V.
LIABILITY doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the
A. POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS
Art. 2183, CC. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
VESTIL V IAC (UY)
179 SCRA 47 CRUZ; December 6, 1989
NATURE: Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate
Court.
FACTS
- July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was
playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to
the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead.” She was discharged after
nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting
of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child
died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a
result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies
- Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that
the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy,"
the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
- Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the Vestils
were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries
caused by the dog.
- On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds
that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death has been satisfactorily established.
Petitioners’ Claim
The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own
the dog that bit her.
Respondents’ Comments
The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was
a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it
bite Theness.
ISSUE
WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.
HELD
Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code
is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.
Reasoning
ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damage should come from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house,
which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no
time of the incident in question.
- There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly
went to the house, once or twice weekly.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a
result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link between
the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been
satisfactorily established.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely
provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak
only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as
they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the
time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever
she might have done to the animal.
- Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance
of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It
is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest
that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
DISPOSITION: The Court approves the time.
B. THINGS THROWN OR FALLING FROM A
BUILDING
CIVIL CODE
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for
damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been
taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of
explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe
and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to
persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or
lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or
deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding
articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person
suffering damages may proceed only against the
engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or
a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
1
Page
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
DINGCONG vs. KANAAN
72 Phil.14; G.R. No.L-47033 AVANCEÑA;Apr.25, 1941
NATURE: Pet. for certiorari assailing the dec’n of the CA
FACTS:
-The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the
house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Basa Street of the
City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. Among
the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a
month, and occupying room no. 10 of said hotel.
Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor of
the hotel and established his "American Bazaar"
dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and
merchandise.
-Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, when
retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that with
only an ordinary basin without drainage. That time, the
pipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run off the
pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and
merchandise of the "American Bazaar," causing a loss
which the CFI sets at P1,089.61.
-The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing
the establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filed
this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong,
Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria.
-CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted
Jose Dingcong. CA reversed and declared Jose
Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to pay the
plaintiffs damages.
ISSUE:
WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are
liable for damages
HELD: YES.
-Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being
the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open
the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and
wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of the
hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also
be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent these damages, despite his power and authority
to cause the repair of the pipes.
Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the
costs against apellant.
C. DEATH/INJURIES IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT
CIVIL CODE:
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers
are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or
injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other
employees, even though the event may have been
purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if
the death or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment. The employer is also liable
for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or
disease caused by such employment or as the result of
the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to
the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary
act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for
compensation. When the employee's lack of due care
contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall
be equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence
of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be
solidarily liable for compensation. If afellow worker's
intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or
injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's
fellow worker.
AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY
58 PHIL 14 VICKERS; March 6, 1933
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
FACTS:
- Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer
Sewing Machine Company in the district of San
Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of
Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his
district according to the records of the company.
- One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while
riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the
corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of
Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay.
- It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora
Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company, and
that at the time of his death he was returning home after
making some collections in San Francisco del Monte.
- According to the practice of the company, if collectors
made collections on Sunday they were required to
deliver the amount collected to the company the next
morning.
- The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan
brought an action to recover from the defendant
corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No.
3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for
compensation.
- Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and
they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act
No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of
P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.
- Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo
Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries
resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the
City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that
Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void
because it denies the defendant the equal protection of
the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract
between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan,
and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate
jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and
nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and
XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles
of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.
2
Page
RULING : NO.
- As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed
on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not
approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the
law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of
which reads as follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury from any
accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such
employment or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the
sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
- The accident which caused the death of the employee
was not due to and in pursuance of his employment.
- At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his
employment with the defendant corporation, but was on
his way home after he had finished his work for the day
and had left the territory where he was authorized to
take collections for the defendant.
- The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in the
course of the employment", and as a general rule an
employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries
resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to
or returning from his place of employment, because such
an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his
employment.
- The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in
section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812
to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this
phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of
Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said:
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of
the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while
the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. By
the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee
while in the course of the employment, but only for such
injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar
to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's
employment of incidental to such employment, and
accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to
some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in
