Confession obtained by torture
Noiles and Miss Ester Magbag,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31653 May 18, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO ORTILLA Y PANGANIBAN, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edcel C. Lagman for defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
About 11:00 in the evening of July 22, 1969, a tragic occurrence took place
at Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila, when a loud explosion rocked
the facade of the building housing the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Library.
It was caused by a hand grenade which bored a small crater on the pavement.
As the smoke cleared, Rodolfo Carlos y Salazar laid prostrate on the ground,
dead. Cause of death was "shock and hemorrhage due to multiple sharpnel
wounds on the right arm, chest and lower extremities with laceration on the
lungs and muscles." (Exhibits B, B-1 & D).
Thereafter, Manila Police Department operatives picked up accused Renato
Ortilla y Panganiban at his residence at 3181 Mariano Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, for questioning, He was brought to the MPD headquarters at Isaac
Peral Street (now United Nations Avenue) where during tile investigation, he
denied any participation in the "grenade throwing" incident. Because he had
then a blackeye on his right eye, he explained that he was mauled on July 20,
1969 by Ladislao Garcia, Rolando Reyes and one Bentot.
Detective Wenceslao Sunga, a neighbor of accused Ortilla, arrived, vouched
for the latter and promised to produce him anytime when needed. Ortilla was
released until July 26, 1969 when he was again picked up by the police who
believed that he was really involved in the "grenade throwing" incident. Upon
interrogation, he admitted in his own handwriting, consisting of two pages,
to have thrown the grenade at the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Library
(Exhibit G), with two (2) annexes, also in his own handwriting-one, a sketch
showing how he committed the crime (Exhibit G-1) and the other, a drawing
of the form of the grenade he used (Exhibit G-2). He also executed another
statement (Exhibit H) in question and answer form. All these statements were
subscribed and sworn to before Manila Assistant City Fiscal Ricardo
Conjares and witnessed by one Atty.
stenographer of Fiscal Conjares.
From these statements executed by accused Renato Ortilla, it appears that on
July 20, 1969, the latter was mauled by Ladislao Garcia, Rolando Reyes and
Bentot. On July 22, 1969, at about 11:00 in the evening, accused Ortilla saw
Ladislao Garcia in front of the Jefferson Memorial Library. He went home,
got the hand grenade and returned to the library. He hid behind the wall of a
building near the Kentucky restaurant and from there he threw the hand
grenade at the direction of Ladislao Garcia. He ran away and heard the
explosion while in flight. The person found dead after the grenade throwing
was not Ladislao Garcia but his friend Rodolfo Carlos.
An information for murder (Criminal Case No. CCC-V-1345) was filed
against Renato Ortilla y Panganiban, as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of July, 1969, at nighttime, purposely sought
to better accomplish his criminal design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kin and with evident premeditation,
treachery, and by means of explosion, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Rodolfo Carlos y Salazar, by then and there
suddenly and treacherously throwing at the latter a handgrenade causing the
same to explode, thereby inflicting upon the said Rodolfo Carlos y Salazar
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. (page
1, Records).
After trial, the when Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
finding accused Renato Ortilla y Panganiban guilty beyond reasonable doubt
"as principal of the crime of murder qualified by the use of explosive and
there being proven the aggravating circumstance of treachery without ally
mitigating circumstance to consider, sentence him to DEATH, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim herein Rodolfo Carlos y Salazar the sum of P12,000.00;
P10,000.00 by way of moral damages suffered and another P10,000.00 by
way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs."
The plea of accused-appellant Renato Ortilla for the reversal of his conviction
is based on insufficiency of evidence as the confessions attributed to him were
involuntary and there was no testimonial evidence to justify the finding that
he was guilty of the crime charged. Appellant claims that he was not at the
scene of the crime before, during and after the fatal explosion. Appellant and
his witnesses declared that between 9:00 and 10:00 in the evening of July 22,
1969 he was in the house of Detective Sunga at Peling Street, asking advice
from the latter regarding the mauling incident which he suffered in the hands
of Ladislao Garcia and his companions. After an hour or so he went to a wake
1
and stayed there for about twenty minutes. He then went in front of the house
of Aling Teresa and conversed with her and Mang Kulas. They were
conversing when they heard a loud explosion. They inquired from each other
where the explosion came from. Mang Kulas and he (appellant) went to the
direction where they heard the sound until they reached the Jefferson Library.
There they saw the victim, Rodolfo Carlos y Salazar, his boyhood friend
prostrate on the ground. After staying for about half an hour, Ortilla returned
in front of Aling Teresa's house and they talked about the incident. Some
neighbors then invited him for a cup of coffee and thereafter, he went home.
Further, appellant claims that when the police took him from his house again
on July 26, 1969 he was tortured or maltreated and intimidated into signing
Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 & H. While he was being investigated, he was
blindfolded and hit several times in the different parts of his body, at one time
made to lie down and then water poured on his face. Regarding the
maltreatment he suffered at the hands of the police investigators, he testified,
as follows:
Q You said that you were brought to a place which you did not know and
then you were stamped and kicked, what happened next?
A I was told to sit down, sir. And my arms were tied.
Q Was there anything which happened to you after you were stamped and
kicked?
A They pushed me on my chest and also on my lips and they also boxed me
on my private parts.
Q How many times was it done to you?
A Three times, sir.
Q What did you feel?
A It was painful, sir.
Q You also said that you were blindfolded with a towel with the policemen
pouring water into your nostrils, can you demonstrate to the court how you
were blindfolded with a towel?
Interpreter:
Witness demonstrating how his face was covered with a towel.
Q While you were thus covered with a towel and they were pouring water
into your nostrils — I withdraw that question. What else happened to you?
A They were shocking my mouth, sir.
Q What else happened to you while in that position?
A Somebody was riding on my stomach, sir.
(TSN, August 25, 1969 hearing, page 11.)
His declaration received confirmation from a competent and neutral source,
Dr. Mariano Lara, then Chief of the Medico-Legal Division of the Manila
Police Department, who examined appellant on July 30, 1969. Dr. Lara
submitted a report (Exhibit 2) of his examination on appellant, to wit:
(5) Also externally are found the following marks and/or complaints:
(a) A brownish linear mark about 4 cm. x 0.2 cm. faintly visible transversely
across the anterior lower right arm.
(b) A similar brownish linear, two (2) parallel marks or impression as of a
band, about 5 cm. long x 1.5 cm. apart, located in the anterior lower left arm.
(c) Spotty brownish marks, multiple two (2) in the anterior left wrist and two
(2) in the dorsemedial right wrist, averred by him to be prior impression made
by handcuff applied around his wrist.
(d) Subject complains of pain in the anterior right chest, anterior aspect of the
neck, and in the postero-lateral neck, but there are no swelling or color
changes. (page 62, Records)
That the above injuries were four (4) days old at the time of the examination
jibe with the statement of appellant that the police inflicted those injuries
upon him on July 26, 1969. Hereunder is the cross-examination on Dr. Lara
by the Prosecuting Fiscal.
Q So this subject you examined at about 6:00 P.M. on July 30, 1969, came
from the City Jail, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And from the nature of the description of the injuries which are contained
in Exh. 2, do you agree with me, Doctor, that they are old injuries?
A I have stated that they are several days old in my report.
Q And it could possibly be, as you stated, to your estimate 4 days old?
A About.
Q Could it be more than 4 but it could not be more than 10?
A The extent of 10 days is beyond consideration. If it is 10 days old the lineal
mark will disappear. As it is brownish in color, I put the period more or less
about 4 days because it can still be seen.
COURT:
Q So letter (a) under par. 5, how many days, can this be assumed as 10 days
old when you examined the accused on August 30?
A I don't think so, your Honor.
Q How about letter (b)?
A The same, it is not 10 days.
Q How about (c)
A Also not 10 days.
Q So(a), (b) and (c) can not be 10 days old?
A No. your Honor.
(TSN, August 21, 1969 hearing, pp. 14-15).
2
The fact is, the prosecution did not present an eyewitness regarding the
Identity of appellant that he was the one who threw the hand grenade. The
conviction of appellant was predicated solely on the confessions which are
being attacked because of their involuntary character. As stated in People vs.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236, 241, where the confession is involuntary, due to
maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of the
constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. "Any form of coercion whether physical, mental or
emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity
is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing." Involuntary
confessions are rejected by all the courts because they are not legal evidence.
If the accused satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the
confession stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is a thing which never
existed. (U.S. v. Santos, 24 Phil. 329; People vs. Panopio, 75 Phil. 767).
In the absence of direct evidence linking herein appellant in the commission
of the crime charged, what remains only are his extrajudicial supposed
confessions. However, appellant vehemently maintained his innocence
during the trial and claimed that he was forced to sign the same. The fact that
after the maltreatment appellant was prevailed upon to sign the extra-judicial
confessions, the same became worthless evidence. The result is, there is no
sufficient evidence upon which appellant's conviction may be sustained.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is reversed and appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered released forthwith from custody unless he
is detained for some other offense. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Trial confession in non-custodial setting Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

3
G.R. No. 70091 December 29, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO MANATAD, JESUS RUBIO, RUDY
LUMARDA, JOSE CABAGERAN, EDDIE DE LA PEÑ;A, CRIS
RAMIREZ, and JESUS or JOHN DOE, accused, BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO,
CHARLITO MANATAD, and EDDIE DE LA PEÑ;A accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ignacio P. Moleta for accused-appellants.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes (hereinafter referred to as the
DECEASED), a resident of Barangay Mabini in the Municipality of Tubajon,
Surigao del Norte, was found killed by his wife and children near the hut in
their farm in Sitio Capacohan in the same barangay. Post Mortem findings
performed the following morning were:
l) Incised wound of the neck.
2) Eight [8] multiple stab wounds at the back; one [1] inch in length and two
and a half [2½] inches in depth.
3) Removed right external ear.
4) Contusions left lumbar region.
5) Both hands tied at the back with rattan.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to incised wounds of
the neck and multiple stab wounds at the back.
On February 2, 1983, in Criminal Case No. 14 of the Regional Trial Court,
10th Judicial Region, Branch 32 (the CASE BELOW), the following eight
(8) persons: (1) Brigido ENCIPIDO (2) Charlito MANATAD, (3) Eddie DE
LA PENA (hereinafter referred to as APPELLANTS), (4) Jesus Rubio, (5)
Rudy Lumarda, (6) Jose CABAGERAN (7) Cris Ramirez, and (8) Jesus or
John Doe were charged with Murder for the death of the DECEASED. Only
fly APPELLANTS were tried, the other five accused having remained at
large.
A review of the prosecution evidence presented in the CASE BELOW can
begin with the testimony of Felicisimo Alciso. This witness narrated that he
went to the hut of the DECEASED in the afternoon of March 30, 1982, in
order to get some chickens which the latter had promised him but that, before
reaching the hut, he heard a gunshot. He stopped and saw that the
DECEASED was being tied and subjected to fist blows. There were three
persons who mauled the DECEASED, while others stayed at a distance.
Then, somebody struck the DECEASED with the butt of a gun causing the
latter to fall to the ground. He described that the hands of the DECEASED
were tied at the back, ENCIPIDO was behind the DECEASED, while
MANATAD and DE LA PEÑ;A were on the sides. 1 On orders of ENCIPIDO
also known as "Commander Tanga," DE LA PEÑ;A, also called "Agosto de
la Pena struck the Deceased's neck with a bolo which almost I severed the
latter's head. Frightened, witness Alciso fled from the scene.
After learning from friends and neighbors that those who had killed the
DECEASED were detained, Alciso went to the jail to find out for himself if
they were among the group responsible for the death of the DECEASED, and
because "I was afraid that I will be the next one to be killed by them." He
recognized APPELLANTS as among the suspects. When he asked DE LA
PENA why he was in jail, the latter answered that it was because they were
the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED. Alciso was unable to talk to
ENCIPIDO and MANATAD.
Before Alciso there was another prosecution witness presented, Armando
Bagacay whose testimony turned out to be hearsay but which nevertheless is
reproduced here to complete the evidence for the prosecution. He testified
that while he was massaging one of the accused, Rudy Lainarda on March
10, 1982, the latter told him that his ailment was caused by witchcraft of the
victim, Jose Lacumbes, and that he would seek the aid of the rebels to cut
Lacumbes' head. Four days later, Bagacay met one of those originally
indicted, Jesus Rubio, who confided to him that they would cut Lacumbes'
neck for making Lumarda sick and for being responsible for all i the
witchcraft in the community. Subsequently, witness Bagacay heard of the
death of Lacumbes at the hands of the rebels.
Two other prosecution witnesses supported testimony Alciso Jorge Ortega,
INP Station Commander of Loreto, Agusan del Norte, testified that when he
had just arrived from Surigao City at about 2:30 o'clock P.M. of May 1, 1982,
and while still at the wharf, he was met by ENCIPIDO who introduced
himself as "Commander Tanga," invited him (Ortega) for a drink so he could
talk to the latter personally. Having ac cepted the invitation, the two
proceeded to a store where ENCIPIDOs fourteen companions were already
waiting. They introduced themselves as rebels and offered to help the
municipal government. In the course of the conversation, ENCIPIDO and DE
LA PEÑ;A disclosed to the Station Commander that they were the ones who
had beheaded the DECEASED, killed a certain Benny and one Balaba, and
who were responsible for all the killings in Dinagat Island.
The other prosecution witness, Mariano Espina, the Municipal Mayor of
Loreto, testified that in the evening of that same day of May 1, 1982, Station
Commander Jorge Ortega informed him that Commander Tanga" and his men
4
wanted to pay him a courtesy call. They arrived at about 8:00 in the evening
at his house. They introduced themselves and placed their sidearms on a table
as a sign of goodwill. At the time, there were about 2 policemen and 3 CHDF
men outside the house but no arrests were made, nor were firearms
confiscated, as a sign of reciprocal goodwill "Commander Tanga" then
confided to the Mayor his mission to cooperate with his administration as
they had heard that he was a good Mayor. He also informed the Mayor that
he had been a member of the NPA since he was 13 years old; that he had
already killed many people, including the DECEASED, so that the latter
could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. For his part, DE LA
PEÑ;A brought out a sharp-pointed knife and tried to test its sharpness,
admitted having cut the neck of the DECEASED, and even showed the latter's
ear, dried by that time.
The foregoing testimonies were buttressed from a most unexpected source.
DE LA PEÑ;A, to the surprise of APPELLANT APPELLANTS' common
counsel testified in open Court that, although he belonged to the group of
"Commander Tanga," the latter, MANATAD and a third individual merely
forced him to join, threatening to kill him if he refused; that he was with the
group from March 28, 1982; that he was present on March 30, 1982 when
"Commander Tanga" and MANATAD killed the DECEASED but that he
was merely standing by; that the duo were the first ones apprehended, and
after them he was also arrested by the CHDF.
