ELEC LAW Cases For Dec 9 2017

G.R. No.
148326 November 15, 2001
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the
Commission on Election (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was issued by its Second
Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the
First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his
certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his
motion for reconsideration.
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional
seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his
certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, 1 while Cagas filed his on February
28, 2001.2
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On
Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition3 to disqualify Villaber and to cancel
the latter's certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2,
1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No.
86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year
imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00.4Cagas further alleged that
this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is
disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its
Decision dated April23, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017,5 affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted,
Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision,
docketed as G. R. No. 106709. However, in its Resolution6 of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third
Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and
executory.7 Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate
of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek to be elected " - which false statement is a
ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
In his answers8 to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not
become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for
promulgation in his presence.9Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and
executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not
involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the
COMELEC, Manila, for resolution. 1âwphi1.nêt
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas' petition, issued the
challenged Resolution10 in SPA A 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from
holding any elective public office" and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled
that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this
Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.11
Villaber fIled a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a
Resolution12 dated May 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
"The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified." (Emphasis ours)
As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law
Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 13
In In re Vinzon,14 the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is

done contrary to justice, honesty , or good morals."
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections15 that "not every criminal act
involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme
Court to determine."16 We further pronounced therein that:
"...in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court
admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes
which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a
crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute." (Emphasis ours)
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre17 that the determination of whether a crime involves moral
turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be
resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torrewhich involves the crime of fencing
punishable by a special law.18
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
"That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal
to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check
No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of
P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice."
(Emphasis ours)
He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides :
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court." (Emphasis ours).
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 19
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda20 we
held that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person.…" 21 The effects of the issuance of a worthless check,
as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez,22 through Justice Pedro L. Yap,
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest." 23 Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or
society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,24 insofar as it
states that conviction under B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he
is not a lawyer.
This argument is erroneous.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda's conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22
and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this
Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There we said in part:
"We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
under both of which she was bound to 'obey the laws of the land.' Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x
x."25(Emphasis ours)
Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-
lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a
member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member.
We cannot go along with petitioner's contention that this Court's ruling in Tuanda has been
abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines,26 which
reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.27 In these two latter cases, the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a
fine was imposed. Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence, the offense no
longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is what we said in Rosa
Lim:
"In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.
The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed
on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that
petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was
committed, 'otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term.' We do the same here. We believe such would
best serve the ends of criminal justice."
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS
TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY
OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which
provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel
M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a
member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating
from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‗OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,‘ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;"1
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."2
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate 3 and sixteen (16)
members of the House of Representatives, 4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report,5 signed by its
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment
thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his
objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action. 6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees 7 to
the Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep.
Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference
Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been
recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral
Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other
members were given a copy thereof.11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House
approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining
their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a
rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the
constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator
signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular. 12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by
the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill
No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners‘ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject
which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in
the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended
its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of
the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
"Accountability of Public Officers:"14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering
those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as
ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents‘ Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss
the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the
present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the
members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered
harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as
taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners‘ allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective
Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted
into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it
encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of
candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as
expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective
official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The
legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No.
9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With
the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to
finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency
or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be
expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of
the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its
title. Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67,
leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the
appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated
as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due
process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that
the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would
be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the
issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those
members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents
merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared
otherwise by the Court.
The Court‘s Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised
by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the
petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
"overarching significance to our society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of
standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then
Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734
(Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos. 19 Similarly, the
Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other
petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the
validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 23Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee
on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the constitutional
provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this Court‘s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-
vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months
away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The
following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons
of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that
the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our
stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law.30And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul
of the Constitution, it is the judiciary‘s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same. 31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the
petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider 32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and
Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All
laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as
well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an
act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. 33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not
only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media
time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation.
To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the
title be a complete index of its content. 36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions
of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all we‘re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this
provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? That‘s
all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election
practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier
seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, I‘m very comfortable with the title
"Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so that we don‘t come back again
until we find the title. I mean, it‘s one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
Yes.
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let‘s get it over with. To me, ha, it‘s not a very touchy
issue. For me, it‘s even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the
Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam
just for the title Is that what you‘re ...?
It‘s not the title per se, it‘s the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. I‘m happy that there is
already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it
would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that we‘re all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, let‘s listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions
deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections
through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly

adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is
a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field,
we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is
covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the
House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair
election practices because ...
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is
more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think that‘s the theory.
So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special
provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
O, sige, fine, fine. Let‘s a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why don‘t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus
Election Code?"

Why don‘t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
That‘s not an election practice. That‘s a limitation.
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election
practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
The rest wala nang problema ano?
VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
The short title, "This Act ..."
You‘re back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." That‘s the House version, eh, dahil
pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act."38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause
with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it
would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. 39 It is
not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed
limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in
Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case
that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the
law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is
achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators
were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply
and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to
casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners‘ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. 44 The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. 46 On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure47 while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. 48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners
insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of
the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not
signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it
was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report
was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched
in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the
provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it now
appears in RA No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for
which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a
detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise

bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment
to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision
states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who runs for president and vice-
president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases51 reveals the Court‘s consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where
the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be
resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,53 viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that
‗the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.‘ And it has been said that ‗Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.‘ Consequently, ‗mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.‘"
The Effectivity Clause

Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take
effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That
is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. 57No such transgression has
been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,

Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA
P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA
WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA
GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM),
BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA
BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK),
AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO),
AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL
SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT
(AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS),
ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG),
SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD),
PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC),
FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY
MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR
BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT
SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND
ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS),Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN

FOUNDATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups
which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for
short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec
resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming
party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or
the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks
to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724
dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner
Rosales‘ previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271
have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be
"declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or
coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec2]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private
respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five
(5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents3 in G.R. No.
177271 and one party-list group4 mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments.
In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and
prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14,
2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under
the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant
thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these – and
ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14
party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA;
(5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT
ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to
Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both
petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still
asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this
urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and
marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter 5 dated March 29,
2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec‘s Law Department requesting a list of that groups‘
nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner
Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales‘
requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner
headline "COMELEC WON‘T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading:
"Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own
behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter 8 to the Comelec formally
requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales‘ earlier plea for information regarding the
names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information,
Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to
earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification,
either confirming or denying … the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman
Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
Comelec en bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees‘
names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales‘ basic disclosure request. In its
relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees
in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the
Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only
on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering
the Law Department to ‘implement this resolution and reply to all letters … inquiring on the party-list
nominees’ is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the
impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 … is the final answer to the two formal
requests … of Petitioners".10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-
RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the
April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation
accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground
that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -
xxx committed grave abuse of discretion … when it granted the assailed accreditations even
without simultaneouslydetermining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified
or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-
point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani 11 case which
states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public
respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the
qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself.
(Words in bracket added; italization in the original) 12
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation
of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would
entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question,
particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The
exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office
of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on
record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal‘s evaluation of the evidence. 14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in
which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the
respondent party-list groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941‘s and UP-LR‘s posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the
qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement
that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of
an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae
Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be
filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding
Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of
names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and
captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be
summarized as follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents
as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the
nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding
the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating
groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in
said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days
before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list
system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election
day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis
added.)
And doubtless part of Comelec‘s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from
the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April
13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the
names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the
party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. … said he and [the other five COMELEC]
Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 …, the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or
coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees.
xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the
right to information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional
provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the
essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.16 Without a government‘s acceptance of the
limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of
Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right
to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple
fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are
ordinarily unavailing.18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access
to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people‘s right to know is
limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by
law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a
measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets
or those affecting national security.19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms
embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the
interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to
case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates
for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-
list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall
not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited
in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision
requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition
to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure
before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelec‘s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a
point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it
were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to
information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the
Comelec‘s disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however,
that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable
statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first
instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind
voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914
case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an
election.22 So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec
to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations
accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No.
177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to
the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on
Elections‘ (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors‘ motions for
reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court‘s December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).1
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, 2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, 4mainly on the ground that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved
the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions
of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-
intervenors submit the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription
against the participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan
political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord
differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment
rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest
demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.
I.
Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC‘s motion for
reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for
reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009
Decision.
i. Timeliness of COMELEC‘s Motion for Reconsideration
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the
same rules,6COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision
within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on
December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009.
The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally submitted on December
14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 – still within the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor‘s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained
when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a
substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued
and protected in another proceeding.7
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a
motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard
even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, 8 when the petition for review of the
judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, 9 and even where the
assailed order has already become final and executory. 10 In Lim v. Pacquing,11 the motion for
intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice
and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 We stress again that Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice.15
We rule that, with the exception of the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may
properly intervene in the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the
case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1,
2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a
matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a personal interest in
maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the
May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009
Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their posts. They
stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and
protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Court‘s Decision attains
finality and forms part of the laws of the land.
With regard to the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this case
involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections," and that
"there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal
profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental
importance."16
Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case
at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.
We now turn to the substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
on the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential
positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants‘ activity regardless of
whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national,
municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of
these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA
9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
III.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair
Election Act,17which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective
Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of
the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, 19 an elected official is
not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position
without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees
in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and
Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MS. QUESADA.
xxxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote:
"No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political
activity." This is almost the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the
government service have actually experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or
indirect partisan political activities of many government officials.
So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict,
and which would deter its violation?
MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter
are more than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public service from
engaging in any form of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in implementation
because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of
government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan political activity, then
no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really implement the
constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x20 (italics supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is
presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and
Section 55, Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 –
respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
xxxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office.
xxxx
Section 55. Political Activity. — No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the
Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity
of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or
employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the
names of his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and
employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be
unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts
involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention
by civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in the civil service,
except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units
and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to
vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to
civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."21 This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of
their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign
period.22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions
included.23
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as
express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office
whom they support. This is crystal clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
viz.:
MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1,

subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the
phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "activity" and in lieu
thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.
May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.
MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which
was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended
as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qualification of the general prohibition against taking part
in elections.
Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this
prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an
unconditional right. In other words, the Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold
from any class the right to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only like to
reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who may want to vote but
who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or electioneering may
vote.
MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no
intention on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee. The
elimination of the last clause of this provision was precisely intended to protect the members of the
civil service in the sense that they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political
contest. The last phrase or clause might have given the impression that a government employee or
worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the case. They
are still free to express their views although the intention is not really to allow them to take part
actively in a political campaign.24
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
i. Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions
challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al.
v. Executive Secretary, et al.25
In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly
discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-
resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are
no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates
of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials
continues to be operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the
end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to both elected and appointive
officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable
classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.
Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 26
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed
Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has
been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be
decided in the same manner.27 This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his
treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision.
It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided
against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am
plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be
an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in
the courts.28
Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be
minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any point within the
issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum. 29 This rule applies to all
pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the
case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision
is predicated.30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent
because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the
court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. 31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.:32
… A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground,
be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is
sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as
an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one
proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. 33 (italics supplied)
ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. 34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. 35 The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,36 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 37
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first,
third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the
differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of
the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain," viz.:
… For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield
the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both
head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
[Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President,
in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire
election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. 38
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice,
the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at
a time."39 In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby
creating some inequity as to those included or excluded. 40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of
reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment. 41 We may
not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by
expanding the class.42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. 43 There is no constitutional
requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied; 44 that the
Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law
creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." 45 He must refute all possible rational
bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the
enactment,46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness
of the classification is "fairly debatable." 47In the case at bar, the petitioners failed – and in fact did not
even attempt – to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a
sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis:
... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute‘s distinction is unfair,
underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find
that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of
the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people.49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote.50 Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it
may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in
utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded
to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which
they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes
of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the
public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it
wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.51 (emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating provisions of
law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would
favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both
appointive and elected officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The
absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected
officials (vis-à-vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a
matter worth exploring – but not by this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the
Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our constitutional system, to
balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the
times. It is certainly within the Legislature‘s power to make the deemed-resigned provisions
applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such
frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot
and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of
affairs from a public policy standpoint.
iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision
adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.52 This was a decision of the First Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a
similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms –
freedom of expression and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be
subjected to strict equal protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its
public work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-
handed manner as to render them unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the provision
in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time
that we, too, should follow suit."
Our assailed Decision‘s reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the
fact that the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its
promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et
al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of
Oklahoma, et al.,54 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory
provisions prohibiting federal55 and state56 employees from taking an active part in political
management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation.
Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment and possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in
regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly
from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must
therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against the interests of the
employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees‘ expression interferes with
the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is not
unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining
which positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions. 57 Therefore, insofar as government
employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a
means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the
prohibitions in question.58
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that
partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate
effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and
employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far
imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but
apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate against no racial,
ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere
with or influence anyone's vote at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education,59 the government has an interest in
regulating the conduct and ‗the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the (government), as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.‘ Although Congress is free to
strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is
sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan
political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government,
or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of
Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected
to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or
against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to
serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal
employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play
substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets.
Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.
There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its
employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public
to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent.
Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was
perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction
that the rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to build a powerful,
invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns
convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be
raised against the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the thousands or
hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure
and political campaigns.
A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that
employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and
at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from
express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor
with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions against
coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judgment of the Executive and
Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their
political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or
coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the
prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that ‗the
prohibitions against active participation in partisan political management and partisan political
campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . ..‘ Perhaps Congress at
some time will come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but
that is its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our
view, does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any
event.60 x x x
xxxx
As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will
of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)
Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally
permissible, viz.:
Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan
political conduct of state employees. Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and
important state interests, particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of qualified people by
insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting them
from ‗political extortion.‘ Rather, appellants maintain that however permissible, even commendable,
the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions too broad in
their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be
permitted. For these and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s
818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them or anyone else.
We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague. 61 We have little doubt that s 818
is similarly not so vague that ‗men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.‘62 Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the
section fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out ‗explicit
standards' for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified
employee from being ‗an officer or member‘ of a ‗partisan political club‘ or a candidate for ‗any paid
public office.‘ It forbids solicitation of contributions ‗for any political organization, candidacy or other
political purpose‘ and taking part ‗in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political
campaign.‘ Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be
disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 as ‗partisan,‘ or ‗take part in,‘ or ‗affairs of‘ political
parties. But what was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here: ‗there are limitations in the English
language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although
the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that
the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with,
without sacrifice to the public interest.' x x x
xxxx
[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as
well as unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable
of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately
be invoked in this manner here.
xxxx
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is
that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting
construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to
constitutionally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is,
manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. x
xx
x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an
exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
‗pure speech‘ toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter
protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a
prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State
from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the
matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that
whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations
to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its
terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute,
directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in
an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a
less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818 regulates a substantial
spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal
trespass. This much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been
unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no
question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees from: soliciting
contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming
members of national, state, or local committees of political parties, or officers or committee members
in partisan political clubs, or candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or
affairs of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to
caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking an active part in partisan political
rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get
voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or
circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party or partisan
political candidate.
x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some
other improper applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be
discarded in toto because some persons‘ arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or
chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore,
unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)
It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles
enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be
interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and were
decided based on a different set of facts," viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act‘s prohibition against "active participation in political
management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to campaign for candidates for public
office, to encourage and get federal employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as
delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the
(sic) Oklahoma‘s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of
the State‘s classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan
political activities of federal employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the appellants
actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior, and were administratively
charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to give
referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for
receiving and distributing campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth
Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed
as a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor
of Cranston then began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule
Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a
different set of facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of
Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim,
Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as
representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality of
§14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits "continuing in the classified service
of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any public office."
(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was
enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act‘s prohibition against "active participation
in political management or political campaigns" 63 with respect to certain defined activities in
which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this discussion are:
(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members were
desirous of, among others, running in local elections for offices such as school board
member, city council member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for
the office of Borough Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation
in a partisan election would endanger his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in
the 1971 partisan election for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he
would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act.
The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns" by cross-
referring to the rules made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:
30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State,
county, or municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not
merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such
announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in
furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee
acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence constitutes
an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity. (italics supplied)
Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds
thereafter to pay compensation to these persons. 64
(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration
of unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklahoma‘s Merit System of
Personnel Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that
"[n]o employee in the classified service shall be … a candidate for nomination or election to any paid
public office…" Violation of Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible criminal
sanctions and limited state employment ineligibility.
Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso.
By no stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter Carriers and
Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior
court, the United States Supreme Court. It was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of
Appeals – the same court that decided Mancuso – to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v.
Lynch65 that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtucket‘s "Little
Hatch Act" prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a
candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed, 66 the violation being punished by removal from
office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground
that that the provision of the city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of
Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It
observed that the view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed
upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer
viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the government‘s interest in regulating both the
conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the
citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of
government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of
Congress, and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public
employees substantially served government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh
the employees‘ First Amendment rights.67
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in Magill
was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances
of that case, that politically active bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends
and hurt political foes. Ruled the court:
The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's
candidacy in even a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue compels us to extrapolate
two recent Supreme Court decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and
Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws barring civil servants from partisan political activity.
Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" against
constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred only activity in
partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan
elections would not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.
xxxx
What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the Court‘s
interest balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this record. We believe
that the district court found more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after
Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental
interest which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available. While
this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not government employees, the Court in Letter
Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its
employees differs significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only
was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave little weight to
the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic
means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than
the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process". 68 It
appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits
substantially serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the employees'
First Amendment rights. x x x (italics supplied)
Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major
governmental interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as
follows:
In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient government,
faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The district court discounted this interest, reasoning that
candidates in a local election would not likely be committed to a state or national platform. This
observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concerned.
But a different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient administration could be thought to
threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of
administration favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts
and purchasing, hiring, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers
identified a second governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as
to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in
privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's
authors evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election process.
Where, as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the
city might reasonably fear that politically active bureaucrats would use their official power to help
political friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly fair and
effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee campaigning; if
parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of favoritism is less, for neither friend nor
foe is as easily identified.
A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a
powerful political machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its
partisan potential. The district court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control over
nominations. But in fact candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to
be highly effective both in determining who would emerge from the primary election and who would
be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs, known party affiliation and support
were highly significant factors in Pawtucket elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have
feared that a politically active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent
workers, an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In municipal elections especially, the small
size of the electorate and the limited powers of local government may inhibit the growth of interest
groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan
issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence voters
or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will mass the
scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional misuse
of the public trust to pursue private political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views
of individual employees may balance each other out. But party discipline eliminates this diversity and
tends to make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their
immediate superior's political ambitions, the entire government work force may be expected to turn
out for many candidates in every election. In Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in
political campaigns, a carefully orchestrated use of city employees in support of the incumbent
party's candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the openness of Pawtucket's
nominating procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots.
The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees
achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of
favor from political activity. The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the
possibility of a civil servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of a
threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion of
employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was in Letter Carriers.
Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of public servants for political ends that
a legislature is most likely to see as the primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of
public employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be inclined to
ride herd on the politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party officials
looking over their shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in nominally
nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of
substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court
lose much of their force. While the employees' First Amendment rights would normally outbalance
these diminished interests, we do not suggest that they would always do so. Even when parties are
absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one strong public interest,
an interest that looms larger in the context of municipal elections than it does in the national
elections considered in Letter Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate
running directly against his superior or running for a position that confers great power over his
superior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of a direct
challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a fireman or policeman who runs for
mayor or city council. The possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should
an employee gather substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)
The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect of the
petitioners‘ overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not to be
taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark," the court held:
The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth in a
closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in
constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the challenged law
is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties attend
the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define "substantial" overbreadth.
We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for
a candidate, and they were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities,
including soliciting contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court found
that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so
similar that we may reach the same result without worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque
distinction between speech and conduct.
The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth in a
statute restricting partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in
nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth apparently
requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of
potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-
fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. The question is a matter of
degree; it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a
law substantially overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with
some idea of the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits. Often, simply reading
the statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of probable
invalid applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part
on the number of elections that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees.
For all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is actively
contested by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even in
campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for
example, are endorsed by the local Democratic committee.
The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken
lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in the short
period before the election was held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs
may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy for
which by municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to government efficiency and
integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand
for consideration of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft,
heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled. 69 As it is no longer good law, the
ponencia‘s exhortation that "[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question,
had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too,
should follow suit" is misplaced and unwarranted. 70
Accordingly, our assailed Decision‘s submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably
linked" with two fundamental freedoms – those of expression and association – lies on barren
ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express one‘s
political views through candidacy,71 as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.72 Bart v.
Telford73 pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for
public office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, one‘s interest
in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.74 Moreover, one cannot bring
one‘s action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any allegation that, by running for an
elective position, one is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters. 75
Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar,
are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve
governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather
than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the
danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on
their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity).
These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive
officials and employees to seek elective office. 1avvphi1
En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing76 and Morial, et
al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al. 77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that
resign-to-run provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains:
…U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when
applied to specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all others, 78 under a classification that
is germane to the purposes of the law. These resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a
general and sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of
the law, the second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials,
they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis in the original)
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run provisions
in these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular officials (vis-à-vis a
general class); the questioned provisions were found valid precisely because the Court deferred to
legislative judgment and found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because
it happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the
claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are subject to the resign-to-
run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme Court:
Article XVI, § 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically
resign their positions if they become candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired
portion of the current term is one year or less. The burdens that § 65 imposes on candidacy are
even less substantial than those imposed by § 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially
the same state interests. The District Court found § 65 deficient, however, not because of the nature
or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the manner in which the offices
are classified. According to the District Court, the classification system cannot survive equal
protection scrutiny, because Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials
are subject to § 65 and why others are not. As with the case of § 19, we conclude that § 65 survives
a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational
predicate to the classification scheme.
The history behind § 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time"
approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous
scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a
transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of those
offices enumerated in the provision from two to four years. The provision also staggered the terms of
other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at each election. The
automatic resignation proviso to § 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic
resignation provision was added in Art. XI, § 11, which applies to officeholders in home rule cities
who serve terms longer than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending
the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms of
1958. That the State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those
officeholders whose terms were not extended by § 11 or § 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not
the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected officeholder's
candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places similar restrictions on other
officeholders. The provision's language and its history belie any notion that § 65 serves the invidious
purpose of denying access to the political process to identifiable classes of potential candidates.
(citations omitted and italics supplied)
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket
approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office" out
of context. A correct reading of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling
to the facts of that case, as each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve
weighing governmental interests vis-à-vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:
The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably
entitled to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should
be taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from expressing their private views on
controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public
duties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public
employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general restrictions on
the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the
methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to
becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary relation to the
achievement of the state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety.
Such a requirement offends neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression and
association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (italics
supplied)
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment
positions require restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated. And a
State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions are
placed. (citations omitted)
V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for
being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts
without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee seeking an elective
post and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto; 79 and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding appointive
positions without due regard for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.
i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Official‘s Position, Valid
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they
apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of
position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may
be attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when
the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered
powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp
on the reins of power."80 As elucidated in our prior exposition:81
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective
positions (apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable – even innocuous –
particularly when viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government employees.
Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous
possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on
the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda through a "carefully
orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the
bureaucracy.
…[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging
political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a
restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the type
of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
(citations omitted)
ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they
are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard
for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in
the national, municipal or barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan office and
the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from
regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,"82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin
to those imposed by the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the
elective office sought is partisan in character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said
to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be
considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the
alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not been
repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein
refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered
political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. 83 Obviously,
these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted,
are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678
applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section
4(a) is clearly unsustainable.
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are
likewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices,
since these are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices. 84
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code
in 1985, Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special
rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Said provision states:
Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. – No person shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad ng
sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from
the commencement of the election period but not later than the day before the beginning of the
campaign period in a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the
barangay office for which he is a candidate.
xxxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the
civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present
state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any
election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also
fail. 85
In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply
also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again,
we explained:
In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has not
received judicial imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter
is simply that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees
that differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.86
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly
broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the
overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute‘s plainly
legitimate sweep.87
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute‘s overbreadth would entail, among
other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of
potentially invalid applications.88 In this regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid
application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. 89 The
question is a matter of degree.90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-
nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this distinction
is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounted must
demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid elections (i.e.
the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to
appointive employees) that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute. 91
The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words
of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the
dark,92 especially since an overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State from
‗enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is admittedly within its power to
proscribe.‘93
This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application
of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden
the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that
must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort. 94
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment
of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances
left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible
harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. 95 Facial
overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the
challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least
substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. 96
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain
in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having
arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad
statute.
a1f
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes – which are, at
best, bold predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State
from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably
within its power and interest to proscribe. 97Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with
these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through
a total invalidation of the statute itself. 98
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had
already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their posts. 99 Several COMELEC
election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of Candidacy in their respective
provinces.100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for representative
of the first district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009101 – even as her position as Justice
Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors, 102 who, in turn, act as Vice-
Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. 103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a
Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow
the tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA
9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally
overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent‘s and the intervenors‘
Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court‘s December 1, 2009 Decision;
DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1)
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Penera‘s (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Court‘s Decision of 11
September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Penera‘s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008
of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as
amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence
against Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has
consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second
sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides
that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate
of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which
he/she may be disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of
the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers
the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts
done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this
Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day,
which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign
period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day.
Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On
the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to
apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to
acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one
candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for
elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebio‘s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were
committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts
before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March
2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline
for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January
2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan
political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in
an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be
arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space
where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate
the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/
manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days
before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and
vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding
to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of
candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-
list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list
system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for
other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which
the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the
printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens‘ arms of the Commission
may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the
serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by
inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that
identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1)
ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to
give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,]
uniform for local and national officials?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present
periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he‘s already a
candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don‘t provide that the filing of the certificate will not
bring about one‘s being a candidate.
SENATOR GONZALES. If that‘s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of
candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is
concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the
reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable
ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will
withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
xxxx
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which
apply immediately upon being a candidate?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the
Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign
periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That‘s right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore
because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate
of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still
not be considered as a candidate.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots,
Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended
the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to
meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x
x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still
not be considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until
the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated
election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine
into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that —
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law"
prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress
expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and
underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second
sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled
by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot
without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second
sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any
portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision
considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot
but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In
so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second
sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states —
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election
offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly
means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these
provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read
together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‗candidate‘ refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to
merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus
file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of
candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one‘s
possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election
campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to
the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law
does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted
a day before the start of the campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera
filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009
only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March
2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan
political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
within the realm of a citizen‘s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the
campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the
campaign period.5
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third
paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the
pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the
start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with
impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a
candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described
under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity,
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign
period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign
period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a
candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about
to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature
campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. 6(Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow
grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does
not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan
activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the
start of the campaign period, are lawful.
In layman‘s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may
be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts
before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of
the law.
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified
or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law
says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan
political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start
of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before
the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign
period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void
for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of
the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law
that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be
considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court
but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and
express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third
paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera‘s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET

ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as
the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor
of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 188456 February 10, 2010
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F.

LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO,
FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC
SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND
RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO
ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, Petitioner-in-Intervention.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Movant-
Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
By Decision dated September 10, 2009, the Court denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al.
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and
Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic). The Court also denied the petition-in-intervention
of Pete Q. Quadra, praying that the respondents be directed to implement the minimum
requirements provided under pars. (f) and (g), Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, or
the Election Modernization Act, as amended by RA 9369.
Petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Court on a motion for reconsideration, as
supplemented, praying, as they did earlier, that the contract award be declared null and void on the
stated ground that it was made in violation of the Constitution, statutes, and
jurisprudence.1 Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board
of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and electronic
transmission of the election returns.
To both motions, private respondents TIM and Smartmatic, on the one hand, and public respondents
Commission on Elections (Comelec), et al., on the other, have interposed their separate comments
and/or oppositions.
As may be recalled, the underlying petition for certiorari, etc. on its face assailed the award by
Comelec of the poll automation project to the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture, the challenge basically
predicated on the non-compliance of the contract award with the pilot-testing requirements of RA
9369 and the minimum system capabilities of the chosen automated election system (AES), referring
to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) system. The non-submission of documents to show the
existence and scope of a valid joint venture agreement between TIM and Smartmatic was also
raised as a nullifying ground, albeit later abandoned or at least not earnestly pursued.
The Court, in its September 10, 2009 Decision, dismissed the petition and the petition-in-intervention
on the following main grounds: (1) RA 8436, as amended, does not require that the AES procured
or, to be used for the 2010 nationwide fully automated elections must, as a condition sine qua non,
have been pilot-tested in the 2007 Philippine election, it being sufficient that the capability of the
chosen AES has been demonstrated in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction; (2) Comelec
has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism to ensure compliance of the PCOS with the
minimum capabilities standards prescribed by RA 8436, as amended, and its determination in this
regard must be respected absent grave abuse of discretion; (3) Comelec retains under the
automation arrangement its supervision, oversight, and control mandate to ensure a free, orderly,
and honest electoral exercise; it did not, by entering into the assailed automation project contract,
abdicate its duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and decide, at
the first instance, all questions affecting elections; and (4) in accordance with contract documents,
continuity and back-up plans are in place to be activated in case the PCOS machines falter during
the actual election exercise.
Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the September 10, 2009
Decision on the following issues or grounds:
1. The Comelec‘s public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there
will be failure of automated elections;
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;
3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in

case the PCOS machines fail;
4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review;
5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the machines

in elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;
6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities that will
assure 100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of the 2010 elections;
and
7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelec‘s

bidding rules.
Both public and private respondents, upon the other hand, insist that petitioners‘ motion for
reconsideration should be held devoid of merit, because the motion, for the most part, either
advances issues or theories not raised in the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and
argues along speculative and conjectural lines.
Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the arguments earnestly
pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired reconsideration.
Petitioners‘ threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may not occur. The
conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the very manner of its
formulation and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public respondent
COMELEC2 x x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will be automated failure of
elections";3 "there is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will
result in failure of elections";4 "the unaddressed logistical nightmares—and the lack of contingency
plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot test—make an automated failure of
elections very probable";5 and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x
the contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections."6
Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value and,
surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis-à-vis the possibility of Comelec going manual,
have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for the purpose a
news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16, 2009.7
Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their comment, described
the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelec‘s contingency plan. Petitioners,
however, the same respondents added, put a misleading spin to the Melo pronouncements by
reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to make reference to his succeeding statements to
arrive at a clearer and true picture.
Private respondents‘ observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of what
has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading conclusion. The
effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be deliberately attached to innocent views or even
occasional crude comments by the simple expediency of lifting them out of context from any
publication. At any event, the Court took it upon itself to visit the website, whence petitioners
deduced their position on the possible failure of automated elections in problem areas and found the
following items:
Allaying fears of failure of elections in 2010, the x x x [Comelec] said it will prepare for manual
balloting, especially for areas with problems in electricity and telecommunications network coverage.
xxx
"Aside from preparations for poll automation, Comelec is also preparing for manual elections sa mga
liblib na lugar [in remote places] x x x, provinces with no electricity and would have issues in
electronic transmission. We are ready for manual polls in at least 30 percent or 50 percent of the
country as a last contingency measure in case the contingency plans for automation are difficult to
implement," said Melo.
The poll chief was reacting to statements expressing the possibility of failure of elections due
to the novelty of poll automation.
"The occurrence of nationwide failure of elections as alleged by doomsayers is impossible. Under

the laws of probability, all 80,000 PCOS machines nationwide cannot breakdown. Maybe several
would but we have standby units for this and we also have preparations for manual elections," he
said.8 (Emphasis added.)
Petitioners next maintain that the Comelec abdicated its constitutional mandate 9 to decide all
questions affecting elections when, under Article 3.310 of the poll automation contract, it surrendered
control of the system and technical aspects of the 2010 automated elections to Smartmatic in
violation of Sec. 2611 of RA 8436. Comelec, so petitioners suggest, should have stipulated that its
Information Technology (IT) Department shall have charge of the technical aspects of the elections.
Petitioners‘ above contention, as well as the arguments, citations, and premises holding it together,
is a rehash of their previous position articulated in their memorandum 12 in support of their petition.
They have been considered, squarely addressed, and found to be without merit in the Decision
subject hereof. The Court is not inclined to embark on another extended discussion of the same
issue again. Suffice it to state that, under the automation contract, Smartmatic is given a specific and
limited technical task to assist the Comelec in implementing the AES. But at the end of the day, the
Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service provider and lessor of goods and services to the
Comelec, which shall have exclusive supervision and control of the electoral process. Art. 6.7 of the
automation contract could not have been more clear:
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission En Banc,
the entire process of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall [still]
be conducted by COMELEC‘s personnel and officials and their performance, completion and final
results according to specifications and within specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of
COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)
The aforequoted provision doubtless preserves Comelec‘s constitutional and statutory

responsibilities. But at the same time, it realistically recognizes the complexity and the highly
technical nature of the automation project and addresses the contingencies that the novelty of
election automation brings.
Petitioners‘ posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in the
appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should PCOS machines fail, cannot be
accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and back-up plans that would be implemented
in case the PCOS machines falter during the 2010 elections.13 The overall fallback strategy and
options to address even the worst-case scenario—the wholesale breakdown of the 80,000 needed
machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved units—have been discussed in some detail in the
Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need not belabor them again.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in the decision
sought to be reconsidered—and this should not be an obstacle for a reconsideration—the hard
reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly
persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.
Second, petitioners‘ position presupposes that the Comelec is, in the meanwhile, standing idly by,
totally unconcerned with that grim eventuality and the scenarios petitioners envision and depict.
Comelec, to reiterate, is the constitutional body tasked to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the discharge of this responsibility, Comelec has
been afforded enough latitude in devising means and methods that would enable it to accomplish
the great objective for which it was created. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the
conduct of elections, the Court—or petitioners for that matter—must not, by any preemptive move or
any excessive zeal, take away from Comelec the initiative that by law pertains to it. 14 It should not be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser
responsibility.15
Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue, invoke the
opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban in Loong v. Comelec,16 where he made
the following observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the basic
features of the automated election system,"17 and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual election x x x are inappropriate, if
not downright useless, to the proper appreciation and reading of the ballots used in the automated
system."18 Without delving on its wisdom and validity, the view of Justice Panganiban thus cited
came by way of a dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting opinion being
a mere expression of the individual view of a member of the Court or other collegial adjudicating
body, while disagreeing with the conclusion held by the majority. 19
Petitioners insist next that public respondents cannot comply with the requirement of a source
code20 review as mandated by Sec. 14 of RA 8436, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 14. Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source
Code of Review.—Once an AES Technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political
party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.
Pursuing the point, after citing a commentary of an IT expert on the importance of a source code
review, petitioners state the observation that "there are strong indications of [the inability] to comply x
x x since the source code, which runs the PCOS machines, will effectively be kept secret from the
people."21
Again, petitioners engage in an entirely speculative exercise, second- guessing what the Comelec
can and will probably do, or what it cannot and probably will not do, with respect to the
implementation of a statutory provision. The fact that a source code review is not expressly included
in the Comelec schedule of activities is not an indication, as petitioners suggest, that Comelec will
not implement such review. Comelec, in its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, manifests
its intention to make available and open the source code to all political and interested parties, but
under a controlled environment to obviate replication and tampering of the source code, thus
protecting, in the process, the intellectual proprietary right of Smartmatic to the source code. Absent
compelling proof to the contrary, the Court accords the Comelec, which enjoys the presumption of
good faith in the performance of its duties in the first place, the benefit of the doubt.
And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court invalidate the automation
contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by Smartmatic during the bidding, showing
that the PCOS technology has been used in elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 12 22 of RA
8436.
We are not convinced.
As stressed in our September 10, 2009 Decision, the AES chosen by Comelec for the 2010
elections has been successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such
as Ontario, Canada and New York, USA,23 albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system
provider.
Roque, et al., in their petition, had questioned the certifications to this effect, arguing that these
certifications were not issued to respondent TIM-Smartmatic, but to a third party, Dominion Voting
Systems. Resolving the challenge, the Court, in effect, said that the system subject of the
certifications was the same one procured by Comelec for the 2010 elections. And besides, the
Licensing Agreement between Smartmatic and the Dominion Voting Systems indicates that the
former is the entity licensed by the latter to use the system in the Philippines.
Presently, petitioners assert that the system certified as having been used in New York was the
Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.
Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new factual dimension to
their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters, the Court cannot plausibly
validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private respondents have even questioned the
reliability of the website24 whence petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former, citing the same
website, state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the Dominion‘s PCOS
machines.
Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories, issues, and arguments
not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on review. Basic considerations of fair
play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal
presentation of evidence25 and on the practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly. 26
Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that Private
Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas without these
facilities."27 This argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly
provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely, a possible breach of a
contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract. 1avvphi1
Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture has
entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on its behalf
the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010 elections. 29 This arrangement, petitioners
aver, violates the bid rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant components of the automation
project.
The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot expect
the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it. And, of course, the Court is at a loss to
understand how the sub-contract would, in the scheme of things, constitute grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Comelec so as to nullify the contract award of the automation project. As
petitioners themselves acknowledge, again citing news reports, "Smartmatic has unilaterally made
the new subcontract to the Chinese company." 30 Petitioners admit too, albeit with qualification, that
RA 9184 allows subcontracting of a portion of the automation project. 31
The motion of intervenor Quadra deals with the auditability of the results of the automated elections.
His concern has already been addressed by the Court in its Decision. As we have said, the AES
procured by the Comelec is a paper-based system, which has a provision for system auditability,
since the voter would be able, if needed, to verify if the PCOS machine has scanned, recorded, and
counted his vote properly. All actions done on the machine can be printed out by the Board of
Election Inspectors Chairperson as an audit log. 32
On the basis of the arguments, past and present, presented by the petitioners and intervenor, the
Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in awarding the
automation contract to the joint venture of private respondents.
In closing, the Court harks back to its parting message embodied in its September 10, 2009
Decision, but this time even more mindful of warnings and apprehensions of well-meaning sectors of
society, including some members of the Court, about the possibility of failure of elections. The Court,
to repeat, will not venture to say that nothing could go wrong in the conduct of the 2010 nationwide
automated elections. Neither will it guarantee, as it is not even equipped with the necessary
expertise to guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and
consolidation software embedded in them. That difficult and complex undertaking belongs at the first
instance to the Comelec as part of its mandate to insure orderly and peaceful elections. The
Comelec, as it were, is laboring under a very tight timeline. It would accordingly need the help of all
advocates of orderly and honest elections, all men and women of goodwill, to assist Comelec
personnel in addressing the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. After all, peaceful,
fair, honest, and credible elections is everyone‘s concern.
WHEREFORE, the instant separate motions for reconsideration of the main and intervening
petitioners are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow
of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices – choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even
choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited
merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of
public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on
genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those
theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will
allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC‘s refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on
the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner‘s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their

sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a person‘s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more
than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural
use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the
woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing
beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was
the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against
people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition‘s par. 6F:
‗Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age‘. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‗In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation.
Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‗Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‗The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that ‗Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy‘ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes ‗Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows‘ as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The
penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent
or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene
literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film,
which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals
or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in
and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible
teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to
the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State‘s avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco),
while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking
the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution,
stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad‘s
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list
race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests
are also the nation‘s – only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do
not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals.
x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected
fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect
or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or
belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if society‘s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT‘s is elevated, there can
be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either
male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group‘s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what
are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years
of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound
or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petition‘s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships
by gays and lesbians who are already of age‘ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which
waves for the record: ‗In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated
as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or
anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all
unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May
2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on
behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner‘s
application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment
on February 2, 2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on
January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions. 16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the
denial of Ang Ladlad’spetition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR‘s motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was
granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties‘ Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines‘ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioner‘s application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC‘s allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioner‘s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned,
the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC‘s field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector
is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC
claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places
in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 21
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial
of petitioner‘s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself,
is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner‘s alleged non-existence were already
available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is
irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent‘s theory, and a serious
violation of petitioner‘s right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at
least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT
networks:"
§ Abra Gay Association
§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan
§ Albay Gay Association
§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija
§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila
§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
§ Can‘t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila
§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City
§ Circle of Friends
§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte
§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila
§ Gay Men‘s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila
§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte
§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City
§ Kabulig Writer‘s Group – Camarines Sur
§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
§ LUMINA – Baguio City
§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila
§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila
§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City
§ ONE BACARDI
§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila

§ PUP LAKAN
§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR
§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila
§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan
§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal
§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila
§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal
§ The Link – Davao City
§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon
§ Women‘s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila
§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if
COMELEC‘s findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC‘s moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent
of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the
civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
second-class citizens. 1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors
to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth
with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its
deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to
pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the
elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to
the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals.
The COMELEC argues:
Petitioner‘s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we
cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its
own existence.28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the
group‘s members have committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or
more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized,
COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the
gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner‘s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to
regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions,
situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the
bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC‘s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not
proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondent‘s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of
similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances. 34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges x x x have followed the ‗rational basis‘ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution." 37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct
as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior.
Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted
state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state
interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC‘s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the
formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than
disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the
same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC‘s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing
between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSG‘s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the
equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect,
and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that
it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC
made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade
society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that
deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and
these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority
rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of
the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only
for a minority, however small – not only for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the
majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could
do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on
the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning one‘s homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex
conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants
on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in
foreign and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that
have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign
authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive
influence on the Court‘s analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free
speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were
caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its
vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated
that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if
it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic
principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and
whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of
expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group should not be
hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand,
LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between
individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy
precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well
may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional
analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that
public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights
claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through
this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely
take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact,
the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlad‘s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity
of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list
elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the
party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been
precluded, because of COMELEC‘s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner‘s fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and
humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than
ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right
to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies
have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation
is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in
Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an
effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures
that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand
for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons
who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which
exclude any group or category of persons from elective office. 50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving
effect to the Philippines‘ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is
not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner‘s invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which
are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be
added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today
is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further
claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of
diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights"
language, then they are no longer controversial. 1avvphi1
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law
is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more
than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are
divided in opinion. This Court‘s role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is
to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in
the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner‘s application for party-list
accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Manila
EN BANC
P.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, protestant,

vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, protestee.
RESOLUTION
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Miriam
Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their
respective memoranda on the issue of whether this case had been rendered moot by the election of
the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on 30
June 1995.
The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. Relying on Sibulo vda. de De Mesa
vs. Mencias,1 Lomugdang vs. Javier,2 and De Castro vs. Ginete,3 she asserts that an election contest
involves not only an adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates, but
more importantly, the paramount need to dispel, once and for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the
true choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with public interest and should be pursued to its
final conclusion to determine the bona fide winner. She further asserts that an election case may be
rendered moot only if the term of the contested office has expired,4 thus her election as Senator and
assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid down in Moraleja vs. Relova,5 be construed
as an abandonment of the instant protest. Finally, she alleges that this Court has departed from the
orthodox view that a case should be dismissed if it has been mooted.6
For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the
Protestant is deemed to have abandoned the instant protest, in light of the ruling in Dimaporo
vs. Mitra7 which construed Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). 8 He
submits, however, that public interest requires that this protest be resolved on the merits considering
that: (a) it involves a matter of paramount and grave public interest; and (b) it was filed merely to
keep Protestant Santiago in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. He likewise
claims that a resolution on the merits would confirm his victory in the 11 May 1992 presidential
election and prove that the instant protest is unfounded. Further more, it would establish guiding and
controlling principles or doctrines with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby
educating the bench and the bar and preventing the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
We cannot subscribe to the view of the Protestee that by filing her certificate of candidacy for
Senator Protestant Santiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the office of President pursuant to
Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to an incumbent elective
official who files a certificate of candidacy for any office "other than the one he is holding in a
permanent capacity." Even more plain is that the Protestant was not the incumbent President at the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy for Senator nor at any time before that. Thus, the holding
in Dimaporo does not apply to the Protestant.
Neither do we find any convincing logic to the Protestee's proposition that this case should
nevertheless be resolved on the merits because its filing was done in bad faith, i.e., merely to keep
the Protestant in the limelight in preparation for her Senatorial campaign. If that were so, then public
interest would be served if this case were put to an abrupt end after the Protestant won a seat in the
Senate. Finally, neither do we find any cogent nor compelling reason to proceed with this case, in
the event that we find it to be moot, simply to establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines
with respect to election protests involving the office of the President or the Vice-President.
I.
The key then to the resolution of the aforestated issue is the consideration of public interest and
public policy and their encompassing effects on election cases which have been unequivocally
expressed in the cases cited by the Protestant.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias,9 this Court stated:
It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and
settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of
dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with
respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding
imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions.
For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty
to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as
expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural
barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al.,
G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So
inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that there
can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of
the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him or the character of an adversary in the
contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office
and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from
the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles
vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595, 597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs.
Maramba, G.R. L-13206).
Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings
in the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election
contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the
protestee. (In Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 [1967], where the trial court proceeded with
the trial of an election protest and decided it even if the protestee had already died and his
Vice-Mayor had assumed office by succession, this Court, instead of dismissing the appeal
brought on behalf of the deceased protestee, required the Vice-Mayor to intervene on the
side of the appellant)
In Lomugdang vs. Javier,10 this Court declared:
Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public
interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not
abated by the death of the contestant. We have squarely so ruled in Sibulo vda. de Mesa
vs. Judge Mencias, G.R. No. L-24583, October 26, 1966, in the same spirit that led this
Court to hold that the ineligibility of the protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53
Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation in office is not a ground for the dismissal of the
contest nor detract the Court's jurisdiction to decide the case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46
Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584).
In the same Sibulo case, already cited, this Court likewise ruled that by virtue of Section 7,
Republic Act 2264, the vice-mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the
continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest
succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice mayor succeeds to the office of mayor that
becomes vacant if the duly elected cannot assume the post.
In Moraleja vs. Relova,11 this Court ruled:
As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant

has abandoned his protest, all that need be said is that once the court has acquired
jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner
be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there can be
no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases. (Francisco, How To Try
Election Cases, p. 163, citing Civilio v. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689). In the same manner that the
acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is not a ground for
dismissal of the protest (Philippine Law on Elections by Martin, 1970 ed., pp. 258-
259, citing Calvo v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-13206, January 7, 1918) like the resignation of the
protestee from the contested office (Angeles v. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595), simply because it is
of public interest that the real winner be known, neither can the acceptance of a more or less
temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-Governor, which is a
primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant's determination
to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant may be viewed in the same light as that
of an employee who has been illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support himself
and family while he prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment
elsewhere. Such employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to
recover. (Tan v. Gimenez, et al. G.R. No. L-12525, February 19, 1960, 107 Phil. 17; Potot v.
Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949, 82 Phil. 679). Of course, the case of protestant
who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not
ruling on it here.
In De Castro vs. Ginete,12 this Court stated:
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected
by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an
election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the
proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which
the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognizing the one who
is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of
the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.
The factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant protest.
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, as in the later case of Silverio vs. Castro,13 the protestee had been
proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate and had assumed office, and then died during the
pendency of the election protest. While in Lomugdang, it was the protestant who died during the
pendency of the protest.
In Moraleja, the election protest survived the protestant's acceptance of temporary employment
during the pendency of his election protest. Likewise, in De los Angeles vs. Rodriguez,14 cited
in Sibulo vda. de De Mesa, an election protest was continued despite the resignation from office of
the protestee.
Finally, in De Castro, the only issue presented was whether the protest should be dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. In this proceeding, the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was
proclaimed the winner by the board of canvassers and even exhorted those present during the
inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's administration.
May the above dicta apply to the case of Protestant Santiago who assumed the office of Senator
after her election as such in the 8 May 1995 election? This question was impliedly raised but not
resolved in Moraleja. For after holding that the acceptance by the protestant therein of a temporary
appointment during the pendency of his protest did not amount to an abandonment thereof, nor
could it be considered inconsistent with his determination to protect and pursue the public interest
involved in the election protest, this Court noted: "Of course, the case of a protestant who accepts a
permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here."15
Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant pursued the new position through a
popular election, as in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for
Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted
upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six
years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election 16 and to end at
noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during
her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this
protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification,
condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume
the office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for
which she was elected. These are givens which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.17
Indeed, it has been aptly said:
It is impossible that government shall be carried on, and the functions of civil society
exercised, without the aid and intervention of public servants or officers, and every person,
therefore, who enters into civil society and avails himself of the benefits and protection of the
government, must owe to this society, or, in other words, to the public, at least a social duty
to bear his share of the public burdens, by accepting and performing, under reasonable
circumstances, the duties of those public offices to which he may be lawfully chosen. 18
In this jurisdiction, an elected public official may even be held criminally liable should he refuse to
discharge an elective office.19
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of
which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992
synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in
proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the
office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the
very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment
or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest
would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this
period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election
protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications
thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the
filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not
clearly legible.20
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a
suppletory character, 21 may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which,
the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. 22 In sum, if an election
protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it
has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.
II.
There is yet another reason why this case should now be dismissed.
This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision
of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated
three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original stand in her Motion and
Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this into account, this Tribunal declared in its
resolution of 21 October 1993:
After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Tribunal
rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes from her pilot
areas are concerned, and against the immediate application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the
Tribunal to the Protestee in respect of the Counter-Protest.
At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonably determined whether the
revised ballots are "considerable" enough to establish a trend either in favor of or against the
Protestant as would justify an appropriate action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the
Tribunal, or whether the unrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the language of the
Protestant, "materially affect the result of the representative sample of the ballot boxes so far
revised." As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time to raise the objections to
the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage.
Consequently, we resolved therein to:
A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the
aforequoted paragraph A of the 5 October 1993 Resolution and for that purpose to DIRECT
the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect said ballot boxes and other election
documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that their
revisions in connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been
terminated, and if such revisions are not yet completed, to coordinate with the appropriate
tribunal or court in which such other election protests are pending and which have already
obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with the end in view of either
seeking expeditious revisions in such other election protests or obtaining the custody of the
ballot boxes and related election documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery
to the Tribunal; and
B. REQUIRE the Protestant to inform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if
after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas she would present
evidence in connection therewith.
Until the present, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunal whether after the
completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in
connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longer
intends to do so.
It is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the Protestant's revisors discovered in the
course of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the
pilot areas and have objected to thousands of ballots cast in favor of the Protestee. Revision is
merely the first stage, and not the alpha and omega, of an election contest. In no uncertain terms
then, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 18 March 1993 that:
Protestant knows only too well, being a lawyer and a former judge herself, that the revision
phase of her protest is but the first stage in the resolution of her electoral protest and that the
function of the revisors is very limited. In her 12 February 1993 Comment on Protestee's 5
February 1993 Urgent Motion for the issuance of a resolution which, inter alia, would clarify
that revisors may observe the objections and/or claims made by the revisors of the other
party as well as the ballots subject thereof, and record such observations in a form to be
provided for that purpose, Protestant unequivocally stated:
8. Further, the principle and plan of the RPET [Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal] is to subdivide the entire election contest into various stages. Thus, the first
stage is the Revision Proper. Second is the technical examination if so desired by
either party. Third is the reception of evidence. And Fourth, is the filing of parties'
memoranda.
and described the function of the revisors as "solely to examine and segregate the ballots
according to which ballots they would like to contest or object (contested ballots) and those
which they admit or have no objections (uncontested ballots)." Indeed, revisors do not have
any judicial discretion; their duties are merely clerical in nature (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24
Phil. 632 [1913]). In fact, their opinion or decision on the more crucial or critical matter of
what ballots are to be contested or not does not even bind the Tribunal (Yalung vs. Atienza,
52 Phil. 781 [1929]; Olano vs. Tibayan, 53 Phil. 168 [1929]). Thus, no undue importance may
be given to the revision phase of an election contest. It can never serve as a logical or an
acceptable basis for the conclusion that massive fraud or irregularities were committed
during an election or that a Protestant had won in said election. If that were so, a Protestant
may contest all ballot boxes and, in the course of the revision thereof, object for any
imagined ground whatsoever, even if the same be totally unfounded and ridiculous to all
ballots credited to the Protestee; and then, at the end of the day, said Protestant may even
announce to the whole world that contrary to what is reflected in the election returns,
Protestee had actually lost the elections.
All told, a dismissal of this election protest is inevitable.
III.
However, three Members of the Tribunal outrightly disagree with the foregoing disquisitions. Hence,
a reply to the important points they raise is in order.
Mr. Justice Puno's perception that the majority would dismiss this "election protest as moot and
academic on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of irregularities made by the revisors of the
protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely irrelevant;
and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the 8 May
1995 senatorial elections," is inaccurate. The dispositive portion of this resolution leaves no room for
any doubt or miscomprehension that the dismissal is based on the ground that the protest "has been
rendered moot and academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence
of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof." There is, therefore, ONLY ONE reason or ground why the protest has been rendered moot
and academic, i.e., it has been abandoned or withdrawn. This was the very issue upon which the
parties were required, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, to submit their respective
memoranda.
The majority neither conveyed, asserted nor even suggested, as Mr. Justice Puno has apparently
understood, that this protest has become moot and academic because the finding of irregularities by
the Protestant's revisors in the course of the revision of the ballots in 13,510 contested precincts in
the pilot areas are "entirely irrelevant," and that the Protestant has abandoned this protest by filing a
certificate of candidacy for the office of Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections. The majority's views on
"irrelevancy" and "on the filing of the certificate of candidacy" are not the grounds themselves, but
parts only of the arguments to strengthen the conclusion reached, i.e., abandonment. Otherwise
stated, in order to make the point crystal clear, the majority never held that the irrelevancy of the
finding of irregularities is a ground why this protest has become moot and academic. It only declared
that the Protestant's: (a) waiver of revision of the unrevised ballots from the remaining 4,017
contested precincts in the pilot areas; and (b) failure to comply with the resolution of 21 October
1995 requiring her to inform the Tribunal within ten days from notice if she would still present
evidence after completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas rendered such "findings"
of irregularities entirely irrelevant considering the Tribunal's disquisitions on what revision is in its 18
March 1993 resolution.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Puno lifted the words "entirely irrelevant"; from the fourth paragraph under
the heading "II" of this Resolution. It must, however, be stressed that the said paragraph is
inexorably linked to the preceding two paragraphs relating to the above-mentioned waiver and non-
compliance, which provide the major premises for the fourth paragraph; more concretely, the latter is
nothing more than the logical conclusion which the major premises support.
The reasons adduced by Mr. Justice Puno for the Protestant's turn-around are mere speculations. In
any event, the protestant's possible "belief . . . that the contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when
properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory," cannot stand against her
previous insistence to proceed with the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots and the
aforementioned finding of the Tribunal in its resolution of 21 October 1993. The Tribunal is not to
blame for "the slow pace of the protest," if at all she so believes in such a state of things. Neither can
the thought of cutting costs be a valid reason. The Protestant knew from the outset that the revision
of the ballots in the pilot areas was a crucial phase of this protest because, under Rule 61 of the
Rules of the Tribunal, the protest could forthwith be dismissed if the Tribunal were convinced that
she would probably fail to make out a case but only after examination of the ballots from the pilot
areas and the evaluation of the evidence offered in connection therewith. It goes without saying that
every ballot then in the pilot areas counts.
Then too, it was never the view of the majority that the Protestant's filing of the certificate of
candidacy for a seat in the Senate in the 8 May 1995 election was the sole and exclusive operative
act for what Mr. Justice Puno perceives to be the majority's second ground why this protest has
become moot and academic. To the majority, such filing was only the initial step in a series of acts
performed by the Protestant to convincingly evince her abandonment of this protest, viz.,
campaigning for the office of Senator, assumption of such office after her election and her discharge
of the duties and functions of the said office. Precisely, in the resolution of 26 September 1995, this
Court directed the Protestant and the Protestee to submit their respective memoranda on the issue
[o]f whether or not the protest has not been rendered moot and academic by the election of
the Protestant as Senator and her subsequent assumption of office as such on 30 June
1995. (emphasis supplied)
As to the concept of abandonment, Mr. Justice Puno and Mr. Justice Kapunan cite Black's Law
Dictionary and the cases of Roebuck vs. Mecosta Country Road Commission, 23 Dober vs. Ukase Inv.
Co., 24 and McCall vs. Cull,25 cited therein. We have turned to the primary sources of these cases,
meticulously perused them, and found none materially significant to this protest.
The first two cases above refer to abandonment of property. Roebuck involved the issue of whether
a roadway had been abandoned by the Mecosta Road Commission. The Court therein held that in
order for there to be an abandonment of land dedicated to public use, two elements must
concur, viz., (a) intention to relinquish the right or property, but without intending to transfer title to
any particular person; and (b) the external act which such intention is carried into effect.
While Dober, on the issue of whether the plaintiff therein abandoned a certain property,
quoted Corpus Juris that the intention to abandon must be determined from the facts and
circumstances of the case. There must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party to
constitute abandonment in respect of a right secured an act done which shows a determination in
the individual not to have a benefit which is designed for him.
It is, of course, settled that a public office is not deemed property. 26
Only McCall involved the issue of abandonment of office. It is stated therein as follows:
Abandonment is a matter of intention and, when thought of in connection with an office,

