1

Legislative 1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304

Ragay Minalabac
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010 Lupi Pamplona
Sipocot Pasacao
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE Cabusao San Fernando
ROBREDO, Petitioners,
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
vs.
Milaor Camaligan
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Naga Magarao
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Pili Bombon
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
Ocampo Calabanga
LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
DECISION Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
PEREZ, J.: Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Baao Bula
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers Balatan Nabua
and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, Bato
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district
and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law
following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31
October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional District Municipalities/Cities Population
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first
and second legislative districts of the province. 1st District Del Gallego 176,383
Ragay
Lupi
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have
Sipocot
a population of 1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
Cabusao

District Municipalities/Cities Population 2nd District Libmanan San 276,777

 2

Minalabac Fernando petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
Pamplona Gainza second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
Pasacao Milaor district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

3rd District (formerly 2nd Naga Camaligan 439,043 Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the
District) Pili Magarao cited 250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga Article VI
4th District (formerly 3rd Caramoan Sangay 372,548
District) Garchitorena San Jose Section 5. (1) x x x x
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba (2) x x x x
Presentacion Siruma
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
5th District (formerly 4th Iriga Buhi 429,070
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
District) Baao Bula
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
Balatan Nabua
representative.
Bato

(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties
of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision
No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two
is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The
(2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a
legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population
new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now
of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts
before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at
may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the
reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken
Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor
were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of
the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in
the province.
the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the
Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national
runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the
of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates

to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a
250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first
district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section
5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
3
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek
the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two
(2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction
between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population
condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will
show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative
districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for
the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716,
which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines
Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of
Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse.
The respondents cite the following reasons:

1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a
tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing
Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial
body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the
main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a
petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that
the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with
issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the
arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever
confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society. 15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and
Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle
of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of
paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition
for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case
4
warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that
absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be
excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim
v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance,
the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements
may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles
must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of
whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by
this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is
to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for
each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to
a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned
about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order
to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each
province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is
only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in
turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district
for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued
that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of
less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000.
The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the
newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
5
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase
its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through
the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two
hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded
to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance
is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN
PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records
would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how
many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply
discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the
determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an
absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue,
in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the
use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned,
population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided
the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the
original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the
Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the
seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least
250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide,
who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his
sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
6
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats
which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at
least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The
population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as
the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less
56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000
inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted
one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of
at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu,
Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then
proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces
and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated
from this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all
protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with
determinants other than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission
narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern
towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa,
Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a
greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the
only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the
standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1)
the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact,
adjacent and contiguous.

Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was
included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between
Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and
based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a
combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added
that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and,
in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He
also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore
if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there
would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested
in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the
Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the
interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of
Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He
proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order
to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is
nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed
transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only
have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213,
and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
Municipality of Aborlan.
7
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the
Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no
objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided
by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region
I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba
are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as
a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines,
Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own
constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with
Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only
141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during
certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population
substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions,
it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to
speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio
City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only

be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would
submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado
stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he
had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the
summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of
Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against,
the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with
Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities
of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La
Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City
alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of
Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into
districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city:
one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and
the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common
interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of
Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common
interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity"
considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For
Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped
with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that
they should "balance the area and population."38
8
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure
quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every
legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of
petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at
least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can,
the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the
formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth
has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts
in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment.
Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words,
Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an
additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided
for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the
protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population
 9

standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the SO ORDERED.
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment
or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative
district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not
250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264,
were: G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities; Perez, J.

FACTS:
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from
the redistricting of Districts One and Two.41
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of
the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the
increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 that would
order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and
first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text
of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative 176,383.
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for
the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province
is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the
population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for
a province.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
10
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A.
9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly,
the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in
Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos
has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for
being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required
by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation
with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional

Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared
official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case,
the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.
G.R. No. 180050 February 10, 2010
11
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands , for beingunconstitutional.Based on the NSO 2000 Census of
Population, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special
census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte
which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income
for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12
square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Section
461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code , a province may becreated if it
has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991
constantprices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not
less than 250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at
least 2,000 squarekilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The
territory need not becontiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities,which do not contribute to the income of the
province.Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted
into law anda plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes
and 63,502 negative.With the approval of the people from both the mother province
of Surigao del Norte and theProvince of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created
into a separate and distinct province.Respondents argued that exemption from the
land area requirement is germane to thepurpose of the Local Government Code to
develop self-reliant political and territorialsubdivisions. Thus, the rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law as long as theyare germane to the
objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and
RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
RULING: No.

