♥POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER♥ On appeal to the Minister of Natural Resources, petitioners argued that

respondent Director was without jurisdiction in ruling that they have lost their
iii. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations
VDA. DE PINEDA vs. PEÑA (THE MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES)
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in 1932. After
Sibayan's death, his heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement
wherein they waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, in favor of
co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.
The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in 1932, and
was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.
In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21
Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their respective
mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. During this time, an
amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered.
In 1972, petitioners instituted a Civil Case against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia
Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, with the CFI, claiming that the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private respondents derived
their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously falsified
and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining
claims.
In 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint against
private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the
"Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim. In 1977, the Director of Mines rendered
a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped" and
"Ullmann" claims.
Since the protest case was filed after PD 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974) took effect in 1974, the provisions of the law
were made applicable to petitioners. PD 463 mandates compliance with
certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped"
claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining
rights to the claim will be lost.
Finding that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of PD 463,
respondent director declared in his decision that petitioners abandoned and
lost their rights over their mining claim.
rights over the "Ped" mining claim, since the case was only for overlapping or
encroachment and the question of whether they complied with the provisions
of PD 463 was never placed at issue in the pleadings. Minister of Natural
Resources dismissed the appeal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO PASS
UPON THE VALIDITY OF THE "PED" CLAIM IN A PROTEST CASE OF
OVERLAPPING OF MINING CLAIMS.
Petitioners contend that public respondents may not validly and legally take
cognizance of an issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the
validity of the "Ped" mining claim.
This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to
PD 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests
involving mining claims.
Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon
recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules,
regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rule-making power, the
Department Secretary on issued the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order
Implementing PD 463.
One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent Minister of
Natural Resources relied upon in his decision to dispose of the jurisdictional
issue raised by petitioners, which provides that The Director, or the Secretary,
in case of appeals, may motu proprio look into the validity of mining claims,
whether raised as an issue or not.
It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.
In order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law
prescribes , and must relate solely to carrying into effect the general
provisions of the law.
With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by
public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with

♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly
delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions
of PD 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128
merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the
enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute.
Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results in a
denial of procedural due process, for it is axiomatic in administrative law
that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. In this
case, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the validity of
the "Ped" mining claim when they submitted rebuttal evidence on appeal.
Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of
law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the
validity of the mining claims involved in the protest case, even if not
raised in issue.
Prohibition against passage of irreplaceable laws
(2) Procedural Limitations – Art. VI Sec. 26-27
Section 26.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Section 27.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
Question Hour – Art VI Sec. 22
3. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules
of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
Legislative Investigations – Art. VI Sec.21
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO
WHETHER THE SENATE HAS THE POWER TO PUNISH ARNAULT FOR
CONTEMPT FOR REFUSING TO REVEAL THE NAME OF THE PERSON
TO WHOM HE GAVE THE P440,000.
YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee
has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness
may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the
subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that
may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or
possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the
form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
WHETHER THE SENATE LACKS AUTHORITY TO COMMIT HIM FOR
CONTEMPT FOR A TERM BEYOND ITS PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE
SESSION, WHICH ENDED ON MAY 18, 1950.
NO. The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose
members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of
only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing
into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or
resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a
term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to
punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body
to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by
duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations
or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat
the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body
as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but
logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to
be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.
WHETHER THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION PROTECTS
THE PETITIONER FROM BEING QUESTIONED.
NO. We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important
question, what is the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000?
were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that
he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to
a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that
a refusal to testify would be so punishable."
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that
he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the
latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
ARNAULT V. BALAGTAS
Facts: Arnault was an attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for
the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government.
The Senate created a Special Committee to determine whether the said
purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the
deal was fair and just.
In the investigation, Arnault was asked to whom a part of the purchase price,
or P440,000, was delivered. He refused to answer this question, and the
Senate issued a resolution (1st) ordering his commitment to the new Bilibid
prison until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer
questions pertinent thereto.
While still in confinement in Bilibid, Arnault executed an affidavit wherein he
gives in detail the history of his life and the events surrounding acquisition of
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed
circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. After
investigation, the Senate issued another resolution (2nd) ordering the
continued confinement of Arnault as they did not believe he told the truth.
Arnault claims that the Senate is not justified in not believing him when he
mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom he gave the P440,000, and
that the legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the
confinement may be considered as having been accomplished, and,
therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
Issues:
1) Can the court review the finding of the Senate in not believing Arnault’s
affidavit?
2) Does the Senate have the power to order his incarceration?
Held:
1) NO. The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of
departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative
ends. The courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by
the legislature are the only means or even the best means possible to attain
the end sought. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of a
constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion
has been properly exercised. The only instances when judicial intervention
may lawfully be invoked are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative discretion.
2) YES. Following American jurisprudence, Congress has the power to punish
for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by
the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate
functions. The only jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the
character of the offense, and that the continuance of the obstruction, or the
likelihood of its repetition, are considerations for the discretion of the
legislators in meting out the punishment. Arnault’s acts were arrogant and
contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.
The Senate refused to believe that Jess D. Santos is the real name of the
person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate,
therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or
reiterated it.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be
considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is
impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority?
