Republic v Sin

G.R. No. 157485, March 16, 2014

Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at
Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan. On August 26, 1991, they respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint
against Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages
claiming that the latter usurped their rights over the property.
ANCF countered that the subject land was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating
the area of said property as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The respondents presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother who acquired it by virtue of a
deed of sale. That in 1988 a potion thereof was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs
asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. To prove possession, respondents presented
several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the disputed property by
virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be
respected and protected.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the respondents amounts to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Held:
No. At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree provide the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors–in–interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial
or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable
or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed
to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. TRI-PLUS CORPORATION

503 SCRA 91

FACTS:
- Tri-Plus Corporation, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed with the MTC of Consolacion, Metro Cebu, and an Application for
Registration of Title over two parcels of land.
- Tri-Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including the improvements thereon, having acquired
the same through purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.
- The trial court received an Opposition to the Application for Registration filed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the grounds that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto and that
the subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are not subject to
private appropriation.
- MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. OSG appeals to the CA.
- CA affirmed the MTC decision.

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 - Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUES:
- (1) Whether or not the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that the property is alienable and disposable.
- (2) Whether or not the respondent has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.

HELD/RATIO:
- Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
- (1) The respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that the lands were alienable.
- Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department.
- All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part
of the inalienable public domain.
- It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.
- In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the
Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the
notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of
the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
- (2) Respondent was not able to prove adverse possession.
- Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show clear, positive
and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.
- Respondent having failed to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable public lands, the Court agrees with
petitioner that there would be no basis in concluding that these lands have already become private. The presumption remains that
said properties remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become the subject of confirmation of
imperfect title.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.

(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)

Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker,
Inc. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay.Candy Maker,
Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its alleged title over the lot.

The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land
Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use,
hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot
subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land
within, its jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so, whether respondent
adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the property?

Held:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent failed to prove
that it possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against
the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a
claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing,
the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

VALIAO vs REPUBLIC

FACTS: On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Galicia,
Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

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On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not
been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no
factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application
for registration.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their
uncle Basilio who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten
in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs
possessed the said land until 1966, whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled
them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the
CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Is the piece of land in question alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

HELD: Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised.
This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial
court. Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before
the lower courts.

Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove
that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a
bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, represented by CLAUDIA C. ARUELO, Respondent.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the
presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.32
As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, we turn to our pronouncements in Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap33:
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided
the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and
such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted
to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. x x x
xxxx
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or

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a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO
G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014; REYES, J.

FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land
situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square
meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.

The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice
of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.

On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order
of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for
registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and
possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers,
since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the
same were purchased by the respondent in 1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28,
1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of
the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications
dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the
bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject
properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of
National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon
actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he
conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m.
Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077
ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50
m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that
nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the
preparation of the topographic map.

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties
may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was
conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties.

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be
considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those
areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only
those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from
it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the
shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise

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found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?

HELD: NO
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this
Court, generally may not disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there
are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean
that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove,
with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.

While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement
to registration of title to the subject properties.

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part
of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable."

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. Under said Section, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on
January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by
the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must 2) prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3)
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
records.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence
that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map
and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites
for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove
that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent
to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a
true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove
by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied
prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall
have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC prior
to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.

The Court does not agree.

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Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the
date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent
presented the testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of
possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of
Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its
predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject
properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated
by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the
possession and occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however
long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years."

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The
respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year.

WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.

SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC. vs REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 152570, September 27, 2006

Facts:

On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent of a lot located in Barangay Abugon, Sibonga,
Cebu. Thereafter, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Free Patent over the said lot and the he Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT).

Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullos heirs.

Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion
of the lot to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title for said lot was irregular
and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The
discovery was made after Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive.

The trial court upheld the free patent. It ruled that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest
reserve or that it has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original title.

The CA revesed the trial court decision. Invalidated the sale of the lot, holding the lot to be inalienable.

