578 Phil.

185
ESTER F. BARBERO v. JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero (Barbero) against
Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Isabela.

Barbero filed a criminal case[1] for estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina (Medina). The
case was raffled to Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela. On 19 February 2003,
Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest[2] commanding the proper officer to arrest Medina.

Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However, Judge Dumlao approved
Medina's bail and, on 9 May 2003, issued an order[3] commanding the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology and the Philippine National Police to release Medina. Barbero
alleged that Judge Dumlao's approval of Medina's bail and his order to release Medina were
unlawful.

On 15 July 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an affidavit-
complaint[4] from Barbero charging Judge Dumlao with gross ignorance of the law. In its
1st Indorsement[5] dated 7 August 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the
affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Indorsement. In its 1st Tracer[6] dated 11
November 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge
Dumlao ignored the 1st Tracer. In its 2nd Tracer[7] dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed Judge
Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 2nd Tracer. In a
Resolution[8] dated 6 April 2005, the Court directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-
complaint and to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for ignoring the
OCA's directives. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 April 2005 Resolution.

In a Resolution[9] dated 17 August 2005, the Court reiterated its 6 April 2005 Resolution. Judge
Dumlao ignored the 17 August 2005 Resolution. In a Resolution dated 6 February 2006, the
Court fined Judge Dumlao P500 for ignoring its directives and directed Judge Dumlao to
comply with the 17 August 2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 February 2006
Resolution. In Resolutions dated 18 September 2006 and 19 February 2007, the Court
considered Judge Dumlao to have waived his right to comment on the affidavit-complaint and
resolved to proceed with the administrative case based on the pleadings already filed.

The Court finds Judge Dumlao liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Court
directives.

Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case
is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province,
city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if
no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.
In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,[10] the Court held that:

There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in
the court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
the application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same courtwithin the
province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place.
(Emphasis ours)
The criminal case Barbero filed against Medina was pending before the RTC of Santiago City.
Judge Anghad of the RTC issued the warrant of arrest, and Medina was arrested by virtue of that
warrant.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under detention by legal
process shall be released except when he is admitted to bail. Section 19 provides that the accused
must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance
with Section 17. Section 17 provides that the bail may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the accused is arrested
in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. If the judge is absent or
unavailable, the bail should be filed with another branch of the same court. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, the bail should
be filed with any RTC of the place.

In the present case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or unavailable or that
Medina was arrested outside Santiago City. Thus, Medina's bail should have been filed with
Judge Anghad. Even if Judge Anghad were absent or unavailable or even if Medina were
arrested in San Mateo, Judge Dumlao would still be liable because the bail should have been
filed with another branch of the RTC in Santiago City or with the RTC of San Mateo,
respectively.[11]

Since the criminal case was pending before the RTC of Santiago City and there was no showing
that Judge Anghad of the RTC was absent or unavailable, Judge Dumlao lacked authority to
approve the bail and order Medina's release.

Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlao's acts of approving Medina's bail and ordering Medina's
release were not in accordance with law:

[N]apag-alaman kox x x na [si Medina] ay basta na lang pinakawalan ni x x x Judge Cesar M.

Dumlao ng Municipal Trial Court ng San Mateo, Isabela x x x;

[A]ng ginawa ni Judge Cesar M. Dumlao ay hindi naaayon sa batas sapagkat wala siyang
kapangyarihang pakawalan x x x [si Medina];

[N]apag-alaman ko rin na ang pagrerelease na ginawa ni Judge Dumlao ay base sa [bail] na

ipinakita sa kanya;

[S]a akin pong pagkakaalam, lahat po ng [bail] sa criminal cases ay dapat aksyunan at
aprubahan ng hukom o judge na siyang may hawak ng asunto;

xxxx
[K]ung maaari po sana, dahil sa kawalang respeto [ni Judge] Cesar M. Dumlao sa ating batas
x x x, ipinakikiusap [ ko] na sana ay imbestigahan ang nasabing pagmamalabis at kawalan
ng respeto[.]
The Court directed Judge Dumlao several times to comment on Barbero's allegations. Judge
Dumlao opted to ignore all of the Court's directives. By his silence, Judge Dumlao admitted the
truth of the allegations. In Palon, Jr. v. Vallarta,[12] the Court held that silence is admission of
the truth of the charges:

Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint or file any responsive pleading or
manifestation despite receipt of notice to do so. x x x The natural instinct of man impels him to
resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is against human nature to just
remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence x x x is an
admission of the truth of the charges. Respondent judge is deemed to have
admitted the charges against him. (Emphasis ours)
This is the second time Judge Dumlao unlawfully approved the bail and ordered the release of
Medina. The instant case has exactly the same set of facts as Lim v. Dumlao.[13] In that case (1)
complainant filed two criminal cases for carnapping and theft against Medina; (2) the criminal
cases were filed with the RTC, Judicial Region II, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela; (3) Judge Fe
Albano Madrid of the RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Medina; (4) Medina was arrested
by virtue of the warrant of arrest; (5) Judge Dumlao approved the bail of Medina; and (6) Judge
Dumlao ordered the release of Medina.

In Lim,[14] the Court held that:

It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman Medina were
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant
of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order of
release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or
in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City.
In this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time
of the posting of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day [Judge Dumlao]
ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City,
Isabela were at their respective posts.

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to
an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section
17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court
recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where x x x the law is
straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

[Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of
release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied
with before he can approve Medina's bail and issue an order for his release. The
law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. (Emphasis ours)
The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of accused whose cases are pending before
other courts constitute gross ignorance of the law.[15] Gross ignorance of the law is a serious
offense[16] punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3)
a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[17]

Aside from Lim, the Court also found Judge Dumlao grossly ignorant of the law in Pascual v.
Judge Dumlao.[18] In that case, Judge Dumlao (1) hastily ordered the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) without notice and hearing; (2) ordered the issuance of the TRO even
though there was no showing of any grave or irreparable injury; (3) hastily granted a motion to
deposit harvest without notice and hearing; and (4) failed to order the sheriff to render an
accounting of the harvest.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Judge Dumlao lacks this
prerequisite.

Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court by repeatedly refusing to comment on the affidavit-
complaint. In its 1st Indorsement dated 7 August 2003, 1st Tracer dated 11 November 2003, and
2nd Tracer dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-
complaint. In its Resolutions dated 6 April 2005, 17 August 2005, and 6 February 2006, the
Court fined Judge Dumlao P500, directed him to comment on the affidavit-complaint, and
directed him to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to
comment. Judge Dumlao unjustifiably ignored all six directives.