In Arnault vs. Nazareno, the Court ruled that the Senate has the authority to
commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative
inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i.e., by reason of its coercive
power, not its punitive power. The 2nd resolution is of a coercive nature, in the
sense that the Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of
the fact which the petitioner had obstinately refused to divulge.
BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) filed a case with
the Sandiganbayan against Bengzon, et. al (Bengzon for brevity), as some of
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
the defendants in said case, to recover the properties of the Romualdez’s
which were being allegedly put beyond the reach of the PCGG through
various devises and schemes designed to conceal the disputed assets with
the aid of the Bengzon Law Office. Bengzon filed their respective answers
with the Sandiganbayan.
Meanwhile, news circulated that the Lopa group (Lopa for brevity) had taken
over the disputed Romualdez properties. Senator Enrile called upon the
Senate to look into possible abuses of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act as Lopa was the brother-in-law of then President Aquino. The Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation and subpoenaed Bengzon
and Lopa, to testify what they knew about the sale of 36 corporations
belonging to the Romualdez’s.
Bengzon and Lopa petitioned the court for a prohibition to enjoin the SBRC
from requiring them to testify (this case now). They claim that:
1. the SBRC has no valid legislative purpose (not in aid of
legislation);
2. the sale is purely a private affair; and
3. the inquiry would violate their right to due process.
The SBRC claims that the court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the
lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less can it enjoin the
Congress or any its regular and special committees from making inquiries in
aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers.
Issues: 1) Does the court have jurisdiction?
2) Can the SBRC conduct the inquiry?
Held:
1) YES. The Court held that (from Angara vs. Electoral Commission) it has the
jurisdiction to determine the nature, scope and extent of the separation of
powers, to allocate constitutional boundaries under the doctrine of judicial
supremacy which is properly the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. As to the present case, it has jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the SBRC to conduct
inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2) NO. The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. It must be exercised:
• in aid of legislation;
• in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and
• the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
Under Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination
of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. The SBRC inquiry was based on Senator Enrile’s speech
which “called upon the Senate to look into possible abuses of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of
the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
Furthermore, jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan.
To allow the SBRC to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before
the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the
SBRC's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the
Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
- Senate as a whole invited various officials of the Executive
Department to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
issue of the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on
September 29, 2005
- On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately.
- Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information
between the President and the public officers covered by this executive
order, including:
*Conversations and correspondence between the President and the
public official covered by this executive order ;
*Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the
interest of national security should not be divulged ;
*Information between inter-government agencies prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements ;
*Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;
*Matters affecting national security and public order
- All public officials enumerated in E.O. 464 shall secure prior consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to
ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers,
adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
- the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense
and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. For defying
President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings.
- On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659,
169660, and 169667, for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this
Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress?
HELD:
POWER OF INQUIRY
- The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution
- Citing the case Arnault case, : “xxx the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently
true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has
shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed.
- As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce
it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If
the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their
offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to
compel the disclosure thereof.
- Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that
proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the
inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published
rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21
also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to
the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
- These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the
proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the
 executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances,
none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of
the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable
violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive
department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the
particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall
these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
- Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still
recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall
under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures
prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions,
its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive
privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
- Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or
the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
- Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
- Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information.
- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power —
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due The
claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of
providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O.
464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each
case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
- In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
- respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
VALIDITY OF SECTIONS 2 & 3
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely
provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in
Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to
be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed
as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and
scope of executive privilege.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it
essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of
course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf,
in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By
order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her.
The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may
not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less
reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the
authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to
Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on
a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege,
he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity
to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt
to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to
secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure
"respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an
echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an
authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must
be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to
ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.
Act as a board of canvassers for Presidential and Vice
Presidential Elections – Art. VII, Sec.4 (4); RA 7166 Sec.
30
Sec.4(4). The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
RA 7166, Section 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
Election of President and Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity and
Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. - Congress shall determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for President and
Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of
canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed,
signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them;
(2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and in
figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the
certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words
and figures in the certificate.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President
shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal
delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not included in the
certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall
be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of
votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the
election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the
actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President, count the votes
as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
Call special Election for President and Vice– Art. VII Sec 10
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a
law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to
be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time
of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of
the next presidential election.
Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of habeas corpus
and declaration of martial law – Art. VII Sec. 18
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Approve presidential Amnesties – Art. VII Sec. 19
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Confirm certain appointments – Art VIII, Sec. 9 and Sec. 16
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees preferred
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety
days from the submission of the list.
Sec.16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each
regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.
Concur in treaties – Art. VII, Sec. 21
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Declaration of war and Delegation of emergency powers –
Art. VI Sec. 23
1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
ARANETA V. DINGLASAN
FACTS:
- Act No. 671 “AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES
AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.” And Section 1 of the
said law provides: “The existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes
it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency.”
- Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides: “In time of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy.”
- Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness.
- Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to
mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds;
restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as
used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive
in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."
ISSUE: When did the Emergency Powers Act or Act 671 ceased to have force
and effect?
HELD:
- As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement
regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry
much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out
 of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act,
if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be
entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become
invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction
of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote
that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law
after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a
different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
- What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the
same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He
said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly
"when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air
attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold
its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can
easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous
powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the
inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this
inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to
amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority.