a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks
to which all persons similarly situated are equally
exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the
particular employment are excluded.
- If the deceased had been killed while going from house
to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of
his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have
the right, prima facie, to recover.
- In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in
his own conveyance.
- Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never
notified the defendant corporation of his removal from
San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the
company did not know that he was living in Manila on
the day of the accident; that the defendant company did
not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish
or require its agents to use bicycles.
- These are additional reasons for holding that the
accident was not due to and pursuance of the
employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to
change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to
Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and
forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant
company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to
use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did
not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his
employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
D. STRICT LIABILITY/PRODUCT LIABILITY
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 142
Art. 2187,CC. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall
be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or
harmful substances used, although no contractual
relation exists between them and the consumers.
Consumer Act:
REGULATION OF SALES ACTS AND PRACTICES
Art. 50. Prohibition Against Deceptive Sales Acts or
Practices. - A deceptive act or practice by a seller or
supplier in connection with a consumer transaction
violates this Act whether it occurs before, during or after
the transaction. An act or practice shall be deemed
deceptive whenever the producer, manufacturer,
supplier or seller, through concealment, false
representation of fraudulent manipulation, induces a
consumer to enter into a sales or lease transaction of
any consumer product or service.
Without limiting the scope of the above paragraph, the
act or practice of a seller or supplier is deceptive when it
represents that:
(a) a consumer product or service has the sponsorship,
approval, performance, characteristics, ingredients,
accessories, uses, or benefits it does not have;
(b) a consumer product or service is of a particular
standard, quality, grade, style, or model when in fact it is
not;
(c) a consumer product is new, original or unused, when
in fact, it is in a deteriorated, altered, reconditioned,
reclaimed or second-hand state;
(d) a consumer product or service is available to the
consumer for a reason that is different from the fact;
(e) a consumer product or service has been supplied in
3
accordance with the previous representation when in
Page
fact it is not;
(f) a consumer product or service can be supplied in a
quantity greater than the supplier intends;
(g) a service, or repair of a consumer product is needed
when in fact it is not;
(h) a specific price advantage of a consumer product
exists when in fact it does not;
(i) the sales act or practice involves or does not involve a
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty
terms or other rights, remedies or obligations if the
indication is false; and
(j) the seller or supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or
affiliation he does not have.
Art. 51. Deceptive Sales Act or Practices By Regulation.
- The Department shall, after due notice and hearing,
promulgate regulations declaring as deceptive any sales
act, practice or technique which is a misrepresentation of
facts other than these enumerated in Article 50.
Art. 52. Unfair or Unconscionable Sales Act or
Practice. - An unfair or unconscionable sales act or
practice by a seller or supplier in connection with a
consumer transaction violates this Chapter whether it
occurs before, during or after the consumer transaction.
An act or practice shall be deemed unfair or
unconscionable whenever the producer, manufacturer,
distributor, supplier or seller, by taking advantage of the
consumer's physical or mental infirmity, ignorance,
illiteracy, lack of time or the general conditions of the
environment or surroundings, induces the consumer to
enter into a sales or lease transaction grossly inimical to
the interests of the consumer or grossly one-sided in
favor of the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier
or seller.
In determining whether an act or practice is unfair and
unconscionable, the following circumstances shall be
considered:
(a) that the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier
or seller took advantage of the inability of the consumer
to reasonably protect his interest because of his inability
to understand the language of an agreement, or similar
factors;
(b) that when the consumer transaction was entered
into, the price grossly exceeded the price at which
similar products or services were readily obtainable in
similar transaction by like consumers;
(c) that when the consumer transaction was entered into,
the consumer was unable to receive a substantial benefit
from the subject of the transaction;
(d) that when the consumer was entered into, the seller
or supplier was aware that there was no reasonable
probability or payment of the obligation in full by the
consumer; and
(e) that the transaction that the seller or supplier induced
the consumer to enter into was excessively one-sided in
favor of the seller or supplier.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3720
AN ACT TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND PURITY OF
FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS BEING MADE
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC BY CREATING THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHALL
ADMINISTER AND ENFORCE THE LAWS
PERTAINING THERETO.
Section 11. The following acts and the causing thereof
are hereby prohibited: (a) The manufacture, sale,
offering for sale or transfer of any food, drug, device or
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.
(b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic.
(c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as
authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow
samples to be collected.
(d) The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in
Section twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or undertaking
is false, except by a person who relied upon a guaranty
or undertaking to the same effect signed by, and
containing the name and address of, the person residing
in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith
the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a
guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b)
which guaranty or undertaking is false.
(e) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely
representing or without proper authority using any mark,
stamp, tag label, or other identification device authorized
or required by regulations promulgated under the
provisions of this Act.
(f) The using by any person to his own advantage, or
revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or
employees of the Department or to the courts when
relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any
information acquired under authority of Section nine, or
concerning any method or process which as a trade
secret is entitled to protection.
(g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or
removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the
doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug,
device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article
is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results
in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
(h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any
advertising relating to such drug, of any representation
or suggestion that an application with respect to such
drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof, or that
such drug complies with the provisions of such section.
(i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales
promotion of any reference to any report or analysis
furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof.
4
Page
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO) Reasoning
227 SCRA 292 DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993 - The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect
to the warranties against hidden defects or
NATURE encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask
Court of Appeals for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or
FACTS fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall
- Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling be applicable.
food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten - Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer
Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
- August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds.
they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of
Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store. merit.
Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found
that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened
soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department II SANGCO, pp 714-734
of Health office in their region and was informed that the
soda samples she sent were adulterated.
- Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her
regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3
cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day
which later on forced her to close down her business on
December 12, 1989.
- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff
Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that
the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-
delict because of pre-existing relation between the
parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed
within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.
- The trial court however annulled the questioned orders
of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings
in the civil case. According to the CA: “the allegations in
the complaint plainly show that it is an action for
damages arising from respondent’s act of recklessly and
negligently manufacturing adulterated food items
intended to be sol for public consumption.” It also noted
that the availability of an action for breach of warranty
does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective
goods.
Petitioners’ Claim:
- Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and prescription.
- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under
A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6
months from the delivery of the goods.
Respondents’ Comments:
- Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for
damages which does not involve an administrative
action.
- Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s
right which can be brought within 4 years (based on
A1146, CC).