Court resolutions directing judges to comment on administrative complaints are not mere
requests. Judges are duty-bound to obey them fully and promptly.[19] In refusing to comment on
the affidavit-complaint for almost five years and despite several directives from the Court, Judge
Dumlao blatantly demonstrated gross misconduct, outright disrespect, indifference, and a
recalcitrant streak in his character.[20]

This is the third time Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Dumlao,[21] the Court found him liable for ignoring its directives. In that case,
the Court held that:

It appears that Judge Dumlao ignored and continued to ignore this Court's
directive requiring him to file his comment on complainant Sinaon, Jr.'s administrative
complaint. He had been afforded more than ample time within which to file the required
pleading. x x x [S]everal Resolutions had been issued by the OCA and this Court requiring Judge
Dumlao to comment on the complaint against him. The first Resolution was issued as early as 2
August 2002 and the last was issued almost three years later, or 5 July 2005, by which time, the
Court already deemed waived Judge Dumlao's right to file his comment and considered the case
submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed. Subsequently, Judge Dumlao again failed to
comply with the order of this Court to file his manifestation in the re-docketed administrative
complaint (concerning his non-filing of the comment) despite due notice.

Judge Dumlao had been given more than ample time to abide with the orders of
this Court, yet he persistently failed to do so. Judge Dumlao neither offered any
reason nor raised any defense for his failure to comply with the mandates of this
Court. Nothing was heard from Judge Dumlao as to what had prevented him from
complying with the Court's directives. Such insolence should not go unpunished.
(Emphasis ours)
In Lim,[22] the Court also found Judge Dumlao liable for ignoring its directives. In that case, the
Court held that, "We agree with the OCA that [Judge Dumlao] must be held administratively
liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an administrative complaint. This constitutes
gross misconduct and insubordination."

Violation of Supreme Court directives is a less serious offense[23] punishable by (1) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months,
or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[24]

Aside from Lim, Pascual, and Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Dumlao has another
administrative case decided against him. In Morales, Sr. v. Judge Dumlao,[25] the Court found
him liable for violating SC Administrative Circular No. 1-90. In that case, the Court held that:

[Judge Dumlao's] claim that he did not know how he inadvertently signed the notarized
revocation of power of attorney in this case betrays a deficiency of that degree of circumspection
demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. It is, in fact, an open admission of his
negligence and lack of care in attending to the incidents brought before him for adjudication.
This kind of judicial carelessness runs contrary to Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which states that:

A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
[(Emphasis ours)]

While we do not expect judges to have an encyclopedic recollection of applicable laws,

jurisprudence or administrative circulars we issue periodically in the discharge of their
responsibilities, they nevertheless have the bounden duty to keep abreast with the law and the
changes therein as well as the decisions of this Court. As a trial judge, [Judge Dumlao] is the
visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct he is
expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence" to maintain public
confidence in the legal system.

Inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest
ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings it to public contempt,
dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt with and punished accordingly.
Judge Dumlao has amply demonstrated his incorrigibility and unfitness to be a judge. He is
undeterred by the several penalties and stern warnings the Court has given him. The Court will
not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty for it cannot tolerate any conduct that diminishes the
faith of the people in the judicial system.[26]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar M. Dumlao, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Isabela, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and VIOLATION OF
SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVES. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN,
RICARDO DE LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision[2] dated October 21, 1994, promulgated by
the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Criminal Case No. OD-269. Convicted of murder were
former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan,[3] Ricardo De los
Santos and Hilario Cajilo.
Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative
case[4] had been filed before the National Police Commission, in which Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Andres
Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan[5] with the killing of his brother Ronie[6] Ilisan. On April
6, 1986, Adjudication Board No. 14[7] rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los
Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the
service with prejudice.[8] On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution,[9] dismissing the
respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon,[10] an Information for
murder[11] against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the
Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms,
inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death.

Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the assistance of their
lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on
February 15, 1988;[12] while Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio Q. Mayor,
entered a plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988.[13]
After due trial,[14] the court a quo[15] rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994,[16] the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO
TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES
FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under the
Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law. (No Bail in penalties of
reclusion perpetua or capital punishment especially when evidence of guilt is strong)

The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of P6,000.00
as actual damages and the heirs of the deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way
of lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all said accused are
ORDERED immediately confined in jail.

The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and
the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are confiscated in favor of the government.

After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this
Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit the foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the
Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter, the receipt
must be attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record.

The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their
favor to its full extent pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED
pending his arrest.[17]

Hence, this appeal.[18]

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the court a quo convicted
the appellants. The killing was qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number
and armed with guns. It further ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed treachery, as it
ratiocinated:

Certain cases, an authority wrote, involving the killing of helpless victim by assailants superior to
them in arms or numbers, or victims who were overpowered before being killed, were decided
on the theory that the killing was treacherous, when perhaps the correct qualifying circumstance
would be abuse of superiority. In these cases the attack was not sudden nor unexpected and
the element of surprise was lacking. (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier
ruled that the qualifying treachery should be considered as an exception to the general rule on
treachery because it was not present at the inception of the attack. The killing was not sudden
nor unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for this reason that we hold that
alevosia should be deemed absorbed or included in abuse of superiority. Even assuming ex-
gratia argumenti that it should be the other way around, the situation will not be of help,
penaltywise, to the accused.

Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code, [102] the imposable
penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In their Brief,
Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion
temporal, contending that their filing of bail bonds/property bonds, before the order for their
arrest was issued, should be treated as voluntary surrender.[103]
 We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no factual basis. The warrant for
the arrest of herein appellants was issued on August 18, 1987,[104] but appellants counsel filed
the Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September 2, 1987.[105] In the second place,
appellants failed to prove the requisites for voluntary surrender, which are:(1) the offender has
not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the
latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[106] The records reveal that a warrant of arrest
was actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo[107] on September 2, 1987 and that they were in
fact detained.[108]
In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court
correctly imposed reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and
(2) the award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs against appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO TIZON y INKING a.k.a. ROMY BONDAT/BUNGAL, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

The Court starts with the basic thesis that the fundamental law guarantees that no person shall
ever be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 1 The law is particularly
zealous in the criminal justice system when the life or liberty of an individual is at stake. An
accusation by the State is never synonymous with guilt. Even when an indictee himself accepts
full responsibility for a crime, such as by his plea of guilt, an adherence to the constitutional
precepts are not dispensed with, and the courts are neither excused from their duty to act with
the greatest caution in seeing to the lawful interest of the accused nor allowed to be less than
protective in securing and safeguarding his rights.1âwphi1.nêt

Before the court, for its automatic review, is the decision of the Regional Court of Manila,
Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 96-152200, which has found herein accused-appellant Romeo
Tizon y Inking guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. The death
sentence having been decreed by the trial court, the records of the case have accordingly been
elevated to this Court.