- It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act
No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on
May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead
of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act,
we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general
legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9,
Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to
legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
organic law.
- Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the
opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos.
600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were
self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be
eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively
approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up
to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in
the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves
would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to
provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily
was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the
curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature
amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the
latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new
ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning
heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the
operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
RODRIGUEZ V. GELLA
FACTS:
Section 26 of Article 6 of the Constitution provides that “in times of
war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
president, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy.” Accordingly, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act
number 671, declaring the national policy that “the existence of war between
the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the president with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency,” and authorizing the
president, “during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules
and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy
declared in section 1.”
ISSUE: W/N Commonwealth Act 671 is for a limited duration only?
RULING:
As the act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision,
it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a
limited period. If it be contended that the act has not yet been duly repealed,
and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the president, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality,
since it may never be repealed by the congress, or if the latter ever attempts
to do so, the President may wield his veto.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the
powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world war
which factually involved the Philippines when Act 671 was passed on
December 16, 1941. that emergency which naturally terminated upon the
ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the
National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war would prevent
it from holding its next regular session.
Be judge of the President’s physical fitness – Art. VII
Sec.11(4)
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or,
if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Power of Impeachment
ROMULO V. YNIGUEZ
FACTS:
Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the
Batasan, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint for
impeachment. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The
Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant
its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges
contained in the complaint attached thereto on August 14, 1985. It then
submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
archives.
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion
praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified
complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. On
September 7, 1985, the present petition was filed with this Court. In said
petition, petitioners pray that after hearing this Court declare Sections 4, 5, 6
and 8 of the Batasan Rules on Impeachment which was approved by the
Batasan on August 16, 1984 by a vote of 114 in favor and 58 against,
unconstitutional, and Committee Report No. 154 of the Batasan Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government dismissing Resolution No. 644
and the complaint for impeachment attached thereto, null and void. They also
pray that this Court issue a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
respondents from enforcing and questioned provisions of the aforementioned
Rules and a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
recall from the archives and report out the resolution and complaint for
impeachment in order that the impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith
by the Batasan as a body.
The provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment claimed by
petitioners to be violative of the Constitution are sections 4, 5, 6 and 8. t is
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
petitioners' contention that said provisions are unconstitutional because they
amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with
the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the
Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the
complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisitive 1/5 of all the members of the
Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the
impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on
Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative
belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.
Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional
because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order
that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan.
By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval
of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a
condition not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII
requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment
trial to proceed.
ISSUES: Can this court order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges
contained in said resolution and complaint for impeachment?
RULING:
What is important to note is that when the Batasan denied the motion
of MP Ramon Mitra for the recall from the Archives of Resolution No. 644 and
the complaint for impeachment, it had in effect confirmed the action of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government dismissing said
resolution and complaint on impeachment. That the Batasan by even a
majority vote can dismiss a complaint for impeachment cannot be seriously
disputed. Since the Constitution expressly provides that "no official shall be
convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all its members," a
majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government disapproving the
resolution calling for the impeachment of the President and dismissing all the
charges contained in the complaint attached thereto, makes mathematically
impossible the required at least two-thirds vote of all members of the Batasan
to support a judgment of conviction. What purpose would be served by
proceeding further when it is already obvious that the required two-thirds vote
for conviction cannot be obtained? Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings
would then be in order.
A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for
impeachment (which is what the denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to
recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment is
tantamount to) makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. The dismissal by
the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings
is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been
vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review.
This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial
prayed for by petitioners.
The fact that petitioners are asking that it is the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, not the Batasan itself, which shall be
commanded by this Court to recall from the Archives and report out the
resolution and complaint for impeachment is of no moment. Aside from the
fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and
complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the
Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no
authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with
any murder from this Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the
Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.
LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with grave coercion before the Sandiganbayan for
having taking advantage of his public position as Mayor of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque by taking over the operation and control of the gasoline station
owned by Pedro Par and by ordering his policemen companions to sell the
gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said gasoline station and
padlock dispensing pump thereof w/o authority of law, depriving Pedro Par of
the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or occupation by means of
threat, force and/or violence, thereby preventing said Pedro Par from doing
something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his
will.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction and it should be filed with the ordinary
courts of Marinduque.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Grave Coercion is covered by Sec. 5, Art XIII of the Constitution.
2. W/N PD1486 is violative of the Sec. 5 ArtXIII of the Constitution
3. W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
RULING:
1. YES. Sec. 5 of Art XIII of the Constitution provides that, “The National
Assembly shall create a special court to be known as the Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
may be determined by law.”
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that SB has jurisdictional
competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other
crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft
and corrupt practices as may be determined by law.
2. NO. Sec. 5 of Art XIII of the Constitution delegates to the lawmaking
body the determination of such other offenses committed by public
officers over w/c the SB shall have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the President
of the Phils, exercising his lawmaking authority issued PD1486 w/c
mandates that the SB shall have jurisdiction over other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers or employees including to those offenses
which are related to their office.
The information clearly alleged that petitioner took advantage of his official
position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline station’s owner in taking
over the operation and control of the gasoline station. The fact that he was a
mayor did not vest him legal authority to take over the operations and control
of the gasoline station without due process.
