Case No.

: 8
ID: G.R. No. L-19550
Date: June 19, 1967
Petitioners: 1HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK
2Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David
Respondents: 1HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN,
in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ
2Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua
Remarks: Subject: Search Warrants; General Warrants; Right Against Unlawful Search is a Personal
Right; Exclusionary Rule

FACTS:
Description of Petitioners:
Member of unnamed corporation, "the President and/or General Manager"
Description of Respondents:
As above mentioned
Juridical Antecedents:
Several judges issued 42 search warrants against Stonehill and other petitioners to seize “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers),” claiming violations of “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
The documents were seized from two locations: (1) their corporate offices and (2) the personal
residences of the petitioners.

FCI: -
CA: -
SC:
On March 20, 1962, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court an original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the aforementioned seized things or papers or any copies
thereof and thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules
of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

On March 22, 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar
as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences
of petitioners.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures pursued
against the petitioners are constitutional considering the petitioners contention that search
warrants are null and void, as it violates the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, among
others:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

and considering further, the respondent’s contention that,

(1) the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

RULING/HELD:
Position:
No, the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures pursued against the petitioners
are unconstitutional.

Legal Basis/Law/ Doctrine/Obiter Dictum:

The Constitution (1935) provides that,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Note:
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Conclusion/SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that,
(1) the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be abandoned;
(2) that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of the petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
(3) that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent;
(4) that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned;
(5) that the motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
(6) and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio:
Right Against Unlawful Search is Personal

1. As regards the warrants issued to the corporations, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause
of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
may be.

2. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Right Against Unreasonable Search

3. The Constitution [Art III, Sec 2] provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

4. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

General Warrants

5. The subject warrants were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

6. General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers.

Exclusionary Rule: Inadmissibility of illegally seized items

7. The prosecutors, relying on Moncado vs. People's Court, maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized
are admissible in evidence against petitioners. Said position was in line with the American common
law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 1 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such
as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an
illegal search.

8. The court declared that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case is abandoned. Most
common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and have adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Justice Hand: “As we
understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege.”

9. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search
warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has
no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime.
But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause..

Concurring and dissenting opinion of Castro, J:

All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving
warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the
searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure.

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in
their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized
from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
Note: Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private
papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices,
warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as
shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and
(b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the
determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of
the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the
void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as clearly indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal
standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

The constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Note:

Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1)

Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration
were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence
against petitioners.

Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

“All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.”
Case No.: 9
ID: G.R. No. L-24693
Date: July 31, 1967
Petitioners: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. and GO CHIU,
Respondents: THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
Remarks:

FACTS:
Juridical Antecedents:
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by
then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into
1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide
open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity
of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process.

FCI:
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and
a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against
the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with
the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances."

The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

CA: An answer was filed by the respondent-City Mayor on August 3, 1963 praying for the
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar
Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City
of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc.,
and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and
be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive
of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City
of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels
in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661,
662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid
by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of
conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February
4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying
for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed
upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City
of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No.
4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made
permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance in question."

SC:
A petition was filed by respondent appealing the judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure
of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is constitutional (due process clause) considering the
petitioners contention that the aforesaid ordinance is void for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
violative of due process and considering further, the respondents contention that the same is
reasonable and with proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of
the police power.

RULING/HELD:
Position:
Yes, Ordinance No. 4760 is constitutional.

Legal Basis/Law/ Doctrine/Obiter Dictum:

As said by Justice Malcolm:
"The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the
people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with
the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance,
has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x .
The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

Note:
There is a primary presumption of validity in a statute or ordinance in the absence of any evidence
to offset its legality or constitutionality.

As said by Justice Laurel:

"Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental
aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.

Conclusion/SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and the injunction issued was lifted.
With costs

Ratio:
There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Municipal Board) is valid.
W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was
only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is
a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other
than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of
police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact
definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was
enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated
by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
Case No.: 10
ID: G.R. No. 81561
Date: January 18, 1991
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Respondents: ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
Remarks:

FACTS:
Juridical Antecedents:
On August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of
the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita
Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A
peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter
and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves
were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

FCI:
An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision convicting accused-appellant of violation of
Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
CA: -
SC:
The appellant appealed the decision rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional
Trial Court, Branch XLIX) to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not seizing of illegal merchandise through unreasonable search and seizure by
civilians is constitutional considering the accused-appellant’s contention that the evidence was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

RULING/HELD:
Position:
Yes, seizing of illegal merchandise through unreasonable search and seizure by civilians is
constitutional.

Legal Basis/Law/ Doctrine/Obiter Dictum:

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

In Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints
upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal.
App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or.,
317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Conclusion/SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

Ratio:
In this case, records clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency and a private individual, who made search/inspection of the packages and the mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not. Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution.

The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Case No.: 11
ID: [G.R. Nos. 112801-11
Date: April 12, 1996
Petitioners: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Respondents: WONG CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK
WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG, CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM
NYUK SUN, accused. WONG CHUEN MING and AU WING CHEUNG, accused-appellants.
Remarks:

FACTS:
Juridical Antecedents:
Eleven (11, 2 British-Hongkong & 9 Malaysians) foreign nationals, including the accused-appellants
and several others were charged with unlawfully transporting shabu into the country after thirty (30)
boxes containing prohibited drugs (34.45 kgs) were found among their baggage upon their arrival
from Hongkong. After their apprehension by airport officials, they were ordered to sign on the
masking tape placed on the said boxes. They were brought to Camp Crame where they were
made to identify the signatures on the boxes and affix their signatures again.

FCI:
On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment finding the eleven (11) accused foreign
nationals guilty of the crime in violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

All accused through counsel filed with the trial court their joint notice of appeal. However, on 7
April 1992, four (4) accused withdrew their notice of appeal. Five (5) others where dismissed. Only
accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung filed their joint appeal brief

The decision of the trial court has already become final and executory with respect to accused
Chin Kong Song, Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok Wee, Chai Min Huwa, Lim Chan Fatt, Chi Kin Yong, Tan Soi
Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.

CA: -
SC:
Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and make the following assignment of errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE JOINT REPRESENTATION BY
PREVIOUS COUNSEL OF APPELLANTS WITH THE GROUP OF NINE MALAYSIANS ACCUSED NOT ONLY
PREJUDICED THE FORMER BUT ALSO AMOUNTED TO THE DEPRIVATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE APPREHENDING CUSTOMS OFFICERS
VIOLATED APPELLANTS MIRANDA RIGHTS.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS MIRANDA RIGHTS.

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, DESPITE THE PAUCITY AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR ABSENCE OF ANIMUS
POSSIDENDI ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANTS.[14]

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not using the signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic
bags containing shabu as admissible evidence is constitutional considering the accused-
appellants’ contention that they were deprived of their right to counsel and due process when
their previous counsels also represented the other accused despite conflicting interests is not well-
taken.

RULING/HELD:
Position:
No, using the signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing
shabu as admissible evidence is unconstitutional.

Legal Basis/Law/ Doctrine/Obiter Dictum:

Section 12[1][3], Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides that,
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offensse shall have the right to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferrably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

Conclusion/SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision appealed be reversed, acquitting Wong Chuen Ming
and Au Wing Cheung of the crime charged, based on reasonable doubt and their immediate
release ordered.

Ratio:
In this case, affixing of the accused-appellants’ signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on
the plastic bags, in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of
shabu punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-
judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. They are, therefore, inadmissible as
evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is
inadmissible against them.