Republic Act No.
9225 August 29, 2003 (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS
WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO.
63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision
of law to the contrary notwiths tanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must
Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of
this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other sec tion
or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and
effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions
of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens
of the United States of America. — Citizens of the United
States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly
licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in
the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing
as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the
Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after
taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I wil l not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as
to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other
jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the
Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of
appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any
State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five
years in any of said courts, that such practice began before
July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or
disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted
without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other
applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being
admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they
have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully
completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of
law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further
evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless
he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law
school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to
the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education
that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history
and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All
applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the
Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule
at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the
examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this
rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit
and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within
sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the
fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that
the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their
professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same
time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and
citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of
applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of
the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino,
English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the
beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not
otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall
be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil
Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal
Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations,
and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public);
Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure,
and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in
Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers,
and in writing. — Persons taking the examination shall not
bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The
questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy
thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each
examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally
without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that
his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his
answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may
allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the
questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be
used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as
are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or
commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their
names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall
be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for
admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place
annually in the City of Mani la. They shall be held in four days
to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar
examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First
day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and
Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law
(morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile
Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day:
Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations
shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be
appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be
composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as
chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve
for one year, and ei ght members of the bar of the Philippines,
who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of
the members of this committee shall be published in each
volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall
endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and
during examination the candidates shall not communicate
with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance.
The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other
provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination,
and the same to count as a failure against him, and further
disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may
be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75
per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per
cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent:
Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per
cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of
examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the
examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the
committee shall file its report on the result of such
examination. The examination papers and notes of the
committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be
examined by the parties in interest, after the court has
approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. —
Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three
times shall be disqualified from taking another examination
unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have
enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as
well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law
school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by
the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that
the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed
the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students
and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful
applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required
examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitl ed to
admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall
thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all
the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be
entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate
of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which
certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme
Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice,
which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he
receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an
attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws
of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings
only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent
with truth and honor, and never seek to mislea d the judge or
any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of the defens eless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all
fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion
as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that
the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived
of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an
attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent
any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt
as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client on appeal,
unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance
in the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. —
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in
taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as
to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No
court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregar d
such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds;
contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may
retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by
the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,
without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice
to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the
name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the advance
party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute
another in his place, but if the contract between client and
attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the
attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in
the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of
the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the
payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in
the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals
or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme
Court in the premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or
Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court.
— Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court
of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon
the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the
Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts
involved and make such order revoking or extending the
suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such,
as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended
from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to
be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice
he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court
may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of
charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears
that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney,
and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the
ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall
be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the
required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court
for sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. —
Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law
the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed
as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the
court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule.
Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less
than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the
following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2)
One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two
hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital
offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to
appear for Government. — Any official or other person
appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for
the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of
a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the
court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No
judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or
of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and
impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as
amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to
it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a
lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain
the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and
to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his
just fees and disbursements.
RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules
safeguarding privileged communications between attorney
and client shall apply to similar communications made to or
received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law
student shall comply with the standards of professional
conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney
to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a
ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated
December 19, 1986).
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of
the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE
138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR
MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who
appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule
(Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar
during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme
Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in
Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T.
Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11
was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at
the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr.
Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the
presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned
the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because
the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer.
On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral
issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by
a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with
said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a
Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and
Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise
Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before
the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its
Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of
allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly
accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound
discretion of the court after having made at least one
supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law
student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule
138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less
than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during
the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale
behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice
as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students,
who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a
counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law
school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential
vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their
law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental
principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular
profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly
a license, as required by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the
court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left
to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states
that the appearance of the law student shall be under the
direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule
must be strictly construed because public policy demands
that legal work should be entrusted only to those who
possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial
disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like
snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has
allowed non-lawyers to appear for party l itigants in places
where duly authorized members of the bar are not available
(U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation
before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated
or capable person in behalf of a litigant who ca nnot get a
lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the
interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in
regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the
rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law
student appearing before the court is properly guided and
supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appea ring
before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule
138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school and that said law student must
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance.
Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of court
A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA,
Respondents.
RE SO LU TI O N
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the
authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension from the practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found
Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their
stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial
Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of
law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and
disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for
two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for
reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be disbarred, not
merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8
dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant
Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of
the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region
II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave
of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that
on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission
on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to
investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's suspension from
the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice
of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from
his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's
suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from
assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility
in the meantime that his authority to pra ctice law is
suspended."11
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not
connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension
from the practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's
resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and
prejudice to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte
clarificatory pleading as this court does not render advisory
opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from
complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan
alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and
discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of
suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's
motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension
and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of
his commission as a notary public."15 According to
complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's
motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the
functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar
and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended
Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect
"a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position
of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of
suspension]."17 The Commis sion on Human Rights, according
to complainant Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to
desist from performing his functions as Regional Director.
Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable
attention and action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office
of the Bar Confidant for report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the
Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of
suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already
lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to file
their respective motions to lift order of suspension with
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Executive Judge of the court where they might appea r as
counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law
during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed
Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional Director
during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar
Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly]
disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According
to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human
Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this
court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory.
"22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that this court require him to
submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights
stating that he desisted from performing his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice
of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that
Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human Rights be
required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that
Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as Regional
Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing
that his suspension from the practice of law did not incl ude
his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o
stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the practice of
law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating]
his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the
statutory principle in law that what is not included is deemed
excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court
required respondents to file their respective motions to lift
order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of
suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and the
Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant
Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from
the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009
provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice
of law and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already
elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from
notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift relative to their
suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where
they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents have
actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during
the entire period of their suspension and disqualification,
unless already complied with in the mea ntime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification
from the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he
has been suspended from office and has stopped from the
performance of his functions for the period stated in the
order of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10) days
from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to
COMMENT on the allegations of complainant against them,
both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27
(Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and
Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of
suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on
complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing
his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from
the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga
alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally,
managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice
of law. These managerial functions allegedly included
."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional
office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of
investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human
Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the
implementation of all other services and assistance programs
of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units
at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary
requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and
expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission
allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of
the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require
the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly]
[complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from
the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated
November 27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed
upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and
distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a
public official for the same acts."38 According to the
Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of
law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon
a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely
different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority
of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer
to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by
whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the]
matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment,
complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed
this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from
the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was
suspended from office and desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he
held his position as Regional Director and only performed
generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan
countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of
suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions
of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark ca se of
Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law.
Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional
Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in]
good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he
had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V.
Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he
held his position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith
in reassuming his position as Regional Director, complainant
Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith,
he should have followed the initial resolution of the
Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office.
Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his
motion for reconsideration of the Commission on Human
Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing
ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and
philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty.
Baliga "[no longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the
title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of
suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume
his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to
compliance with the requirements for issuance of a notarial
commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty.
Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective
comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human
Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010,
the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga
"should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions,
duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which
[required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering
that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions
as Regional Director which required the practice of law, the
Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the
Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on
this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended
holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to
lift suspension "pending [the Commission on Human Right's
filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in
abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-
year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was
ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not
practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on
Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty.
Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty
that might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The
Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the
position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not
[require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it
will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives
on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion
to lift order of suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of
suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the
practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts
which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge
is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this
court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the
Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge
or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office
created under the Constitution with power to investigate "all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with each office
having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office
is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position
of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and
Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the
Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the
following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to
"[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional
offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of
human rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or
investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among
parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and/or possible submission of the
matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including
notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal
profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by
members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who
are necessarily members of the bar.72 Investigating human
rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses
of action and protection remedies and reviewing and
approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared
by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law.
Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member
of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law.74
When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when
he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law,
the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the
position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended
lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional
Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for
one year on June 15, 2006, "effective immediately."75 From
the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension
on July 5, 2006,76 he has been without authority to practice
law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI.
As the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its
resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect,
prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is
suspended. This is without prejudice to the investigation to
be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not
generally allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on
Human Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into effect
and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by
decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the
discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for
the period for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in
effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional
Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not violate
Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only
suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human
Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the
Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard
when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions
was not supported by the record. It was also
immaterial.1âwphi1 He held the position of Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to
practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was
disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty.
Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as
Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty.
Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months for
practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his
position as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to
practice law.1âwphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc
issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its
first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/
Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished Atty.
Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same
offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The
resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007
reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007,
respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable
Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional
Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights -
Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en
Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to
convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally
blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for
breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline,
is concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath
of office as government employee. As records have it, the
Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a
commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to
act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and
regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by
the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court
resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June
2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty.
Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer
reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of
being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having
contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary
public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege,
the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in
equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the
Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that
the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from
whatever privilege the Commission grants of every official
and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the
one year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the
Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the
further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may be too
harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is
being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the
admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to
complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in
Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty
of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the service.80
(Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the
resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty.
Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney
VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commi ssion on Human Rights that we have
the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.81
The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other
issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension
from the practice of law. Although the Commis sion on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82
it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in
the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a
"privilege burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the
privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of
[the] legal profession."84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from
the practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve
a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from
the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a
copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the
Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN
THE SUPREME COURT"
DE CISI ON
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of
the 37 respondent law professors1 in response to the
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause
Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative matter,
not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of
Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno)
to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither
is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as
intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
(Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a ba r disciplinary
proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the
exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a member
of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly
unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently
behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law
professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship
of their duties as such under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in
our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge
to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view
that when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be
mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of
their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive
language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for
that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during
the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration.
