Enrile v Salazar
As a result of the series of coup attempts staged
by disgruntled military personnel against the
administration of President Corazon Aquino,
then-Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers
on suspicion of rebellion on the strength of a
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court. The warrant was issued on
an information charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from Nov. 29 to Dec. 10,
1990. Senator Enrile was taken into custody at
the National Bureau of Investigation
headquarters and held without bail, none
having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
As a result, Enrile filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the Supreme Court. In his
petition, he argued that the crime he was being
charged with is nonexistent. He insisted that
there is no such crime as rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked
the ruling in the landmark case of People vs.
Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion
cannot be complexed with common crimes such
as murder; as such, the proper crime that
should have been charged against him is simple
rebellion—which is bailable.
Enrile’s petition was granted. The Court,
speaking through Justice Andres Narvasa, later
Chief Justice, said that the Hernandez ruling was
still good law, that is, rebellion could not be
complexed with murder, that there was no such
crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes
such as murder are absorbed in rebellion and so
only the latter can be charged. Enrile was
entitled to bail as a result.
Enrile v Sandiganbayan
In Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, a case decided last
year by the Supreme Court, bail was also
granted to Enrile. In this case, Senator Enrile,
now more than 90 years old, once again stands
as an accused before the Sandiganbayan in the
crime of plunder, a non-bailable offense, on the
basis of his purported involvement in the
Priority Development Assistance Fund scam.
Before the Supreme Court, Enrile assailed the
resolution by the Sandiganbayan denying his
Motion to Fix Bail and his Motion for
Reconsideration. He asserted that before
judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled
to bail as a matter of right; that it is the duty
and burden of the prosecution to show clearly
and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the prosecution
has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances—his age and his voluntary
surrender.
Voting 8-4, the magistrates granted the petition
of Enrile. The decision, penned by Associate
Justice Lucas Bersamin, stated that even non-
bailable charges in offenses punishable by
death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua
is subject to judicial discretion. The majority
said “bail may be granted as a matter of right or
discretion” in allowing Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile’s temporary freedom. It further said the
granting of Enrile’s motion was due to
humanitarian considerations. “Enrile’s poor
health justifies his admission to bail,” the ruling
said.
Four magistrates registered their dissenting
opinions from the majority decision. In
particular, Justice Leonen, dissenting, found no
grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan
when it failed to release the accused on bail for
medical or humanitarian reasons. According to
Leonen, Enrile’s release for medical and
humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his
prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer
for the grant of bail in this Petition on his
medical condition. For Leonen, the grant of bail
by the majority was a special accommodation
for Enrile as it is based on a ground never raised
before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings
filed before the court. Leonen also criticized the
decision for having a weak legal basis—the
grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds.
He also claims that the court has no authority to
use humanitarian grounds. The dissenting
justice wrote: “not only is this contrary to the
rule of law, it also undermines the legitimacy
and the stability of our entire judicial system,”
adding that “bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in
our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or
provision of the Constitution,” and that the
conditions for bail under court rules were “so
canonical”—hence, clear-cut.
Brocka v Enrile
The Brocka vs. Enrile case, decided in 1990 by a
different Supreme Court, illustrates the change
of regime and what a difference democracy
makes.
The case started on Jan. 28, 1985 when movie
director Lino Brocka and theater director Behn
Cervantes, both icons in their artistic fields,
were arrested along with their companions (this
included Howie Severino of GMA-7, then a
teacher at the Ateneo de Manila High School),
were arrested by elements of the Northern
Police District following the forcible and violent
dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy
with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of
Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO).
Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal
Assembly before the RTC-Quezon City. Without
prior notice to their counsel, Brocka, et al. were
subsequently charged with Inciting to Sedition.
In their petition for habeas corpus, Brocka, et al.
as petitioners, contended that respondents’
manifest bad faith and/or harassment are
sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution, aside from the fact that the second
offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is
premised on one and the same act of attending
and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike.
They maintain that while there may have been
a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC),
the law does not allow the splitting of a single
act into two offenses and filing two
informations therefor, further, that they will be
placed in double jeopardy.
The main issue raised before the Supreme Court
was the legality of enjoining the criminal
prosecution of a case. And in a unanimous
decision, the Court granted the petition and
enjoined the criminal prosecution of Brocka et
al. for the second offense of inciting to sedition.
According to the Court, Brocka, et al. have
clearly shown the circumstances to show that
the criminal proceedings had become a case of
persecution, having been undertaken by state
officials in bad faith. The Court added that the
hasty filing of the second offense, premised on
a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly
betrayed the respondent’s bad faith and
malicious intent to pursue criminal charges
against Brocka, et al. It further noted—“. . . the
tenacious invocation of a spurious and
inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty
preliminary investigation were clear signals that
the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al.
in detention until the second offense of
“Inciting to Sedition” could be facilitated and
justified without need of issuing a warrant of
arrest anew.”
Ilagan v Enrile
In 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was
arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-
INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis
of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the
Ministry of National Defense. Subsequently,
two other lawyers were arrested and detained
on the basis of a Mission Order.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by and on
behalf of the three detained attorneys on the
ground that their arrests were illegal and
violative of the Constitution, since arrests
cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders
and that there appears to be a military
campaign to harass lawyers involved in national
security cases. The petition also contended that
their detention was improper arrest, and that
no preliminary investigation has been
conducted.