3. YES. For the crime charged against the petitioner, the SB has
concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts pursuant to PD 1486. Well
established is the rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case
where said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue
exercising the same to the exclusion of all other courts.
It is true that PD1861(promulgated 1983) provides that where the penalty for
offenses in relation to their office does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for 6 yrs or fine of P6,000, they are no longer w/in the
jurisdiction of the SB but w/in the regular courts. However since the
information was filed in 1980, the SB has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the SB with jurisdiction over
public officers and employees including those in GOCCs. There are
exceptions like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be
removed by impeachment. Sec. 2, ArtXIII o the 1973 Constitution provides
that, “The President, the members of the SC, and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other
high crimes or graft and corruption.”
Thus the above provision prescribes removal from office of the
aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to
allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be
charged criminally while holding his office w/ an offense that carries the
penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
fundamental law.
According to Chief Justice Fernando, judgment in cases of impeachment shall
be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the RP but the party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment, according to law
and that if the same does not result in the conviction and the official is no
removed, the filing of a criminal action in accordance with law may not
prosper.
a. Power with regard to utilization of natural resources-
Art. XII, Sec. 2
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
b. Amendment of the Constitution – Art XVII Secs 1 and 2
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
3. Legislative Process
a. Requirement as to bills
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
(1) As to titles of bills – Art. VI Sec 26(1)
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.
DE LA CRUZ V. PARAS
FACTS:
The municipality of Bulacan passed Ordinance No. 84 entitled, the Prohibition
and Closure Ordinance of Bacaoe, Bulacan, which prohibited the operation of
night clubs within the municipality. De La Cruz, et. al as owners of such
establishments filed 2 cases of prohibition with preliminary injunction with the
CFI of Bulacan on the following grounds:
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
2. xxx
3. That under PD189, as amended, by PD259, the power to license and
regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism.
The court issued a restraining order. The answers were thereafter filed which
alleged the ff:
1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate
but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night
clubs invoking Sec 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, RAs 938, 978 and 1224.
2. xxx
3. That PD189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their
jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs.
The court then upheld the constitutionality of such ordinance and dismissed
the cases. Hence the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is valid.
RULING:
YES. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as
follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.
- The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein." It is practically a reproduction of the former
Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof,
according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of
United States v. Abendan "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law
of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or
in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given
subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not
prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable
exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid
RA 938 as was originally entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS.' Its first section insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal
or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate
by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs,
cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
jurisdiction." Then, the first section was amended to include not merely "the
power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit...” The title, however, remained the
same. It is worded exactly as RA938. It is to be admitted that as thus
amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal
council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were
all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all,
however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit.
The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by
petitioners that to construe RA938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution
mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid
if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club
was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory
power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence
extending to all "the great public needs, to quote from Holmes, and to interdict
any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and
by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A
construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom
certainly commends itself.
The general welfare clause in the Local Government Code is set forth in the
first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein" According to such Code, the sangguniang
bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist
guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns
of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and
regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority
without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or
massage parlors. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is
to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant
licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to
judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no
more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their
employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an
undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be
susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for
the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power,
were thus left without employment.
LIDASAN V. COMELEC
FACTS:
18 June 1966: President signed HB 1247 into law—RA 4790. It created the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The officials were elected
in 1967. However, 12 barrios were in Cotabato and not in Lanao del Sur.
COMELEC adopted a resolution that Dianaton shall be composed of the
areas enumerated in RA 4790. The Office of the President recommended to
the COMELEC that the statute be suspended pending correcting legislation.
COMELEC issued another resolution that only a declaration of
unconstitutionality could it stop implementing the law. Lidasan (a resident and
taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter)
argued that it is unconstitutional for violating the one bill one subject rule.
ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional for violating the one-bill one-subject
rule. YES.
RATIO:
No bill may be enacted into law should include more than one subject. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the
towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2)
it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
A change in the boundaries of 2 provinces may be made without necessarily
creating a new municipality. The principle that only the unconstitutional portion
of a statute should be invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does
not apply here. The explanatory note of the bill from which this statute
originated expressed that the envisioned municipality would be self-sufficient.
This of course includes the 21 barangays, and not the 9 barangays that would
be left if the valid portion would be allowed to continue. Factors affecting the
independence of a municipality include population, territory, and income.
Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with
reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in
Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took
away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the
other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of
the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing,
that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the
remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion
upheld.
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to
create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan
in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of
Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer
must be in the negative.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government.
Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of
local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting
for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its
totality
There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that
petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the
implementation of Republic Act 4790. Here the validity of a statute is
challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that
the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore,
hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by
lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is
residing has been transferred to a different provincial control. The right of
every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his
place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this
jurisdiction.
TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
Facts: This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own
behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely
affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987
entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers
to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred
to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took
effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in
the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue
Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,
That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall
be subject to sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated
Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines,
and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the
case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was
necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their "survival
and very existence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film
piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in
Intervention.
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the
following grounds:
a. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts
payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane
to the subject matter thereof; (syllabus topic covered)
b. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
c. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of
the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
d. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
e. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
f. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance,
which it is not.
Issue: Whether or not the P.D. 1987 is constitutional?
