Journal of Economic Studies

Racial and low-income quotas in Brazilian universities: impact on academic performance

Claudia B R Vidigal,
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Claudia B R Vidigal, "Racial and low-income quotas in Brazilian universities: impact on academic performance", Journal of
Economic Studies, https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-10-2016-0200
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 Racial and Low-Income Quotas in Brazilian Universities: Impact on Academic Performance

Abstract

Purpose
This paper aims to estimate the impact of racial and low-income quotas on academic performance
of students from public and private universities in Brazil.

Design/Methodology/Approach
Using propensity score matching (PSM) applied to student-level data from the National
Examination of Student Performance (ENADE) conducted in 2012, this paper identifies the
impact of the quota policy on academic performance considering all Brazilian universities.

Findings
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The results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in academic performance
between students admitted under the racial quota and those who had the regular admission (non-
quota students). The impact is positive, however, for students from the North region of Brazil and
among those with very low family income, whereas a negative impact is observed for those from
the Central-West region. In regard to the low-income quota, quota students perform worse than
eligible non-quota students as their scores are, on average, 14% lower. Similar findings are
observed when different subsamples are considered.

Originality/Value
This paper’s main contribution is to provide a different approach from those presented by the
previous literature to evaluate the impact of the quota policy on academic achievement. Moreover,
this study considers all Brazilian institutions whereas other papers have analyzed only one or a
few universities.

Key words: Racial quotas; Low-income quotas; Academic performance; Brazil; Brazilian
universities.
 2

1. Introduction

Brazilian society is renowned for its historical socioeconomic and racial disparities. In spite of
recent improvements in some indicators, such as reductions in both income inequality and poverty
and greater participation of non-white individuals in the labor force, those disparities persist and
greatly affect the Brazilian educational system, notably in higher education. Access to higher
education in Brazilian universities is a very competitive process in which only those who are well
prepared or have better socio-economic conditions are likely to get admission. According to the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 51.3% of young people between 18 and 24
years old are enrolled in post secondary education in Brazil (IBGE, 2013). This level is much
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lower than developed countries where this percentage exceeds 70% (World Bank, 2013). While
more than half of the Brazilian population is composed of non-white people, among those who are
enrolled in universities only 34.5% are black and brown (5.2% black and 29.3% brown).1 In
addition, no more than 8% of students from public universities are from the poorest 20% of the
population, a proportion that is even lower in private universities (3.7%).
In order to increase less advantaged students’ access to higher education, the Brazilian
Government and some private universities have adopted affirmative action policies such as racial
and low-income quotas in the admission process. These quotas target disadvantaged students
based on criteria such as income, race, and being graduates of public secondary schools. The main
goal of the quota policy is to offer better social and economic opportunities for disadvantaged
students and, as a consequence, to reduce the disparities in the access to higher education and in
the labor market as well.
Given that quota policies have occupied a place of increasing prominence in the discussion
of reduction of socioeconomic and racial disparities, this paper aims to evaluate the impact of
racial and low-income quotas on the academic performance of students in public and private
Brazilian universities.
Although there is a consensus regarding the racial and social inequalities in Brazil, there is
no agreement about the benefits of the quota policy in Brazilian universities (Bailey and Peria,
2010). Some critics argue that students admitted under quotas do not have the necessary academic

1
In Brazil, people frequently use various terms to identify different shades of skin color, but in the decennial censuses
individuals are asked in a multiple-choice question to self-identify their skin tone or race based on only five possible
answers. Respondents can self-identify as white, black, brown (mixed skin color), yellow (Asian descent), and
indigenous. In 2010, 47.5% of the Brazilian population was white, 7.5% was black, 43.4% brown, 1.1% yellow, and
0.4% was indigenous (IBGE, 2014). According to Carvalho et al. (2004), the identification of skin color and race in
Brazil is very a subjective process, based not only on physical appearance, but also on other factors such as income,
education, and social status. For instance, a dark-skin person who is also poor is likely to identify himself or herself
as black. In contrast, an individual of the same skin tone but with a higher status is more likely to identify himself or
herself as brown or another color closer to the white end of the color scale.
 3

background to perform well in college, which implies that they might get low grades in courses.
The argument is that the adoption of quotas would result in poor academic performance of the
beneficiaries, with negative effects also on overall students’ achievement. Empirical studies for
the Brazilian case, however, show that, on average, students who are admitted under quotas tend
to have satisfactory grades (Cardoso, 2008; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto, 2013; Childs and
Stromquist, 2014).
Most of the literature related to the impact of affirmative action on college enrollment and
academic performance is focused on the United States, but a growing body of research has
analyzed developing countries, such as Brazil and India (Desai and Kulkami, 2008; Robles and
Krishna, 2012; Bertrand et al., 2010; Bailey and Peria, 2010). The recent literature for the United
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States has investigated the practice of affirmative action in higher education and the effect of its
proscription on the admission and representation of minority students (Tienda et al., 2008; Epple
et al., 2008; Blume and Long, 2014; Howell, 2010; Grodsky and Kalogrides, 2008; Hinrichs,
2012; Dickson, 2006). Hinrichs (2012) evaluates the impact of affirmative action bans on college
enrollment, educational attainment, and college demographic composition of American
universities. The author finds that for the typical student and the typical college, affirmative action
bans have no effect. The proscription, however, decreases underrepresented minority enrollment
and increases white enrollment at selective colleges. Blume and Long (2014), in turn, estimate the
magnitude of the change in affirmative action in college admission decision, that is, they evaluate
how affirmative action bans affect the relative likelihood of admission of minority and
nonminority applicants. They find substantial declines in levels of affirmative action between
1992 and 2004 in highly selective colleges in the states where the policy was proscribed (i.e.,
Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Washington). The
authors also demonstrate how these declines affect not only students who live in the states where
the policy was banned, but also students in adjacent states due to the lack of highly selective
colleges.
In the Indian context, Bertrand et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of a low-income quota
program in engineering colleges and its implications for labor market outcomes. They find that
the policy successfully targets poorer students, who gain economic benefits, such as higher
incomes, from attending those colleges under quotas. Robles and Krishna (2012) similarly find
that affirmative action effectively targets minority students who are poorer than the average
displaced non-minority student. In addition, their results suggest that students admitted under
quotas, especially those in more selective majors, have lower performance than non-quota
students and are more likely to get worse jobs.
 4