The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local
Government Code. The beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local
Government Code when it added the italicized portion “The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
“ In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the
law as it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a
territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between
the basic law and the rules andregulations implementing the said law, the basic law
prevails.
Naval vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014
CASE:
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari to assail the (a)
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution granting the petition filed by Julia, seeking to
cancel the COC as Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of
Naval, who is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon elective local
officials; and (b) COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution denying Naval’s Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution issued by COMELEC Second Diviosn.
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a
member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns
12
were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The
present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor,
merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the
2013 elections. He filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course
or to Cancel COC of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire
Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. Allowing Naval to
run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-
term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly
construed.
Naval alleges: First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not
merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the
separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which used to comprise
the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the
same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
OSG contends: Seeking the denial of the instant petition, OSG contends that Naval
had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post for three
consecutive terms. Naval thus violated Section 78 of the OEC when he filed his COC
despite knowledge of his ineligibility.
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution: Cancelled Naval’s COC on grounds:
When a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the
elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary
requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation
cognizable under Section 78 of the OEC.
The new Third District where Naval was elected and has served is composed of the
same municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the towns

Gainza and Milaor. The territorial jurisdiction Naval seeks to serve for the term 2013-
2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served. The electorate
who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same electorate who shall vote for
him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of voters who elected
him into office for three consecutive terms.
COMELEC en banc’s Resolution: Denied Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to the
above. The COMELEC pointed out that absent the verification required under Section
3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval’s motion was instantly
dismissible. Nonetheless, according to the COMELEC, it is clear that the position to
which Naval has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 elections is the same
position for which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.
The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert Naval’s post into one different from
what he previously had.
ISSUE:
WON Naval’s, a provincial board member, election to the same position for the third
and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district, a violation of the
three-term limit rule.
RULING:
YES. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional Commission approved that
there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms. For the Body believed
that the imposition of term limits would be tantamount to squandering the
experience of seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the
citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the office.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and
limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. The
“limitation” under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—“no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.” This formulation—
no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence
of an inflexible rule. This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision
and of the circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear
intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms
13
must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for,
values of less than equal constitutional worth.
In Naval’s case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District
is to be created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est
recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers mean what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve
equality of representation among the districts.The aim of legislative apportionment
is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting
shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of
registered voters therein. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider
Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in
2010 and 2013.
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality
of representation.”
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does
not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines
Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of
constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval.
For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent
unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that
the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a
compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier
exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Further, sustaining
Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.

The Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real
sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded
that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws.
Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.
The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to
perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a guarantee
of every citizen’s equal access to public service. These are the restrictions statesmen
should observe for they are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our
republican institutions.
Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the COMELEC are AFFIRMED.
Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO
Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in
CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in
the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created
without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased
the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution;
the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite
is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative
district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change
14
in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members
citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative
districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has
two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This
easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only
250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which
stated that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make
a determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable
Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such
qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner
her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not
otherwise required by the constitution."1(as originally underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:

"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who
is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque."2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go
thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as
member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications
are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's
submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on
18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency
via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the point has obviously
been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her due
proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on
18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013,
the COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's
motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that
CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
15
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned
cancellation of petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a
definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been
removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to
proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission En Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days
from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the
Supreme Court for a restraining order that will remove the immediate effect
of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five
(5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the
proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner did not move to
have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is
barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of
respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She
could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the
COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid
the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her
became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even
more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her
certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her
proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated
possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this
case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even
an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her
proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and
secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane
decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days
thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b)
of Rule 18 in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL
become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane
decision, unrestrained, moves from promulgation into becoming final and
executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the
Commission or a division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice
shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the
very date of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her
petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May
20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard
the available legal way to remove the restraint on her proclamation, and,
more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The
utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating
that her proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme
Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted
proclamation as the very reason to support her argument that she could no
longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the
HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for
office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion
at which she directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such
conclusion. It is with her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the
COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any
Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner
repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions
thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired
the congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As already
shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are
clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue
16
of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing
legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the
HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of
the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however
unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at
present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful
winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for
cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is
the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation,
was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in
the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14
May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case.
The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's
ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision
erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no
restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within
five days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013
questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013
COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did
not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision
favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of the
COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably
needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a
proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and
special civil action for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or
one heard summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best

indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section
4 of which states that the Commission may designate any of its
officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case
and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in
Section 3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be
summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position paper together with
affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x
and that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the
hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by the
Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of
Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the
exercise of the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the
limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is
brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court
should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is
here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
17
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the
party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably
and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration.
(Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1)
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-
General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack
of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden
to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation
dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of
an American passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was
able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present
substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that
she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American
citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon
her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she
submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
18
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner
admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual
Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to
her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with
rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's
explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules,
then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed
Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in
September 2012.1âwphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office
as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not,
prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of
allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she
reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of
office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This
statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for
re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at
the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has
indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225,
petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time
before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath
of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain
requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order
No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of

office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt. 7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC
and the HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of
Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s
certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the
pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The
matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original
action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but
on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the
COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation
matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional
authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so
only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable
step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification
of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive,
and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the
COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings
is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the
Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of
repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in
the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET
proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly
proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of
certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the
parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while
there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted
haste can be attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this
petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the
exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the
19
speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the
unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The
petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a
sitting member of the House of Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the
motion was contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding
that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts
approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It
may well be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost
upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is terminated. 9 When
petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact,
the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction
cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance,
undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of
withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal
effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes.
Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her
petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she
designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the
petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June
2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27
March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the
lone district of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident
of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically:
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a
resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same
time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as
admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents
show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is not a
permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant4 of the United States of America;5and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when
she is, in fact, an American citizen.6
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife
of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid
and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage
with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply
with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab
initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her.8 As to her
date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office
shows that it was on 3 July 1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she
is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.10
20
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a
"Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List
of Exhibits"11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the
internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O.
Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by
its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of
Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S.
passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon
Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of
Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various
travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 12 cancelling
petitioner’s COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby
CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in
her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the oneyear
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus,
she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Marinduque.
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an
American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division
relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is a
naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only
resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of

Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24
September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement
prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized
citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution 15 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13
May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality 16 declaring the
14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering
that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation
with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. 17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30
June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the
following issues:19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over
Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered evidence"
without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without
giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.
21
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional
qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-
a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-
issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks
remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction
over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a
Member of the House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this Court was
made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and
executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues
raised by petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the
discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was emphasized that the
term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives begins on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was
duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the
House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the
following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins
only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v.
COMELEC,24 the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v.
COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis
the HRET, held that:
22
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction
over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of
election and contested returns – were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional
body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a
proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases,
the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate
who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 27 the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had
been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and
assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or after the start of his
term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he
brought to Our attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of
the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC
as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First
Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his
oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties
accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred
to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had
already assumed office, and hence, was already considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, unlike in the present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what
has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a
purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013.
However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives
provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or
affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here,
although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it
was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether
the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency
via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard
this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted
of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En
23
Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such
act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which
affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was
promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and executory on 19
May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides:
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare
nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend
elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and
executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37 29 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition
before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do so. She would file the
present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent
COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well
as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the
party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC:31
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably
and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
(Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts:
(1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-
General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
24
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack
of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner’s burden
to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation
dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of
an American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was
able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present
substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that
she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American
citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon
her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she
submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner
admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual
Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to
her.33 Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with
rules, even as a superfluity."35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s
explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules,"
then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed

Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in
September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office
as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did
not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath
of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she
reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of
office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner execute an
oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why
did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225,
petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time
before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath
of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain
requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order
No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of
office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her
natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division
that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
25
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his
domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made
it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-acquired
her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained
her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had renounced
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year
residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in
Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient
to prove her one-year residency. For, petitioner has never regained her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the
said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.)
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is
summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and
admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of whether
or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in Mastura v. COMELEC:38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts
of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC —
created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment
of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1âwphi1
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants
this Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance is
found in Beluso v. Commission on Elections39 where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific
meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that
grave abuse of discretion exists.
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives other than those enumerated in the Constitution, is
unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.
The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House
of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the
candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year
residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not
err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No.
9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It
simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is upheld.
SO ORDERED.
January 12, 2016
26
G.R. No. 211140
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN 1 B.
BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party
is the son of a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought
to be done as dictated by law and justice solely for that reason.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon.
Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary General, House of
Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque .
Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May
13, 2013 elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;" 2 thus, he seeks the
following reliefs:
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering said respondent to administer the proper
OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner to
assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the
powers and prerogatives of said position of Marinduque representative;
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN]
BARUA-YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of
Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and