In their defense, ENCIPIDO and MANATAD denied having I killed the
victim and interposed the defense of alibi. ENCIPIDO claimed that on March
30, 1982, he was sawing lumber from morning till 3:00 P.M. at Barangay Boa
for a certain Norberto Bukid. After working he rested in Bukid's house and
did not leave the place. He further testified that he did not know the
DECEASED nor the Station Commander, nor the Municipal Mayor except
when he surrendered his .45 caliber pistol to the latter on May 2, 1982 after
which he was arrested. He decided to surrender his pistol because he was
afraid he might be apprehended for having an unlicensed firearm.
MANATAD and DE LA PENA were also placed in jail with him. Thereafter,
with seven others, he was taken to PC head- quarters at Surigao City where
they were severely maltreated and he was forced to sign an affidavit admitting
that he is "Commander Tanga" responsible for the killing of the DECEASED
and other persons. He denied having admitted to the Station Commander and
to the Municipal Mayor his Identi ty as "Commander Tanga" or that he had
killed the DECEASED and other persons besides.
MANATAD, for his part, also denied all imputations against him, stating that
he only came to know ENCIPIDO in jail; that he did not know the
DECEASED nor who killed him that during the whole day of March 30,
1982, he was plowing the field tenanted by his mother-in-law at Barangay
Malinao; that he started plowing early in the morning and stopped at about
5:00 o'clock P.M. after which he stayed home. Barangay Captain Sergio
Peniones partially corroborated MANATAD's testimony by stating that he
saw MANATAD plowing the i field in the morning of March 30, 1982.
MANATAD's wife, Bienvenida Edusma also testified that her husband
stayed home after 5:00 o'clock P.M. of that day as he was tired after the day's
work; that, in fact, she quarreled with her husband because he refused to
accompany her in bringing their sick child to Tubajon on so that she went
alone carrying the child even though she was then seven months pregnant.
In a Decision promulgated by the Trial Court on December 5, 1984,
APPELLANTS were found guilty of Murder and sen tenced to reclusion
perpetua to pay damages to the heirs of the DECEASED in the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay 3/8 of the costs.
On behalf of APPELLANTS, counsel de officio filed a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Trial Court on December 26, 1984, which the
latter denied for having been filed more than fifteen (5) days after the
promulgation date of December 5, 1984. A Notice of Appeal filed before the
then Intermediate Appellate Court was allowed as an appeal not from the
judgment but from the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The
penalty imposed by the Trial Court being reclusion perpetual the appeal was
indorsed to this instance, which we accepted in the interest of substantial
justice.
APPELLANTS raise the following Assignments of Error:
A
The lower Court erred in giving credence to the hearsay testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Mariano Espina and George Ortega basing therefrom
its findings of conviction;
B
The lower Court erred in giving credence to the incredible and hearsay
testimony of Felicisimo Alciso the alleged eyewitness;
C
The lower Court erred in appreciating the so-called judicial admission of
accused Eddie de la Pena as against his co-accused Brigido ENCIPIDO and
Charlito Manatad;
D
The lower Court erred in convicting appellants Brigido ENCIPIDO and
Charlito Manatad;
E
5
The lower Court erred in refusing to give due course to appellants' motion for
reconsideration holding that it was filed out of time when its judgment
accordingly has become final;
F was about "20 arms length" from the hut of the DECEASED, while he was
The lower Court erred in convicting appellant Eddie de la Peñ;a.
The evidence against APPELLANTS, taken en conjunto" justifies the finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
1. Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso positively Identified APPELLANT as
among the group who led the DECEASED out of his hut, with his hands tied
behind his back, and thereafter mauled him and hacked his neck in the
afternoon of March 30, 1982. The autopsy findings, particularly, the "incised
wound of the neck," "contusions left lumbar region" and "both hands tied at
the back with rattan" confirm his description of what he had witnessed.
The defense contents, however, that said witness could not have recognized
APPELLANTS.
It is true that at the start of his testimony, he had stated that he did not
recognize the assailants. Thus:
Q. Who were the persons who mauled Jose Lacumbes during that time?
A. I saw that there were three of them but I could not recognize them; and
there were some other persons who were staying from a distance. 2
That testimony, however, referred to the early stage of the incident when the
victim was being mauled. Subsequently, in respect of the killing itself, the
witness declared:
Fiscal Sandangal
Could you not recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes?
Witness:
I could recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes. 3
Then he described specifically:
Q. What else did you see, if any?
A. I saw that somebody was beating Jose Lacumbes with the use of a gun,
and when Jose Lacumbes fell down, Commander Tanga commanded Eddie
de la Pena to cut the head of the victim but the head was not severed from the
body. 4
After pointing to the APPELLANTS in the Courtroom and replying to a
question by the Court, Alciso further explained:
Court (addressing to the witness) When did you know the accused by their
names?
WITNESS: In the jail your Honor. Before I met them in the jail I already
recognized their faces but I just do not know their names. Later on, I already
know their names. 5
The defense further claims that Alciso could not have recognized the
assailants because he was at a distance of 80 to 90 meters away from the scene
of, the crime. In another instance, however, he said that the place of the killing
also about the same distance from the hut at that time. The distances stated
were merely his estimates and can be moderately exact or moderately inexact
specially with provincial folk. The important fact is that even from where he
was, he witnessed the incident and his description of it was corroborated by
the admission of APPELLANTS, themselves and supported by the autopsy
findings on the cadaver. As this Court ruled in People vs. Hamtig et al., 6 the
credibility of the testimony of a witness is not affected by some flaws and
inconsistencies in minor details, if as regards the main incident, the Identities
of the malefactors, the testimonies appear to be consistent with each other."
And although it was admittedly the first time that Alciso saw the malefactors,
it does not necessarily follow that he could not have recognized their faces.
Persons observing a startling occurrence would strive to know the ones
involved specially where as in this case the DECEASED was not unknown
to Alciso.
Next, it is argued that Alcisos testimony that he went to i the jail to verify the
Identity of the malefactors is not worthy of credence. Concededly, that
actuation was unusual However, as the witness explained he did so because
he feared that he may be the next one to be Killed And the fact that he asked
DE LA PEÑ;A why the latter was in jail does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion, as alleged, that he had not witnessed the occurrence. A friendly
question was more likely to evoke candid answer.
There is nothing strange either in Alcisos not having mentioned the culprits
by name in his sworn statement taken more than three months after the
incident, having referred to them merely as "five persons." As is wen known
"an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself Omissions and
misunderstanding . are not infrequent, particularly under circumstances of
hurry and impatience." 7
ENCIPIDO and DE LA PEÑ;A verbally acknowledged their guilt before
Station Commander Ortega and Municipal Mayor Espina when they
individually boasted that they had killed the DECEASED so that the latter
could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. They admitted that
they had beheaded the DECEASED. DE LA PEÑ;A even showed the Mayor
the DECEASED's dried ear which he had severed, Further, while I i in jail,
DE LA PEÑ;A also admitted to Alciso when the latter I asked him the reason
for their confinement, that it was because they were the ones who had
beheaded the DE CEASED. These oral confessions indicating complicity in
6
the commission of the crime with which they are charged are admissible in
evidence against the declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PEÑ;A pursuant to
Sections 22 8 and 29 9 of the Rules of Court. It is the fact that admissions were
made by APPELLANTS and against their own interest which gives them
their evidentiary value. 10
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extra-judicial confessions were
independently made without collusion, are Identical with each other in their
material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the
commission of the crime. 11 They are also admissible as corroborative
evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances
presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the
commission of the crime charged and proved. 12 They are what is commonly
known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general
rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only
against the declarants thereof.
And while it may be that ENCIPIDOS written statement before the PC on
May 6, 1982 confessing to the killing of the DECEASED was not presented
at the trial no presumption of wilful suppression of evidence may be levelled
against the prosecution on account of its non-production. Apparently, for the
prosecution, it was not important or necessary to bolster up its case.
The argument that the testimonies of Station Commander Ortega, Mayor
Espina, and Alciso as to the extrajudicial admissions made to them
respectively by ENCIPIDO and/or DE LA PEÑ;A constitute hearsay, and
thus inadmissible, is not well taken. Oral confessions may be proved by any
competent witness by whom they were heard, the same as any other fact:
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood an of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance. (23 C.J.S. 196).
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the
testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood,
and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the
accused. (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551).
13
ENCIPIDOS and DE LA PEÑ;A's extrajudicial acknowledgments of guilt to
the Municipal Mayor and the INP Station Commander are not necessarily
incredible for, in their minds, they were not "confessing" but bragging of their
exploits" in the belief that they were saving the community from the
witchcraft of the DECEASED and the evil doings of some people. There is
no proof whatsoever that the extrajudicial admissions in question were
coerced or concocted by those officials, who are responsible public officers
and presumed to have regularly performed their functions and against whose
impartiality nothing has been proven. The fact that no arrest were made by
them immediately after the disclosures do not necessarily belie their
testimonies since the spirit of "reciprocal goodwill" pervaded the encounters.
Arrests were made, however, the day after, or on May 2, 1982.
APPELLANTS had the opportunity during the trial to refute their verbal
admissions as in fact, they denied having made them, but their denials do not
ring with truth in the face of other inculpating evidence.
3. The additional incriminating evidence was furnished by DE LA PEÑ;A
who, in open Court, under oath, testified that he belonged to "Commander
Tanga's" group, was with them since two days before the incident, and that
he was with ENCIPIDO and MANATAD when they killed the DECEASED.
DE LA PEÑ;AS declaration confirms the existence of the group, their
responsibility for the killing and, at the very least, his presence during the
commission of the crime.
True, DE LA PEÑ;A exculpated himself by stating that he was only forced
to join the group and was merely standing by when the killing occurred. A
statement involving guilt does not, however, lose its character as a confession
from the fact that it was accompanied by statements of an exculpatory nature,
14
it being "the natural tendency of every transgressor, with perhaps very rare
exceptions, to acquit himself while he can do so from all liability that might
arise from his act, or at least mitigate it in the eyes of the law and those of his
fellowmen". 15 Like other evidence, it must be weighed, believed, or
disbelieved in whole or in part, as reason may decide. Herein, the exculpatory
statement has been proven false by Alcisos credible account that upon
ENCIPIDOS orders, DE LA PEÑ;A hacked the DECEASED's neck with a
bolo which almost severed the latter's head, which testimony is confirmed by
the autopsy finding of "incised wound on the neck." It was likewise proven
false by DE LA PEÑ;As own extrajudicial admission to the Municipal Mayor
that he had hacked the DECEASED's neck and severed his ear, which is
buttressed by the post mortem finding of "removed right external ear."
DE LA PEÑ;AS judicial admission is admissible not only against him but
against his co-accused ENCIPIDO and MANATAD as well. The general rule
that the confession of an accused may be given in evidence against him but
that it is not competent evidence against his co-accused, admits of exceptions.
Thus, this Court has held that where several accused are tried together for the
same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one during the trial
7
implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. 16 "The
extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is
different from the testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The first is
admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is perfectly admissible
against his co-accused," 17 who had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. In this case, counsel de officio had such opportunity
to cross-examine DE LA PEÑ;A but did not avail of it because in his own
words:
Atty Moleta: I would like to inform the Honorable Court that I am in quandary
It is my duty as counsel-de-oficio to be candid to this Honorable Court. The
witness has not actually followed what I intimated to him to be the nature of
his
testimony. 18
In other words, the reason counsel refrained from cross examination was not
because he was not given the opportunity to do so but because DE LA PEÑ;A
did not follow counsel's bidding as to the nature of his testimony. The
coached testimony failed but the truth prevailed. Besides, defense counsel
could have presented rebuttal evidence to overcome DE LA PEÑ;A's
testimony if he had chosen to do so but did not.
Thus, MANATAD's direct participation in the commission of the crime with
which he is charged has been established by DE LA PEÑ;A's declaration in
open Court that "Commander Tanga and Charlito Manatad killed a certain
person," and the corroborative testimony of Alciso who categorically testified
that MANATAD was on one side of the DECEASED, DE LA PEÑ;A on the
other and ENCIPIDO at the back when they perpetrated the offense with
which they are changed. In MANATAD's respect, therefore, it is not
necessary to invoke conspiracy" to support his conviction.
The defense of alibi separately interposed by ENCIPIDO and MANATAD
cannot prevail over their positive Identification by eyewitness Also by
ENCIPIDOS verbal acknowledgments of guilt, and by DE LA PEÑ;A's
judicial and extra- i judicial admission/confession, which are interlocking and
ad-missible as against themselves and as against the others whom they also
implicated. Neither were ENCIPIDO and MANATAD able to prove that they
were at some place for such a period of time that it was impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Barangay
Boa where ENCIPIDO was allegedly sawing lumber was approximately 60
kilometers away, 19 and Barangay Malinao where MANATAD was
supposedly plowing the field, about 12 kilometers, 20 from Barangay Mabini,
Tubajon, Surigao where the incident occurred.
In the last analysis, the core issue addresses itself to the credibility of
witnesses, a matter that the Trial Court had unequalled competence to
consider and decide since it was in a vantage position to observe the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses of both sides while testifying, an opportunity
not afforded to Appellate Courts. Its findings as to credibility should not be
disturbed and are entitled to great weight unless there is some fact of record
that has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued,
21
which exceptions we find absent herein.
The last assigned error delving on the refusal of the Trial Court to give due
course to appellants' Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the
judgment had become final is no longer of any consequence since all the
grounds therefor have been elevated to and considered by this Court on
appeal.
In fine, the threads of evidence woven together establish APPELLANTS'
guilt to a moral certainty.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed except as to
the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in accordance
with recent jurisprudence. With proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras and Feliciano,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., reserves his vote.
Right to counsel in administrative investigation
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001]
ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
8
COMMISSION, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The present petition seeks to review and set aside the Decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals dated July 31, 1998 [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the
dismissal of petitioner Estelito V. Remolona (Remolona) from the
government service for dishonesty, and the Resolution dated February 5,
1999[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster
at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery
Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.
In a letter[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R.
America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who
purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the
National Board for Teachers.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Mr. America likewise
disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning
for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's board
examinations.