Held: Petition dismissed. Petitioner has not overcome the presumption of
validity which attaches to a challenged statute. There is no clear violation of
the Constitution which would justify the SC in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the
title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute
seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end
that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the
parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is
that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should
be given practical rather than technical construction.
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of
the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
— Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every
sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall
acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The
express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in
order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles
explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the
DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble
and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to
answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the
rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. The rationale behind the tax
provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms
including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450
Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum
from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately
P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry.
INSULAR LUMBER V. CTA
Facts: RA 1435 is called “An act to provide means for increasing the highway
special fund”. The Commissioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 5 of the
Act invoking the constitutional requirement that a bill shall not embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title. Sec. 5 deals with the
partial exemption of miners and loggers. The commissioner claims that this
partial exemption is clearly not expressed in the title of the act and it provides
for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
Issue: Is said provision valid?
Held: Yes, it is valid. The commissioner’s argument is without merit. RA 1435
deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy which is the
necessity for increasing the highway special fund thru the imposition of an
increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 is in effect a
partial exemption from the imposed increase tax. Said proviso, which has
reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general
subject of the law.
The primary purpose of said constitutional requirement is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation, the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or
its operation.
(2) Requirements as to certain laws
(i) Appropriation of Laws – Art VII Sec. 22, Art VI Secs.
24-25 and 29
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days
from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Section 25.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government
as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal
year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall
be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Section 29.
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
 armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds
of the Government.
GUINGONA V. CARAGUE
PETITIONERS: Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., members of
the Senate RESPONDENTS: Guillermo Carague, Secretary of Dept. of
Budget and Management; Rozalina Cajucom, National Treasurer; and
Commission on Audit FACTS:  The 1990 budget totals P233.5B  It consists
of 1. P155.3B appropriated by Congress under RA6831 (General
Appropriations Act of 1990 or GAA 1990), of which 27B will go to DECS, the
highest among all departments; and 2.P98.4B in automatic appropriations
(P86B for debt servicing) pursuant to: a. PD81 (which amends RA4860,
Foreign Borrowing Act), (entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society), and c.PD1967
(“An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Rep. of
the Phil. On Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loans by Appropriating Funds for the Purpose”) 
Petitioners, are seeking: 1.the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree Nos. 81, 1177 (Section 31) and 1967; and 2.the
restraining of the disbursement for the debt service under the 1990 budget
under said decrees (i.e. the P86B automatic appropriations).  They are
basing their petition on 3 grounds: 1.By appropriating more funds for debt
servicing (P86B) than for education (P27B), such appropriations are violative
of Section 5, Article 14 of the Constitution. 2.PDs 81, 1177 and 1967 are no
longer operative under the present Constitution (1987) 3.Such PDs violate
Section 29(1), Article 6 of the Constitution, which states that “no money shall
be paid out of the National Treasury except in pursuance to an appropriation
made by law.” PROCEDURAL ISSUES: 1.Locus Standi – as Senators, they
may raise the issue of unconstitutionality − as taxpayers, they have personal
interest in restraining unlawful expenditure of public funds 2.Justiciability – in
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., which involves the constitutionality of the
presidential veto of certain provisions of GAA 1990, the Court held that the
political doctrine interposes no obstacle to the judicial determination of rival
claims under the Constitution. − With the Senate maintaining that the
President’s veto is unconstitutional, and that the charge being controverted,
there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of
Congress and the Executive that may be taken cognizance of by the SC
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
ISSUES:
I.W/N the P86B debt servicing appropriation is violative of Section 5, Article 14
of the Constitution and, therefore, invalid.
NO.The fact the DECS appropriation is the highest budgetary appropriation
among all department budgets is a clear and sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.  The
Constitution mandates the assignment of highest budgetary priority to
education in order to insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful
share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment  However, this does not mean that
Congress is so hamstrung that it is deprived of the power to respond to the
imperatives of national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.  Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our
enormous debt  It is a matter of: 1. honor 2.protecting our credit standing
3.the very survival of our economy
II.W/N PD81, PD1177 and PD1967 are still operative under the Constitution.
YES.Section 3, Article 18 of the Constitution recognizes that all existing
decrees not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative under
amended, repealed or revoked.Implied repeal and revocation is frowned upon.
 PD 81 amends RA 4860, which authorizes the president to obtain foreign
loans and credits and appropriates the necessary funds therefore, by
providing that funds are hereby appropriated from the National Treasury to
cover any deficiency for debt servicing  PD1177 provides for the automatic
appropriations for expenditures for, inter alia, principal and interests on public
debt  PD1967 provides that “there is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in
the National Treasury, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments
on foreign or domestic loans  Their purpose is to enable the government to
make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country  Petitioners allege that said decrees
became functus officio when Pres. Marcos was ousted because, with the
expiration of the one-man legislature, the legislative power was restored to
Congress and that new legislation for automatic appropriations must come
from Congress.  The SC held that it could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to require all existing laws to pass through
Congress again  The requirement of Sections 24 and27, which requires
appropriations and bills to originate from the House of Representatives and be
approved by the President, applies only to bills that are still to be passed by
Congress  This is all the more true because of the “political wisdom” of
automatic appropriations, which is to provide flexibility to the government for
effective execution of debt management policies.
