. This was done so that the Indian victims of a nuclear
disaster also have equal right of compensation like that of the victims in foreign courts.

13. However, most of the provisions of the CLNDA 2010 are in compliance with the international
conventions for compensation by placing the onus of compensation on the operator. The liability
rests on the principle of no fault or strict liability like that of the CSC.

CIVIL LIABILITY NUCLEAR DAMAGE ACT, 2010

 civil liability for nuclear damage and prompt compensation

 through a no-fault liability regime channeling liability to the operator
 appointment of Claims Commissioner
 establishment of Nuclear Damage Claims Commission and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto
 s.4 talks about liab of operator for accidents in that nuclear installation; or (b) involving
nuclear material coming from, or originating in, that nuclear installation
 S.5 : when not liable : natural disaster, civil war
 S.8 . Operator to maintain insurance or financial securities.
 S.17. This Act secures the operator the right to recourse under certain circumstances and
provides a mechanism to compensate victims of nuclear damage
  In November 2011 under the parent Act, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules were
notified. These Rules stipulate certain mandatory clauses for contracts that secure the
operator the right to recourse.
 S.18. The right to claim compensation for nuclear damage shall extinguish, if such claim is
not made within a period of- (a) ten years, in the case of damage to property; (b) twenty
years, in the case of personal injury to any person, from the date of occurrence of the
incident n
 It also prescribe the procedure to provide compensation to victims in case of nuclear incidents
 Section 3 : Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to notify nuclear incident within a period of
fifteen days from the date of occurrence of a nuclear incident,
... 1789 – Uranium, named after the planet Uranus, was discovered by Martin
Klaproth, a German chemist,
1895 - Ionising radiation was discovered by Wilhelm Rontgen –glass tube experiment
passed electric current leading to formation of X-rays- Father of modern medical
diagonosis
1896 - Henri Becquerel found that pitchblende (an ore containing radium and uranium)
caused a photographic plate to darken- peculiar features of radium
Villard found a third type of radiation from pitchblende: gamma rays, which were much the
same as X-rays. in 1896 Pierre and Marie Curie gave the name 'radioactivity' to this
phenomenon.
1898 Samuel Prescott showed that radiation destroyed bacteria in food.
In 1902 Ernest Rutherford showed that radioactivity as a spontaneous event emitting an
alpha or beta particle from the nucleus created a different element
Niels Bohr was another scientist who advanced our understanding of the atom and the way
electrons were arranged around its nucleus through to the 1940s.
In 1932 James Chadwick discovered the neutron.
Enrico Fermi found that a much greater variety of artificial radionuclides could be formed
when neutrons were used instead of protons. The nucleus captures the neutrons, causing
severe vibration leading to the nucleus splitting into two not quite equal parts, which is knows
as atomic fission. It results in an enormous release of energy as well.

Conceiving the atomic bomb

British scientists gave a major impetus to the concept of the atomic bomb
They predicted that an amount of about 5kg of pure U-235 could make a very powerful
atomic bomb equivalent to several thousand tonnes of dynamite. They also suggested
how such a bomb could be detonated, how the U-235 could be produced, and what the
radiation effects might be in addition to the explosive effects.
They proposed thermal diffusion as a suitable method for separating the U-235 from the
natural uranium.
Two important developments came from the work at Cambridge. The first was
experimental proof that a chain reaction could be sustained with slow neutrons in a
mixture of uranium oxide and heavy water, ie. the output of neutrons was greater than
the input
When U-235 and U-238 absorb slow neutrons, the probability of fission in U-235 is
much greater than in U-238.

Developing the concepts

By the end of 1940 remarkable progress had been made by the several groups of
scientists coordinated by the MAUD Committee
By March 1941 one of the most uncertain pieces of information was confirmed - the fission
cross-section of U-235.
The final outcome of the MAUD Committee was two summary reports in July 1941.
One was on 'Use of Uranium for a Bomb' and the other was on 'Use of Uranium as a
Source of Power
The first report concluded that a bomb was feasible .
The second MAUD Report concluded that the controlled fission of uranium could be
used to provide energy in the form of heat for use in machines, as well as providing
large quantities of radioisotopes which could be used as substitutes for radium.
The two reports led to a complete reorganisation of work on the bomb and the 'boiler.