ISSUE
WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and
pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4
years
5

HELD
Page

YES
 E. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
Art. 1314, CC. Any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the
other contracting party. (n)
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
29 Phil 542 TRENT; February 18, 1915
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CFI
FACTS:
-Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist
was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a
contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar”
for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125.
- Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist
days before the delivery date so that he can lease the
film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350
for the film for the same period.
- Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for
damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE:
WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with
the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not
knowing at the time the identity of the parties
HELD: YES
- Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the
contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from
unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to
induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist.
- Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person
who, by act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay
for the damage done. There is nothing in this article
which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of
the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person
to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is
required in order that the injured party may recover for
the damages suffered.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed
SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua)
GR No. 120554 Quisumbing; September 21, 1999
NATURE:
Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision
FACTS:
- In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing
Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement
with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The
contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of
the same, they continued on a month to month basis. In
1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members
forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with
Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators.
- So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek
Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business
name, Trendsetter Marketing.
- In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua
advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September
1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January
1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were
new lease contracts for signing. While the letters
contained a statement that the leases will be terminated
if the contracts were not signed, the same were not
rescinded.
- In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him
to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be
used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able
to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan.
- Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for
nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC
Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The
CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court
and the CA awarded legal fees only.
ISSUE
- WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference
of contract
HELD-
- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is
respect for the property of others, and a cause of action
ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of
his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner,
Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent of the latter’s property right.
Reasoning-
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damges are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One
becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of asset if
a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with;
b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of
the invasion;
d) the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under the general negligence rules.
- On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its
existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal
justification or excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek
Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in
asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor
was unlawful interference.
- The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted
solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the
6
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest
Page
rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was
not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So.
Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of
damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous
interference is Article 1314 which states that “ any third
party who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party”. The
Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In this casse, due to
defendant’s action of interference, plaintiff was forced to
seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses
to protect his interests. The Court, however, found the
award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos 100,000.00
Disposition:
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the
modified award of attorney’s fees.
AQUINO, pp 795-801
F. LIABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Art. 2189, CC. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN
171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989
Nature:
Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA
Facts:
 on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court
interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she
was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured,
due to which she was hospitalized, operated on, and
confined.
 She averred that she suffered mental and physical
pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She
has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at
the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income.
She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former
jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to
perform her religious, social, and other activities
which she used to do prior to the incident.
 Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which
was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by
leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet
wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.
 City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted
that the manhole is owned by the National
Government and the sidewalk on which they are
found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the
National Government. He said that he supervises
the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that
they are properly covered, and the job is specifically
done by his subordinates.
 Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees.
CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground
that no evidence was presented to prove that City of
Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd.
 City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that
is not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the
city.
Issue:
WON control or supervision over a national road by the
City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to
answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC.
Held: YES
- The liability of private corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil
Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
7
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
Page
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
- It is not even necessary for the defective road or street
to belong to the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective
road or street.
- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer.
- The charter only lays down general rules regulating
that liability of the city. On the other hand, article
2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from
“defective streets, public buildings and other public
works.”
On Damages awarded
- Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven
expenses of P8053.65. The trial court should not
have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely
on “speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the
amount.
- Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is
reduced to P20000. Guilatco’s handicap was not
permanent and disabled her only during her
treatment which lasted for one year.
- Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000.
- Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus
P450 bonus remain the same
- P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same
Disposition: Petition granted. CA decision reversed and
set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with
modification.

G. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

CIVIL CODE:

Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is

presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. (n)

Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of

negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or
injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons
or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in
his occupation or business. (n)

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is

responsible for the damages resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs. (1907)

Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or

a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
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