The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is
not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has
been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual
concern of this Court to determine by respondents’
explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar
have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through
improper intervention or interference as third parti es to a
pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was
respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court
to act on their Statement,2 which they formally submitted,
through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of
freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal
reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom
of expression is not a defense in admini strative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in
court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’
invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who
teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys
that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by
the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over
by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’
actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of
this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano
del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31,
2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"),
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision,
raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject
this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s
foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely,
under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional
provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international
human rights and humanitarian standards, including those
provided for in the relevant international conventions of
which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diploma tic protection
with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to
protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the
rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and
pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares
(Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for
the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds
for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other
arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO
PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR
THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN
IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG
CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence
bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic)
also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by
the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment
for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly
plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo
and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice
plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the
Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the
GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized
and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In
the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle,
one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in
the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque
quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku
regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the
international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded
to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 *plagiarism+ claims are based on a motion
for reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine
Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental -motion-
alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-
four sentences and citations that are identical to sentences
and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan
Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
petitioners’ *plagiarism+ allegations until after the motion was
filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s
jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions
against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture
are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the
opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available here:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162
230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his
colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of pla giarism
contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly
plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis,
wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my
attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed
Court, I am compelled, as a question of the integrity of my
work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and
humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible
unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the
case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No.
162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of
possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast
Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate
of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),
where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the
extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said
Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that
your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I
made in the article and employed them for cross purposes.
This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to
argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has
been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that
your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the
arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed
Court as to the issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010,
the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards (the Ethics Committee) purs uant to Section 13,
Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En
Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred
the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics
Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys.
Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del
Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled
"Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court"
(the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and
on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement
also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA
News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The
statement was likewise posted at the University of the
Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on
August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the
Statement of the University of the Philippines College of Law
Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter
dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a
statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28 members of the
faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points
could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted
letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged
signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP La w
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each
name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law
faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed
against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a
time of war. After they courageously came out with their very
personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women",
waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from
their own government as well as from the government of
Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse
in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230
(28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a
singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the Universi ty of the
Philippines College of Law views the charge that an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The
plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated
without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the
integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and
misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own. In
the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at
worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and
expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went
into committing such ideas and expressions i nto writing, and
then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and
simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is
one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form
part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the
Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by
dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and
falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source
material shows that the ponente merely copied select
portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them
into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under
the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the
Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also
bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of
any mention of the original writers’ names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for
itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the
ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes
from the original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’
sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not
acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary
sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion
of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in
fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to
appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and
analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be
expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly journals.
This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity
with sources all the more demands correct and careful
attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a
matter of diligence and competence expected of all
Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original
writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that
the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main
source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that
the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual
slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status
of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek
remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya
decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the
contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution by
transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying
works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International
Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility for
personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the
role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts
rarely have such opportunities to make an international
impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women"
who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World
War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford
them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on
this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya
petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials,
the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so
doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to
actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners.
Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even
the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation
of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the
Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal
systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute (4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of
honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the
to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the
members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the
society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy Court may consider appropriate;
that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear
and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would (5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review
only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a
justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise
in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice,
relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and adjudication.
and misinterpreted texts.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law,
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether
collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This (SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but Dean and Professor of Law
also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions,
are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must (SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN
be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not Dean (1978-1983) (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of Dean (1989-1995)
reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step (SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional Dean (1995-1999) (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA
care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in REGULAR FACULTY
the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the
position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all (SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
controversies: a position that requires competence and Professor (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
integrity completely above any and all reproach, in Assistant Professor
accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and (SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY
professional ethics. Associate Dean and Associate Professor (SGD.) EVELYN
(LEO) D. BATTAD
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn Assistant Professor
duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the (SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN
profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the Associate Professor (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
University of the Philippine Coll ege of Law that: Assistant Professor
(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Assistant Professor (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach Assistant Professor
of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and (SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY
professional competence expected of the Supreme Court; Assistant Professor (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
Assistant Professor
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and LECTURERS
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing (SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal (SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
precedents through dubious means; (SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the (SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the (SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S.
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all QUIMBO
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, (SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN
such as the petitioners therein; FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA (SGD.) SUSAN D.
VILLANUEVA29
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian
J. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism
issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of
international law at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to
you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the
above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30
of your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing the
concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to
this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost
word by word from the introductory chapter of my book
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law
(Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a
generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment,
but as this is in relation to a citation from another author
(Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive
passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be
considered an appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been
used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the
erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows
that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely
accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international
law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present
study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5).
In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the
preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of
the reality of international law, established in the
jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to
see how my work should have been cited to support – as it
seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am
concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s
Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from
your Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty.
Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee
noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of
certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the
names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three
days from the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics
Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty
Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of
the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in
all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement
was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have
signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the
Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) a s represented
in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R.
Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his
name was not included among the signatories in the previous
copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of
ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en
banc since the same Statement, having been formally
submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already
under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc
made the following observations regarding the UP Law
Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the
educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as
an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how
he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet
arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the
articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay
ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed
against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a
time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resoluti on of the said
case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners *in the
Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is
critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is
also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so
far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the
line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can
threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for
the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit
the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine
the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing
the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP
Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as l aw professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according
to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations
omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan
M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona,
Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay,
Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C.
Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn
G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of
the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36
11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the
same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for
submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during
the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation
before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the
Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was
docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in
Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing
granted by the Court, respondents filed the following
pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35
of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.
Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same
charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof.
Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for
Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon
10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for
Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof.
Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on
November 19, 2010 a common compliance which was signed
by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In
the "Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents
stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement
in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon
them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members
of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one
that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that
"they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out
that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note
with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and
conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed
are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law
professors and officers of the Court, and have violated
‘Canons *1+, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the
following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect
to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to
influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44
in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that
their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to
defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was
purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement
"focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise
guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writi ng in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to
‘participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon
4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote
respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1,
id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a
"special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against
plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome
occurrences have a profound impact in the academe,
especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to
misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an
‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the
Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it
appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any
action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases
for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21,
2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have
said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into
the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del
Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the
gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges."51
Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the
Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism
allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to
urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held
accountable in accordance with the standards of academic
writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted
to a discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of
the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and
foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially
argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge
against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they
are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity
Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance
included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010
of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice
Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya
decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text
from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that
appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional
and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a
2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights
Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of
their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from
said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his
ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by
the Court when others have likewise spoken on the
"plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted
that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are
legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published
reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to
the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism,
specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and
Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July
25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published
in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director
General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror
on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8,
2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call
for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the
Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31,
2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar
Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del
Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges
Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star
on August 16, 2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University
College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court
has singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the
Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they
may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance,
respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing
their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the
court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy
who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United
States v. Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and
In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance,
respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued in
the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an
institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the
University of the Phil ippines Charter of 2008 which provided
that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility
to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and
breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy
discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of
study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had
they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya
decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and
credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a
culture and generation of students, professionals, even
lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for
research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would
have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that
intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s
conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this
Court to consider the following portion of the dissenting
opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v.
Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a
calm and impartial course from the bench than by an attempt
to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a
too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case.
The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients
and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do
well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language
soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way
the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe
they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law,
members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully
pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the
Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that
respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed
"violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the
foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the
alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that
before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute
and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the
Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and
conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for
hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full
and fair opportunity to require the production of and to
present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts,
records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and
accorded the opportunity to cross -examine the witnesses
who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the
Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano
C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof.
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a
separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista
Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the
Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights
allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and
conclusions in the Show Caus e Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f
the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the
Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions to
protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to
resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her
deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the
Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited
jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic
freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of
higher learning such that schools have the freedom to
determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be
admitted to study and that courts have no authority to
interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these
matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She
claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of
the University of the Philippines and other universities on
their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an
exercise of respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of
expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and
imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public
health or other legitimate public interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez)
filed a separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez
Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the
circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He
alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation
among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of
academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained
citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was
shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the
Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle
with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed
the same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he
should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar under the
Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position
that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic
society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re:
Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and
(c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur)
2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly
influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should
influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83
and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the
farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the
Statement."84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress
upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on
what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his
Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated
12 October 2010, some espoused the view that willful and
deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element
of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion
that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the
academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for
academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable
Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent
to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s own.85
(Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to
concede that he "might have been remiss in correctly
assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and
could have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with
a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has
faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that
the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his
oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a
"dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were
three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which
he described as follows:
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the
faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the
actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members
subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with
the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August
2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual
physical signature, but which reflects as signatories the
names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the
notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly
and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August
2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially
received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP
College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before
the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring
Integrity II, and which presently serves as the official file copy
of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be
signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears
the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories
to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the
notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of
eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and
Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has
been directed to explain are the dis crepancies in the
signature pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity
III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were
prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively
broad agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean
Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it
among the faculty members so that those who wished to may
sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty
roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did
the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity
Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had
already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the
process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I
among the members of the faculty. Some faculty members
visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their
offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for
one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring
Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean
Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as they
could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that
Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean
Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a
style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of
Law. Following his own established practice in relation to
significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the
signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the
first printed draft would appear, together with the
corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring
Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks
opposite or above the names of non-signatories in the final
draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for
aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such
documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to
vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as
among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he
did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the
mistake to a miscommunication involving his administrative
officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity
II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed
the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the
"(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among
those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it
was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention
of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer tha t
she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday,
06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also
according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was
leaving for the United States the following week. It would
later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate.91
(Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his
administrative officer, however, and so placed full reliance on
her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty
members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that
they were signatories, even though they were at that time
unable to affix their signatures physically to the
document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean
Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding
their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would
turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff
talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice
Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its
contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that
he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean
to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United
States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any
rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to
him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice
Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to
Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24
September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This
time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the
true import of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in
late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by
the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement
was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become
controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would
take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and
under those circumstances, he wanted to show due
deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate
Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by
signing the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the
signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was one of
the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous
description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the
version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed
by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the
Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring
Integrity I when it was circulated to him. However, his name
was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the
reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The
dean assumed that his name was still included in the
reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover
note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law
faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have
submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the
main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three
versions and only the signature pages were not the same.
