[G.R. Nos. 114224-25.

April 26, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO LUA Y

NERI, accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT

ON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT
AND RESPECT ON APPEAL. -The thrust of this appeal is laid on the
credibility of the witnesses. Time and again this court has ruled that the
findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood
by the latter which if considered would materially affect the result of the case,
this court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.

2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF

OFFICIAL DUTIES; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - We find no
compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The appellant
asseverates that the police arrested him at all cost to save face and to
project that OPLAN SATURN was successfully carried out. Such allegation is
a mere conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases, the accused
would most often raise the defense of being framed up. However, for that
defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and
convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult
to prove. In the absence of proof, the presumption is that the police officers
regularly performed their official duties.

3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES; STANDS IN THE

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE PRINCIPAL
PROSECUTION WITNESS WAS ACTUATED BY IMPROPER MOTIVE TO
FALSELY TESTIFY AGAINST THE ACCUSED. - The appellant failed to
convincingly show any ill motive on the part of prosecution witnesses to
testify falsely and to impute to him such grave offenses. It is settled that
where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness
was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
 actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who
brought him no harm or injury.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR

MATTERS. - The imputed inconsistencies regarding the time when the
arresting officers arrived at the appellants residence and the date when the
markings on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. This Court finds the same too minor to matter, the
same having been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution
witnesses. Thus, in People v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 106098, 7 December
1993, 228 SCRA 293) we held that testimonial discrepancies could be
caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather
than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

5. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; ARTICLES SEIZED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A

VALID SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST; ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE. - Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally
important matter as regards admissibility of the evidence should likewise be
passed upon. The buy-bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a
form of entrapment allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful
having been caught in flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a
warrant for the seizure of the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the
same being the fruit of the crime. With respect to the body search made by
Puno, the same was valid being incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .
38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets and the empty shell found in the
cylinder are admissible in evidence.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST; LIMITED TO

BODY SEARCH AND TO THAT POINT WITHIN THE REACH OR
CONTROL OF THE PERSON ARRESTED OR THAT WHICH MAY
FURNISH HIM WITH THE MEANS OF COMMITTING VIOLENCE OR OF
ESCAPING. - As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants
house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its
inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was
lawful, the warrantless search made inside appellants house became
unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search
warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful
arrest, the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach
or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant
was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can
 hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or
control.

7. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED

FOR THE VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II THEREOF; DEPENDS
ON THE QUANTITY OF DRUGS INVOLVED. - This Court finds accused-
appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4,
Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, under which the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed. However, with the passage of R.A. 7659,
which took effect on 31 December 1993, amending certain sections of The
Dangerous Drugs Act, the imposable penalty for the sale or delivery of
prohibited drug is prision correccional to reclusion temporal if the quantity
involved is less than 750 grams of marijuana. Taking into account that
appellant is not shown to be a habitual delinquent and the said amendatory
provision being favorable to him, the quantity of marijuana involved being
only 5.3934 grams or less than 750 grams, the aforestated penalty imposed
under R.A. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, and following People v. Simon, the imposable
penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one
(1) month and one (day) to six (6) months of arresto mayor.

8. ID.; P.D. 1866; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; ESTABLISHED IN

CASE AT BAR. - On the charge of illegal possession of firearms, we sustain
the finding and conclusion of the trial court. The prosecution has indubitably
established the existence of the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets,
and the fact that appellant did not have the necessary license or permit to
possess the same. Accordingly, under Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed, the range of which is seventeen (17) years four (4) months and
one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Considering the pertinent provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law, while the minimum shall not be
lower than the minimum likewise fixed by law.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ross Bautista Law Firm for accused-appellant.
 DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City finding accused-appellant Rolando Lua y Neri guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art.
II, of R.A. No. 6425[2] as amended, and of P.D. No. 1866.[3]

Pursuant to OPLAN SATURN, a program addressing the growing drug

problem in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, a buy-bust operation was conducted
by police operatives for the entrapment of Rolando Lua.

At 12 oclock noon of 30 March 1991, Lt. Norberto Surara, Commander of

Bagong Silang Police Sub-station, Caloocan City, and his men discussed plans
to serve a search warrant on alleged drug pusher Hilario Talavera and to
conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Rolando Lua
alias Chekwa. To verify the report on the illegal drug activities of appellant,
Ulysses Orlino, a police informer, was dispatched to the vicin of Lua. A few
moments later, Orlino returned confirming the report on appellants illegal
operations near his residence at Bo. Sto. Nio, Tala, Caloocan City. Two teams
were formed, one to conduct the buy-bust operation, and the other, to serve the
search warrant on Hilario Talavera. Police Officers Constantino Guerrero,
Marino Puno, Jose Marte and Alfredo Antonio formed the buy-bust team.
Guerrero was designated as poseur-buyer. Before leaving the station Guerrero,
in the presence of SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana and other police officers, marked
with X and his initials C.G. 3 P10-bills to be used in the entrapment of appellant.
Guerrero and his buy-bust team arrived at Bo. Sto. Nio at 4 oclock in the
afternoon together with their informant Ulyssess Orlino. Orlino pointed to
Guerrero the appellant who was then outside the door of his house. The team
strategically positioned themselves near a neighboring house while Guerrero
approached accused-appellant Lua and said, Chekwa, pa score nga, and
simultaneously handed him the 3 marked P1O-bills. Appellant took the money
and went inside his house. Shortly after, he returned with 3 small tea bags of
marijuana which he gave to Police Officer Guerrero. At this juncture, Guerrero
signaled to his companions to close in. He then grabbed appellant by the hand
after introducing himself as a police officer and arrested him. Guerrero
recovered the marked money from the other hand of appellant.
When the rest of the team approached Guerrero and appellant Lua, PO
Marino Puno noticed something bulging from the waistline of appellant so he
immediately frisked him. Puno lifted Luas shirt and found a .38 cal. paltik in the
latters possession. Guerrero who was standing beside the accused grabbed the
handgun which had two (2) live bullets and an empty shell in the cylinder. When
Lua was asked where he kept the rest of the marijuana he unhesitatingly replied
that they were inside his house. Accompanied by the police operatives,
appellant went inside his house and in the presence of his wife pointed to the
police officers a soapbox containing a brick of dried marijuana. Puno showed the
marijuana brick to those around him including appellants household.

After the operation, appellant together with the pieces of evidence against
him, namely, 3 marked P10-bills with serial numbers RB886096, PF245345,
QF260152; 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams); marijuana brick inside a
soapbox (209.00 grams); and, a .38 cal. paltik with two (2) live bullets and an
empty shell, were surrendered to the team leader, SPO3 Perfecto Sobejana,
and Lt. Surara who were both waiting at the barangay hall. SPO3 Sobejana and
Patrolmen Guerrero, Puno, Antonio and Marte jointly executed a sworn
statement on their operation.

At six oclock in the evening appellant Rolando Lua as well as the pieces of
evidence found in his possession were referred to PO3 Gilbert Dioso for
investigation.

On 1 April 1991 PO3 Dioso prepared a referral letter to the National Bureau
of Investigation for laboratory examination and chemical analysis of the 3 tea
bags and the brick of marijuana wrapped in a newsprint and placed inside a
plastic bag. The following day, 2 April 1991, Dioso also prepared a referral letter
to the Inquest Fiscal of Caloocan City for proper evaluation and disposition of
the cases against appellant.

On the same day the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist

Alicia Liberato submitted her Reports Nos. DDM-91-249 and DDM-91-250
finding the specimens positive for marijuana.

Parenthetically, on 6 July 1992, PNP Senior Superintendent Antonio T.

Sierra, Chief of the Firearms and Explosive Office, issued a certification that
accused-appellant Rolando Lua was not a licensed nor a registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber after verifying the computerized master list of all
licensed firearm holders.

Separate informations for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as

amended, and for violation of P.D. 1866 were filed against Rolando Lua.

The appellant has a different account of the events. He says that at around 4
oclock in the afternoon of 30 March 1991 while sleeping in his house with his 3-
year old daughter he was awakened from his sleep when a certain Resty, a
security guard of the Tala Leprosarium, handcuffed him. He asked Resty why,
but he received no answer. According to appellant Resty was with three (3)
other companions - Rodel Ginco who was also a security guard at the Tala
Leprosarium, Boy Mano who was a civilian, and Police Officer Guerrero. Then
he was boarded in an owner-type jeep and brought to the other barangay in
front of Hilario Talavera s house. He also claims he was transferred to a parked
mobile car where he saw Edgardo Calanday inside the car also
handcuffed. From where he was sitting he could see the police operatives
walking to and fro inside Talaveras house. Then they were brought to the
administration site outside the Tala Leprosarium where they stayed for an hour,
after which they were brought to the Bagong Silang Detachment where they
were detained for three (3) days.

Appellants neighbor, Catalino Hidacan, corroborated the testimony of

appellant. Hidacan testified that after the arrest the persons who nabbed the
appellant returned and entered the latters house. However, when they went out,
they were already carrying with them something wrapped in a newspaper while
one of them was holding a gun.

Appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court: (a) in sustaining the
prosecution and disregarding completely the testimony of defense witness
Catalino Hidacan; (b) in according probative weight to the testimonies of the
police officers on the disputable presumption that they regularly performed their
duties thus disregarding the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and, (c) in not taking judicial notice of
his physical condition when his hands were closed and clinched because of
Hansens disease or leprosy so that it is highly improbable to possess a firearm
and violate P.D. 1866.

The thrust of this appeal is laid on the credibility of the witnesses. Time and
again this court has ruled that the findings of the lower court respecting the
credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before
the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which if considered would materially affect the result
of the case, this court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court. The
appellant asseverates that the police arrested him at all cost to save face and to
project that OPLAN SATURN was successfully carried out. Such allegation is a
mere conjecture bereft of factual basis. In drug related cases, the accused
would most often raise the defense of being framed up. However, for that
defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like
alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. In the
absence of proof, the presumption is that the police officers regularly performed
their official duties. Moreover, the appellant failed to convincingly show any ill
motive on the part of prosecution witnesses to testify falsely and to impute to
him such grave offenses. It is settled that where there is no evidence to indicate
that a principal prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause
damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury. [4]
Appellant would persuade us that the police narration of facts could not be
freed from material inconsistencies, thus the disputable presumption that the
police officers acted regularly in pursuance of their official duties must be
rendered subordinate to the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

We are not convinced. The imputed inconsistencies regarding the time when
the arresting officers arrived at the appellants residence and the date when the
markings on the recovered gun were placed do not affect the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. This court finds the same too minor to matter, the same
having been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses. Thus,
in People v. Gonzales[5] we held that testimonial discrepancies could be caused
by the natural fickleness of memory which tend to strengthen rather than
weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Contrary
to appellants claim, the guilt of the accused has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimony of PO Guerrero was sufficient to show that
indeed appellant committed the offenses with which he was charged. It was
established that appellant sold and delivered prohibited drug to PO Guerrero
who acted as poseur-buyer knowing fully well that what he sold and delivered
was a prohibited drug.

As regards the third assigned error, we do not find the same compelling
enough to exculpate the appellant. Leprosy or Hansens disease is a chronic
granulomatous infection of humans which attacks superficial tissues, especially
the skin and peripheral nerves. [6] The infection normally results in the loss of
touch but the patient does not really lose his motor functions. Only in severe
cases do trauma and secondary chronic infections lead to loss of digits or distal
extremities.[7] In the case at bar, the appellant failed to show that he can no
longer make use of his hands, thus rendering him incapable of committing the
offenses with which he is being charged. The disease does not deter him from
possessing nor of using a firearm in violation of P.D. No. 1866.
 Having settled the issues raised by appellant, the equally important matter as
regards admissibility of the evidence should likewise be passed upon. The buy-
bust operation conducted by the police operatives is a form of entrapment
allowed by law. The arrest of the appellant was lawful having been caught in
flagrante delicto. Consequently, there is no need for a warrant for the seizure of
the 3 tea bags of marijuana (5.3934 grams) the same being the fruit of the
crime. With respect to the body search made by Puno, the same was valid being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live
bullets and the empty shell found in the cylinder are admissible in evidence.

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial
court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially
the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made
inside appellants house became unlawful since the police operatives were not
armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made
incidental to a lawful arrest, the same being limited to body search and to that
point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish
him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar,
appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can
hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.

In sum, this court finds accused-appellant Rolando Lua guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, under
which the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed. However, with the passage
of R.A. 7659, which took effect on 31 December 1993, amending certain
sections of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the imposable penalty for the sale or
delivery of prohibited drug is prision correccional to reclusion temporal[8] if the
quantity involved is less than 750 grams of marijuana. Taking into account that
appellant is not shown to be a habitual delinquent and the said amendatory
provision being favorable to him, the quantity of marijuana involved being only
5.3934 grams or less than 750 grams, the aforestated penalty imposed under
R.A. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, and following People v. Simon,[9] the imposable penalty
shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.
 On the charge of illegal possession of firearms, we sustain the finding and
conclusion of the trial court. The prosecution has indubitably established the
existence of the .38 cal. paltik and the two (2) live bullets, and the fact that
appellant did not have the necessary license or permit to possess the
same. Accordingly, under Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, the
range of which is seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to reclusion perpetua. Considering the pertinent provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by law, while the minimum shall not be lower than the minimum
likewise fixed by law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. For violating

P.D. 1866, accused-appellant ROLANDO LUA y NERI is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal maximum as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight
(8) months and 20 days likewise of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum;
and, for violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum
as minimum, to two (2) years, six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional medium as maximum, to be served successively in accordance
with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment
upon a showing that he agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of
the time of such preventive imprisonment.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT

FIGUEROA and BEATRICE VALERIO, accused.

ROBERT FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellant ROBERT FIGUEROA (hereafter OBET) appeals

from the 18 May 1998 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 97-306, convicting him of violation
of Section 14-A[2], Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-
accused Beatrice Valerio (hereafter Betty) was acquitted.

OBET and Betty were indicted under an information, dated 2 April

1997, whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on 16 February 1997 and for sometime prior thereto in Paraaque City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without
authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, produce, prepare or
process methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting
to a 2.4 liters, directly by means of chemical synthesis.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned OBET and Betty each entered a plea of not guilty.
[4] Trial on the merits then ensued.

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI

Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas, NBI Special Investigator III Pio M.
Palencia (hereafter PALENCIA), and NBI Intelligence Agent II Martin
Soriano (hereafter SORIANO).

PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of

SORIANO at Project 6, Quezon City, when they received a call from their
informant, a woman, who reported that a certain OBET was allegedly
engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA and
SORIANO forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with
OBET for a buy-bust operation. After several hours, the informant
reported that OBET was already waiting for her at No. 1485 Soliman
Street, Makati City, with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she
was ready with P150,000. PALENCIA then caused the dusting of
fluorescent powder over ten pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust
money and gave them to the informant.[5]

On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant

proceeded to the rendezvous area. They arrived at half past twelve
o'clock in the early morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate was
already open, the informant entered the premises, while PALENCIA and
SORIANO discreetly crawled and positioned themselves near the gate of
the house. Strategically positioned, PALENCIA overheard OBET ask the
informant whether she had the money. PALENCIA then saw the informant
hand over the money to OBET. While counting the money, OBET sensed
the presence of other people in the area. OBET, who was in possession
of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of PALENCIA,
while hurrying towards the house. OBET then held hostage his mistress,
Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the next three hours until the
arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom OBET surrendered.
PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered
buy-bust money to the WPD Headquarters for recording purposes and,
thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.[6]

At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically

interrogated OBET about the source of his shabu. OBET eventually
volunteered that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El Grande Street,
B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. PALENCIA and SORIANO took OBET to
Betty's house as a follow-up operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m.
of the same day, 16 February 1997. As OBET called Betty earlier to tell
her that he was arriving, Betty already had the gate opened for them.
After parking, PALENCIA saw Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET
in handcuffs, Betty asked what happened. OBET replied that he was just
caught in a buy-bust operation. PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to
convince Betty to surrender the shabu that OBET insisted was hidden
inside the house. As Betty persistently denied the existence of the shabu,
PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while, OBET
proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside the main
house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly pointed to what he termed
as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia,
such as a beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.[7]

Thereafter, PALENCIA requested a laboratory examination of all the

seized items and an ultraviolet light examination over the persons of
OBET, Betty and a certain Eva Baluyot. [8] PALENCIA claimed that based
on the certification issued by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI,
all the items seized from Betty's residence were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride except specimen no.7; while from
among the persons subjected to ultraviolet light examination, only OBET
was found positive for fluorescent powder.[9]

On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO

conducted the search without a search warrant, but with the consent of
Betty.[10] He also admitted that he did not actually see OBET or Betty in
the act of manufacturing shabu.[11]

NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's

testimony. He likewise admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET,
during which he divulged Betty as the source of shabu, was conducted in
the absence of any counsel. SORIANO also confirmed PALENCIA's
testimony that they were not armed with a search warrant, but that they
conducted the follow-up operation at Betty's house under the hot pursuit
theory.[12] He further maintained that OBET, after conferring with Betty,
uttered, Ako na nga, ako na nga"(I will do it, I will do it). OBET then
proceeded to the dirty kitchen, pointed to the refrigerator and had it
moved. Thereafter, SORIANO saw a plastic pail containing liquid with
floating brown substances.

SORIANO admitted that he and PALENCIA neither witnessed OBET

and Betty manufacture shabu in the manner described in Section 2(j) of
the Dangerous Drugs Act[13]; nor did they possess evidence, independent
of the items they had seized, that OBET and Betty were engaged in the
labeling or manufacturing of shabu.[14]

Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas testified that on 16 February

1997, she conducted a laboratory examination for the presence of any
prohibited or regulated drug on eleven different specimens (Exhibits
"B"-"L").[15] The result of the examination disclosed that all the specimens
except specimen no. 7 (Exhibit "H") were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[16] She further observed that specimen no. 8 (Exhibit I- I-2),
the brown liquid with floating solid flakes contained in a plastic pail, was
positive for epedrine,[17] a substance used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. She opined that this crude form of
shabu would have to undergo chemical processes, like extraction,
crystallization, distillation, before it could be finally converted into shabu's
crystalline form. She also conducted a fluorescent powder examination
over the persons of OBET and Betty. Only OBET gave a positive result. [18]

On the other hand, OBET testified that while he was watching

television on the night of 15 February 1997, he heard the doorbell rang.
Upon seeing Eva Baluyot, his childhood friend, he opened the door for
her. Inside the house, Eva handed him a bundle of money and stated that
she was buying shabu from him. OBET emphatically told Eva that he was
not engaged in such illegal trade and returned the money. OBET then
accompanied Eva out of the house. At the garage, OBET noticed
someone peeping from the dark; so he told Eva to go back inside the
house with him. Eva ignored the request. OBET thus left Eva at the
garage and got his .45 caliber gun from his house. While he was locking
the door, his handgun accidentally fired off, as he forgot that it had
already been cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of people outside
claiming that they were NBI men. Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the
house but instead told the alleged NBI men to call the Makati Police,
specifically Major Reyes. The NBI agents, however, persisted in
convincing OBET to go out of the house. He did get out of his house after
three hours when he heard the voice of Major Reyes. OBET gave to
Major Reyes his gun. The Makati Police and the NBI men thereafter
conducted a joint search inside OBET's house which, however, yielded
nothing. OBET was then brought to the Makati Police Headquarters
where the incident was recorded. Thereafter, PALENCIA, SORIANO
and another NBI man brought OBET to the house of Betty, his former
live-in partner, at El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City, upon the
insistence and information of Eva Baluyot.[19]

Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to call and tell
Betty that he was already near. The gate was already opened when they
arrived, and the NBI men freely parked their car at the garage. Then,
PALENCIA and SORIANO alighted from the car and entered Betty's
house. OBET was left in the car under the charge of the third NBI man;
hence, he knew nothing of what happened inside Betty's house. [20]

For her part, Betty admitted that she was romantically involved with
OBET and had a child by him. She recalled that on 16 February 1997,
OBET called at around 6:00 a.m. and requested her to open the gate for
him, as he was already near. She ran down to the garage and opened
the gate. Since her car was parked halfway through the garage, she went
to the main house to get her car keys to make way for OBET's car. But as
she came out of the main house, OBET's car was already parked inside
the garage. She noticed that OBET had two companions with long
firearms. The two, whom Betty later found out as NBI men PALENCIA
and SORIANO, informed her that they had just come from a buy-bust
operation and that OBET had led them to her house, as there were illegal
chemicals kept in the premises. Shocked andamazed, she then asked for
a search warrant, but the NBI men could not produce any. [21]

Betty further recalled that the NBI men claimed that they found
contraband items near the dirty kitchen at a small space behind
the refrigerator where cases of softdrinks were stored. Betty denied any
knowledge that there were illegal chemicals inside her house and that
these were manufactured into shabu. She also denied knowing Eva
Baluyot.[22]

On cross-examination, Betty disclaimed her alleged consent to the

search of her house, for she specifically asked the NBI men for a search
warrant. She asserted that she did not see the NBI men find the shabu
paraphernalia because she went up to the second floor of her house. She
only saw that the NBI men were bringing several items out of her house.
[23]

The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless
arrests of OBET and Betty were conducted within the purview of valid
warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5, [24] Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search
conducted at the house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very
items seized by the NBI agents at the kitchen of Betty's guesthouse
were admissible as the corpus delicti of the violation of Section 14-A of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the
paraphernalia seized were indispensable to the processing or
manufacturing of shabu into crystallized form. Although it conceded
that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see the crystallization
processes, the trial court observed that the Dangerous Drug Act does
not require that there be actual manufacturing activities at the time of
the seizure.

The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution
to adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured
 shabu without the requisite authority. It did not arrive at a similar
conclusion as far as OBET was concerned, but declared that based on
the evidence on record, OBET's guilt of the crime charged was proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in the decision of 18 May 1998 the trial
court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the conviction of
accused Beatrice Valerio y del Rosario for Violation of Sec. 14-a of Article III of
R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, this court pronounces her NOT GUILTY
and considering that she is detained at the NBI the NBI is directed to
immediately release her from custody unless there be some reasons for her
detention. Finding, however, accused Robert Figueroa GUILTY as charged [of]
the same offense in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by
law, specifically Art. VI [sic] of the Revised Penal Code.
The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer
of Robert Figueroa to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.

Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to us. He

principally premises his prayer for acquittal on the failure of the State to
show by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during custodial
investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent,
to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and to be informed of such rights. He asserts that he did not
waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were allegedly extracted
from him are inadmissible in evidence. Even assuming that his
extrajudicial statements were admissible, Betty's acquittal would work in
his favor because the indictment is based on conspiracy. In a conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all. Therefore, the acts imputed to him were
also the acts of Betty, and vice versa. Since the trial court considered
insufficient for conviction the acts of Betty, then he, too, should be
acquitted.

In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

maintains that not all warrantless searches and seizures are illegal. For
one, a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable and offensive
to the Constitution if consent is shown. In this case, the prosecution
convincingly proved that Betty consented to the search of her house.
With her consent, Betty validly waived her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Consequently, the items seized in
her house by virtue of the consented search are admissible in evidence
against her and OBET.

The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per
se work to absolve OBET of the crime charged. Betty's believable
disavowal of the location of the paraphernalia and other circumstances
on record reasonably indicative of her innocence cannot redound in favor
of OBET. The latter apparently knew the exact location of the hidden
paraphernalia. By such disclosure, it is not far-fetched to conclude that
OBET had been actually engaged in the manufacture of shabu.

We first resolve the question of whether Betty's acquittal would benefit

OBET.

We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on

conspiracy, the acquittal of a conspirator likewise absolves a co-
conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is well-settled that once
a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of
the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other
conspirators.[25] It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove
conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually
responsible for their own respective acts. Accordingly, OBET's criminal
liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as
established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.

We should then determine whether the prosecution was able to

establish beyond reasonable doubt OBET's guilt for unauthorized
manufacture of shabu, a regulated drug.

After a meticulous review of the records and of the evidence

adduced by the parties in this case, we find that what PALENCIA and
SORIANO did left much to be desired, thereby resulting in a bungled
prosecution of the case. The evidence for the prosecution miserably
failed to prove OBET's guilt of the offense charged.

The buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other

regulated or prohibited drug was found in OBET's person and residence.
No evidence was adduced to show that OBET handed shabu over to the
informant. Yet, he was placed in custody. For what offense he was held in
custody does not, initially, appear very clear on the record.
 It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of
PALENCIA and SORIANO and held hostage his mistress and her two
children. Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation for such
crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or
crimes other than that with which he was charged.

On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or

interrogated about the source of the shabu, none of which was found
during the buy-bust operation. In short he was held in custody as a
consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link
him to the source and establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu.
Allegedly, he admitted that the source was Betty. On the basis of that
admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together with OBET, proceeded to
the residence of Betty. Needless to state, OBET cannot be investigated
for anything in relation to shabu while under custody without informing
him of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such
rights should be in writing and made in the presence of a counsel
pursuant to Section 12 (1)[26], Article III of theConstitution. It has been
held that these rights attach from the moment the investigation
starts, i.e. when the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. [27]

It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that

prior to in-custody questioning, the confessant was informed of his
constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts does
not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. [28] Hence, in
the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these
constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and
cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. [29] In other words,
confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of
the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and
more so against third persons.[30] This is so even if such statements are
gospel truth and voluntarily given.[31] Such statements are useless except
as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the suspect's
rights.[32]

SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was

conducted without the presence of a lawyer, and there is no proof that
OBET waived said right and the right to remain silent. No waiver in
writing and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant
 to paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any
admission obtained from OBET in the course of his custodial
investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a
justification for the search without a warrant.

The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to

by Betty. Indeed, a consented search is one of the exceptions to the
requirement of a search warrant. In People v. Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho
San,[33] we pointed out that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not
absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2)
seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest
effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional

guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that
the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.[34] The third condition does not exist in the instant
case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant, thus:
Q And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is that correct?

A Yes sir.

Q And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?

A No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.

Q And what was their reply?

A They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property.[35]

Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a

valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial
court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per the
prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust
operation. He surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two
children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further
questioning on illegal drugs.

There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles
confiscated therefrom belong to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA
and SORIANO the places where the articles were found provides no
sufficient basis for a conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the
articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be
constitutionally and legally used against him to establish his criminal
liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid custodial
investigation.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 May 1998 Decision

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City, convicting herein
accused-appellant Robert Figueroa of violation of Section 14-A, Article III
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. He is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and
ORDERED immediately released from confinement or detention unless
his continued detention is warranted by virtue of a valid legal cause. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to submit within five (5)
days from receipt of a copy of this decision a report on the release of
accused-appellant.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL.
JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The three
petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused
of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison,
et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security
Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation
of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen
issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however,
respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No.
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque,
Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to
Judge Paño.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by
Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and
the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for
rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in
the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made
that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the
two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-
ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter
alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are
presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to
the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be
subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying
that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search
Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the
Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of
Judge Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by
respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized
Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly
authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not
been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The respondents,
represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this
present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army
and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
 Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books
and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what
items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize
as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings
of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives
and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as 'subversive
documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive materials
Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be
lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than, the description
found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and
void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed copies
of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and
tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable
records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant
under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search
Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)—
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search
warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's
Army.
 Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign and
local sources. 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching
questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the
Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and
merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court
that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners did
raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already
questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation
on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December
12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore, while not
denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should
be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is
initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial
than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on
petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an
invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE.
Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who
had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was
made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must
be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is
some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in
the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general
vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the
opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for
possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission
No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as
evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.
Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.
Aquino, J.; took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. The questioned search
warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation
of the constitutional mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of
Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence
obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This
constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all
evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such
basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or
modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of
the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August
30, 1985). The Court has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs.
Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-
B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently
against the constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in
the dissenting portion of his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves
knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12
which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time
of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case,
petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall
Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an
untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge
Ernani Cruz Paño for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera. In addition I wish to state the judge either did
not fully know the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to
be used by the military. In either case his action can only be described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security
Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military
Commission No. 1. I agree with Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified
by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas,
statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials
seized by the government agents." What are subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a
conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent to
do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus copies of Playboy magazines were
seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician who was suspected of being
a subversive. I say return everything to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 issued by the Hon.
Ernani Cruz Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St.,
Quezon City It does not specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized
hereunder. Being in the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the aforequoted provision
(Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As
to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be
seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense." Hence—
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means
of committing violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In
Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the
lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or
immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully arrested while
committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons
or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122.
158. ... But the right does not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks
distant from Alba's house where the arrest was made. When it was entered and searched, the
conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search
cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis
supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general rule is that, in
addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.
The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the
arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have
 a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in
making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future
arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84
F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of
August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the
same day or "late that same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner
AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayn St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place
where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record. But what appears undisputed is that the search was
made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest . It cannot
be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful
arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is
ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion
of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all the
things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited
by law, cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA
388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized by the government agents
which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the law can and must be retained by the government.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. The questioned search
warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation
of the constitutional mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of
Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence
obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This
constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all
evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such
basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or
modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of
the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August
30, 1985). The Court has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs.
Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-
B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently
against the constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in
the dissenting portion of his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves
knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12
which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time
of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case,
petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall
Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an
untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant
No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera. In
addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of
a search warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the military. In either case his action can only be described as
deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security
Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military
Commission No. 1. I agree with Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified
by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas,
statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials
seized by the government agents." What are subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a
conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent to
do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus copies of Playboy magazines were
seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician who was suspected of being
a subversive. I say return everything to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 issued by the Hon.
Ernani Cruz Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St.,
Quezon City It does not specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized
hereunder. Being in the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the aforequoted provision
(Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As
to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be
seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense." Hence—
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means
of committing violence or escaping or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In
Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the
lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or
immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully arrested while
committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons
or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122.
158. ... But the right does not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks
distant from Alba's house where the arrest was made. When it was entered and searched, the
conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search
cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis
supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general rule is that, in
addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.
 The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the
arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have
a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in
making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future
arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84
F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of
August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the
same day or "late that same day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner
AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayon St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place
where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record. But what appears undisputed is that the search was
made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot
be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful
arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is
ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion
of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all the
things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited
by law, cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA
388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized by the government agents
which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the law can and must be retained by the government.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188611

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
BELEN MARIACOS,
Appellant. Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding
appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated

November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.]
9165, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the

Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic)
grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary
permit or authority from the proper government agency or
office.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not

guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in

the information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel,

La Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had

just alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession

of the accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for
examination to the Crime Lab;
 5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged
drug submitted for examination gave positive result for the
presence of marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused

contained (sic) and submitted for examination weighed
7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-

affidavit executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses

of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila
and Magdalena Carino.