Since the implementation of a national quota system in Brazilian universities in 1999,

when the Special System of Quotas was established, several studies have been conducted on the
topic (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto, 2012a; Ferman and Assunção, 2005; Cunha, 2006; Pedrosa et
al., 2006; McCowan, 2007). Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2012a), for instance, conducted a large
study in the University of Brasilia, one of the first Brazilian universities to use quotas, in order to
evaluate their impact. Using a difference-in-differences approach, they find, among other results,
that admission under the racial quotas does not diminish the performance of black and brown
quota students or increase the difference between white and black students' grades. Their findings
suggest that existing differences result from factors other than the quotas, such as level of parental
education and socio-economic backgrounds. In line with these results, there is growing literature
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on the role of family background, socioeconomic status, and personality traits in explaining
academic performance (Francis and Tanuri-Pianto, 2012b; Brese and Mirazchiyski, 2010; Liu et
al., 2006; Vignoles and Powdthavee, 2009; Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2003). Using data
from the University of Brasilia’s admission examination and a survey of students, Francis and
Tanuri-Pianto (2012b) found that race, socioeconomic status, and gender are important barriers to
college attendance and achievement. Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham (2003), in turn,
investigate the influence of personality traits on academic performance in two British universities
and find that personality is significantly related to student’s achievement.
Using propensity score matching (PSM) applied to data from the National Examination of
Student Performance (ENADE) conducted in 2012, this paper identifies the impact of the quota
policy considering all public and private universities in Brazil. This is a major contribution since
previous studies have not considered all Brazilian institutions; they have analyzed only one or a
few universities. Another unique contribution is to investigate the impact on academic
performance across different groups of students in order to evaluate possible differential effects.
Furthermore, results from this study provide important evidence for the discussion about the
effectiveness of quotas in Brazilian universities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context of the
racial and low-income quotas and the admission process in Brazilian universities. Section 3
presents the data set and section 4 explains the empirical strategy used to estimate the impact of
the quotas on academic performance. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 summarizes the
findings and provides some policy recommendations.

2. Racial and Low-Income Quotas and the Admission Process in Brazilian Universities
 5

Economic disparities between white and African descendants in Brazil are prominent, and they
are even higher when considering black and brown individuals from lower income levels. There is
also a notable discrepancy between the wages earned by white and black or brown people in
Brazil. The difference between white and black employees’ wages is, on average, 46.4%. This
disparity is even greater when we consider only black women. A black woman earns, on average,
a wage 32.7% lower than a white woman and 50.1% lower than a white man. Moreover, only a
small share of employers is African-Brazilian, representing no more than 30% of the total (RAIS,
2013).
Various policies have been put in place since the early 1990s in order to reduce the
aforementioned inequalities. The first Brazilian affirmative action initiatives related to education
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started in 1992 with programs developed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Such

organizations offered college preparatory courses for low-income and/or African-Brazilian
students. The implementation of a national quota system occurred seven years later, in 1999,
when the Special System of Quotas was established in federal public universities for students
from public schools.2 The most recent affirmative action started in 2012 and guarantees 50% of
enrollments in federal public universities to eligible students who received all their secondary
education in public schools. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Education (MEC), admissions
under the quota system also take into account both family income level and race (MEC, 2013).
The admission process in Brazilian universities is highly competitive, especially in public
universities, as they are in general considered to be better than private institutions. In addition,
public universities do not charge tuition or fees, which makes them even more attractive. Contrary
to many countries, where the admission process uses multiple criteria, selection in most Brazilian
universities is based only on scores in the vestibular exam, which is a sequence of exams that
applicants are required to take (Arcidiacono, 2005; Carvalho et al., 2014). Although universities
use the vestibular in order to select students, the process is decentralized and each institution may
formulate its own exam. Before taking the exams students must choose a single undergraduate
major of interest, and then they compete only with those who chose the same major.
After 2009, however, some universities incorporated in the admission process the National
High School Exam (Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio – ENEM), which evaluates the
performance of students from public and private high schools. Universities may use only this

2
The policy targeted students from public schools due to the fact that in Brazil this type of schools tends to have
worse quality compared to the private ones. As a consequence, students who attend public schools have, in general,
lower school performance than those who attend private institutions (Oliveira et al., 2013; Morais and Belluzzo,
2014). The Brazilian public school system (from elementary to high school) is funded by state governments, that
overall provide poor infrastructure and services due to budgetary constraints and political choices. Therefore, students
from families that can afford paying for private schools receive a higher quality education compared to those from
lower socioeconomic status families.
 6

exam or combine it with other mechanisms in the selection process. Moreover, they can use a
quota system with the purpose of selecting disadvantaged students based on criteria such as
income, race, and/or if the student had his whole high school education from public schools. As in
the case of vestibular, each university can adopt its own criteria for quota admissions. The
eligibility requirement is, in general, to be self-declared as black, brown or indigenous in the case
of racial quotas, or to have family income no higher than 1.5 Brazilian minimum salaries per
capita, which currently correspond to 370 US dollars, for the low-income quotas. In some cases,
the racial and low-income quotas also require students to have had their whole high school
education from public schools.
Besides the fact that students must specify only one major during the application process,
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they can also indicate if they want to be considered for admission under quotas, when this policy
is available. In most universities, students who select this alternative compete with all the other
applicants, as they have not chosen that option. That is, they go through the regular examination
process, but if their scores are below the cut-off level for regular admission, they are considered
for admission on a quota basis. This mechanism of admission implies that students admitted under
quotas inevitably have lower admission scores than those admitted under the regular process.
Therefore, estimates of the effect of quotas on academic performance, by comparing the scores of
quota and non-quota students, are negatively biased once quota students present a lower
performance by the time of their entry to university. The admission process for eligible and non-
eligible students in those universities is represented in Figure 1.
Conversely, in some universities, students who specify that they want to be considered for
admission under quotas compete only with applicants who have chosen that same option. If their
scores are below the cut-off level for quota admission, however, they can be considered for the
regular admission, competing with all other students (Figure A1 in the Appendix). This
mechanism, though, is not the most commonly used when quotas are available.
In contrast to other countries, in Brazil students are told if they were admitted under a
quota system. The official communication informing them of the final result of their application
specifies whether they were admitted under quotas or not.
 7