On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director Bella Amilhasan to
conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's eligibility, after verification
from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records
revealed "that Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing
examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not
include the name of Remolona. Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as
indicated in her report of rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who
took the examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%." [if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion,
Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner
Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of facts[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating
of Mrs. Remolona, which is summarized in the Memorandum[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
submitted by Director Pasion as follows:
"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September, 1990, while riding in a
Kapalaran Transit Bus from Sta. Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo City,
he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin (this is how it sounded) who happened to
be sitting beside him;
3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until he was able to confide
his problem to Atty. Salupadin about his wife having difficulty in acquiring
an eligibility;
3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as working at the Batasan,
offered his help for a fee of P3,000.00;
3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan where he gave the amount
of P2,000.00, requirements, application form and picture of his wife;
3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00 P.M., they met again
at the Batasan where he handed to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00
plus P500.00 bonus who in turn handed to him the Report of Rating of one
Nery C. Remolona with a passing grade, then they parted;
3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he showed the Report of
Rating to the District Supervisor, Francisco America who informed her (sic)
that there was no vacancy;
3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr. Magsino in writing x
x x that Mr. America is asking for money in exchange for the appointment of
his wife but failed to make good his promise. He attached the corroborating
affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico
and Nery C. Remolona x x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to get six (6) checks at
P2,600.00 each plus bonus of Nery C. Remolona;
3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he felt that Mr. America
would verify the authenticity of his wife's Report of Rating, he burned the
original."
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring
the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that
he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the foregoing,
Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative
action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability
since it has not been shown that she willfully participated in the commission
of the offense.
Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against
petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for
possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
A formal hearing ensued wherein the parties presented
their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional Director Bella A.
Amilhasan issued a Memorandum dated February 14, 1995 [if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
recommending that the spouses Estelito and Nery
Remolona be found guilty as charged and be meted the corresponding
9
penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSC which issued
Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the spouses Estelito and
Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty of dismissal
and all its accessory penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was
held in abeyance pending proof of his identity. [if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] In its
Resolution No. 965510[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] dated August 27, 1996, the
CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Remolona,
absolved Nery Remolona from liability and held that:
"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments presented fails to
persuade this Commission to reconsider its earlier resolution insofar as
Estelito Remolona's culpability is concerned. The evidence is substantial
enough to effect his conviction. His act of securing a fake eligibility for his
wife is proved by substantial evidence. However, in the case of Nery
Remolona, the Commission finds her innocent of the offense charged, for
there is no evidence to show that she has used the fake eligibility to support
an appointment or promotion. In fact, Nery Remolona did not indicate in her
Personal Data Sheet that she possesses any eligibility. It must be pointed out
that it was her husband who unilaterally worked to secure a fake eligibility
for her.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied
insofar as respondent Estelito Remolona is concerned. However, Resolution
No. 95-2908 is modified in the sense that respondent Nery Remolona is
exonerated of the charges. Accordingly, Nery Remolona is automatically
reinstated to her former position as Teacher with back salaries and other
benefits."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision
dismissing the petition for review filed by herein petitioner Remolona. His
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in denying petitioner's motion for new trial;
2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and
3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an offense not work
connected in relation to his official position in the government service.
The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service
employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which
is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his
official duty. Remolona likewise imputes a violation of his right to due
process during the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by
counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him
is inadmissible because he was merely made to sign a blank form. He also
avers that his motion for new trial should be granted on the ground that the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case before
the Regional Office of the CSC was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Finally, he pleads that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits
is too harsh considering the nature of the offense for which he was convicted,
the length of his service in government, that this is his first offense, and the
fact that no damage was caused to the government.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible because he was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when
questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such
investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section
12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. [if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at
times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing
laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a
respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is
clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule
XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public
10
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of
government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating
authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the
investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The investigation was
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there is a
prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by
the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof
and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by
Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his
dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial
admission and that he merely signed a blank form cannot be given credence.
Remolona occupies a high position in government as Postmaster at Infanta,
Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions specially
where he is being administratively charged with a grave offense which carries
the penalty of dismissal from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due
process under Section 2(3), Article XI (B) of the Constitution which provides
that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause. Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable
under the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act must have been
committed in the performance of his function and duty as Postmaster.
Considering that the charge of dishonesty involves the falsification of the
certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on
his office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This
proposition is untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense
punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of
the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is
that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for
the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty
of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The
Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he
performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government
position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his
office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders
the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed
and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The
private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to
continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. [if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the
object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in the government.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body
are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not
only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. [if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of
evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Thus, when confronted with conflicting
versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in
the exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the
basis of the evidence received.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] The rule, therefore, is
that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]
We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we
find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the
Court of Appeals. The written admission of Remolona is replete with details
that could have been known only to him. No ill-motive or bad faith was ever
imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the investigation. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed remains
unrebutted.
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
formal hearing before the CSC is entirely a matter of discretion on the part of
the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court
clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is
within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of
the proceedings under review transmitted to it.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Verily,
11
the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the case on the bases of the
uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by the
parties.
We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the
penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that there was no damage caused
to the government since the certificate of rating was never used to get an
appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary damage
was incurred by the government, there was still falsification of an official
document that constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be countenanced,
considering that he was an accountable officer and occupied a sensitive
position.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting
a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Right to counsel before officer conducting preliminary investigation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

12
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57184-85 November 14, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIA ABANO, ELISEO CABAÑA alias LUCIO CABAÑA and
PABLO CABAÑA alias TEOFILO CABAÑA, defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, J.:
Before Us on automatic review is the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit
Criminal Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148,
which found Eugenia Abano guilty of the crimes of parricide and murder, and
Eliseo and Teofilo, both surnamed Cabana, of two murders. Two death
penalties were imposed on each of the accused.
The information dated May 7, 1980 in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2147
for parricide and murder alleges:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1980 at 11:30 o'clock in the evening,
more or less, in Sitio Tunga, Barangay Cantuod, Municipality of Balamban,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Eugenia Abano, then united in lawful
wedlock with Agripino Abano, and conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another with Eliseo Cabana alias Lucio Cabana and Pablo
Cabana alias Teofilo Cabana, armed with sharp bladed weapons, with evident
premeditation and treachery and in consideration of a prize or reward for the
accomplishment of their criminal purposes, with deliberate intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab
the said Agripino Abano with the weapons aforecited thereby inflicting upon
the latter multiple wounds on the vital parts of the body which injuries caused,
as a consequence, the instantaneous death of the victim.
In addition to the above qualifying circumstances, the offense was committed
with the aid of armed men; superior strength and arms; nighttime; in
consideration of the prize or reward and perpetrated in the dwelling of the
victim.
Except for the difference in the name of the accused, the absence of the
allegation on the accused's relationship to the victim and the fact that
Bienvenida Cumad is Identified as the victim, the information for murder in
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2148 is also dated May 7, 1980 and couched
in basically the same language.
The prosecution's version of the crimes is as follows:
Eugenia Tolero Abano and Agripino Abano were married in 1948. 1 At the
time of the commission of the crimes in February, 1980, they had been
separated for three years. Eugenia, who was then 57 years old, stayed in the
conjugal home in Cumbado, Balamban, Cebu with two of their children, one
of whom was mentally incapacitated. To support her dependents, Eugenia
worked as copra-maker earning eight pesos a day.
Agripino, 55 years old, lived with another woman, 50-year old widow
Bienvenida Cumad, at the Abanos' hut some 400 meters away from the
conjugal home. Only a bridge separated the Abanos' conjugal home from the
hut which was actually located in Tunga, Cantuod, Balamban, Cebu.
Behind Eugenia's house was another hut which used to be a pig pen. Elevated
from the ground by about two feet, only a sack served as its door. It was
occupied by Rodolfo Abano, a son of Eugenia and Agripino, and his family.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February 7, 1980, Rodolfo's wife,
Concordia, saw Eugenia partaking of supper with Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo
Cabana at the former's house. Concordia knew Eliseo and Teofilo because
they were medicine men or quack doctors who frequented Cumbado to treat
sick persons.
Just before midnight or at around 11:30 o'clock that night, Concordia was
sleeping near the door of their hut, with her four children lying between her
and her husband, when she was awakened by someone pulling her hair. As
the hut was lighted by a kerosene lamp, she recognized the man pulling her
hair to be Eliseo. With Eliseo was his son, Teofilo. Eliseo was standing on
the ground but he was able to reach for her hair use of her position near the
door.
Eliseo tried to cover her mouth and cautioned her not to make any noise.
Afraid of what he might do to her with the bolo [pinuti] she noticed he was
carrying, Concordia jumped out of the hut. Eliseo then ordered her to
accompany him to her father-in-law, Agripino. Along the way, Eliseo and
Teofilo instructed her to tell Agripino that his son Rodolfo [Concordia's
husband] was suffering from a stomach ache and that he should be brought
to a doctor.
Upon reaching Agripino's hut, Concordia called him saying, "Tay, Tay, wake
up, bring Rudy to the doctor because he is suffering stomach ache." 2
Agripino answered by asking her why Rudy had stomach ache. Concordia
told him that Rudy had eaten something raw.
Eliseo then dragged Concordia towards the road, pointed the bolo at her and
said, "You run now, but do not tell your husband about this because if you
will tell him I win kill your husband and all the members of your family." 3
Concordia ran and hid for some time under the big stove between Eugenia's
house and her hut before proceeding home.
13
Delia Cumad, the 15-year-old daughter of Bienvenida, who was then sleeping
in one of the two rooms of Agripino's hut was likewise awakened by
Concordia's voice. She heard Concordia telling Agripino that Rudy was sick
because he ate something raw. Then she noticed Agripino pass by her on his
way to the hut's door. When Agripino was already downstairs, Delia heard an
impact the sound of which resembled that of the hacking of a banana trunk. 4
Then she heard Agripino calling out, "Day, help Day, I am hacked." Delia
tried to prevent her mother Bienvenida from going down the hut but the latter
persisted. Bienvenida brought along a kerosene lamp. Because she was afraid,
Delia did not even try to peep through the window to see what was happening.
Neither did she hear Bienvenida and Agripino mention any names while they
were outside the hut. 5
Almost an hour later, Delia came down the hut. She looked for Agripino and
Bienvenida but failed to find them. Scared, she ran to the house of Rosario
Montero. On the way, Delia met Rudy and Concordia Abano. Rudy asked her
where she was going. Delia replied that she was going to the house of Rosario
Montero. She did not tell them what happened to Agripino and Bienvenida.
As it was too quiet in Rosario's house, Delia proceeded to the house of Pesing
Baynas to whom she related what had transpired at their hut. Pesing
accompanied her back to their hut. Four meters from that hut, they found the
lifeless body of Bienvenida.
Rodolfo Abano was awakened by his mother Eugenia at around midnight.
She asked him to transport Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to Matab-ang, Toledo
City in his motorized tricycle. When Rodolfo said that he would rather
transport them in the morning, Eugenia told him that Eliseo and Teofilo were
in a hurry.
At that time, Concordia was feeding her baby but she accompanied Rodolfo
to the garage to get the motorized tricycle. It was on the way to the garage
that they met Delia Cumad.
From the garage, Rodolfo went back to his hut where, after Concordia had
alighted from the tricycle, Eugenia boarded it. Near her house, Eugenia got
off and Eliseo and Teofilo boarded the tricycle. As he was ferrying them to
Matab-ang, Rodolfo noticed that they were carrying a piece of sack that was
rolled over a two-feet-long object. From Matab-ang, Rodolfo went back to
Cantuod. There he met Bernie Verdeflor who told him that his father and his
common-law wife were dead.
Bienvenida D. Cumad died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock
and hemorrhage due to multiple wounds on the neck [head], trunk and
extremities." 6 In the medico-legal necropsy report, she is Identified as
Bienvenida Delfin Abano. 7 Actually, her maiden name was Bienvenida
Mancia Delfin but she was mistaken for the legal wife of Agripino by Doctor
Ladislao V. Diola, Jr. who conducted the autopsy on the two victims. 8
Bienvenida sustained an avulsion which penetrated her skull and four
lacerated wounds in the anterior portion of the neck, the right lumbar region,
the right iliac region and the right wrist. The inferior vena cava on both sides
of her neck and the left carotid arteries were lacerated. 9
Agripino Albano also died of "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock
and hemorrhage due to multiple wounds on the head, trunk and extremeties."
10
He sustained twelve lacerated wounds and an abrasion on the head and
neck, and twenty-one lacerated wounds, five stab wounds and an avulsion in
his trunk and extremities. He had a half-moon fracture in his cranium
extending from the left to the right temporal bone and other fractures in his
orbital and ethmoidal bones, third cervical vertebra, seventh rib and left
elbow joint. He also suffered a subarachnoidal hemorrhage of the brain, and
laceration in his upper lobe left lung, middle lobe right lung, septum, right
ventricle and right kidney. 11
In the course of the investigation conducted by the police, Delia Cumad,
Rodolfo Abano, Concordia Abano, Eugenia Abano, Eliseo Cabana and Pablo
[Teofilo] Cabana were interrogated. Significantly, only the interrogations of
Rodolfo and Delia were reduced to writing. 12
In his sworn statement, 13 Rodolfo narrated that at about twelve noon of
February 9, 1980, his mother, Eugenia, revealed to him that she hired Eliseo
and Pablo [Teofilo] Cabana to kill Agripino and his common-law wife.
Because of that statement, Vicente S. Cabahug, the substation commander of
the Balamban Police Force, interrogated Eugenia. At the trial court, Cabahug
related how he investigated Eugenia. He testified thus:
Q. After the revelation of Rodolfo Abano that it was her mother who hired
the other two accused to kill the deceased Agripino Abano and Bienvenida
Cumad, what else did you do?
A. After the revelation of the said Rodolfo Abano of the killing of the father
and the common-law wife, I investigated Eugenia Abano as she was made to
stay around, then at about 11:00 o'clock on February 11 in the morning, 1980,
she admitted and confirmed the revelation of her son, Rodolfo Abano.
COURT [To the witness]:
Q. But what did she admit?
A. She admitted and she narrated to me that she even burst into tears telling
me of the agony that she suffered for the last three years her husband was
living in the house with a girl aside from her and they were living 200 meters
away where she lives and she confided and confessed that she was forced to
hire the two accused, these Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to kill her husband and
14
common-law wife. 14
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VELOSO:
Q. According to you, Eugenia Abano admitted hiring the present two accused
who appeared to be father and son.
A. Yes.
Q. Now. You asked her what was the prize or reward?
A. Yes, I asked her.
Q. What did she say?
A. According to Eugenia Abano she told the two accused, Teofilo and Eliseo
Cabana that the consideration was the proceeds of the passenger tricycle that
she was going to sell after the killing of her husband and the paramour.
Q. In other words, she promised to pay the consideration after the act of
killing has already taken place?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she tell you what guarantee she issued in order that the father and son
Cabanas would really execute the act?
A. She did not give any guarantee.
Q. So that was only the promise?
A. According to her only the promise. 15
According to Cabahug, he reduced Eugenia's statement in writing but he did
not bring his notes in court because they were "just more or less [a] scratch."
16
On the strength of those confessions, Cabahug filed on February 11, 1980, a
complaint for parricide with murder and double murder against Eugenia and
"Eliseo Doe and Pablo Doe" before the municipal circuit court of Balamban-
Asturias. Said complaint was amended three times: first, to fill in the full
names of Eliseo and Teofilo; second, to include "Cording Abano" as one of
the accused; and third, to reflect Concordia's full name.