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San
Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at
the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from
Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint
was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2 Pallayoc), the Chief of
Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect
or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to
Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met

with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed
him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney
that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3)
bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack
bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he
found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers.
He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner
of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together
with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the
black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments
later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag,
were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the
 women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were
under arrest, but one of the women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein
accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the
police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to
witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15)
minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2)
bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were
recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the

confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The
laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant,

together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for
the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for
passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to
carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first,
accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told
that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion,
Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the
bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2
Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were
brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani
Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-
appellant discovered the true contents of the bags which she was asked to
carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she
did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic)
she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3]

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as
charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of
the Court personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in
considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She claimed
that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer
(PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search
warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for
apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had
illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable
cause for her arrest.[6]

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series
of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and
regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs the
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia,
immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to
sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed,
casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She,
likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated
were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued
that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were
valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering
dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed
when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The
OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and
participated in the trial and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed aside
appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried
in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that
physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.[11]

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed
the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that
appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the
police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto of carrying and conveying the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held
that appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of
the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be
delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc
needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he
saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his
lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

xxxx

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the
contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the
other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags.
Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled
thereto at that time.
 Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local
police has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more
than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other
recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the
contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and
again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under
the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in
order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the
moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use
because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.[13]

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to
conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on
searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which
are proper and which are not.

Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence
used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches
was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been
probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
 complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid.
These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section

12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest

in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police

who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without

further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to
the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
[15]

In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest,
a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle
to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to

conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the

requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or
seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential
requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can
be lawfully conducted.[17] Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be
admitted in evidence against the person arrested.[18]

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.[19]

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is
so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to
be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement
which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity.[21]

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when
the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an
aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[22]

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc
had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to
procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of
the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed,
he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the
police received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay
Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At
dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay
Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
[23]

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although,
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the
exceptions therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.[24]

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an

arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search.[25]

Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution

and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall
act as a broker in such transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to
her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention,
however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited
drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[26]

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged
is malum prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited
drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and
their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala
prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against
public order.[29]

Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another.

[30] There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When
the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of
transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal
act.[31] The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act
of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached.[32]

Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the
disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.
[34] Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of
knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang
merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask
what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant
said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her
companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not
to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the
procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of
all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the
very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition
of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control

of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA
 shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to
the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening
of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front
of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana
and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He
and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant
was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ
were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with
Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items
seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately
brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the
Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter
marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellants
claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of
appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground
for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest
was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain
unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items
taken from her during the trial.[38] Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide
by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could
have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not.
Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain
of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities,
as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing
proof to the contrary.[39]

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction
must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998]

RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995, [1] which affirmed in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner
Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Petitioner was charged under the following information:

That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops,
marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.[2]

The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo
Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other
police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo
Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the
area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and
frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was
more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police
headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On
July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail [3] and the trial court issued his order of
release on July 29, 1991.[4]

Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation

Laboratory Section, testified that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino
regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested
positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.

By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping

in his house and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He
alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when
they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for
investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife
Myrna corroborated his story.

The trial court rejected petitioners defense as a mere afterthought and found
the version of the prosecution more credible and trustworthy.

Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting
petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused
Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in
relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to
the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate

court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
on the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were
inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his
conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly
identified.

After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no
compelling reason sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts.

First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility
of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment
of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine
the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during appeal
in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
have altered the conviction of the appellants. [6]

In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were
more credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show
that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other
than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him
such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such
ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty
must prevail.

In People v. Velasco,[7] this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duty which provides:
x x x. Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-
bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were
motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer
whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on
the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant,
as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . .,
must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had
been framed.[8]

Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any

consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the
time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of
all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he
was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was
physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the claim of a frame-up, like
alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for
it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.[9] No clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.

Second, petitioner contends that the prosecutions failure to present the

alleged informant in court cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal.
This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution to produce the
informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best
witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been
conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended
petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as
the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no
compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa,
the lone witness for the prosecution, was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The testimony
of a sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient
to convict.[10]

Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagans testimony, the prosecution was able to
prove that petitioner indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the
finding of conviction was proper.

Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise
be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x.

Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in
flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area
of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner
handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched
him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime.

As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence,

however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches

and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful

arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.[11] It may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In
this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after
his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.

In the case of People v. Lua,[12] this Court held:

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial court
correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as
well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellants
house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search
warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful arrest, the
same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person
arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was
arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his
reach or control.

The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the
doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search
made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant
at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.

In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took
effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the
quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7629,
Section 20, and as interpreted in People v. Simon[13] and People v. Lara,[14] if the
quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty
ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration
that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable
to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty
imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
of arresto mayor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the

Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and
ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
U.S. Supreme Court

Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957)

Carroll v. United States
No. 571
Argued April 4, 1957
Decided June 24, 1957
354 U.S. 394
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Syllabus
Petitioners were arrested on warrants and subsequently were indicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for violations of local lottery laws and for
conspiracy to violate them. After indictment, each filed a pretrial motion under Rule 41(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression of evidence seized from his
person at the time of his arrest. The District Court granted the motions on the ground
that probable cause had been lacking for issuance of the arrest warrants. Urging that,
without the evidence that had been seized and suppressed, it would have to dismiss the
indictment for want of sufficient evidence to proceed with the prosecution, the
Government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, which reversed the District Court.
Held: the appeal should have been dismissed; the Government had no right to appeal
from such an order in such circumstances, either under the general statutes relating to
the appellate jurisdiction of all federal courts of appeals or under the special statutes
relating to the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. Pp. 354 U. S. 396-415.
1. The suppression order here involved is not sufficiently separable and collateral to the
criminal case to be "final," and hence appealable under the general authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, giving the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from "all final
decisions" of the district courts. Pp. 354 U. S. 399-408.
(a) Appellate jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a given type of case is dependent
on authority expressly conferred by statute. Pp. 354 U. S. 399-400.
(b) In federal jurisprudence, at least, appeals by the Government in criminal cases are
something unusual, exceptional and not favored. Pp. 354 U. S. 400-403.
(c) The suppression order here involved, having been entered after indictment and in the
district of trial, has an interlocutory character, and therefore cannot be appealed by the
Government as a "final decision." Pp. 354 U. S. 403-405.
Page 354 U. S. 395
(d) The suppression order here involved does not have sufficient characteristics of
independence and completeness to make it appealable as an order separable from, or
collateral to, the criminal case. Pp. 354 U. S. 403-408.
2. The suppression order here involved is not a "final" order within the criminal case, and
thus appealable under the statutory provisions applicable in the District of Columbia in
criminal cases. Pp. 354 U. S. 408-415.
(a) Even today, criminal appeals by the Government in the District of Columbia are not
limited to the categories set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3731, although, as to cases covered by
that nationwide jurisdictional statute, its explicit directions will prevail over the terms of §
935 of the District of Columbia Code of 1901, now found in §23-105 of the District of
Columbia Code (1951 ed.). Pp. 354 U. S. 408-411.
(b) Under § 226 of the District of Columbia Code of 1901, the practice had developed of
allowing appeals from interlocutory orders in criminal cases; but § 226 was replaced in
1949 by the nationwide appellate jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§1291 and 1292,
which do not authorize interlocutory appeals in criminal cases. Pp. 354 U. S. 411-413.
(c) The standard of "final decisions" as prerequisite to appeal is not something less or
different under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 as the successor to § 226 of the District of Columbia
Code of 1901 than it is under § 1291 as the successor to the nationally applicable appeal
provisions of the Judicial Code. P. 354 U. S. 413.
(d) The statutory provisions applicable to the District of Columbia, subject to the further
limitations stated therein, afford the Government an appeal only from an order against it
which terminates a prosecution or makes a decision whose distinct or plenary character
meets the standards of the precedents applicable to finality problems in all federal
courts. Pp. 354 U. S. 413-415.
98 U.S.App.D.C. 244, 234 F.2d 679, reversed and remanded.
Page 354 U. S. 396
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were arrested in February, 1954 on John Doe warrants, and subsequently
were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, with two
others, for violations of the local lottery laws and for conspiracy to carry on a lottery.
[Footnote 1] After indictment, each filed a pretrial motion under Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure [Footnote 2] asking for the suppression of evidence seized
from his person at the time of his arrest. The District Court granted petitioners' motions
to suppress on the ground that probable cause had been lacking for the issuance of the
arrest warrants directed against them. [Footnote 3] United States v. Hall, 126 F.Supp. 620.
The Government
Page 354 U. S. 397
appealed the order for suppression to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. The indictment against petitioners had not been dismissed, but the
Government informed the Court of Appeals that, without the "numbers" paraphernalia
seized and suppressed, it would lack sufficient evidence to proceed on any of the counts
involving petitioners, and therefore would have to dismiss the indictment. Petitioners
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear an appeal by the Government
from an order of the District Court granting a motion to suppress that was made while
an indictment was pending in the same District Court. The Court of Appeals sustained its
jurisdiction on the authority of its prior decision in United States v. Cefaratti, [Footnote 4]
and reversed the district judge on the merits, holding that there had been probable
cause to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners. 98 U.S.App.D.C. 244,
234 F.2d 679. We granted certiorari, limited to the question of appealability of the
suppression order, because of the importance of that question to the administration of
the federal criminal laws. 352 U.S. 906.
The Government contends, most broadly, that the suppression order of any District
Court is "final" and sufficiently separable and collateral to the criminal case to be
appealable under the general authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, notwithstanding that such an
order is not listed
Page 354 U. S. 398
among the few types of orders in criminal cases from which the Government may appeal
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. [Footnote 5] More narrowly, failing acceptance of the
position
Page 354 U. S. 399
just stated, the Government maintains that an order of suppression is, within the
criminal case, a "final" order, and thus appealable under the statutory provisions for
appeals by the Government in criminal cases that are applicable exclusively in the District
of Columbia. [Footnote 6] It will be convenient to discuss the issues in the same order.

