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RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU
In this paper I offer two arguments designed to defend the existence of cat-
egorical reasons, which I define as those justifying considerations that ob-
tain independently of their relation to an agent’s commitments. The first
argument is based on certain paradigm cases meant to reveal difficulties
for practical instrumentalism—the view, as I define it here, that categori-
cal reasons do not exist, because all reasons must serve the commitments
of the agents to whom they apply. The second argument relies on consid-
erations of responsibility and blame to establish the existence of categori-
cal reasons.
Categorical reasons, as I will define them here, are reasons that ob-
tain independently of their relation to an agent’s commitments. Such
reasons do not depend for their existence on their being instrumen-
tal to the achievement of any of an agent’s desires, goals or cares. I
believe that there are categorical reasons for action, and will offer
two arguments on their behalf.
If there are categorical reasons for action, then practical instru-
mentalism is false. Practical instrumentalism (henceforth, just in-
strumentalism) is the view that the only reasons there can be are so-
called hypothetical reasons, i.e. reasons to do things that are in
some way ancillary to the achievement of one’s commitments (cares,
desires, wants, goals, etc.).
Apart from the intrinsic interest of the matter, showing that there
are categorical practical reasons, and that instrumentalism is false,
is important for at least two reasons. First, it would enable us to re-
sist relativistic arguments that assume that moral requirements en-
tail excellent reasons for action, but make reasons contingent on our
commitments, thereby making the content of moral requirements
contingent on our commitments. Second, it would provide us with
II
III
Premiss (4). Premiss (4) is a stipulation that comports with the rele-
vant possibilities, and should be granted by all parties to the debate.
It is easy to conjure situations in which perfect instrumentally ra-
tional deliberation, begun from a fanatic’s existing commitments,
would generate no consideration that opposed his deadly undertak-
(b) Here is another criticism of the first premiss. This criticism be-
gins with a subtle distinction between a reason that opposes an ac-
tion, and a reason for an agent which opposes that action. Critics
who advance this second objection concede that blameworthiness
requires a reason that opposes the blameable action. But they deny
that this reason must be one that applies to each blameable agent. In
effect, they reject my argument’s first premiss,
(1) If someone is blameworthy for doing something, then there
is a reason for that person not to do it,
while endorsing a close cousin:
(1⬘) If one is blameworthy for doing something, then there is a
reason not to do it.
Critics will argue, however, that (1⬘), when conjoined with premiss
(2), does not yield (3). And they are right about that. So if we must
replace (1) with (1⬘), my argument collapses.
Here is the core thought that underlies this criticism. Warranted
blame occurs within a practice that is defined by a legitimate set of
rules that are effective in achieving a valuable purpose. Blame is de-
served whenever these justified rules call for it, and they may do so
even when there is no reason for a given individual to abide by these
rules.
Consider a familiar illustration. Suppose that hard determinism is
true, but rather than abandoning our practices of blame, we choose
to retain them. We implement them through a set of rules that as-
sign blame when it is socially efficacious to do so. There may be no
reason for an agent who is unconcerned with the rules (and the con-
sequences of violating them) to refrain from disobedience. But this
will not immunize her from blame, on the assumption that the rules
which specify its assignment are justified.
Once we grant that assumption, it is true that there is a reason to
adhere to the relevant rules. This reason is provided by the justifica-
tion of the social practices that the blaming rules are designed to en-
force and protect. But the reason is a general one; it need not apply
to each person whose actions fall within the scope of these rules. So
(1⬘) is true, but (1) is not. And that’s bad news for me, since it is (1)
that is needed to make my argument go through.
I agree that (1) is what is really needed. But I also think that the
challenge to it is unsuccessful. Any system of warranted blame must
allow for the existence of legitimate excuses. And it seems to me
that an agent has an excellent excuse if there was no reason for her
to refrain from doing what she did. If a justified system of rules and
criticism fails to provide an agent with a reason for obedience, then
it is illegitimate to criticize her for failing to meet its standards.
Blame points to a personal failing. But there is nothing necessarily
amiss with the character of an agent who strays from norms that fail
to provide her with reasons. Indeed, it would be grossly unfair to
criticize a person for flouting rules that supply her with no reasons
for compliance. (1⬘) allows for this kind of unfairness. (1) does not.
(1⬘) severs the tie between blameworthiness and personal shortcom-
ing. (1) does not. These points give us reason to prefer (1) to (1⬘).
Premiss (2). Premiss (2) tells us that autonomous fanatics are blame-
worthy for their killings. It can be supported thus: if any agents are
blameworthy for their actions, surely those who are bent on evil are
among them. This is so whether the immoralists are doing evil for
its own sake, or doing what is in fact evil, all the while characteriz-
ing their actions to themselves as ones that are aimed at a good. An
informed, uncoerced, rational fanatic is the perfect exemplar of the
(a) The first way in which we might deny that blame accrues to au-
tonomous fanatics is to insist that being blameworthy for something
requires that an agent has a reason that she has failed to adequately
respect. Having a reason implies the reason’s accessibility—one has
a reason to f only if one either appreciates that reason, or can, in
some suitable way, be brought to appreciate it. And since the rele-
vant evildoers are those whose commitments bear no instrumental
relation to the relevant reasons to refrain, such people do not have
any reason to avoid undertaking their atrocities. This means that
they are not to blame for the harm they do.