Romeo Tizon was charged with the crime of "Rape with Homicide" in an Information that read:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Asst. City Prosecutor upon Sworn Statements of the witnesses
for the victim, JONABEL ANTOLIN Y ROMAILA, copies of which are hereto
attached as Annexes, accuses ROMEO TIZON Y IKING a.k.a. ROMY
BONDAT/BUNGAL of the crime of Rape with Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about August 21, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit:
by dragging one JONABLE ANTOLIN Y ROMAILA inside a warehouse located at
the corner of Valderama and Lavarez St., Binondo, this City, laying her on the
cemented floor, repeatedly banging her head on the floor until she lost her
 consciousness, pulling down her short pants, and thereafter, had carnal
knowledge of the said JONABEL ANTOLIN Y ROMAILA, a minor, eight (8) years
of age, against the latter's will and consent, and on said occasion, the said
ROMEO TIZON a.k.a. "ROMY BONDAT/BUNGAL" caused her fatal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

On 10 September 1996, the accused was arraigned with the assistance of his counsel de oficio.
He pleaded guilty to the indictment. Following the plea, the trial court proceeded to receive
evidence to determine the precise degree of culpability of the accused. In its decision, the trial
court gave a brief narrative of the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution; thus —

1. Myra Contado — a 13-year old neighbor of the victim who testified that on the
night of August 20, 1996 at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, she saw the
accused Romeo Tizon jumped from the top of the roof of the warehouse where
the victim was found dead in the early morning of August 21, 1996, and that she
and the accused even looked at each other (nagkatinginan pa kami);

2. Dr. Manuel Lagonera — the Medico Legal Officer of the WPD-PNP who
testified as to the cause of death of the victim and of the fact that the victim was
sexually violated;

3. Pet Byron T. Buan — the Forensic Chemist who examined the orange t-shirt
and the two (2) shorts of the accused which were found at the warehouse;

4. SPO1 Steve Casimiro — the Police Investigator who investigated this case
and took the confession of the accused;

5. SPO4 Graciano Bautista — who testified that he is one of the police officers
who apprehended the accused in Dasmariñas, Cavite;

6. Independencio Antolin — the uncle of the victim who testified that on the night
of August 20, 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was with the victim
and that at around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, he saw the accused Romeo Tizon
who looked drunk (amoy alak) wearing an orange t-shirt who told him that he will
enter the warehouse to get his clothes;

7. Mario Bernardo — a neighbor of the victim who testified that in the early
morning of August 21, 1996 at around 6:45 he went to the bodega to feed his
chicken when he saw blood at the chicken coop and when he looked up at the
top of the chicken coop, he saw the head of the victim child inside the sack.

8. Margie Alvarez — the aunt of the victim who testified that on the night of
August 20, 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, she saw her niece, the
victim, carrying two sticks of cigarette and went to the warehouse and that she
saw the accused wearing an orange t-shirt near the door of the said warehouse;
and
 9. Mary Grace Antolin Yetyet — another aunt of the victim, a female barangay
tanod who testified that prior to the disappearance and discovery of the dead
body of the victim, she saw the accused wearing the same orange t-shirt which
was found in the scene of the crime. 3

The defense, in turn, placed on the witness stand Brgy. Kagawad Levi Alfonso of Brgy. Fatima,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, who stated that the accused, through his relatives, had voluntarily
surrendered to him and his co-kagawads. No other witness was presented.

On 30 October 1996, following the offer of evidence made by the parties, the trial court rendered
its decision; it concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty as

charged and imposing upon him the penalty of death and ordering him to pay the
heirs of the victim the total sum of P200,000.00 for actual and moral damages.

SO ORDERED. 4

And, thus, ended an abbreviated proceedings spelling doom on the accused and a sentence of
death hanging over his head.

In its appeal brief, the defense ascribed to the trial court the following "errors" supposedly
committed by it; viz:

1. The prosecution's evidence do not clearly establish that rape has been
committed by the accused, hence the court a quo committed an error in the
appreciation of the evidence and should instead hold the accused guilty of acts of
lasciviousness and homicide.

2. The court a quo erred in awarding the heirs of the victim the total sum of
PHP200,000, the award [not] being supported by evidence. 5

It is the considered opinion of this Court, after reviewing the records, that the case must be
remanded to the court a quo for further and appropriate proceedings.

The Rules of Court have set exacting standards to be strictly complied with by the trial court in
the arraignment of an accused. Rule 116 trial of the Rules of Court, in part, provides:

Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. — (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned
for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking
him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at
the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter
his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter
of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
 (c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of
not guilty shall be entered for him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the

accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The rationale behind the rule is to ensure not only that due process of law is effectively
observed but also, and at bottom, that no accused is wrongly convicted or erroneously
sentenced. It constantly behooves the courts to proceed with utmost care in each and
every case before them but perhaps nothing can be more demanding of judges in that
respect than when the punishment is in its severest form - death - a penalty that, once
carried out, is irreversible and irreparable. It cannot be said that when a person pleads
guilty to a crime there is no chance at all that he could, in fact, be innocent.
Statistics 6 can easily dispel that notion.

In the instant petition, the only thing on record that the Court finds at the arraignment of the
accused is the order dated 10 September 1996, of the trial court which reads:

ORDER

Upon arraignment and after reading the information in the language known and
understood by him, accused ROMEO TIZON Y INKING a.k.a. ROMY
BONDAT/BUNGAL, assisted by counsel, Atty. Aristotle M. Reyes, pleaded guilty
to the offense charged.

Set the hearing of this case for the reception of the prosecution's evidence in
order to determine the extent of the guilt of the accused on September 16, 17
and 18, 1996, all at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

The defense is also advised to be ready with its evidence.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Manila, September 10, 1996.

(Sgd) RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA

Judge 7

While it would appear from the text of the order that the information has been read in a
language known and understood by the accused, then assisted by counsel de oficio, that
regrettably, however, is just about all. Absolutely nothing else on record can disclose
that the trial court has kept up with the rest of the procedure set out in Sections 1 and 3,
Rule 116, of the Rules of Court which also prescribes that the accused or his counsel be
 furnished with a copy of the complaint with the list of witnesses against him, and when,
specifically, an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, a searching inquiry is made in
order to fully ascertain the voluntariness and consequences of the plea of guilt. This
Court has had occasion 8 to state that the requirements of the Rules are mandatory,
affording, such as they do, the proper understanding of the all-important constitutional
mandate regarding the right of an accused to be so informed of the precise nature of the
accusation leveled against him so essential in aptly putting up his defense. The
searching inquiry, which must be recorded, requires the court to make it indubitably
certain that the accused is fully apprised of the consequences of his plea of guilt. In this
case, peculiarly, the court must let the accuse realize that a plea of guilt will not, under
Republic Act No. 7659, affect or reduce the death penalty as he may have otherwise so
perceived and come to believe or been advised. Not infrequently, said the Court in one
case, 9 an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty, and it should compel the judge to make
sure that he does not labor under these mistaken impressions. 10 In sum, the searching
inquiry under Section 3, Rule 116 must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and
(2) a complete comprehension of the legal effects of the plea, 11 so that the plea of guilt
is based on a free and informed judgment. So indispensable is this requirement that a
plea of guilt to a capital offense can be held null and void where the trial court has
inadequately discharged the duty of conducting the prescribed "searching inquiry." 12

Given the attendant circumstances, this Court cannot send accused-appellant to the death
chamber, for no matter how outrageous the crime might be or how deprave the offender would
appear to be, the uncompromising rule of law must still prevail. Verily, a judgment of conviction
cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. 13 In the interest of substantial justice then, this Court
has no recourse but to remand the case to the trial court for further and appropriate
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No.