I
It is axiomatic, as a matter of history as well as doctrine, that the existence of appellate
jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a given type of case is dependent upon
authority expressly conferred by statute. And since the jurisdictional statutes prevailing
at any given time are so much a product of the whole history of both growth and
limitation of federal court jurisdiction since the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, they have
always been interpreted in the light of that history and of the axiom that clear statutory
mandate must exist to found jurisdiction. It suffices to cite as authority for these
principles some of the cases in which they have been applied to the general problem
now before us, the availability of appellate review sought by the Government in criminal
cases. E.g., 7 U. S. More, 3 Cranch 159; United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310; In re
Heath, 144
Page 354 U. S. 400
U.S. 92; Cross v. United States, 145 U. S. 571; United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159.
[Footnote 7]
There is a further principle, also supported by the history of federal appellate jurisdiction,
that importantly pertains to the present problem. That is the concept that, in the federal
jurisprudence, at least, [Footnote 8] appeals by the Government in criminal cases are
something unusual, exceptional, not favored. The history shows resistance of the Court
to the opening of an appellate route for the Government until it was plainly provided by
the Congress, and after that a close restriction of its uses to those authorized by the
statute. Indeed, it was 100 years before the defendant in a criminal case, even a capital
case, was afforded appellate review as of right. [Footnote 9] And
Page 354 U. S. 401
after review on behalf of convicted defendants was made certain by the Acts of 1889 and
1891, the Court continued to withhold an equivalent remedy from the Government,
despite the existence of colorable statutory authority for permitting the Government to
appeal in those important cases where a prosecution was dismissed upon the trial
court's opinion of the proper construction or the constitutional validity of a federal
statute. [Footnote 10] When the Congress responded to the problem of such cases in the
Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, now 18 U.S.C. § 3731,
Page 354 U. S. 402
it did so with careful expression of the limited types of orders in criminal cases as to
which the Government might thenceforth have review. [Footnote 11] It was as late as 1942
before the Criminal Appeals Act was amended to permit appeals by the Government
from decisions, granting dismissal or arrest of judgment, other than those grounded
Page 354 U. S. 403
by the trial court upon the construction or invalidity of a statute. [Footnote 12]
It is true that certain orders relating to a criminal case may be found to possess sufficient
independence from the main course of the prosecution to warrant treatment as plenary
orders, and thus be appealable on the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, without regard to
the limitations of 18 U.S.C. §3731, just as, in civil litigation, orders of equivalent
distinctness are appealable on the same authority without regard to the limitations of 28
U.S.C. § 1292. [Footnote 13] The instances in criminal cases are very few. The only decision
of this Court applying to a criminal case the reasoning of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541, held that an order relating to the amount of bail to be exacted falls
into this category. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1. Earlier cases illustrated, sometimes without
discussion, that, under certain conditions, orders for the suppression or return of illegally
seized property are appealable at once, as where the motion is made prior to indictment,
[Footnote 14] or in a different district from that in which the trial will occur, [Footnote 15] or
after dismissal of the
Page 354 U. S. 404
case, [Footnote 16] or perhaps where the emphasis is on the return of property rather
than its suppression as evidence. [Footnote 17] In such cases, as appropriate, the
Government as well as the moving person has been permitted to appeal from an
adverse decision. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465.
But a motion made by a defendant after indictment and in the district of trial has none of
the aspects of independent just noted, as the Court held in Cogen v. United States, 278 U.
S. 221. As the opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis explains, the denial of a pretrial motion in
this posture is interlocutory in form and real effect, and thus not appealable at the
instance of the defendant. We think the granting of such a motion also has an
interlocutory character, and therefore cannot be the subject of an appeal by the
Government. In the present case, the
Page 354 U. S. 405
Government argues, as it offered to stipulate below, that the effect of suppressing the
evidence seized from petitioners at their arrests will be to force dismissal of the
indictment for lack of evidence on which to go forward. But that is not a necessary result
of a suppression order relating to particular items of evidence, nor have we been shown
whether it will be the result in practice in the generality of cases. Appeal rights cannot
depend on the facts of a particular case. The Congress necessarily has had to draw the
jurisdictional statutes in terms of categories. To fit an order granting suppression before
trial in a criminal case into the category of "final decisions" requires a straining that is not
permissible in the light of the principles and the history concerning criminal appeals,
especially Government appeals, that are outlined above and more fully set forth in the
cases cited. [Footnote 18] Other Courts of Appeals that have considered the problem have
concluded that this order is not "final" or appealable at the behest of the Government.
[Footnote 19]
Page 354 U. S. 406
The Government exhorts us not to exalt form over substance, in contending that the
present order has virtually the same attributes as the suppression orders found
reviewable in earlier cases. We do not agree that the order entered in a pending criminal
case has the same characteristics of independence and completeness as a suppression
order entered under other circumstances. Moreover, in a limited sense,
form is substance with respect to ascertaining the existence of appellate jurisdiction.
While it is always necessary to categorize a situation realistically -- to place a given order
according to its real effect -- it remains true that the categories themselves were defined
by the Congress in terms of form. Many interlocutory decisions of a trial court may be of
grave importance to a litigant, yet are not amenable to appeal at the time entered, and
some are never satisfactorily reviewable. In particular is this true of the Government in a
criminal case, for there is no authority today for interlocutory appeals, [Footnote 20] and,
even if the Government had a general right to review upon an adverse conclusion of a
case after trial, much of what it might complain of would have been allowed up in the
sanctity of the jury's verdict. [Footnote 21]
Page 354 U. S. 407
If there is serious need for appeals by the Government from suppression orders, or
unfairness to the interests of effective criminal law enforcement in the distinctions we
have referred to, it is the function of the Congress to decide whether to initiate a
departure from the historical pattern of restricted appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases.
[Footnote 22] We must decide the case on the statutes that
Page 354 U. S. 408
exist today, in the light of what has been the development of the jurisdiction. It is only
through legislative resolution, furthermore, that peripheral questions regarding the
conduct of Government appeals in this situation can be regulated. Some of the problems
directed at legislative judgment involve such particulars as confinement or bail of the
defendant, acceleration of the Government's appeal, and discretionary limitation of the
right to take the appeal. [Footnote 23]

II
The Court of Appeals sustained its jurisdiction on the basis of statutory provisions
peculiar to the District of Columbia. Here again, the jurisdictional statutes are a product
of historical development, and must be interpreted in that light. During the century from
1801 to 1901, the Congress several times organized and reorganized the courts of the
District of Columbia, independently of the federal courts in the States. It is not necessary
here to relate the chronology of shuffled jurisdictions and
Page 354 U. S. 409
nomenclature. [Footnote 24] It is sufficient to note that, from 1838 on, review of a final
judgment of conviction in the criminal trial court was available in the appellate tribunal of
the District. [Footnote 25] However, the appellate judgment was not further reviewable in
this Court in any manner during this period. In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92; Cross v. United
States,145 U. S. 571. When the Acts of 1889 and 1891 opened up appellate review of
criminal convictions in the federal courts throughout the country at first directly to this
Court, it was held that those statutes did not apply to cases originating in the District of
Columbia. Ibid.
In 1901, the Congress codified the laws of the District of Columbia, including those
relating to the judicial system. District of Columbia Code, 31 Stat. 1189. Criminal
jurisdiction was vested in the trial court of general jurisdiction, then known as the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. [Footnote 26] A single section of the statute, §
226, conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over decisions of the
Supreme Court in general terms, apparently including criminal decisions. A party
aggrieved could take an appeal from a final order or judgment, and was entitled to
allowance of an appeal from an interlocutory order affecting possession of property. In
addition, the Court of Appeals could allow an
Page 354 U. S. 410
appeal, in its discretion, from any other interlocutory order when it was shown "that it
will be in the interest of justice to allow such appeal." [Footnote 27]
Section 935 of the Code of 1901 established this new provision:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the United States or the District of Columbia, as the case
may be, shall have the same right to appeal that is given to the defendant, including the
right to a bill of exceptions: Provided, That if on such appeal it shall be found that there
was error in the rulings of the court during the trial, a verdict in favor of the defendant
shall not be set aside."
31 Stat. 1341. The legislative history of the Code does not indicate why the Government
was now given a right of appeal, but we may surmise that the draftsmen of the Code
desired to adopt a procedural technique that was then in force in a large number of
States. [Footnote 28] The "same right of appeal that is given to the defendant" would be
defined by reference to § 226, of course, in cases coming up from the Supreme Court.
After the Congress conferred on the United
Page 354 U. S. 411
States a more limited right of appeal from the District Courts in the Criminal Appeals Act
of 1907, running directly to this Court, it was held that the 1907 Act was not applicable to
cases decided in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. There, § 935 provided
"the complete appellate system." United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 289 U. S. 164.
When the Criminal Appeals Act was broadened in 1942, it was then first made applicable
to the District of Columbia. [Footnote 29] But the text of § 935 was not repealed at that
time, nor was it repealed in connection with the 1948 revisions of the Judicial Code and
the Criminal Code. [Footnote 30] It may be concluded, then, that, even today, criminal
appeals by the Government in the District of Columbia are not limited to the categories
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3731, although, as to cases of the type covered by that special
jurisdictional statute, its explicit directions will prevail over the general terms of § 935,
now found in the District of Columbia Code, 1951 Edition, as § 23-105. United States v.
Hoffman, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 161 F.2d 881, decided on merits, 335 U. S. 335 U.S. 77.
Meanwhile, under the general provisions of § 226 of the 1901 Code, the practice had
developed of allowing appeals from interlocutory orders in criminal cases. A particular
instance disturbed the Congress in 1926, and it immediately passed a statute to
eliminate the practice. It is apparent from the legislative history that it was interlocutory
appeals for the defendant that were considered anomalous in a federal court and
undesirable from the viewpoint of prompt dispatch of criminal prosecutions, [Footnote 31]
but the new provision in terms applied equally to the possibility of an interlocutory
appeal's being allowed
Page 354 U. S. 412
to the Government through the combined provisions of § 226 and §935. The 1926
enactment, as it now reads in the District of Columbia Code, 1951 Edition, § 17-102,
states:
"Nothing contained in any Act of Congress shall be construed to empower the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to allow an appeal from any
interlocutory order entered in any criminal action or proceeding or to entertain any such
appeal heretofore or hereafter allowed or taken."
44 Stat. 831, as amended. 48 Stat. 926. The allowance of appeal technique no longer
exists as to cases coming from the District Court (the former Supreme Court), but, if this
section does not continue to have life by force of the words "or hereafter . . . taken," it
does not matter, for § 226 itself was replaced in 1949 [Footnote 32] by the nationwide
appellate jurisdiction provisions of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, § 1291 and §1292, which do
not authorize interlocutory appeals in criminal cases.
Thus the statutory context in which the court below made its ruling is seen to be this:
subject to stated limitations, the Government has the "same right of appeal" as the
defendant in criminal cases in the District Court for the District of Columbia, but no party
can appeal an interlocutory order in such cases. In United States v. Cefaratti, 91
U.S.App.D.C. 297, 202 F.2d 13, the Court of Appeals reconciled these rules by holding:
"Since defendants may appeal from 'final decisions,' to say that 'the United States . . .
shall have the same right of appeal that is given to the defendant . . . ' means that . . . the
United States may appeal from final decisions. It does not mean that the United States
cannot appeal from a final decision
Page 354 U. S. 413
unless it so happens that an opposite decision would also have been final."
91 U.S.App.D.C. at 302, 202 F.2d at 17. Applying this reasoning to orders for the
suppression of evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that such an order had the
requisite finality and independence of the criminal case to be appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. In the present case, the court below reaffirmed its Cefaratti analysis. Insofar as
these decisions, resting on opinions of this Court, [Footnote 33] imply a reviewability for
suppression orders that would be general to cases from all Federal District Courts, we
have already indicated our disagreement earlier in this opinion.
But the Government contends that appealability under the District of Columbia statutes,
though it requires a "final decision," does not call for the independent or separable
character of the orders in the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals, because here it is
not essential to characterize an order as plenary or disassociated from the criminal case,
inasmuch as the Government has a comprehensive right of appeal within a criminal case
in the District of Columbia. We do not agree that the standard of "final decisions," as
prerequisite to appeal, is something less or different under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as the
successor to § 226 of the District of Columbia Code of 1901 than it is under § 1291 as the
successor to the nationally applicable appeal provisions of the Judicial Code. Cf. Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 342 U. S. 6, 342 U. S. 12. By this, we do not mean to say that § 935 of the
1901 Code is no broader than 18 U.S.C. § 3731, but merely that the underlying concepts
of finality are the same in each case.
As the outline of the statutory development demonstrates, both this Court and the
Congress have been strict
Page 354 U. S. 414
in confining rights of appeal in criminal cases in the District of Columbia to those plainly
authorized by statute. We do not believe that the combined provisions of the 1901 and
1926 enactments permit the Government to appeal in any situation where the decision
against it may have some characteristics of finality, yet does not either terminate the
prosecution or pertain to an independent peripheral matter such as would be appealable
in other federal courts on the authority of Stack v. Boyle, supra. The 1901 Code gave the
Government "the same right of appeal that is given to the defendant," while the 1926
amendment to the Code restricted the defendant's right of appeal to those decisions of
the Supreme Court (now District Court) that have a "final" effect, as that term is
understood in defining appellate jurisdiction. We conclude that full force cannot be given
to the limitations imposed on criminal appeals in the District of Columbia unless the
Government is restricted as is the defendant. This is not to say "that the United States
cannot appeal from a final decision unless it so happens that an opposite decision would
also have been final," as the Court of Appeals suggested in Cefaratti. Quite to the
contrary, our holding is that the statutory provisions applicable to the District of
Columbia, subject to the further limitations stated therein, afford the Government an
appeal only from an order against it which terminates a prosecution or makes a decision
whose distinct or plenary character meets the standards of the precedents applicable to
finality problems in all federal courts. [Footnote 34]
Page 354 U. S. 415
In thus defining the Government's appeal rights under § 935 of the 1901 Code, we are
mindful of the considerations that motivated the Congress to specify in 1926 that
interlocutory appeals in criminal cases were not possible:
"Promptness in the dispatch of the criminal business of the courts is by all recognized as
in the highest degree desirable. Greater expedition is demanded by a wholesome public
opinion."
S.Rep. No. 926, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. And cf. H.R.Rep. No. 1363, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
Delays in the prosecution of criminal cases are numerous and lengthy enough without
sanctioning appeals that are not plainly authorized by statute. We cannot do so here
without a much clearer mandate than exists in the present terms and the historical
development of the relevant provisions. Cf. United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S.
159; United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y
SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street parlance as "shabu" or
"poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged
with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat
were convicted. They were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and to pay the
costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The pertinent portion of the information reads
as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or
transport 56 teabags of Metamphetamine, a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.1
The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of
illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information thus received, a
project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to
infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter referred to
as Tia).
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by another confidential agent
named George on August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire a male travelling companion for his business nips
abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. In the course of those meetings,
Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant), whom Tia found out to be the person he was to
accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal
syndicate. Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain Luisito Palmera, filed with his
superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they departed,
Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the Philippines as declared
in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two o'clock in the afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the People's
Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few hours. The pair thereafter went
to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were
opened for examination during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Appellant kept the cans of tea in
his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with
appellant. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a
cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked
the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese
drugs. Tia stayed in the room for about twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant had with him his red
traveling bag with wheels. Before departing from Guangzhou however, customs examiners inspected their luggage.
The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of appellant. The contents of the cans were not closely
examined, and appellant was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila International Airport, on
schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant, while Tia, upon being instructed,
looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant
and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle. Lim followed in
another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on the tip given by Tia.
On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a briefing, the operatives were ordered to take strategic
positions around the arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the first ones to spot the
suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the other members of the team that the suspects were in sight.
Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The operatives also spotted
Lim meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda
Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi
driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The
operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag
owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from
the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came
out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for inspection. From the red
traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the one previously opened. Nothing else of consequence
was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for
questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon City. Lim
was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of appellant were opened and
examined. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline powder inside instead of tea
leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for
preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside the tea bag yielded a positive
result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. Samples from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were
similarly tested. The tests were also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the government anti-
narcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED
AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING, DISPATCHING
OR TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE
PROSECUTION.2
We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the
accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers
concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of a
arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the search
and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not automatically make the warrantless
search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a valid warrant to
effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search
warrant.
The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the
case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,3 these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving
vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly show that
the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect
the search on appellant and his co-accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the appellee's brief,
that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is
the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement
which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity.4
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought."5
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country.
The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which
appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival
of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and convicted under Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which reads:
 The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispose, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied).
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing
metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby implying that the accused were being
charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery"
because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued
that "dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for "transporting,"
appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting necessarily requires a
point of destination, which again is non- existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and his co-accused
were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co-
accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey
from one place to another."6 The operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the
place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he
and his co- accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the search and
arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced. Otherwise, there would
be nothing to interrupt.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts of delivery, dispatch or transport, proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so included is sufficient for conviction under Section
15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a
special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a
wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly
charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent. 7
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify for the prosecution
on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. Appellant argues that deep penetration agents such as Tia
"have to take risks and accept the consequences of their actions." 8 The argument is devoid of merit. The discharge of
accused Tia was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:
Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with
the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may
directone or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state . . . (emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused is left to the sound discretion of the
lower court. The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. 9 In
1âwphi1