On February 14, 1980, the municipal circuit judge issued a warrant for the
arrest of Eugenia, Concordia, Eliseo and "Pablo." 17 Eugenia and Concordia
voluntarily surrendered to the police. 18 Eliseo was arrested in Toledo City
while he and his wife were selling mangoes. 19 He led the arresting officers
to Pinamungahan, Cebu, where his son Teofilo [Pablo] was also arrested. 20
After their arrest Eliseo and Teofilo were interrogated by Cabahug thus:
Q. Having arrested both Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, did you investigate them?
A. No. Because we brought along with us Eliseo Cabana to Pinamungahan
and put him in jail when we went up the mountain to arrest Eliseo [sic]
Cabana. When Teofilo Cabana arrived after his arrest we confronted [sic]
them to the Pinamungahan Police Station. When they were confronted by us
they admitted that they were the ones who killed Agripino Abano and
Bienvenida Cumad. Eliseo Cabana admitted that he was the one who killed
Agripino Abano while the other one, Teofilo Cabana admitted that he was the
one who killed Bienvenida Cumad.
Q. Who was present when you interrogated Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana?
A. We were plenty. We have T/Sgt. Paddy. Baron, Pat. Kiyamko, Pat.
Cabanero, then we have Pat. Leonor Dagohoy of the Pinamungahan Police
Station and Antonio Mahinay also of the Pinamungahan Police Station were
present when we confronted Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana at the Pinamungahan
Police Station
Q. In your investigation of the accused Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana
did you come to know what weapons were used by them in the commission
of the crime?
A. We asked them the weapon that they used.
Q. What was their answer?
A. Eliseo Cabana said he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti and Teofilo
Cabana admitted also that he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti. 21
The municipal circuit judge set the preliminary investigation of the case on
February 9, 1980. On that date, all the accused appeared in court but they
were not assisted by counsel. Eugenia and Concordia manifested that they
wanted the investigation postponed to February 28. Notwithstanding, the
investigating judge assigned one Atty. Sarmiento as counsel for Concordia
who was thereafter investigated. 22
Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana waived their right to present evidence in the
preliminary investigation. Eugenia also waived her right to further
preliminary investigation. 23 Those waivers were the subject of two orders
both dated February 28, 1980. 24
At the continuation of the investigation on March 4, 1980, Atty. Cosme
Montesclaros, who "appeared for the accused" but who was actually
appearing only for Concordia, presented Eugenia as a witness. She testified
that on February 3, 1980, she forged an agreement with Eliseo and Teofilo to
kin Agripino and Bienvenida as she herself could not "do it" because she is a
woman and that on the night of February 7, she was with Eliseo and Teofilo
when they threatened and pulled the hair of Concordia although she did not
proceed to the latter's hut. 25
In view of Eugenia's admissions, Atty. Montesclaros moved to dismiss the
charge against Concordia on the ground that she was threatened at that time.
26
Said counsel then filed a memorandum in support of said motion to dismiss.
27
The prosecution opposed it alleging that Concordia's defense of duress was
incredible and fabricated because she was a "principal by direct participation
15
and indispensable cooperation." 28
Nevertheless, on March 13, 1980, the investigating judge issued an order
discharging Concordia as an accused and forwarding the records of the case
to the Court of First Instance for trial on the merits. In ordering Concordia's
discharge the investigating judge noted that she was a mother of four children
the youngest of whom was still being breastfed for which reason she should
not be made "to undergo the travails of confinement in jail pending
termination" of the case for humanitarian considerations. 29
Thereafter, the assistant provincial fiscal filed the two informations quoted
and mentioned earlier. At their arraignment, the three accused pleaded not
guilty. 30
They interposed alibi as their defense. Eugenia testified that on February 7,
1980, she was making copra in Singing, Balamban until 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon when she returned home. She did not entertain any visitors and was
in bed at 8:00 o'clock. She was awakened at 4:00 o'clock the following
morning by Rodolfo who informed her that his Papa had been killed. 31
Eugenia narrated that when she asked Rodolfo who killed his father, Rodolfo
answered that he did not know. She told him to report the killing to the
municipal authorities but she herself was detained and investigated by the
police on suspicion that she "caused the death" of her husband. 32 On her
detention and investigation, Eugenia testified thus:
COURT [To witness]:
Q. You were detained ahead of Concordia Abano?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. COURT. Proceed.
A. ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —
Q. How about your co-accused , did you see them in that detention cell where
you and Concordia Abano were detained?
A. Yes, after they were arrested.
Q. By the way, where did the police actually place you?
A. In the office of the Chief of Police.
Q. Do you mean to say you were not actually placed inside the cell?
A. That is right.
Q. Concordia Abano testified before this Court that sometime on February
14, 1980 you confided to her that you were the one who instigated the two
accused to kill your husband in consideration of a reward in concept of the
proceeds of the motorcycle which was in the possession of your husband,
what can you say to that?
A. That is not true.
Q. What is the truth then?
A. I never told Concordia that I was the one who instigated the two accused
to kill my husband and give them rewards out of the proceeds of the
motorcycle in the possession of my husband because I do not have possession
of the motorcycle. After my husband lived with another woman he brought
the motorcycle and it was my son who drove that motorcycle in conducting
passengers.
Q. Who is that son?
Q. Rodolfo Abano.
A. Rodolfo Abano testified that on February 9, 1980 he went to your house
and there you confessed to him that you were the one who induced the two
accused in consideration of a reward to kill your husband and his paramour,
what can you say to this testimony?
Q. That is not true.
A. What is the truth?
Q. I did not tell him that I instigated the killing of my husband. I never had
any ire against my husband.
A. Do you know Lt. Vicente Cabahug
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Lt. Cabahug testified that you told him that you were the one who induced
the two other accused to kin your husband and his paramour in consideration
of a reward, what can you say about this?
Q. It was Vicente Cabahug who told me to admit everything so that my
daughter-in-law will not be implicated and that I will not be included in the
case, instead I will be made a witness for the prosecution
A. Can you give any reason why Concordia Abano and Rudy Abano would
testify against you in these cases?
Q. Yes, sir, it is because the police had requested Rudy to ask me to admit so
that Concordia will be dropped from the case because she has many children
and I will not be included and instead I will be made a witness.
COURT [To witness]:
Q. Do you mean to say that you admit the crime only for this reason?
A. I was compelled to tell statements against myself because the Chief of
Police told me that I will not be included in this case. 33
Eugenia acknowledged that she had a lawyer during the preliminary
investigation but her lawyer, Atty. Rafael de la Victoria, was absent during
its continuation on March 4, 1981. She testified further:
Q. Do you know the reason why the Court proceeded with the preliminary
investigation in the absence of your lawyer?
FISCAL —
The witness is incompetent.
16
COURT —
May answer.
WITNESS-
A. Yes, I know.
ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —
Q. What was the purpose?
A. So that Concordia Abano will be released.
Q. Were you able to testify in that preliminary investigation which was
conducted on March 4, 1980 by the Municipal Court of Balamban?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who presented you there since you were not represented by a lawyer?
A. They forced me to testify so that Concordia will be released.
Q. Who forced you?
A. The Chief of Police.
Q. Can you tell the court what have you testified in that proceeding.?
A. I testified there against myself because I cannot bear looking at my
grandchildren, the children of Concordia Abano who were small and who
were in jail with Concordia and who were crying all the time and Concordia
requested me to own everything in this case so she will be released.
Q. What was the result of that hearing on preliminary investigation on March
4, 1980?
A. Concordia was released,
COURT [To witness]:
Q. You said that you were unable to bear the sight of your grandchildren in
jail and so you managed to have Concordia Abano released, what did you
testify to in the preliminary investigation that caused Concordia Abano to be
released?
A. I testified there that I was the one who ordered because I was confused
that time.
Q. Order to what?
A. I was the one who ordered the killing.
Q. Whom?
A. My husband.
Q. What was your reason for being confused. That is not a reason for ordering
the killing?
A. I was confused of the sorrows I felt that I was suspected of ordering the
killing of my husband. I did not do it.
Q. Did you not state for the reason of the killing the fact that your husband
was living with another woman?
A. That is not true, because, although my husband was living with that woman
for three years I never did anything against him because I have no ill-reefing
against my husband.
ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —
I want to make of record that the witness is crying in the course of her
testimony on that point.
COURT —
Make it of record. 34
On cross-examination, Eugenia disclosed that she allowed Agripino and
Bienvenida to live in their conjugal hut on the land of
Mendoza which she and Agripino used to till as tenants therein, because
Agripino was "brave" and he used to box and maltreat her whenever she
expressed her objection to Agripino's cohabitation with Bienvenida. Eugenia
surmised that it was his paramour who induced her husband to maltreat her
so that she would die and Agripino and Bienvenida would Eugenia also
admitted that she knew be free to live together. 35 Eliseo and "Pablo" Cabana
because as quack doctors, they treated the children of Rodolfo. 36
According to Eugenia, she voluntarily went to the municipal building on
February 11, 1980 to seek protection after she heard rumors that Agripino's
brothers and sisters were threatening to kill her. 37 In the municipal building,
Rodolfo requested her to admit the crimes so that his wife could be released
and then, he apologized to her for the statements against her that he had given
the police. 38 Eugenia insisted that she admitted participation in the crimes
because of the request of her son. 39
To establish the whereabouts of Eliseo Cabana when the crimes were
committed, the defense presented in court his wife, Patricia. She testified that
on the night of February 7, her husband was at home in Bairan, Toledo City
and that when she woke up at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, Eliseo was still
asleep. 40 She stated that her husband did not use Lucio as an alias because
he was known as either Li or Eli among his friends and neighbors. 41
Eliseo himself admitted that he was familiarly known as Eli. 42 He was a
farmer who was also engaged in mending pots and pans and in making
handles or scabbards of bolos. He denied being a quack doctor. 43
After he and his son Teofilo were arrested on February 14, 1980 in Toledo
City and Pinamungahan, respectively, they were detained at the Balamban
jail, where they were handcuffed the whole night. When their handcuffs were
removed in the morning, a policeman told them that two deaths had occurred
in Cantuod and, with a gun pointed at them, that policeman told them to admit
the killings otherwise he would break their heads. Eliseo was not able to say
a thing but he took cover behind a cemented wall. Later, a policeman named
Boy Rosario told them to affix their thumbmarks to a document the contents
17
of which were not read to them. 44
It was Rodolfo Abano or Rudy who categorically told them to admit having
perpetrated the killings and to produce two bolos so they could be exonerated.
45
One of the bolos thus presented was owned by Ambrosio Pilapil. 46 Eliseo
told the police about it and the latter took it from Pilapil sometime in
February, 1980. Pilapil had delivered it to Eliseo in order that a scabbard
could be made for it and Eliseo returned it to Pilapil on February 25, 1980. 47
The other bolo, Exhibit B, was recovered in Eliseo's house by the police.
According to Eliseo, Rudy Abano left it with him early in the morning of
February 8, 1980 with the intention of bartering it with one chicken which
Rudy needed for his daughter's birthday. 48
Eliseo expressed his belief that Rodolfo and Concordia Abano were involved
in the killings but that they pointed to other persons indiscriminately so that
they could extricate themselves from the charges. 49 Although he admitted
having been convicted of homicide in another case, Eliseo denied
involvement in the murders of Agripino and Bienvenida. 50
For his part, Teofilo Cabana, a farmer and coconut-gatherer, testified that on
February 7 and 8, 1980, he was in his house in Binabag, Pinamungahan,
Cebu. 51 He denied having participated in the murders of Agripino and
Bienvenida. 52 He stated that he did not use Pablo as an alias and labelled as
lies the prosecution's allegation that he and his father were quack doctors.
Special counsel Gabriel Trocio, Jr. testified that on February 27, 1980, he
administered the oath of Rodolfo Abano who retracted his statement
implicating his own mother. In his sworn retraction, Rodolfo stated that he
was forced to make said statement because he wanted his wife to be released
as he and his wife were in a "difficult and bitter situation" inasmuch as his
pregnant wife had to breastfeed their youngest child in jail. 53
Defense counsel Rafael de la Victoria testified that on February 18, 1980,
Rodolfo Abano sought the help of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in
behalf of his wife and mother. 54 He asserted that contrary to Rodolfo's
allegation, the latter voluntarily executed his affidavit of retraction. 55
According to Atty. De la Victoria, he filed before the investigating judge a
motion to postpone the preliminary investigation on February 28, 1980 to
March 6, 1980 56 but it was not acted upon. When he learned that Eugenia
confessed during the continuation of the preliminary investigation on March
4, 1980 while he, as her counsel could not appear in court, Atty. De la Victoria
confronted Eugenia who told him that she was "constrained" to make self-
incriminating statements during that hearing. 57 Consequently, on March 8,
1980, Eugenio executed a sworn statement professing innocence of the
crimes charged against her and stating that she made self-incriminating
statements because of her confused mind and her pity for Concordia whom
she wanted released from jail because she was breastfeeding a child and her
other children were all crying inside the jail. 58
The prosecution did not present any rebuttal witnesses.
On January 27, 1981, the lower court rendered the decision under
consideration. The lower court stated that the "web of circumstantial
evidence" produced "beyond all doubt, complete proof of the guilt" of
Eugenia Abano as principal by inducement and Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana as
principals by direct and actual participation. 59 It considered as "evidence of
high caliber and of great persuasive value" Eugenia's confession which, it
believed, "was not extracted from her under custodial interrogation by police
authorities." 60
In the instant mandatory review, Eugenia Abano, through her counsel de
oficio, contends that the lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against her, her
alleged verbal extrajudicial confession and her inculpatory statements during
the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980 after she had waived her right
to such investigation, in the absence of her counsel and without her being
informed of her rights under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, and
[b] failing to acquit her in both cases on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, the same counsel de oficio avers that the
lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against them their alleged extrajudicial
confession and that of their co-accused, Eugenia Abano, as well as the latter's
confession during the preliminary investigation; [b] giving fun faith and
credit to the testimony of Concordia Abano and [c] failing to acquit the
accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.
In view of the absence of eyewitnesses to the killings, the confessions of the
accused are of great importance in the disposition of these cases.
Understandably, the appellant's assignments of errors are focused on the issue
of whether the rights of the accused had been properly protected when they
made self-incriminating statements. The Constitutional provision involved
states thus:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. [Art. IV]
As the confessions in question were taken during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution" the aforequoted constitutional provision is applicable in this
18
case. 61
In People vs. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379, this
Court discussed extensively the procedural safeguards for in-custody
interrogation of accused persons. In that case, wherein no eyewitnesses
testified to the brutal killing of an octogenarian, the chief of police,
corroborated by the sworn statements of two other policemen, testified that
the accused voluntarily confessed to the killing. In ruling against the
admissibility of the alleged oral confession, this Court stressed the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove that before the accused made his alleged oral
confession, he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
as there was no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.