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Contention of the petitioner:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR officers testimony. It claims that the testimony was a mere opinion to the effect
that if there was no classification yet of an area, such area should be considered as a public forest.

2. Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May 1975, or long after the issuance of the free patent and title in question
and should not be applied retroactively to prejudice their vested rights.

3. Even the Republic designated the lot as a Cadastral Lot.

4. The land classification map presented by the respondent was held inadmissible by the lower courts, it is neither a certified true
copy nor one attested to be a true copy by any DENR official

5. The survey conducted by the DENR is not clear because they used an unreliable and inaccurate instrument.

Issue: Whether or not respondent property showed that the subject lot is a timberland block.

Ruling:

1. No. Respondent failed to prove that the free patent and original title were truly erroneously and irregularly obtained.

It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain.
It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer
certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus,
the State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent, bears that
burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be
presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate

2. The Court finds that the findings of the trial court rather than those of the appellate court are more in accord with the law and
jurisprudence.

3. There shall be no retroactive effect of P.D. 705.

A portion of Section 13 of P.D. No. 705 states:

“….Those still to be classified under the Present system shall continue to remain as part of the public forest.”

Prior forestry laws, including P.D. No. 389, which was revised by P.D. No. 705, does not contain a similar provision. Article 4 of the
Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The Court does not infer any intention
on the part of then President Marcos to ordain the retroactive application of Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 705.

Thus, even assuming for the nonce that subject parcel was unclassified at the time Orcullo applied for a free patent thereto, the fact
remains that when the free patent and title were issued thereon in 1971, respondent in essence segregated said parcel from the mass
of public domain. Thus, it can no longer be considered unclassified and forming part of the public forest as provided in P.D. No. 705.

4. The Land Classification Map submitted is a mere photocopy. A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence of the
existence of the L.C. Map.

5. The testimony of the foresters who conducted the survey are not conclusive as to the nature of the land at present or at the time
the free patent and title were issued. Assuming that the area is covered by mangroves when they surveyed it, there is no proof that
it was not planted with trees and crops at the time Orcullo applied for free patent.

6. The delineation of the areas as timberland or forests reserve was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent
over the subject lot.

The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in every claim or right by the Government against one
of its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and due process must be observed.

CRUZ vs SEC OF ENVIRONMENT

Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights
Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as

Page 7 of 16
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Alba vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 5246

FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-
owners, on Dec. 18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied by a plan and
technical description of the said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the petition be
registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.
On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a revision of the case,
including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said motion and which he alleges
to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their
registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration. He further alleged having inherited the 2
lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in
Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)
He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said
motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties,
rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.

The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant
of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38
of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase
of 1864.
ISSUE:

1 Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the
same year?
2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
HELD: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in
conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908.
1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud.
2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his
behalf. It is to contain, among other things, the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known.
The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose Grey and this contract was duly executed in writing.
(While the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land,
nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts)
The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and while he petitioners were minors. So
it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they presented
their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their
application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they
include in their application the names of their tenants.
Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. However, this
did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication
“to all whom it may concern.” Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given] exceptions.
It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned
by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description “to all whom it may concern.”
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration
Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

Casimiro Development Corp. v. Mateo

G.R. No. 175485, 24 July 2011
Facts:
1) Registered parcel of land originally owned by Isaias Lara, respondents’ maternal grandfather, which was passed on to his children.
2) The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad Lara-Mateo.

Page 8 of 16
3) Deed of sale was executed in favor of Laura, one of Felicidad’s children, who applied for land registration; OCT was thereafter issued.
4) Property used as collateral to secure a succession of loans, a TCT of which was eventually issued in the name of China Bank.
5) Casimiro Development Corp. thereafter purchased the property from CB; Felicidad died intestate.