96-152200 convicting accused-appellant Romeo Tizon y Inking of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE;
instead, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings
conformably with the disquisition hereinabove expressed.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE,
OCCIDENT AL MINDORO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge Jose S.
Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 451 and 46,2 San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave Abuse of Authority in
relation to Criminal Case No. 2-1928,3 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy,
Peter Alfaro and Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."

Complainant Bandoy alleged, inhis verified complaint,4 that he was one of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De
Jesus, Jr.),which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br.
44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was
initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier
criminal complaint against him for Violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14
of the Omnibus Election Code (Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br.
44.

Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan during the
2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public elementary
school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; thatthey were both
assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to
be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire),
son of House representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor Jose Tapales
Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De
Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, which was captured on video by a member
of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from the Commission of
Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some ballots insidehis
backpack; and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the
offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued
against De Jesus, Jr.5

According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial
Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him,
Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty.
Lorenzo). Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against
him. Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008
before then Las Pinas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva.6 Because complainant Bandoy was
charged with Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving
them incarcerated for morethan two years.7

Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by
displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several
postponements of De Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008,8 but was
reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge
Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers on July 6, 2011.9

Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus, Jr.’s non-
appearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed obvious court
defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his continuous non-
appearance in the court’s subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example of Judge Jacinto,
Jr.’s supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the
case of serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.’s obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified
absences when his appearance was necessary.
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition for review
before the Department of Justice (DOJ)to have the serious illegal detention case against them
dismissed. Meanwhile, coaccused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of
Appeals (CA)and won the case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her.
At first, the DOJ denied their petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm
of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental
Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-
accused.10 Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw
Information.

Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to withdraw information.
In the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally
resolved12 to allow him to post a bail bond of ₱100,000.00 each or a total of
₱300,000.00.13 Bandoy added that Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge
Jacinto, Jr.’s child.

Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De Joya
Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time
that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but upon reconsideration,
Judge Mayor decided to reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case
of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on October 25, 2012,14while their bail for
the serious illegal detention case was cancelled.15

According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate this present
administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayor’s
assignments on account of the latter’s compulsory retirement from service on December 1,
2012, which would include their pending serious illegal detention case. He claimed that Judge
Jacinto, Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his coaccused even though
there was no warrant of arrest against them.16 He begged the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr.
handle their case of serious illegal detention for fear that they would have to endure another
bout of extreme bias and partiality from him.

In his Comment,17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan.18 He also denied
having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP and the
CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely consulted him on how to go about
the order of cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa
Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po
akong parang may kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda
dahil wala na po silang piyansa (as a consequence thereof)."19 Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused
to issue a warrant of arrest when he was asked because he was not handling the case
anymore.20

Bandoy, in his Reply,21 brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to
thwartthe enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest against
ten individuals.22 He also divulged that the audit team from the Court was personally assisted by
Judge Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor
Villarosa.23 Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police
officials wanted to arrest them even without a warrant of arrest.24 Bandoy showed a timeline of
events supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge
Jacinto, Jr., evaded arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the
case for ballot switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his chambers.25 He
further reiterated his plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch 44.

In his Rejoinder,26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as Assisting Presiding
Judge of Branch 44.27He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten
individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but only after a
finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that
he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the warrants of
arrest as the charge was a non-bailable offense.28 He likewise denied seeking any favor from
Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He
explained that the audit team paid him a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of his
cooperation.29 He again restated that the police officials merely coordinated with him as was
customary because he was the Executive Judge of the municipality.30 Judge Jacinto, Jr.
believes that Bandoy’s accusations against him were designed to oust him as Presiding Judge
of Branches 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44,
Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental Mindoro.31

In its Report,32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) did not give
credence to Bandoy’s allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest without a
warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit team was conveniently housed in Aroma
Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof.33The OCA observed, however, that
Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency over the several resettings of the
arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the
OCA equated his silence to admission.34

Thus, the OCA recommended that:

1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45,
Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular
administrative matter; and

2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and, accordingly, be FINEDin the amount of
Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.35

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites
to the due performance of judicial office.36

Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted
position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional competence
at all times.37

In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De
Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers.1âwphi1 He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose
not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed
against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of
the bench, that was being challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of
man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It isagainst
human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations."38 His
silence introduces doubt in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.

Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and
procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof requiring arraignment of an
accused to be made in open court, to wit:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be
made in open courtby the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint
or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other then
those named in the complaint or information.

(Emphasis supplied)

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge
can take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal
litigation "where the issues are joined x x x and without which the proceedings cannot advance
further."39

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.40 There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was "gross
or patent, deliberate or malicious."41 It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts
or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption.42 Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good
faith.43

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to
know the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy.44 They are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be
conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.45 When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge
can easily be the mainspring of injustice.46

Canon 2,47 Rule 2.0148 and Canon 349 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that
judges, as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly
and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest
and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are
circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so,
such acts may cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general.50 As held in
Joselito Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City:51
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.

Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007
to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed
of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but
he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an
impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.1âwphi1

Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-
8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11
(A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found
guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not more than
₱40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but
they cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still
under review and evaluation. Thus, a fine of ₱40,000.0052 is deemed appropriate under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED in the
amount of Forty Thousand (₱40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
AMANTE-DESCALLAR v JUDGE REINERIO ABRAHAM B. RAMAS

Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City,
Branch 18, filed seven administrative complaints against respondent Judge Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas,
of the same court, for gross ignorance of the law, gross negligence, and violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

In Misc. No. 2820, complainant charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law in relation to
Civil Case No. 3412. She claimed that in the Order dated August 18, 2006, respondent granted the motion
for execution of the prevailing party by counting the five year period provided in Section 6 of Rule 39
from the counsels receipt of the Entry of Judgment. Complainant averred that Rule 39 expressly provides
that the five year period is reckoned from the date of entry of judgment; and not from the date of receipt
by counsel; that jurisprudence is replete with rulings that a final judgment ceases to be enforceable after
that period, but merely gives the prevailing party a right of action to have the same revived. Hence,
respondent should be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and violation of Rule 3.02 [1] Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.[2]

In Misc. No. 2821, complainant charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law in relation to
the conduct of the plea bargaining in Criminal Case Nos. 5601-2000 and 5602-2000 both entitled People
v. Cebedo. On pre-trial, the defense offered to enter into plea bargaining by offering to plead guilty in
Crim. Case No. 5602-2000 for possession of seven (7) decks of shabu in exchange for the withdrawal of
Crim. Case No. 5601-2000 for selling one deck of shabu. The prosecution agreed and respondent
approved the agreement declaring Crim. Case No. 5601-2000 withdrawn[3] and dismissed as a
consequence of plea bargaining.[4]