The Manhattan Project

The Americans increased their effort rapidly and soon outstripped the British.
Research continued in each country with some exchange of information.
The first atomic bomb, which contained U-235, was dropped on Hiroshima on 6
August 1945. The second bomb, containing Pu-239, was dropped on Nagasaki on 9
August. That same day, the USSR declared war on Japan. On 10 August 1945 the
Japanese Government surrendered.
The first atomic device tested successfully at Alamagordo in New Mexico on 16 July 1945. It
used plutonium made in a nuclear pile.

The Soviet bomb

After the defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945, German scientists were "recruited" to the
bomb program to work in particular on isotope separation to produce enriched uranium. This
included research into gas centrifuge technology in addition to the three other enrichment
technologies.
construction began in November 1945 of a new city in the Urals which would house the first
plutonium production reactors -- Chelyabinsk-40 (Later known as Chelyabinsk-65 or the
Mayak production association). This was the first of ten secret nuclear cities to be built in the
Soviet Union. The first of five reactors at Chelyabinsk-65 came on line in 1948. This town
also housed a processing plant for extracting plutonium from irradiated uranium.

Nuclear energy goes commercial

In the USA, Westinghouse designed the first fully commercial PWR of 250 MWe, Yankee
Rowe, which started up in 1960 and operated to 1992
1962. - Canadian reactor using natural uranium fuel and heavy water as a moderator and
coolant.
n 1964 the first two Soviet nuclear power plants were commissioned
In Kazakhstan the world's first commercial prototype fast neutron reactor (the BN-350)
started up in 1972
In the USA, UK, France and Russia a number of experimental fast neutron reactors
produced electricity from 1959,

NUCLEAR REVIVAL
n the new century several factors have combined to revive the prospects for nuclear
power. First is realisation of the scale of projected increased electricity demand
worldwide, but particularly in rapidly-developing countries. Secondly is awareness of
the importance of energy security, and thirdly is the need to limit carbon emissions due to
concern about global warming. In the USA the 2005 Energy Policy Act provided incentives
for establishing new-generation power reactors there, and the first four AP1000 reactors are
under construction. The history of nuclear power thus starts with science in Europe,
blossoms in UK and USA with the latter's technological might, languishes for a few
decades, then has a new growth spurt in east Asia

QUESTION 2
Legality of bombing in horoshima and Nagasaki
in the light of international humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind that during the Second World
War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of
the civilian population or civilian property, as the Conventions then in force dealt only with the
protection of the wounded and the sick on the battlefield and in naval warfare, hospital ships, the laws
and customs of war and the protection of prisoners of war.[

In 1963, the District Court of Tokyo decided The Shimoda Case, in which it
assessed the legality of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the
United States. In Shimoda, As an element of their claim, the plaintiffs asserted
that the United States government violated both positive and customary
international law by its use of atomic weapons. The plaintiffs claimed that the bombs
caused indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering, constituted a poisonous gas, and failed to distinguish
between combatants and non combatants, all in violation of various international agreements.

The court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that the atomic bombings
contravened international law. Specifically, the court upheld the plaintiffs' claim that the
bombings did not discriminate between military and nonmilitary objectives 7 4 caused unnecessary
suffering, violated prohibitions against poison gas, 5 and was not justified by military necessity. 6
The review draws several distinctions which are pertinent to both conventional and atomic aerial
bombardment. Based on international law found in Hague Convention of 1907 IV - The Laws and
Customs of War on Land and IX - Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, and the Hague Draft
Rules of Air Warfare of 1922–1923 the Court drew a distinction between "Targeted Aerial
Bombardment" and indiscriminate area bombardment, that the court called "Blind Aerial Bombardment",
and also a distinction between a defended and undefended city. [15] "In principle, a defended city is a
city which resists an attempt at occupation by land forces. A city even with defence installations and
armed forces cannot be said to be a defended city if it is far away from the battlefield and is not in
immediate danger of occupation by the enemy." [16] The court ruled that blind aerial bombardment is
only permitted in the immediate vicinity of the operations of land forces and that only targeted aerial
bombardment of military installations is permitted further from the front. It also ruled that, in such an
event, the incidental death of civilians and the destruction of civilian property during targeted aerial
bombardment was not unlawful.[17] The court acknowledged that the concept of a military objective was
enlarged under conditions of total war, but stated that the distinction between the two did not
disappear.[18] The court also ruled that when military targets were concentrated in a comparatively small
area, and where defence installations against air raids were very strong, that when the destruction of
non-military objectives is small in proportion to the large military interests, or necessity, such destruction
is lawful.[17] So in the judgement of the Court, because of the immense power of the bombs, and the
distance from enemy (Allied) land forces, the bombing of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki "was an illegal
act of hostilities under international law as it existed at that time, as an indiscriminate bombardment of
undefended cities"