Page 9 of 16
6) CDC brought action for unlawful detainer in the MeTC against the sons of Felicidad; the latter claimed MeTC did not have jurisdiction;
the land was classified as agricultural; has been in continuous possession of the land.
7) MeTC ruled in favor of CDC, RTC against, CA and SC in favor CDC.
8) Respondent brought action for quieting of title, RTC favored CDC, CA against (not a buyer in good faith).
Issue:
Is the concerned Certificate of Title in the name of Laura indefeasible and imprescriptible?
Ruling:
Yes. The property has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration before CDC became the registered owner by
purchase from China Bank; OCT has already been issued to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the
property therein described, subject to liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. Neither the respondent
nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing various transfers, and even acknowledged the registration of the land under the name of
Laura.
CDC was an innocent purchaser for value. Considering that China Bank’s TCT was clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or
encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China
Bank.
NB:
If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the
system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.
The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein. The issuance of the
certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the
real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another
person.
Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period
allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.

Legarda vs. Saleeby

G.R. No. 8936

FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. There exists and
has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2,
1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs
should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by
him. On March 25, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been
included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition
for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name
of the defendant.
ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial
proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it
Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he
had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years
before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the registration of titles under the Torrens system affords us
no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which
indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the
owner of the land. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of
land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned
to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of
the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

REYNALDO and NANCY RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM

Page 10 of 16
 G.R. NO. 135817

FACTS:
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of COT and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez with the
allegation that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land, registered in her name on February 6, 1948. One of the
subject lands is situated in the Pagbilao, Quezon, and the other in the Atimonan, Quezon. Pablo claimed that he exclusively possessed the
same until her death on July 19, 1971.

Pablo claimed that he succeeded to all her rights of ownership and possession after her death. However, the spouses Rodriguez, despite their
knowledge that the son was now the owner and possessor, allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the
subject lots from persons who were not the owners thereof.

The spouses Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT despite the fact that the owner's duplicate copy was in the possession of
Pablo. A TCT was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani, estranged husband of Dominga. This title was cancelled by another TCT issued in
the name of Eduardo Victa, and again, was cancelled by another TCT issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez, All the the aforementioned
TCTs were issued on February 10, 1975.

On the other hand, the spouses Rodriguez alleged that Dominga was not the mother of Pablo. They averred that the subject lots were the
conjugal property of Frisco and Dominga, when the latter died, Frisco was her sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Frisco allegedly sold the
subject lots to Eduardo who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses Rodriguez. The latter claimed that they were purchasers in good faith and
for value.

On September 8, 1988, in the course of the trial, Pablo died and was duly substituted by his spouse, Concordia Ong Lim and children.

A deposition of Frisco was taken on October 22, 1977, which stated, that Frisco was married to Dominga, after 11 months, they
separated and the former left the conjugal dwelling. He knows that Dominga died and that Pablo is her son. Atty. Alejandro Aguilan, who
helped him prepared an affidavit, asked him to signed it otherwise the property he will receive will be forfeited in favour of the government.
He does not know anything about the parcels of land. The lawyer took advantage of Frisco and persuaded him to agree to the transactions.

Thereafter, the RTC held in favor of Pablo. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision

ISSUE:
Whether the principle of idefeasibility of title applies to this case.

HELD:
No. Spouses cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title with respect to TCT because "the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud."

They cannot deny any knowledge of the fraud that attended the transactions involving the subject lots, including their acquisition thereof.
Stated differently, petitioners cannot claim that they were purchasers in good faith and for value because the transactions involving the
subject lots were so replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that should have put them on guard about the defects in the respective
titles of Frisco and Eduardo.

CAGATAO vs ALMONTE
The Facts

This case stemmed from an action for annulment of deeds of sale, cancellation of title and damages filed on April 18, 1996 by petitioner
Virgilio G. Cagatao (Cagatao) against respondents Guillermo Almonte (Almonte), Arthur Aguilar (Aguilar), Spouses Ernesto and Avelina
Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), and Marvin John Fernandez, Marson Fernandez and Marjun Fernandez (collectively the Fernandez
Siblings).[4]