Complainant averred that respondents conduct was contrary to the provisions on plea bargaining in
Section 2 of Rule 116, Rules on Criminal Procedure[5] and Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 8493,[6] and
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98.[7] She argued that it was unclear whether the offended party consented
and whether the prosecutor has proper authority to enter into such agreement; and that plea bargaining is
limited to a plea to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.[8]

In Misc. No. 2824, complainant alleged that the validity and propriety of the plea bargaining
in Crim. Case Nos. 5760-2K, 5761-2K, 5762-2K entitled People v. Dumpit and the dismissal of one case
as a consequence thereof are questionable. Respondent approved the plea bargaining agreement entered
into by the prosecution and the accused[9] and dismissed Crim. Case No. 5760-2K and Crim. Case No.
5762-2K as a consequence of plea bargaining. Upon arraignment,[10] accused pleaded guilty to the sale of
shabu. Thereafter, respondent issued a Decision[11] finding the accused guilty of selling shabu in Crim.
Case No. 5761-2K. The next day, the accused applied for probation and was released on recognizance.[12]

Complainant also alleged that respondent was grossly negligent relative to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 40-03[13] against accused Dumpit which led to the filing of an Information for possession of
shabu docketed as Criminal Case No. 6899.[14] In a Motion to Quash the Information, the accused
challenged the jurisdiction of the court over his person and prayed for the suppression of the evidence
obtained[15] on ground that Search Warrant No. 40-03 was intended for one Edmun Camello and not
Dometilo. In the Order[16] dated May 3, 2004, respondent quashed Search Warrant No. 40-03, admitting
that there was indeed an error in the search warrant, particularly the name of the person subject thereof
which rendered it intrinsically void.

Complainant argued that respondents failure to read carefully the contents of the search warrant before
affixing his signature constitutes gross negligence; that any inadvertence on the part of the stenographer
should not be construed to exonerate the respondent who signed the search warrant without ascertaining
the correctness of its contents; that by such negligence, respondent exposed the judicial system to ridicule
by declaring null and void a search warrant which he himself issued and likewise caused a blow on the
morale of the police officers who lost the case on a technicality.

In Misc. No. 2825, complainant assailed the August 2, 2006 Order[17] issued by respondent
dismissing Criminal Case No. 8149-2K6 entitled People v. Lopez for lack of probable cause. In said case,
respondent gave the prosecution ten days from receipt of the order to file a comment or opposition to the
accuseds Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. However, on August 2,
2006, or only seven days after the prosecution received its copy of the order, the respondent issued an
Order dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Complainant claimed that respondent disregarded
due process because the Order dismissing the case was rendered before the expiration of the 10 day
period given to the prosecution to file comment.

Moreover, complainant alleged that respondent should have treated the subject motion as a
Motion to Quash. Thus, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 117, the motion should be made before the accused
enters a plea, and not after arraignment, as in this case, and based on any of the grounds stated in Section
3, and failure to assert any ground before arraignment shall be deemed a waiver thereof.
 In Misc. No. 2860, complainant alleged that on the strength of Search Warrant No. 87-04,[18] the
accused in Criminal Case No. 7235-2K4 was arrested after a search conducted in his residence. After
arraignment, accused filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence. However, the
prayer[19] in said motion inadvertently asked for the quashal of another search warrant issued in another
case.

Complainant claimed that despite the glaring error, respondent gave due course to the motion;
worse, the dispositive portion of the Resolution dated August 8, 2005 was a mere reproduction of the
erroneous prayer in the Motion. Complainant alleged that the same cannot be treated as a mere
typographical error; that respondent did not read the resolution before affixing his signature; that
respondent exhibited gross ignorance in issuing Search Warrant 87-04 and thereafter invalidating the
same for failing to comply with the requisites of a Search Warrant; and that respondent issued several
search warrants beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his court which were eventually invalidated thereby
putting the efforts of the arresting officers to naught.

In Misc. No. 2861, complainant argued that respondent provisionally dismissed Criminal Case
No. 6994-2K3 entitled People v. Fernandez, for failure of the prosecution to present the laboratory
technician on several occasions despite having presented several other witnesses. Complainant claimed
that the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case solely on that ground since the prosecution has
presented other witnesses whose testimonies respondent is duty bound to pass upon before making a
resolution of the case. While Section 23 of Rule 119 allows the Court to dismiss the case for insufficiency
of evidence, it requires that the prosecution must first rest its case and be given opportunity to be
heard. The right of the accused to a speedy trial does not mean the arbitrary dismissal of the case against
him to the prejudice of other parties in the case.

In Misc. No. 2887, complainant averred that Raup Ibrahim and Vivian Duerme who were the accused in
three criminal cases[20] filed motions to suppress evidence and quash information praying for the dismissal
of the cases against them. Respondent gave the prosecution ten days to file a Comment on the said
motions. However, in disregard of the period given to the prosecution, respondent issued an Order dated
July 31, 2006 dismissing the three cases.
 In his Comment, respondent judge argued that complainant failed to show that his decisions were
issued whimsically and arbitrarily or that the parties in said cases were deprived of due process; that
hearings were conducted and the parties were given equal opportunity to be heard, and the dispositions in
question were served upon them; that assuming his rulings to be erroneous, the rules provide remedies by
which said rulings may be contested, which the parties failed to avail of. Moreover, if complainant
believed that the dispositions were erroneous, she should have alerted the respondent as lawyer and an
officer of the court.

Moreover, respondent assailed the standing of complainant to file the administrative complaint
docketed as Misc. No. 2820 because she was not the counsel of the parties nor was she a party to the
case. He claimed that assuming the assailed order to be erroneous, the proper party could still avail of
proper remedies under the rules; and that the present complaint only attempts to preempt whatever legal
action the parties may undertake which is tantamount to a usurpation of the rights of the aggrieved party
to a judicial process and an arrogation of judicial discretion.

With respect to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5601 as alleged in Misc. No. 2821, respondent averred
that the prosecution initiated its withdrawal on August 4, 2000; that the assailed orders were properly
served to the parties; however, neither contested the disposition of the court hence, the orders became
final and executory by operation of law.

In Misc. No. 2824, respondent averred that the parties in Criminal Cases No. 5760-2K, 5761-2K
and 5762-2K actively participated in the proceedings. None of them contested the disposition of the court
which are now final and executory.
Respondent imputed ill motive on the part of complainant in filing the present charges. He claimed that he
filed an administrative complaint against complainant for irresponsibly disclosing wrong and malicious
information in Election Protest Case No 0001-2K4, to which complainant retaliated by filing
administrative charges against him for Absenteeism and Falsification of Certificate of Service and for
bringing home a piece of evidence, of which respondent was found guilty. Thereafter, respondent filed
another administrative charge against complainant for Gross Inefficiency, who in turn filed the instant
administrative complaints.