Non-eligible student Eligible student

Want to be considered for

admission under quotas
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No Yes

Vestibular score

Admitted Rejected

Considered under
quotas

Admitted Rejected
under quotas

Non-eligible student and eligible student who does not want to be considered under quotas
Eligible student who wants to be considered under quotas

Figure 1 – Stylized admission process for most Brazilian universities

The implementation of a quota system in Brazilian universities, in general, has no direct

costs since only a percentage of the available seats are reserved for disadvantaged students. That
is, there is no increase or decrease in admission slots as a consequence of the adoption of quotas.
Some social or indirect costs are generated, however, when non-eligible students are displaced by
quota students. In most cases, the displaced students are those who have low scores in the
vestibular exam (although higher than the admission scores of quota students) and, as a
consequence, have to retake the exam if he or she has not been admitted to another less selective
 8

college. In relation to the benefits of the quota system, recent studies have confirmed that the
policy has been an important instrument for reducing poverty and income inequality by providing
quota students with higher professional training and participation in the labor market.
Furthermore, the policy has increased underrepresented minority enrollment in both public and
private universities (Bayma, 2012; UERJ, 2015).

3. Data and Descriptive Statistics

In order to estimate the impact of the racial and low-income quota policies on academic
performance of students in Brazilian universities, this study uses data from the National
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Examination of Student Performance (Exame Nacional de Desempenho de Estudantes – ENADE)

conducted in 2012. The examination is part of the National System of Higher Education
Assessment (Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação Superior – SINAES) and evaluates the
performance of undergraduate students from public and private institutions who are enrolled in
their first and last years of university. The exam is mandatory for all last year students,3 covering
the standard syllabi of the courses in which students are enrolled, and it takes place at the end of
the academic year (typically in December). Every three years ENADE examines the same set of
undergraduate majors, and in 2012, 469,460 students from 7,228 undergraduate programs and
1,646 universities were evaluated.4 Therefore, this study takes advantage of a large data set
comprising most Brazilian students enrolled in their last year of university from the evaluated
undergraduate programs.
The choice for the year of 2012 relies on the fact that compared to the year just before that
(2011) and to the most recent available data (2013), it has a significantly greater number of
students taking the ENADE exam. Yet, general estimates are also obtained for 2011 and 2013,
and as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, the findings for these years are quite similar to those
presented and discussed in the results section of this paper. Lastly, notice that these three
mentioned years cover the whole three-year cycle of evaluation, thus including students from all
possible majors.

3
After 2010 ENADE became mandatory only for students enrolled in their last year of university. It would be very
desirable to compare students enrolled in their first and last year of university, but the last time in which both groups
of students were evaluated was in 2010, and in that year almost 24% of the students did not answer the
socioeconomic questionnaire, which has the information of interest for this study. Therefore, those students would
have to be excluded from the sample, what would lead to considerable measurement errors and biased estimated
results.
4
A total of 587,351 students were eligible to take the exam in 2012, but 20% of them did not take it. As mentioned
above, the exam is mandatory and students can be penalized for missing the exam. In the case of absence, students are
prevented from receiving their diplomas. Most of the students, however, take the exam the following year in order to
regularize their situation with the university.
 9

The data set was obtained from the National Institute of Studies and Educational Research
Anísio Teixeira (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira – INEP)
and includes information about socioeconomic and racial status of the students, which is provided
through a questionnaire that they fill out during the examination. Moreover, students are asked if
their admission to the program was based on affirmative action, such as racial or low-income
quotas, which allows the investigation of the effect of such policies on academic achievement.5
The research sample was drawn from the population of students who answered the
socioeconomic questionnaire, disregarding those who did not answer it. The reason for that lies in
the fact that most of the variables used in the estimations derive from that section of the exam.
The final sample, thus, consists of 465,872 observations, which represents more than 99% of the
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students who took the exam. Table 1 reports some sample characteristics according to the type of
university. Overall, it is possible to see that most students are from private institutions, are female
and are white. As discussed before, even though most Brazilian individuals are black and brown,
less than 40% of students in both private and public universities are non-white. Furthermore, we
observe the proportion of students from private and public universities whose admissions were
under racial and low-income quotas. For private institutions, the number of students admitted
under racial and low-income quotas represents less than 7% of the total number of students
enrolled in their last year of university. This percentage is even lower in public institutions, not
exceeding 4% of all last-year students.

Table 1 – Sample characteristics of public and private universities

Type of university
Variable (% of public (% of private
Public Private
university university Total (a + b)
(a) (b)
students) students)
Female 28,859 54.56 241,507 58.48 270,366
Male 24,032 45.44 171,474 41.52 195,506
White 33,750 63.92 264,497 64.15 298,247
Nonwhite 19,047 36.08 147,779 35.85 166,826
Racial quota 1,131 2.14 3,503 0.84 4,634
Low-income quota 645 1.22 24,375 5.90 25,020
Number of students 52,891 412,981 465,872

Table 2 shows the average ENADE test scores of quota and non-quota students according
to type of university. The exam is based on a 0-100 scale, however, the average scores tend to be

5
It is possible that stigma associated with quotas might lead students to misreport their admission status. However,
since quota students have made explicit their choice for this type of admission during the application process and it is
not possible to identify questionnaire respondents, it seems unlikely that students would misreport their quota-based
admissions.
 10

very low, regardless of the type of university. In general, non-quota students from public
universities have higher scores than the others.
The average score of those students was 3.7 points (9.7%) higher than the scores of non-
quota students from private universities and 6.3 points (17.8%) above the average score of low-
income quota students from private schools. Students admitted under a racial quota from private
institutions had better performance in relation to non-quota and low-income quota students. Their
average scores are higher (4.1%) even if compared to racial quota students from public
universities.