This purportedly is merely "reflective of *the Statement’s+
essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to
continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory
portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each
one reflecting the same text but with more and more
signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean
Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been
made to appear in a document that a person has participated
in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for
he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the
UP College of Law had agreed wi th the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not
committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and
10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court
the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law
faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire
to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he
did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "cour sed
[the Statement] through the appropriate channels by
transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for
the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope
that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable
Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation
v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required
quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no
dubious character or motivation for the act complained of
existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of
the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of
nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance, including
the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records,
evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this
case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation
involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this
Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is
a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges
that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of
Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned i n the same capacity in
2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle,
espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United
States, that ‘…*d+ebate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In
signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak
means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting
opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v.
Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be
effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would
deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very
teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage
and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in
timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality
of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not
pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so
as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of
Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free
speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance
of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and
that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the
same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the
submissions of respondents, the material issues to be
resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their
freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain
why they should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar
under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are
respondents entitled to require the production or
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230)
and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of,
and the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have
been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their
freedom of expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the
issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with
respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech
and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption
behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s
decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they
characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause
Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that
they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya
case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners
in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled
for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance,
publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents
expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of
plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not
only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation
precisely to determine the truth of such al legations."112 It
was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there
was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections
to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that
respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement
that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as
fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay
ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed
against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a
time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said
case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners *in the
Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized
respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is
critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is
also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so
far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the
line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can
threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for
the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit
the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine
the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing
the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP
Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity accordi ng
to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations
omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in
respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the right
to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced
against the equally primordial concern that the independence
of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens
but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers
whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of
fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the
Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt
and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his
second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record
that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popul ar will expressed at the polls in the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because
we should not want that some citizen, parti cularly some voter
of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim,
and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the pres tige
of this honorable court and of each and every member
thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we
wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these,
which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as
neither justified nor necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to
the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his
said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to
threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can never
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb
and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration
of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to
the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author
shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in
case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press
for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial
outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because
he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus
creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to
make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature
of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of
sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and
disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to
intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the
fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has
acted erroneously.118 (Emphas es supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents
culled their quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm.
Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading
filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who
are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and
therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the
Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory,
Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to
uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity,
not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege,
not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being
what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St.
Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice,
and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging
discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases
supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for
his injudicious statements in his pleading, by accusing the
Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’
Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings
contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the
Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court
indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and
releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great
injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the
decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In
the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the pres ent members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He
then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive
the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor -at-
law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future
and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed
foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like
any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon
actuations of public officers, including judicial authority.
However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of
the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must
conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal
authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that
decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment.
His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they
do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when
they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v.
Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even
those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience
and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to
the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
x x xx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications or in the cours e of a
political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez
Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a
pending cause, respecting the same, has always been
considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the
administration of justice, and subjects such persons to
contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to
have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every ci tizen
has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts,
under the protection and forms of law, free from outside
coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the
court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.
x x xx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately "so many blunders and
injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of
one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of
this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of
the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might
be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the
bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124
(Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are
still good law can be easily gleaned even from more recent
jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively
disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine, for
making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the
guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the
sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity
of the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not
mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we
stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an
officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his
right as a citizen, and it is even his duty a s an officer of the
court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA
562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to cons ider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec.
657, 665).
x x xx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this
Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
x x xx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by
the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.
x x xx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary
language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra),
or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people
in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade
the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82
Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re:
Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and
offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42
[1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the
resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Publi c Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs.
Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an
administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and
impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer
responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x
x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent
lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate
language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we
had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the
Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions
of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and
cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality
of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common
Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any
limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex
society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist
that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values
that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the
case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the
orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless
and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose.
This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from
the practice of law for issuing to the media statements
grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a
pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases
supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some
respondents133 that the Statement presents no grave or
imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with
respondents’ academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and
jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and
undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach
their students and how they will teach. We must point out
that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that
dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this
Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has
not been passed upon in any previous case before this Court,
is the question of whether lawyers who are also law
professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an
administrative proceeding for intemperate statements
tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a
case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free
speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in
this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed
above is that the constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by
their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession
and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom
of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law
professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in
view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134
lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the
practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and
more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are
bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the
legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the
fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined
with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’
proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of
the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate
in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of
the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes
and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence
the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding
which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this
indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge
of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom
of expression and academic freedom, the Court considers
here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations
presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo,
and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of
respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has
committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has
found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No
matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of
his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts
and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts
and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which
we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re
Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with
more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya
case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language,
which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the
Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya
Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the
objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following
paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for
justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere
in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny
relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.
x x xx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the
Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justi ce to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse,
such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism
issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholl y immaterial
to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These
are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in
separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the
discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the
guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance,
respondents even go so far as to attach documentary
evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del
Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing
of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor
counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said
ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to
bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it
has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language
in the Statement was intended for effective speech; that
speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen."136 One wonders what s ort of effect
respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as,
among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for
the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see
how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to
send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively
plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is
to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams
which were deliberately quoted in full in the narration of
background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the
civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of
the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones
who would expectedly be affected by any perception of
misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond
the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took
pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly
manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents
could not do the same. These foreign authors’ letters
underscore the universality of the tenet that legal
professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can
express his opinions logically and soberly wi thout resort to
exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to
spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the plagiarism
issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the
Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration,
why was the same published and reported in the media first
before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible
that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the
general public and designed to capture media attention as
part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who
is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of
observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court,
particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter
of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the
Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s
issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final
disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely
publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time
the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not
know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they
had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court
intended to take no action on the ethics charge against
Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time
from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27,
2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early
August when the Ethics Committee had already been
convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was
fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the
Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend
to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents
from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening
event into account in the interest of fairness .
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise
find no merit in the respondents’ reliance on various news
reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet
as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the
contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance
show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to
warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138
action. This Court takes into account the nature of the
criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same
on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons
outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal
issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests
in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are
the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of
fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an
exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for
such silence would have a grave implication on legal
education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common
Compliance, considering that this appears to be the first time
these respondents have been involved in disciplinary
proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the
benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well -
intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is
established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then
good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded
in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was
not his intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the
respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases
which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well
settled rule in all places where the same conditions and
practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of
intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is
the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a
valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the
language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a
defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be
observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S.,
455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to
him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to
make such concession. However, in order to avoid a
recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the
bad example, from taking the same course, this court
considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with
the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance
should, notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be
reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13,
to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the
administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the
differences in his Compliance compared to his colleagues. In
our view, he was the only one among the respondents who
showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He
was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to
sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his
agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the
reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the
UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12,
2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty
brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not
willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He
was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been
remiss in failing to assess the effect of the la nguage of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this
without having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue,
without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed
below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of
due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court
expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their
principles but only that they recognize that they themselves
may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We
commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the
respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause
Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds
Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a
member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and, therefore,
not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should
be excused from these proceedings. However, he should be
reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if
one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility
for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among
legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for
under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding
the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen
to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with
for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and
for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that
Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful reproduction
of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because
looking at the text or the body, there were no differences
between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies
in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement
(i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos
with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more
signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses
that he is not administratively liable because he did not
misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had
agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or
who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s
implied view that the signatures in the Statement are not as
significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the
Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific
point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at
that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty
Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who
have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority
mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons
who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from
respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the
"importance" of their positions as UP law professors
prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s
predicament is the fact that he did not from the beginning
submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on
August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II
with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would
turn out, according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there
were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to
lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative
officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate
information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice
Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II.
Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of
Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of
Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring
Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a
bulletin board or a website a signed document may have to
be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the
notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept
that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to
eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court,
especially this Court, of a signed document for the Court’s
consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its
authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that
is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of
the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered
any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his
submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11,
2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting
Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and
unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of
vandalism with respect to court submissions for court
employees are accountable for the care of documents and
records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen
deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that
did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the
reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the
answer. In the course of his explanation of his willingness to
accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza
agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in
a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized
him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed
the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II
was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one
purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the
same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is
precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a
person or persons participated in an act when such person or
persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his
reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there
was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one
person to be indicated as having actually signed the
Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an
intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had
was only hearsay information that the former intended to
sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to
observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the
Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until
all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the
Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was
truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of
Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean
Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures
that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he
could not wait for actual signatures before submission of the
Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they
were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was
neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission
to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean
Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance
unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing to ascribe these
isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced
zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean
Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full
candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required
under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for
production/presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230
and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein
asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their
Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause
Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or presentation of
witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230)
and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and
evidence that were presented or may be presented in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a
hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate
Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly
expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity
Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is this group of
respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for
them to be accorded full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity
of a hearing in this case springs largely from its
characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt
in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on
the majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for
opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is
not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which
requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As
explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was
docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B,
Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio
by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall
proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a
formal investigation, through a referral to the specified
officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court.
Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11
of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative
proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We have held
that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What
the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential to due process, the requirements of which
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion
to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of
Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging
in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without
further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where
the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer
without need of any further investigation after considering
his actions based on records showing his unethical
misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the
image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to
public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took
judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer
and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the
astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held
that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of respondents' administrative liability,
without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v.
Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before the
respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct
already established by the facts on record.
x x xx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal
charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant
lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard.
As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her
letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146
(Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had
no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they do
not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have
they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court
to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically
stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial,
they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a
formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records,
evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court
which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the
conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is
the primary reason for their request for access to the records
and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To
illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is
relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of
the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring
Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there.
Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show
Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement
with language that the Court deems objectionable during the
pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than
the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions,
news reports/columns (many of which respondents
themselves supplied to this Court in their Common
Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public
knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to
explain are the language of the Statement and the
circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing,
dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not
see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be
sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents
and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would
be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he
narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before the
Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo
on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon
his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take
some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a
hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one
who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles,
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on
an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a
matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies
respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to
any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to
divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of
evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not to
make a full defense at this time, because they were counting
on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-
out. Indeed, law professors of their stature a re supposed to
be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the
non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should
bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to
the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly
expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a
legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately
and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound
by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court
is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from
criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established
ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court
employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of
the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to
conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts.
There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely,
Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn
(Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan
P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La
Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S.
Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and
Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35
respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the
Court and the administration of justice and warned that the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the
Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full
candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned
that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is
excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded
that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law
school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat
of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access
to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED
IN RE OZAETA, 92, SCRA 568 July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &
CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO
P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN,
JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA,
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN
M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS
S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RE SO LU TI O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the
surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May
5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were
ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name which includes the
name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil
Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the
last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business
of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner
as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts
contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy
and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption
of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the
legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same
degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that
implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire
and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a
firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name
of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has
acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not
transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased
partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon
33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception
because the deaths of their respective deceased partners
were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation
for several days; the stationeries now being used by them
carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm;
petitioners will notify all leading national and international
law directories of the fact of their respecti ve deceased
partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6
there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a
law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the
firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in
the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under
consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu
(the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm
name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter
was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from
including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston,
who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an
incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of
Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins
& Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before
acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957,
stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of
Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the
law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the
same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins &
Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of
the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no
reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953
when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation,
the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes
that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the
relations between attorney and client, and the high standards
demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give
rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their
firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy
thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the
rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez
and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnershi p names
of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or
more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include
their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability,
of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm
name of a partnership must either be those of living partners
and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons
who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the
Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in
the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a
partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot
be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm
particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for
the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of
a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from
the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and
because such payments will not repres ent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly,
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for
transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be
no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to
allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for
himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation
established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of
the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to
consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily
deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased
partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership
which continues the business using the partnership name or
the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the
law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory
to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of
its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and
cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right
to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence
of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a
commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115)
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends
or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships
of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed
as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically
valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where
there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to
good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be
likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for
business. For one thing, the l aw on accountancy specifically
allows the use of a trade name in connection with the
practice of accountancy. 10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is
a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ...
It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on
trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been
stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct
being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining
to business is that the law is a profes sion.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men
pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service, — no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession
from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its pos sessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associ ation" in
support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in
the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is
permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm
names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse
at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law
firms in this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of
the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or
more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this
purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new
partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S.
Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search
of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently
allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in
the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is
sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
(33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in
their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained
the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of
the present ten partners of the firm bears either name
because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not
offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was
adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative
policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both
the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar
Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of
the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible
by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in
the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts.
The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such
practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that
sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of
conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local
custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court
of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such
proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of
such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in
the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing
lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if
proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which
clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of
any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public
order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the
administration of justice and should not be considered like an
ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a
spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal
gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to
mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think
of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with
their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much
of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law.
But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or
corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or
physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is
often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his
profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This
spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and
ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of
a learned art have their justification in that they secure and
maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their
firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are deni ed and
petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA"
from their respective firm names. Those names may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals who have
been partners in their firms indicating the years during which
they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and
De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for
granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these
petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the
late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned,
and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names
[Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of
June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of
that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as
the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law
firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their
petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to
continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death
of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the
Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice
Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the
partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the
partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also
invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of
the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or
deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the
condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two
firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former
Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period
when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use
of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the
clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That
practice was followed before the war by the law firm of
James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that
the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for
granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these
petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the
late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned,
and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names
[Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of
June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of
that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as
the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law
firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in thei r
petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to
continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death
of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the
Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice
Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the
partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the
partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also
invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of
the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or
deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the
condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two
firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former
Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period
when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use
of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the
clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That
practice was followed before the war by the law firm of
James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that
the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.
IN RE EDILLION, 84, SCRA 568
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its
competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar
admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the
specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession
and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of
his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A.
Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being
unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had
repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute
resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It
was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing
an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to
the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth
in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Ca stro: "On
November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On
January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano
B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ...
Should the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation
to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the
action taken should be submit by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On
January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March
2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March
24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case
was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification
of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of
Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as
found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. —
Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the
aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions constitute
an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and
to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of
this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws
are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out
in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous
case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526,
In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of
the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The
unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the
integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional
question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and,
within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From
the time the decision was rendered, there were various
pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with
a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the
matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it
turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be
oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation
of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since
respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal
knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases coming
before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather
generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been
duly taken to task, there was the impression that his
recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the
extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than
justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to
this Court where a different attitude on his part was
discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and
circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state
of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the
welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel,
their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of
the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement
could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23,
1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his
part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can
integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed
during which he war. barred from exercising his profession
was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that
as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt
and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially
if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is
no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is
concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What
must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to
follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the
part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for
the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of
October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A.
Edillon.
A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
DE CISI ON
REYES, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment
against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's
demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from
her client purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their
case which was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in
February 2005, he, along with his siblings engaged the
services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent
them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of
Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The
complainant claimed that sometime in February 2007, Atty.
De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before
the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’
stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract.3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time
was that, a month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza
had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon,
for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him,
which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before
the Court. Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita
De Taza were submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received P300,000 shall be used to expedite
the case which, in turn shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of
said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same
should not be included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall
be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of P500,000 has been advanced as part of
expense [sic] to expedite the process before the courts. The
said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the
same should be reimbursed to her by her siblings upon
winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in
Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the Court had already
denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty.
De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He
tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no
longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted
a complaint for disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also
attached several affidavits and documents9 from other
individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing
checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain
Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit10 which was
attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued
11 checks11 in her favor amounti ng to P481,400.00, which
were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her
went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose
Affidavit12 was attached to the complaint, averred that Atty.
De Taza issued a check13 for P50,000.00 as payment for her
loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank for being drawn
against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an
affidavit,14 stating that Atty. De Taza owes her P29,560.39
and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15
informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the
country as she was joining her husband in the United States
of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza
was required by the Court to file a Comment. However, the
copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal
carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court
then resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2,
2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address at
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also
returned unserved with the notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8,
2008 that the complainant inform the Court of Atty. De Taza’s
new address, which the complainant faithfully complied with
by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in the U.S.A. The Court,
in its Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk
of Court to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December
10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using
the latter’s U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated
December 10, 2007 with the complaint was returned; this
time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The
Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009, held that
the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and
resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing
of her comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties,
in which they failed to appear. Thus, the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. The
complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred that
he was already residing abroad and maintained that he had
already submitted his documentary evidence at the time of
the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not
file any position paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that
Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from
the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar
Discipline’s recommendation in a Resolution24 dated January
3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Inves tigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent’s demand of *P+800,000.00 to expedite the case
pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had
long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.25
(Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS,
DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS
UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not
able to refute the accusations against her. Numerous
attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend
herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these
efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of
residence was an unscrupulous move on her part to evade
her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the
Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De
Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s charges. Her
failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a
hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary
proceedings are investigations by the Court to ascertain
whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the
Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against
Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.28
(Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required."29 Based on the documentary evidence submitted
by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested
a propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks
and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason.