The Duero ruling is applicable in this case.
While Eugenia Abano was free to go home from February 8, 1980 when she
was first "invited" for questioning by Chief of Police Cabahug until the time
she confessed on February 11, 1980, she was in fact in the custody of the
police notwithstanding Cabahug's assertion that she was "not exactly placed
in jail." 62
Concededly, Cabahug informed Eugenia that she needed a lawyer. But there
is no proof that Cabahug offered to secure one of her at the instance of the
State especially after she had manifested that she could not afford to hire her
own counsel. 63 Cabahug's omission to make such offer is a grave one. It
rendered her alleged confession inadmissible. 64
Similarly, there is no evidence that Eugenia was informed of her right to
remain silent. Neither is there proof that she had voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived that right. 65
Moreover, as the unchallenged testimony of Eugenia reveals, she made the
confession because the chief of police promised that she would "not be
included in the case" as she would be discharged as a prosecution witness.
Considering her emotional and mental state at that time, that promise must
have overcome Eugenia's better judgment. It became a factor which
contributed to the inadmissibility of her confession. 66
Chief of police Cabahug's uncorroborated testimony on the confessions of
Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana is likewise bereft of indications that he had
observed the procedural safeguards mandated by the Constitution to which
the Cabanas are entitled as a matter of right. In fact, from Eliseo's unrebutted
testimony, use of threats to extract their alleged confessions is evident. 67
We agree with the Solicitor General that the municipal judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation need not apprise Eugenia of the nature and
gravity of the charges against her and the consequences of her admission
thereof when she appeared as witness for Concordia Abano. During that
investigation, all that was needed was for the investigating judge to remind
her that she was under oath and that she should "ten the truth and nothing but
the truth."
But the Solicitor General overlooked an aspect in the presentation of Eugenia
as her daughter-in-law's witness which cannot pass the test of fundamental
fairness. She was presented as such witness after she had waived her right to
preliminary investigation and at a time when she was unassisted by counsel.
As it were, Eugenia, an unschooled copra-maker, was left to fend for herself
in a proceeding wherein she herself was the accused.
What added gall to her bitter predicament was the fact that she was presented
as a witness to forestall the further detention of her daughter-in-law and insure
the latter's discharge as her co-accused only to find herself in the precarious
situation of answering questions the implications of which may have been
beyond her comprehension. Ironically, the investigating judge cited "human
considerations" as a reason for discharging Concordia as an accused,
unmindful of the fact that in allowing Eugenia to incriminate herself, he was
trampling on her rights as an accused.
As this Court enunciated in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, L-29169, August
19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 680 and in Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483, 488,
the rule against self-incrimination positively intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction." In the Chavez case, we express the
view that the rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial
The situation would have been different had Eugenia been assisted by counsel
during the preliminary investigation For the- she could have availed herself
of legal advice on when to refrain from answering incriminating questions.
We consider the absence of Eugenia's counsel when she appeared as witness
during the preliminary investigation as an irreparable damage which rendered
inadmissible her alleged confession.
The inadmissibility in evidence of the accused's extrajudicial confession,
notwithstanding, We find the "web of circumstantial evidence" which the trial
court found sufficient for conviction, to have remained unimpaired. Under
Section 5 of Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
[a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
These requirements have been satisfied in the case at bar.
Concordia testified that she saw Eugenia Abano with her co-accused, Eliseo
and Teofilo Cabana, taking supper together at the former's house hours before
the commission of the crimes; that Eliseo and Teofilo forced her [Concordia]
19
to accompany them to Agripino's hut and in order to draw Agripino out of
said hut, instructed her to say that her husband Rodolfo needed to be brought
to a doctor because of a stomach ache; and that after she returned to her hut,
Eugenia woke Rodolfo to ask him to bring Eliseo and Teofilo in his motorized
tricycle to Matab-ang, Toledo City. This testimony was not rebutted, but in
fact corroborated in part by Delia Cumad, who testified to hearing Concordia
calling to Agripino to bring Rodolfo to a doctor as he was suffering from a
stomach ache; and by Rodolfo himself, who testified to his being roused from
sleep by his mother Eugenia with the request to bring the Cabanas to Matab-
ang, Toledo City. Noteworthy is the fact that her request came shortly after
the victims were hacked to death as it was while Rodolfo and Concordia were
on their way to get the tricycle from the garage that they met Delia, who was
then on her way to a neighbor's house to seek help.
Rodolfo testified that from the garage, he went back to his hut, where after
Concordia had alighted from the tricycle, Eugenia, boarded it up to a place
near the latter's hut where she got off and the Cabanas in turn boarded it.
Rodolfo likewise stated that he noticed the Cabanas carrying a piece of sack
rolled over a two-foot object.
The events narrated by Concordia, Delia and Rodolfo constitute an unbroken
chain of natural and rational circumstances, which corroborate each other and
point beyond reasonable doubt to the complicity of the accused in the crimes.
The defense attempted to discredit Concordia by turning the tables on her. No
reason nor motive was however proferred why Concordia would commit the
crimes or why she would falsely accuse her own mother-in-law and the
Cabanas, who were virtual strangers and against whom she held no grudge,
of crimes so grave. On the other hand, among the persons implicated, it was
Eugenia Abano who had the motive to order the killing of her husband and
his paramour. Her initial protestation that she harbored no ill-feelings toward
her husband and his common-law wife was totally negated by her very own
testimony that Agripino used to box and maltreat her every time she objected
to his cohabitation with Bienvenida and the suspicion she expressed that it
was Bienvenida who induced her husband to maltreat her so that she would
die and they would be free to live together. Because her husband was "brave"
she could not do anything openly about the situation and she merely kept her
resentment concealed within her. Human nature as it is, the tendency is for
pent-up emotions to grow and magnify, rather than diminish and disappear,
particularly where the cause thereof is constantly present, as in the case at
bar, and it is not uncommon in the realm of human experience for such
emotions to burst and translate themselves into violence-thus, the so-called
crimes of passion.
The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. How
she must have suffered during the three years that her husband lived with his
paramour. The wound in her heart, occasioned by the separation, never had a
chance to heal, but was kept raw and bleeding by the brazen and cruel
behavior of her husband maintaining a love nest so near the abandoned wife.
Four hundred meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so
in a rural community where the next-door neighbor may be housed at an even
greater distance. It is indeed in cases like this, that the bounden duty of the
court to apply the law becomes a painful task and the maxim "dura lex, sed
lex" makes its full impact felt. In view of the exceptional circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, the Court recommends executive clemency for
accused-appellant Eugenia Abano.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, is hereby
affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnities for the heirs of the
deceased Agripino Abano and the heirs of the deceased Bienvenida Cumad
are hereby increased to P30,000.00 each. For lack of necessary votes, the two
death penalties imposed on each of the accused are hereby commuted to
reclusion perpetua. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Minister of
Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Right to counsel during identification confrontation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
20
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984,
which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of P12,000.00 and to
pay the costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel,
Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his
death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the sand
and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate,
15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when
they are applied with more jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the
disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accused-appellant, belongs to this
class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor,
marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence,
following the odyssey of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area
to another in order to escape the ravages of internicine war and rebellion in
Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family
had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His existence
in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been
registered in the Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to which he
belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for
the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the
police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and
Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for
the prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and that Usman Hassan must, therefore, be set free.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when
he testified, married, and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the
killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of the father of the
deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February
3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of July 23, 1981; that he was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon
when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone
in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab
Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about
two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was selecting
mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the
stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the
cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face
but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel,
Jr. was holding the motorcycle with both of his hands, the assailant come
from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on his chest
while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able
to see the assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing
the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit
stand a — distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and
maong pants, but "he did not see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the
assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not exactly see what kind
of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he brought
the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to know that
he was already dead, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and his
appearance.
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of the
one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La
Merced?
A Yes, sir,
Q Can you recall what time was that?
A I do not know what time was that.
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the
accused?
A...
21
Q For Identification?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
A Yes he was alone.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel
business, do you have any blood relationship with them?
A Yes. sir. 6
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only
on July 25, 1981, two days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27,
1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after the killing, was never
presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was
practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the
People, during his cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the
following questions and answers:
xxx xxx xxx
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the incident
you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person
whom I can recognize by face if seen again embraced my companion Ramon
Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the area.
That this person without much ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed
him (Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other
and immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long hair,
dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or
less 5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person fled the area I
immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him
to Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may companion
(Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any words to me for he was in serious
condition and few minutes later, he expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack (sic)
Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed
your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La
Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were confronted with one Usman
Hassan, whom this Officer brought along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.
Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your companion,
Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully noted by me
and this I cannot forget for the rest of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued while in
the process of buying some mangoes in that area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman Hassan
in stabbing your companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything more
to say, add or alter in this statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in the
future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is
substantially the same as that embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C",
by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the
prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an
unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without
any provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same
allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that
it confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in the
funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness,
Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter
Trade, wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong,
this City, was arrested in connection with the above stated incident. That this
Officer and companions arrested this person Usman due to his physical
appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson.
During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade
22
was confiscated in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought
along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims
companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson positively
Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub
and admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he
used said knife for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy
the quantum of proof — beyond reasonable doubt — required by the
Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused
person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow
us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun
guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn
him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a
sea of convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must
not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of
innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are
weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of
the constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-
foil to the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the
inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That
evidence, as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the
two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore
suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and
unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be introduced by Police
Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin
Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the
testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the
witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his
chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds,
one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another
stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical
expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which
was the cause of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the
alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the
Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City, particularly by
Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we
are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the
Identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman
Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police investigator
and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions,
at the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As
correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure
adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose
Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio
testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson for
confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio
made a turnabout by saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a
"police line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more
the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the leading
questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if not sincerity, on
the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in
his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused
testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to
Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as the police
investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his examination-in-
chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio.
There was no such police investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the
accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in the police line-
up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where there was none,
activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as
eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of
Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific
crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands
neither our respect nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the
self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the
latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a
crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At
23
that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly
against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness
Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of
the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within
the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this
infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the
investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution
were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially. Samson was not
investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously
mentioned, his statement was taken by the investigator only two days after
the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been
taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendor—
from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful
evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was
investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as
to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested
him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M.,
according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime, was
not also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the
killing or of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its
scabbard, 23 Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the right side of
his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at
all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and
compared with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test — had
Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it — would
have revealed whether or not the knife in question (confiscated from the
accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had
indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead
nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife could
have been cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This
presumption of the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is
tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution,
25
in a separate case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and
deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly reveals that
on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar
stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident,
with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa,
'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long
record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa
was tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and
the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The
said resolution further states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses
ever testified for fear of possible reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself
was killed by a policeman on August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently
under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was) molesting and
extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The
records of the case at bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal
Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in
connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police
character that made the police officers disregard the possible connection
between the slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang
of the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar
Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have
provided that vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But
why should the police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was
already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead,
became a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to
wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he is so marginalized as to
claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police
investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not
scientific, conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State
was too awesome for him to counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he
was arrested at the former barter trade, which is a place just across the place
of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore
strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the
barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to the
city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes home at past 5:00
o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation
— that, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take
him home — was found by the trial court as 'flimsy and weak since he did
not explain why he had to go home late that evening." 32 But the whole trouble
is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any single question to
the accused, and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of
clarification, if only to put on record what the mother and son could articulate
with clarity. Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy, the mother and
24
son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to the
prosecution witnesses during their examination by asking them clarificatory
and mostly leading questions. In that sense and to that extent, the accused was
disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the
accused but the importance of which was brushed away by the trial judge was
the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters away)
soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although Police
Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his
pushcart with a companion. If he were the assailant, he would have fled. But
the trial court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that the
accused 'was lulled by a false sense of security in returning to the place (of
the stabbing), when no police officers immediately responded and appeared
at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the past where
criminals return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist
can explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has
no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally classed with
criminals. In the second place, the trial court's rationalization ignores the
biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with approval by
this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous
are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total
absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete
stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to
arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, 35
procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that
a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack
of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal.
This is especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36
as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which
the trial court disregarded the claimed young age of Usman Hassan.
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such
claim on the testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who
declared that her son Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was
born in the year 1967. She testified that she was just told by a person coming
from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman. However on
cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the date or year
of birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the
date or year of birth of her children is of course understandable, considering
that she is unschooled and she belongs to a tribe that does not register births,
deaths or marriages, however, it is strange that she only took pains to find out
the year of birth of her son Usman. For this reason, the Court granted a motion
of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein accused examined
by a competent dentist to determine his age. However, the findings of the
dentist of Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows
the following: "age cannot be determined accurately under present mouth
conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age." This
simply means that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21
years of age, or any age in between those aforestated years. From the
observation of this court, the accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of
age at the time he committed this crime and this observation is based on his
personal appearance, his size and facial features and other personal
characteristics, hence he can not be classified as a youthful offender under
Article. 189 of Presendential Decree No. 603, as ammended by Presedential
Decree No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs.
Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it
was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit is
at issue as a basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is
incumbent upon the accused to establish that circumstance ad any other
elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment
or cause the suspension of his sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively
of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more meticulousness and care
should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance
on the observation of the judge as had happened in this case. The preliminary
findings of the dentist that the accused could be anywhere between fourteen
to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate
determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial
judge on notice that there is the probability that the accused might be
exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing
indicates that the accused had not been granted the concern and compassion
with which the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve.
It is when judicial and police processes and procedures are thoughtlessly and
haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied the poor
are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment now, considering
the acquittal of the accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman
Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His release from
confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause. With
25
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Uncounselled confession inadmissible

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125938. April 4, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY
PINANTAO alias OGCO, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XVII, Kidapawan, Cotabato promulgated on September 15, 1995,
declaring appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with rape, and sentencing
each of them to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and ordering them to pay
P30,000.00 and P10,000.00 in favor of Marites Alcantara and Cesario
Alcantara, respectively.
The information filed on August 31, 1987 alleged:
That on or about the 24th day of March 1986, at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening at Barangay Mateo, Municipality of Kidapawan, Province of
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused JOEL JANSON, RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO in
company with alias ABDUL, alias PUTO, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,

26
who are still at large and whose names are still unknown, constituting a band
and armed with long and short firearms, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, with force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away,
at gun point, cash money in the amount of P1,400.00, three (3) pieces of wrist
watches, one (1) can coffee beans and one (1) chicken and if converted into
cash it amounted to P1,845.00 or a total amount of Three Thousand Two
Hundred Fourty (sic) Five Pesos (P3,245.00), Philippine Currency, owned by
Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA; and on the same occasion, the above-
named accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation and armed
with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
turns in having carnal knowledge with one MARITESS ALCANTARA, a
girl about 13 years old, daughter of Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA,
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
persons in the aforesaid amount.
All contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime
and the use of unlicensed firearms.
Kidapawan, Cotabato, August 31, 1987.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
On December 9, 1987, both accused pleaded not guilty. [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Trial then ensued.
For the prosecution, the following witnesses were presented: Teresa
Alcantara, Marites Alcantara, Dante Alcantara, Cesario Alcantara, Dr. Cesar
Manuel, Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, and police officers Pedro Idpan, Jr. and Ortello
Achas.
TERESA ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986 at about 10:00 in
the evening, the accused with six (6) other companions asked for food. She
asked them to come back the following day but they threatened to strafe and
burn the house if they are not let in. The accused then entered the house and
once inside, made all occupants lie down before covering them with a blanket.
The accused demanded money from Teresa and she gave them P1,000. She
was brought to the kitchen and someone guarded her. For a while, there was
complete silence. Then she went inside the room of her daughter Marites, and
saw her totally naked. Her daughter told her that she was raped. She gave an
additional P1,000 to the accused who also got two (2) wristwatches worth
P690.00, two (2) Seiko watches worth P443.00, a chicken worth
approximately P20.00, and one can of coffee beans. The appellants were
speaking among themselves in the Manobo dialect.
Teresa identified appellants Janson and Pinantao as two of the men who
robbed their house and raped her daughter that night. She testified that she
knew appellants since they were their neighbors at Mateo. She also claimed
that while Janson and Pinantao were masked during the incident, she
recognized them through their body built, physical appearance, and their
voices while speaking in Manobo.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
MARITES[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] ALCANTARA testified that she was thirteen
(13) years old at the time of the incident. She corroborated the testimony of
her mother and added that after the group entered their house and hogtied her
father, the appellants entered her room and turned off the lights inside.
Someone poked a gun at her. Then Ricky Pinantao, who had an amputated
right hand; Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona raped her. In open court she
identified appellants Pinantao and Janson as two of her abusers, claiming that
they were previously known to her. She claimed that she knew Ricky because
he was their neighbor and that he often went to their house to buy bananas,
while she knew Joel because he often went to their barangay to visit his
relatives. She likewise claimed that while the appellants turned off the lights
in their house, there was a full moon that night which gave her enough light
to see her abusers. She immediately told her parents that she was raped, and
she underwent medical examination the following day.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
DANTE ALCANTARA testified that on the day of the robbery he was only
nine (9) years old. He said he recognized appellants Janson and Pinantao
because they were their neighbors. On cross-examination, he admitted that
the four robbers were masked, but the witness insisted that he was able to
recognize Pinantao with his cut wrist and mustache, and also Janson because
of his built.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
CESARIO ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986, their house was
robbed and his daughter was raped. He admitted that during the incident, he
was not able to identify the perpetrators since he was hogtied face
downwards, and he was covered with a blanket.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The prosecution also presented DR. CESAR MANUEL. He testified that the
physical examination he conducted on Marites Alcantara a day after the
incident revealed that there were lacerations between the labia majora, labia
minora, and the prepuce caused by a sharp instrument. There was also the
presence of seminal fluid in the vagina of the victim indicating that there was
actual sexual contact.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
ATTY. JORGE ZERRUDO testified that he only assisted appellant Janson in
waiving his right to counsel, and that the sworn statement was already
prepared when he signed it. Nevertheless, he asked appellant Janson if the
contents of the statement were true, and whether he wished to be assisted by
counsel.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
P/SGT. PEDRO IDPAN, JR. testified that he was a member of the Integrated
National Police (INP), Kidapawan, Cotabato, assigned in the investigation of
27
the crime of robbery with rape involving appellant Joel Janson. He identified
Jansons sworn statement saying it was signed by him without being forced.
He admitted that during the investigation, there was no lawyer present and
that Atty. Zerrudo signed the affidavit only after the investigation was
conducted. He claimed, however, that prior to the custodial investigation, he
informed Janson of his constitutional rights and that despite being a Manobo,
Janson fully understood Cebuano,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] which was the
language used during the custodial investigation.
Finally, P/SGT. ORTELLO ACHAS testified that he was at the police station
when Teresa Alcantara appeared on June 24, 1986, and requested that she be
accompanied to the jail to identify the person who was earlier apprehended
and detained. She identified the person as appellant Joel Janson. On cross-
examination, P/Sgt. Achas admitted that he was not the one who conducted
the investigation on the person of Joel Janson and that he could not remember
whether appellant Janson who was then sixteen (16) years old and a Manobo
was assisted by a lawyer. Neither could he remember whether a mental or
physical examination was made upon Janson.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
For the defense, the following witnesses were presented: Datu Amado
Pinantao, Atty. Francis Palmones, Jr., and the two appellants: Joel Janson and
Ricky Pinantao.
DATU AMADO PINANTAO testified that he is an uncle of Ricky Pinantao,
and that they belong to a cultural minority group, the Manobos. He admitted
that they lived near the house of Cesario Alcantara. He said that on March
24, 1986, appellant Pinantao was in their house and that it was impossible for
him to be elsewhere because earlier, in 1985, Pinantao was hacked by one
Bernardo Agio resulting in the amputation of Pinantaos hand. He averred that
Pinantao could not go out of their house because at the time of the incident,
the wound he sustained was not yet completely healed.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
ATTY. FRANCIS PALMONES, JR., testified that he notarized the sworn
statement[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] of the appellant Janson on April 3, 1987,
marked as Exh. 4 and that Janson affirmed and understood the contents of
said affidavit because it was translated to him in the Visayan vernacular. [if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Appellant JOEL JANSON, for his own defense, declared that he was assisted
by a lawyer when he was investigated and made to sign a sworn statement
before the police on June 26, 1986. But he denied the accusation against him
and claimed that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation. He claimed that he did not know how to read or write, and that
he was made to execute a sworn statement before a certain policeman named
Ulep. Only after the investigation did Atty. Zerrudo sign the document. On
cross-examination, he said that he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against him,
saying that he did not know Marites and Cesario Alcantara. He claimed that
he was arrested in March 1987 because he was implicated by appellant Janson
as one of the perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina Agio. [if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif]
On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all of the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby pronounces the accused Ricky Pinantao alias Ogco and Joel
Janson guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt
and accordingly, sentences Ricky Pinantao and Joel Janson each to undergo
a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Marites Alcantara the
sum of P30,000.00; to indemnify Cesario Alcantara the sum of P10,000.00.
No award of other damages in the absence of proof thereof.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Both appellants filed their notices of appeal and submitted separate appellants
briefs. Appellant Ricky Pinantao averred that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-
JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF APPELLANT JOEL JANSON, SAID
EVIDENCE BEING INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED
RICKY PINANTAO, UNDER THE INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE AS
AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED RICKY PINANTAO EITHER FOR
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE RESULTANT CONVICTION OF RICKY
PINANTAO;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES OF THE ALCANTARA FAMILY
WHICH WERE SHOT THROUGH WITH MATERIAL
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND UNNATURAL
TESTIMONIES; and
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THAT IN
FACT THERE WAS A REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE IDENTITIES
AND GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
28
Appellant Joel Janson, for his part, averred that:
I came to know Ricky Pinantao because he is a neighbor and that he often goes
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT JOEL JANSON WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
JOEL JANSON GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Simply put, the issues in this case are as follows: (1) Was the guilt of
appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond reasonable doubt? (2) Is the
extrajudicial confession of Janson admissible as evidence for the
prosecution? and (3) May said confession be used against co-accused
Pinantao?
We find the appeal impressed with merit. Appellants should be acquitted.
Generally, the findings of the trial court concerning credibility of witnesses
are accorded great weight and respect because it had the opportunity to
observe closely in the first instance the demeanor of the witnesses presented
before it.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] However, when the trial court overlooked or
misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which
if considered would materially affect the result of the conviction, such
findings will not bind this Court.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] Such is the case at
hand.
Consistent with the testimonies of Teresa, Marites, Cesario, and Dante
Alcantara, we can gather that what transpired that fateful night is as follows:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of Cesario
Alcantara threatening to strafe and burn it should they not be let in. Once
inside, the masked group of men turned off the lights, hogtied Cesario, pushed
him facedown and covered him with blankets. They asked for money and
Teresa gave them P400.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Teresa was then led to the
kitchen. During this time, her daughter Marites was raped [if
!supportFootnotes][24][endif]
by four men. Then Marites was led to the kitchen where
the culprits threatened to abduct her if her mother would not give them
money. Teresa then gave them an additional P1,000 while the group took
three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one chicken. Then they left the
house, all the while speaking in the Manobo dialect.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
While the testimonies of the witnesses up to this point are credible and
undisputed, it is unfortunate that the certainty ends here.
Marites testified in open court that she was raped by Ricky alias Ogco
Pinantao, Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] She said that she
to their house to buy bananas. She also said that she came to know Joel Janson
because he is always going to Mateo since he has a relative there. [if
!supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Upon cross-examination, however, Marites admitted that she was not certain
of the identity of her perpetrators at the time of the incident or immediately
thereafter. According to her, it was only after Joel Janson was apprehended
for another crime, and after he confessed to the police, that she was able to
confirm her suspicion. When asked in open court, she was not able to
satisfactorily explain the discrepancy in her initial sworn statement before the
police and her testimony later.
Pertinent portions of her testimony in court are instructive:
Q: Was this Ricky Pinantao armed when he entered your room?
A: No sir, he wasnt.
Q: Where (sic) you afraid of him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Knowing that, according to you, you know him, did you not question him,
Ricky, why are you doing this to me?
A: I did not because I was only suspecting.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
xxx
Q: Is it not Marites, to refresh your memory, is it not that when a sworn
statement was taken from your (sic), you stated in your affidavit that you did
not recognize anybody?
A: That was what I stated in my statement.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
xxx
Q: Miss Marites, in this sworn statement of yours, which was already marked
as Exhibit E for the prosecution and Exhibit 1 for the defense, there is a
question here: Can you recognized (sic) any of the four men or any of the six
men that robbed and raped you? [you answered, I do not know anyone sir.
Now] in your testimony here, you said that you know the two accused, how
will you reconcile this one?
A: It is like this, what I am telling now in Court is the one true, during that
time, when the statement was taken on me (sic), I have already suspect in my
mind and I could not tell their names but there were some evidence that
dovetailed in my mind, like, the cut wrist of the one perpetrator, Ricky
Pinantao and the mustache. And these are the things that I recall.
Q: Now, how come that you did not tell the police of the perpetrators during
that time of investigation?
A: Sir, it is very hard to name names during that time when a statement was
29
taken on me. But when this Joel Janson was first apprehended, it was
confirmed by his statement to the policeman. (sic)[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
xxx
Q: So, when Joel Janson was apprehended, that was the time you confirmed
that he was the perpetrator?
A: xxx Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Therefore, you failed to recognize Joel Janson during said time of the
incident?
A: I knew him through his body built.
xxx
Q: So, you merely assumed that Joel Janson is one of those persons who
robbed you, because of the aforesaid statement, that his alleged statement in
the police?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: According to you, you have confirmed your suspicion of this Joel Janson
after he was apprehended?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the same manner you confirmed your suspicion of Ricky Pinantao after
he was apprehended?
A: He himself revealed. Aside from that I already suspected because of his
cut wrist and his mustache.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] (emphasis ours)
While courts generally brush aside inconsequential contradictions between
declarations of the affiant in her sworn statements and those in court, the rule
is otherwise where the discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable
facts such as those omissions in the affidavit concerning important details
which the affiant would not have failed to mention and which omission could
well affect the credibility of the affiant.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] If indeed, the
victim recognized one of her assailants as Ricky Pinantao because of his
amputated hand, she should have mentioned such glaring trait the first time
she gave her statement to the investigating officers. But she never mentioned
anything. On the contrary, she admitted that she did not recognize any of her
assailants. She also admitted that it was only after Joel Janson was
apprehended and confessed to the crime, implicating Ricky Pinantao, that she
confirmed her suspicion.
The testimony of Teresa Alcantara is also riddled with uncertainties:
Q: How many day had lapsed (sic) before you reported the incident to the
police?
A: Three months after the incident.
xxx
Q: Will you please explain why you reported the incident after three months?
A: It was only upon hearing through radio DXND the name of this person
Joel Janson who was reported to have robbed the corn of a certain Atty. Jalipa,
that I reported to the police.
Q: That was the only reason why you reported to the police after three months
already?
A: It is like this: After hearing that, I went to the police right then and there.
I saw this Joel Janson who was the person among those who raped my
daughter and entered our house.
Q: If you knew already that Joel Janson was among those persons who robbed
you, why did you not report to the police immediately?
A: The following morning, I immediately reported, sir.
Q: And you gave sworn statement before the police on the following
morning?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: Of course, this Joel Janson was unmasked when those six men came to
your house?
A: This Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao were the one (sic) wearing mask.
Q: In other words, during the incident you failed to recognize outright who
were those persons masked?
A: I identified them through their body built and voice because they were
speaking Manobo.
Q: But you identified them because of their voice?
A: Voice and bodybuilt.
Q: But of course, you did not actually see the face of Joel Janson?
A: How can I see when he is masked.
xxx
Q: You only mentioned his (Joel Jansons) name (to the police) after you heard
his name over the DXND?
A: Yes...[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] (emphasis ours)
What stands out in the testimonies of the victims is that they were uncertain
of the identities of the masked men who committed the robbery and rape that
night and anchored their suspicion on the alleged confession of Joel Janson.
This confession, however, is itself inadmissible for failing to meet the
constitutional requirements for admissibility.
The lawyer who allegedly assisted Joel Janson in the waiver of his right to
counsel, Atty. Zerrudo, testified:
Q: In other words, this sworn statement marked Exhibit B was already
typewritten and prepared when it was brought to you by the police?
30
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
xxx
Q: But before he was brought to your office allegedly to assist him in his
waiving of his right, he was already subjected to investigation as this sworn
statement was already prepared?
A: That is true, but not signed.
Q: Of course he was not assisted because he was already subjected to police
investigation in his waiving of his constitutional rights?
A: May be, I am not sure about that. That was may be, that was already
prepared when they came to my office but only unsigned.
Q: What was prepared, the whole investigation or this entire part or that part
of waiving his rights?
A: As far as I can remember, it was already prepared, Your Honor.[if
!supportFootnotes][35][endif]
xxx
Q: Atty. Zerrudo, we are clear to the fact that this document was already
prepared before when it was brought to your office?