implies that the occupant has quit the office and ceased to perform its duties. As long as he
continues to discharge the duties of the office, even though his source of title is two
appointments, one valid and the other invalid, it cannot be said he has abandoned it. It was
said in Steingruber v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Com. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78: "A public office
may be abandoned. Abandonment is a species of resignation. Resignation and
abandonment are voluntary acts. The former is a formal relinquishment; the latter a
relinquishment through non-user. Abandonment implies non-user, but non-user does not, of
itself, constitute abandonment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must
be with actual or imputed intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the
office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and is a question
of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal
or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of intention is involved.
Strictly speaking, McCall is inapplicable to this protest for, as correctly stated in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Kapunan, the Protestant could not abandon the office of President which she was not
holding at the time she filed the certificate of candidacy for Senator. But the majority of the Tribunal
never declared, nor even implied, that she abandoned the office of President because it knew that
she had yet nothing to abandon. Precisely, she filed this protest to be declared the winner for that
office, to thereafter assume and perform the duties thereof, and exercise the powers appertaining
thereto. What the Tribunal explicitly states is that the Protestant abandoned this Protest, thereby
rendering this protest moot.
Mr. Justice Puno also insists that abandonment raises a question of fact and that the Tribunal cannot
resolve it "for lack of competent evidence"; moreover, he notes that the Protestee "has not adduced
evidence which can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her protest; on the
contrary, the Protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it
be decided on the merits." Suffice it to say that the Protestant herself has not denied nor questioned
the following facts, which by themselves, constitute overwhelming proof of the intention to abandon
the protest:
(a) Filing of a certificate of candidacy for Senator for the 8 May 1995 elections;
(b) Campaigning for the office of Senator in such election;
(c) Taking her oath of office as Senator upon the commencement of the term therefor;
(d) Assumption of office as Senator; and
(e) Discharge and performance of the duties appertaining to the office of Senator.
These acts speak for themselves res ipsa loquitur to negate any proposition that the Protestant has
not abandoned this protest.
Thus, what initially appears to be the correct view in the dissent is, in the final analysis, misplaced.
This must also be the verdict upon the following pronouncements of Mr. Justice Puno:
A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit
that the majority ruling on abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election
contest is concerned less with the private interest of the candidates but more with public
interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an election
contest is to seek and enforce the judgment of the people on who should govern them. It is
not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy of our Constitution underlines in bright
that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his
sovereignty just as the first duty of any reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of
the people at all cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova, we emphatically held that ". . . once the
court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands
that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so much so
that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases."
Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even on
the ground of death of the protestee or the protestant.
The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the
case at bar even while the protestee and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of
the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even while the protestee and the protestant
together plead, that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by deciding their
dispute on the merit[s] and not on technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the
better stance for the Tribunal to decide this election contest on the merit[s] and vindicate the
political judgment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other considerations.
Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot depend on the
uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants as often times they are directed by the wind of
convenience, and not by the weal of the public.
For one, the majority has, in no uncertain terms, demonstrated the dissimilarities in the factual
settings of the instant protest vis-a-vis the earlier cases that enunciated the doctrine relied on by Mr.
Justice Puno. Then, too, it must be reiterated, to avoid further miscomprehension, that
the Moraleja ruling even conceded that the matter of abandonment "could be different" if the
petitioner therein had accepted "a permanent appointment to a regular office" during the pendency
of his protest. In short, Moraleja in fact intimates abandonment of an election protest if, in the
meantime, the Protestant accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office. If that be so, then
would it be, and for weightier reasons, against a protestant who voluntarily sought election to an
office whose term would extend beyond the expiry date of the term of the contested office, and after
winning the said election, took her oath and assumed office and thereafter continuously serves it.
In Moraleja, the Supreme Court was meticulous in excluding abandonment from the enumeration of
specific "acts or wishes" of the parties which must be disregarded because of the public interest
component of an election protest. As reflected in the above quotation from Mr. Justice Puno's
dissent, only default, compromise, or stipulation of factsare included.
Finally, with all due respect, the above pronouncement of Mr. Justice Puno forgets that, as distinctly
pointed out in the early part of this Resolution, the Rules of the Tribunal allow summary dismissal of
election protests even for less important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the
Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and cash deposits
were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules, 27 and the additional provision for dismissal under
Rule 61. All these provisions of the Rules would then be put to naught or, at the very least, modified
or amended in a way not authorized by the Rules, if the theory of Mr. Justice Puno be accepted.
Such theory would unreasonably bind the Tribunal to the technical minutiae of trial on the merits to
bring to their ultimate end all protests or contests filed before it including those filed by candidates
who even forgot to vote for themselves and obtained no votes in the final count, but, unable to
accept defeat, filed a protest claiming massive fraud and irregularities, vote-buying, and terrorism.
Consequently, all the time and energy of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be spent
appreciating millions of revised ballots to the prejudice of their regular judicial functions in the Court,
as the electoral protest of every Juan, Pedro, and Jose who lost in the presidential elections would
have to be heard on the merits. Public policy abhors such a scenario and no public good stands to
be thereby served.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to
(1) GRANT the Protestant's Motion of 16 August 1995 to dispense with the revision of ballots
and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas;
(2) DISMISS the instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and academic by
its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof; and
(3) DISMISS, as a consequence, the Protestee's Counter-Protest.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the
application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate
their choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate
printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in
the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or
printed in the official ballots on election day,should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be
considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
The Case
In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in conjunction with
Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31, 2010,
Casimira S. Dela Cruz (petitioner) assails COMELEC Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the
votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been
cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of
candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:
1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of
Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong;
2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting the instant
Petition and:
(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 8844
considering as stray the votes cast in favor of the disqualified nuisance candidate
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;
(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be counted and tallied
in favor of Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
4116; and
(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the
Petitioner‘s Election Protest is pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality
of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes after the votes
in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted and tallied to the
votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz.
3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent
if Petitioner is proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2
Factual Antecedents
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the
Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique under the ticket of the National People‘s Coalition (NPC). Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela
Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy4 for the same position.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5 to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the
ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election
process in mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with
petitioner‘s surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is considered a very strong candidate for the
said position having been elected as member of the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket
of the NPC and obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In
contrast, Aurelio is an unknown in the political scene with no prior political experience as an elective
official and no political party membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio
has no sufficient source of income but since the 2007 elections petitioner‘s opponents have been
prodding him to run for the same position as petitioner in order to sow confusion and thwart the will
of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner further cited Aurelio‘s miserable showing in the previous local
elections when he ran and garnered only 126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007)
and barangay captain of Barangay Maray, Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista
v. COMELEC,6 petitioner asserted that these circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelio‘s lack of a
bona fide intention and capability to run for the position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution7 declaring Aurelio as a
nuisance candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in
Bugasong.
Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in
the Certified List of Candidates8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of
the candidates for Vice-Mayor, including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on
the Official Sample Ballot as follows:
VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1
O 1. DELA CRUZ, O 2. DELA CRUZ, O 3. PACETE, John Lloyd
Aurelio N. Casimira M.
"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NPC) "BINGBING" (NP)
Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion10 praying,
among other things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio‘s name from the
Official List of Candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election
paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the event
Aurelio‘s name can no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC
issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance
with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.
On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8844 11 listing the names of
disqualified candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and
2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio‘s
name remained in the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on
May 13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor.
However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for
Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong13 showed the following results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-
Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong. 14
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election
protest praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of
respondent Pacete‘s proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
Petitioner‘s Arguments
Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioner‘s
6,389 votes, petitioner contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of
Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus,
petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921 votes as against the 6,428 votes of
private respondent. By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes
instead of counting the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No.
4116, the COMELEC‘s First Division gravely abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws because there is no substantial difference between the previous manual elections and the
automated elections conducted in 2010 to justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in
2001,particularly on the matter of votes cast for a candidate who was declared a nuisance candidate
in a final judgment where such nuisance candidate has the same name with that of the bona fide
candidate. Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly
recognized the substantial distinctions between and among (a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance
candidates whose names are similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance candidates
who do not have similar names with those of the bona fide candidates, and (d) candidates who had
voluntarily withdrawn their certificates of candidacy. As a result of the failure of the COMELEC‘s First
Division to make these important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that applies to
disqualified candidates, nuisance candidates and all other candidates whose certificates of
candidacy had been cancelled or denied course, petitioner‘s right to due process was clearly
violated, and only made possible the very evil that is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to
consider the votes cast for the nuisance candidate as stray but count them in favor of the bona fide
candidate.
Respondents‘ Arguments
COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its exercise of
supervisory or regulatory authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored rule is that a
statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party assailing it must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this
case, petitioner miserably failed to prove a clear breach of the Constitution; she merely invokes a
violation of the equal protection clause and due process of law without any basis.
On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a substantial distinction
between a manual election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated election governed
by Resolution No. 8844. While the votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate, this is no longer the rule for automated elections.
COMELEC cites the following factors which changed the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in
automated elections now contain the full names of the official candidates so that when a voter
shaded an oval, it was presumed that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and voted for that
candidate, regardless of whether said candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2)
since the names of the candidates are clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when
these were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot secrecy folder, the voter‘s
intention is clearly to vote for the candidate corresponding to the shaded oval; (3) the rules on
appreciation of ballots under Section 211, Article XVIII of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to
elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots; and (4) with the use of the
automated election system where the counting of votes is delegated to the Precinct Count Optical
Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation controversies, including complaints regarding the
appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the names of the candidates written, were flaws
which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the purpose of our election laws,
Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable to all persons of the same
class even in succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance candidates without
distinction.
Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For public office is not a
property right and no one has a vested right to any public office.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the votes cast for
Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot
be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also cites an annotation on election law, 15 invoking this
Court‘s ruling in Kare v. COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when read together with Section 72,
are understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has
already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray."
Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC caused the publication
of Resolution No. 8844 in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There was thus an
earnest effort on the part of COMELEC to disseminate the information, especially to the voters in
Bugasong, Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on the official ballots as one of the
candidates for Vice-Mayor. Said voters were amply forewarned about the status of Aurelio‘s
candidacy and the consequences that will obtain should he still be voted for. Additionally, the
petitioner and Aurelio bear different first names, female and male, respectively; petitioner and her
political party engaged in a massive voter education during the campaign period, emphasizing to her
supporters that she was given the corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and the voters
should be very circumspect in filling up their ballots because in case of error in filling up the same,
they will not be given replacement ballots. As to the Judicial Affidavits of those who voted for
petitioner attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the
ballots, which was attached to the petition, petitioner in effect would want this Court to sit in
judgment as trier of facts.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the
Revised Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of
discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 18
COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country,
its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.19 In this case, Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC
clearly contravened existing law and jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a candidate
as a nuisance candidate, especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same
surnames as those of bona fide candidates.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on COMELEC when it
issued Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in Section 211 (24),
Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts shall give
priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision
shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every
ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The
board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the
election is to obtain the expression of the voter‘s will:
xxxx
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be
considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC20 where this Court, construing the above
provisions, stated:
According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to
the rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelec‘s Decision to declare the second placer as winner
in the mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof,
as amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:
xxxx
When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a
candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor,
shall be considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to
disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law
lists other grounds for disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of
the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly
inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code. 21 (Emphasis supplied; italics not ours)
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the votes cast for
the disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as stray as explicitly
mandated by Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the OEC.
We disagree.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to
petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance
candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a
certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or
other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section
68 (giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing
electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited
contributions) of the OEC or Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and
a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused
with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in
different eventualities. Private respondent‘s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the
COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in
fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
xxxx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68
of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is
false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in
Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section
68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. 24 (Additional emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot
be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did
when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be
considered stray, to those registered candidates whose COC‘s had been cancelled or denied due
course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less
to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as
he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes
cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special
action cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or division,
particularly on special actions (disqualification cases).
special action cases refer to the following:
(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is
hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
xxx
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the
lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the
votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis
supplied)25
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final
judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC 26 where the name of the nuisance
candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on
the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin
Bautista‘s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or
three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on
orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are
not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable
despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final
on electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes
mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista)
and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had
constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as
a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This
is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by
virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the
COMELEC‘s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate. 27
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 28 this Court
likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a
nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that
the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day
inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects
the voter‘s will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly
the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been
informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election.
Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter‘s will was similarly present in this case, if not
worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been
declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private
respondent‘s lead of only 453 votes after the recount.29
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the
basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but
counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC‘s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance
candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to
private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise
into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a
significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another
candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability
of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the
electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by
nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the
May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What
needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant
circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista.
x x x30
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No.
4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the
form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions
between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for
the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC
opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of
ballotsapply only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or
operators benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny
due course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to
minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot,
but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist. 31
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for
the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been
rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the
name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of
disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot.
Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted
from list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same
surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a
good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC
should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such
cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on
grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of
COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in
Bautista, the voters‘ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been
intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of
candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters
who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide
candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same. 1âwphi1
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-
ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. 32 Indeed, as our electoral
experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates
from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought
to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly
GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes
cast for candidates listed therein, who were declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of
candidacy have been either cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is hereby declared NULL
and VOID. Consequently, the 532 votes cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections of May
10, 2010 should have been counted in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray
votes, making her total garnered votes 6,921 as against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John
Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared winner.
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its

President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas

Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST,

represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly

PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its

Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly

known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its
Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña

Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS
RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva,

Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH
(GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI),

represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN

INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C.
Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante

Navarroand Guiling Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its

President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS

(AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by

its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY

AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners
thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER,

JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and

Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND
WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR

CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G.
Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND
IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-

EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC
Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M.
Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486

1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,

vs.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 2 20
November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February
2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

No.
A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to
(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show
Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.
6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a
(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
(PP), Party (AI) party represents a
12-165 marginalized and
(PLM) underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the
Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations sectors; - The sectors of
of homeowners‘
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track
Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.
10 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
(KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.
11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove
Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division‘s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida‘s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track
record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.
6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.
8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party‘s track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.
10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.
13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido - Failure to show that
Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
for the marginalized and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
for the marginalized and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
marginalized citizens.
24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party‘s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system; and
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
the sector.
27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
nominees are employed in the construction
industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party‘s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are
bona fide
members.
32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration
(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.
35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.
36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
- The party‘s nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation
(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party‘s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM,
KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE,
FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD,
ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the
54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group

203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
(PLM)
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(PLM) (APEC)
203960 12-260 1st
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
(PLM) (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
(PLM)
204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
(PLM)
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM)
204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
(PLM)
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
(PLM)
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
(PLM)
204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
(PLM)
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(PLM)
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(PLM) (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165
(PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;
and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
The Court’s Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified
to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the
party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win
in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter
elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and
another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not
be represented in the voters‘ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The
constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion
among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid
the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the
proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation
in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose
among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which
sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers,
fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar
groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be
represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in
the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went
through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors.
And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become
because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second,
we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers.
These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a
farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a
farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to
avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination.
First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot,
he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been
registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not
be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen
can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had
been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a political party and
register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for
the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any
party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15
names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum
qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are
tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes;
KMU gets 5 percent; a women‘s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at
least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no
reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group,
should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or
four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or
five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think
that if they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five
percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a
party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same
time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get
a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a
district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain
groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes.
But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose
and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors
and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be
sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they
be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can
also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding
only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz
is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election
if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because
it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that
all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties
ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor
leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party
may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of
the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted
by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on
this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute
a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in
the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral
parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong
Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties
equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented.
The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-
moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to
speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first
party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise —
that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal
was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to
candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta
group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be
expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral
contest with the more veteran political groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only,
and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list
system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-
traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the
words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had
the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time
sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer:
the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only
one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and
regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need
not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or

platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least
a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens

who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section
5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously,
they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them
from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their
only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being
obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized
and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941,
to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the
COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and
hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the

"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section
2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House
of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must
be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution
on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5
that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors
are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for
the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not
mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her
sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an
opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in
poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the
national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not
belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties
under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by
RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling ‗Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.‘ "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has
been compounded by the COMELEC‘s refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major
political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly
prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their
sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress"
from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to
the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list
elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their
sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the
House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies."
The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to
participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in
party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of
the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed
to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks
to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must
either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in
the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious

purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded
or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of
the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In
BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have
only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose
and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats,
reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our
rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-
list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified
by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines
and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do
not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track
record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under
such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners
in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination
whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The
41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in
the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections
may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 199612 January 22, 2013
RENATO M. FEDERICO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR and OSMUNDO M.
MALIGAYA,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, assailing
the December 21, 2011 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Bane. in SPC No.
10-082, entitled In Re: Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico,
Osmundo M. Maligaya v. Renato M. Federico and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Santo
Tomas, Batangas.
The Facts
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were candidates for
the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Party‘s official mayoralty candidate.2
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the
province of Batangas, died. Two days later, or on April 29, 2010,3 Edna withdrew her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute
candidate for her deceased husband.
On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the Office of the Election Officer
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, his COC4 and CONA5 as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as
substitute candidate for mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.
On May 7, 2010, the Comelec Law Department referred the Affidavit of Withdrawal, the COC and
the CONA of Edna, as substitute candidate for her late husband, and those of Federico, as
substitute candidate for her, to the Comelec En Banc for its consideration. 6
On the same day, May 7, 2010, Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy7 of Federico before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 10-137 (DC).
Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute candidate for Edna
because the period to file the COC for substitute candidates had already lapsed after December 14,
2009, pursuant to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. 8
In Resolution No. 8889,9 dated May 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC
of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as
substitute mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas.
By that time, however, the official ballots had already been printed. Expectedly, on May 10, 2010,
the day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor
of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya‘s 22,577
votes.10
On May 11, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) printed the Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates 11 (COCVP) showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." as the
winning mayoralty candidate. The printed COCVP, reads:
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS of the CITY/MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS do

hereby certify under oath that we have duly canvassed the votes cast in 81 precincts in the
city/municipality for the Candidates therein for city/municipality offices in the elections held on May
10, 2010. Attached hereto and forming part hereof is a Statement of Votes by Precinct (CEF No. 20-
A-1) obtained by each candidate for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
That after such canvass, it appears that SANCHEZ, Edna P. obtained 28389 votes for the office of
City/Municipality Mayor, the same being the highest number of votes legally cast for said office; and
SILVA, Armenius O. obtained 25532 votes for the office of City/Municipality Vice Mayor, the same
being the highest number of votes legally cast for said office.
ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby proclaim the above candidates as the duly
elected City/Municipality Mayor and City/Municipality Vice Mayor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed these presents in SANTO TOMAS, Province of Batangas
this Tue May 11, 14:09:55 PHT 2010.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
This action of MBOC prompted Maligaya to file his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent
Edna Sanchez,12docketed as SPC No. 10-022, on May 20, 2010. This petition was, however, later
withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, and the case was dismissed by the Comelec First
Division.13
A second print-out14 of the COCVP was issued by the MBOC bearing the same time and date with
the same number of votes garnered by Edna being credited to Federico. The second print-out reads:
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS of the CITY/MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS do

hereby certify under oath that we have duly canvassed the votes cast in 81 precincts in the
city/municipality for the Candidates therein for city/municipality offices in the elections held on May
10, 2010. Attached hereto and forming part hereof is a Statement of Votes by Precinct (CEF No. 20-
A-1) obtained by each candidate for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
That after such canvass, it appears that FEDERICO, Renato M. obtained 28389 votes for the office
of City/Municipality Mayor, the same being the highest number of votes legally cast for said office;
and SILVA, Armenius O. obtained 25532 votes for the office of City/Municipality Vice Mayor, the
same being the highest number of votes legally cast for said office.
ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby proclaim the above candidates as the duly
elected City/Municipality Mayor and City/Municipality Vice Mayor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed these presents in SANTO TOMAS, Province of Batangas
this Tue May 11, 14:09:55 PHT 2010.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
On June 1, 2010, upon learning of the proclamation of Federico as the winning mayoralty candidate
by the MBOC, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M.
Federico15 as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, docketed as SPC No. 10-082. The petition was
predicated on the alleged illegal act of the MBOC in issuing a falsified and patently antedated
second COCVP in the name of Federico without reconvening, without due notice, and without
annulling the first COCVP issued in favor of Edna.
In his answer to the petition, Federico raised, among others, the defenses that the petition was an
erroneous remedy, having no basis under the rules; that it was not based on valid grounds; and that
it should not have been given due course as it was belatedly filed. 16
The members of the MBOC likewise filed an answer, claiming good faith when they proclaimed
Federico as winner considering that the substitutions of Edna and Federico were valid under
Comelec Resolution No. 8889.17
Meanwhile, Maligaya‘s petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of Federico was denied
by the Comelec Second Division in its Resolution,18 dated October 19, 2010. It gave due course to
Federico‘s COC and CONA on the basis of the Comelec En Banc‘s Resolution No. 8889 which
upheld Federico‘s substitution.
In its Resolution,19 dated June 21, 2011, the Comelec First Division denied Maligaya‘s petition to
annul the proclamation of Federico for having been filed out of time, as it was filed beyond the ten
(10) day period from the day of proclamation as provided for under Section 6, Rule 4 of Comelec
Resolution 8804.20 Further, it held that Federico‘s filing of candidacy for mayor, vice Edna, was valid.
Maligaya then filed his Verified Partial Motion for Reconsideration,21 dated June 27, 2011, insisting
that his petition had not yet prescribed and that Federico‘s substitution was null and void with his
COC and CONA filed after December 14, 2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678. He further claimed that the generation of a second print-out of the
COCVP bearing the same time and date with the same number of votes garnered by Edna being
credited to Federico was questionable for it was impossible for Federico to be proclaimed as the
winning candidate because the Canvassing and Consolidating System (CCS) had already printed a
COCVP with the name of Edna, as the winner.
The said partial motion for reconsideration was elevated to the Comelec En Banc for proper
disposition.
In his Comment22 on Maligaya‘s partial motion for reconsideration, Federico pointed out that his
substitution of Edna had already been upheld with finality and, thus, could no longer be questioned.
He prayed for the dismissal of the case.
In the hearing of August 25, 2011, the Comelec En Banc considered the case submitted for
resolution.
On August 31, 2011, Federico filed a motion for reconsideration23 of the Comelec En Banc‘s Order
given in the August 25, 2011 hearing, claiming that the case was barred by forum shopping and litis
pendentia. Pending his motion, he elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on September 9, 2011
by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 198283. This petition was
subsequently dismissed by the Court on October 4, 2011 for being premature in view of the
pendency of the partial motion for reconsideration before the Comelec En Banc. 24
On December 21, 2011, the Comelec En Banc issued the assailed Resolution granting Maligaya‘s
partial motion for reconsideration. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
The proclamation of respondent Federico is hereby ANNULLED. Accordingly:
1. The Executive Director is ordered to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers

for the municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;
2. The Special Municipal Board of Canvassers is ordered to immediately notify the parties,
reconvene and proclaim petitioner OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA as the duly elected Mayor of
Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and
3. The Law Department is directed to conduct an investigation on the members of the (Old)
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for possible violation of Section 32
pars. (c) and (f) Article VI of COMELEC Resolution No. 8809.
Let the Executive Director implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.25
The Comelec En Banc ruled that the petition for the annulment of Federico‘s proclamation filed on
June 1, 2011 was within the prescribed ten (10) day period. It explained that the period for the filing
of the said petition should be reckoned from May 27, 2011, when Maligaya discovered the existence
of the second COCVP and not on May 11, 2011, the proclamation date. The Comelec En Banc was
of the view that the annulment of Federico‘s proclamation was in order because of his invalid
substitution of Edna, as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline and due to the illegality of
the proceedings of the MBOC in generating the second COCVP without authority from the Comelec
and without notice to the parties, in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 8804.
Hence, Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order, dated December 23, 2011, before this Court anchored on the
following
GROUNDS
(I)
The validity of Petitioner‘s substitution as mayoralty candidate is already a settled fact.
A. Petitioner validly substituted Edna Sanchez pursuant to Section 77 of the Omnibus