The complainant even submitted a document evidencing
Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for
drawing checks against a closed account, among other
complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such
conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an
ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is
exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza
must remember that she is not only a symbol but als o an
instrument of justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public i nterest and
public order.1âwphi1 It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard
to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the
image of the profession she should hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his
siblings were even worse as she had the gall to make it
appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the
Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange
for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was
employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her
clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are
reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she
even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for that particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
his client.31 In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza
demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her
demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the
following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oa th;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.32
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two
years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v.
Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to
the erring lawyer who issued worthless checks to pay off her
loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that
suspension from the practice of law for four years was the
appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client
into paying P42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of a
petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein
presented to his client a copy of the petition with stamped
receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition
was filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein
demanded P14,000.00 from the complainant to be put up as
injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on
other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was
handling the case. When the complainant verified this with
the judge, the judge denied the respondent’s allegations. The
complainant later learned that the bond was also
unnecessary, as the application for a writ was already denied
by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended
the respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."37 "The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal
profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the
judicial system with such irresponsible representations is
reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."38
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate
from the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the
practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO YEARS with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let
it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
RE SO LU TI O N
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia
Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint against respondent
Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged
the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot
they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren
asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including
expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that
full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the
title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One
Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty.
Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling
of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original
copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation,
survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March
10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that
from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about
the case and each time he would say that the titling was in
progress; that they became bothered by the s low progress of
the case so they demanded the return of the money they
paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same
provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren
made a special appearance against them in a case pending
before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu
(MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants
an acceptance fee of P10,000.00, but denied that the amount
was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed,
however, that he received the payment of P1,000.00 and
P6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be
filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance
fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling
of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration;
and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence
when he participated in a case filed against the complainants
in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf
of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed
to appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012,
the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have
violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he
accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the
acceptance of P7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation
and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in
the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined
for appearing in a case against complainants without a
written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that
he be suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors,
adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from
the practice of law for three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors
on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the
penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted
the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance
fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the
case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5
years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found
GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective
from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to
be included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, VICENTE A. PICHON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.
RE SO LU TI O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez
(complainant) was the widow of the late Feli pe Domiguez
who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the
Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to
file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged
the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty.
Agleron). On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and
received from complainant the following amounts for the
payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 -P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September
2, 1996 - P5,250.00 or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of
four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty.
Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.1
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his
professional service and received the amount of P10,050.00.
He, however, explained that their agreement was that
complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental
expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and
ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the
signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full
the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of
the attorney’s fee, but complainant fa iled to do so. Atty.
Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in
court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank
while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee
and attorney’s fee.2
In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full
payment of the filing fee and asserted that the filing fee at
that time amounted only to P7,836.60.
In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12,
2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to
have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
four (4) months.
In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one
(1) month.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors except as to the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty
bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to
his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless
of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.6 He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.7
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file
the complaint against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao
Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and
signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges
on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the
filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such
justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would
exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is
entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he
accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant
had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should
have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about
the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in
dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when
he failed to file the appropriate charges.1âwphi1
In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should
never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his
negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as
suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this
case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly,
respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to
be included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6484 June 16, 2015
ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMULO
RICAFORT, Respondent.
DE CISI ON
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative case stemmed from the
complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B. Llunar (complainant) filed
against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and
inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.
Antecedents
In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of
Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent to file a case against
father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the
recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Banez
family but was fraudulently registered under the name of
Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.
The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank
of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure
proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The
respondent received from the complainant the following
amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the
redemption price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover the
filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case
involving the subject property was ever filed by the
respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City.
Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent return
to her the amount of P95,000.00.
The respondent refused to return the whole amount of
P95,000.00 to the complainant. He argued that a complaint2
for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually
been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer,
Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only
what was left of the P95,000.00 after deducting therefrom
the P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee
for handling the case.
The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for
annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she
had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel.
Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late and the
property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also,
the complainant discovered that the respondent had been
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29,
2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative Case
No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the reason
another lawyer, and not the res pondent, filed the complaint
for annulment of title in court.
In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the respondent to
have been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's
case and to have gravely abused the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating Canons
156 and 17,7 and Rules 1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and 18.0411
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent
to have erred in not informing his client that he was under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Due to these
infractions, Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the
respondent remain suspended indefinitely from the practice
of law.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors agreed with the Investigating
Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but
modified the recommended penalty from indefinite
suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent
to return to the complainant the amount of P95,000.00
within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved
for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued
that his referral of the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was
actually with the complainant's knowledge and consent; and
that he paid Atty. Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case.
These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit14
dated November 17, 2004, but were alleged to have been
overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP
Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated
June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's motion for
reconsideration.15chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his
dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law
while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him
the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions
making him liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent
did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's
case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the
complainant's property within the period of redemption.
What is worse is the delay of three years before a complaint
to recover the property was actually filed in court. The
respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily
available to recover the complainant's property. Under these
facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the
amounts given to him by the complainant for handling the
latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent
received from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00,
P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the
mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary
civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant
approached the respondent several times thereafter to
follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the
respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her
case had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the
respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded
that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but
her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later
promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any
amount has been made. These facts confirm that the
respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates
every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession"16 and to "account
for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client."17 In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds
or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.18chanrobleslaw
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being
forthright with the complainant that he was under indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should
have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by the
complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that
"a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients." The respondent
lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar
when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing
that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law
despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This
infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed.
Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for
five (5) years from the practice of law would have been
justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the
profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these
rules. In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the
respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over
the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and
in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution
issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 filed against him by his client. We then
suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a
penalty short of disbarment. Under his current l iability -
which is no different in character from his previous offense -
we have no other way but to proceed to decree his
disbarment. He has become completely unworthy of
membership in our honorable profession.
With respect to the amount to be returned to the
complainant, we agree with the IBP that the respondent
should return the whole amount of P95,000.00, without
deductions, regardless of whether the engagement of Atty.
Abitria as counsel was with the complainant's knowledge and
consent.
In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have
been necessary had the respondent been honest and diligent
in handling the complainant's case from the start. The
complainant should not be burdened with the expense of
hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the
respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where
there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name REMOVED
from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately upon his
receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of P95,000.00 to complainant Adelita B. Llunar,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's
personal record and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country. This Decision should likewise be posted on the
Supreme Court website for the information of the general
public.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RE SO LU TI O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr.
Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol
for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving
cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer certificates
of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds
of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession of
parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Titl e (OCT)
No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia,
Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel
Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael
Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs
of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while
Efren received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective
names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21,
1972, emancipation patents and titles were issued to
Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the
program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to
complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of
absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived
from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the
agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and
affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of
Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for
the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the
DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full
implementation of the March 2, 1994
decision.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for
Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition6
which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela”7.
Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol
had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no
authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record.
Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized
Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had
already been dead9 for more than a year. He claimed that
Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre,
who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land.
Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efren’s widow10 and
daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a waiver
of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa
through a deed of sale. Both also stated that they were
familiar with Efren’s signature. They state that the signature
in the waiver was different from his usual signature.
Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and
gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol
introduced falsified and manufactured evidence into the
proceedings. Atty. Caracol, i n introducing a document
denominated as Waiver of Rights where Efren waived all his
rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the
execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor of
Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for
falsification of public document and use of falsified document
against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty.
Caracol.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to
appear as “additional counsel”. He said that he had
consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the
filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there
was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found
that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct.
It found that respondent did not present credible evidence to
controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by
plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at
the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead.
It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained
the authority nor did he present any proof of the authority.
However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable
for falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and
misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he was counsel
of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real
client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended
that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and
recommendation but modified the penalty to one year
suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved
for reconsideration17 but was
denied.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court
returned to him since no legal fees are required in
administrative cases.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a
presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client,
hence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause
in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but
the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to
produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and
to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in
court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
(Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this
Court said that while a lawyer is not required to present proof
of his representation, when a court requires that he show
such authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority
to act. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A lawyer is not even required to present a written
authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal
notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts
performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, [a]
court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party
may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the
client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to
act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may
he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of
court.23 If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a
retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom
he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound
or affected by his appearance unless the purported client
ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a
lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official
transaction.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is
retained by a client, an attorney-client relationship
terminates upon death of either client or the
lawyer.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he
appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The records
are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren
was questioned. Neither is there any indication that
Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the
course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed
away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest,
prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed
the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that
he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and
thus the parties may have been
substituted.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in
People v. Mendoza28 where he
stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by
accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the advice of his
counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It
would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious
when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man
did no*t+ commit. As the ponencia observes, “outside of his
improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence
against him – presented or forthcoming. From the evidence
of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could
have been implicated.”
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the
PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal in the
discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any
moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an
innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn
them without cause. The defense counsel in this case did not
seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded
Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit
evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty.
Caracol’s liability under the present circumstances, we would
like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our
judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an
attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with
fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his
clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer’s oath which each lawyer
solemnly swears to uphold the law and court processes in the
pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect
in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as
agents of the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less
than candid about his representation. We also observe that
he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty.
Caracol’s blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be
countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his
lawyer’s oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it
proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period
of one year.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol
GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L.
Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon
finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA,
petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951
MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
respondents.
Petitioners in their own behalf.
Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R.
Lucena for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by
the same petitioners against the respondents General Court-
Martials composed each of different members or officers of
the Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the
respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the
petitioners from the enjoyment of their right to appear as
counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to
which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys
duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the
ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17,
Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said
defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially
interested in any contract with the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of
office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral
Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is
the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office. . . ..
The only question for this Court to determine in these two
cases is whether the prohibition contained in the above
quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the
petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable,
because the words "any court" includes the General Court-
Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the
meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting
members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal
case in which an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,"
refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a
Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must
be taken as established that where words are used which
have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general
must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the
subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the
limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp.
680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine
Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word
"court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a
Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior
courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of
error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided
for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer
to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the
petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et a l
vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in
this connection the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an
instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or
connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the
country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its
field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil
tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the
fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special
provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in
general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law
courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its
statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. an
the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and
according, not only to the laws and customs of the service,
but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and
justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the
Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest
sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen.
425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial
is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any
other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid
as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in
authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of
the army but not to other members of the body politic, and
that it is limited to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same
authority as civil courts of the United States, have the same
plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the
latter courts have in controversies within their cognizance,
and in their special and more limited sphere a re entitled to as
untrammeled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule
that one accused of the crime has the right to be represented
before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared
by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It
has been held that a constitutional provision extending that
right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies
to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right
to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power
to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is
properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing
the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50
Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal,
rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the
reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War
46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial
as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing
death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court
before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the
meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also
evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or
punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the
Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106,
of the Rules of Court, a cri minal action or case is one which
involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the
punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name
of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of
War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or s pecial court-
martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the
People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and
Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly
to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a criminal court.
It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a
contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an
individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil
verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the
ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the
clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none can be
conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex
parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654,
quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs.
Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words
and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of
an accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative
case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a
bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same
offense, because the latter would place the accused in
jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206
U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was
held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier
for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and
conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the
judgment of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take
cognizance; and restricting our decision to the above
question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with
the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the
plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted
of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by
him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent
jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United
States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense
in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent
intention or purpose of the framers of our Constitution in
enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution,
it is obvious that there exist the same if not more reason for
prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in
court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil
courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is
guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex.
Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as
counsel for the accused in court-martial, the respondents did
not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right,
and hence the petitions for mandamus in these two cases are
denied with costs against the petitioners.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo,
JJ., concur.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
I disqualify myself.
MARY JANE D. VELASCO, A. C. No. 5033
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,*
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN and Promulgated:
ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO,
Respondents. July 28, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-----x
DE CISI ON
PER CURIAM:
This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane
D. Velasco on March 31, 1999, against respondent lawyers for
forgery and
falsification constitutive of malpractice.[1]
On June 21, 1999, the Courts Second Division required the
respondent lawyers to comment on the complaint within (10)
days from notice.[2]
On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for
respondents, filed a Motion for Extension to File Comment
praying that an extension of sixty (60) days from August 16,
1999 be given to them to file their comment.[3]
On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for
Extension with a warning that the same shall be the last and
no further extension will be given.[4]
The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.
On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and
their counsel to show cause why they should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure
and to comply with the resolution requiring the comment.
Copies of the resolution dated June 20, 2001 were returned
unserved from Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations
party out/unknown at/party moved out and moved out. Atty.
Doroin received the said resolution on July 27, 2001.[5]
On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the
correct addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty.
Charlie Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply
with the show cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was
ordered to submit his comment.[6]
Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.
On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show
cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her
non-compliance with the said directive and to submit her
compliance within ten (10) days from notice. In the same
resolution, the fine imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was
increased from Php 500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to
file his comment on the complaint as required by the Court,
or to suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in case he fails to
pay and to submit his comment on the complaint within ten
(10) days from notice.[7]
In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed
the Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php
1,000.00. However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit the
comment on the administrative complaint required of him
and has not complied with the show cause resolution dated
April 17, 2002 by submitting the correct addresses of Atty.
Quintin P. Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.[8]
In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant
submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty.
Hector Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of
Attorney authorizing Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the
instant case.[9]
On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the
compliance of the complainant as well as the latters
manifestation and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.[10]
On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a
Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to
the case scheduled on October 26, 2005 with a strict note
that [n]on-appearance by any of the parties shall be deemed
a waiver of their right to participate in further
proceedings.[11]
On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact
of the complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres
Villaruel, Jr. appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin
and Atty. Hector Centeno had not filed their comment, they
were directed to submit it within (10) days from receipt of
notice. The hearing of the case was reset on November 30,
2005.[12]
On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez,
attorney-in-fact of the complaint, together with his counsel,
Atty. Villaruel, appeared. The notices sent to respondents
were returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a
notation RTS-Moved. As respondents had not filed their
comment on the complaint, they were declared in default. In
an Order dated November 30, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva Maala submitted her report and recommendation,
viz.[13]
The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:
x x xx x x x xx
In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was
appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No.
Q-96-27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled In the matter of the
Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo Doroin, Monina
E. Doroin, petitioner. The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on
21 January 1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this Special
Proceedings case, respondents were collaborating counsels
for Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by
deceitful means into making her sign an Extra -Judicial
Settlement and Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the
sum of P1,216,078.00 giving the paramour of complainants
father, Josephine Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and
also allotting complainants two (2) alleged illegitimate
brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of
P1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in
accordance with law. But no share was assigned to
complainants mother, who was the lega l wife of Dr. Eduardo
Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainants share of Php 1,216,078.00,
Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was
an alleged Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of
complainants father located at Kingspoint subdivision,
Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885,
Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult a
lawyer regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of
Authority to Sell before she signs the same. Eventually, she
was not able to sign the said Confirmation because
complainants lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and
negotiate with Atty. Doroin regarding the same.
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint
Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house
constructed thereon, but when she visited it again on January
1999, there was already a four-door townhouse constructed.
Complainant was informed by the caretaker at the site that
the owner is one Evangeline Reyes -Tonemura. Complainant
also learned later on that the property, which was one of the
properties submitted to the Court handling the Special
Proceedings case in the Inventory of Property dated 3 April
1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes -Yonemura
[sic], by forging the signature of complainants late father.
Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City,
knowing that complainants father was already dead as of 21
January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute
Sale, that complainants father appeared before him in
Quezon City on 17 January 1997.
Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document
was filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on
12 September 2001 and pleaded not guilty. After the
arraignment, Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared [sic] in
court and jumped bail.[14]
The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Res ponsibility when they
caused extreme and great damage to the complainant.[15]
The Commissioner also noted that the failure of the
respondents to answer the complaint for disbarment despite
due notice on several occasions and to appear on the
scheduled hearing set showed flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrates despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.[16]
The Commissioner recommended that the respondent
lawyers be disbarred.
On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline with the modification that respondent lawyers be
suspended indefinitely instead of being disbarred.
The Notice of Resolution and the Report and
Recommendation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
were submitted to the Court, through the Director for Bar
Discipline, in a transmittal letter dated January 22, 2007.
The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty.
Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their lawyers oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which would merit their disbarment.
We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the
IBP, but modify the penalty to be imposed on respondent
Atty. Hector Centeno.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[17]
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all
times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the
public at large,[18] and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.[19] In Marcelo v. Javier,[20] we reminded the
members of the legal profession that:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the
courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law during good behaviour and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
right, and attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by
a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, bas ed on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney. [21]
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally
rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[22]
In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent
lawyers forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the
deed of extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it
was in accordance with law.
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers
constitute a blatant violation of the lawyers oath to uphold
the law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that no lawyer s hall engage in dishonest
conduct. Elementary it is in succession law that compulsory
heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate
by way of legitimes[23] and no extrajudicial settlement can
deprive the spouse of said right except if she gives it up for
lawful consideration, but never when the spouse is not a
party to the said settlement.[24] And the Civil Code reminds
us, that we must give every man his due.[25]
The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They
failed to answer the complaint filed against them. Despite
due notice, they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set
by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the
complainant remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v.
Tugade,[26] we ruled that [a lawyers] failure to a nswer the
complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath
of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
[27]
The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty.
Considering that the license to practice law, though it is not a
property right, sustains a lawyers primary means of livelihood
and to strip someone of such license amounts to stripping
one of a career and a means to keep himself alive, we agree
with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the more
appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we
cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside
from committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her
rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when
he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded
from the criminal proceeding against him after having posted
bail.
We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and their regional and city chapters to
maintain an updated record of the office and residence
addresses of their members to help facilitate looking for
lawyers. As officers of the court, lawyers should be readily
available upon the Courts beckoning.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY, and Atty. Hector Centeno is hereby
DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and also be placed
on the personal records of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RE SO LU TI O N
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin
M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in
May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar
Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines
that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has
none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities
as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2
It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenanc e
of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes
him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts
and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provi sions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is enti tled to practice
law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules
of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such
as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking
the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in
good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of
annual membership dues in the IBP;11 pa yment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions
in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
"all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practic e
accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court
the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay
is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DE CISI ON
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which
denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasa y City, in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June
5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed
before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of
the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent
or friend of a party l itigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the
public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz
appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC
denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a
Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February
1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section
34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the
private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain
public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the
issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for
civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion
for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does
the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil
aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated
June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of
a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend
of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member
of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the
MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order
of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and
a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the
certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied
the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the
RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court,
the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when
it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the
herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the
necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE
BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE
SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE
LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE
CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons,
or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation,
clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19
governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court
takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student,
may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits
the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance
in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal
case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited
by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredi ted by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter
No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervisi on of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his
Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000.