During the time of World War 2, the laws of war fell under the Hague Conventions
(1899 and 1907), the Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923) and early parts of the Geneva
Convention.
Nuclear weapons are also offensive to the Dedaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, ïhe Hague
Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases of July 29, 1899, the " Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, the Hague
Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907,10 the Geneva Convention for the Ameiioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12,1949 (the First Geneva
convention), the Geneva Convention for the Ameiioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12,1940 (the second Geneva Convention), the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of M'ar of August 12, 1949 (the third
Geneva Convention), the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times
of War of August 12, 1949 (the fourth Geneva Convention) and Geneva ProtocolI (1977)

Article 22 of the Hague mles provides that . Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the
civiiian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a military character, or of
injuring non-combatants is prohibited

Secondly, it is a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law that a violation does not
juste a counte~iolation. Article 46 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12,1949 ( the First Geneva convention)
says: Reprisais against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or equipment protected by the
Convention are prohibited.

Specific legal rules and provisions

 Article 25 of the regulations of the Law and Customs of War on Land of 1899 (indiscriminate
nature of attack).
 Article 23(a) of the regulations of the Law and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Hague
Convention IV on 18 October 1907.
 Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, (prohibition on ‘the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases).
 Articles 22 and 24 of the Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1923 (prohibition on indiscriminate aerial
bombing of non-combatants).
Safety principle
safety is the primary requisite for the use of nuclear energy and the applications
of ionizing radiation. Nuclear and radiological emergencies and accidents may have a
detrimental impact not only on the facilities in which they occur but also on the environment in the
vicinity
In discussions on nuclear safety, a number of subsidiary principles have been
articulated. One such principle has been labelled the ‘prevention principle’. It
holds that, given the special character of the risks of using nuclear energy, the
primary objective of nuclear law is to promote the exercise of caution and
foresight so as to prevent damage that might be caused by the use of the
technology and to minimize any adverse effects resulting from misuse or from
accidents. A complementary principle is the ‘protection principle’. The
fundamental purpose of any regulatory regime is to balance social risks and
benefits. Where the risks associated with an activity are found to outweigh the
benefits, priority must be given to protecting public health, safety, security
and the environment. Of course, in the event that a balance cannot be
achieved, the rules of nuclear law should require action favouring protection. It
is in this context that the concept commonly referred to as the ‘precautionary
principle’ (i.e. the concept of preventing foreseeable harm) should be
understood.
Hence both the risks and the benefits of nuclear energy be well understood
and taken into account with a view to achieving a sensible balance in the framing
of legal or regulatory measures. Fundamental safety principles codified in
legislation may be applied to a wide variety of activities and facilities that pose
very different types and levels of risk. Activities posing significant radiation
hazards will obviously require stringent technical safety measures and, in
parallel, strict legal arrangements. Activities posing little or no radiation hazard
will need only elementary technical safety measures, with limited legal
controls. The law should reflect the hierarchy of risk. Indeed, legal restrictions
that cannot be justified by the risk posed by a certain activity may be deemed
an undue limitation on the rights of the persons or organizations conducting that
activity.
Security principle
the modern development of nuclear technology had its origins in the military
programmes of several States., they also pose risks to the security of persons
and social institutions along with health and safety risks.
Lost or abandoned radiation sources can cause physical injury to persons
unaware of the associated hazards.
The acquisition of radiation sources by terrorist or criminal groups could lead
to the production of radiation dispersion devices, to be used to commit
malevolent acts.
The diversion of certain types of nuclear material could contribute to the
spread of nuclear explosives to both subnational and national entities. For
these reasons, legal measures are required to protect and account for the
types and quantities of nuclear material that may pose security risks. These
measures must protect against both accidental and intentional diversion from
the legitimate uses of these materials and technologies.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [23] of 1979 provides for
certain levels of physical protection to be applied to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes on
the territories of Contracting Parties as well as to their ships and aircraft during international nuclear
transport
On-site and off-site emergency preparedness should be considered at all stages of the licensing
procedure, and especially during the design and construction of facilities and radiation equipment in
order to make possible and facilitate countermeasures

SAFETY CONVENTIONS

Chernobyl nuclear plant accident led to the creation of an international

regime for the safe development of nuclear energy under the aspices of
IAEA.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA conducts on-
site inspections to ensure that nuclear materials are used only used for peaceful purposes.