A: Yes, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] (emphasis ours)
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, also admitted in open
court that the sworn statement of appellant Joel Janson was taken without the
presence of counsel and that this statement together with the waiver of his
right to counsel, was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo
for signing.
As shown by the transcript:
Q: But the accused during the investigation was not assisted by counsel, is
that right?
A: At the time when I conducted the investigation, the counsel is not yet
present.
Q: In other words, during the conduct of the investigation there was no
counsel being present assisting the accused Joel Janson?
A: None, sir.
Q: So in all the sworn statement of the accused Joel Janson made earlier was
made without the assistance of counsel? (sic)
A: When I prepared the investigation I advised him to get a counsel of his
own choice but the counsel was not yet present.
Q: He was not assisted by counsel during the conduct of the investigation?
A: Yes, sir.
Court : What do you mean, Sergeant, Atty. Zerrudo was not yet present?
A: When I conducted the investigation, Atty. Zerrudo was not present.
xxx
Court: He signed it after the investigation?
A: The prepared testimony.
Court: After the investigation?
A: After the investigation.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] (emphasis ours)
Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot
be admitted in evidence. The manner by which it was obtained violated
accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or
admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded
as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif]
As provided for in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible against him.
In People v. Javar,[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] this Court was clear in pronouncing
that any statement obtained in violation of the Constitution, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] In People v. Gomez,[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] citing
People v. Rodrigueza,[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] this Court held that Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to a
person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession
to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. [if
!supportFootnotes][43][endif]
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is
to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion no matter
how slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is
sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence
31
with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These constitutional
guarantees have been made available to protect him from the inherently
coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation. [if
!supportFootnotes][44][endif]
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must,
however, be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, made in the presence and
with the assistance of counsel,[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] and it must be in writing.
Indeed, any waiver of the right to counsel without the assistance of counsel
has no evidentiary value.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif]
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel was made
knowingly and intelligently. Appellant Joel Janson was illiterate, and a minor
of sixteen (16) years at the time of the offense. As held in the case of People
v. Bonola,[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif] where the accused was unschooled and only
nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe that considering
the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel. In such instances, the need for counsel is more pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a
prepared statement when they went to the lawyer who is supposed to assist
appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel.
This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato, Jr.,[if
!supportFootnotes][48][endif]
where the police officers already prepared the affidavits
of the accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, and
the latter explained the contents of the affidavits in Visayan to the accused
who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same, the court held
that the affidavits are inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily
given. As also ruled in People v. Compil,[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] the belated
arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual
signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect of lack of
counsel for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from the accused therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus,[if
!supportFootnotes][50][endif]
we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to
writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the
Constitution.
As pointed out in People v. Deniega,[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] if the lawyers role
is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a priorly prepared
document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accuseds
constitutional rights, the constitutional standard is not met.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used
against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial confession by an accused
implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in open court or when
there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on
his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as against said co-
accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. [if
!supportFootnotes][52][endif]
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
finding Janson and Pinantao guilty of the crime of robbery with rape fails to
persuade us that appellants have been adequately identified as the
perpetrators of the heinous offense. In our view, to affirm that judgment of
conviction on the basis of contradictory testimony of prosecution witnesses
and the flawed extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson is to sanction
a possible miscarriage of justice.
What befell the Alcantara family, particularly to Marites, is abhorrent and
should be condemned. But after due reflection and deliberation, we still find
difficulty in sustaining the trial courts conclusion regarding appellants guilt
because of inconclusive identification. Doubts persist in our mind as to who
are the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense has been perpetrated, but
who are the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific
evidence to still our doubts! But we have only uncertain testimonies to rely
on. It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the persons on trial are the
ones who committed the offense that the judgment should be for conviction.
Only when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt can we be certain that,
after trial, only those responsible should be made answerable. [if
!supportFootnotes][53][endif]
The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] In this exacting standard, the
prosecution failed. It follows that the judgment of the lower court convicting
appellants ought to be set aside for failure to meet the quantum of evidence
constitutionally required.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, Branch XVII, in Criminal Case No. 2016 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao
are ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, and ordered released
from prison unless they are being held for some other lawful cause. The
Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report
to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
32
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69844 February 23, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO POLICARPIO y MIRANDA, accused-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Convicted of violation of Section 4 Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended in a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the dispositive
part of which reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for
Violation of Section 4. Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended, the court
hereby sentenced the accused to suffer a penalty of CADENA PERPETUA
and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency with costs against the accused.
The accused shall be entitled to the full term of his preventive imprisonment
pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act 6127, provided he abides by the rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, he shall only be entitled to 4/5.
accused Romeo Policarpio y Miranda now interposed, this appeal to this
Court alleging that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WERE

33
VIOLATED BY THE APPREHENDING NARCOTICS AGENTS.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS APPREHENDED IN THE ACT OF SELLING
MARIJUANA, OR IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, AND IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT HE WAS CHASED AND CAUGHT IN A RICEFIELD
BETWEEN SITIOS BAGONG BAYAN AND SAN JUAN AT
DARANGAN, BINANGONAN, RIZAL.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HIS WITNESS
ISIDRO PARALEJAS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE
II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425 AS AMENDED.
The facts of the case as found by the court a quo are as follows:
On June 16,1984 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, operatives of the Narcotics
Command, Camp Crame headed by P/Capt. Gabriel Paile swooped down at
Bagong Bayan, Kalawaan, Darangan, Binangonan, Rizal, after receiving an
information that the accused alias Dupong is engaged in the sale and
distribution of marijuana and other prohibited drugs and tagged as the main
source at the area. The team was organized earlier by Lt. Col. Manuel T.
Raval, Commanding officer, 13th NRU Narcotics Command and was
dispatched to the target area to entrap the accused Romeo Policarpio,
accordingly, Pat. Mangila will pose as a buyer and was handed the marked
P20.00 bill (Exhibit "I" to "I-3") with which to buy the stuff before they
proceeded to the area of operation. At about 2:00 p.m. same date, the
operatives arrived at Bagong Bayan, Kalawaan, Darangan, Binangonan,
Rizal. Leaving their vehicle at a distance, they posted themselves at strategic
places. The poseur buyer Pat. Enrico Mangila, together with the informant,
looked for the accused and at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of same date
Pat. Mangila and the informant were able to locate the accused in front of his
house. Thereafter, Pat. Mangila was introduced by the informant to the
accused as the person who needs some marijuana leaves, and after they had
talked with the accused for a while, the accused gave Pat. Mangila two small
plastic bags containing dried marijuana leaves and rolling paper (Exhibit "B"
to "B-4"). In turn Pat. Mangila gave to the accused the marked P20.00 bill
(Exhibit "I" to "I-3"). As previously arranged, Pat. Mangila scratched his head
and his companions, Pfc. Basco and Mendiola grabbed and arrested the
accused. From the accused was confiscated the marked P20.00 bill on his
front pocket. After the arrest of the accused, the latter led his captors to his
house and the operatives seized another six (6) small plastic bags of dried
marijuana leaves together with rolling papers contained in a bigger plastic
bag marked Tie Tae Toe (Exhibit "C" to "C-6") placed on a top of the
refrigerator at the kitchen of their house. Arrested with the accused is a certain
person Rogelio Policarpio, who turned out to be his cousin and who was
earlier convicted by this Court for Possession of Dried Marijuana Leaves in
Criminal Case No. 273-B of this Court. The accused and the confiscated
prohibited drugs were brought to Camp Crame and the Marijuana leaves were
turned over to the PCCL for examination (Exhibit "D"). The PCCL conducted
examination over the evidence thus (sic) over, and rendered its Chemistry
Report with the finding that the evidence thus examined gave a positive result
for the test for marijuana (Exhibit "A" to "A-3"). At the PC Headquarters, the
accused Romeo Policarpio signed a bond paper acknowledging that the six
(6) small plastic bags of marijuana leaves were confiscated from him (Exhibit
"G" to "G-2"). He likewise signed a document acknowledging the fact that
the marked P20.00 bill was confiscated from him (Exhibit "F" to "F-1").
Similarly, accused signed a sworn statement where he opted not to give
statement until he is represented by a counsel (Exhibit "J" to "J-2").
Under the first assigned error appellant claims that Exhibit G which is a
receipt signed by appellant acknowledging that six (6) small plastic bags of
marijuana leaves were confiscated from him and Exhibit F a receipt signed
by appellant acknowledging that the P20.00 bill involved in the purchase of
the marijuana leaves was confiscated from him are not admissible in evidence
as they were taken in violation of his constitutional right.
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional
right to be silent and that he may refuse to give a statement which maybe used
against him, that is why he refused to give such a written statement unless it
is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this
effect. 1 However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic
bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt
2
and to sign a receipt for the P 20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried
marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila. 3
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign
these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the
commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to
sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who
confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is
a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he
34
was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of
his right. 4 Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is
inadmissible in evidence.
The second, third, and fourth assigned errors are factual in nature wherein the
appellant raises the question of credibility of the witnesses and reiterates his
defense denying that he had been apprehended in the act of selling marijuana
and receiving P 20.00 as payment thereof He alleges that he was then at a
mahjong session and that he was pursued by the police when they came.
The too-well known rule in this jurisdiction is that the findings of facts of the
trial court are conclusive in this proceeding and will not be disturbed unless
some facts or circumstances may have been overlooked that may otherwise
affect the result of the case. The Court finds no reason to depart from this rule
in the present case.
While the Court now holds that the receipts for the six (6) plastic bags of
marijuana and the P20.00 bill which appellant was made to sign 5 are not
admissible in evidence against him, nevertheless there is ample evidence in
the record other than these receipts to establish the commission of the offense
by the appellant. Prosecution witnesses Pat. Enrico Mangila and Pfc. Jose
Basco were present and categorically attested to the fact that the appellant
sold two (2) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves to Mangila and received as
consideration thereof P 20.00. 6
While the appellant attempts to discredit the testimony of said police officers,
he has not shown any improper motive why they should testify in the manner
that they did. Thus their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credence. 7
As a matter of fact courts give much credence to entrapping police officers,
as in this case, as they are presumed to be in the regular performance of
official duties. 8
Drug addiction is one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our
society. More often than not it is the young who constitute the greater
majority of the citizenry who are the victims. It is of common knowledge that
drug addicts become useless if not dangerous members of society and in some
instances turn up to be among the living dead. This is the reason why the
courts and law enforcement agencies should continue in their relentless
campaign not merely to minimize but to totally eradicate the evil before it is
too late. And everyone must be involved in this drive if we are to succeed.
The peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction. They deserve no less
than the maximum penalty.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto with costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Section 13 Right to bail
5.1 Application for bail moots habeas corpus
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61770 January 31, 1983
JOSE S. BAGCAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA, Presiding Judge of the City Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch II, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Acting on Jose S. Bagcal's petition asking for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that he was illegally detained, We issued the writ on October
19, 1982, returnable to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Cagayan de Oro City, on November 8, 1982.
After due hearing, Judge Eulalio D. Rosete rendered a decision on November
17, 1982, with the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered denying
the petition for the release of the petitioner but ordering the Respondent Hon.
Rolando R. Villaraza to hear the petition for bail filed by the petitioner at the
soonest time and as speedy as possible, to determine only if the evidence
supporting the charge of murder is strong, and if not, to fix the bail.
Petitioner has appealed the decision to Us; he asks that he be immediately
released from detention. Respondent Judge Rolando R. Villaraza, on the other
hand, has asked Us to clarify his role in respect of the hearing for bail.
35
Petitioner was arrested on February 28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary.
The arrest was without warrant. He has been detained at Camp Alagar,
Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest to the present.
On August 6, 1982, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an information
for murder against petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro presided by respondent Judge Rolando R. Villaraza. The information was
accompanied by the affidavits of several persons.1äwphï1.ñët They were not
subscribed before Judge Villaraza who did not ask the affiants to ratify their
oaths nor did he ask them searching questions. The information has no
certification by the City Fiscal that he had conducted a preliminary
investigation. Indeed, if the City Fiscal had conducted a preliminary
investigation, the information should have been filed in the Court of First
Instance which had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. It is obvious that
the information was filed with Judge Villaraza so that he would conduct a
preliminary examination and thereafter issue a warrant of arrest.
Judge Villaraza under the circumstances mentioned above issued a warrant
for the arrest of petitioner. The circumstances attending the issuance of the
warrant of arrest have been invoked in the petition for habeas corpus. And it
is the warrant of arrest that has been invoked in the return of the writ to justify
petitioner's detention and it is also the basis for the decision of Judge Rosete
on denying the petition.
Petitioner claims, and Judge Rosete agrees, that respondent Judge Villaraza
should not have issued a warrant of arrest without a preliminary examination
of the witnesses for the prosecution. However, Judge Rosete held, and We
agree, that although the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity
attached to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in support
thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was
denied.
WHEREFORE, We affirm the decision of Judge Rosete with the sole
modification that the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Cagayan
de Oro City and not the municipal trial court, should conduct a hearing on the
application for bail. If he finds the evidence against petitioner to be strong,
he should deny bail but if he finds the evidence not sufficiently strong, he
should grant bail. The record of the case against petitioner should be elevated
to the aforesaid Executive Judge.
SO ORDERED.

36
 5.2 Meaning of capital offense
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63409 May 30, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HENRY PARBA defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leonardo T Siguion Reyna counsel de oficio for Parba.
NARVASA, J.:
By judgment promulgated on December 10, 1982 in Criminal Case No. 1462,
by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte (Branch I, Iligan City),
Henry Parba was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape with homicide and correspondingly sentenced "to the supreme
penalty of death, with the accessories prescribed by law; to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Alejandra Dalidig in the sum of P12,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. " The
case is before this Court on automatic review (subpar: (1), par. 3, Sec. 17,
R.A. No. 296; Sec. 5(2), Art. X, Constitution).
Henry Parba entered a plea of not guilty upon being arraigned in the Court a
quo on July 20, 1981, under an Amended Information charging him with
attempted rape with homicide "contrary to and in violation of Article 335 as
amended by Republic Act No. 2632 and Republic Act 4111, with the
agravating circumstances that it was committed in a secluded place; that the
wrong done in (the) commission of the crime ... (was) deliberately augmented
by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission, and (that) the
accused is a recidivist. " Trial was subsequently conducted in due course.
After five (5) witnesses had been presented by the prosecution, the hearing
scheduled on October 29, 1982 was postponed to November 15, 1982, at the
instance of Henry Parba, through his counsel de oficio, in order that he could
"study thoroughly the feasibility of withdrawing his former plea of not guilty
and ... substitute the same with that of guilty" (ORDER, 29 October, 1982).