Election Code.
B. The validity of Petitioner‘s substitution was already decided with finality by the Comelec.
C. Resolution No. 8889 is valid. The Comelec, in issuing Resolution No. 8889, passed upon
all matters and issues laid before it in the case. Moreover, after Resolution No. 8889 was
issued, it was in force and had to be complied with.
(II)
The proclamation of Petitioner was regular and done in accordance with law.
A. The votes cast for "SANCHEZ, Edna P." were legally considered votes for Petitioner.
B. The petition to annul Petitioner‘s proclamation was filed out of time.
(III)
Private Respondent cannot validly be proclaimed as elected mayor because he was the losing
candidate.26
In the meantime, on December 29, 2011, the Comelec En Banc issued Minute Resolution No. 11-
1306 constituting the special MBOC pursuant to its December 21, 2011 Resolution. 27
On January 16, 2012, the Comelec En Banc issued a Writ of Execution ordering Federico to vacate
the position as mayor and to cease and desist from performing the functions of the said office. 28
On January 17, 2012, the Special MBOC issued a notice to convene on January 24, 2012 at the
Comelec‘s Session Hall for the purpose of proclaiming Maligaya as the duly elected mayor. 29
In its Resolution, dated January 17, 2012, the Court required the respondents in this case to
comment on Federico‘s petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from notice, to which Maligaya and
the Comelec complied. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining the Comelec from constituting and reconvening the Special MBOC and from
proclaiming Maligaya as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas. 30
Pending resolution of the case, on February 28, 2012, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva (Intervenor Silva)
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene, 31 praying essentially that as
Federico failed to qualify, he should be adjudged as his legal successor as mayor, under Section 44
of the Local Government Code32 (LGC).
Both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Maligaya opposed the motion to intervene, both
arguing that he (Maligaya) was the only mayoralty candidate left to be voted for given the withdrawal
of Edna and Federico‘s invalid substitution. Maligaya, then, was not a second placer but the sole and
only placer in the elections. Hence, the doctrine of the second-placer would not apply to him.
The Issues
From the pleadings of the parties, the principal issues presented for resolution are: (1) whether
Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position; (2)
whether Maligaya‘s Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
docketed as SPC No. 10-082, was filed on time; and (3) granting that Federico was disqualified,
whether he should be succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC or replaced by Maligaya.
Essentially, the issue thrust upon the Court is whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion
when it annulled Federico‘s proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his
substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.
Federico insists that his substitution of Edna was valid and had long been final in view of Comelec
Resolution No. 8889. He likewise argues that his proclamation as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
was valid and regular and, hence, it must be upheld.
The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG representing public respondent Comelec En
Banc. The electoral commission committed no grave abuse of discretion when it came out with its
December 21, 2011 Resolution,33 in SPC No. 10-082, granting Maligaya‘s partial motion for
reconsideration. The Court shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
Federico‘s substitution of Edna Sanchez

as mayoralty candidate was not valid
In its assailed December 21, 2011 Resolution, the Comelec En Banc annulled Federico‘s
proclamation as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, on the ground that his substitution of Edna was
invalid, the substitute COC and CONA having been filed after the December 14, 2009 deadline
provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
Federico argues that Comelec Resolution No. 8678 cannot prevail over the provisions of Section 77
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), prescribing the rules on
substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of his COC. The law provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by,
the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections
not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed
with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied)
Federico posits that he timely filed his COC as it was not later than midday of the day of the election.
He argues that the law makes no distinction between the different causes for substitution – death,
disqualification or withdrawal. Regardless of the cause of substitution, the deadline for the filing of a
substitute COC is "not later than mid-day of the election." Accordingly, he asserts that he validly
substituted Edna having filed his COC and CONA on May 5, 2010 or five (5) days before the
elections and having complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution.
Federico‘s argument is not well-taken.
The Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful
the conduct of the first national automated election.
On January 23, 2007, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, An Act Amending Republic
Act No. 8436, Entitled ‗An Act Authorizing The Commission On Elections To Use An Automated
Election System In The May 11, 1998 National Or Local Elections And In Subsequent National And
Local Electoral Exercises,‘ To Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness And Accuracy Of
Elections, Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, As Amended, Republic Act No.
7166 And Other Related Elections Laws, Providing Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes.
Section 13 of said law partially provides:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC.15. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or
the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or
the proposition to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable,
electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position
in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to present the
entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the
ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and
change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot.
Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by
surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be
listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote
upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspector shall affix her/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or-
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
Under said provision, "the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," 34 has been empowered to set the
dates for certain pre-election proceedings. In the exercise of such constitutional and legislated
power, especially to safeguard and improve on the Automated Election System (AES), Comelec
came out with Resolution No. 8678.
As automated elections had been mandated by law, there was a need for the early printing of the
ballots. So that all candidates would be accommodated in the ballots, the early filing of COCs was
necessary. If there would be late filing and approval of COCs, the names of aspiring candidates
would not be included in the ballot, the only document to be read by the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines.
The Law, Rules and Regulations

on Substitution
With regard to substitutions, Congress and the Comelec came out with laws and rules addressing
anticipated problems in such cases. Thus, under Section 12 of R.A. No. 9006, in order to obviate
confusion, the name of the substitute candidate should, as much as possible, bear the same
surname as that of the substituted candidate. Section 12 reads:
Section 12. Substitution of Candidates. – In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have
been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but
shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where
the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided,
however, That if the substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision shall not apply.
[Emphases supplied]
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with Resolution No. 8678.
On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If

after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate
belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any
independent candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided
for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified by final
judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If the death or
permanent disability should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
the substitute candidate may file the certificate with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President or
Senator, with the Law Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as substitute candidate
for any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the foregoing that different deadlines were set to
govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate due to
death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until
midday of the election day to file the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the
substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is
voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw
while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the
substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will
just be wasted.
When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy
as mayor and substituted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29,
2010. The party actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from
Edna. By fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to
withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of
withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden
death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial
race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
Comelec Resolution No. 8889

not binding on Maligaya
Federico asserts that Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to the COC of Edna, as
gubernatorial candidate; and his COC, as mayoralty candidate, was valid as the Comelec passed
upon all matters and issues laid before it in the case. According to him, the legal presumption was
that official duty had been regularly performed. The resolution was an operative fact by which the
Comelec denied Maligaya‘s petition to deny due course to the COC of Federico, and on the basis of
which the MBOC counted the votes for Edna as votes cast for Federico.
As far as Maligaya is concerned, the resolution was void as it lacked legal basis as Federico‘s
substitution was invalid, his COC having been filed only on May 5, 2010, or after December 14,
2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. No reason was
mentioned in the resolution why his COC was given due course except that the withdrawal "merely
caused a vacuum in mayoralty contest." 35 The resolution reads:
Mrs. Edna P. Sanchez is qualified to substitute for her deceased husband. And this substitution is
not contrary to law or our rules. She is stepping up from her candidacy as Mayor to Governor, and
such action merely caused a vacuum in mayoralty contest. The rule being cited by the Law
Department that the substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as
herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009, is far from germane
considering that the vacancy arose by reason of the death of Governor Sanchez.
To stress, the vacancy in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was due to the withdrawal of
Edna as mayoralty candidate, not due to the death of Armando Sanchez.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as it was in
contravention of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. With respect to Federico, it
cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right, like the right to be voted for public office. Indeed,
a void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time. 36
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such nullity and
annul the proclamation."37
More importantly, Resolution No. 8889 was merely an administrative issuance, based on documents
forwarded to the Comelec. It was not a result of an adversarial proceeding, where the parties were
heard and allowed to adduce evidence. In issuing Resolution No. 8889, the Comelec did not bother
to notify the parties who would have been affected. It was, thus, not a decision in an actual case or
controversy which ripened into finality.
Unquestionably, parties who had no participation therein were not bound by the resolution. Federico
cannot invoke res judicata, one of the requirements of which is identity of parties. Stated differently,
as Maligaya was not a party in the said proceeding, Resolution No. 8889 was not binding on him.
The second COCVP in favor of

Federico had no legal basis.
Without question, the votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to Federico as he was never a
legitimate candidate. As there was an invalid substitution, there could not be a valid proclamation. In
effect, the second COCVP in his name had no legal basis. Granting that those who voted for Edna
had in mind to vote for Federico, nonetheless, the fact that there was no compliance with the rules
cannot be ignored.
x x x. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand,
and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we
cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing
the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.38
It was alleged that the MBOC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, raised the hands of Federico as the winner.
As correctly pointed out by Maligaya, however, this was impossible because the CCS printed the
name of Edna Sanchez as the winner on the first COCVP. Thereafter, the MBOC came out with a
second COCVP, this time, with the name of Federico on it with the same number of votes as that of
Edna, and generated on the very same date and the very same time as the first COCVP - a physical
impossibility.
Maligaya‘s Petition to Annul

the Proclamation of Federico
was filed on time
Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27,
2010. From that day, he had ten (10) days to question the dubious proceeding in the MBOC under
Section 6 of Resolution No. 8804. Considering that Maligaya filed his petition to annul Federico‘s
May 10, 2010 proclamation on June 1, 2010, it was indeed filed on time.
It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the
second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this regard, the Court believes that the
actions taken by Maligaya after the elections and the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico
strongly indicate that he was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he should file
a petition questioning the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation
of Federico. The Court adopts with approbation his reasoning on the matter. Thus:
5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge that it was
Edna Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the alleged proclamation of
respondent Federico on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another petition on June 1,
2010, this time against Federico, to annul his proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was
filed within ten days from the knowledge of the alleged proclamation of Federico.
5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya believed
in good faith that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he did not initially know
that there was a COCVP in the name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is also a proof that
petitioner did not dilly dally in protecting his rights. There simply is no reason and it runs
counter to human conduct for Maligaya to file a petition for annulment of proclamation of
Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it was Federico who was proclaimed.
5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows that the
proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least made surreptitiously. Had Maligaya
known of the proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly filed the petition for
annulment of proclamation against Federico. But because it was made without any notice to
the herein private respondent, he only knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June
1, 2010. Private respondent did not certainly sleep on his rights as he filed the proper petition
within the prescribed period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when, as shown
above, the COCVP of Federico was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En
Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the interest of herein private
respondent Maligaya.39 [Emphasis and underscoring in the original]
Accordingly, the Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it annulled the actions of the MBOC and
the proclamation of Federico. Such exercise is within its powers under the law to administer and
enforce election laws.
x x x, The statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the boards of
canvassers includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what
the boards should have done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or
actions as may be required pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the board; conducting an
inquiry affecting the genuineness of election returns beyond the election records of the polling places
involved; annulling canvass or proclamations based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or
tampered returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the
board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all;
requiring the board to convene.401âwphi1
There being no valid substitution,

the candidate with the highest number
of votes should be proclaimed as the
duly elected mayor
As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one qualified candidate in the mayoralty race
in Sto. Tomas, Batangas Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest number of
votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the May 10,2010
elections.41
Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of Intervenor Silva that he be considered the
legal successor of Federico, whom he claims failed to qualify, has no legal basis. There is simply no
vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on succession under Section 4442 of the LGC cannot be
invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Armenius Silva is DENIED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is ordered lifted.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 172131 April 2, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO J. UNICO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 filed by Liwayway Vinzons-Chato seeking to nullify the
Resolution2 dated March 17, 2006 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPC No.
04-096. The assailed resolution affirmed the Resolution3 dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC
(First Division) dismissing petitioner Chato‘s "petition to correct/nullify the election returns in the
municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, due to illegality of the proceedings before respondent
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo and for manifest errors in the election returns; to declare null
and void and without legal effect the proclamation of respondent candidate; and to declare and
proclaim petitioner as the candidate with the highest number of votes received for the lone
congressional district of the Province of Camarines Norte."
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections.
In her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Chato alleged that during the canvassing of the
election returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) from May 10 to 12,
2004, her counsel raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies
in the election returns from various precincts of the municipality of Labo. Prior to the suspension of
proceedings on May 12, 2004, the MBC Labo gave her twenty-four (24) hours, or until 6:00 p.m. of
May 13, 2004, to prove her allegations.
Allegedly in violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 20 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other
Purposes), before the expiration of the period granted and without notice to petitioner Chato or her
counsel, the MBC Labo concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its
canvass to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Camarines Norte. At that time, which was
around 4:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, petitioner Chato‘s counsel was supposed to deliver to the MBC
Labo her letter enumerating the election returns allegedly containing manifest errors and
discrepancies.
Petitioner Chato‘s counsel was thus constrained to appear before the PBC and moved for the
suspension of its proceedings on the ground that there were still pending incidents before the MBC
Labo. The PBC, however, denied the said motion. Upon instruction of the PBC, petitioner Chato filed
therewith a letter-petition for reconsideration of the denial of her request to remand the matter to the
MBC. However, on May 14, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., petitioner Chato‘s counsel received a
Resolution, of even date, of the PBC denying with finality her letter-petition for reconsideration. In so
ruling, the PBC stated that pre-proclamation controversy was not allowed for the election of
Members of the House of Representatives. It noted that the matters raised by petitioner Chato,
which formed part of the proceedings of the PBC, were proper for an election protest before the
competent tribunal. Further, according to the PBC, it had no authority to direct the MBC Labo to
reconvene for the purpose of receiving petitioner Chato‘s written objections and supporting
documents and re-canvassing the election returns.
Likewise on May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-
elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. 1awphi1.nét
Petitioner Chato forthwith filed with the COMELEC a Petition alleging manifest errors in that –
1) Total number of ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots is more than the number
of voters who actually voted in Barangays Anamea[m], Bagong Silang III, Bakiad, Malangcao
Basud and Submakin;
2) Total number of votes counted is less than the number of voters who actually voted in
Barangays Gumamela, Pinya, Dalas, Anameam, Baay, Bagacay, Bagong Silang I, II & III,
Bakiad, Bautista, Bayan-Bayan, Bulhao, Cabusay, Calabasa, Cabatuhan, Canapwan, Daguit
I, Dumagmang, Exciban, Fundado, Gumacutan, Guisican, Iberica, Lugui, Mabilo I & II,
Macogon, Mahan-hawan, Malanggan Masalong, Napaod, Pag-asa, Pangpang, San Antonio,
Sta. Cruz, Submakin, Talobalib and Tulay na Lupa;
3) The entries in some election returns coming from different precincts in Barangays Tulay
na Lupa, Baay and Lugui, all of Labo, Camarines Norte, appear to have been written by one
person; 1a\^/phi1.net
4) No data on number of voters who actually voted and of ballots found in compartment for
valid ballots from Barangays Bulhao, San Antonio, Tulay na Lupa, Daguit, Pinya, Cabusay,
Napaod, Pag-asa and Dalas; and
5) One election return is supposedly an election return from Barangay Del Carmen, Labo,
but there is apparently no Barangay Del Carmen and does not appear to be part of the series
of election returns assigned to Labo.5
Petitioner Chato insisted that correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election
returns, questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the boards of canvassers, or noting
of
objections on election returns or certificates of canvass were allowed before the MBC. She further
claimed that with all the manifest errors and obvious discrepancies appearing on the face of the
election returns, it could not be said that the canvassing of votes in Labo reflected the true and
correct number of votes that she received in the said municipality.
On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the
proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said order on the ground that
respondent Unico‘s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission
of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically
conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-
proclamation controversies on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody,
and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President,
Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List.
The COMELEC (First Division) found that the relief sought by petitioner Chato was actually for the
re-counting of votes, not merely correction of manifest errors in the election returns. Further, in
seeking to nullify respondent Unico‘s proclamation, petitioner Chato alleged manifest errors in the
election returns and that they were tampered with and prepared under duress.
Addressing these contentions, the COMELEC (First Division) explained that a re-count of votes is
not within the province of a pre-proclamation controversy, which is generally limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. It observed that under Section 31 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6669 (General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Board of
Canvassers in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), objections to the election returns or
certificates of canvass were to be specifically noted in the minutes of the board. With respect to the
manifest errors alleged by petitioner Chato, the COMELEC (First Division) stated that her objections
were general in character as they failed to specify the election return(s) containing these alleged
manifest errors as well as the precinct(s) from which they came. Under the circumstances, the MBC
Labo could not immediately rule on petitioner Chato‘s bare allegations for to do so would have
resulted in a fishing expedition.
The COMELEC (First Division) mentioned that even her petition for reconsideration filed with the
PBC was bereft of evidence to support her claim of manifest errors. It was only in her petition filed
with the COMELEC that petitioner Chato specifically enumerated the election returns that allegedly
contained infirmities or manifest errors. However, according to the COMELEC (First Division), the
resolution of the matters raised by petitioner Chato, e.g., correction of the votes garnered by the
candidates and reflected in the election returns, would require the opening of the ballots. This could
only be done in an election protest considering that petitioner Chato likewise alleged fraud,
substitution, and vote padding.
The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters
pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a
ministerial function. Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation,
1ªvvphi1 .nét
the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply with its duties and functions
including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning candidate for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte. The decretal portion of the Resolution dated April 13, 2005 of the
COMELEC (First Division) stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter LACK OF
MERIT.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the
COMELEC en banc for resolution.
In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chato‘s
motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view
of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th)
Congress. It reasoned, thus:
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme
Court made a categorical pronouncement that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which
are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the
1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide
the pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of
the Senate.
The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC,
et al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC‘s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET‘s own jurisdiction begins.
Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DENIED

for lack of merit. The Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated last April 13, 2005
is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner Chato now seeks recourse to the Court alleging that:
THE SOLE ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IS WHETHER OR NOT
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION ON MARCH 17, 2006.9
Petitioner Chato essentially contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it ruled that it had already been divested of jurisdiction upon respondent Unico‘s assumption of office
as a Member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner Chato vigorously asserts that respondent
Unico‘s proclamation was void because it was based on doctored election documents and not
through the legitimate will of the electorate. As such, it can allegedly be challenged even after
respondent Unico had assumed office.
Petitioner Chato further submits that the COMELEC possesses the authority to pass upon issues
involving manifest errors in the certificates of canvass and the composition of the board or its
proceedings. It also has the authority to pass upon the nullity of what otherwise is a null and void
proclamation.
With respect to petitioner Chato‘s case, the MBC allegedly violated Section 20 of RA 7166 by failing
to rule on her objections during the canvassing of votes. The PBC allegedly confounded this error by
refusing to correct the alleged manifest errors in the election returns or certificate of canvass before
it. The COMELEC, for its part, allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not annul
the proclamation of respondent Unico even as it allegedly possessed such authority as well as to
correct manifest errors in the election returns and certificates of canvass, and order the re-counting
of the ballots. Petitioner Chato emphasized that the COMELEC has the power of supervision and
control over boards of canvassers, including the power to review, revise and/or set aside their
rulings. Although the COMELEC, through the First Division in its earlier order suspending the effects
of respondent Unico‘s proclamation, ordered the examination of the evidence and documents
submitted by the parties, petitioner Chato avers that the COMELEC never disclosed the outcome of
this supposed examination.
She thus urges the Court to order the COMELEC to direct the examination of the election returns of
the municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, or release the results thereof if one had already been
undertaken; constitute and convene a new MBC, and direct the same to prepare a new election
return, accomplish a new certificate of canvass and submit it to the PBC; direct the PBC to
reconvene and canvass the new certificate of canvass, and subsequently proclaim the winning
candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Construing this provision in Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, 10 the Court held that:
x x x The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals
which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the
1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa (Congress). x x x
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals‘ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. 11
Further, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" has been interpreted in this wise:
The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee‘s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. 12 (Emphasis supplied).
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC‘s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET‘s own
jurisdiction begins.13 Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with
the HRET.14
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken
his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the
COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato‘s petition. The
issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity
of respondent Unico‘s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico‘s
proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has
taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people‘s mandate.15
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato‘s election protest against respondent
Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.16 Petitioner Chato‘s
remedy would have been to file an election protest before the said tribunal, not this petition for
certiorari. The special civil action of certiorari is available only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power for certiorari to prosper.17
All told, the COMELEC en banc clearly did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006 holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon respondent
Unico‘s proclamation and oath-taking as a Member of the House of Representatives. On the
contrary, it demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the proof required to establish the domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen who
seeks election as governor of a province.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia
in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22,
2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., in
Barangay Veteran‘s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. 1 On September 1, 2009 he
renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same 2 in compliance with
Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.3
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he
lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter
in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Veteran‘s Village, opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos‘ name in the Commission on Elections‘ (COMELEC‘s) voters list
for Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. 4
Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T.
Lim in Ipil a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos‘ name from the official voters list. After hearing, the
MCTC rendered a decision, denying the petition.5 On appeal,6 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed
the MCTC decision. The RTC decision became final and executory.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos‘ COC7 on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and
(2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained
Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the
residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Division‘s decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere
guest or transient visitor in his brother‘s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile.
Acting on Jalosjos‘ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court resolved on
May 7, 2010 to issue a status quo ante order, enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing its February
11, 2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and was proclaimed
winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.8
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. 9 For purposes of the election laws,
the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,10 meaning that a person must not only
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. 11
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate‘s compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of intention. 12 Still, jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time.13
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
One. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully
changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was unable
to discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful domicile, it must be
assumed that his domicile is either Quezon City or Australia.
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos‘ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It
may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia
when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country
for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. 14
On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He
left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has
merely been staying at his brother‘s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in
a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should
live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.15 To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What
matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of
making it his domicile.
Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his
residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better
chance of noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo
presented, who just sporadically passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that
Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and
national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay. 1âwphi1
Three. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. 16 The evidence Jalosjos presented
is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in holding otherwise.
Four. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts
regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May
4, 2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination
as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of
the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC
Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1(as originally underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque." 2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is
a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated,
was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent
oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of
the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May
2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As
the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her
due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we
here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY
BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider
the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of
candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of

petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation.
On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even any attempt to remove
it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may
be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En
Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier
to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner did not
move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy
has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding
against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to
avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became
executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She
would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which
would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated
possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and
after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy,
clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law
into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane
decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in
the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND
EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from promulgation into
becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a

division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon
the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its
promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact
received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13. 4 On that date, she had absolutely no
reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove the restraint on her
proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The
utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her
proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative
of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as
the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she
directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured
proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc
and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In other words,
petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions thereon, past
and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that
she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the
impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of
Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the
existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has
exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.
That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional
provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the
House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in
the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of
petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully
litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May
2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed
the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for
Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The
bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court
within five days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become
valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of
the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to
legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme
Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for
a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and
principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily.
The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special
Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any
of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive
evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties
may, after due notice, be required to submit their position paper together with
affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that this
provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence
are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the
COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's
authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's
submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25
June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was
a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question
and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was
filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of
five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7,