to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein
petitioner, in her stead; and
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN,
PREVENT and PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING
her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position.3
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident
of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition4 to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several
material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (iv) that her date of
birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible
for the office she seeks to be elected to."5 The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053
(DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence,
Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
hereby CANCELLED.6
Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.
But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national
elections were held on May 13, 2013.
The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of
the COMELEC First Division, to wit:
27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission
(First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.7
A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Marinduque, through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.
Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May
16, 2013.
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the
Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner
of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District
of Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-
028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed
against Reyes in the HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P
Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality8 in SPA No. 13-
053 (DC), which provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed
since the date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court
restraining its execution, the Resolution of the Commission en banc promulgated on
May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.9
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed
as GR. No. 207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and
Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution

of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for material
misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.
In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs.
New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the
Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings
of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in
SPC No. 13-010.
On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution
dismissing Reyes's petition, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is upheld.10
Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has
jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a
valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.11
On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:
[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate
EXECUTION of this Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and
May 14, 2013; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections. 12
At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started
discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
28
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of
Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's
petition and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of
Reyes. The dispositive part reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the
position of representative in the House of Representatives for the province of
Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i)
granting Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution);
and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the
proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion.
Accordingly, a new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque
is hereby constituted to be composed of the following:
1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman
2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman
3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member
4. Three (3) Support Staffs
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the
convening of the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013

(Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros,
Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member
of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13,
2013 National and Local Elections.
Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial
Board of Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional
candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections.
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy
of the Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the House of Representatives. 14
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein
petitioner Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered
precincts.15
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally
convened in a joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the
Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before
Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of
Petition "without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as
will be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum."16
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration17 (of this Court's June 25,
2013 Resolution in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this
Court, viz.:
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the
petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.18
On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.
29
On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for
reconsideration and was denied by this Court.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to
Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting,
among others, that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque.
On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to
implement and enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9,
2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation
of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of Marinduque. It is further
prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution be personally served and
delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's
implementation and enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution
and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued
by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable Commission. 19
the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that
all copies of its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the
Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the
Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and furnished to
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.
On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
reiterating the above-mentioned request but to no avail.
On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating
his earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll
of Members and register his name in her place as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the
letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused
to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate
the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she
continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:
A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and
ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of
petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative and allow him to
assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office.
B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED
and ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent
Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and include the name of the
Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of
PERMANENT. INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit
respondent Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing the
functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE the
said office.21
As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and
clear legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." 22 He insists
that the final and executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and
this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of respondent Reyes's
proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the
congressional seat.
Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte,
Jr. "to administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the
prerogatives of the congressional seat for Marinduque
representative;"23 and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xx x
30
as the duly elected member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes
from the Roll ofM embers." 24 Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to the effect that the Speaker of the House
of Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the petitioner therein
(Codilla) as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged
ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his
right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. 26
With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and
unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and
serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances,
bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of Marinduque Representative
since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several hundreds of
thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain,
prevent and prohibit [her] from usurping the position." 27
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo
warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she
usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in
the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public
office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases. 28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the
Court over Quo Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives.
She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo
Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal
right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that numerous jurisprudence have
already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists
that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically states that the
COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate,

as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over quo warranto cases30 filed
against Reyes by several individuals.
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction
to annul [her] proclamation. "31But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting
for the sake of argument that the proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as
second placer cannot be declared the winner x x x" as he was not the choice of the
people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting
the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an
Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap, opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:
I.
UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES,
INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE,
VESTED IN THE HRET.
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest
filed against respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final
and executory, respondent Reyes may not be restrained from exercising the
prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Reyes :S name from the
Roll of Members of the House.
II.
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER,
BEING MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT
VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be
compelled by mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner
and register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House.
31
III.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.32
The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for
this Court to revisit its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013
both in GR. No. 207264, given that (i) this Court was "divided" when it issued the
same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that this
Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is no
hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.
Moreover, the OSG contends that:
Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013
Resolution, upholding the cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no
compelling reason for the House to withdraw its recognition of respondent Reyes as
Marinduque Representative, in the absence· of any specific order or directive to the
House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v.
COMELEC that required any action from the House. Again, it bears emphasis that
neither petitioner nor respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap were
parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.
Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against
respondent Reyes:
(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan &
Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;
(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes;
(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and
(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay
Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.33