On February 16, 1949, a homestead patent over the property subject of this controversy (Lot No. 5598, Pls-67) was issued in favor of Juan
Gatchalian.[5] Cagatao claimed that sometime in 1940, Gatchalian sold the lot to Delfin Manzulin (Manzulin) in exchange for one carabao,
as embodied in a barter agreement which was unfortunately destroyed or lost during the Second World War.[6] In 1990, Manzulin allegedly
executed a private written document in the Ilocano dialect, transferring ownership over the property to his son-in-law, Cagatao.[7] The
latter then occupied and cultivated the land until the Fernandez Siblings attempted to take possession of the lot, thereby prompting him to
file the subject complaint before the RTC.[8]

The respondents, on the other hand, contended that on April 3, 1993, the Spouses Fernandez purchased the property from Almonte and
Aguilar who had in their possession a tax declaration covering the said land.[9] To protect their interest, on January 17, 1996, Spouses
Fernandez once again bought the same property for P220,000.00 from Emmaculada Carlos (Carlos), believed to be the owner of the lot by
virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12159-A, a reconstituted title in her name.[10] The former, in turn, executed a deed of
sale, dated January 22, 1996, in favor of their children, the Fernandez Siblings, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. T-249437 in their
names.[11]

Page 11 of 16
In his Memorandum before the RTC, Cagatao questioned the sale to Spouses Fernandez by Carlos because, at that time, Manzulin was
already the owner of the subject property. He also pointed out that it was highly irregular that Spouses Fernandez would buy the same
property from two different vendors on two different occasions. Apart from these anomalous transactions, Cagatao insisted that TCT No.
T-249437 in the name of the Fernandez Siblings was a nullity because the sale from the Spouses Fernandez was simulated, as testified to
by Avelina Fernandez (Fernandez) who confirmed that she and her husband did not sign the deed of sale purporting to have transferred
ownership of the property to the Fernandez Siblings.[12]

The respondents claimed that Cagatao was unable to present proof of title or any public document embodying the sale of the property from
Gatchalian to Manzulin and from the latter to Cagatao. They also argued that even if a homestead patent was indeed issued to Gatchalian,
the same became void when he (Gatchalian) did not occupy the land himself, in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act
of 1936).[13]

Pending litigation, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents from disturbing Cagatao’s possession of the
land in question during the pendency of the case.[14] In its Decision, dated June 22, 2001, however, the RTC ruled that Cagatao’s evidence
was insufficient to prove his ownership over the land in question because Manzulin never acquired a lawful title to the property from his
predecessor, Gatchalian. The court explained that the transfer to Manzulin was null and void because it failed to comply with Section
20[15] of Commonwealth Act No. 141. As to the supposed conveyance of the lot from Manzulin to Cagatao, it could not have been valid
because the document alleged to be a deed of sale was a private document which did not conclusively establish his (Cagatao’s) right to the
property because of the requirement in contract law that the transmission of rights over an immovable property must be contained in a
public document.

The RTC, after noting that Cagatao had no valid title, ruled that his claim of possession could not prevail over the claim of ownership by
Spouses Fernandez as evidenced by a certificate of title. Accordingly, it upheld the validity of the deed of sale, dated January 17, 1996,
between Spouses Fernandez and Carlos. It, however, nullified the transfer from Spouses Fernandez to Fernandez Siblings because Avelina
herself admitted that she and her husband never signed the deed of sale which transferred ownership to their children. Finally, the RTC
sustained the validity of TCT No. T-12159-A in the name of Carlos, theorizing that someone must have applied for an original certificate of
title from which the said title was derived.[16] Thus, the RTC disposed:
1. the dismissal of the plaintiff’s [Cagatao’s] Complaint;

2. the Cancellation and setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction;

3. the Register of Deeds to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-249437 issued in favor of Marvin, Marson and Marjun, all surnamed
Fernandez, the Deed of Sale (Exhibit “C”) dated January 22, 1996 being null and void; and

4. declaring the Deed of Sale (Exhibit “2”) dated January 17, 1996 in favor of Sps. Avelina M. Fernandez and Ernesto S. Fernandez and TCT
No. T-12159-A registered in the name of Emmaculada G. Carlos as valid and binding.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Aggrieved, Cagatao elevated the case to the CA. On July 29, 2005, the CA partly granted his petition and modified the decision of the
RTC. The CA deemed as speculative and without legal basis[18] the trial court’s conclusion that Gatchalian might have abandoned his
homestead patent, leaving it open for another person to apply for a patent and secure an original certificate of title from which TCT No. T-
12159-A in the name of Carlos originated. In other words, the ownership of the land remained with Gatchalian by virtue of the homestead
patent in his name, and neither the alleged transfer to Manzulin nor the theory of abandonment of the RTC could divest him of said title.