The OCA also noted that in another case docketed as RTJ-06-2015, involving the same parties,
respondent judge was found guilty of Simple Misconduct and was fined P11,000.00 and sternly
warned. The charges of Absenteeism and Falsification of Certificate of Service against him was referred
for Investigation but no report has yet been submitted.[24]

The issue for resolution is whether respondent judge is administratively liable for the alleged
erroneous rulings and issuances made by him in the exercise of his judicial functions.

It is elementary that not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties
renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. [25] In Maquiran v.
Grageda,[26] the Court held that alleged error committed by judges in the exercise of their adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through
judicial remedies. Thus:

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute
for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.

Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make
in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be
recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done
within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally,
prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be a final declaration by a competent
court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order or under the
stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.

In Misc. No. 2820, the Court agrees with the OCA that the ruling of the respondent as to the
interpretation of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not automatically subject him to
administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law. First, there is no showing that parties to the case
have exhausted judicial remedies against the alleged erroneous ruling. Neither was it refuted that, as
claimed by respondent, the subject civil case, unlike the other administrative charges, is still pending and
active, and should his ruling be erroneous, the parties still have available remedies to contest said
ruling. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the
assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. [27] Second, there was no showing
and neither was it alleged that the issuance of the ruling was attended with bad faith, malice, or
dishonesty.

As regards Misc. No. 2861, the Court agrees that the charge of gross ignorance of the law against
the respondent judge should be dismissed. The allegations of complainant and the proffered evidence do
not prove the elements of this administrative offense, to wit: that the subject order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence
but more importantly must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. [28] The soundness of
the provisional dismissal of the criminal case subject of Misc. No. 2861 lies within the judicial discretion
of the respondent, erroneous exercise of which does not automatically render him liable. In proper cases,
unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial, may even be
a ground for the permanent dismissal of a criminal case.[29] In the subject case, respondent deemed it
proper to order only the provisional dismissal of the case.

As regards Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887, the Court finds that respondent violated the basic
and fundamental constitutional principle of due process when he granted the motions filed by the accused
in the criminal cases subject of these administrative complaints without giving the prosecution its day in
court. Worse, respondent disregarded the period he gave for the prosecution to file comment on the
motions. Such action cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment but a
blatant disregard of established rules.

In Balagtas v. Sarmiento,[30] the Court found respondent therein grossly ignorant of the law in
granting the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad in violation of due process. Thus:

Considering the litigious nature of Peiths motion and the fact that the criminal
and civil aspects of the cases were simultaneously instituted, the public prosecutor and
 the private offended party should have been notified, failing which, the respondent judge
should not have acted upon the motion.

The Rules of Court is explicit on this point. A motion without notice of hearing is
pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide.
The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The
rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing,
the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection. The objective of the rule is to
avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and to
ensure impartiality in the trial.

In granting Peiths Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad, the respondent
judge violated a basic and fundamental constitutional principle, due process. When the
law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all,
judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules. Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

In the instant administrative cases, the motions filed before respondent judge were likewise
litigious in nature which must be heard. Respondent judge should not have acted on said motions filed by
the accused without first giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its side.

Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good
faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of
tolerable misjudgment. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act
as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of
a judge owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.[31]

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law and procedure as a
serious charge punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. In the instant case, the penalty of suspension from office for
six months without salary and other benefits, is proper.
 With respect to Misc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824, the Court disagrees with the findings of the
Office of the Court Administrator that the issuance of the Orders dated September 4, 2000 and August 14,
2000, respectively, amounted to gross ignorance of the law because it was made in violation of the
provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, prohibiting plea bargaining.

At the time the assailed rulings were issued, the prohibition on plea-bargaining provided in
Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is not absolute. It applies only when the person is charged
under R.A. No. 6425 where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Though Sections 15 and
16 of the said law, under which the accused was charged, provide that the sale and possession of these
drugs is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, these penalties may only be imposed if the same were
of the quantities enumerated in Section 20.[32] If the quantity involved is less than that stated, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending on the quantity.[33]

It is to be noted that the decision to accept or reject a plea bargaining agreement is within the
sound discretion of the court subject to certain requirements of statutes or rules. [34] In Daan v.
Sandiganbayan,[35] the Court defined plea bargaining as a process, in criminal cases, whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of
a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.[36]

In the instant administrative cases, the determination of whether the agreement complied with
requirements set forth by the rules lies in the sound discretion of the respondent judge. Whether the
quantity of shabu in the criminal cases subject of Misc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824 is covered by the
prohibitory provision of Section 20-A is also within the competence of the trial court judge to pass
upon. Should there be an error in the dismissal of the cases as a consequence of plea bargaining, parties to
the cases are not without judicial remedies.

The Court notes, however, that respondent was also charged with gross negligence in Misc. No.
2824 and Misc. No. 2860. Misc. No. 2824 relates to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 40-03 where the
name of the accused in the caption differs from that mentioned in the body. On the other hand, Misc. No.
2860 relates to the Order quashing a Search Warrant in another criminal case and reproducing the Prayer
in the Motion to Quash filed as its dispositive portion. The errors committed by respondent judge in the
mentioned cases could have been avoided had he exercised diligence and prudence expected of him
before affixing his signature.

As held by the Court in Padilla v. Judge Silerio,[37] in the discharge of the functions of his office,
a judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond
suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of
responsibility. Certainly, a judge is enjoined, his heavy caseload notwithstanding, to pore over all
documents whereon he affixes his signature and gives his official imprimatur. In Judicial Audit and
Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City, Branches 63, 64 and 65,[38] the Court found respondent judge therein negligent for failure to
exercise the necessary diligence in the performance of his duties and was imposed a fine of P5,000.00.

Respondent judge cannot take refuge behind the mistakes and inefficiency of his court
personnel. He is charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising them to
secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity. Indeed, he is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court
personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are promptly notified of his orders and
decisions.[39] In Co v. Judge Plata,[40] the Court found respondent judge therein liable for negligence for
his failure to scrutinize the documents he had signed and to follow the proper procedure for fixing the
amount of bail.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds respondent Judge Reinerio
Abraham B. Ramas of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18, GUILTY:

1) of gross ignorance of the law in Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887, for
which he is suspended from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits;

2) of negligence in Misc. No. 2860 and Misc. No. 2824, for which he is meted a
FINE of P5,000.00.

Respondent is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
 The charges in Misc. No. 2820, Misc. No. 2821, and Misc. No. 2861 against respondent Judge
Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y

SADSAD, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases are before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, finding accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. guilty of
four counts of rape of his minor daughters, Oleby and Maricris Nadera, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one count of rape and death for each of the
remaining three counts. Accused-appellant was also ordered to indemnify complainants Oleby
Nadera in the amount of P150,000.00 and Maricris Nadera in the amount of P50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. MENDOZAJ

Reversal of the decision is sought on the sole ground that -

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT'S IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
AND IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE ACCUSED FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCE OF
HIS PLEA.[1]

The facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby, born
on October 2, 1982; Maricris, born on March 16, 1984; March Anthony, born on January 8,
1986; and Sherilyn, born on September 27, 1987.[2]

On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain, and came home to the Philippines for
vacation only in July 1993. She then left again for Bahrain in September 1993 and did not return
until September 12, 1995.[3]

On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother
that they had been raped by their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the
police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant.[4]

After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant

with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.