No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in
these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34
of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of
a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party l itigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34
of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the
fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his
entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used
by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule
138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly cla rified in
Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held tha t,
by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of
Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had
been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was
no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for
damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for
a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offens e,
such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
country, and crime against popular representation.9 The
basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the
Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and
supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB
ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.
Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado
brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale
of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese
occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an
answer on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15,
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their
appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. On October 5, these
attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob
Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his
appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in
substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who
had withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote
Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing
the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted
with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged,
"she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the
latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to
this suggestion, Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo
on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court,
wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney
Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and
identified as Exhibit A, is in full as follows:
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
July 13, 1945.
Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
Manila, Philippines
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil
case No. 70075 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I fi nd that
the basic facts which brought about the controversy between
you and the defendant therein are as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property
described in the complaint, as the same was purchased
and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to
say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property
was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without
your knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.

Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action
against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had
the right to presume that your husband had the legal right to
dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was
in his name. Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese
military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as
so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the
sale. I believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided
merely because it was made during the Japanese occupation,
nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser was not a
citizen of the Philippines. On his last point, furthermore, I
expect that you will have great difficulty in proving that the
real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that
death has already sealed your husband's lips and he cannot
now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot
appear in the proceedings in your behalf. The records of the
case you loaned to me are herewith returned.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney
Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker
came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a
woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told
him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs.
Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real
estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the
Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman
asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian
should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of
real property during the Japanese regime were valid even
though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that this
being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no
objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him
about a suit she had instituted against a certain Syrian to
annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had
made; that according to her the case was in the hands of
Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away
from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased
husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a
lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that
Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her action was not that
the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but
that the premises were her private and exclusive property;
that she requested him to read the complaint to be
convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then
asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property
and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he
told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her
husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on
Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava,
his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him
and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit
concerned legal matters he attended to her and requested
her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and
she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not
handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers,
calling Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had
said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office,
Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been
dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients"
to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco)
upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more
proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case
was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without
reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his
possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last
meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a
proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him
to handle his case stating that his American lawyer had gone
to the States and left the case in the hands of other
attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28,
1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon
in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David,
later promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the
complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than
that already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause
was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not
attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much
is undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to
the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits
of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of
papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's
purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney
Francisco's professional services. Granting the facts to be no
more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the
relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco
and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with the
ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a
professional one and not merely one of principal and agent,
the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of
justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as
deeds, bills, contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11
Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that
the client should have employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation
was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established. . . . (5 Jones
Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause
in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107;
36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the employment of
an attorney. The contract may be express or implied and it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is
sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.
An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of
a request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros.
and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that
"an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professi onal
employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon
an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court
prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf
of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed
to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in
the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.)
In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources higher
than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re
Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so
received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains,"
and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or,
worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at
the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and
affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and
client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no
secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff,
would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs.
Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to
support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and
client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of
what information was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been
engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on
behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though
during the continuance of the employment nothing of a
confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the
client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553,
Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party
in litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with
respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the
attorney acquired from his former during that relationship,
before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the
adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F.
994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing
against a former client, it is unnecessary that the ascertain in
detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent
litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an
attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter
act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired
no knowledge which could operate to his client's
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce
vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice
the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive
of other un salutary results. To make the passing of
confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to
make the employment conditioned on the scope and
character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the
freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to
consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights
in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received
and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new
position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to
an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceedings, if
an investigation be held, the court should accept the
attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
"Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice." (John H. Wi gmore's Evidence,
1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs.
Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded
on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said
in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ca esar's wife,
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we
nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the cause of the
adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal
advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any
injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the
honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt,
or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is
highly in expedient. It had the tendency to bring the
profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into
public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of
justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the
purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney
is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he
has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he
should decline to perform the contemplated services on
behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue ha rdship on the
attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a
separate and independent fee for consultation and advice
was conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a
preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and
secure his future services, and induce him to act for the
client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being
deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity
of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from
him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an
express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor
received in payment of the services contemplated; its
payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay
his attorney for the services which he has retained him to
perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A
and that Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of
reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If
this letter was written under the circums tances explained by
Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the
fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated,
emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds
and estop him in the same manner and to the same degree as
if he personally had written it. An information obtained from
a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a
mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or
assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and
interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his
connection with the firm is available to his associates or
employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered to where,
as in the present instance, the opinion was actually signed by
the head of the firm and carries his initials intended to convey
the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No
progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the
client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from
apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the
prohibition were not extended to the attorney's partners,
employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months
had passed from the date Attorney Francisco first appeared
for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right
to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the
appearance of an attorney was allowed even on appeal as a
ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which
throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the
attorney had been suffered so to act without objection, the
court said: "We are all of the one mind, that the right of the
appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of
failure to make it sooner; that professional confidence once
reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional
employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A.
L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not
by certiorari deserves scant attention. The courts have
summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and
the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the
administration of the justice. The summary jurisdiction of the
courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay
over money collected by them but embraces authority to
compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent
upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The
courts from the general principles of equity and policy, will
always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients
and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting
from a situation in which they may stand unequal . The courts
acts on the same principles whether the undertaking is to
appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary
remedy against attorneys flows from the facts that they are
officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of
the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and
as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts and
to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to
the court as well as to their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137
Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.)
Attorney stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other
court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification
should be allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla,
Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. L-840 June 30, 1969
JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, CARLOS UY, JR., and, FRANCISCO R.
ACHACOSO, petitioners,
vs.
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, respondent.
RE SO LU TI O N
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners Joaquin G. Garrido, Carlos Uy, Jr. and Francisco R.
Achacoso seek either the disbarment or the suspension of
respondent Attorney Norberto Quisumbing, upon the ground
that he filed Civil Case No. 73668 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, as counsel for the plaintiffs therein,
including among them one L. Garcia Pastor, who had not, in
fact, authorized respondent to institute said action on his
(Garcia Pastor's) behalf. Copy of an alleged affidavit of Garcia
Pastor to this effect was annexed to the complaint of
petitioners herein, which was filed on September 30, 1968.
In his answer thereto, respondent alleged that he filed the
complaint in said case No. 73668 at the request of one of the
plaintiffs therein, namely, Julio Muñoz, who claimed to have
authority to act on behalf of L. Garcia Pastor in connection
therewith. In support of this al legation, respondent
submitted a photostatic copy of an affidavit of said Muñoz,
dated July 12, 1968, which had allegedly been submitted in
Civil Case No. 73091 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Subsequently, or on December 4, 1968, respondent filed a
"manifestation" annexing thereto another affidavit of Muñoz,
made in Barcelona, Spain, on November 11, 1968, in further
support of said allegation. Thereafter, petitioners filed their
reply, which was the object of a rejoinder on the part of
respondent. The aforementioned pleadings and the annexes
thereto sufficiently establish the facts necessary for the
determination of this administrative case.
It is the contention of Muñoz, a Spanish citizen, residing in
Barcelona, Spain, that he is the controlling shareholder or the
representative of the controlling shareholder of Carmun
Trading (N.Y.), Inc., Carmun Trading (Philippines), Inc.,
Safintex, S.A. and Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. —
hereafter referred to, respectively, as Carmun (N.Y.), Carmun
(Phil.), Safintex and SEF; that Carmun (N.Y.) gave Antonio V.
Rocha, a businessman in the Philippines, the sum of
$400,000, with which, in 1949, he constituted and funded the
Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., hereafter referred to as
Capital; that in 1958, Rocha, who successfully managed the
Capital, as its president, and held the shares therein in trust
for Carmun (N.Y.), transferred said shares to Carmun (Phil.);
that thereafter Rocha was replaced, as president of Capital,
by petitioner Garrido, who had only 16 out of the 10,000
shares of Capital; that L. Garcia Pastor and Jaime Amat, both
Spanish citizens and residents, the former of Madrid, Spain,
and the latter of Pasay City, Philippines, hold 10 shares each
of Capital, which Muñoz caused to be as signed to them to
qualify them as members of the Board of Directors of Capital,
of which he (Muñoz) is the Chairman; that Carmun (Phil.)
transferred its shares in Capital to Safintex, which, in turn,
transferred the shares to SEF; that between 1964 and 1966,
there had been an impairment in the financial condition of
Capital owing to alleged mismanagement by petitioner
Garrido, involving the juggling of accounts, the falsification of
records and other irregularities, committed in connivance or
with the cooperation of herein petitioners Achacoso and Uy,
Vice-President and Accountant General, respectively, of
Capital; that, as a consequence, substantial assets of Capital
were fraudulently transferred by the petitioners to the
Property and Liability Insurance Corporation, which was
organized and is owned by petitioners Garrido and Achacoso;
and that, accordingly, he (Muñoz) asked respondent herein to
file, on his behalf and that of Capital, SEF, Garcia Pastor and
Amat, said Civil Case No. 73668 against petitioners herein, to
oust them as president, vice-president and accountant,
respectively, of Capital, and to recover damages.