Table 2 – Average ENADE test scores according to type of university and student admission
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under a quota policy

Type of university Difference
Student Between Within types
Public Private
types Public Private
Non-quota 41.320 37.683 *** *** ***
(16.777) (13.425)
Racial quota 38.024 39.589 *** *** ***
(15.625) (13.760)
Low-income quota 35.302 35.073 *** ***
(14.394) (12.849)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Within types pair-wise comparisons, for each type of
university (public and private), are as follows: non-quota x racial quota; racial quota x low-
income quota; low-income quota x non-quota.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

In order to analyze the impact of racial and low-income quotas separately, two categories
of students were distinguished in the analysis: those who are eligible for racial quotas (“racial
quota sample”) and those who are eligible for low-income quotas (“low-income quota sample”).
The first category includes students who are self-declared as black, brown or indigenous. That is,
it excludes white students and those who are of Asian descent (“yellow”), even those who were
admitted under racial quotas, since they do not meet the eligibility criteria. The second category
comprises students who have total family income below six Brazilian minimum salaries, which
implies that students who have total family income above that level were excluded from the
sample, regardless of having had admission through low-income quotas.6

6
In 2012, six minimum salaries corresponded to 3,732 Reais (which was equivalent to US$1,910). I selected this
income level because the eligibility criteria for the low-income quota is to have family income no higher than 1.5 per
capita minimum salary and the average Brazilian family size is four persons (IBGE, 2014). Because the ENADE data
set provides only total family income, it was necessary to use an approximation value for that income level specified
by low-income quotas. This criterion comprises 85% of students admitted under the low-income quotas, therefore it is
a conservative proxy.
 11

The control variables used to estimate the impact of racial and low-income quotas on
academic performance are presented in Table 3. All of them are dummy variables that represent
student and university characteristics, academic background, parental education, and family
structure.

Table 3 – Description of the control variables

Variables Description
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Female Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student is female, and zero
otherwise.
Married Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student is married, and zero
otherwise.
Lives apart from family Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student lives apart from family,
and zero otherwise.
Family income Vector of 3 dummy variables indicating the family income in minimum
salaries (less than 1.5 minimum salaries; from 1.5 to 4.5 minimum
salaries; from 4.6 to 10 minimum salaries; more than 10 minimum
salaries; where the first range is the reference category).
Mother’s education Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student’s mother has college or
higher degree, and zero otherwise.
Public university Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student is from a public
university, and zero otherwise.
Geographic region Vector of 4 dummy variables indicating the region in which the
university is located (North; Northeast; Southeast; South; Central-West;
where Southeast is the reference category).
Public high school Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student had his whole high
school education from public schools, and zero otherwise.
Morning classes only Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student has classes only during
the morning, and zero otherwise.

Tables 4 and 5 report descriptive statistics for both racial and low-income quota samples,
by quota and non-quota students.
The sample characteristics reflect some of the discrepancies between students who were
admitted under quotas and non-quota students. For the racial quota sample, quota students have
lower family income and less educated mothers relative to eligible non-quota students. In
addition, 89% of the racial quota students had their whole high school education from public
schools compared to 68% of non-quota students. There are also observable differences in the type
of university attended. The proportion of quota students who are in public universities is higher
 12

than that observed for non-quota students. For the former, this proportion is 26%, while it is 11%
for the latter.

Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for racial quota students and non-quota students, racial quota
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sample
Racial quota students Non-quota students
Variables Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Non-education variables
Female 0.538 0.499 0.569 0.495 ***
Married 0.231 0.422 0.279 0.448 ***
Lives apart from family 0.098 0.298 0.076 0.266 ***
Family income
Less than 1.5 minimum salaries 0.212 0.409 0.110 0.312 ***
1.5 to 4.5 minimum salaries 0.596 0.491 0.496 0.500 ***
4.6 to 10 minimum salaries 0.170 0.376 0.303 0.460 ***
More than 10 minimum salaries 0.022 0.146 0.091 0.287 ***
Geographic region
North 0.065 0.246 0.072 0.258 *
Northeast 0.255 0.436 0.237 0.425 ***
Southeast 0.390 0.488 0.428 0.495 ***
South 0.128 0.334 0.122 0.327
Central-West 0.162 0.369 0.142 0.349 ***
Education variables
Mother’s education 0.106 0.308 0.166 0.372 ***
Public university 0.257 0.437 0.111 0.314 ***
Public high school 0.891 0.312 0.675 0.468 ***
Morning classes only 0.196 0.397 0.173 0.378 ***
Number of observations 4,231 152,150
Notes: ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

In relation to the low-income quota sample, quota students also have less educated
mothers compared to non-quota students. A significant difference is further noted regarding the
type of university they attend: 3% of low-income quota students are in public universities,
compared to 11% among non-quota students.
 13

Table 5 – Descriptive statistics for low-income quota students and non-quota students, low-
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income quota sample

Low-income quota
Non-quota students
Variables students Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Non-education variables
Female 0.619 0.486 0.614 0.487
Married 0.276 0.447 0.251 0.433 ***
Lives apart from family 0.077 0.267 0.107 0.309 ***
Non-white 0.425 0.494 0.403 0.490 ***
Geographic region
North 0.042 0.200 0.041 0.199
Northeast 0.099 0.299 0.153 0.360 ***
Southeast 0.502 0.500 0.460 0.498 ***
South 0.230 0.421 0.234 0.423
Central-West 0.127 0.333 0.111 0.315 ***
Education variables
Mother’s education 0.087 0.282 0.160 0.367 ***
Public university 0.026 0.158 0.111 0.314 ***
Public high school 0.837 0.370 0.696 0.460 ***
Morning classes only 0.112 0.315 0.156 0.362 ***
Number of observations 20,994 285,271
Notes: ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

As discussed before, public universities tend to be better than private universities in Brazil,
which implies a very competitive selection process, in which only the most prepared students are
selected. Moreover, as can be seen from table 5, the proportion of students who had their whole
high school education from public schools is higher for quota students than for eligible non-quota
students: 84% versus 70%. Considering the fact that public high schools have lower quality than
private schools, this discrepancy is a possible reason for the lower participation of low-income
quota students in the public system of higher education.

4. Empirical Strategy
 14

As noted earlier, two categories of students were distinguished in the analysis: those who are
eligible for the racial quota and those who are eligible for the low-income quota. Therefore, based
on the eligibility criteria, the following two equations are estimated to measure, respectively, the
impact of racial and low-income quotas on academic performance:

ܵܿ‫݁ݎ݋‬௜ = ߙ଴ + ߜܴ݈ܽܿ݅ܽ_‫ܽݐ݋ݑݍ‬௜ + ܺ௜ோ ߙଵ + ܼ௜ ߙଶ + ߝ௜

(1)

ܵܿ‫݁ݎ݋‬௜ = ߚ଴ + ߛ‫ܽݐ݋ݑݍ_݁݉݋ܿ݊݅_ݓ݋ܮ‬௜ + ܺ௜௅ ߚଵ + ܼ௜ ߚଶ + ‫ݑ‬௜

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(2)
where ܵܿ‫݁ݎ݋‬௜ denotes the academic performance of student i on the ENADE test. Racial_quota
and Low_income_quota are binary variables that are equal to 1 for students admitted under racial
and low-income quotas, respectively, and zero otherwise. The individual-specific vectors of
covariates are given by ܺ௜ோ and ܺ௜௅ and include the non-education variables such as gender, race,
marital status, and family income. Zi is a vector of covariates related to educational attainment and
it includes variables such as mother’s education and type of university. Lastly, ߝ௜ and ‫ݑ‬௜ are mean
zero error terms.
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and, with the purpose
of identifying how the effects vary according type of university, gender, income level, race, and
geographic region, different subsamples are created based on each of those characteristics. Quota
and non-quota students are then compared considering the whole sample and also the subsamples.

4.1 Identification Strategy

Direct comparisons between students under the quota system and students with regular admission
would lead to biased estimates due to self-selection into the quota system. That is, the existence of
observed and unobserved individual characteristics can influence the individual decision of
applying for admission under quotas (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Dehejia and Wahba 2002). In
order to deal with the bias generated by the selection problem, this paper uses propensity score
matching (PSM) to identify the impact of quotas on academic performance. The choice for this
particular approach is driven by some data set constraints. The main restriction is that Brazilian
students are evaluated only once during their academic program, which provides a cross sectional
data set with individual-specific characteristics. In addition, the data set does not include the
 15

students’ cut-off scores in the vestibular exam, which also restricts the type of method that can be
used.7
The matching procedure consists of pairing students admitted under the quota policy with
students admitted without quotas who have similar observable characteristics. Matching methods
require that the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and the common support assumption
(CSA) hold. For the CIA to hold, the outcome of a student, which is the academic performance if
admitted under quotas or under the standard process, must be independent of the treatment
assignment (process of admission) conditional on a vector of pre-treatment observable
characteristics that are related to the treatment assignment and the outcomes. Although this
assumption is not testable, it is assumed that it holds. According to Todd (2008), cross-sectional
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matching estimators are applicable when the researcher knows that the major determinants of
program participation are accounted for and that any remaining variation in who participates is
due to random factors. In addition, it is considered the fact that students do not have any
incentive to achieve a high performance in the ENADE exam: it neither influences their grades
nor appears in their transcripts. As aforementioned, the only incentive students have to take the
exam is to receive their diplomas. They are obligated to take the exam mainly because policy
makers are interested in assessing the quality of higher education. Therefore, after conditioning on
observable characteristics, it is assumed that academic performance is independent of the process
of admission. Furthermore, for each observable characteristic satisfying the CIA, there must be
students who get admitted under a quota and students who do not. This condition is the CSA and
it implies that it is necessary to have a region of common support overlap in characteristics of
quota and non-quota students in order to estimate the effects of the quota policy. It is tested based
on the graphical examination of the density distribution of the estimated propensity scores of both
treatment and comparison groups.8

7
The ideal way to evaluate the impact of quotas on academic performance would be the implementation of a
randomized control trial (RCT). In an ideal experiment, the sample of eligible students who specify that they want to
be considered for admission under quotas would be selected and some of them would be randomly assigned to
admission under quotas (treatment group) and the others would not be admitted under that policy (control group).
Random assignment of quotas ensures that the treatment and control groups have the same characteristics and the
unique difference is the fact that the former group receives the treatment. Therefore, any systematic difference in
academic performance between the two groups can be attributed to the treatment effect. Although this evaluation
method is ideal in order to estimate the impact of quotas, there are some political and ethical restrictions that make
this type of experiment impracticable. The RCT implies that some students will not have access to the same
opportunities that are offered to others and only those who are randomly selected to be admitted under quotas will
benefit from the policy. Furthermore, if it is considered the most common process of admission in Brazilian
universities (Figure1), where eligible students not admitted under the regular process nor under quotas are rejected,
then it is not possible to infer anything about the control group, which implies the unfeasibility of the experiment. The
approach used in this paper, in contrast, considers all eligible students and matches each quota student with non-quota
students based on their observable characteristics so that it is assumed that the only difference is the process of
admission.
8
The figures of the distribution of the propensity scores for quota and non-quota students for both types of quotas are
shown in the Appendix.
 16

One limitation of the matching method is that it relies on a large comparison group in
order to match individuals from the treatment and comparison groups. However, as the number of
variables increases, the difficulty in finding exactly the same value for all observed control
characteristics also increases. Thus, with the purpose of reducing the dimensionality of the
matching problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of the propensity score, which is
the probability of receiving the treatment conditional on observed control characteristics. Using
propensity score matching (PSM), the academic performance of students is assumed to be
independent of the process of admission after conditioning on the probability of being admitted
under the quota policy. It is important to highlight that since it is assumed that both CIA and CSA
hold, then the estimated results can be interpreted as impacts or effects of racial and low-income
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quotas on academic performance. Nevertheless, since propensity score matching does not address
the selection problem on unobservable characteristics, the estimated results should not be
interpreted as causal effects.
The propensity score was estimated using both probit and logit models and many different
matching algorithms, such as the nearest neighbor, k-nearest neighbors, with distinct calipers
(Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). The results were quite similar, demonstrating the robustness
of the findings. According to Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Caliendo and Kopeining (2008), the
bias can be reduced by using a single comparison unit for each treatment unit. Moreover, it is
recommended to use replacement during the matching procedure in order to minimize the
propensity score distance between the matched comparison units and the treatment unit.
Therefore, the results presented in the next section are based only on a probit model, using the
nearest neighbor as the counterfactual, and with replacement. In addition, all the control variables
described in the previous section were included in the propensity score estimation. The results of
the probit model are presented in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.
Once the propensity score is calculated for all individuals, then treatment and comparison
groups can be matched, and as a result, the impact of the racial and low-income quotas can be
estimated. Thus, it is possible to estimate the effect of the quota policy on those who were
enrolled in a university under that policy (the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT) and
the impact of the quotas on the academic performance of all eligible students, both treated and
untreated (the average treatment effect, ATE).

5. Propensity Score Matching Results and Discussion

This section presents the estimated results of the impact of the racial and low-income quotas on
academic performance in Brazilian universities. Using propensity score matching, quota and non-
 17

quota students for both racial and low-income quotas were matched controlling for all variables
presented in Table 3. The matched sample means of the exogenous variables for both racial quota
sample and low-income sample are reported in Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix. It is possible
to see that there is no statistically significant difference between the treatment and control groups
after matching for both samples. Therefore, there is no distinction in relation to observable
characteristics between the two groups, meaning that in this analysis quota students are compared
with non-quota students that have the same distribution of covariates and, as a result, any
difference in their academic performance may be associated to the quotas.
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5.1 Racial quota

Table 6 shows regression estimates of the impact of the racial quotas on academic performance
considering the full racial quota sample. The first column presents results for the OLS
specification, which is considered naïve because it fails to control for the match and the matching
process between racial quota students and non-quota students. The second and third columns
report the estimation results for the propensity score matching specification, which controls for
potential bias due to the self-selection problem based on observable characteristics that influence
the probability of being admitted under racial quotas.

Table 6 – Estimates of the impact of the racial quotas on academic performance on the ENADE
test: OLS and propensity score matching results, racial quota sample
PSM
Variable OLS
ATT ATE
Racial quota 2.867*** 0.064 -0.317
(0.210) (1.676) (1.371)

Number of observations 156,365 156,365 156,365

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5%
level. *Significant at the 10% level. The standard error for the ATE was calculated using
bootstrapping with 100 replications.

Under the OLS estimation, the score of a quota student is, on average, 2.9 points higher
than the score of a non-quota student, at the 1% level of significance. This result is mostly driven
by the fact that racial quota students from private universities have higher scores than non-quota
students while this type of university responds for almost 90% of all enrolled students.
 18

Considering the propensity score matching specification, the estimated results for the full
racial quota sample, which includes all the control variables and does not restrict the estimation to
specific groups of students, indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in academic
performance between students admitted under the racial quota (treated) and those who had regular
admission, the non-quota students (control). Therefore, there is no significant impact (ATT) of the
racial quotas on the academic performance of students who entered university through racial
quotas. Similarly, the policy does not affect the scores of all eligible students, as can be seen by
the ATE estimate.
The regression estimates of the impact of the racial quotas on academic performance
according to different subsamples are presented in Table 7. The results indicate that racial quota
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students perform better than non-quota students when specific groups of students are considered.
For instance, among students with very low family income, racial quota students have scores 4.1
points (12%) higher than non-quota students. A similar effect is noted for students from the North
region of Brazil. The academic performance of quota students from that region is 5.5 points (15%)
higher than the scores of students who were admitted under the regular process. The impacts are
negative and statistically significant only for the subsample of students from the Central-West
region of Brazil. Quota students from that region have scores 5.8 points (13%) lower than non-
quota students.

Table 7 – Estimates of the impact of the racial quotas on academic performance on the ENADE
test: ATT results for the full racial quota sample and subsamples
Mean ATT/
Sample
Samples Control
size (N) Treatment Control ATT (%)
Full sample 156,365 40.006 39.943 0.064 0.16
(1.676)
Gender
Female 88,922 39.108 36.001 3.107 8.63
(2.384)
Male 67,443 41.055 44.465 -3.410 -7.67
(2.250)
Type of university
Public 17,908 38.156 38.967 -0.811 -2.08
(1.727)
Private 138,457 40.648 40.257 0.391 0.97
(2.055)
Family income
Less than 1.5 minimum salaries 17,575 39.060 34.947 4.113* 11.77
(2.184)
1.5 to 4.5 minimum salaries 78,020 40.086 41.147 -1.061 -2.58
(2.503)
4.6 to 10 minimum salaries 46,882 40.561 41.679 -1.117 -2.68
 19

(2.516)
More than 10 minimum salaries 13,888 42.720 41.086 1.634 3.98
(3.470)
Geographic region
North 11,169 41.133 35.626 5.507* 15.46
(3.271)
Northeast 37,162 40.448 38.204 2.243 5.87
(2.377)
Southeast 66,719 40.030 38.300 1.730 4.52
(3.833)
South 19,077 38.615 43.136 -4.520 -10.48
(2.917)
Central-West 22,238 39.901 45.736 -5.835** -12.76
(2.840)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
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Overall, the estimated effect of the racial quota on academic performance suggests that
students who took advantage of being admitted to university under that policy, with lower
performance in the vestibular exam, strive throughout college and have equal performance than
non-quota students at the end of the program. This is in line with the findings of Francis and
Tannuri-Pianto (2013), who argue that the empirical evidence is not consistent with the claim that
students admitted under the quota policy are made worse off by being placed in universities with
academic standards they are unable to meet.

5.2 Low-income quota

Table 8 reports the regression estimates of the impact of the low-income quotas on academic
performance for the full low-income quota sample. The first column shows the estimation results
for the naïve specification, in which low-income quota students are not matched to non-quota
students. The second and third columns present the estimation results for the propensity score
matching specification, in which quota students are matched to non-quota students according to
their observable characteristics.

Table 8 – Estimates of the impact of the low-income quotas on academic performance on the
ENADE test: OLS and propensity score matching results, low-income quota sample
PSM
Variable OLS
ATT ATE
Low-income quota -1.674*** -5.530** -0.828
(0.096) (2.459) (1.601)

Number of observations 306,234 306,234 306,234

 20

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5%

level. *Significant at the 10% level. The standard error for the ATE was calculated using
bootstrapping with 100 replications.

The OLS result suggests that low-income quota students perform worse than non-quota
students. Their scores are, on average, 1.7 points lower than the score of a non-quota student, at
the 1% level of significance. As expected, the estimation results for the propensity score matching
specification are quite different. The average treatment effect of low-income quotas on the
academic performance of quota students (ATT) is also negative and statistically significant. This
result indicates that quota students have scores 5.5 points lower than non-quota students. The
average treatment effect of low-income quotas on all eligible students (ATE) is also negative, but
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not statistically significant.

One could argue that the implementation of low-income quotas would make students
worse off since the scores of quota students will be lower if they are admitted under that policy. It
is important, however, to think whether this negative effect is in fact meaningful in magnitude and
also to take into consideration the existence of a downward bias in these estimates since there is
already a difference between quota and non-quota students by the time of admission. Therefore,
the impact of this type of quota can be seen as ambiguous as it depends on the size of that bias.
Table 9 presents the regression estimates of the impact of the low-income quotas on
academic performance according to different subsamples.

Table 9 – Estimates of the impact of the low-income quotas on academic performance on the
ENADE test: ATT results for the full low-income quota sample and subsamples
Mean ATT/
Sample
Samples Control
size (N) Treatment Control ATT (%)
Full sample 306,234 35.234 40.763 -5.530** -13.57
(2.459)
Gender
Female 187,988 34.601 40.036 -5.434 -13.57
(3.362)
Male 118,246 36.260 41.942 -5.682* -13.55
(3.134)
Type of university
Public 32,212 34.881 46.729 -11.848*** -25.35
(2.044)
Private 274,022 35.243 40.605 -5.361** -13.20
(2.481)
Race
White 182,460 35.481 41.071 -5.590 -13.61
(3.463)
Non-white 123,774 34.899 40.345 -5.446* -13.50
 21

(3.276)
Geographic region
North 12,655 34.212 40.154 -5.942* -14.80
(3.576)
Northeast 45,723 35.087 35.793 -0.706 -1.97
(3.272)
Southeast 141,809 35.754 37.273 -1.519 -4.08
(4.310)
South 71,542 35.727 47.744 -12.017** -25.17
(4.691)
Central-West 34,505 32.735 46.004 -13.269*** -28.84
(3.819)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
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The results indicate that the scores of quota students are lower than those of non-quota
students in all subsamples evaluated. The greatest differences are observed in the subsample of
students from public universities, among those from the South region, and also for students from
the Central-West region. Quota students in the Central-West region, for instance, have scores 13.3
points lower than non-quota students, which means that students admitted under low-income
quotas have scores 29% lower than students who have the same observable characteristics but
were admitted under the regular process.
Particular attention should be given to the results considering only students from public
universities. They suggest that low-income quota students from that type of university have much
lower academic performance than eligible non-quota students. Their scores are, on average, 11.8
points (25%) lower compared to the scores of eligible students admitted without quotas. In fact,
this result indicates that, even though low-income quotas are important for allowing the
enrollment of poor students in public universities, that policy is not sufficient to eliminate the
achievement gap between quota and non-quota students under the low-income criterion.
As pointed it out before, however, the real magnitude of the overall impact of the low-
income quotas on academic performance is ambiguous due to the downward bias implied by the
lower scores of quota students in the vestibular admission exam.

6. Conclusion

The main objective of this paper was to estimate the impact of the racial and low-income quotas
on academic performance of students in Brazilian universities, using data from the National
Examination of Student Performance (ENADE) conducted in 2012.
 22

The results for the racial quotas indicate that there is no statistically significant difference
in academic performance between students admitted under the policy and students who have the
same observable characteristics but had the regular admission (non-quota students). The impact of
that type of quota is positive and statistically significant, however, for the subsample of students
from the North region of Brazil and among those who have very low family income. For the
subsample of students from the Central-West region the impact is negative.
As for the low-income quota, the results suggest that quota students perform worse than
eligible non-quota students. Their academic performance are, on average, 14% lower compared to
eligible students admitted without quotas. Similar findings are observed when different
subsamples are considered, that is, regardless of the subsample, the scores of quota students are
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always lower. It is important to note, however, that the existence of a downward bias, due to the
lower scores of quota students in the vestibular admission exam, implies an ambiguous impact of
the low-income quotas on academic performance.
Overall, the results of this paper indicate that other strategies, in addition to the low-
income quotas, are necessary to reduce the achievement gap between quota and non-quota
students with low family income. By way of contrast, the adoption of racial quotas by public and
private universities has allowed the admission of disadvantaged students without producing such
negative effects on scores while reducing the disparities observed between white and non-white
Brazilian students. Undeniably, the implementation of racial quotas is a substantial opportunity
for non-white students getting access to higher education in Brazil.
 23
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APPENDIX