In addition, the CA took note of Entry No. 7259 in the memorandum of encumbrances at the dorsal side of TCT No. T-12159-A, which
disclosed the existence of another deed of sale entered into by Carlos and the respondents on January 17, 1979. Holding that the two sales
could not overlap, it invalidated the January 17, 1996 deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez. It also considered as void the
sale of the same property by Almonte to Spouses Fernandez and observed that neither the latter nor the Fernandez siblings invoked this
transaction as the basis of their claim.

Although the CA declared that Cagatao’s claim of ownership could not be recognized, it nevertheless ruled that his possession could not be
disturbed because only the true owner could challenge him for possession of the subject property. Leaving the parties where it found them,
the CA disposed:
1) the Register of Deeds is ORDERED TO CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 249437 issued in favor of Marvin, Marson and Marjun,
all surnamed Fernandez; 2) the Deed of Sale dated January 17, 1996 between Emmaculada Carlos and the Fernandez spouses is declared
NULL and VOID; 3) the Deed of Sale dated January 22, 1996 between defendants-appellees Fernandez siblings and the Fernandez spouses
is DECLARED NULL and VOID; 4) the Deed of Sale dated April 3, 1993 between the Fernandez spouses and Guillermo Almonte and
Arthur Aguilar is likewise DECLARED NULL and VOID; 5) the verbal sale between Delfin Manzulin and plaintiff-appellant is DECLARED
NULL and VOID. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction against defendants-appellants Fernandez siblings is made PERMANENT.[19]
The respondents moved for a reconsideration of the CA decision on August 24, 2005. On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered the questioned
Amended Decision, reversing itself when it ruled that the deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez could not be declared null
and void, especially because Carlos was not impleaded as a party in the case. It, however, stressed that Cagatao’s possession of the subject
property should be respected. Any party, including the respondents, who would like to assert their claim of ownership or a better right over
the lot should assert their right in an appropriate action in court against him.

Not in conformity, Cagatao moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution, dated August 7, 2006.[20]

Page 12 of 16
Hence, this petition.

The Issues

In his petition, Cagatao raises the following issues:

I Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the reconstituted TCT No. 12159-A in the name of
Emmaculada Carlos is void.
II
III Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that homestead title holder Juan Gatchalian and the petitioner as
his successors-in-interest are the true owners of the subject property.

IV Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rendering the challenged Amended Decision by deleting from the dispositive
portion of the original Decision its ruling that the Deed of Sale between Emmaculada Carlos and respondents Spouses
Fernandez over the subject property is void.[21]
The Court’s Ruling

Cagatao’s entire petition revolves around the assertion that the reconstituted TCT No. 12159-A in the name of Carlos was a fake and
should have been declared void. This claim is based on the existence of an allegedly falsified annotation (Entry No. 7259), the speculative
nature of the RTC’s declaration that the said title appeared valid, and the fact that the respondents were not able to present an affidavit of
loss or any proof of judicial reconstitution.[22]

The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.

The validity of TCT No. 12159-A cannot be attacked collaterally; Carlos is an indispensable party

From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear that he is assailing the validity of the title of Carlos over the land in question. Section 48 of P.D.
No. 1529 clearly states that “a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” An attack on the validity of the title is considered to be a collateral attack when, in an
action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the said action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the
title.[23] Cagatao’s original complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT No. T-249437 in the name of the Fernandez Siblings
and the nullification of the deeds of sale between the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses Fernandez, and the earlier one between the latter and
Almonte and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao mention that he sought to invalidate TCT No. 12159-A. It was only during
the course of the proceedings, when Spouses Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased the property from Carlos, that Cagatao thought
of questioning the validity of TCT No. 12159-A.

Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the existence of a valid Torrens title in the
name of Carlos which has remained unchallenged before the proper courts has made irrelevant the issue of whether Gatchalian and his
successors-in-interest should have retained ownership over the property. This is pursuant to the principle that a Torrens title is irrevocable
and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. The purpose of adopting a Torrens System in our jurisdiction is to guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. This is to avoid
any possible conflicts of title that may arise by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens title and dispense with the
need of inquiring further as to the ownership of the property.[24] Hence, a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the
whole world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.[25]

Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should have been impleaded as an indispensable
party. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines indispensable parties to be “parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action.” It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos in his action for the annulment of TCT
No. 12159-A. Basic is the rule in procedural law that no man can be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger and strangers to a
case cannot be bound by a judgment rendered by the court.[26] It would be the height of injustice to entertain an action for the annulment of
Carlos’ title without giving her the opportunity to present evidence to support her claim of ownership through title. In addition, it is
without question a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.[27]

Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the ownership of the subject lot of Carlos and Spouses Fernandez, he should institute a direct action
before the proper courts for the cancellation or modification of the titles in the name of the latter two. He cannot do so now because it is
tantamount to a collateral attack on Carlos’ title, which is expressly prohibited by law and jurisprudence.

Deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez is presumed valid

The CA did not err in amending its decision and recognizing the validity of the sale between Spouses Fernandez and Carlos. Time and
again, the Court has repeatedly ruled that a person dealing with a registered land has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and
need not inquire further, unless the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such an inquiry. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title as evidence of lawful ownership of the property protects
buyers in good faith who rely on what appears on the face of the said certificate of title. Moreover, a potential buyer is charged with notice
of only the burdens and claims annotated on the title.[28] As explained in Sandoval v. Court of Appeals,[29]

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. . . a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further
except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or
when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence
of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for
value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.[30]
In this case, there has been no showing that Spouses Fernandez were aware of any irregularity in Carlos’ title that would make them
suspicious and cause them to doubt the legitimacy of Carlos’ claim of ownership, especially because there were no encumbrances
annotated on Carlos’ title. At any rate, that is the proper subject of another action initiated for the purpose of questioning Carlos’ certificate
of title from which Spouses Fernandez derived their ownership because, otherwise, the title of Spouses Fernandez would become
indefeasible. The reason for this is extensively explained in Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals:[31]
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on
the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if
not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles
issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.[32]
While the Court finds that the validity of TCT No. 12159-A cannot be attacked collaterally and that Cagatao had not sufficiently
established his claim of ownership over the subject property, it agrees with the CA that he, the current possessor, shall remain to be so until
such time that his possession is successfully contested by a person with a better right.

REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO

G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006

FACTS:

 December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application covering a parcel of land
situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This application was approved and Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued subsequent
thereto.

 Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained the sales patent through fraud,
false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts. This was however dismissed by the Director of lands and further affirmed
by then Minister of Natural Resources.

 Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and relocation survey found out that 83 sq. m. of the titled property of Guerrero is under
actual physical possession of Marcelo Bustamante, husband of Angeluna. Thus, upon the directive of the Office of The President,
the Director of Lands instituted a petition for the amendment of plan and technical description.

 Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to dismiss but however was dismissed thereafter. However, the RTC ruled in favor
of Guerrero stating that the Republic failed to prove its allegation that Guerrero obtained the sales patent and certificate of title
through fraud and misrepresentation. RTC also ruled that the original certificate of title in the name of Guerrero acquired the
characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of 1 year from the entry of the decree of registration. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Guerrero procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent and
OCT through fraud and misrepresentation.

2. W/N Guerrero’s title acquired the characteristic of indefeasibility.

HELD:

1. NO.

the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now
covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land
Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to
attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon
noted or what the law warrants or reserves.

Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a
Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.