In this case, the government argued that the
detained attorneys were arrested on the basis
of a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued
by the President on Jan. 25, 1985; that the Writ
of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by
virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.
Subsequently, they further argued that the
petition for habeas corpus had been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an
Information against them for Rebellion, a
capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest against the three detainees.
In a unanimous decision, the Court, through
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, stated that
the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial
court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or
the Information on grounds provided by the
Rules or to ask for an
investigation/reinvestigation of the case. The
Court further stated that habeas corpus would
not lie after the Warrant of Commitment was
issued by the Court on the basis of the
Information filed against the accused.
As a result, the petition for Habeas Corpus was
dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The Court pronounced that the three
detainees were now detained by virtue of a
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal
case for Rebellion filed against them before said
court.
The Ilagan doctrine has been roundly criticized
for being anti-democratic. Unfortunately, it is
still routinely invoked by prosecutors to justify
detention of accused even when the original
arrests were illegal. A few years ago, in the
celebrated case involving 43 health workers
illegally arrested in Morong, Rizal, the Court of
Appeals justified the workers’ continuing
detention citing this unfortunate precedent.
The Ilagan decision, rendered in 1985, was one
of the last decisions of the Supreme Court
before the Edsa revolution.
Aquino v Enrile
When martial law was proclaimed in September
21, 1972, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., together
with Ramon Mitra Jr., Francisco Rodrigo, and
Napoleon Rama, the stalwarts of the opposition
fighting against the dictatorship, were arrested
and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the
President (September 22, 1972), “for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort
in the conspiracy to seize political and state
power in the country and to take over the
government by force.
Aquino and colleagues filed petitions for habeas
corpus. But while eventually all the petitioners
were either permitted to withdraw their
petitions or released from detention subject to
certain restrictions, Aquino remained in
detention. In fact, formal charges of murder,
subversion and illegal possession of firearms
were lodged against him forcing him to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Military
Commission trying him.
Faced with Aquino’s remaining legal challenge,
the court had to confront the issue of whether
or not the court could inquire into the validity
of Proclamation No. 1081. Put more simply, is
the question political or justiciable in character?
Paraphrased another way, are not the issues
raised in the petitions related to the propriety
or constitutional sufficiency of the issuance of
the proclamation purely political, which are not
for the Judiciary, but for the people and the
political departments of the government to
determine?
Five justices, namely, Justices Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino held that the
question was political and therefore its
determination was beyond the jurisdiction of
the High Court. Arrayed on the side of
justiciability were four justices including Justices
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma
who held that the constitutional sufficiency of
the proclamation may be inquired into by the
Highest Court.
Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believed
that political questions were not per se beyond
the Court’s jurisdiction, but that as a matter of
policy implicit in the Constitution itself the
Court should abstain from interfering with the
Executive’s proclamation.
Justice Makalintal who penned the decision
sided with non-justiciability when he opined
that the political-or-justiciable-question
controversy has become moot and purposeless
as a consequence of the general referendum of
July 27-28, 1973. With the ruling of non-
justiciability having attained the majority vote,
the High Court decided to dismiss all petitions.
An interesting side story of this case involved
Senator Jose W. Diokno. He was one of the
original petitioners but later he withdrew from
the case, stating that he had lost confidence in
the Supreme Court after it ruled that the 1973
Constitution was in effect.
Almost 10 years later, the Supreme Court would
revisit the issue of illegal detentions in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile. In 1982, Sabino Padilla and
eight others out of the 14 detainees were then
having a conference in the dining room at Dr.
Parong’s residence. These individuals, together
with a few others totaling 14, were previously
under surveillance by the authorities as they
were suspected of engaging in subversive
activities being members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines. It was during this
meeting that they were arrested by the
Philippine Constabulary by authority of a
Presidential Commitment Order and brought to
an undisclosed location.
Not knowing the whereabouts of her son
Sabino, Josefina Padilla, went to the Court
praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus to direct respondents then-Minister of
National Defense Enrile, Gen. Fabian Ver, Gen.
Fidel Ramos and Lt. Col. Colonel to produce the
bodies of the missing individuals.
In the resolution of the Court, the writ of
habeas corpus was issued and respondents
were required to make a return of the writ. At
the hearing of the petition, the Solicitor General
contended that the so-named persons were
arrested and are being detained for offenses
with respect to which under Proclamation No.
2045, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
continues to be suspended; in effect saying that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing as to them. Hence, courts cannot
inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest
and detention.
Before the Court, the legality of the Presidential
Commitment Order was put in issue.
Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice
De Castro said that the arrest of persons
involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more
an act of capturing them in the course of an
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for
the purpose of immediately prosecuting them
in court for a statutory offense. Hence,
according to J. De Castro, the arrest and
detention of persons ordered by the President
through the issuance of Presidential
Commitment Order PCO is merely preventive.
The majority further stated that a Presidential
Commitment Order, the issuance of which is
the exclusive prerogative of the President under
the Constitution, may not be declared void by
the courts, under the doctrine of “political
question.”

Disagreeing with the majority, Justice

Teehankee opined that notwithstanding the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the higher and superior mandate of the
Constitution guarantees the right to bail and
vests the courts with the jurisdiction and
judicial power to grant bail which may not be
removed nor diminished nor abdicated.