Table A1 – Estimates of the impact of the racial and low-income quotas on academic
performance: ATT and ATE results using the 2011 and 2013 ENADE tests
2011 2013
Variable
ATT ATE ATT ATE
Racial quota 0.533 -0.536 -0.175 0.441
(1.631) (1.217) (1.164) (0.941)
Number of observations 113,670 113,670 70,958 70,958
Low-income quota -0.846 -2.268* -3.022** -0.626
(2.054) (1.256) (1.512) (1.321)
Number of observations 202,902 202,902 125,078 125,078
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5%
level. *Significant at the 10% level. The standard error for the ATE was calculated using
bootstrapping with 100 replications.

Table A2 - Estimates of the impact of the racial quotas on academic performance: ATT results for
different algorithms
ATT
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Racial quota 0.952 0.057 0.963 0.817 4.380***
(0.978) (1.675) (0.976) (1.190) (0.300)

Number of observations 156,365 156,365 156,365 156,365 156,365

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
(1) Logit, three nearest neighbors, and 0.01 standard deviation caliper size.
(2) Logit and a single neighbor.
 24

(3) Probit, three nearest neighbors, and 0.01 standard deviation caliper size.
(4) Probit, two nearest neighbors, and 0.02 standard deviation caliper size.
(5) Probit without replacement.
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Table A3 - Estimates of the impact of the low-income quotas on academic performance: ATT
results for different algorithms
ATT
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low-income quota -2.751** -5.531** -2.750** -3.701** 1.502**
(1.368) (2.468) (1.366) (1.726) (0.126)

Number of observations 306,234 306,234 306,234 306,234 306,234

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.
(1) Logit, three nearest neighbors, and 0.01 standard deviation caliper size.
(2) Logit and a single neighbor.
(3) Probit, three nearest neighbors, and 0.01 standard deviation caliper size.
(4) Probit, two nearest neighbors, and 0.02 standard deviation caliper size.
(5) Probit without replacement.

Table A4 – Results of the probit estimates of the propensity score, racial quota sample
Variables Coefficient Standard error
Non-education variables
Female -0.113*** 0.014
Married -0.091*** 0.016
Lives apart from family -0.070*** 0.025
Family income
1.5 to 4.5 minimum salaries -0.200*** 0.019
4.6 to 10 minimum salaries -0.478*** 0.023
More than 10 minimum salaries -0.720*** 0.044
Geographic region
North -0.072** 0.029
Northeast 0.027 0.018
 25

South 0.026 0.022

Central-West 0.087*** 0.021
Education variables
Mother’s education -0.044* 0.023
Public university 0.544*** 0.019
Public high school 0.536*** 0.021
Morning classes only 0.061*** 0.018
Constant -2.105*** 0.030
Number of observations 156,365
Notes: ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10%
level.
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Table A5 – Results of the probit estimates of the propensity score, low-income quota sample
Variables Coefficient Standard error
Non-education variables
Female -0.013* 0.007
Married 0.007 0.008
Lives apart from family -0.092*** 0.013
Non-white 0.027*** 0.007
Geographic region
North 0.022 0.018
Northeast -0.128*** 0.012
South -0.032*** 0.009
Central-West 0.026** 0.011
Education variables
Mother’s education -0.187*** 0.012
Public university -0.608*** 0.018
Public high school 0.299*** 0.009
Morning classes only -0.063*** 0.011
Constant -1.621 0.011
Number of observations 306,234
Notes: ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10%
level.

Table A6 – Matched sample means of student’s variables: treatment and control groups, racial
quota sample
Groups
Variables
Treatment Control
Non-education variables
Female 0.539 0.539
Married 0.231 0.232
 26

Lives apart from family 0.098 0.098

Family income
Less than 1.5 minimum salaries 0.212 0.212
1.5 to 4.5 minimum salaries 0.596 0.596
4.6 to 10 minimum salaries 0.170 0.170
More than 10 minimum salaries 0.022 0.022
Geographic region
North 0.065 0.065
Northeast 0.255 0.255
Southeast 0.390 0.390
South 0.128 0.127
Central-West 0.162 0.163
Education variables
Mother’s education 0.106 0.106
Public university 0.257 0.257
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Public high school 0.891 0.891

Morning classes only 0.196 0.195
Number of observations 4,231 152,134
Note: No statistically significant difference was found for the variables above.
Table A7 – Matched sample means of student’s variables: treatment and control groups, low-
income quota sample
Groups
Variables
Treatment Control
Non-education variables
Female 0.619 0.619
Married 0.276 0.276
Lives apart from family 0.077 0.077
Non-white 0.425 0.425
Geographic region
North 0.042 0.042
Northeast 0.099 0.099
Southeast 0.502 0.502
South 0.230 0.230
Central-West 0.127 0.127
Education variables
Mother’s education 0.087 0.087
Public university 0.026 0.026
Public high school 0.837 0.837
Morning classes only 0.112 0.112
Number of observations 20,993 285,241
Note: No statistically significant difference was found for the variables above.
 27
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Non-eligible student Eligible student

Want to be considered for

admission under quotas

No Yes

Vestibular score Vestibular score

Admitted Rejected

Rejected Admitted
under quotas

Non-eligible student and eligible student who does not want to be considered under quotas
Eligible student who wants to be considered under quotas
Eligible student who wants to be considered under quotas and who was rejected
under the quota process (student’s score can be considered under the regular process)

Figure 1A: Stylized admission process for some Brazilian universities

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Figure 2A – Distribution of the propensity scores, racial quotas

28
 29
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Figure 3A – Distribution of the propensity scores, low-income quotas

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Bertrand, M., Hanna, R., and Mullainathan, S. (2010), “Affirmative Action in Education:
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