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However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of
registration obtained by actual fraud. However, the Republic in this case failed to prove that there is actual and extrinsic fraud to justify a
review of the decree. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in
procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its
right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud.

2. YES. Guerrero’s title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was vested with th garment of indefeasibility.

NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity
of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of
land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded
and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The
further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, justice and equity
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the
absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title
to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of
the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

FLORENTINO W. LEONG and ELENA LEONG vs. EDNA C. SEE,

FACTS:

Spouses Florentino and Carmelita Leong owned a property located in Quiapo , Manila, where Florentino’s sister-in-law, Elena stayed rent-
free with her in laws.

The Spouses Leong immigrated to the USA and not long after, got divorced in Illinois. In their divorce settlement, Florentino conveyed all
his right, title , and interest over the subject property. Intercalated in the lower margin of page 12 of the instrument was a long-hand
scribbling of a proviso, purporting to be a footnote remark": Neither party shall evict or charge rent to relatives of the parties, or convey
title, until it has been established that Florentino has clear title to the Malabon property. Clear title to be established by the attorneys for
the parties or the ruling of a court of competent jurisdiction. In the event Florentino does not obtain clear title, this court reserves
jurisdiction to reapportion the properties or their values to effect a 50-50 division of the value of the 2 remaining Philippine properties.

On November 14, 1996, Carmelita sold the land to Edna. In lieu of Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale,
Carmelita presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a waiver of interest notarized on March 11, 1996 in Illinois. In this
waiver, Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to the land.17 Consequently, the land’s title, covered by TCT
No. 231105, was transferred to Edna's name.

On April 1, 1997, Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Elena and the other relatives of the Leong ex-spouses.

In response, Elena’s cited the title’s legal infirmity for lack of Florentino’s signature and that Carmelita’s non-compliance with the
scribbled proviso annulled the transfer to Edna. Florentino filed a case of for declaration of nullity of contract of title and damages to
Carmelita, alleging that the sale was without his consent, The 2 cases were consolidated.

RTC ruled in favor of Edna See. Ordered Elena to vacate the property, but ordered Carmelita to pay Florentino his half of the sale with
interest and damges. CA affirmed in toto,

ISSUE:

WON the Edna See was an Innocent Purchaser for Value?

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower courts that correctly found that the respondent is a purchaser in good faith for value
who exercised the necessary diligence in purchasing the property.

First, good faith is presumed, and petitioners did not substantiate their bold allegation of fraud. Second, respondent did notrely on the
clean title alone precisely because of the possession by third parties, thus, she also relied on Florentino’s waiver of interest. Respondent

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even verified the authenticity of the title at the Manila Register of Deeds with her father and Carmelita. These further inquiries prove
respondent’s good faith.

The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further."

One need not inquire beyond the four corners of the certificate of title when dealing with registered property.Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 known as the Property Registration Decree recognizes innocent purchasers in good faith for value and their right to rely
on a clean title.

Even assuming the procurement of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, "such defective title may still be the source of a
completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value."

Respondent, an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value with title in her name, has a better right to the property than Elena.
Elena’s possession was neither adverse to nor in the concept of owner.

Republic vs Court of Appeals, Gr. No. L-43105, August 31, 1984

Facts:

The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay,
about 20 meters therefrom in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila Laguna. It was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909.
When Benedicto died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicial partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on his son, Santos del Rio, as the
latter’s share in the inheritance.

Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santo to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there
was no definite commitment as to rentals some of them had made voluntary payments to Santos. In violation of the original agreement,
private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land, which prompted Santos to file an ejectment against the private oppositors.
Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales application with the Bureau of
Lands and was opposed by Santos.

Issue:
W/N the applicant-private respondent has a registrable title to the land. Held:

Private persons cannot reclaim land from public waters without prior permission by the government and, even if reclamation is authorized,
acquisition thereof for ownership is not automatic. The claim of private oppositors, that they have reclaimed the land from the waters of
Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed the same for more than 20 years does not improve their position. In the first place, private
persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from the
government authorities. And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party
reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. Private oppositors failed to show proper
authority for the alleged reclamation therefore; their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.

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