the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of the conditions for the discharge had not been met by the
prosecution. Therefore, the discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.
Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts surrounding the commission
of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. The allegation is baseless. Appellant himself
admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the testimony of the discharged accused. The fact of corroboration of
the testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely because paragraph (a) of the aforequoted
rule on discharge requires that the testimony be substantially corroborated in its material points. The corroborative
testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of accused Tia.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused)
was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-
0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch
the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a
Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer
of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint
at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who
was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be
a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped
to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling
the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the
same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of
his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that
the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom
he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification
papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his
passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag
outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to
get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give
credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise
such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not
inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2)
months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling
bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado;
Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as
amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the
search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need
to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under
the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence
of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located
at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an
informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused
was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the
officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to
present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed
to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an
innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required
to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.
From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal
effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as
well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM
agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
 Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not only found its niche
in all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying recognition and acceptance in our case
law.1 The present Constitution2 declares that —
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."3
The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search of his body, or his
personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate
arrest.4
An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant, an arrest may
also be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:5
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." 6 And it has been held that the
search may extend to the area "within his immediate control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.7
Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in cases of "search of
a moving vehicle,8 and "seizure of evidence in plain view." 9 This was the pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention to Moreno v. Ago Chi;10 Alvero v. Dizon,11 Papa v.
Mago,12 and an American precedent, Harris v. U.S.13
If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest
without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise,
and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the
search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree. 14 In that event, any evidence taken, even if
confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 15 But the right against an
unreasonable search and seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly
decided not to invoke it.16
There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these established principles.
However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may properly be derived from the proven
facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just cited should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain, however, is that the
soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's person and the things in his possession
at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant
or arrest nor a search warrant everytime they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them
one considering that searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior
to the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the norms of the law.
For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit a crime, in the soldiers'
presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a
crime. All they had was a suspicion that Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they
had was, in the words of the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the
Office of the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera) were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First Division. 17 There,
Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking from an inter-island vessel. The
officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The
search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court
nevertheless held that since the PC officers had failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time
(two days) to do so and therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search of
Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal; and the marijuana
was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against Aminnudin for violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different conclusions were
reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant constitutional and legal propositions are not
misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988),18 the accused boarded a "Victory Liner" passenger bus
going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was carrying at the back of the seat then occupied
by Obiña, an INP member "on Detached Service with the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obiña's
suspicion, and at the first opportunity, and without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag
and noted that it contained camote tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of
marijuana with which he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at Sta. Rita, and
Claudio alighted, Obiña accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a policeman, and announced his
intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana because of the distinctive odor detected by him.
Ignoring her plea — "Please go with me, let us settle this at home" — he brought her to the police headquarters.,
where examination of the package in Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The
Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus
discovered admissible in evidence against the accused.
In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990),19 two police officers and a barangay tanod were
conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed
not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there) but also on persons who may be engaging in the
traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red
travelling bag . . who was acting suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they
identified themselves as peace officers; found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one
kilogram, more or less; the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, where he
was investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that person, Tangliben, charging him with a violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as amended. Upon these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that
there was a valid warrantless arrest and a proper warrantless search incident thereto.
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In contrast"
to Aminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and obtention of a search
warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case —
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-
appellant as carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant . . . To require search warrants during on-the-
spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robber, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with
which these persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable the PC officers to secure a
search warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no time to get the warrant, and there were "on-
the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing a crime, the search of his person and his effects was
considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al., decided on August
2, 1990,20 and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.21
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao Metrodiscom, and
when he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers, he suddenly fled. He was pursued,
overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody. The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found
to contain a revolver, for which he could produce no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition,
and a tear gas grenade. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial.
This Court affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search without
warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he had with him at the time.
The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio,22 a 1968
case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the search.
In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics
Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway going towards
Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking,
would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen
manning the checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney
approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were
seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under
arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court
upheld the validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, 23 and declared that,
as in Tangliben, supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delictotransporting prohibited drugs at the
time of their arrest. Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin24 in which, as aforestated,
it appeared that the police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected criminal enterprise and the vessel
on which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a search
warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the Court found that the officers concerned had no exact description of
the vehicle the former would be using to transport marijuana, and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects'
arrival, and pointed out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat on the high seas whose route
and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise alter its course, or
select another destination.25
The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho Wing; et al., G.R.
No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an undercover or "deep penetration" agent,
Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and
Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the
contents of six (6) tins of tea and replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of
substituted "tea," they were met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been tipped off by Tia,
and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo, loaded on the group's vehicles,
quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of white crystalline powder which, upon analysis,
was identified as metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Tia was discharged as state witness. Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
One of the questions raised by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and
personal effects was legal. The Court, citing Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986),26 held legal the
search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the dangerous drug, considering that there was
intelligence information, including clandestine reports by a planted spy actually participating in the activity, that the
appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; that the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders
on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from
one place to another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.27
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were found by the Court
as justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly ascertained that the woman he was
arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but
also a package emitting the odor of marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously,
and had been positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive action. In Posadas, the
person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when accosted had attempted to flee from the police
officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged
in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a
warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable divergence of views among the members
of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved on reasonable
doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by an informer; no attempt to flee;
no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time
in process of perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched
Malmstedt's pouch and the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the
search disclosed that the bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and suspicion. The
search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances
sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed, or adjust been
committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The
search was therefore illegal, since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of
his body and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken,
and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An arrest made in that case would be
unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy bears" in the luggage found
in his possession — an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory examination — does not help the cause of the
prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to all persons under custodial investigation. 28 He was not informed, prior to being interrogated,
that he had the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,"
and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not does it appear at all that he
waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead
with the investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel. The admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these
circumstances, as the Constitution clearly states, are "inadmissible in evidence against him. 29
The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him "for any purpose in any proceeding."
Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the admissions supposedly made by him without his first
being accorded the constitutional rights of persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and
admissions, nothing remains of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his defense is feeble,
unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar axiom, the State must rely on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of
the hashish is an objective physical reality that cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate
with any degree of persuasion, much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity.
This is the paradox created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is that the
hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the efforts of the police
and military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or
some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and commendation of the Courts and indeed of every
responsible citizen. But those efforts must take account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to
persons who may fall under suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by
the objective of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective
might be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of the guilty, and all
because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even if truthful or otherwise credible. 30
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant on reasonable
doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application to the facts of
this case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and seizures. It is consistent with
my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a
unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311,
Valmonte v. De Villa (on checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181
SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this case that some
members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its protection to society, which deserves our
higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to
violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a person a criminal,
until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial court. Until then, the Constitution
bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise
fall short of our own standards of propriety and decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he
may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search and seizure as long
as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That fact will retroactively validate the
violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize, the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is
the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1, which was
discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by an express provision in the
1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present Constitution, again explicitly declares that
any evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice. In the case at bar, the
1âwphi1

search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the route was being used by marijuana
dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that
probable cause? The ponencia notes that the military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the
Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the
warrantless search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused
was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of
illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was
the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:
. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be
used. It is also desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are
1avvphi1

the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I
do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to
protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part.
If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome the accusation
and take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with outlawed evidence than exalt order
at the price of liberty.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A.
ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
DENR, respondents.

[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-

CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation
Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were
originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of
the Court en banc.

Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352

Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered
as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under
Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to
expire on 25 September 1990.

Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty.

Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the
DENR, respectively.

The material operative facts are as follows:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra

flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together
with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of
the refusal of the owner.[2]
 On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from
the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs;
a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. [3]

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's
lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining
stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000
board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove
the legitimacy of their source and origin.[4]

Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the

owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory
of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner
is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. [5]

On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting
an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required
documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles
denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required from the
petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure. [6]

On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending

to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;

2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event
its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within
ten days from date of seizure;

3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr.
Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber
and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;

4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber loaded
therein for transport lumber using recycled documents.[7]
 On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and
directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-
dealer's permit should not be cancelled.

On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles
informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required
documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]

On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after

reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered
CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with
law the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber,
shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. [9]

On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary
injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil
Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner
questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and
seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its
cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different
sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of
Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3
May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705

(The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed
and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series
of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner
located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila.The team caught the
petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had
already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a
trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the
lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It
also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the
team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned
out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy
Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take
photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust
around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles
loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of
approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in
the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.[10]

As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed

with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case
(hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.

In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a

complaint against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po,
for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro
Arellano, handed down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be
filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd.
ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs
covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]

This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H.

Bello, III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging. [13]

On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by

the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with
the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory
portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises
and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously
and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000
bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.[14]

On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
 1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks,
found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune
Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby
set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the
Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and
sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;

2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the
proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions
loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;

3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment;

4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and
sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said
petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and
determined how those lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and

5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes
of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or
origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and
accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a
search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled
that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was
still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge
Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. [17] And, although the
search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer
is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search.
[18]

The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the
reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued
by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in
compliance with the directive in the warrant.

As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial
court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a
fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.

The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.

On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion

to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a)
the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said
section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken
by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of
the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of
Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.
[19]

The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the
required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions
of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68
would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal
logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. [20]

In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case
on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required
by forest laws and regulations is not a crime." [22]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No.
106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.

On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-

G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the
decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the
issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles
since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is
not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful
under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:

This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest

product involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in
the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is
that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its
acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present
any despite the period of extension granted to it. [25]

The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992. [26] Hence, the petitioner came
to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988,
which was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]

On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a

decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies;
(b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not
lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was
valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was
justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended.

The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.

In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the

petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the
grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL
CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs,
especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted
for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest
product.

The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee

can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705
pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in
part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in
favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the
forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the
offense.

Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80

are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required
legal documents.

Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court
on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.

We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which
the other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-
V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge
Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor
"other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not
prohibited and penalized under the said section.

Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an

information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this
ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the
facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense,
[29] and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the

information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that
the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense.

Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D.

No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and
if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.

Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's
coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly
charge a violation of the said section?

A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible

conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that
what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the
required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and

(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as
lumber. They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated
by the words approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not
with the preposition of. They must then be raw forest products or, more
specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood,
oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and
flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and
geological resources in forest lands.

It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the information.Accordingly, even
if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above
fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.

Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting
opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for
enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With
the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion
that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.

The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates
the rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated
must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.

Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify

his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and
Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, [30] cannot lead one
to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly
states:

8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood
species. (Italics supplied)
 In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the
investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the
information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be
filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an

affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from
the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this
Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of

either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the
same section in the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for
the market.[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes
no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non
distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of

the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
 G.R. No. 104988

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed
decision of 29 November 1991.

It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan
and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure
of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a
forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such
a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions

to the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except
by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident
to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches,
and (4) consented warrantless search.[35]

We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990
done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time
within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in
one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted,
it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still
within the ten-day period.[36]

As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because
possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified
therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further
discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.

G.R. No. 123784

 The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably
fail to show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court
of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6
February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter
want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment on the
petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the
judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never
disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended
by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and
since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner
has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of
lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the
authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized

must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No.
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the
suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.

All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than
rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to
block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which
deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm
and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous
destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must
not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or
favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection
of our forests.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

 1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August
1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the
said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear
and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and

2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the
petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.

Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of
Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as
Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance
of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port
of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon.
Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of
the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of
March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in
connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent Remedios
Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No.
67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and
from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and
loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate
No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the
trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales
of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry
No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
 Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios
Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with
restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios
Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence
at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department
without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of
counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then
Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods
were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming
them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and
Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were
imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the
Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights
would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed
for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the
trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine
bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16,
1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by
the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the
Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and
detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to
wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated
no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the
Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties
and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the
seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and
Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said
Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that
the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for;
that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would
deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would
not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the
denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods,
the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the
above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by
the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the
release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as
shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was
filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the
goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions
affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the
Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes
and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago
filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios
Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the
corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been
directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged, among others, that
the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed
goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the
correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their
answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by
respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967,
because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine
bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the
goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises
and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in
good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4)
that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention;
(5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and
unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in
question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the
present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the
release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that
the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in
issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all
lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff
and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff
and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods
remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of
the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated
that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as
evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not
been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in
the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to
avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that
there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in
bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces
of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal
watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's
metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it
appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7,
220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question,
were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs
Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the
Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina
Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their
Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs
had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the
Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question,
therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court
of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure
and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the
Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided
by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that
Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and
rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial
shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon
examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it
is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right
to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction
over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes
because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor
subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila
issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs
and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On
December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by
Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs
sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and
mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs
authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
 This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and
institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12,
1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify
whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964,
Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu
Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these
are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and
customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have
been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the
proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court
of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit
recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective
the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax
Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra,
Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the
Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are
later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods,
for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the
goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much
less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10And so, it cannot be said, as
respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction
over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting
it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila
had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not
seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila
Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for
the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any
box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein
of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police
officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14This was what
happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to
make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of
the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and
seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court,
considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and
in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made
lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but
also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there
was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find
any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully
brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.
This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of
February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The
substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L.
178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno.
2d ed. p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional.
Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107
U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make
any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the
court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18 All that they
complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v.
 United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379,
190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant or
other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws
of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a
warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a
judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the
circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by
quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn
vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the
world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other
public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but
a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The
baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from
those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal
laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a
search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the
circumstances under which it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was
in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the
purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion
U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No. 67496
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and 1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974