In Criminal Case No. C-4982, the information[5] alleged-

That on or about the 17th day of May, 1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental
 Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of
force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, nine (9) years of
age at that time against the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4983, the information[6] charged -

That on or about the 17th day of April, 1995 at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of
Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, and unlawfully and
feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his daughter,
OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at that time against the latter's will
and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4984, the information[7] stated-

That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, sometime in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age
at that time against the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4985, the information[8] recited -

That on or about the 3rd day of March 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental
Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of
force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his daughter, MARICRIS NADERA, eleven (11)
years of age against the latter's will and consent.

The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against
him.[9] However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S.
Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the informations.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon, Oleby Nadera,
Maricris Nadera, and Daisy Nadera.

She testified that the hymenal lacerations may have been caused by the insertion of a hard
object, the patient's history of genitalic insertions, a straddle injury, or sitting on hard wood. She
could not determine when these lacerations were sustained because they had healed over a
period beyond seven days.[11]
In the case of Maricris Nadera, Dr. Fesalbon explained that the hymenal lacerations could have
been caused by penetration such as through instrumentation or insertion of an object inside the
vagina. They could also have been caused by the penetration of the penis. Upon inquiry from
the court, Dr. Fesalbon stated that the fact that Maricris had more hymenal lacerations than
Oleby could be due to the difference in the impact of penetration. She added that the number of
times each of the girls had sexual intercourse could not be ascertained merely from the hymenal
lacerations, although it could be concluded that an object had been inserted in the vagina.[13]

Oleby Nadera testified about the rapes committed by her father against her as follows:

On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while Daisy was away working as a
domestic helper in Bahrain, accused- appellant pulled Oleby, then nine years of age, towards a
bed, removed her panties and shorts and ordered her to keep quiet. He then placed himself on
top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He proceeded to make an up and down motion
while on top of his daughter. All the while, Oleby was crying, pleading with her father, "Huwag
po!", "Huwag po!" Accused-appellant again ordered Oleby to keep quiet lest her brother and
sisters were awakened. Afterwards, accused-appellant told Oleby to put on her panties and
shorts and to go to sleep. Oleby went to the bed where her brother and sisters were sleeping
and cried.

On another occasion, on April 17, 1995, accused-appellant sent Sherilyn and Maricris to the
sari-sari store while he asked March Anthony to gather firewood. While Oleby was left alone
inside their house in Barangay Bayani, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, accused-appellant again
raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at that time. Accused-appellant closed the door and
windows, removed Oleby's panties and shorts and sat down. While sitting down, accused-
appellant placed Oleby's legs on his thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Later on, he
told Oleby to put on her panties and shorts and told her to fetch her brother and sisters.

Oleby was raped by her father for the third time on April 24, 1995. That evening, she woke up to
find her father on top of her, taking off her shorts and panties and inserting his penis into her
vagina. As her father was taking off her clothes, Oleby cried and pleaded, "Huwag po! Huwag
po!" Instead of desisting, accused-appellant told her to keep quiet so as not to awaken her
brother and sisters, and threatened her with harm if she made any noise. Accused-appellant
then made a pumping motion, consummating the sexual act with his daughter.[14]

After Oleby's direct examination had been finished, Atty. Brotonel, accused-appellant's counsel,
did not conduct any cross examination on the ground that he was convinced Oleby was telling
the truth.[15]

On that same day, Maricris also testified. She related how she was raped by her father on
March 3, 1996, the year before, when she was 11 years old. At about eight o'clock in the
evening of said date, while her brother and sisters were sleeping, she was pulled by her father
towards his bed and told to lie down. Accused-appellant then placed himself on top of Maricris
and inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricris pleaded "Papa, huwag po, maawa naman kayo
sa amin." Ignoring his daughter's pleas, accused-appellant continued raping her by making a
pumping motion and threatened to kill all of them if she cried. Accused-appellant afterwards
asked Maricris to put on her shorts and panties and return to bed. He told Maricris not to cry so
as not to awaken her siblings. She did not tell anyone what befell her because she was afraid. A
neighbor, named Lita Macalalad, asked her if Oleby had been raped by their father. It turned out
Oleby had told her ordeal to Lita Macalalad while they were washing clothes and talking about
Oleby's parents. Oleby also told Lita Macalalad that Maricris had been raped by their father as
well, a fact related to Oleby by Maricris.[16]

Daisy Nadera, accused-appellant's wife, also testified for the prosecution. Her testimony
focused on the dates of births of her children and the fact that she was out of the country when
the alleged rapes occurred. She testified that she and her daughters filed a complaint for rape
against accused-appellant after discovering his hideous acts. Thereafter, her children were
subjected to a medical examination.[17]

On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its
case thereafter.

Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense.

On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four
counts of rape against his daughters. The dispositive portion of its decision[18] reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds accused Elegio Nadera, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Rape [4 counts] with the qualifying
circumstance that the victims are under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years for the rape committed
on May 17, 1992 and three DEATH PENALTIES for the rape committed on April
17 and 24, 1995 and March 3, 1996, together with the accessory penalties
provided by law. He is also ordered to indemnify victim Oleby Nadera the total
amount of P150,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983 and C-4984 and
Maricris Nadera, the amount of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-4985, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

S OO R D E R E D.

As already stated, accused-appellant's lone assignment of error is that the trial court accepted
his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he
understood the consequences of his plea. In support of his contention, accused-appellant
invokes the ruling in the case of People v. Dayot[19] in which this Court ruled that, in criminal
cases, the judge must be convinced that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. This
could be done by requiring him to narrate the events leading to the crime, making him reenact it,
or asking him to supply missing details. The judge must satisfy himself that: (1) the accused is
voluntarily pleading guilty, and (2) he is truly guilty and there is a rational basis for a finding of
guilt based on his testimony.

We find merit in accused-appellant's allegations. In addition, we find that there was inadequate
representation of his case in court, thus necessitating the remand of this case for further
proceedings.

I.

Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

 SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.-
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital
offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the
plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.[20]

What constitutes a searching inquiry, as explained in People v. Alicando,[21] is that the plea of
guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus
on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea.

In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of
accused-appellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and
whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication in the
record that accused-appellant changed his plea to guilty is the Certificates of Re- Arraignment,
dated August 5, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982 to C-4985.[22] On what exactly accused-
appellant said in entering his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been told by the trial judge,
the records shed no light. There is thus no evidence to show that accused-appellant's guilty plea
was voluntarily made or that he had fully understood the consequences of such plea.