III.W/N they are unconstitutional by violating Sections 24 and 29(1), Article 6
of the Constitution or W/N under the said PDs there is undue delegation of
legislative power
NO.If the delegation of the authority to execute the legislative intent satisfies
the test of completeness, then there is a valid delegation. The legislature does
not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who is to
do it, and what is the scope of his authority.  In Edu vs. Ericta, the SC said
that “to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard that
implies, at the very least, that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy… the standard may be either
express or implied from the policy and purpose.”  The SC found that, in this
case, the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.  Although the
decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very
nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees  The Executive
is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed  The
mandate is only to pay the principal, interest, taxes, and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness… No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by
the books of the Treasury  Section 29(1), Article 6 merely states that
appropriation should be made by law  It does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be done “by law” 
This is precisely what the decrees did, it made appropriations by law
(ii) Tax Laws – Art VI, Sec. 28, Art XIV, Sec. 4(3-4)
Section 28.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 4.
1. xxx
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
2. xxx
3. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall
be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned,
may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations
provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
4. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments,
donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
TAN V. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS: These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge,
in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also
commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"),
amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and, in
G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93,
promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued
implementation of the amendatory legislation.
We will focus in G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
In G.R. No. 109446, petitioners, assailing Section 6 of Revenue Regulations
No. 2-93, argue that public respondents have exceeded their rule-making
authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships.
The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
The Court has given due course to both petitions. The parties, in compliance
with the Court's directive, have filed their respective memoranda.
Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of
Republic Act No. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely
entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in
G.R. No. 109289).
The full text of the title actually reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-
Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
Amended.
(1)ISSUE: W/N RA 7496 is constitutional.
HELD: Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as
(a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the
legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole
act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are
usually made, of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above objectives of the
fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else
would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have
been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law
would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently
from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The
contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has
long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs.
Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as:
(1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2)
the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4)
the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class
(Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA
52).
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law
declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail.
The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax
power. No such transgression is so evident to us.
(2)ISSUE:W/N the SNIT applies to partners in general professional
partnerships.
HELD: YES. There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who
practices his profession alone orindividually and one who does it through a
partnership (whether registered or not) with others in the exercise of acommon
profession. Under the present income tax system, all individuals deriving
income from any sourcewhatsoever are treated in almost invariably the same
manner and under a common set of rules. Although the generalprofessional
partnership is exempt from the payment of taxes (but it still has an obligation to
file an income tax returnmainly for administration and data), the partners
themselves are liable for the payment of income tax in theirindividual
capacity computed on their respective and distributive shares of profits.
Notes:
Differences between general professional partnerships and ordinary business
partnerships:
a.A general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership
(which is treated as acorporation for income tax purposes and so
subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an incometaxpayer.
The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is
tax exempt, but on thepartners themselves in their individual capacity
computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits.
b.Ordinary business partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are
³taxable partnerships.´ Generalprofessional partnerships are ³exempt
partnerships.´ Under the Tax Code on income taxation, the
generalprofessional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere
mechanism or a flow-through entity in thegenerati
GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
The President issued EO438 which imposed in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported to the Phils, an
additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across
the board on all imported articles including crude oil and other oil productions
imported into the Phils. This additional duty was subsequently increased from
5% to 9% by the promulgation of EO443.
EO475 was subsequently issued reducing the rate of additional duty on all
imported articles from 9% to 5% ad valorem except in the cases of crude oil
and other oil productis which continued to be subject to the additional duty of
9% ad valorem.
The President issued another order, EO478 which levied in addition to the 9%
ad valorem tax, a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.00 per barrel of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing
the Validity of EO475 and EO478 for being violative of Sec. 24, Art VI of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the said EOs are unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. Though Sec. 24, Art VI of the Constitution provides that the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is of course w/in the
province of the Legislative, it does not follow that the assailed EOs, assuming
they are revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted by the Congress. Sec. 28(2) of Art VI provides that, “The Congress
may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.”
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President, subhec to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose to fix w/in specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts.
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code, Secs. 104
and 401. These are provisions which the President explicitly invoked in
promulgating the assailed EOs.
Petitioner contends that the President is authorized to act under the Tariff and
Customs code only to protect local industries and products for the sake of the
national economy, general welfare and/or national security.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
This lacks merit for the ff reasons:
1. The entire contention is anchored on just 2 words, one found in Sec.
401(a): existing protective rates of import duty and the second in the end
of Sec401(a): protection levels granted in sec 104 of this Code. The words
protective and protection are simply not enough to support the very broad
and encompassing limitation w/c petitioner seeks to rest on those 2
words.
2. The Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs
Code is one of 2 principal traditional generators of governmental revenue,
the other being the BIR.
3. Customs duties are very much like taxes which are frequently
imposted for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes.
4. Sec 401 of the Code establishes genral standards with w/c the
exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must
be consistent: that authority must be exercised in the interest of national
economy, general welfare and or national security.
(iii) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V. CA
Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, was registered as a “non-pioneer
enterprise” with public respondent Board of Investments (BOI) having been so
issued, a Certificate of Registration under Executive Order No. 226, also
known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, in the manufacture of
glazed floor tiles. Among the specific terms and conditions imposed on First
Lepanto’s registration were that:
“1. The enterprise shall export at least 50% of its production; (and)
“2. The enterprise shall produce only glazed floor tile.