Although Garcia Pastor had not personally authorized
respondent herein to file said case on his (Garcia Pastor's)
behalf, as one of the plaintiffs therein, respondent had no
reason to doubt the veracity of the information furnished by
Muñoz regarding his power to grant such authority, in
representation of Garcia Pastor. Indeed, the latter seemingly
claims to have returned his shares in Capi tal to Muñoz, thus
impliedly admitting that he (Garcia Pastor) held the shares on
behalf of Muñoz. At any rate, Muñoz knew nothing about said
alleged return, he being in Japan, at the time of the filing of
Case No. 73668, whereas Garcia Pastor was then in
Barcelona. Moreover, the records of Capital were in the
possession of petitioners herein, and respondent felt that the
Complaint in Case No. 73668 should be filed without delay,
owing to the urgency of the relief prayed for.
In other words, when respondent's services were engaged in
connection with said case, Muñoz informed him that he
(Muñoz) was the controlling stockholder of Capital and that
Garcia Pastor was his alter ego in its board of directors.
Accordingly, Muñoz authorized respondent to file the a ction,
not only in his (Muñoz) name, but, also, in that of Garcia
Pastor. Under the circumstances, it is clear that respondent
has not committed any act of malpractice. In fact, Garcia
Pastor has not complained against respondent for having
acted as he did. The present administrative proceeding has
been instituted, not by Garcia Pastor, but by the defendants
in the aforementioned civil case.1awphil.nêt
WHEREFORE, the complaint herein is hereby dismissed. It is
so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Fernando, JJ., took no part.
A.C. No. 1666 April 13, 2007
LUISITO BALATBAT, Complainant,
vs
ATTY. EDGARDO ARIAS Y SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DE CISI ON
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative complaint refers to the charges of
"malpractice and gross negligence" against Atty. Edgardo
Arias y Sanchez of relative to Civil Case No. 003066-CV for
recovery of a sum of money.
In the Complaint1 dated September 8, 1976, Luisito Balatbat
alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to
undertake his defense in the said civil case. According to
complainant, he did not attend the scheduled hearings
because respondent told him that there was no need to be
present. But when he verified the status of the case from the
then City Court of Manila, he was surprised to learn that a
Decision2 dated June 21, 1976 had already been rendered.
Complainant alleged that the enforcement of the decision
caused him and his family "untold miseries, embarrassment
and public ridicule."3
The evidence on record shows that the city court declared
complainant in default for failure to appear during the June
18, 1976 hearing. Plaintiff was, thereafter, allowed to present
evidence ex parte. After three days, a judgment adverse to
complainant was rendered, prompting the plaintiff to move
for execution ex-parte;4 Two days thereafter, a Writ of
Execution5 was issued.
In his Answer,6 respondent claimed that the notice of the
hearing of the June 18, 1976 trial was "made to appear as
though signed by him."7 He insisted that it was not his
signature. He, likewise, asserted that contrary to
complainant’s allegations, he always tried to take the
complainant with him to the city court for all the scheduled
hearings; it was always the complainant who, for one reason
or another, could not go with him.8
Respondent further alleged that complainant had filed a
Manifestation in the City Court terminating his (respondent’s)
legal services, and a new counsel for complainant entered an
appearance. Respondent claimed that he could not have
possibly opposed the Ex Parte Motion for Execution filed in
the civil case since he was not furnished a copy thereof.9
Respondent prayed that complainant be punished for
contumacy for being motivated by ill will and malice in filing
the instant administrative complaint against him.
The Court referred the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation.
Complainant testified that he had gone to the City Court to
make a follow-up on the status of the case since respondent
had not been communicating nor collecting fees from him for
two months. He then discovered that a decision had already
been rendered.10 He went to respondent’s office to inquire
the status of his case, and respondent told him that "they
were on the loss." He asked respondent to show him the copy
of the decision, and respondent replied that "it was already in
default." Complainant then demanded that the records of the
case be shown to him but again, respondent refused.11
Respondent, for his part, claimed that it was complainant
who notified him of the adverse decision and promised that
he would verify this with the city court.12 Respondent then
requested the complainant to return the next day. He insisted
that unlike the notices of previous hearings in the case, he did
not receive any notice from the City Court of the supposed
hearing that was reset on June 18, 1976;13 that the signature
appearing therein was not his; and that he did not know who
had affixed the same.14 Thereafter, he informed the
complainant that he had already prepared a draft pleading;
that he would file it to have the decision set aside; and that it
could easily be proven that "the signature appearing in the
records was not his signature."15
The presentation of the parties’ respective evidence was
terminated on September 6, 1977. After they submitted their
respective Memoranda, the case was transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Ba r Discipline
(IBP-CBD). The parties were then required to furnish copies of
the documentary exhibits submitted in evidence.
Incidentally, it appears that a confusion as to the identity of
respondent arose when the IBP-CBD sent a Notice16 dated
January 15, 1992 setting the hearing of the case on February
28, 1992 to a certain Atty. Edgardo S. Arias at the latter’s
address in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. On the date set for
hearing, the said Edgardo S. Arias filed a Motion to Be
Furnished Copy of Complaint and for Re-Setting of Hearing,
averring therein that he did not know the nature of the
charge against him because he had not been furnished a copy
of the complaint and other supporting documents.
Accordingly, he requested that complainant be ordered to
furnish him a copy of the complaint and that he be given at
least fifteen days thereafter to file his answer or comment.17
On May 5, 1992, he filed his comment. Emphasizing therein
that his middle name was SORCA, he lamented that the
instant complaint must have referred to Atty. Edgardo
SANCHEZ Arias, a practicing lawyer in Manila, and not to
himself for the reason that he had been permanently residing
and practicing his profession in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
since 1971.18
In its Report dated October 20, 1995, the IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) month, and warned that a
repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
The IBP Board of Governors then issued Resolution No. XII -
96-45 dated January 27, 1996, adopting the said Report and
Recommendation.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
Based on respondent’s own admissions, he did not properly
withdraw as counsel for complainant. The settled rule is that
the attorney-client relation continues until the client gives a
notice of discharge, or manifests to the court or tribunal
where the case is pending that counsel is being discharged,
with a copy served upon the adverse party.19 Thus, the only
way to be relieved as counsel is to have either the written
conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving
him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138,
Section 2620 of the Rules of Court.
This rule is consistent with the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry
it to its termination, and is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause.21 The duty of a lawyer to
safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer
until his effective discharge from the case or the final
disposition of the entire subject matter of the litigation.22
The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the name
of the new counsel is properly recorded and the records
properly handed over.23 Verily, the abandonment of a client
in violation of the attorney’s contract amounts to an
ignorance of the most elementary principles of professional
ethics.24
As the Investigating Commissioner noted, it was respondent’s
duty, upon being apprised of the adverse decision, to exhaust
all available remedies at the time to prevent its attaining
finality and, more importantly, to forestall the inevitable
execution that would follow considering that at that time, the
winning party had not yet filed the motion for execution.25
Our pronouncement in Santiago v. Fojas26 is instructive on
this point:
x x x Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care
and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with its correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
Respondent’s actuations belie his claim that he had not been
remiss in his duties to his client. The records show that on
March 25, 1976, he received a notice of hearing27 for the
setting of the case for trial on April 30, 1976. He went to the
City Court on the appointed day.28 However, finding that
plaintiff and defendant (complainant herein) therein had not
yet arrived, he requested the clerk of court to cancel the
hearing on the ground that he had two (2) criminal cases
pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branches 17
and 29 which he had to attend to.29 He then failed to verify
the next hearing date with the court. When asked why he
failed to do so, respondent declared that it "slipped [his]
mind and took the word of the Clerk of Court that notices
[would] be sent to both parties.30 As it turned out, the said
hearing was re-scheduled to June 18, 1976, the day plaintiff
presented his evidence ex parte. Forthwith, judgment was
rendered based solely thereon after which, execution
ensued.31 Respondent should have, at the very least, moved
to have the hearing postponed on the ground of conflict in his
scheduled hearings in other cases.
Indeed, the negligent failure of respondent to act accordingly
under the circumstances clearly negates not only his claim
that he "appeared in court always mindful of his duties,"32
but also his vow to serve his client with competence and
diligence33 and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him.34 Respondent’s actuations likewise violate Rule 18.04,
which mandates that a lawyer keep the client informed of the
status of the case and respond within a reasonable time to a
client’s request for information. A client must never be left in
the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and
confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular
and the legal profession in general.35
It must be stressed that public interest requires that an
attorney exert his best efforts in the prosecution or defense
of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his
client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.36 Lawyers are indispensable part of the
whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a
time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled
at the legal profession, strict compliance with one’s oath of
office and the canons of professional ethics is an
imperative.37
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Edgardo Arias y
Sanchez is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1)
month. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
He is likewise DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of
this Decision to enable the Court to determine when his
suspension shall have taken effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all the
courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA,
respondent.
DE CISI ON
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess
the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed onl y on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of
law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member
of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center. However,
the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the
latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims
that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.
He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent
prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona -Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise
found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The
OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The
OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of
law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to
cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent
took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he
was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had a uthorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona -Hao
also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty.
Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as
the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC.
On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona -
Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law,
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
xxx
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when
he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission
to the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional SO ORDERED.

right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simpl y by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.

In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll
of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing
law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and

took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full -fledged lawyer. The
fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that

the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the

Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated
11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents
resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as
counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,

evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar