[155] People of the Philippines vs.

Jaime Brioso
G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016

Facts:

The accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape of a then 4 year-old girl. When arrested, the accused denied the
allegations and interposed the defense of alibi. The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of the child victim holding that she
testified on the rape that happened to her in a straightforward and credible manner. The RTC also cited the findings of the medico-
legal which corroborated the testimony of the victim. The trial court did not give weight to accused's defense of alibi because the
place where he claims to be at the time of the rape is just a few minutes walk from the scene of the crime, hence, it is not
physically impossible for him to be at the said scene at the time of the commission of the rape. The RTC further held that victim
positively identified accused as the one who raped her.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. The CA held, among others, that: it found no reason to depart from the
findings of the RTC regarding the credibility of the child victim. It also held that delay in reporting her rape may not be construed as
indication of a false accusation. The CA also allowed that a child of tender years may be asked leading questions as found in the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, the accused-appellant failed to allege and prove any improper motive on the victim's part to falsely
accuse him of rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the victim's testimony was credible considering her failure to clearly narrate her alleged rape in court and that what
she did was merely to confirm the leading questions propounded to her by the prosecutor.

Ruling:

The Court does not agree. Quoting the CA's ruling the SC concurs that the victim was unable to narrate the rape with ease without
the leading questions propounded by the prosecutor and the trial court is not unnatural. To be sure, a court cannot expect a rape
victim to remember every ugly detail of the appalling outrage, especially so since she might in fact have been trying not to
remember them. Thus, it is palpable that the victim remembered the painful sexual intercourse forced upon her by the accused.
She just did not want to replay the whole rape in her mind and simply gave her terse but sufficient answers to the questions posed
by the prosecution and the trial judge during her direct examination. Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling
or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche
for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone.

As to the leading questions asked by the prosecutor during the victim's direct examination, it is too late in the day for the accused
to object to the manner of questioning adopted by the public prosecutor. The accused should have interposed his objections in the
course of the oral examination of the victim, as soon as the grounds therefor became reasonably apparent. As it were, he raised not
a whimper of protest as the public prosecutor recited his offer or propounded questions to the victim. Worse, the accused subjected
the victim to cross-examination on the very matters covered by the questions being objected to; therefore, he is barred from
arguing that the victim was "only made to confirm the leading questions propounded to her which are all in line with the theory of
the prosecution."

Moreover, it is true that, as a rule, leading questions are not allowed in direct examination. However, Section 10 (c) of Rule 132
allows leading questions to be asked of a witness who is a child of tender years, especially when said witness has difficulty giving an
intelligible answer, as when the latter has not reached that level of education necessary to grasp the simple meaning of a question,
moreso, its underlying gravity. This exception is now embodied in Section 20 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which
took effect on December 15, 2000. Under Section 4 thereof, a child witness is any person who at the time of giving testimony is
below the age of eighteen (18) years. In the instant case, the victim was only eleven (11) years old when she took the witness
stand. Thus, the decision of the RTC to allow the prosecution to ask the victim leading questions is justified.

[156] People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016

Facts:

The accused-appellants were previously found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Supreme Court for the murder of Dennis
Venturina as well as for the attempted murder of private complainants Leandro Lachica (Lachica), Arnel Fortes (Fortes), Mervin
Natalicio (Natalicio), Cristobal Gaston, Jr. (Gaston), and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. (Mangrobang, Jr.). Their crimes were results of
fraternity-related activities. The accused appellants now come again before the Supreme Court on Motion for Reconsideration
presenting more evidence to warrant the reversal of the Supreme Court’s May 5, 2014 decision against them.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants presented substantial arguments in their Motions for Reconsideration as to warrant the
reversal of this Court's May 5, 2014 Decision.

Ruling:

No.

(In relation to Impeachment by Bias):

The secrecy that surrounds the traditions and practices of a fraternity becomes problematic on an evidentiary level as there are no
set standards from which a fraternity-related crime could be measured. In People v. Gilbert Peralta, this Court could not consider a
fraternity member's testimony biased without any prior testimony on fraternity behavior:

Esguerra testified that as a fraternity brother he would do anything and everything for the victim. A witness may be said
to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false
color or pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the proper
foundation of the bias by asking the witness the facts constituting the bias. In the case at bar, there was no proper
impeachment by bias of the three (3) prosecution witnesses. Esguerra's testimony that he would do anything for his
fellow brothers was too broad and general so as to constitute a motive to lie before the trial court. Counsel for the
defense failed to propound questions regarding the tenets of the fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the members
to each other. The question was phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra's personal conviction[.]

Thus, the inherent difficulty in the prosecution of fraternity-related violence forces the judiciary to be more exacting in examining all
the evidence on hand, with due regard to the peculiarities of the circumstances. In this instance, we have thoroughly reviewed the
arguments presented by accused-appellants in their Motions for Reconsideration and have weighed them against the evidence on
hand. Unfortunately, their Motions have not given us cause to reconsider our May 5, 2014 Decision.

[157] Fe P. Zaldivar vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 197056, March 2, 2016

Facts:

Zaldivar and Jeanette Artajo (Artajo) were charged with Estafa pursuant to a complaint filed by respondent Mamerto Dumasis
(Dumasis) before the RTC. During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented Alma Dumasis and Delia Surmieda as witnesses,
and both identified their respective affidavits, which constituted their direct testimonies. Zaldivar's counsel, Atty. Salvador Cabaluna,
opted not to cross-examine the witnesses, while Artajo's counsel was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine in view of
his absence despite notice.

Dumasis, by himself and without the consent or acquiescence of the public prosecutor subsequently filed a Motion for Inhibition
against Judge Virgilio Patag, which was granted by the latter. Hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 23, presided by Judge
Edgardo Catilo (Judge Catilo).

On November 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order, denying the admission of the prosecution's exhibits. The trial court also nullified
and set aside the previous proceedings conducted and set the case anew for pre-trial conference. Zaldivar then filed a Motion to
Declare Prosecution's Case Terminated, which was denied by the RTC. Her Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied.
Aggrieved, Zaldivar filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.

The CA found strong and compelling reasons to review the findings of the trial court presided by Judge Catilo, and set aside the
Orders made by him as well as directed him to proceed with the trial of the case. The CA likewise dismissed Zaldivar's theory that
the prosecution failed to prove by competent and admissible evidence the crime as charged in view of the prosecution's act of
merely presenting the affidavits of its witnesses in lieu of giving their testimonies in open court. The CA ruled that such conclusion is
best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that the prosecution presented its evidence in a manner that it deems fit over
which neither Zaldivar nor the trial judge has no control.

The CA also ruled that Judge Catilo grossly abused the exercise of his discretion and judgment when he nullified the pre-trial
proceedings taken before Branch 33 and ordered the conduct of a new pre-trial. According to the CA, the trial court's order is
tantamount to ordering a new trial or re-opening of the case to the prejudice of the rights of the accused. The CA concurred with
the OSG’s contention that Judge Catilo is without authority to nullify and set aside the proceedings already conducted and to set the
case for a second pre-trial conference to consider matters, which were not covered in the first pre-trial conference. Moreover, the
CA stated that instead of calling for a new pre-trial, Judge Catilo could recall witnesses as provided for in Section 9, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Unsatisfied, she instituted this petition grounded
on the same issues raised in the CA.
Issue:

Whether or not the CA was correct in rendering its decision and resolution.

Ruling:

The assailed CA decision and resolution are affirmed. The CA was correct in ruling that Zaldivar's contention that “the prosecution
failed to establish by competent and admissible evidence of the crime charged” is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court.
Zaldivar should be reminded of the rule that "the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Unless Zaldivar files a demurrer to the evidence
presented by the prosecution, she cannot enjoin the trial court to terminate the case on the ground of the prosecution's alleged
failure to establish and prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The validity and merits of the prosecution's accusations, or
Zaldivar's defense for that matter, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper.

The CA, likewise, correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it nullified the proceedings previously
conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial of the case. Note that one of the main reasons presented by Judge Catilo in nullifying the
pre-trial proceedings was that the proceedings conducted after the pre-trial conference did not comply with the prescribed
procedure in the presentation of witnesses. But as propounded by the CA, and even the OSG who appeared for Judge Catilo, what
the trial court should have done to correct any "perceived" procedural lapses committed during the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence was to recall the prosecution's witnesses and have them identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective
affidavits. This is explicitly allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which provides:

Sec. 9. Recalling witnesses. — After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot
be recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion as the interest of justice may
require.

The trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question, for strict observance of the order of trial or trial procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance obtaining in
each case at the discretion of the trial judge.

[158] Fortune Tobacco Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 192024, July 1, 2015

Facts:

The facts of this case are akin to those obtaining in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 and G.R. No. 180006. In G.R. No. 167274-275, the
Court eventually sustained petitioner's claim for refund of overpaid excise taxes on cigars and cigarettes for the period covering
January l, 2002 to December 31, 2002. In G.R. No. 180006, the Court likewise sustained petitioner's claim for refund of overpaid
excise tax paid in 2003 and the period covering January 1 to May 31, 2004. The subject claim for refund involves the amount of
excise taxes allegedly overpaid during the period beginning June 1, 2004 up to December 31, 2004.

Issue:

Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of petitioner's claim for tax refund.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit. Unlike in the proceeding had in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 and G.R. No. 180006, the denial of petitioner's
claim for tax refund in this case is based on the ground that petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and
the amount thereof. As a result, petitioner seeks that the Court re-examine the probative value of its evidence and determine
whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid.

This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below,
the Court's jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A
question of law which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants. This is in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

In fact, the rule finds greater significance with respect to the findings of specialized courts such as the CTA, the conclusions of
which are not lightly set aside because of the very nature of its functions which is dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax
problems and has accordingly developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of
authority. Moreover, it has been said that the proper interpretation of the provisions on tax refund that does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants is a question of law.
Verily, the sufficiency of a claimant's evidence and the determination of the amount of refund, as called for in this case, are
questions of fact, which are for the judicious determination by the CTA of the evidence on record.

(In relation to Tender of Excluded Evidence):

At any rate, even if the Court should find fault in the ruling of the CTA Division in denying the admission of petitioner's evidence,
the result would be the same because petitioner failed to offer any proof or tender of excluded evidence. As aptly discussed by
the CTA En Banc:

Petitioner posits that if their exhibits, specifically Exhibits "G", "G-1" to "G-7" and Exhibit "H", are admitted together
with the testimony of their witness, the same would sufficiently prove their claim. A closer scrutiny of the records
shows that petitioner did not file any offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence.

Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony.

The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's offered
documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to form part of the records
of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances
of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender
of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the
offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of excluded evidence.

It is of record that the denial of the excluded evidence was never assigned as an error in this appeal. Thus, this Court
cannot pass upon nor consider the propriety of their denial. Moreover, this Court cannot and should not consider the
documentary and oral evidence presented which are not considered to be part of the records in the first place. Thus,
Exhibits "G", "G-1" to "G-7" and Exhibit "H", together with the testimony of petitioner's witness thereon, cannot be
admitted and be given probative value.

It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did not move
that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate court, as documents forming no part
of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case.

It also bears pointing out that at no point during the proceedings before the CTA En Banc and before this Court has petitioner
offered any plausible explanation as to why it failed to properly make an offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence. Instead,
petitioner harps on the fact that respondent CIR simply refused its claim for refund on the ground that RR 17-99 was a valid
issuance. Thus, for its failure to seasonably avail of the proper remedy provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.

Although it may be suggested that the CTA should have been more liberal in the application of technical rules of evidence, it
should be stressed that a liberal application, or suspension of the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception
to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.

In this case, as explained above, petitioner utterly failed to not only comply with the basic procedural requirement of presenting
only the original copies of its documentary evidence, but also to adhere to the requirement to properly make its offer of proof or
tender of excluded evidence for the proper consideration of the appellate tribunal.

Indeed, to apply technical rules strictly against the CIR because it simply relied on the validity of RR 17-99 — but not be strict
with respect to petitioner's shortcomings, would be unfair. For this would go against the principle that taxation is the rule while
exemption/refund is the exception.