PEDRO PACIS, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL R. PAMARAN, as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, and RICARDO SANTOS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice for petitioner.
Juan T. David for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
For the petitioner Pedro Pacis, then Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, it was vital that this prohibition proceeding against the then Assistant City Fiscal of
Manila, Manuel R. Pamaran, should be instituted. For unless restrained, the prosecutor was bent on continuing with the investigation of a charge of usurpation of judicial
functions1 allegedly committed by him, when in the course of his official functions and pursuant thereto, he issued a warrant of seizure and detention for an automobile owned
by respondent Ricardo Santos, who, according to the records in his office, had not paid the customs duty collectible thereon. To counter such a move, and invoking what he
alleged was a violation of the constitutional provision that only a judge, under the 1935 Constitution could issue a search warrant, 2respondent Santos filed the aforesaid
complaint for usurpation. Based on such an assumption and with petitioner clearly not being a member of the judiciary, there was plausibility in the claim that he ran afoul of the
penal law. While the matter was pressed with vigor by Attorney Juan T. David, counsel for respondent, the applicable legal doctrine is on the side of petitioner. It is a well-settled
principle that for violations of customs laws, the power to issue such a warrant is conceded. Thus there is justification for this prohibition suit against respondent Assistant City
Fiscal. On the undisputed facts and in accordance with the controlling legal doctrine, no such offense as usurpation of judicial function could have been committed. Clearly then,
respondent Assistant City Fiscal should be restrained. So we rule and grant the writ prayed for.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957.
It was brought into this country without the payment of customs duty and taxes, its owner Donald James Hatch being
tax-exempt. It was from him that respondent Santos acquired said car. 3 On June 25, 1964, he paid P311.00 for customs
duty and taxes. Petitioner on July 22, 1964 received from the Administrator, General Affairs Administration of the
Department of National Defense, a letter to the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such
automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his
office. Thus he did ascertain that although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount
collectible on said car should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted
seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the automobile was taken
while it was parked on Economia Street, Manila, by Department of National Defense agents who were authorized to
do so by virtue of the said warrant. It was then brought to the General Affairs Administration compound. Then on
August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel, wrote to the petitioner asking that such warrant of
seizure and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and the car released on his contention that the
issuance of the warrant was unauthorized. He likewise threatened to proceed against the petitioner for violation of
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code and for damages. Petitioner on August 31, 1964 answered counsel of
respondent Ricardo Santos, denying the request for the release of the car and adverting that the petitioner had, under
the law, authority to issue such warrant of seizure and detention. What followed was the filing by respondent Ricardo
Santos on September 15, 1964 of a criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of
Manila. It was assigned to then respondent Fiscal Manuel R. Pamaran for preliminary investigation. As the latter
respondent was bent on proceeding with the charge against petitioner, this action was instituted. 4
Thus the significance attached to the jurisdictional question posed was evident. There was moreover the necessity for
a definite ruling as to whether petitioner in the discharge of his official function did lay himself open to a criminal
prosecution for usurpation of judicial functions, the drive against "hot cars" being then at its height. Not much
reflection was needed to show the chilling effect of a criminal prosecution of this nature on the vigorous enforcement
of customs laws. This Court therefore required respondent to answer so that the matter could be fully ventilated. It
was duly forthcoming, stress being laid on the alleged infraction of the constitutional mandate that a warrant of search
and seizure, to be valid, must be the product of a judicial determination. The question before this Tribunal is thus
clear-cut and well-defined.
As set forth at the outset, the law on the matter is clear. It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs
for the Port of Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and detention for
the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos. What was done by him certainly could not be the basis of a
prosecution for the usurpation of judicial functions. Prohibition is therefore the proper remedy.
1. It is to be admitted that the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure must not be eroded
or emasculated. The right to privacy so highly valued in civilized society must not be diluted. Only upon compliance
then with the proper requisites mandated by law should one's possessions be subject to seizure. That much is clear.
Under the 1935 Constitution the intervention of a judge was well-nigh indispensable. So it was under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916. Even then, however, as shown by the leading case of Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal,5 a 1920 decision, it was the accepted principle following the landmark case of Boyd v. United
States6 that the seizure of goods concealed to avoid the duties on them is not embraced within the prohibition of this
constitutional guarantee.7 More to the point. In a recent decision of this Court, Papa v. Mago,8where the seizure of
alleged smuggled goods was effected by a police officer without a search warrant, this Court, through Justice Zaldivar,
stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a component court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveing any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in
the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace ... ." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws."9
The plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is thus undeniable. No such constitutional question then
can possibly arise. So much is implicit from the very language of Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 10 It
speaks for itself. It is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. 11 The power of petitioner is thus manifest. It being
undeniable then that the sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the performance of a duty
according to law, there is not the slightest justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal to continue with the
preliminary investigation after his attention was duly called to the plain and explicit legal provision that did not suffer
at all from any constitutional infirmity. The remedy of prohibition lies.
2. The depth of the concern expressed by the Solicitor-General as counsel for petitioner is easily understandable. No
revenue official can be expected to display the proper zeal in plugging all the loopholes of tax or tariff statutes if the
risk of a criminal prosecution is ever present. At the same time, in fairness to respondent Santos, his insistence on
procedural regularity, especially so where there is an alleged invasion of a constitutional right, was in keeping with the
soundest legal tradition. The rule of law would be meaningless if what is ordained by the fundamental law could be
ignored or disregarded. From the foregoing, there was no such infringement. What was done by petitioner was strictly
in accordance with settled principles of law. No doubt need be entertained then as to the validity of the issuance of the
warrant of seizure and detention. His liability for any alleged usurpation of judicial function is non-existent. Such
imputation was definitely unfounded. Even if however the matter were less clear, the claim that the search and seizure
clause was in effect nullified is hardly impressed with merit. Considering that what is involved is an alleged evasion
of the payment of customs duties, what was said by Circuit Judge Hutcheson in the Ginsburg decision 12 possesses
relevance. Thus: "Based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, this is another of those cases in which appellant and
appellee, concerning themselves little with the Constitutional words, seize upon particular words in particular cases to
roll them as sweet morsels under their tongues. It may not be doubted that, in respect of searches and seizures, the
decisional gloss which constitutes the common law of the Constitution has created in the federal courts a climate of
opinion favorable to the citizen, less favorable to his oppressors. Neither may it be doubted that particular decisions
have not only struck down particular oppressors but in their vigor and clarity have set up streams of tendency in
accord with which later decisions have run. It remains true, however, that each case of this kind is a fact case. The
correct decision of each depends not so much upon a higher critical examination of the accumulated decisional gloss
as upon a common sense determination of whether, within the meaning of the word the Constitution uses, the
particular search and seizure has been "unreasonable," that is, whether what was done and found bears a reasonable
relation to the authority then possessed and exercised or transcends it to become oppression." 13
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and the successor of respondent Manuel R. Pamaran, now
a criminal circuit court judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of the City of Manila to whom the complaint
against petitioner for usurpation of judicial functions arising out of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and
detention, subject-matter of this litigation, has been assigned, is perpetually restrained from acting thereon except to
dismiss the same. No costs.
Zaldivar, (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119619. December 13, 1996]

RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO

GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK,
EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE,
ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA,
FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO
CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS
MACTAN, MARLON CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO
CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO, RONNIE JUEZAN,
BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA,
TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO,
JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY
CABALLERO and ROPLANDO ARCENAS, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting petitioners of
the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance
penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of
1975.

In an Information dated October 15, 1992, petitioners were charged with a

violation of P.D. 704 committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of September 1992, at Brgy. San Rafael, Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen
Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon, a domestic corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines, being then the owner, crew members and
fishermen of F/B Robinson and with the use of said fishing boat, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the said accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another catch, take or gather or cause to be caught,
taken or gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the coastal waters of Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan, with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of
more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally caught thru the use
of obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide).[1]

The following facts were established by the prosecution: In September 1992,

the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters
of the city. In response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force
Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators
of the laws on fishing.

On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force
Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several
small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline of Barangay San
Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and
members of the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr.,
immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized
sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-
kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected
the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the
course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captains
deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found them to be mere
photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu
and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat.
[2] They checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be

in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and
the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.

At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by

SPO3 Enriquez to guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two
foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command
office. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the
boat, its crew and fishermen were charged with the following violations:
1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayors
permit;

2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized--26; On board--36);

3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports.[3]

The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat
captain to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for
laboratory examination. As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner Ernesto
Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a
plastic shopping bag filled with water. SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and in
the presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed them inside a large
transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with heat from a
lighter.[4]

The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

sub-office in the city for examination to determine the method of catching the
same for record or evidentiary purposes. [5] They were received at the NBI office
at 8:00 in the evening of the same day. The receiving clerk, Edna Capicio, noted
that the fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the
office freezer to preserve them. Two days later, on October 3, 1992, the chief of
the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified the specimens for laboratory
examination at the NBI Head Office in Manila. The fish samples were to be
personally transported by Edna Capicio who was then scheduled to leave
for Manila for her board examination in Criminology. [6] On October 4, 1992, Ms.
Capicio, in the presence of her chief, took the plastic with the specimens from
the freezer and placed them inside two shopping bags and sealed them with
masking tape. She proceeded to her ship where she placed the specimens in
the ships freezer.
 Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992 and immediately
brought the specimens to the NBI Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI
Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and
found that they contained sodium cyanide, thus:
FINDINGS:
Weight of Specimen 1.870 kilograms Examinations made on the above-mentioned
specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS to the test for the presence of SODIUM
CYANIDE x x x
REMARKS:
Sodium Cyanide is a violent poison.[7]

In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa

City filed the complaint at bar against the owner and operator of the F/B
Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein
petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer,
Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28
fishermen of the said boat.

Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As
defense, they claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen
Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They
alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used
this method for one month and a half in the waters of CuyoIsland. They related
that on September 30, 1992 at about 7:00 A.M., they anchored the F/B
Robinson in the east of Podiado Island in Puerto Princesa City. The boat captain
and the fishermen took out and boarded their sampans to fish for their
food. They were still fishing in their sampans at 4:00 P.M. when a rubber boat
containing members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay
Dagat approached them and boarded the F/B Robinson. The policemen were in
uniform while the Bantay Dagat personnel were in civilian clothes.They were all
armed with guns. One of the Bantay Dagat personnel introduced himself as
Commander Jun Marcelo and he inspected the boat and the boats
documents. Marcelo saw the two foreigners and asked for their passports. As
their passports were photocopies, Marcelo demanded for their original. The
captain explained that the original passports were with the companys head
office in Manila. Marcelo angrily insisted for the originals and threatened to
arrest everybody. He then ordered the captain, his crew and the fishermen to
follow him to Puerto Princesa. He held the magazine of his gun and warned the
captain Sige, huwag kang tatakas, kung hindi babarilin ko kayo! [8] The captain
herded all his men into the boat and followed Marcelo and the police to Puerto
Princesa.

They arrived at the city harbor at 7:45 in the evening and were met by
members of the media. As instructed by Marcelo, the members of the media
interviewed and took pictures of the boat and the fishermen. [9]

The following day, October 1, 1992, at 8:00 in the morning, Amado

Villanueva, one of the fishermen at the F/B Robinson, was instructed by a
policemen guarding the boat to get five (5) fish samples from the fish cage and
bring them to the pier. Villanueva inquired whether the captain knew about the
order but the guard replied he was taking responsibility for it. Villanueva
scooped five pieces of lapu-lapu, placed them inside a plastic bag filled with
water and brought the bag to the pier. The boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya,
received the fish and delivered them to the PNP Maritime Office. Nobody was in
the office and Andaya waited for the apprehending officers and the boat
captain. Later, one of the policemen in the office instructed him to leave the bag
and hang it on a nail in the wall. Andaya did as he was told and returned to the
boat at 10:00 A.M.[10]

In the afternoon of the same day, the boat captain arrived at the Maritime
office. He brought along a representative from their head office in Manila who
showed the police and the Bantay Dagat personnel the original passports of the
Hongkong nationals and other pertinent documents of the F/B Robinson and its
crew. Finding the documents in order, Marcelo approached the captain and
whispered to him Tandaan mo ito, kapitan, kung makakaalis ka dito, magkikita
pa rin uli tayo sa dagat, kung hindi kayo lulubog ay palulutangin ko kayo! It was
then that SPO3 Enriquez informed the captain that some members of the
Maritime Command, acting under his instructions, had just taken five (5) pieces
of lapu-lapu from the boat. SPO3 Enriquez showed the captain the fish
samples. Although the captain saw only four (4) pieces of lapu-lapu, he did not
utter a word of protest.[11] Under Marcelos threat, he signed the Certification that
he received only four (4) pieces of fish.[12]

Two weeks later, the information was filed against petitioners. The case was
prosecuted against thirty-one (31) of the thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon
remained at large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon
Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown.

On July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty and
sentenced them to imprisonment for a minimum of eight (8) years and one (1)
day to a maximum of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The court also ordered
the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton
of assorted live fishes as instruments and proceeds of the offense, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO
ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL
AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES
ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ARNEL
VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, JORNIE DELACRUZ, JESUS MACTAN,
FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, RONNIE JUEZAN,
BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO
DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO
LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, ROLANDO ARCENAS and JOLLY
CABALLERO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Fishing with the
use of obnoxious or poisonous substance commonly known as sodium cyanide,
committed in violation of section 33 and penalized in section 38 of Presidential Decree
No. 704, as amended, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
appreciated and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the
aforenamed accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from a minimum of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to a maximum of NINE (9)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the second sentence of Article 10
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
a) Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson;
b) The 28 motorized fiberglass sampans; and
c) The live fishes in the fish cages installed in the F/B Robinson, all of which have been
respectively shown to be tools or instruments and proceeds of the offense, are hereby
ordered confiscated and declared forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.[13]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial

court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MERE

POSITIVE RESULTS TO THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM CYANIDE
IN THE FISH SPECIMEN, ALBEIT ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE OCCASION OF
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND ARREST, IS ADMISSIBLE AND SUFFICIENT
BASIS FOR THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
FISHING.
II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SEC. 33 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 704 CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, SUCH THAT THE GRAVAMEN OF THE
OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING MUST STILL BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ACQUITTING THE PETITIONERS.[14]

The Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying

for petitioners acquittal.[15]

The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily

question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the
warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of
petitioners. More concretely, they contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide
in the fish specimens should not have been admitted and considered by the trial
court because the fish samples were seized from the F/B Robinson without a
search warrant.

Our constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons
without a judicial warrant.[16] As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a
judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are:[17] (1) a search
incident to a lawful arrest;[18] (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a
moving motor vehicle;[19] and (4) search in violation of customs laws.[20]

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition
that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and
secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search
warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure can be
constitutionally effected.[21]
 The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats
breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed
motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the
Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. [22]

We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing
boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence
seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial
court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence,
waived their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said
search and seizure.[23]

Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next question now is
whether petitioners are guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances. Again, the petitioners, joined by the Solicitor General,
submit that the prosecution evidence cannot convict them.

We agree.

Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and
38 of P.D. 704[24] which provide as follows:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;
dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any
person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or
fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and
(d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives
with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as
hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the
Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for
research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic
products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate
predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without
causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally,
That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large
dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess, deal in, sell or in any
manner dispose of, for profit, any fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been
illegally caught, taken or gathered.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing
combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for
electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a
presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the
discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner,
operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance or electricity.

xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 38. Penalties. -- (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in illegally caught fish or
fishery/aquatic products.-- Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:

xxxxxxxxx
(2) By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if obnoxious or poisonous
substances are used: Provided, That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical
injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to twelve (12)
years, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from
twenty (20) years to life or death;

x x x x x x x x x.[25]

The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or

gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic
products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or
poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has
been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or
equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a
fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are
presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.

Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree
violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. [26] As
early as 1916, this Court has rejected this argument by holding that: [27]
In some States, as well as in England, there exists what are known as common law
offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The
state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well-defined
limitations, has the right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as
what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention.[28]

The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled

matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that
proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the
accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
[29] To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the

other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. [30] In fine, the presumption must
be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed. [31]

The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt

based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes
the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for
electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and
poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing
boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate
fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were
engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the
discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the
fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the
fact proved.[32]

We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. [33] It
can not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to
preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact
presumed.[34] At no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the
presumption,[35] thus:
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But
the experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be
explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put
witnesses on the stand or go on the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and
any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection
with the commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt which the
prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen goods.[36]

We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have

successfully rebutted this presumption. The facts show that on November 13,
1992, after the information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail,
petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be
reexamined.[37] The trial court granted the motion. [38] As prayed for, a member of
the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa, in the presence of authorized
representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local Fisheries Office, took
at random five (5) live lapu-lapu from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens
were packed in the usual manner of transporting live fish, taken aboard a
commercial flight and delivered by the same representatives to the NBI Head
Office in Manila for chemical analysis.

On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI
in Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish
negative for the presence of sodium cyanide, [39] thus:
Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.
Examination made on the above-mentioned specimens gave NEGATIVE RESULTS to
the tests for the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE.[40]

The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton
of assorted live fishes. There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B
Robinsons fish cage. It was from this fish cage that the four dead specimens
examined on October 7, 1992 and the five live specimens examined on
November 23, 1992 were taken. Though all the specimens came from the same
source allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two tests resulted in conflicting
findings. We note that after its apprehension, the F/B Robinson never left the
custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was anchored near
the city harbor and was guarded by members of the Maritime Command. [41] It
was later turned over to the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard Commander
of Puerto Princesa City.[42]

The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish

samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes
in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.

The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports

petitioners claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. According to them,
they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on
board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution evidence
itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and line when
they came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael. One of the
apprehending officers, SPO1 Demetrio Saballuca, testified as follows:
ATTY. TORREFRANCA ON CROSS-EXAMINATION:
 Q : I get your point therefore, that the illegal fishing supposedly conducted at San Rafael is a
moro ami type of fishing [that] occurred into your mind and that was made to understand
by the Bantay Dagat personnel?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Upon reaching the place, you and the pumpboat, together with the two Bantay Dagat
personnel were SPO3 Romulo Enriquez and Mr. Benito Marcelo and SPO1 Marzan, you
did not witness that kind of moro ami fishing, correct?

A : None, sir.

Q :In other words, there was negative activity of moro ami type of fishing on September 30,
1992 at 4:00 in the afternoon at San Rafael?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And what you saw were 5 motorized Sampans with fishermen each doing a hook and line
fishing type?

A : Yes, sir. More or less they were five.

Q : And despite the fact you had negative knowledge of this moro ami type of fishing, SPO3
Enriquez together with Mr. Marcelo boarded the vessel just the same?

A : Yes, sir.

x x x x x x x x x.[43]
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium
cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of
the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. An Inventory was
prepared by the apprehending officers and only the following items were found on board
the boat:
ITEMS QUANTITY REMARKS
F/B Robinson (1) unit operating
engine (1) unit ICE-900-BHP
sampans 28 units fiberglass
outboard motors 28 units operating
assorted fishes more or less 1 ton live
hooks and lines assorted
x x x.[44]
 We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers found in the boat
assorted hooks and lines for catching fish. [45] For this obvious reason, the
Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the apprehending officers
immediately after the search did not charge petitioners with illegal fishing, much
less illegal fishing with the use of poison or any obnoxious substance. [46]

The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the
result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the
circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible
conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four
specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.

Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that for the first
laboratory test , boat engineer Ernesto Andaya did not only get four (4) samples
of fish but actually got five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson. [47] This
Certification that four (4) fish samples were taken from the boat shows on its
face the number of pieces as originally five (5) but this was erased with
correction fluid and four (4) written over it. [48] The specimens were taken, sealed
inside the plastic bag and brought to Manila by the police authorities in the
absence of petitioners or their representative. SPO2 Enriquez testified that the
same plastic bag containing the four specimens was merely sealed with heat
from a lighter.[49] Emilia Rosaldes, the NBI forensic chemist who examined the
samples, testified that when she opened the package, she found two ends of the
same plastic bag knotted.[50] These circumstances as well as the time interval
from the taking of the fish samples and their actual examination [51] fail to assure
the impartial mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly
safeguarded.

Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force
Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply
observed by the Solicitor General, the report received by the Task Force Bantay
Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through muro ami on the
waters of San Rafael. Muro ami according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with the
use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the
fishermen surround[ing] the net.[52]

This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to

execute.[53] What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight
(28) fishermen in their discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their
sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that
would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat
and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were
tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged
with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are
acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances
defined under the Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of
1975. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B.
QUE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of

Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705 [1] as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) 277.[2]

The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz,
a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with
illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the
vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. [3]

On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and
SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the
morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and
Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate
number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge.[4]

There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao,
accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified
accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo. [5]

SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut
slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were
sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. [6]

SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting

documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport
agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification
from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-
appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a
certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut
slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. [8]

SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task

Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the
members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the
coconut slabs.[9]

At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force,
together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination
confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile
lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the
tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the
seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of
tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters)
and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]

On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277. The Information alleged:

That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and
custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of
Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued
in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority
to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he

acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial,
he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa [13] and Elpidio
Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from
the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came
from the forest area covered by th PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they
were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services. [15]

Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of

lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal
search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him

to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and
the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of
the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the
provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler
truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance
with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]

Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors: [18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by
EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in
EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there
are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for
possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights
of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights
of accused under custodial investigation.

On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be

convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which
amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest
laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.

Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705

provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied)

Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to
those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the
enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would
render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the
law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at
the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport
of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order
provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer,
non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities
shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR
officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.

xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO
or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant
producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In
order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery
receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.

xxx

When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present

any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court
found:

xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present
a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily
showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a
certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title
covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Q
ue on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms
gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8)
located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of
its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The
accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his
truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but
with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the
outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs
which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much
aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not
secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner
that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994
addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the
CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the
reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4,
1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According
to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the
afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom
he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the
lumber would be for personal used (sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-
request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a
government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any
document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets
a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his
avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned
the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination,
the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned
the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person x x but they were
already reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said
that he did not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request,
to wit:

xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I
am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him
when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.[19]

xxx

Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any

documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.

We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of
illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves
that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is
legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section
68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by
presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal
of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without
the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.

On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the
seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of a poisonous
tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of
his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his
right to counsel.

We do not agree.
 The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was
summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person
shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The
basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that
the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
search appellants truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal
Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos
Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were
patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck
described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge,
accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there
were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked
for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present
any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of
probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellants truck even
without a warrant.Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized
and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-
appellant.

The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether

appellants right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The
Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision

appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA
CRUZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the decision [1] promulgated on February 18, 1997, by
the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal
Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection.

In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as

follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay
Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who
was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully
grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which
dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and
prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted,
cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of

counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of
the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15
a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about
the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio
Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. [3] The prohibited plants were allegedly
planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief
of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M.
Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias
and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to
"uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same. [4]

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay
road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their
informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately
25 meters from appellant's hut.[5]PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.
[6]The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants.[8] Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. [9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the
Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination
of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive
indication for marijuana.[10] She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana
plant placed inside a white sack with markings.

xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result
to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]
 The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on
which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland
Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya.[12] This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of
Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.[13]

As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at

around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable
farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not
know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." [14] This unknown
person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were
found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. [15] Five armed
policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing
there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at
him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. [16]Appellant was so nervous
and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. [17]

The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them
to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of
uprooted marijuana plants.[18] The police team then brought him to the police
station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace
officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore
a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal
logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he
would "be put in a bad situation." [19] At the police headquarters, appellant
reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.
[20]

On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses

around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.
[21] The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the
barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the
marijuana plants were found was located between his house and Carlito
Pascua's.[22]

The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony
was offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted
in the lot he was cultivating. [23] Tipay presented a sketch he made, [24] which
showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts
of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor.According to Tipay, the marijuana
plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters
distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua. [25] Tipay admitted on cross-examination
that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements. [26] He
further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter
of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and the
proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants. [27]

Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as
charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating
marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the
accused.
"SO ORDERED."[28]

Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE

SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING
PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF

VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUSDELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND
WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA. [29]

Simply stated, the issues are:

(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?

(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?

(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
 (4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?

The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are
interrelated.

Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does
not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the
protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not
places.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records
clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first
place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in
an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from
afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they
reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the
police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless
lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.

The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by
the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely
to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a
search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and
forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate
the said plants upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot
was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to
keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was
required."[30]

The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and
seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit
of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. [32]Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. [33]

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the
declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least
one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had
revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted
was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have
convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended
the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient
to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and
seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are
searches allowed without warrants. [34] The mantle of protection extended by the
Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their
intentions.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we

apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements
must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; and

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[35]

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. [36] Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The
seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.[37] Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants
was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could
spot the illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand."
The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
 Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the
protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of
the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity
of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.[39] The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" [40] of the
individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected
against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. [41] To conclude
otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead
to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable
searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or
a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as
to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.

We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants
were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second
issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for
the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful
search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the
court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as
evidence to convict appellant.

We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of
the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized
marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now
address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution
suffices to convict appellant?

In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the
police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana
when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the
marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent
counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial
investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the
constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if
given without any counsel."[42]

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana

plants in question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to
counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to
have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation
conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to
elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes
that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and
independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant
claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply
to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor
can it override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.

The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that
appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the
police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants
failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him
indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.

The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.[43] An investigation begins when it is no longer a
general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when
the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. [44] The moment the police try to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person
suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of
counsel.[45]

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the
police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the
marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was
supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had
likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana
cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was
no longer a general inquiry.[46]

Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is
the cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need
to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking
him..."[47] In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already
investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under
custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." [48] As a suspect, two armed policemen
interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and
three other armed policemen.[49] All had been dispatched to arrest him. [50] From
these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of
his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note
that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for
photos in front of the marijuana plants.

Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to

its admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be
in writing.[51] The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It
was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused
during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his
arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being
violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.
[52] Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made
without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.[53]

It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be

convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author
thereof.[54] The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only
stand the test of reason,[55] it must likewise be credible and competent.
[56] Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. [57] Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is
bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." [58]

In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to
convict appellant of the offense charged. These were the seized marijuana
plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said
marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other
evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these
proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict
him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.

First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted
without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence
clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There
was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the
immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running
afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.

Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which

appellant allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay
but also violative of the Bill of Rights.The purported confession was made
without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by
the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without
running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal
investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel
during such investigation.

In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to

appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied
upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.

The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..." [59] To justify the conviction
of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must
stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the accused.[60] Absent the required degree of proof of an
accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.[61] In this case, the seized
marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted
with constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding."[62] Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled
investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence
against him.[63] Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the
prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of
evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of
innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather,
we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."[64]

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless
held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, G.R. No. 176077

Petitioner, Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
- versus - MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 31, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting petitioner of
Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was
charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
authority of law, did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control [METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE
(SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the
provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3]

Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela
Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3
Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement
Unit.The testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was
dispensed with after petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the
prosecution.

On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The
testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister,
respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their
testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution

First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police
Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in Physical Science Report
No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1, and D-2) that per qualitative examination conducted on
the specimen submitted, the white crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram,
0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
 Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police Station-Drug
Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution further endeavored to
establish the following:

At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the
Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates after the (sic)
receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right
drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan
City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and
(sic) E-3, and E-4). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by
SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug
Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and
herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team boarded a
rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant
and/or memorandum.

When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at
around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the
house of one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the
house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a
small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a
distance of 1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which
he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently
pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3
Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while Abe, on the other hand,
after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4)
pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio
immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned
them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as
Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a ABE, 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident
of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident completely
opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he alleged that at
about 4:00 oclockin the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his
sister and father, were at the upper level of their house watching the television soap
Cindy, they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to
go down. There already inside were several male individuals in civilian clothes who
introduced themselves as raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his
(Abe) arrest for alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to
these officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at
the back when he tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and
together with his father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way
to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small
piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by the
raiding police team from their house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner]
 was transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained. That
upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the said headquarters, his father was ordered
to go home.[5]

On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the
elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6] convicting petitioner of
Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused ABRAHAM
MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of possession of a
dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under the provision of Section 11, sub-
paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, in view of the absence of aggravating circumstances. The Court
likewise orders the accused to pay the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php300,000.00) as fine.

Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.

On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the decision of the
RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against
him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the
time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

 1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO
DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM OF SHABU
TRADING ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH CONVERTED
THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A RAIDING TEAM, CAN VALIDLY
MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT HAVING
BEEN FIRST OBTAINED FROM A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.

2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED

WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR A
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE FOUR (4)
PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING ARRANGED BY
PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS ENTRY INTO THE HOUSE
AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT ANY WARRANT.

4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC

SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 5
(3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF

HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND
NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING
THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION.

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE

PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ON
THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND ARREST, IS CORRECT.[10]

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure
of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him.Petitioner
insists that he was just watching television with his father and sister when police
operatives suddenly barged into their home and arrested him for illegal possession
of shabu.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside
their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not
sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search
warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets
by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police
surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence
will take the place of a validly issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a
curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view
doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly
questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the
arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.

Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his
constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his
detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished
accordingly.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.[11] An accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[12]

In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection raised
as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his
arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not
even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.[13]

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that
of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously
issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.  a peace office of a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;[14]

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.[15]

In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in flagrante

delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The
established facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to verify the reported drug-related
activities of several individuals, which included the petitioner. During the operation,
PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic
sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the living room of their home. The
plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3
Antonio, who was only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner was
seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house by gently pushing the door. Upon
gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer. After which,
petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3
Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioners contention, PO3
Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights.[16] PO3 Antonio then took the
petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned them
over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of the
name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline
substance were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which
later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.
Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the
petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing
a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established
exceptions.

Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure
must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[17] The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and
judicial exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a

judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic
sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon
learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic
sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls
within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have
that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant
and may be introduced in evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
 across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye
and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant
before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of
the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in
evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure in
the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its
seizure, this too deserves scant consideration.

Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

x x x x.

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
 confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.

x x x x.[21]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with
the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced
against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[23]

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of
the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain
of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently
established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily
surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with
petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately brought to the police station
and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating
officer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the
person of the petitioner were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of
the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for
laboratory examination to the National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The
evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela
Rosa.[24] After a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets
by the latter, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.[25]

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the
prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the
forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his
residence were also the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the
Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.
[26] Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly
established in the present case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per
seconstitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus
probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.[27]

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.[28] Although not
constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest
assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live
and in person in open court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the
trial courts are in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration
from rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite
statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth.[29]

In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the
trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of
the prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of
petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed by
the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the
crime charged against him.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the
accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and
frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must
be proved with strong and convincing evidence.[30]

As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence
imposed should, however, be modified.
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the
degree of purity thereof:

x x x x.
 Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows:

x x x x.

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly-introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). The evidence adduced
by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his
possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug,
without any legal authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable
penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period
shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law; hence, the imposable
penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

ELENITA C. FAJARDO, G.R. No. 190889

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
January 10, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006 decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.

The facts:

Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation
of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in

Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of
law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and
control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.]
M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with
defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16
Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56
caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45
ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their
possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial
Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial
Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03
issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan.[3]

When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
[4] During pre-trial, they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:

1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;

 2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search
warrant in this case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes,
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;

3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the

evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;

4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita

Fajardo in the morning of August 28, 2002; and

6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested

immediately upon the arrival of the military personnel despite the fact
that the latter allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm in the
evening of August 27, 2002.[5]

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,[6] these are the chain
of events that led to the filing of the information:

In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special
Operations Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police
Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of
concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III
Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the
residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.

Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the
PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons
scampered and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding
two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of
petitioner.

Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband
of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners
house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the
perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A
few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the
police troops. No agreement materialized.

At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2
Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw
Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects
landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a neighboring
residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega),
radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects,
which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US,
with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial
number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1
Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search
warrant.

The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with

a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the
police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was able to
confiscate the following:

1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;

2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.

Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to
possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information
for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed
against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search
warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and
signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this
pertinent portion of the application:

That this application was founded on confidential information received by

the Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[7]

They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since
petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to
accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain
in the living room (sala).

Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt
prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother,
Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the
raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was
wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[8]

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already
denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying
the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were
not appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and
Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in
the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they
have effectively waived such irregularities and defects.

In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
 Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having
served with the Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for
going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his military background, it
is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable
about different types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier,
undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for
firearms, explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those
firearms and ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of
the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a government property. If it is
so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those
items. The logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.

xxxx

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession

of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control and management.
This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The
same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of
the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.

xxxx

x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it
is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession
was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

xxxx

To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive

under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm
ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the
subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused
has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or
explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of
 a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused
has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit
G).

The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or
license on the two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US
with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five
(35) pieces live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live
caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered from their possession
during the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police
Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9]

Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms

and explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as
high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also
lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.

Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied in an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with
the CA.

Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its
conclusions of law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following
observations:
 [A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did
not have personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to
possess firearms as required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical
statement on that point during the application. Also, he failed to attach to
the application a certification to that effect from the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification
is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license
or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why
said certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary,
during the application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply
ignored.[10]

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared
inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside
the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence,
pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a

firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They
were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and
twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in the CA
Resolution dated December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse.

At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and
Valerio charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, viz.:

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but

one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles
confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of
Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.[13] Illegal possession of two
(2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16
ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is
punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified
as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .
45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with
firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.[14]

On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol,
model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced
serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which states:

Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession

of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.[15]

This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294,
which categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a
license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated
different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above classification,
unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of
any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:
 Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)

By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now
particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is
classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then
grouped according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D.
No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information,
and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,
[16]because different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the
weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.

Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner
and Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a
waiver, and they could be convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the
information.[17] This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the
courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2,
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the
search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review
since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively
acquitted from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to
the conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.

The Issues
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers
does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid
intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with
Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of
the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly
seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is
there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of
the receivers.

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were
seized in plain view, hence, admissible.

No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the
same article

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus,
evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any
of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence
in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a
right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.[19] It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject
to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.[20]

Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45
caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen
respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought
refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio
when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the
policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search
warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects.
Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or
evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when
subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.

The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:

Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

A Yes, sir.

Q What were they doing?

A They were cordoning the house.

Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that
incident. What did he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.

Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is
the police officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the
following day.

Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you
recall where were you?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.

Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual
incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.
Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that
something outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know him?

A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.

xxxx

PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do
something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.

xxxx

Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the
flashlight on the place where something was thrown.

Q What did you see if any?

A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

xxxx

Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28,
2002, do you recall another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.

Q And can you tell us what was that incident?

 A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell
on top of the roof of another house.

Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of
the house?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was that person?

A Zaldy Valerio again.

xxxx

Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out
of the house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.

Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of
the house?
A He was on top of the house.

xxxx

Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.

xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.

xxxx

Q What did you do if any?

A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.

xxxx

Q Who opened the fence for you?

A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.

Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you
find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21]

The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their
initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the
seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the
law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.

Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence.
The liability for their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on
petitioner.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for
illegal possession of part of a firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the
following disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22] are instructive:

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession

of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be
effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to
convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an
intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes
significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence
of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
 When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the
crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime
and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not
have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit
an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the
second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is
done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent
and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still
be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to
any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored
in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the
accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is
not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it
is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession
was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or
control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting
the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No.
1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as
long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[23]

Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed
when the holder thereof:

(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof

(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24]

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of
the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding
the receivers, before or during their disposal.

At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because
Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners
house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent
in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.

Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed
from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to
convert such assumption into concrete evidence.

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses
are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which
are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by
law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.

The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient
particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized
receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two
guns when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely
then that the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen
with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired
with Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence
indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act
committed by Valerio.
Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome
by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the
same does not have the corresponding license for it.[26]

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must
yield these requisites:

(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and

(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for
the firearm to which the seized part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States
Property and the other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as
Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm
parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.[27] His testimony was corroborated by
DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28]

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained
that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber
of firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification[30] to that
effect and identified the same in court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the
certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who
is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.

U.S. Supreme Court

Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)

Harris v. United States
No. 34
Argued December 12, 13, 1946
Decided May 5, 1947
331 U.S. 145
Syllabus
1. Upon warrants charging violations of the Mail Fraud Statute and the National Stolen
Property Act, five federal agents arrested an accused in the living room of an apartment
which was in his exclusive possession. Without a search warrant, they searched the
apartment (living room, bedroom, kitchen and bath) intensively for five hours, for two
canceled checks and any other means by which the crimes charged might have been
committed. Beneath some clothes in a bedroom bureau drawer, they discovered a
sealed envelope marked "personal papers" of the accused. This was torn open and found
to contain several draft cards which were property of the United States and the
possession of which was a federal offense. Upon the evidence thus obtained, the
accused was convicted of violations of the Selective Training & Service Act of 1940 and §
48 of the Criminal Code.
Held: The evidence was not obtained in violation of the provision of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor did its use violate the
privilege of the accused against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 331 U.
S. 150-155.
2. A search incidental to an arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to the premises under his immediate control. P. 331 U. S.
151.
3. A search incidental to an arrest, which is otherwise reasonable, is not rendered invalid
by the fact that the place searched is a dwelling, rather than a place of business. P. 331 U.
S. 151.
4. The search in this case was not rendered invalid by the fact that it extended beyond
the room in which the accused was arrested. P. 331 U. S. 152.
5. The search in this case was not more intensive than was reasonably demanded by the
circumstances. Pp. 331 U. S. 152-153.
6. The objects sought and those actually seized in this case were properly subject to
seizure. P. 331 U. S. 154.
7. It is of no significance in this case that the draft cards which were seized were
unrelated to the crimes for which the accused was arrested. P. 331 U. S. 154.
Page 331 U. S. 146
8. Since possession of the draft cards by the accused was a serious and continuing
offense against federal laws, upon discovery of the cards, a crime was being committed
in the very presence of the agents conducting the search. Pp. 331 U. S. 154-155.
9. If entry upon the premises be authorized and the search which follows be valid, there
is nothing in the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure by law enforcement
agents of government property the possession of which is a crime, even though the
officers are not aware that such property is on the premises when the search is initiated.
P. 331 U. S. 155.
10. That abuses sometimes occur is no basis for giving sinister coloration to procedures
which are basically reasonable. P.331 U. S. 155.
151 F. 2d 837, affirmed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y
Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric
Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such information was later
amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The
amended information reads:
 That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @
Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with
magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of
Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant
interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial
or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was not
presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court
rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka
Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and
considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles and/or items
seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and submitted in court as evidence
are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, the same to be turned over to the
Philippine Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS
DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED
INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE
SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST
HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN
FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF
SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd
PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of
CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa.
When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at
Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta,
the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x
7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989).
 After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They
interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with
Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by appellant. When they
reached the house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados
was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain
of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again
required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco
outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first,
she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon
entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled
"Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were
companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow them
to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the
Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and
brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the
house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the
house and owned the items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn,
October 31, 1989). (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in our society, We
must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case at
bar, not only did We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence
against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible
evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14
rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two witnesses
who attested to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned
the name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the same
time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items. (TSN of
October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K-
2," tell us if it has any connection to the house?
A The same house, sir.
Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan
Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did
you find out the identity?
A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true
identity of Bernie Mendoza?
A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
 Q Can you name these officers?
A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-
55)
M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez
Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that
house?
xxx xxx xxx
A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka
Bernie is the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal
knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible
because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should not
be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking
out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make
any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as the
lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have exercised his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show
any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the
subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant on this basis
alone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not
prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute. There
are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2)
search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July
31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant's house upon
invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened
one of the rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more
subversive items; that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles used
in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly conducted without search warrant with the consent of the person
searched in this case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant's
house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized without a
warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in
his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in
his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN,
October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the
appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house
in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this
evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power
to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a
consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here
demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is
silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not
grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They
knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making
the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they
could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely
no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a
military invasion. (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the identification of the
gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was
described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number
thus:
FISCAL
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house?
Lt. Quijardo:
A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately
saw different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive
orientation and the M-14 rifle.
Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?
A In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes
of identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit
"D."
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL:
Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that
firearm to the firearm which according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house.
(TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it could spell the
difference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of the
firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Since
the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus delicti(the
substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not been fully established. This
circumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the gun was found) have
totally emasculated the prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense that the crime
of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with
the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of subversion. The defense
submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge. In People
of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very essence of
subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976,
73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and
held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is
a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the
purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-
Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public
uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a
member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance
which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289 (1981]), this
Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a crime
against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government is the very element of
the crime on rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) , other similar associations and its successors because their existence and
activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security.
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal
means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary
to the arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be
guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary
or indispensable.
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an accused is
simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of
common crimes as applied in rebellion would have found application therein. The respondents relied
on the opinion of this Court when it said:
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS
NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION
WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING
SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the charge under the
third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez case is
not applicable in that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct
offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion
 qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical result of this
may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that obtain in
the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws is
something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992).
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession of
firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no
option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso,
guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine
of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors
assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police was justifiable
on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as
the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine
Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a
gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and
verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila,
applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police
attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found
the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended
a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer
door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read
it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search
the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it
contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes
was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso,
and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his
resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured
the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down
on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and
shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him
downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol
wagon. 1awph!l.net

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them were
eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found
guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced
to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except that he stresses certain
points as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the
contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe
was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable to set
forth further facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the search
warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.

APPLICATION FOR (G)

SEARCH WARRANT

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47

Revellin, detective.

Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C.,
City of Manila? — A. Yes. sir.

Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to the
best of my information the house is occupied by John Doe.

Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premises there are
instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery
tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been reported to
me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are or there will be gambling
conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are known as gambling house. I
have watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a gambling house and a place
where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips,
lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.

I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing questions
and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.

 (Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court

The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant alone. This
document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,

vs.

JOHN DOE, Defendant.

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good
reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of
the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other
utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John
Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using
them in violation of the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10)
days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house
situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the above
described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are commanded
to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court

Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in
the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the
right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although naturally entering
more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing
to be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or justice is satisfied
of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist,
he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of ............................, or in
the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any other place to be searched with reasonable
particularity, as the case may be) for the following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a
person charged with a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which
it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process
known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such
intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs.
Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D,
947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are material differences
between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe search warrants we propose to take into
consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal
([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal Procedure. In
that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is
unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him
when found.
xxx xxx xxx
Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be apprehended is
void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential
requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant
for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe,"
"whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition,
contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and
this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is
to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of
residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the
apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary that
a warrant should have been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court, is the
case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there appeared that one Peaslee had made a
complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your
complainant unknown," had committed an assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued
against "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing
complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of identification of the
person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice
Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of the defendant at
the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain the name of the defendant, nor
any description or designation by which he could be known and identified as the person against whom it was
issued. It was in effect a general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested,
as being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary
principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of
Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches
and seizures of his person, and that all warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant
to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected persons or to seize their property be not accompanied with a
special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an
ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name or give some description of a party to
be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and without other designation of the
person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim.
Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is
unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the warrant;
but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal
appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified.
(1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he
attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The defendant whom he sought to arrest
had a right to resist by force, using no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in question, if they
were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an unlawful act by lawful means, or a
lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they
are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional and statutory,
requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person to be seized. A
failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process
must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the law was summarized
by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings forth certain points of paramount
force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched
as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele
vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were
accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-called
Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited
game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission
of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs.
Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit,
and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search
warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his
control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices
and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic
Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the
warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a
description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the
warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly
the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this
John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso
without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not the
home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a
club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead
the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would
commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the
police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man has
a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less so in a club or public place, the person
sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the
officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest.
Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's
idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3
Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein. Mention
was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information, permitting a fictitious name to be
inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that
the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to
comment on this contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly describe the place to
be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be
hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by
superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant
was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the
agents of the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of the House of
Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating
circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender
of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the
prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have
resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within the
medium of that provided by the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the trial judge, and
concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that the judgment appealed from
must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two
months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding
order to carry this judgment into effect issue.