First Lepanto was, by virtue of its registration, granted non-fiscal and fiscal
incentives by the BOI, including an exemption from taxes on raw materials
and tax and duty exemption on its imported capital equipment.
Private respondent Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc., a competitor of First
Lepanto, is also registered with the BOI as a non-pioneer producer of ceramic
tiles
Later, First Lepanto requested for an amendment of its registered product to
“ceramic tiles” in order to likewise enable it to manufacture ceramic wall tiles;
however, before the BOI could act on First Lepanto’s request for amendment,
Mariwasa and Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc., already had on file their separate
complaints with the BOI against First Lepanto for violating the terms and
conditions of its registration by the use of its tax and duty-free equipment in
the production of ceramic wall tiles.

BOI found First Lepanto guilty and imposed a fine of almost 800k. After paying
the imposed fine, First Lepanto, formally filed its application with the BOI to
amend its registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”

Another verified complaint was filed by Mariwasa with the BOI (docketed BOI
Case No. 92-004) which asseverated that, despite BOI’s finding that First
Lepanto had violated the terms and conditions of its registration, the latter still
continued with its unauthorized production and sale of ceramic wall tiles.
Respondent BOI dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Mariwasa went to the CA via Petition for review. CA annulled the decision of
the BOI

ISSUE: Did the CA err in annulling the decision of the BOI?

HELD: Yes. The BOI is the agency tasked with evaluating the feasibility of an
investment project and to decide which investment might be compatible with
its development plans. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy
decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the government agency
concerned and not by the courts.[11] BOI has allowed the amendment of First
Lepanto’s product line because that agency “believes that allowing First
Lepanto to manufacture wall tiles as well will give it the needed technical and
market flexibility, a key factor, to enable the firm to eventually penetrate the
world market and meet its export requirements.”

Moreover, to hold to hold the BOI from taking action on First Lepanto’s
application would be to defeat the declaration of investment policies
expressed in the law;

“ART. 2. Declaration of Investment Policies. - To accelerate the sound

development of the national economy in consonance with the principles and
objectives of economic nationalism and in pursuance of a planned
economically feasible and practical dispersal of industries and the promotion
of small and medium scale industries, under condition which will encourage
competition and discourage monopolies.

A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.”

♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
FABIAN V. DESIERTO
Facts:
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business. Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer
of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects
including those under the FMED. Agustin took advantage of his official
position and engaged in an affair with Fabian. During the affair, Agustin gifted
PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office.
When Fabian tried to end their affair, misunderstandings and unpleasant
incidents developed between them. Agustin refused and resisted her attempts
to do so by employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-
complaint dated July 24, 1995 for violation of Section 19, RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of PD No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree).
Ombudsman Desierto found Agustin guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by Agustin and since his new cousel was a former classmate and
close associate of Desierto, Desierto moved to inhibit himself from the case.
The case was now transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who
rendered a Joint Order of June 18, 1997, setting aside Ombudsman
Desierto’s resolution and exonerated private respondent from the
administrative charges.
Fabian appealed to the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by the Office of the Ombudsman
which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved Agustin from
administrative charges.
Fabian argued that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) provides that decisions of the Ombudsman on administrative cases
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by Certiorari under Rule 45. However,
she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, when a respondent is absolved of the charges in
an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its
aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to
limit the power of review of this Court.
Agustin on the other hand contends that the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among
others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of
procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law."
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court assumes jurisdiction over the
appealed administrative case ruled by the Ombudsman.
Ruling: NO.
The provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and
orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the
quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law
creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the
regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are
referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19 preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the
courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies20 are now required to be brought to the Court
of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to
"ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman
which is a "high constitutional body."
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
Procedure for the passage of bills – Art VI Sec 26(1)
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ARROYO V. DE VENECIA
• Joker Arroyo brought a suit against Speaker JDV, etc for the violation of
the Rules of House. They are challenging also the passage of RA 8240
(which amended the NIRC by imposing sin-taxes on beer and cigarettes,
• The bill originated from the House, it was approved on 3rd reading and
was transmitted to the Senate.
• The Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its report to the House;
Congressman Javier, Chair of the ways and means comte, delivered his
sponsorship speech.
• During interpellation, JOKER ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING TO
QUESTION THE QUORUM, ALTHOUGH UNTIL THE END OF HIS
INTERPELLATION, HE NEVER DID.
• Joker challenged RA8240 arguing that is was passed in violation of the
rules of the House, which rules embody the Constitutional mandate in Sec
16(3). He argues that a violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Consti itself.
• Specifically, he alleges that:
o The yeas or nays were not asked, but was simply approved only
to prevent him from questioning the presence of a quorum.
o The Chairman deliberately ignored his questioning.
o The Chairman refused to recognize him and instead proceeded to
act on Albano’s motion to declare the report approved.
o The Chairman suspended the session without first ruling on his
questioning
o That the session was hastily adjourned to prevent him from
formally challenging the existing of a quorum.
ISSUE: Was there GADALEJ when Congress enacted RA 8240?
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
SC:
NO. LAW REMAINS VALID.
