Mark L.

Abragan Saturday 3:30-5:30

Special Proceedings

Case Digest
Vancil vs Belmes
Facts:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over
the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes,
the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and
Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order.
Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to
determine who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
Issue:
Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.
Ruling:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Art.
211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that
Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She
admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians
who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

Sinco vs. Longa

Facts:
Hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco y Librado, the plaintiff’s great
grandfather, from whom it is passed to his son Escolastic Sinco who died during the Spanish regime.
The latter left a widow, Saturnina Lopez and 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz and Coloma all surnamed
Sinco. Of these, Sergio and Maria Paz are still living, but Coloma died leaving 3 children who are the
plaintiffs in this case, namely Vicente, Pilar and Desemparados. The estate of Escolastico appears to
have been encumbered with debts and in order to liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and three
children leased the property. The lease was continually extended until Saturnina died in 1904. After the
death of the mother, Sergio was hard pressed for money to sustain numerous family and sold his
undivided 1/3 share in the hacienda. The buyer, Longa insisted in acquiring the whole property and
subsequently the 1/3 share of Maria Paz was included in the sale.
In order to accomplish the said end, Emilio Tevez, the guardian of the then minor plaintiffs petitioned
for the approval of the sale alleging that the estate was heavily encumbered and that the minors had no
cash assets to meet their subsistence and education. Subsequently, the court issued its order authorizing
the guardian to make the sale as requested. After the minors attained majority age, they instituted this
petition seeking to annul the said sale pertaining to their 1/3 undivided interest in the hacienda alleging
that the subject sale was attended with fraud. Emilio Tevez, the guardian, was anxious for the sale to
obtain money for his own uses.
Issue:
 Whether or not the sale should be annulled.
Ruling:
No. In passing upon controversies involving charges of fraud alleged to have been committed
many years before the litigation was begun, the proof of such fraud, to be accepted by the court, should
be full and convincing. Experience teaches the danger of lightly accepting charges of fraud made many
years after the transaction which is the subject of question was accomplished, when death may have
sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes affected by time may have given a totally different
color to the questioned transaction. In this case, the participants to the alleged fraud such as the
guardian Emilio Tevez, were already dead. Furthermore, the court also said that the jurisdiction of the
court to authorize the sale of the property of minors rests upon the averments of the petition and
adequate publication or appearance of the parties interested. The fact that the statements of the petition
may be untrue with respect to the existence of encumbrances on the property and necessity of the sale,
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, which rests upon the averments and not upon the truth of
those averments. The suggestion that theorder was irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court
because publication was not made overthe whole period required by law losses its forcein view of the
fact that the next of kin of theminors are stated in the order to have personally appeared in court.

Nery vs Lorenzo
Facts:
A parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the widow of the deceased Leoncio
Lorenzo. The vendor was Bienvenida (widow), guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of
whom later assailed the validity of the said transaction. The latter contended that despite the order of
the guardianship court authorizing the sale of the lot, they were not informed of the move. Further, they
contended that the guardianship proceeding was conducted without notifying the two older siblings
although they were already more than 14 years of age at that time.

The heirs of Silveria Ferrer who allegedly owned 1/4 of the property likewise intervened in the action.
The lower court adjudged them the owners of the 1/4 portion and it likewise declared the sale to be null
and void.

The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to the spouses (as
to the 3/4 portion) by the guardian is valid, without prejudice to the children demanding from their
mother their participation in the proceeds. Not being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the
spouses Nery, the children of the deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court could have validly authorize the sale of the property

Ruling:
No, the juridictional infirmity is clear. The Court of Appeals failed to give due weight to the
jurisdictional defect that the minors over 14 years age were not notified. The probate court is therefor
correct in not have authorized the sale due to this clear jurisdictional infirmity. The rights of the young
should never be ignored and it does not matter if their guardian is their mother, as even in some cases,
the interest of the mother is opposed to that of the children.

Finally, when minors are involve, the state being the parens patriae has the duty to protect the rights of
persons or individuals who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

Facts:
Monina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose parents were unknown and whose
whereabouts were unknown were brought to them. They reared and took care of the two kids. Primo
died in 1998 but Monina got married to Angel Olario, an American citizen. When the children were
brought to them, they registered them making it appear that they were the natural parents. Monina
decided to adopt the two (2) children by availing of the amnesty under RA 8552 to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child, hence, she filed the petition on April 24, 2002.

Michelle was 25 years old and already married at the time of the filing of the petition. Michael was 18
years old. The husband of Michelle gave his consent to the adoption. The DSWD issued a certification
that they were abandoned children. After trial, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
husband of Monina did not join her in the petition as required by Section 7(c), Article III, RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code. She filed a Motion for reconsideration as she did not fall under any of
the exceptions provided for by the law. (Sec. 7(c), Article III, RA 8552). It likewise ruled that the
contention that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband,
who was not even made a party in this case, must comply. As to the argument that the adoptees are
already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial
court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.

Hence, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner,
who has remarried, can singly adopt.

She contended that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the
State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. She argued that the legal
maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argued that joint parental authority is
not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

Held:

No.The husband and wife should have jointly filed the petition for adoption. The principle of dura lex
sed lex is applicable as the law is explicit that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt.

The use of the word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
her husband are not legally separated from each other. The fact that her husband gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that her
husband must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7
of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior
to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed
to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise
be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of her husband. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner.

Republic vs Vergara
Facts:
The spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due who are the younger siblings of
Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a
naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural
parents, gave their consent to the adoption.

The lower court granted the petition and allowed the adoption. Regional Trial Court disregarded the
sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and
fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the
law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a
child.

The republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye
are not qualified under the law to adopt.

Issue:
Whether or not they should be allowed to adopt the said children?

Ruling:
No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the
Family Code which states:
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the
minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions
laid down by the law.
On the otherhand Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption
by husband and wife. Article 185 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt
the latter's child but her brother and sister. The law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating
the proscription against judicial legislation

Comparative Analysis
Parco v. Court of Appeals and Paciente v. Dacuycuy
In the of Parco vs Court of Appeals, it was ruled that the guardianship court has no jurisdiction
to order the reconvenyance of the properties of the ward. The court reasoned that it does have the
jurisdiction to order the said reconvenyance because there is a cloud over the titles of the properties in
question. An as such a reconveyance would require the determination of the ownership or title of the
subject three parcels of land, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and thus must
be threshed out in a separate and ordinary civil action.
On the otherhand, in the case of Paciente vs Dacuycuy it was ruled that the guardianship court has
jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title of the properties of the ward. The
court in this case ruled that guardianship court has jurisdiction to issue the said order because the title
and ownership of the minors over the disputed property is clear and indisputable . Thus, the court
orders for the return or deliver of the property is valid.