2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden
now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent
utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter,
made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen
and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."
(Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted
no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A.
No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that
she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen,
thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that
she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with
rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner
executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225
applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the
COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012. 1âwphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference
to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions
-Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she
did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be
considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance
in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt. 7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET
insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its
cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the
Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave
abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any
certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s
constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only
upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such
membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by
the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the
Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no
hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a
representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of
cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit
in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the
qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June
2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite
the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the
unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very well
invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained
in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the
Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now
appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in
order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties,
but continues until the case is terminated. 9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction
vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition.
Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has
legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative
and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against
trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot
withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she
designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed.
Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206698 February 25, 2014
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed via petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order is the Resolution1 dated April 1, 2013 issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, which affirmed the Resolution2 dated January 15,
2013 of its First Division dismissing petitioner Luis R. Villafuerte's verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Miguel R. Villafuerte (respondent).
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the Province of
Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections. On October 25, 2012, petitioner
filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition3 to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented
a false and deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in
his COC that "L-RAY JR.-MIGZ" was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended to
appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately
omitted his first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead "LRAY JR.," which is the nickname of his
father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, "LRay Villafuerte, Jr."
In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, 4 respondent denied the commission of any
material misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname
"LRAY JR. MIGZ" and not only "MIGZ"; that the choice of name/word to appear on the ballot was
solely his choice or preference; and that the presumption that the voters would be confused on the
simple fact that his name would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC's First Division denied the petition for lack of merit and
disposed as follows:
x x x no compelling reason why the COC of respondent should be denied due course to or cancelled
on the sole basis of an alleged irregularity in his name/nickname. Laws and jurisprudence on the
matter are clear that material misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to qualifications of a
candidate, such as citizenship, residency, registration as a voter, age, etc.
Nothing has been mentioned about a candidate's name/nickname as a ground to deny due course or
cancel his/her COC. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which denied the same in
a Resolution dated April 1, 2013.
The COMELEC found that its First Division did not err in denying the petition as existing law and
jurisprudence are clear in providing that a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material
when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's eligibility; and that a
misrepresentation of a non-material fact is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. It found that petitioner's allegations
did not pertain to respondent's qualifications or eligibility for the office to which he sought to be
elected. The candidate's use of a name or nickname is a not a ground to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging the following
issues:
Respondent COMELEC palpably and seriously committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or in excess of jurisdiction when it whimsically and capriciously limited the grounds provided
in Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code to a candidate's qualifications
only and excluding as a ground a candidate's material representation that is FALSE on his identity
which renders him ineligible to be voted for as a candidate, because a FALSE representation of
ones' true name/nickname as a candidate is a deliberate attempt to misinform, mislead, and deceive
the electorate and notwithstanding that Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code expressly states
that "any" material misrepresentation in violation of Section 74 of the same Code is a ground for
cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy.
II
Respondent COMELEC committed serious errors and patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or in excess of jurisdiction in failing or refusing to apply prevailing jurisprudence and law,
wherein it was held: that cancellation of COC is not based on the lack of qualification although it may
relate to qualification based on a "finding that a candidate made a material representation that is
false"; thereby disregarding the well-entrenched rulings of this Honorable Court that material
misrepresentation may also include ineligibilities to run for office or to assume office and is not
limited to qualifications; utterly ignoring the ruling of this Honorable Court that votes cast in favor of a
candidate using a nickname in violation of Section 74 are STRAY votes, and in turning a blind eye to
its constitutional and statutory duty and responsibility to protect the rights of the voters and the
integrity of the electoral processes in our country, among others.
III
Respondent COMELEC whimsically, capriciously and despotically allowed herein respondent

MIGUEL to use "LRAY JR.-MIGZ" and thereby illegally disregarded the effects of R.A. 8436 as
amended by R.A. 9369 or the Automation Law and the requirement therein for the alphabetical
arrangement of the names of the candidates and for allowing respondent Miguel to deliberately and
misleadingly omit his baptismal first name MIGUEL which is mandatorily required by Section 74 to
be included in his COC and for respondent Miguel to use more than one nickname for which he is
not generally or popularly known in Camarines Sur.
IV
Material misrepresentation as contemplated by law is NOT to protect respondent as a candidate, but
MORESO, to protect the right of other candidates under the Automation Law, and more importantly
to protect the electorate from being misinformed, misled and deceived. 6
The main issue for resolution is whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
Petitioner filed the petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code claiming that respondent
committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his COC that his name/nickname
to be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ instead of his baptismal
name, VILLAFUERTE, MIGUEL-MIGZ; that such declaration made under oath constitutes material
misrepresentation even if the material misrepresentation did not refer to his qualifications but
referred to his eligibility to be validly voted for as a candidate and, consequently, to his eligibility to
assume office.
We find no merit in the argument.
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code states that no person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn COC within the period fixed herein. Section 74 thereof
enumerates the contents of the COC, to wit:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a
certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has
not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil
registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim,
his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are
two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being
made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who
may continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was
elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly
known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires.
And the proper procedure to be taken if a misrepresentation is committed by a candidate in his COC
is to question the same by filing a verified petition pursuant to Section 78, thus:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.- A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under
Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. What then
constitutes a material misrepresentation?
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 7 petitioner Victorino Salcedo II filed with the COMELEC a
petition seeking cancellation of respondent Ermelita Salcedo's (Ermelita) COC on the ground that
she had made material misrepresentation by stating her surname as Salcedo. Petitioner claimed that
Ermelita had no right to use the surname Salcedo, since her marriage to Neptali Salcedo was void.
The COMELEC En Banc found that Ermelita did not commit any misrepresentation nor usurp
another's name since she had the right to use her husband's surname for being married to him, and
thus, validated her proclamation as Mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo appealed the COMELEC's
resolution, and we held:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is

authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person
pursuant to Section 78 x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section
78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for
the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right
to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not
specify what would be considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this
phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code. 8
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of

the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of
the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public
office upon just any innocuous mistake.
xxxx
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one‘s
qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the
public as to one's identity is not within the scope of the provision. 9
In Aratea v. Commission on Elections,10 we proclaimed Estela D. Antipolo, the alleged second placer,
as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, being the one who remained as the sole qualified candidate for
the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, since the COC of Romeo D.
Lonzanida, the first placer, was declared void ab initio. We find that violation of the three-term limit is
an eligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office and the misrepresentation of
such is a ground to grant the petition to deny due course or cancel a COC. We said that:
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election.
Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is
eligible for said office." The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties and to enhance the electorate‘s freedom of choice, is found both in the Constitution and
the law. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible.
One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in
Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having
all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office. 11
xxxx
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus
qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position,
such fact is material in determining a candidate‘s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office.
Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida
misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he
was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida‘s representation that he
was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office.12
In Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections,13 where petitioner therein claimed that respondent

committed material misrepresentation when he stated his name in the COC as Rustico Besa
Balderian instead of Chu Teck Siao, we found that it had been established that in all of respondent's
school records, he had been using Rustico Besa Balderian, the name under which he was baptized
and known since he can remember. He never used the name Chu Teck Siao by which he was
registered. It was also established that he had filed a petition for change of name to avoid any
confusion and which the RTC had granted. We then said, that –
AT ALL EVENTS, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office." It need not be emphasized that
there is no showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondent‘s
identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived. 14
Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate
to prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or
qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age,
citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the
Local Government Code.15 Hence, petitioner‘s allegation that respondent‘s nickname "LRAY JR.
MIGZ" written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname
written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus
qualification to run for public office.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we said,
respondent's nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence
showing that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had the intention to
deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office
he seeks to assume.
Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then
incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as "LRay." Their relationship is shown by the
posters, streamers and billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son
on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know who respondent is. Moreover, it
was established by the affidavits of respondent‘s witnesses that as the father and son have striking
similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms, which remained unrebutted, the appellation of
LRAY JR. has been used to refer to respondent. Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by
the name MIGZ16 written as respondent‘s nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters,
as in fact, such name distinguishes respondent from his father, the then incumbent "Governor
LRAY," who was running for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District of Camarines Sur. As we ruled
in Salcedo II v. COMELEC,17the use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the
public as to one‘s identity, is not within the scope of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
respondent's nickname written in his COC, without intending to mislead the voters as to his identity,
cannot be canceled. We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc in
finding that respondent did not commit material misrepresentation in his COC.
Petitioner relies on Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 18 to justify the annulment
of respondent's COC. In Villarosa, which involves the counting of ballots under the manual elections,
respondent Quintos filed an election protest relating to the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa
(Villarosa) alleging that the "JTV" votes should not be counted in the latter's favor. We then held that
Villarosa‘s use of "JTV" as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election
process; thus, votes of "JTV" were considered stray votes. In so ruling, we found that "JTV" is the
nickname of Villarosa‘s husband, who was then the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro;
that when Villarosa's husband ran and campaigned for as representative in both the 1992 and 1995
elections in the same legislative district where Villarosa ran in the May 1998 elections, he was
generally known as "JTV." We thus ruled that the voters who wrote "JTV" in the ballots had no other
person in mind except then incumbent representative Jose Tapales Villarosa, or the same person
whom they have known for a long time as "JTV." We also took into consideration Villarosa's
statement in her affidavit admitting that she was generally and popularly known in every barangay in
Occidental Mindoro as "GIRLIE" before and after she filed her COC; and even her counsel asserted
during the oral argument that her other nickname before she filed her COC was "Mrs. JTV" and not
"JTV." We also found that since the name "GIRLIE" written on the space for representative was in
fact claimed by petitioner Villarosa and credited in her favor, then the "JTV" votes under the idem
sonans rule cannot be counted for Villarosa, because only one nickname or stagename is allowed;
and that Rule 13 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which allows the use of a nickname
and appellation of affection and friendship, provided that it is accompanied by the first name or
surname of the candidate, was not applied since the "JTV" votes were unaccompanied by her first
name or surname. Thus, we found that malice and bad faith on the part of Villarosa was evident
when, in her COC and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her
husband, the incumbent representative of the district in question.
Villarosa is not on all fours with this case. This case is a petition to deny due course and to cancel
COC on the ground of a statement of a material representation that is false; to be material, such
must refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks to hold. Here,
respondent's nickname is not a qualification for a public office which affects his eligibility. Notably,
respondent's father, who won 3 consecutive terms as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte,
is popularly known as "LRAY," so when respondent wrote in his COC, "LRAY JR. MIGZ" as his
nickname, he differentiated himself from Governor "LRAY," which negates any intention to mislead
or misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. Also, the appellation LRAY
JR. was accompanied by the name MIGZ which was not so in the Villarosa case.
It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall use in a COC the
name by which he has been baptized, unless the candidate has changed his name through court-
approved proceedings, and that he may include one nickname or stagename by which he is
generally or popularly known in the locality, which respondent did. As we have discussed, the name
which respondent wrote in his COC to appear in the ballot, is not considered a material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as it does not pertain to his
qualification or eligibility to run for an elective public office. By invoking the case of Villarosa which is
in the nature of an election protest relating to the proclamation of Villarosa, petitioner should have
instead filed an election protest and prayed that the votes for respondent be declared as stray votes,
and not a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC.
Finally, petitioner claims that the false representation of respondent's nickname written on the COC
is meant to undermine the statutory requirement regarding the alphabetical listing/arrangement of
names of the candidate as provided under Section 1319 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9369 amending RA
8436, the automated election system; that he would be put to a great and undue disadvantage as he
became no. 5, while respondent was in no. 4 in the list of candidates for Governor of Camarines Sur.
We are not persuaded.
Considering that respondent's name is VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ, his name would indeed be
ahead of petitioner's name, VILLAFUERTE, LUIS, in the official ballot which contains the
alphabetical listing of the candidates for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines Sur.
However, petitioner's claim that such listing would lead to confusion as to put him to undue
disadvantage is merely speculative and without basis as the voters can identify the candidate they
want to vote for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013, of the Commission on
Elections En Banc, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203974 April 22, 2014
AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-07971 and Minute
Resolution No. 12-09252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both
promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for
Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel public respondent to implement the
same.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city
of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte,
and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were
allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should
be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the
conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city,
the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU)
directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City‘s conversion and how it will cause
material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of
the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of
Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to
conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC,
Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite.
Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a
municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the
plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012, 3 the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012,
in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-24 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the
assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-
memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
component city into highly-urbanized city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City
to participate in said plebiscite.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on
substantially the same arguments earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other
hand, public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and
that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this
instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU,
and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and
prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit‘s probable elevation to that of
an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which
adopted a calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1,
2012. Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan
prayed that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree
that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite, and that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent from implementing the
questioned resolution. On October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-0989 suspended the
preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the
plebiscite was once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM
regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.
After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court
for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to
schedule the plebiscite either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the
TRO issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite
has become mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the delay in holding the
plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days
form the date of the President‘s declaration.
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position by arguing that
mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts
surrounding the case, it cannot be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautista‘s
entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus
Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the locality
during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling
the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in
G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan City‘s conversion. Given
the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on
March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the qualified registered
voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus
moot and academic for ultimately, the public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The
only variation will be as regards its participants.
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for
determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10,
Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses
not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in
the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan
City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City
of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the
registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining
towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions, it is but proper that
we ascertain first the relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the
LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the
Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy" in times of war and other
national emergency under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in
nature.5 The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the
approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the
case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC
provisions detailing the requirements for the creation of barangays 6, municipalities7, cities8, and
provinces9. Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also
been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected."
(emphasis supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception
to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted
earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or
not the requirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it
ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices
under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the
President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of
conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city
proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for
the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the delegation of
power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code
is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation,
division, merge, abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said
constitutional provision.
This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Court‘s pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by analogy.
While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent
component city into a component city, its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in
ascertaining the proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city comes within the purview of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and its application to cases
of conversion were discussed thusly:
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of
our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of
the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the
people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries
of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people‘s
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units. 12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial
that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the
enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching
ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the
constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528 13 was declared
unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela without
submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial
alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a
change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase
"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines
between political subdivisions, where the LGU‘s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the
other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGC‘s Implementing Rules and Regulations, which reads:
Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City. –
xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion – The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make
it independent of the province where it is geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will
come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City‘s gain of
independence. With the city‘s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of
Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City‘s severance
from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija‘s 5,751.3 sq.
km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City‘s
conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take
place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and
more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs
and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision should be interpreted
with the other relevant provisions in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC
which is undeniably the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision
itself, "Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. On the other hand, Sec.
453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a
city as highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the declaration after the city
has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application and ratification in a
plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus,
the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite
requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act
beyond the Constitution‘s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond
what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva: 14
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection. x x x
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
Constitution.15 In a long line of cases, the cardinal principle of construction established is that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or
more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted,
even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language used.17
Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should
be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning
of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of
the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political
units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view
of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an
HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their
interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly
requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the conversion of Puerto
Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered
voters in said cities alone. It is clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said
plebiscites was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on who will
vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that
the Court is asked to resolve the question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities
have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said cities
prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the
operative fact doctrine―that ―the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.‖18
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly

affected by Cabanatuan City‘s conversion
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and
Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly
affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.
a. "Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly
affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC 19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are
worth revisiting.
We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose
economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted
from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. 21
xxxx
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will
be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the
separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy
of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected
and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (emphasis added)
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X, we affirmed our ruling
in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain
the earlier finding that what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the
Constitutional Commission:23
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are
actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words.
Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part
of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the
plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155––the
predecessor of the LGC––thus:
Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume that a province has
municipalities and there is a merger of two municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the
plebiscite will be conducted within the two merged municipalities and not in the eight other
municipalities?
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and that is the reason we
probably have to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two municipalities which are being
merged, but the entire province will now have to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire municipality have to vote? There
are two barangays being merged, say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to
participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected directly by the merger of
two of its barangay.
Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged, abolished, whatever, would
the rest of the municipality not participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to
one municipality?
Senator Guingona. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51 barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two municipalities, let us say, in a
province with 10 municipalities – the entire province – will the other municipalities although not
affected also have to participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the territorial boundaries of
the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman
mentioned.24
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not
only changes in economic but also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an
LGU shall be considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be
participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from
an independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby
necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner
Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan City‘s conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija
to justify the province‘s participation in the plebiscite to be conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan City‘s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija
will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285
of the LGC. The law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the
internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the following manner:
(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on
the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory
of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt,
suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city
will cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter‘s population.
Taking this decrease in territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded
that Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers‘ values. As
assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for Region
III:25
Basis for IRA Province of Cabanatuan Province of

Computation Nueva Ecija City Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City
No. of Population 1,843,853 259,267 259,267
CY 2007 Census
Land Area 5,751.33 282.75 5,468.58
(sq. km.)
IRA Share of Actual IRA Estimated IRA Reduction

Nueva Ecija Share share excluding
Cabanatuan
City
Based on ₱800,772,618.45 ₱688,174,751.66 ₱112,597,866.79
Population
Based on Land ₱263,470,472.62 ₱250,517,594.56 P 12,952,878.06
Area
Total ₱125,550,744.85
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in
IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City‘s
conversion, petitioner Umali‘s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also
adverse, deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City
is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may
levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided,
however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions
of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys
the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry
resources,26 professional taxes,27 and amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be
argued that this is not a derogation of the province‘s taxing power because it is in no way deprived of
its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory, the conversion will still reduce the
province‘s taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in
shares in local tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a material
and substantial change to the province‘s economic rights, warranting its participation in the
plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC
is in order, viz:
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty
Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city
treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
A component city‘s conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province is a threat
to the latter‘s economic viability. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be
converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province‘s
operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead
costs. Moreover, the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in the province‘s economic
performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its most progressive city of
Cabanatuan attains independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its
residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan‘s conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative
supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12,
Art. X of the Constitution read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall
not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is
converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province
and be under the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight
because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater
economic activity require greater autonomy.29 The provincial government stands to lose the power to
ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve
resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. 31 The province will also be divested of
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the
appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be
modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for
and be voted upon as provincial officials.33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will
be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents‘ benefit.
Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects
queued by the provincial government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not
scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial
jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1âwphi1
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its
residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered
voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Respondents‘ apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set a
dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces
will always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain the city‘s dependence is
speculative at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the
conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed
to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable
how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter that
is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights of its constituents. To
limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is
as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they
demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is
hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public
respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally,
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City
into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a
within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN

ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking
to set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc which affirmed in toto the Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division
canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 4 were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he
was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-
resident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not
properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his
address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during
the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto,
Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No.
9225.6 He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a
Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his
family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and
finally in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a
material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu,
Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to

GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby
CANCELLED.7chanrobleslaw
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by petitioner as he
was already given a copy of the petition and also in consonance with the Commission's
constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that
while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply
with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e.,
persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency
requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization
as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes;
thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove that he was able to
reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for elective office in said locality which
he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that petitioner
won over private respondent.8 Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer
Proclamation.9
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc
assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. 10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution 11 of the May 3, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in
favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation
of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of
Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR IMPORT OF

PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523
PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS
PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR
"GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE
BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS
ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON
RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel his
COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not
personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by
registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode of
service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs
(1)15 and (4),16 Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's certificate of
candidacy should have been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the settled rule,
however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the
COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of
their Rules of Procedure.cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition
of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended
by the Commission.chanrobleslaw
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired.17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of respondent's petition

to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of
Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e., pertaining
to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served
personally on petitioner, respectively, and held that:cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that
the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose
right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not
only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by
brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This
principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v.
Commission on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as
defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed
by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The
COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest
of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is
for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the
electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its
command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 19chanrobleslaw
Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes
at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC,
pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public interest,
which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's s
ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:cralawlawlibrary
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the procedure for filing a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which requires
service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the
efforts exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware
that such service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for petitioner to
personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in Canada at the time of its filing
as shown in respondent's travel records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter an opportunity to
answer the allegations contained in the petition even prior to the service of summons by the
Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the conference
held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations
against him. He even filed a Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process which is the very
essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to substantive
considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, x x x
xxxx
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order,
x x x.
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants the relaxation of
the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure, consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in
several cases.20chanrobleslaw
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born
and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had
paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of
suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan,
Batanes during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers
that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public
office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the
acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his
nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with
the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of the law.21 The law does not provide for residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is only logical and consistent with
the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes
material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
chanrobleslaw
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides, among
others, for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.chanrobleslaw
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place
where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Respondent
filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one
year immediately preceeding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, 25 that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26 A domicile of origin is acquired by
every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the
same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be
said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and
became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's
case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA
No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place
was put in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:cralawlawlibrary
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the
USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it
his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.31chanrobleslaw
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically
make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a
Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able
to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May
13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA
No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his
domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with
an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to
May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative
bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion
has marred such factual determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the
factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required under Section
39 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May 13,
2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v.
Commission on Elections,34 we held:cralawlawlibrary
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government

those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the
qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of
the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the
will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.35chanrobleslaw
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately proceeding the day of the election, thus, a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to
Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to COCs, to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.chanrobleslaw
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the
false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy. 36 We concluded that material representation contemplated
by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age,
citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for
in the Local Government Code.37 Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. 38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3, 2013 of the
COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc
and are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE

CAPITAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
could run for and hold elective public office.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Per Curiam Resolution2 dated December 9, 2013 of respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated
September 6, 2013 of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling in Maquiling
v. Commission on Elections,4 disqualified petitioner Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the
May 13, 2013 elections, set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, and declared respondent Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said
municipality.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for
his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
No. 92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of
Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009,
Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because
he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing
aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the
winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's continued
use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was
disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The
Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession
should be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He
argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the
Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert his
status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he
continued to use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine
passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after
receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No. 195649.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the
May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC 6 for the same
position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and set
aside the Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for
elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte
in the May 10, 2010 elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in
his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does not mean that he
failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after
complying with the requirements that he perfonned positive acts which effectively disqualified him
from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.
xxxx
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. 7
The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an
Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April3, 2009." 8cralawrednad
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a
Petition9 seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel
his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309
(DC) and was raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said petition was,
however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the
total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation. He
argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado
is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and
without any legal effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition
in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following
Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to
comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was
deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as
held in Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of
Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming
Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" was submitted in evidence, the
same would not suffice because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on
October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution

reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent Rommel Cagoco
Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration. 12 He argued that the Comelec
Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on all fours with the
present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period
reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the
sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming
support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6,
2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor ofKauswagan.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second Division. It
accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the Comelec En Banc's Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED.
The Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013
Elections.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer for injunctive
relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December
26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary
Restraining Order14 in view of the issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution to
implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the respondents to file their
respective comments on the petition. In the same Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's ancillary
relief for temporary restraining order.
Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order dated
January 14, 2014,16 contending that the acts sought to be restrained by Arnado are already fait
accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution17 and
pursuant thereto a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be
the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office. Since then,
he has assumed and performed the duties and functions of his office.
In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a Status Quo
Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor of
Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.
Issues
In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE
PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR
LATE FILING, ETC.
II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE
DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.
IV
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012.19
Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his right to
procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers that
Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter subsequently filed a similar case docketed as
SPC No. 13-019. In addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period
reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.
Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with procedural
infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial
and no hearing for the reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not
follow its own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.
Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse of discretion but
also violated his constitutional right to due process when it allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph
(Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the Second
Division. Furthermore, the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it
disqualified him from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the
voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him.
Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of his former
counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with
Oath of Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012,
he is a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is
qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Petition for certiorari is limited to the

determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial
issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of
policy, this Court will not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had
committed grave abuse of discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64
petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." 22 "Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave." 23 Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been
defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. 24cralawrednad
In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the Comelec En Banc acted
capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9, 2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to
law or jurisprudence.
Arnado's allegations that Capitan

violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.
There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are
instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.25cralawred It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping when
in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the
same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.27cralawrednad
Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a general
averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-019, the
Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed to comply with this Court's Revised Circular
No. 28-91,28without demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not
shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties,
issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit to this Court a copy of the Petition
in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of proclamation case). As the party insisting that Capitan committed
forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of establishing the same. After all, it is settled that he who
alleges has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not sufficient. 29cralawrednad
Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and
SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the parties are only Capitan and Arnado. In the
second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as
respondent. There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the annulment of Arnado's
proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), it
appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of Capitan's allegations therein or he made a
deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A
copy30 thereof annexed to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify and/or
cancel the certificate of candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein state in no uncertain terms
that it is one for disqualification based on Arnado's failure to comply with the requisites of RA 9225
and on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second Division appropriately
treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC. It is
elementary that the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the
petition.31cralawrednad
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, 32 a petition for disqualification should
be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. 33 Thus, the
petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013. 34cralawrednad
The other procedural lapses allegedly

committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place,
Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the
dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being
accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. 35 Also, it was Capitan who
filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is not in a position to question the
alleged inaction of the Comelec on said motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified
Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En Banc and subsequently appealing to this Court
despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for
consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina,36it was held that once a party elevates the case before the
appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains
pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte
face and deny that same jurisdiction."37cralawrednad
In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only
permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact
which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be
consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number.
In Muñoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of a mere possibility,
an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he
has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions
attached thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar
questions of law and fact."39 In this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No.
13-019 does not appear to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do not even involve the
same parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Comelec in not consolidating them.
Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant consideration. The proceedings in a special action
for disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in
nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with. 40 In Diangka v. Comelec,41 this Court
held that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously
applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary
in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for
disqualifications are subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said
Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether clarification
questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants, and whether the adverse party is to be granted
opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc
reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or as in the case at bar, a party's answer and the supporting
papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case. 42
Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc

committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of the
Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not
correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
and Luie Tito F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that
Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The September 6, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division does not state who the ponente is. The same goes true
with the questioned December 9, 2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of the Comelec En Banc. As a per
curiam resolution, it was arrived at by the Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any
particular ponente. Hence, we need not belabor Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis
therefor lacks factual moorings.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin

requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified
from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase
"dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that
Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held
in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed
withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to
comply with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an
affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not
suffice for having been belatedly executed.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the
Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is
worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010
elections — being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The
Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing
grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the
deficiency in his qualification because at the time this Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on
April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice
Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance
to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and abusive denial of
opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's
April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied therewith by
executing an affidavit affirming his April3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with the effect of
the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born Filipino
citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It
was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of
the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that
Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the
Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court
ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with.
Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse
Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply
allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation.
Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance with the
qualifications to run for local elective office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the May 10,
2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US
passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor
of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and
applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established. 48 Under the
doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the
same."49 It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the same
issue.50cralawrednad
It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to disqualify
him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his candidacy.
In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the
use of his US passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on
his qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But
despite the petitions filed against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010,
Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy
for the 2013 elections and without executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the
argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC
since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections,
is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling, Arnado should be
made to face the consequences of his inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible questions about his
qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009

Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the original
or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter
the outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in
the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this
Court disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on due process considerations.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process
impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to
go to trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Petitioner should have
offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any
applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines
shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally
presented:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no
opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process.
Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice. 52
Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and
March 23, 2010. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 201 0,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DATE OF Arrival:01/12/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :057782700
DATE OF Arrival:03/23/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :05778270053
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado never bothered to
correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented evidence in this petition to prove that he did not
travel abroad on those dates using his US passport.
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he had taken
in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified by the
circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine passport in his travels
abroad beginning December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by
Arnado's Philippine passport.
With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue
that had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the
issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's argument in this case-that he is
qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the
May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009
Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel
abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that
courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties. They cannot render judgment based on issues that have never been
raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that "points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations
of due process underlie this rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was
cancelled by virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation where Arnado
expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried
with it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he requirement of an express
renunciation x x x does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation
of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this was never raised
in this petition. At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 356 of RA
9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2)
thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section
5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado's 2008
implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in
2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.
Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an express one specifically
required by law.
Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his US passport
effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already become final and immutable. We can
no longer resurrect in this case the issues that have already been resolved there with fmality.
In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the first quarter of
2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to the rollo of the Maquiling case. But said copy
of Arnado's Philippine passport57 is a mere "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY
ON FILE" as attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the Comelec. 58 This is clearly
stamped on aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a mere
secondary evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and unless the offeror has
proven the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original. 60 In this case,
however, Arnado's Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine
passport cannot sway us to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration
that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even
assuming that the recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010
and March 23, 2010, which effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in
his disqualification to run for an elective public office.
Landslide election victory cannot

override eligibility requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84%
of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court pronounced that election
victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise,
certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local
government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the required
qualifications under Section 39,63a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the
same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 64 of the same law. After
all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for election to local
public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the
circumstances that disqualify local candidates." 65cralawrednad
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In that case, petitioner Lopez
was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US
citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his
candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007 without first
making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez
won in the elections, this Court still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a
candidate for a local elective position for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2)
of RA 9225. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions
of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of
the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. 67
In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in
sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running in the
May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said
municipality.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions
are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 212953 August 5, 2014
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This treats of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order1dated June 3, 2014 of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de Mesa Festin (Festin) were
two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the
May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15, 2013, private respondent was proclaimed
the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes, edging out petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes.
With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. Specifically,
petitioner brought to the attention of the court the complaints of various voters who claimed that
several ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the face of the ballots
correspondingto the name of petitioner were embossed or waxed to prevent them from being
shaded. As a consequence of the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the 92
clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, private respondent, so petitioner claimed, was
illegally proclaimed.
In his answer, private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in the precincts,
particularly the number of votes credited to petitioner.
With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical recount of the
ballotswere conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Ruling of the RTC
On November 7, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the proclamation of respondentFestin
void, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby DECLARESthe Protestant, JOSE TAPALES
VILLAROSAas the duly elected mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013
National and Local Election and VOIDSthe Proclamation of Protestee Romulo De Mesa Festin as
elected Mayor by the Board of Election Inspectors of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. 2
The RTC justified its ruling by deducting 2,050 votes from private respondent that were allegedly
pre-marked or tampered.
Following this development, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was
granted by the RTC on January 15, 2014.3 On January 23, 2014, respondent Festin‘smotion for
reconsideration was denied.
Meanwhile, on February 3, 2014, private respondent Festin elevated the case to public respondent
COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief. Petitioner immediately moved
for its dismissal on the ground that the petition‘s verification is allegedly defective.
Ruling of the COMELEC
Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss, the COMELEC, acting through its First Division, on
February 13, 2014, issued an Order requiring petitioner to file his answer to the petition. Through the
same Order, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from
implementing its Decision during the pendency of the case. Without waiving the grounds relied on
his motion to dismiss, petitioner timely filed his answer to the petition.
To petitioner‘s surprise, on April 10, 2014, public respondent COMELEC granted private
respondent‘s request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC Decision‘s execution pending
appeal. What petitioner considered questionable was that the injunction was issued by a newly-
constituted Special First Division,which was allegedly formed due to the absence of several
COMELEC commissioners who, at that time, were personally attending to the concerns ofthe
overseas absentee voters abroad. Petitioner points out that the special division was constituted only
on April 8, 2014 through Resolution No. 9868and was composed of only two members, Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreño, with the former presiding.
In response to the issuance of the injunction, petitioner filed an urgent motion praying for its quashal,
which was denied by public respondent COMELEC First Division through the assailed June 3, 2014
Order. Thus, the instant petition.
The Issues
In ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part ofpublic respondent COMELEC, petitioner relied
on the following grounds:
1. Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not find that the Special First Division
did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction;
2. Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the urgent ex-parte motion to
quash the writ of preliminary injunction.
Concisely stated, the issue in this case is the legality of the formation of the Special First Division
and the validity of the Orders it issued, specifically the April 10, 2014 Order granting the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
According to the petitioner, the COMELEC First Division acquired jurisdiction over the case on
February 13, 2014 when it directed him to file an answer relative to the appeal filed by private
respondent Festin, and when it issued a TRO enjoining the execution pending appeal. Thus,
petitioner insists that this precluded the Special First Division from acquiring jurisdiction over the
same case and, consequently, from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. As argued by the
petitioner, the mere absence of two of the commissioners in the division is not sufficient to oust it of
jurisdiction and confer the same on a new one.
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
Propriety of certiorari in assailing COMELEC rulings
Petitioner‘s recourse, aside from being unsound in substance, is procedurally infirm. The governing
provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commissionshall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or rulingof each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty daysfrom
receipt of a copy thereof. (emphasis added)
In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections,4 We have interpreted the provision to
limit the remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC en
bancrendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.5 Certiorari will not generally
lie against an order, ruling,or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into
account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As
elucidated in the case:
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal,
orany plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration
is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement
constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final enbanc decision may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory.6 (emphasis added)
The above doctrine further gained force when it was reiterated in Our recent ruling in Cagas v.
COMELEC,7 in which We held that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of
the COMELEC in an election protest may not directlyassail the said order in this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during
the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. 8
The exception in Kho v. COMELECis inapplicable

As an exception to the cases of Ambiland Cagas, We have ruled in Kho vs. COMELEC 9 that when it
does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the
challenged final order or decision is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, the
aggrieved party can, by necessity, directlyresort to the Court as the proper forum for reviewing the
ruling. Thus, We have granted, in the said case, the petition assailing an interlocutory order of a
COMELEC division.
The exception, however, does not obtain herein. Noteworthy is that in 1997, when Khowas resolved,
what was thenin force was the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated on February 15, 1993
(1993 COMELEC Rules). As expressly provided in Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules:
Section 2. The Commission en banc. –The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter
specifically provided, or in preproclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a
commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a
unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative anaction or
proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the commission en banc.
xxxx
Section 5. Quorum; Votes required. x x x
x x x x (c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which
shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.
Patent in the above-cited provisions is that the COMELEC en banc, at that time, did not have the
power to resolve motions for reconsideration with respect to interlocutory orders issued by a division.
This circumstance was a controlling factor in Our ruling in Kho.
On the other hand, applicable in the instant petition is COMELEC Resolution No.
8804,10 promulgated on March 22, 2010. As expressly provided:
Rule 20
Motion for Reconsideration
Section 1.Grounds of Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the
grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said
decision, is contrary to law.
xxxx
Section 5.How motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the ECAD Clerk concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2)
days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
xxxx
Section 7.Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc. - The motion for reconsideration shall be
decided within fifteen (15) days from the date the case or matter is deemed submitted for decision,
unless otherwise provided by law. (emphasis added)
Stark is the contrast between the two cited rules. To reiterate, under the 1993 COMELEC Rules, the
COMELEC en bancis strictly prohibited from entertaining motions for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders unless unanimously referred to the en bancby the members of the division that issued the
same, whereas under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, all motions for reconsideration filed with
regard to decisions, resolutions, orders and rulings of the COMELEC divisionsare automatically
referred to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, in view of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804‘s applicability
in the instant petition, a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en bancis available to
petitioner herein unlike in Kho.
From the foregoing, petitioner‘s procedural lapse becomes manifest. With the availability of a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at petitioner‘s disposal, his hasty resort to certiorari to this Court
cannot be justified. On this ground alone, the instant petition canand should be dismissed outright.
The assailed Order was not issuedin grave abuse of discretion
Even delving into the merits of the case, it cannot be said that the issuance of the assailed Order
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion since public respondent‘s actions findsufficient
constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (emphasis added)
Evidently, it is pursuant to this mandate that the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7808 11 on
January 16, 2007. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the said Resolution, in part, provides:
Sec. 6. Substitution of members of a Division. –
(a) Temporary vacancy. – Whenever a member of a Division is on leave, seriously ill, temporarily
disabled, isabsent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the junior member of the
other Division shall substitute such Commissioner, participating therein in an acting capacity, in
addition to his regular membership in his own Division.
xxxx
Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is
assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division," as the case
may be, for purposes of the pertinent casestherein pending."
Thereafter, with the retirement of Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and Commissioner Armando
Velasco, the above-quoted rule was amended by Resolution No. 963612 on February 13, 2013 to now
read as:
Sec. 6 Substitution of member of a Division. –
(a) Temporary vacancy. - Whenever a member of a Division is on Leave, seriously ill, temporarily
disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the Chairman shall
substitute him with another Commissioner,or the Chairman shall sit in place of said member, and in
that event he will preside.1âwphi1
xxxx
Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is
assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division" as the case
may be, for purposes of the pertinent case therein pending.
Invoking the rule, as amended, the COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9868 13 on April 8, 2014.
The Resolution sought to address the temporary vacancies in both Divisionsof the COMELEC in
view of the pressing matters concerning overseasabsentee voting that required the attention and
presence abroad of Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Christian Robert S. Lim of the COMELEC
First Division, and of Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph of the Second Division. 14
Due to the absences of the aforementioned Commissioners, and to constitute a quorum for the
Divisions, Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat as presiding Chairman for both Divisions until his
colleagues‘ return.15 Thus, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 3 as amended, Special Divisions were created
with the following compositions:16
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. – Presiding

Commissioner Al A. Parreño – Member Commissioner
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. – Presiding

Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca – Member Commissioner
Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia – Member Commissioner
With the foregoing discussion, it becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special Divisions is
not only sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules but also by the Constitution no less.
No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special
First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Contrary to petitioner‘s claim, it
cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that
there has been consequent transfers of the case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC
did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies inboth of its
Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merelyindicates that the commissioners sitting
therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. The COMELEC First
Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before the substitution was
made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation
of the Special First Division since this only entailed a change in the Division‘s composition of
magistrates. Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If anything, it was only
petitioner‘s naivety that misled him into interpreting the designation of the division as a "special" one,
meaning it is distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also mistaken in claiming that the
jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division from the Special First Division by ruling
on the motion to quash since the First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.
Petitioner raises a fuss anent the temporary or permanent shuffling of members in the Commission
when, in fact, this is not a novel practice. In instances such as this, exigencies justify the substitution
of members and the designation of special divisions to prevent paralysis in the administration of
justice. This is also resorted to in order to ensure that the speedy disposition of cases is not impeded
and that docket systems are unclogged. Obviously, these advantages far outweigh petitioner's
baseless cry of violation of due process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition 1s hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014
ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
A politician thinks of the next election –
a statesman of the next generation.
- James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author
The Case
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive terms. But
then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following questions. First.What are the
consequences to the provincial board member‘s eligibility to run for the same elective position if the
legislative district, which brought him orher to office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be
reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are carved out and renamed as
another district? Second. Is the provincial board member‘s election to the same position for the third
and fourth time, but now in representation ofthe renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit
rule?
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorariwith an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction1 filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to
assail the following resolutions of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC):
(a) Resolution2 (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on March 5, 2013, in SPA
No. 13-166 (DC), granting the petition filed by Nelson B. Julia (Julia), seeking to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy3 (COC) as Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Camarines Sur
(Sanggunian) of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon
elective local officials as provided for in Article X, Section 84 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section
43(b)5 of the Local Government Code (LGC); and
(b) En BancResolution6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, denying Naval‘s Motion
for Reconsideration7 to the Resolution dated March 5, 2013.
Antecedents
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, 8 which reapportioned
the legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following manner:
[[reference -
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/207851.pdf]]
District Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of
R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716
1st Libmanan, Minalabac, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi,
Pamplona, Pasacao, San Sipocot, Cabusao
Fernando, Del Gallego,
Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,
Cabusao
2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,
Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San
Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor
Calabanga,9 Gainza,
Milaor
3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,
Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Camaligan, Canaman,
Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Magarao, Bombon,
Tinambac, Siruma Calabanga
4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,
Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,
Presentacion, Sangay, San
Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,
Siruma
5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District.
The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged
with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third
District.
Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On
October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed beforethe
COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy11 of
Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected
from. The three-term limit rule‘s application is more with reference to the same local elective post,
and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunianmember for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in
the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed. 12
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division cancelled
Naval‘s COC on grounds stated below:
[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the elective posts he
seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary requirements for eligibility, he commits a
false material misrepresentation cognizable under Section 78 of the [OEC].
xxxx
The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed the important components
of[Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution]:
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has servedthree consecutive terms in an elective
local office[;] he must also have been electedto the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. x x x
x x x The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been elected for public office for
three consecutive terms. The candidate must have been elected in the samelocal government post.
This connotes that the candidate must have been inthe same elective position serving the same
constituency who elected him to office for three consecutive terms.
xxxx
The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the Constitution to prevent the monopoly of
power centered only on a chosen few. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall
the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality
in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The framers also considered the necessityof the
enhancement of the freedom of choice of the electorate by broadening the selection of would-be
elective public officers. By rendering ineligible for public office those who have been elected and
served for three consecutive terms in the same public elective post, the prohibition seeks to infuse
new blood in the political arena.
xxxx
x x x [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is composed of the same
municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the towns Gainza and [Milaor]. The
territorial jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial
jurisdiction he previously served. The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 isthe
same electorate who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of
voters who elected him into office for three consecutive terms.
The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v. Hernandez (SPA No. 10-
078)13 cannot be applied inthe case at bar. Hernandez who then hailed from Libmanan belonged to
the First District of Camarines Sur. With RepublicAct 9716, Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao and San Fernando, all originally belonging to the First District, were merged with Gainza
and Milaor to form the Second District. With the addition of the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor, it
cannot be said that the previous First District became the Second District only by name. The voters
of Gainza and Milaoradded to the electorate of the new Second District formed a different electorate,
different from the one which voted for Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections. In the case
at bar, the municipalities comprising the new Third District are the same municipalities that consisted
of the previous Second [District], absent Milaor and Gainza.
The Supreme Court, in Latasav. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city
did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office
of the city mayor[.]
x x x x14 (Citations omitted)
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en bancdenied Naval‘s
Motion for Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC pointed out thatabsent the verification
required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval‘s motion was
instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, the COMELEC proceeded to discuss the demerits of Naval‘s
motion, viz:
The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the
records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To
put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case
of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor,
having been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in
light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court
pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the
municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court
took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the
same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected
the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same
group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval] has filed his
candidacy for the 13 May 2013 x x x Elections is the same position for which he had been elected
and had served for the past nine (9) years.
xxxx
x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the same: First, the
territorial jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same except for the municipalities of Gainza and
Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716; Second, the inhabitants of the 3rd District of
Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is presently running as member of the [Sanggunian], are the same
voters who elected him for the past three (3) consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the
[3rd ] District are the same group of voters whom [Naval] had served as member of the [Sanggunian]
representing the 2nd District.
x x x The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Naval‘s] post [into one] different from [w]hat
he [previously had]. As correctly ruled by the Commission (Second Division), [Naval] ha[d] already
been elected and ha[d] already served inthe same government post for three consecutive terms, x x
x[.]
x x x x.15 (Citations omitted)
Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC
gravely erred and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence:
I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN
THE SAME GOVERNMENT POST;16
II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS;17and
III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8, ARTICLE X OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC APPLIES TO NAVAL.18
The Arguments of the Contending Parties
In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative Districts
of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the
separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which used to comprise the Second
District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones as those who had
elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Naval further invokes Article 9419 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the LGC to argue that Sanggunianmembers are elected by districts. Thus, the
right to choose representatives in the Sanggunianpertains to each of the districts. Naval was elected
as Sanggunian member in 2004 and 2007 by the Second District. In 2010 and 2013, it was the Third
District, which brought him to office. Essentially then, Naval‘s election in 2013 is merely his second
term as Sanggunianmember for the Third District.
Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC20 to point out that for the disqualification on the ground of
the three-term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, but it is also required that he or she had been elected to the same position
for the same number of times.21
Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELEC‘s interpretations of the rulings in Latasa v.
COMELEC22 and Bandillo, et al. v. Hernandez.23 In Latasa, the Court applied the three-term
prohibition only because notwithstanding the conversion of the Municipality of Digos into a city, the
mayor was to serve the same territorialjurisdiction and constituents. Naval asserts that the same
does not hold true in his case. Naval further avers that in Bandillo, which finds more application in
the instant petition, the COMELEC ruled that the three-term limit cannot be invoked in a situation
where the legislative districts have been altered. An extraction or an addition both yields a change
inthe composition of the voters.
Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his constituents, whose will
and mandate should be upheld. Besides, Julia‘s counsel already withdrew his appearance,
indicating no less than his client‘s lack of interest in still pursuing Naval‘s ouster from office.24
In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the instant petition.
The OSG contends that Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post for
three consecutive terms. Naval thus violatedSection 78 of the OEC when he filed his COC despite
knowledge of his ineligibility. Naval‘s reliance on Bandillo is also misplaced since in the said case,
two towns were instead added to form a new district. Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new
set of voters. The OSG also alleges that Naval is not entitled to the issuance of injunctive reliefs by
this Court. No clear and unmistakable right pertains to Naval and it is his eligibility to be elected as
Sanggunianmember for the Third District which is the issue at hand.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition.
As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.
The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties cite Latasa,
Lonzanida v. COMELEC,26 Borja,Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,27 and Bandillo, which all involve the
application of the three-term limit rule, the factual and legal circumstances in those cases are
different and the doctrinal values therein do not directly address the issues now at hand.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The then
municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term limit rule by arguing
that the position of a city mayor was not the same as the one he previously held. The Court was not
convinced and, thus, declared that there was no interruption of the incumbent mayor‘s continuity of
service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections. While
serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months before the expiration of the
mayor‘s third term, he was ousted from office. He ran again for the same post in the immediately
succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the
ground of violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not
beconsidered as having served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an
involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected official‘s continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two
immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he ran for
the same position for the third time, his disqualification was sought for alleged violation of the three-
term limit rule. The Court ruled that whenhe assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession,
his service should not be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate
should have been thrice elected for and had served the same post consecutively. In Aldovino,
preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor. The Court ruled that the
said suspension did not interrupt the elective official‘s term. Although hewas barred from exercising
the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement
tothe office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten
towns, which used to comprise Camarines Sur‘s old First District, to form the new Second District.
The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule against the elected Provincial Board
member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with
an altered territory and constituency.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-term limit rule upon
local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the process of doing so, it is
inevitable to discuss the role of elections and the nature of public office in a democratic and
republican state like ours.
The Role of Elections in our
Democratic and Republican State,
and the Restraints Imposed Upon
Those Who Hold Public Office
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.28
Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state and a public
office, viz: A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is
not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism
is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after
which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsiblegovernment whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, ‗at all times be accountable to the people‘ they are
sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the
promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves. 29 (Emphasis ours
and italics in the original)
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral process in
the following wise:
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it
isthrough the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people
express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able to choose their leaders in
accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should elect
whom they please to govern them. Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving the
viability of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic
participation.31 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
The importance of elections cannottherefore be over emphasized. Thus,
True, election is the expression ofthe sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a
free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. x x x.32(Italics ours)
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give
effect to the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations tobeing elected to a public
office.33 Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of
public office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to public
service.34 Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term limits, is significantly reiterated by Section
43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again declared that a public office is a public
trust and not a vested property right. 35
The Deliberations of the Members
of the Constitutional Commission
on the Three-Term Limit‘s
Application to Local Elective
Officials
Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the exchanges of the
members on the subject of the three-term limit rule imposed on local elective officials: VOTING ON
THE TERMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local Governments had
not decided on the term of office for local officials and suggested that the Body decide on the matter.
xxxx
On Mr. Bacani‘s inquiry regarding localofficials, Mr. Davide explained that local officials would
includethe governor, vice-governor and the members of the provincial board; the city mayor, city
vice-mayor and members of the city board; and the municipal mayor, municipal vice mayor and
members of the municipal council. He stated that barangay officials would be governed by
speciallaw, to which Mr. Nolledo agreed.
xxxx
MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3

In reply to Mr. Guingona‘s query onwhether the Committee had decided on the interpretation of "two
reelections", Mr. Davide suggested that the matter be submitted to a vote.
Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as proposed by Mr. Garcia,
would allow a local official three terms, after which he would not be allowed to seek any reelection;
or whether, as interpreted by Mr. Davide, it would mean that after two successive reelections or a
consecutive periodof nine years, he could run for reelection after the lapse of three years.
xxxx
RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS
Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after which, they would be
barred from ever runningfor reelection.
On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf ofthe Committee, stated that local officials after two
reelections would be allowed to run for reelection after the lapse of three years.
xxxx
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulomanifested that the Body would proceed to the
consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative
No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate
reelection after three successive terms).
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to prevent monopoly
of political power because the country‘s history showed that prolonged stay in public office could
lead to the creation of entrenched preservesof political dynasties; 2) to broaden the choiceso that
more people could be enlisted to the cause of public service; 3) no one is indispensable in running
the affairs of the countryand that reliance on personalities would be avoided; and 4) the
disqualification from running for reelection after three terms would create a reserve of statesmen
both in the local and national levels.
He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the introduction of new
ideas and approaches. He stressed that public office would no longer be a preserve of conservatism
and tradition, and that public service would no longer be limited to those directly holding public office,
but would also include consultative bodiesorganized by the people. INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO
In reply to Mr. Regalado‘s query whether the three terms need not be served consecutively, Mr.
Garcia answered in the affirmative.
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2
Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power because of a new
awareness, a new kind of voter and a new kind of Filipino, at the same time, it pre-screens the
candidates among whom the people would choose by barring those who would have served for nine
years from being reelected. He opined that this would actually require an additional qualification for
office to a certain number of people.
He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of statesmen, their future
participation is actually limited to some areas and only for a certain periodof time. He added thatit is
not for the Commission to decide on the future of our countrymen who may have more years ahead
of them to serve the country.
xxxx
INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE
xxxx
Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsod‘s manifestation, Mr. Ople expressed apprehension
over the Body‘s exercise of some sort of omnipotent power in disqualifying those who will have
served their tasks. He opined that the Commission had already taken steps to prevent the
accumulation of powers and prequisites that would permit officials to stay on indefinitely and to
transfer them to members of their families. He opined, however, that perpetual disqualification would
deprive the people of their freedom of choice.He stated that the Body had already succeeded in
striking a balance onpolicies which could ensure a redistribution of opportunities to the people both
in terms of political and economic power. He stated that Philippine politics had been unshackled
from the two-party system, which he said was the most critical support for the perpetuation of
political dynasties. Considering that such achievement is already a victory, Mr. Ople stated that the
role of political parties should not be despised because the strength of democracy depends on how
strong political parties are, that a splintering thereof will mean a great loss to the vitality and
resiliency of democracy.
Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from office.
x x x x.
MR. GARCIA‘S RESPONSE TOMR. OPLE‘S STATEMENTS
Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1) the recognition of the
ambivalent nature of political power, and 2) the recognition of alternative forms of public service. He
stated that it is important to remember the lessons learned from the recent past; that public service is
service to the people and not an opportunity to accumulate political power, and that a prolonged stay
in public office brings about political dynasties or vested interests. Regarding political parties, he
stated that it will encourage the constant renewal of blood in party leadership, approach, style and
ideas. He opined that this is very healthy for a pluralist and multi-party democracy.
On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that public service
could be limited to public office since many good leaders who were in the streets and in jail fought
against the dictatorship. He stressed that public service would also mean belonging to consultative
bodies or people‘s councils which brought about new forms of service and leadership.
REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR
Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the voice of God.He stated that
if the people want to elect a representative to serve them continuously, the Commission should not
arrogate unto itself the right to decide what the people want. He stated that in the United States, a
Senator had served for 30 years.
xxxx
REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO
Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms. Tan, although
she stated that they spoke of the same premises. She stated that she agrees with them that leaders
need not be projected and developed publicly in an election as leaders are better tempered and
tested in the various forms of mass struggles and organized work. She stated that if the people are
to be encouraged to have their own sense of responsibility in national leadership, what ultimately
matters is the political determination of the citizenry to chart their own national destiny. She opined
that the Body should allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and imbibe the
salutary effects of their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself. She stressed that in
the final analysis,the Commission cannot legislate into the Constitution the essence of new politics
as it is a chastening experience of learning and unlearning. Adverting to Mr. Garcia‘s statement that
politics is an imperfect art, she stated that the Commission could correct politics with all its
imperfections and flaws by a constitutional provision. She opined that perpetual disqualification
cannot provide the cure. She maintained that perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which
could also be counter-productive, in the sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities of
realpublic service.
REMARKS OF MR. BACANI
Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and that proposals were
made to empower the people to engage in the legislative process,the Body presupposed the political
maturity of the people. He observed that in this instance, political maturity is denied with the
constitutional bar for reelection.He opined that the Body should stick to the premise that the people
are politically mature.
REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA
By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacani‘s statements,Mr. Garcia stated that the proposal was basically
premisedon the undue advantage of the incumbent in accumulating power, money, party machine
and patronage and not on lack of trust in the people.
Mr. Garcia stated that politics isnot won by ideals alone but by solid organized work by
organizations. He stated that with three terms, an official would have served the people long enough.
xxxx
VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.
xxxx
RESULT OF THE VOTING
The result of the voting was as follows:

Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) — 17 votes
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) — 26 votes
With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the Chair declared
Alternative No. 2 approved by the Body.36 (Emphasis and italics ours)
The Constitution mandates the
strict implementation of the
three-term limit rule.
The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers thereof had not
discussed with specifity the subject of the three-term limit rule‘s application on reapportioned
districts.
From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the members of the
Constitutional Commission on the general application of the three-term limit rule show. On one side
were those who espoused the stern view that perpetual disqualification to hold public office after
three consecutive terms would ensure that new blood would be infused into our political system.
More choices for the voters would give fuller meaning to our democratic institutions. On the other
side of the fence were those who believed that the imposition of termlimits would be tantamount to
squandering the experience of seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the
citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in office.
In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal that no
immediate re-election after three successive terms shall be allowed. On the other hand, 17 members
stood pat on their view that there should be no further reelection after three successive terms.
Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if there
would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on whether the term
limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only three
consecutive elections tothe same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once
again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election.
The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few,
while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those who are
worthy to be called statesmen.
The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive
deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rulecannot
be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for.
Ratio legis est anima.37
"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration.Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind
the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose." 38 In Aldovino, the Court describes
the three-term limit rule as inflexible.
In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-term limit on
the ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of suspension was imposed
upon him. Although not in all four withNaval‘s case, there are principles enunciated therein which
undeniably hold true, viz:
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
official‘s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years– during which an
official has title to office and can serve. x x x[.]
xxxx
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—"no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation—no more than three
consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. x x x.
xxxx
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding
its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional
objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed
for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. x x x.
xxxx
x x x [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases
teach usto strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
xxxx
[In] Latasa v. Commission on Electionsx x x[,] [t]he Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
people‘s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office. x x x.
xxxx
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X—both by structure and
substance—fixes an elective official‘s term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive
terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of
a circumvention. x x x.39 (Citations omitted, italics and emphasis in the original and underscoring
ours)
Reapportionment and its Basis
Reapportionment is "the realignment orchange in legislative districts brought about by changes in

population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation." 40 The aim
of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. 41 The basis
for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of
registered voters therein.42
R.A. No. 9716 and the Reappor-
tioned Districts of Camarines Sur
Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:
Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur is hereby reapportioned in order to create an additional legislative
districtto commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the municipalities of

Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando of the current First (1st) Legislative
District are hereby consolidated with the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor of the current Second
(2nd) Legislative District, to comprise the new legislative district authorized under this Act.
Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are summarized as follows:
a) First District – The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st) Legislative District shall
continue to be designated as the First (1st) Legislative District, composed of the following
municipalities: Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao;
b) Second District – This new legislative districtshall be composed of the municipalities enumerated
in Section 2 hereof;
c) Third District – The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be renamedas the Third (3rd)
Legislative District, composed of the following: Naga City and the municipalities of Pili, Ocampo,
Camaligan, Canaman, Magarao, Bombon and Calabanga;
d) Fourth District – The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without any change in its composition,
shall be renamedas the Fourth (4th) Legislative District, composed of the following municipalities:
Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac and
Siruma; and
e) Fifth District – The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any change inits composition,
shall be renamedas the Fifth (5th) Legislative District, composed of the following: Iriga City and the
municipalities of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula and Nabua. (Italics and emphasis ours)
As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of Camarines
Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District and now
configured as follows:43
[[reference -
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/207851.pdf]]
Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of
RA 9716 RA 9716
2 3rd District
nd Population: 439,043
District Naga
Population: 474,899 Pili
Gainza Ocampo
Milaor Canaman
Naga Camaligan
Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second
District, but it merely renamed the
other four.
The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current Third
District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of
the old Second District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No.
9716 indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of
the towns from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the word "rename." Although the qualifier "without a change in its
composition" was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive
isthe clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest.
The following statutory construction rules surface:

First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage
meaning; the words should be read and considered intheir natural, ordinary, commonly accepted
usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been
employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation. Second, a word of
general significance ina statute is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is
shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally
spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general
sense.44 (Citations omitted)
The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. 45
In Naval‘s case, the words of R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created,
but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal
provision to be construed compels acceptanceand negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers mean what they say. 46
The verb createmeans to "make or produce something new." 47 On the other hand, the verb
renamemeans to "give a new name to someone or something." 48 A complete reading of R.A. No.
9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to
be merely renamed as the current Third District.
It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from
that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This
numericalfact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old
Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunianmembers are elected
by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is
the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
The application upon Naval of the
three-term limit rule does not
undermine the constitutional
requirement to achieve equality of
representation among districts.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality

ofrepresentation among the districts.49 It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval‘s
argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Naval‘s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the
right toequal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the
renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented,
albeit by another eligible person.
The presumed competence of the
COMELEC to resolve matters

falling within its jurisdiction is
upheld.
"Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is
confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of
due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain."50
"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove not merelyreversible
error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision or resolution."51 "Grave abuse of discretion
arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence." 52
In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC‘s disquisitions to be amply supported by the
Constitution,law and jurisprudence.
Conclusion
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court
to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our
Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive
elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no
cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovinoaffirms this
interpretation. Further, sustaining Naval‘s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same
office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.
Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real sovereign,
soto speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a
commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are
restrictions too.
Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled "What Term
Limits Do That Ordinary Voting Cannot."53 In the article, Greek mythology was tapped to make a
tempting analogy. The gist of the story follows.
In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce all men
approaching them with their voices. Those who fell into the Sirens‘ trap never returnedhome to their
wives and children. A clever strategy was thus hatched to secure safe passage for Odysseus and
his men. The men were to plug their ears with wax to muffle the songs of the Sirens. Odysseus, on
the other hand, was to be tied to the mast of the ship so he could still listen to the songs, which may
contain clues on how they can get home. When the wind died down,Odysseus heard beautiful
voices calling out to them. The voices were incomparable to anything he had ever heard before.
Even whenOdysseus knew that the irresistible voices were coming from the Sirens, he struggled
with all his strength to free himself from the ropes, but was unable to do so. The voices became
fainter as the men continued to row. When the voices can no longer be heard, Odysseus realized
how he had nearly been beguiled. They had made it through safely and Odysseus was untied. It was
their clever plan which kept them all alive. 54
The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the Constitution recognized
the propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term
limits and a guarantee of every citizen's equal access to public service. These are the restrictions
statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our
republican institutions.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated
March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

148326 November 15, 2001

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner,

Hence, this petition.

In In re Vinzon,14 the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is

He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides :

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

This argument is erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

G.R. No. 152161

CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006

The Petitioners‘ Case

The Respondents‘ Arguments

The Court‘s Ruling

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider 32

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Yes. Anyway, let‘s listen to Congressman Marcos.

Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

O, sige, fine, fine. Let‘s a brainstorm. Equal...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

That‘s not an election practice. That‘s a limitation.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.

The Fair Election.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

O, Fair Election Act.

Fair election practices?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Wala nang practices nga.

Wala nang practices.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.

The rest wala nang problema ano?

Wala na iyong practices?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.

O, wala na? We will clean up.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

The short title, "This Act ..."

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

You‘re back to your No. 21 already.

The full title, the same?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise

The Effectivity Clause

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,

G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007