And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office
of the winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then
there would obviously be a clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC,
given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the appropriate cases should be filed
before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June
25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of
office, at noon of June 30 following the election, then quo warranto petitions and
election protests filed on or after said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET
under its own rules for having been filed out of time, where the winners have
already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to June
14.34
In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December
14, 2015 dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,35 the twin petitions for quo
warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for
Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014
Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.36
In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No.
207264 is the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." 37
To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal
of a Petition-In-Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin
petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the
hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against x x x
Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration of
the said September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based on the argument that the latter
was contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No.
207264.
Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-
The Tribunals Jurisdiction
32
It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should
resolve the same vis-a-vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They
pray that "after due proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of
Representatives, representing the Province of Marinduque." In addition, the
petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court
pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the
outright dismissal of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling
in G.R. No. 207264. For her part, respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal
of the present petitions, albeit after reception of evidence by the contending parties.
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power
or authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives."
xxxx
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18,
2013, the COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her
COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency
requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes
challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of
June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the
nullification of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot
assume jurisdiction over the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins
only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives.
And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a

concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of
June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus:
x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution:
xxxx
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate
who is not a member of the House of Representatives x x x.
xxxx
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.xx x
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office x x x.
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the
first essential element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives over which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element
is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified
by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this
ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present
petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of
33
Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It
further stresses:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless,
and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office."
The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme
Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all decisions and
determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the
Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must take
their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court.39
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77
(Usurpation of Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015,
has been filed in court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes. "41
The Issue
The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ
of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform
the specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition.
The Ruling
The petition has merit.
At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this
petition to re-litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are
reminded to respect the Entry of Judgment that has been issued therein on October
22, 2013.

After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent
that this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case,
contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the
use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the
controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office.42 In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the
final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and
executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's
Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC
in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present
petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties
and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert
this petition to one for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may
file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.43
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been
established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
34
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.44
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have
no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to
register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives,
respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of
Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC
No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as
settled and beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any
questions regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her qualifications
as a Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she has already been
proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the
House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her proclamation,
oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation between Velasco
and Reyes.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013.
The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to
run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque - for
without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election and
much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC
was promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this
Court's final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the
COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning
candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a
couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said
decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued
proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of
the present petition for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts
that should be taken into consideration:
First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by
the COMELEC En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14,
2013, the effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did
not avail of the prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order
within a period of five (5) days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of
COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was forthcoming, the PBOC
should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.
Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent
Reyes's COC in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and
these Resolutions are already final and executory.
Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-
010 cancelled respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed
Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives in
representation of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. The said
proclamation has not been challenged or questioned by Reyes in any
proceeding.
Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. in open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid
proclamation.
Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in
deciding this case will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu
between her and Velasco.
35
Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to
serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO LEGAL
PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo
warranto proceeding before the HRET.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution
acknowledging and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo
warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was based on the existence of a final and
executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not a bona
fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To
reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission
on Elections45-
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's
submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be
proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation
of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office.
xxxx
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to
argue on the basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the
opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation
which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis
supplied.)

Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the
HRET is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available
remedy to any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the
House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the leadership of the
latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the
Supreme Court
Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes
before the HRET had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of
the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s
December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear and certain
right to the subject office.
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of
this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and
entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In
other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for
acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion
of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual
and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath
and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a
matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in view
of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said
ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful
Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-General to enter said
Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
36
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has
a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by
respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos
and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of

Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken
his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)
Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14,
2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No.
13-053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-
010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC);
and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is the
rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence,
entitled to a writ of Mandamus.
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for
the enforcement of the Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine of res
judieata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the public respondents,
this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap, are all legally bound by
this Court's judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC
correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was
ineligible for the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship
and the requisite one-year residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view
would have our dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed in every
direction by any and all registered voters not a party to a case to question the final
decision of this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res judieata is intolerable for
it will defeat this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was duly
proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final judgment that
Reyes was ineligible for the subject position.47
It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated
and take judicial notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected
to the subject position had already been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling
deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to the Rule of Law and should
not be countenanced.
In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No.
13-010, there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the
37
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the
pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,48 "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the
reign of chaos and confusion."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon.
Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the
oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public
respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives,
shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This Decision
shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado V. HRET and Philip Arreza Pichay
G.R. No. 219603 January 26, 2016
Facts: Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9 October
2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First LegislativeDistrict of Surigao del Sur.
Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections on the ground that
Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that
when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to
be a candidate had yet to lapse.
Pichay claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He contended
that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel
was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing
company.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed
Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First
 38

Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for
quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as
Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by final
judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two
years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the
penalty imposed on him.
HRET held that Pichay did not participated the writing of the libelous articles but his
conviction was in line with his duty as the president of the publishing company.
Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s conviction for libel did
not involve moral turpitude.
Issue:
W/N the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude
Ruling:
filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay
clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
He committed an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
he owes his fellow men, or society in general,” and an act which is “contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as
publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the
publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees
whom he selects and control s may be said to cause to be published what actually
appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually
concerned in the publication or not.
Accordingly, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a
crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he
filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered
stray votes.

A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus ElectionCode:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,

or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.

In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v.
People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four
defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether
they were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the