The following counter-argument sets out the relevant line of
thought:
(1ca) If an agent is blameworthy for doing something, then that
agent must have an accessible reason not to do it.
(2ca) Dedicated immoralists with no commitments that would
be served were they to refrain from evildoing do not have
any accessible reason to so refrain.
(3ca) Therefore such immoralists are not blameworthy for their
evil deeds.
Although I cannot give a full assessment of this argument, I think
that there are problems for both premisses, and that the accommo-
1
See Harman (1975) and Williams (1995) for this criticism of premiss (1), as well as for this
specific line of defence regarding negative evaluations of the consistent evildoer.
moral criticism does not? I don’t think there is a good answer to this
question.
Instrumentalists see how jarring it is to be unable to denounce the
moral monster. So, while denying that he is blameworthy, they nev-
ertheless insist that he is evil, awful, demonic, etc. Such criticisms
implicate the existence of reasons that have been ignored. These rea-
sons exist even if the moral monsters do not have them. These rea-
sons exist even if they bear no instrumental link to the commitments
of such agents. These are categorical reasons.
Admittedly, I have not offered anything like a full evaluation of
the counter-argument (1ca)–(3ca). But for present purposes we can
do without such an assessment. For even if we were to ignore my
reservations about its premisses and concede the soundness of the
counter-argument, this would be at best a Pyrrhic victory for instru-
mentalists.
To see this, assume for the moment that the conclusion of the
counter-argument is true, and that dedicated immoralists are not to
blame for their actions. We must then ask whether they are properly
subject to other, strong forms of evaluative criticism. Summing up
my line of replies from the previous paragraphs, we can see that
there is trouble either way.
Suppose they are beyond all criticism. Those who blow up buses
of schoolchildren or detonate bombs at civilian funerals are not evil,
malign, or depraved; their actions are not horrific, atrocious, odious,
or despicable. There is surely something deeply wrong with an in-
strumentalist position that licenses such immunity. Yet if dedicated
immoralists are properly subject to these negative evaluations, this
susceptibility to criticism implies the existence of categorical reasons.
On the safe assumption that dedicated immoralists really do merit
some of the criticisms just mentioned, then categorical reasons
exist—even if such evildoers are not blameworthy for their deeds.
(c) A last basis for rejecting premiss (2) comes from the assertion
that no one is blameworthy for anything. This might be true. If so,
my second argument is unsound. I can’t say anything here to falsify
this potential criticism. All I can do is to express the conviction,
shared by almost everyone, that at least some people are rightly
blameable for their poor choices and actions. The examples used to
substantiate this conviction seem to me more compelling than any
of the premisses employed in arguments to defeat them.
Because my second argument rests in part on this undefended
conviction, it is best to conceive of its conclusion conditionally: if
anyone is blameworthy for any of her choices, then there are cate-
gorical reasons. We get to this conclusion by means of a conceptual
truth (premiss 1), an uncontroversial statement of possibilities
(premiss 4), and a highly plausible premiss (2) that expresses a deep-
ly commonsensical assessment of evildoing.
IV
The notion of a categorical reason has a storied past, and this line-
age may contribute to some misunderstandings that it is best to
forestall. There are certain elements that are commonly associated
with the idea of a categorical reason, but whose defence is no part
of my current brief. I am thinking specifically of the notions that
categorical reasons always override any possibly competing reasons,
that they apply of necessity to all rational agents, and that they exist
either by virtue of being the outcome of successful rational delibera-
tion or by virtue of being entailed by presuppositions common to all
exercises of rational agency.
The categorical reasons whose existence I am defending are not
2
She there expresses reservations about the views defended in Foot (1972).
3
This paper has gone through a number of different incarnations over the past couple of
years. I am grateful to Harry Adamson, Simon Blackburn, Jerry Cohen, Steve Darwall,
David Enoch, David Killoren, Hallvard Lillehammer, Mike Martin, Ellie Mason, Anthony
Price, Peter Railton, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Tom Senor, Barry Ward and David Wiggins for
forcing me to think much harder about some of the claims and arguments that appeared in
earlier drafts. Many thanks to audiences at the University of Michigan, Edinburgh Univer-
sity, Northern Illinois University, the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, Union College,
the Institute for Advanced Study at Hebrew University, the Colloquium in Legal and Social
Philosophy at University College London, the Aristotelian Society, and the Moral Sciences
Club at Cambridge University for their acute comments on earlier versions of this essay.
Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin, Madison
600 N. Park Street
Madison, wi 53726
usa
shaferlandau@wisc.edu
REFERENCES