On the next scheduled date of trial November 15, 1982, Henry Parba moved
thru counsel and was allowed by the Court to substitute his initial plea of not
guilty with one of guilty. After this time, the five (5) witnesses (and exhibits)
thus far presented by the prosecution, had established the material facts
constituting the crime charged inclusive of the collateral circumstances. It is
significant that the distinguished counsel who was appointed by this Court to
represent Henry Parba on appeal does not seriously dispute those facts, which
are tersely summarized in the Solicitor-General's brief, as follows:
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 24, 1981, Roy Salgado, a prosecution
eyewitness, while conversing with his buddies (barkada) in front of the store
of Epifanio Clerigo in Tubod Iligan City saw Bonifacio Tolo bringing the
victim, Alejandra Dalidig, from a waiting shed towards an unoccupied hut
located in Manauang Iligan City (pp. 5-7, tsn, May 19, 1982).
Roy Salgado knew Dalidig was insane because she was the woman who was
residing at Dodo Benti's house (id.).
While following Bonifacio Tolo to the hut, Roy Salgado saw his cousin, the
accused-appellant, in the yard of the hut. He was able to recognize accused-
appellant because of a fluorescent lamp installed atop a post (p. 30, Id).
Shortly thereafter, Bonifacio Tolo brought the victim inside the hut. Roy
Salgado peeped inside and saw Bonifacio Tolo having sex with the victim.
Roy Salgado then saw Henry Parba go inside the hut after Bonifacio was
through, the latter going straight to the Banana plantation to change his
clothes (pp. 9-10, Id).
Roy Salgado peeped again and saw accused-appellant taking hold of victim's
arm and embracing her. The victim was heard shouting as she was being
boxed by accused-appellant several times. Roy Salgado, thinking of the
victim's safety, asked accused-appellant to stop. Appellant instead told
Salgado to just go home because he (Salgado) had nothing to do with the
victim (pp. 11-12, 4546, Id). To avoid any conflict, Roy Salgado went home
and slept.
Thereafter, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of March 25, 1981, Roy
Salgado was awakened by accused-appellant who was carrying a double-
bladed hunting knife (pp. 13; 33- 35, Id) wrapped in a carton. Acting sleepy,
accused-appellant stood up and told Roy Salgado he forgot his shoes at the
banana plantation (id). Accused-appellant then left.
In the early morning (6:00 a.m.) of March 25, 1981, a certain Sgt. Francisco
Englatiera, who was assigned to the Iligan City Police Station, but who was
then in his house that early morning, saw an unusual crowd in front of a hut
which was about 30 meters from his residence (pp. 5-6, tsn, Sept. 23, 1981).
Upon reaching the hut, where there were about 50 to 100 people around, he
saw the body of the victim Dalidig with four to five stabbed wounds covered
with banana leaves (p. 7, Id). Sgt. Englatiera was then tipped by a certain
Aniceto Sismar who saw accused-appellant within the vicinity at around
37
10:00 p.m. the night before (id). Accompanied by two members of his staff, Q Mr. Parba, your counsel here, Atty. Alberto Abragan, manifested that you
Sgt. Englatiera proceeded to the house of a certain Edgar Parba. The latter have intimated to him your desire to withdraw your former plea of not guilty
was not in the house but accused-appellant was there (p. 8. Id). and to substitute the same with that of guilty, is that correct?
After a series of interrogation, accused-appellant, trembling and turning pale, A Yes, Your Honor.
confessed that he killed the victim because she refused to have sex with him Q Do you know the consequences of your offer?
(p. 9, Id). Accused-appellant was immediately brought to the Police Station A Yes, Your Honor.
(p. 11, Id). Q In other words, you are admitting all the allegations here in the information.
It was Pat. Milo Parades who took down the written sworn statement (Exh. A Yes, Your Honor.
"A", p. 12, tsn, Feb. 26, 1982) of accused- appellant admitting responsibility Q And that you actually committed all the acts alleged therein?
after the latter was fully apprised of his constitutional rights (p. s, tsn, March A Yes, Your Honor.
19, 1982). The investigation was conducted in the Cebuano Bisayan dialect Q Has your lawyer explained to you the import and meaning of all the words
which the appellant fully understands (p. 14, tsn, supra). " appearing therein?
Both Henry Parba's counsel and the Solicitor-General are in agreement as A Yes, Your Honor.
regards what transpired at the hearing of November 15, 1982. In his brief, the COURT:
former reproduces pages 2 to 7 of the transcript of stenographic notes, viz: And do you know, as a matter of fact, that because of your offer the Court
FISCAL ULYSSES LAGCAO: will have to sentence you accordingly. This is a grave offense.
The same appearance for the prosecution, Your Honor, we are ready. A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. ALBERT ABRAGAN: COURT:
Respectfully appearing for the accused, Your Honor. The accused has Q And despite your awareness of the consequences of your offer you still
intimated to this representation that he will change his plea of not guilty to insist in withdrawing your former plea of not guilty and to substitute the same
that of guilty. with that of guilty?
COURT: A Yes, Your Honor.
Usually in cases like this we require the presentation of all the evidence COURT:
necessary to show the extent of liability of the accused, but considering that Well, in view of this you read the information again to the accused.
the prosecution has already presented several witnesses perhaps that will ... (Court Interpreter, Mr. Saidali Gandamra reading the information to the
FISCAL LAGCAO: accused
Nevertheless. Your Honor, after the accused have formally entered a plea of COURT:
guilty, I will be presenting my documentary evidence. Q By the way, Mr. Defense Counsel, have you explained to your client the
COURT: consequences of his offer?
You mean you are no longer presenting other witnesses? ATTY. ABRAGAN:
FISCAL LAGCAO: Yes, Your Honor, during the last hearing.
No more, Your Honor, I will just present our documentary exhibits. COURT:
COURT: The possible penalty, as well as the meaning and import of all the words
So you believe that on the basis of the evidence already presented it is appearing in the information? ATTY. ABRAGAN Yes, Your Honor, but I
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? did not explain the allegation of recidivism and I think it is in the amended
FISCAL LAGCAO: information, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor. COURT:
COURT: Alright, you read the amended information to the accused.
(To the accused) FISCAL LAGCAO:
Come here May we be allowed to withdraw the allegation of recidivism, Your Honor, as

38
we have not established that. FISCAL LAGCAO:
COURT: Thru the testimony of Ludovina Frasco, Your Honor.
You mean you are not sure whether you have presented any evidence in COURT:
support thereof and therefore you are going to withdraw it now? Q You came to know later on that this woman was suffering from mental
FISCAL LAGCAO: abnormality?
Yes, Your Honor. COURT: You have here the amended information, Fiscal; A The following day, sir. (pp. 8-10, tsn, Nov. 15, 1982).
it appears on page 21 of the record, you delete the particular portion regarding The other relevant occurrences on that day, November 15, 1982, are set out
recidivism You delete that, initial it, and place the date today. in the Decision of the Court a quo, as regards which there is again no dispute.
COURT INTERPRETER: In order to complete the records of the case, Fiscal Ulysses Lagcao offered in
(After reading the amended information to the accused evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, B-1, C, C-1, C-2, D and E, and
Q Do you understand the information? the testimonies of Sgt. Francisco Englatiera, Pat. Milo Parades, Roy Salgado,
A Yes, sir. Dr. Livey Villarin and Ludovina Frasco.
Q What is your plea? A Guilty. (tsn, pp. 2-7, Nov. 15, 1982). After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense counsel invoked the
And the Solicitor-General's brief, in turn, reproduces pages 8 to 10 of the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and other circumstances
same transcript, viz: of a similar nature and analogous to those mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9
COURT: of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Fiscal Lagcao admitted the existence
Q In other words, Mr. Accused, by your plea of guilty you are admitting also of said mitigating circumstances.
the following aggravating circumstances: (1) that the crime was committed Judgment was thereafter promulgated, convicting Henry Parba of the crime
in a secluded place and (2) the wrong done was deliberately augmented by charged and sentencing him as aforestated, "to the supreme penalty of death,
causing other wrong not necessary for its commission? etc. "
A Yes, Your Honor. This judgment Henry Parba now assails in this Court. It is claimed by his
COURT: counsel that:
With respect to the other allegations, Mr. Defense Counsel, have you already 1) the lower Court erred in accepting the accused's plea of guilty which was
explained them to the accused? improvidently made; and
ATTY. ABRAGAN 2) assuming, without conceding, that the accused did not make an
I have not explained that aggravating circumstances. improvident plea of guilty and should rightfully be convicted, the lower Court
COURT: erred in disregarding the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in
Do you know this statement here, the meaning or import of this statement that determining the penalty to be imposed.
"by means of force and violence", you commenced the commission of rape The first point that appellant's counsel attempts to make is-
upon one Alejandra Dalidig? ... that the plea of guilty was hastily accepted by the trial court; and that the
ACCUSED: accused did not fully understand the meaning, import and effect of such plea
A Yes, Your Honor. to a capital offense. The trial court simply asked the accused whether he
Q And in your comprehension or understanding, you also admit that you did realized that because of his plea of guilty he will be sentenced accordingly.
all these? There is no evidence that the court took great care and patience in explaining
A Yes, Your Honor. to him all the allegations in the amended information in the native dialect.
Q And that you also know that the woman was not in her normal frame of There is also no evidence that the trial court explained to him the gravity of
mind? the offense charged. And more importantly, there is no evidence that the trial
A I do not know, Your Honor, that she was a mentally defective woman. court explained to the accused that despite such plea of guilty and other
COURT: ordinary mitigating circumstances which may be considered as present
Fiscal, did you have any of this? herein, there is no other recourse but to sentence him to the mandatory penalty

39
of death. Thus, the trial court failed to exercise patience and circumspection
in explaining the meaning of the accusation to the accused and the full import
of his plea of guilty (appellant's brief, pp. 76-77, rollo).
Appellant's argument cannot be sustained in the light of the facts on record.
The record shows that through his counsel de oficio, appellant asked for and
was granted a postponement of two weeks or so so that he could "study
thoroughly the feasibility of withdrawing his former plea of not guilty and ...
substitute the same with that of guilty." The record further shows that in
response to questions of the court, appellant affirmed his counsel's
manifestation of his desire to change his plea from not guilty to guilty. He
also affirmed not only his awareness of the consequences of his offer to
change his plea and that the change of plea would imply that he was
"admitting all the allegations ... in the information, " but also that in fact, he
had "actually committed all the acts" described in the information. Appellant
also confirmed that his lawyer had explained to him "the import and meaning
of all the words appearing" in the indictment. He affirmed, too, his knowledge
that because of the change of plea "the Court will have to sentence ... (him)
accordingly," and that the offense was "a grave offense"; and he declared that
despite knowing all "the consequences," he would "still insist" on his
preferred change of plea. The record moreover shows that the Court also
questioned appellant's counsel and obtained from the latter the assurance that
he had explained to his client the consequences of the offer of change of plea,
"as well as the meaning and import of all the words appearing in the
information," except "the allegation of recidivism" which, however, was
quickly withdrawn by the fiscal. The record shows, furthermore, that after the
amended information had once again been read to the accused, and in answer
to still other questions by the Court a quo, appellant Parba stated that he knew
that by his plea of guilty he was "admitting also the ... aggravating
circumstances: (1) that the crime was committed in a secluded place, and (2)
the wrong was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary
for its commission;" and that he understood the "meaning and import" of the
statement that "by means of force and violence ... (he) commenced the
commission of rape upon one Alejandra Dalidig." In fact, "in (his)
comprehension or understanding," he admitted having done those acts. The
record finally discloses the fact, not impugned by appellant, that the Trial
Court's explanation "was translated by the Court Interpreter in the Bisayan
dialect which the accused speaks and understands" (Decision, p. 8, rollo), and
that all throughout the proceedings on November 15, 1982, the day appellant
voluntarily changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, his counsel de oficio
was present and assisted him, just as he had done at all other prior
proceedings. This Court holds that upon these facts on record, the Trial Court
had—
...exercised that patience and circumspection which is enjoined of trial judges
in explaining to the accused the nature and meaning of the accusation and the
full import of their plea of guilty. This injunction on trial judges in hearing a
capital offense where the accused entered a plea of guilty, reiterated in the
case of People vs. Baluyot (75 SCRA 148, 154) relied upon by appellant,
appears fully complied with in the instant case. The record speaks for itself,
and nothing more need hardly be said on this score. (People vs. Pascual, Jr.,
109 SCRA 197, 204).
Of no little significance is the circumstance that appellant's decision to change
his plea from not guilty to guilty was reached after the prosecution had
presented five (5) witnesses whose evidence, as aforestated, satisfactorily
proved the commission by appellant of the crime charged, inclusive of his
spontaneous and voluntary acknowledgment thereof on no less than two (2)
occasions: the first, verbally, at his residence, and the second, in writing, at
the police station.
This Court is satisfied, therefore, that no error is imputable to the Court a quo
not only in its appreciation of the evidence, as establishing appellant's
culpability independently of his plea of guilty, but also in its determination
that the change by the appellant of his plea from not guilty to guilty had been
done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily with full awareness and
understanding of the nature and consequences thereof.
The second point raised by appellant's court-appointed counsel, upon the
other hand, is well taken. The Lower Court did err "in disregarding the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in determining the penalty to
be imposed. "
That Henry Parba was seventeen (17) years of age at the time he perpetrated
the offense of which he has been found guilty is clearly shown by the
evidence (Exh. A). Given this undisputed fact, Parba avers that he is entitled
to the benefits of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. -
When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower
by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
40
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
The Solicitor-General shares this view. And this Court declares their views
to be correct.
The case of People vs. Ramos, 94 SCRA 843, adverted to by the Court a quo,
in which it was ruled that regardless of the presence of mitigating
circumstances, when a person is found guilty of rape with homicide (or
attempted rape with homicide), for which the law prescribes the single,
indivisible penalty of death, courts do not have "any discretion with respect
to the severity of the penalty to be imposed," does not preclude the application
of Article 68 to the appellant herein. Ramos obviously had reference to
ordinary mitigating circumstances, not to the privileged mitigating
circumstance dealt with in Article 68 which has the effect of lowering the
penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. Thus, in
accordance with said Article 68, the proper penalty imposable upon appellant
is not death but reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, with the modification above-mentioned, i.e., the reduction of
the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Henry Parba from death to
reclusion perpetual the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.

41
Restriction of provisional liberty as bail The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the
country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of
Manotoc vs. CA (May 30, 1986) a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available
at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
StartFragment restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to
Manotoc vs. CA | May 30, 1986 leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of courts.

FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-
Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage
house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with
SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such
was granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the
latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for
departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc
which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal
complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP
respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to
post bail.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of
his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed
travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never
indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business
transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: “The liberty of abode and of changing the same… shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court….” According to SC, the
order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order
as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the
country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by
the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior
orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel
abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right,

neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction
over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD: NO.

42