In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused pleaded guilty, thus:

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public

Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, on August 5,
1997, when these cases were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the
accused manifested that the accused, realizing the futility of entering into trial
and considering that he actually committed the acts complained of, intimated his
intention to enter a plea of guilty to the above- mentioned charges. The accused
was then asked by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a plea of
guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May 17, 1992
against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would
be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and for the three other counts of rape
committed on April 17 and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on March
3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old at the time], he would be
sentenced to death by lethal injection. After having been informed of this, he
insisted that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is
ready to face the consequences thereof.[23]

The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a
searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his
guilty plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of
death is insufficient.[24] For more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or
because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial judge must erase such
mistaken impressions.[25] He must be completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the
accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the
manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked
whether he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the
consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio-
economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial
court must ask questions concerning them.[26] In this case, absent any showing that these
questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been
undertaken by the trial court.

What the trial court did in this case, as described in its decision, is similar to what happened
in People v. Sevilleno.[27] In that case, the accused was charged with the rape and homicide of a
nine-year old girl. The accused pleaded guilty whereupon the judge asked him questions: (1) Do
you understand your plea of guilt? and (2) Do you know that your plea of guilt could bring the
death penalty? This Court held that these questions did not constitute a searching inquiry.

. . . In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense,
especially where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the proper
and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and
necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the
aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused
really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea.[28]

Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently.

II.

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[29]

As already stated, the prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Oleby and Maricris
Nadera, the results of their medical examinations, and the testimonies of their mother, Daisy,
and the physician who conducted the medical examination of the two girls, Dr. Cynthia
Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this case, however, persuade us that a remand of
this case is necessary.

First. A perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the factual
and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of
the prosecution's evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No.7659, amending Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate the reason for the decision. There is no
evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found the testimonies of the
witnesses credible. Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
 Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment.- The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b)
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there be any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the
civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

In People v. Bugarin,[30] we stated:

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they
must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based
serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of
the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law
with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative
of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge
must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in
the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects
the judicial function.

Second. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the
Public Attorney's Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine
Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera's cross examination; and,
(c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but also to inform the accused of his
right to do so, if he desires.

Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and
substance to the accused's right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken
lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard
the accused's fundamental rights.

In the case of People vs. Bermas,[31] no less than three PAO lawyers were found by the Court to
have failed in performing their duties to their client, an accused charged with raping his
daughter. The first lawyer inexplicably waived the cross examination of the private complainant
and later asked to be relieved of her duties as counsel de oficio. A second lawyer appointed by
the court missed several hearings during the trial and could no longer be located. The third PAO
lawyer appointed by the trial court accepted his duties reluctantly and later ceased to appear for
the accused. This Court held that:

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and
acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient
and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.

Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this case falls short of the quality of
advocacy demanded of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the
penalty. A glaring example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his client's cause is his
decision not to cross examine Oleby Nadera, as revealed in the following portion of the records:

COURT:

.......Any cross?

ATTY. BROTONEL:

.......If Your Honor please, we are not conducting any cross-examination,

because this representation, from the demeanor of the witness, I am convinced
that she is telling the truth.[32]

It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable.

Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure
that the accused's constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was
not rendered for naught.

It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the complainant against that of the
accused, the two being the only persons present during the commission of the offense. While
the lone testimony of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such testimony must be
clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the
accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent.[33] This is where cross examination
becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths,
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress,
and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused and thus to give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all
reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed to be innocent.[34]
Indeed, cross examining Oleby Nadera becomes indispensable if her testimony is viewed
together with the results of her medical examination. Oleby Nadera claimed that she was last
raped by her father on April 24, 1995.[35] Yet, the medical examination conducted on her on April
30, 1996[36] revealed the presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal canal on that date. This was a
year after the last rape allegedly committed by her father. This evident discrepancy leads to only
one natural conclusion: Oleby engaged in sexual intercourse a few days before she was
examined. This raises a number of questions that bear upon the credibility of Oleby as a witness
and upon the guilt of accused- appellant. This may not necessarily mean that she was lying
when she said that on April 24, 1995 she had been raped by accused-appellant, but it does
indicate a necessity-that of cross examining her in order to ferret out the truth.

The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris' testimony. While she was
cross examined by defense counsel, the examination was at best a half-hearted attempt to
comply with a lawyer's obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required considering that a man's
life is at stake. The cross examination centered on what Maricris did or did not do while she
witnessed her sister being raped, and on her failure to report the allegedly incestuous rapes
against them. Said cross examination did not even touch upon the specific details concerning
the rape committed against her. Containing lurid details as it may be, it was nonetheless
important to probe Maricris' testimony, especially since it was substantially similar to the first
incident of rape narrated by her sister, and thus raised the possibility that it was a rehearsed, if
not concocted, story.

Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, according to the trial court's decision, he even expressed his conformity to the
admission of the same. Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of accused-
appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the records is it shown that accused-appellant was informed,
either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.

Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no
matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty
was all the more imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His
duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio.

In view of the foregoing, we find it necessary to remand the case for the proper arraignment and
trial of the accused, considering not only the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his
lawyer's neglect in representing his cause. A new trial has been ordered in criminal cases on
the ground of retraction of witnesses, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea
of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and
where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution
and the defense.[38]

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated April 27, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983, C-
4984 and C-4985 are REMANDED to it for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
The trial court is enjoined to conduct the proper trial of accused-appellant with all deliberate
speed upon receipt of the records of the cases.

SO ORDERED.2/28/
Trinidad v Ang

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner spouses Alexander Trinidad and
Cecilia Trinidad (petitioners) to challenge our Resolution of September 29, 2010. Our Resolution
denied the petition for review on certiorari for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of
the order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Masbate City, and of filing the motion
for reconsideration, in violation of Sections 4(b)[2] and 5,[3] Rule 45, in relation to Section
5(d),[4] Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

Antecedent Facts

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
a petition for review challenging this Resolution.

On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to
appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order.

The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest[5] praying, among others, for the deferment
of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ.

The MTCC, in its Order[6] dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, subject x x x to paragraph
c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On August 10, 2009, the
MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners arraignment on September 10, 2009.[7]

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, docketed as SCA No. 05-2009. The
RTC, in its decision[8] of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The petitioners moved to
reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied their motion in its order[9] dated July 5, 2010.

The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after
the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the
DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on December 1,
2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a
pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ.

The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the
60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They cited several cases to
show that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the
DOJ is resolved.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the
assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration

In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that the date of receipt of the
assailed RTC order was stated in the petition. The petitioners further state that they filed the
motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2010.

The Courts Ruling

We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on certiorari.

A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the petitioners received
a copy of the RTCs assailed order. In addition, the petitioners failure to state the material date of
filing the motion for reconsideration is only a formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of
the rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
justice.

Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible error
in the challenged RTC order.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway,[10] the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10,
2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10
months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the
Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
How,[11] Roberts, Jr. v. CA,[12] and Dimatulac v. Villon[13] were all decided prior to the
amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on
December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the
suspension of arraignment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE the petition for review
on certiorari; and

(2) DENY the said petition for petitioners failure to show any reversible error in the challenged
RTC order.

SO ORDERED.