What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are
MERELY INTERNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE of the House rather than the
Constitutional requirements for the enactment of law. Joker does not claim
that there was no quorum, but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the House rules, he was prevented from questioning the presence
of quorum.
Joker claims that the violation of house rules is a violation of the constitution
itself. NO.
The rules adopted by deliberative bodies (such as the House) are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver by the body adopting them.
PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL, AND WITH
THEIR OBSERVANCE, THE COURT HAS NO CONCERN. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will NOT invalidate the action, when the requisite number
of members have agreed to a particular measure.
The constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within
the limitations suggested, and ABSOLUTELY BEYOND THE CHALLENGE
OF ANY OTHER BODY.
The failure to regard the rule is NOT a subject matter of judicial inquiry. A
legislative act will not be declared invalid for non compliance with internal
rules. No court has ever declared an act of the legislature void just because of
non-compliance with rules of procedure made by itself.
In this case, there is NO RULE IN THE HOUSE which specifically requires
that in approving the Bicam Conference Committee Report, the Chair must
restate motion and conduct nominal voting. The manner by which the report
was approved has a BASIS IN LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE.
The Constitution does NOT require that the yeas and nays of the Members be
taken every time the House has to vote. Only in the following instances were
yeas and nays are mandatory:
1) last and 3rd reading of a bill
2) request of 1/5 of the members present
3) repassing of a bill over the veto of the President.
Also, while it is true that Albano moved for adjournment, Joker could have at
least objected if there was anything he wanted to say. THE FACT HOWEVER
IS THAT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING!! The question he raised was not a
point of order nor a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
As to the QUORUM, the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of a quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when the
quorum is obviously present. LAW VALID.
The President’s Veto Power
Qualified v. Absolute Veto
Messaged Veto v. Pocket Veto
No Pocket Veto in the Phils
Executive Impoundment
Section 27, Art VI, 1987 Constitution
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
Section 20, Art VI,1935 Constitution
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; but if
not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent together, with
the objections, to the House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the Members voting for
and against shall be entered on its Journal. If any bill shall not be returned
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall
become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress
by adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law
unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object. When a provision of an appropriation bill
affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time, vetoing the particular item or items to
which it relates. The item or items objected to shall not take effect except
in the manner heretofore provided as to bills returned to the Congress
without the approval of the President. If the veto refers to a bill or any item
of an appropriation bill which appropriates a sum in excess of ten per
centum of the total amount voted in the appropriation bill for the general
expenses of the Government for the preceding year, or if it should refer to
a bill authorizing an increase of the public debt, the same shall not
become a law unless approved by three-fourths of all the Members of
each House.
3. The President shall have the power to veto any separate item or items
in a revenue of tariff bill, and the item or items shall not take effect except
in the manner provided as to bills vetoed by the President.
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORP V. VALENCIA
Facts:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary
injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and
operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against
respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief
of the Radio Control Division.
Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and
duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications (formerly
Commerce And Communications), provides:
SEC. 3.
(1) He may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or
operator license; Provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing.
It is in the exercise of this power that the respondents allegedly are now
conducting the investigation in connection with the petitions for renewal.
Petitioners’ application for renewal was disapproved for being late.
Issues:
(1)whether the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection
with petitioners' applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal
basis; (2) whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the
Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS; and (3)
whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9
and is entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.
Held/Ratio:
Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground
to disapprove the applications for renewal.
But the only reason relied upon by the respondents to be the ground for the
disapproval of the applications, is the alleged late, filing of the petitions for
renewal. The notices to petitioners (which in effect take the place of complaint
in civil or administrative cases or an information in a criminal action) alleged
only one supposed violation which would justify, disapproval. But petitioners
claim that this violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was
condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
July 24, 1962, which in its pertinent part, reads:
CIRCULAR TO:
ALL RADIO STATIONS, RADIO DEALERS, MANUFACTURERS AND RADIO
TRAINING SCHOOLS
It has come to the attention of this Office that a great number of radio station
operators have been conducting their operations resorting to practices which
are in violation of existing radio laws and regulations, such as:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Late submission of applications for new and renewal licenses.
It is no the intention of this Office to correct whatever laxity which in the put
has encouraged this illegal practices, to strictly others the radio regulations
and to take drastic action against violators of these regulations.
You are, therefore, requested to examine closely your operating practices,
permits and licenses and take remedial measures as soon as possible but not
later than August 10, 1962.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
(SGD.) ROBERTO M. SAN ANDRES Radio Regulation Chief APPROVED:
(Sgd.) M. V. Feliciano Undersecretary
It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains petitioners' contention that
the previous non-observance by station operators of radio laws and
regulations of the Radio Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal,
among others, was condoned if the necessary steps were taken to correct
their records and practices before August 10, 1962. It is not denied that herein
subject applications for renewal were all made before said date, or even
before the issuance of the circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone reason
given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is
therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and,
hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. The raison
d'etre for it has disappeared. Its continuation will serve no useful purpose in
contemplation of the law authorizing investigations in connection with
applications for renewal of permit.
Respondents' claim that they have no authority to condone or pardon
violations of the radio control regulations cannot be upheld. Firstly, by specific
provision of law,1 the respondent Department Secretary is given the discretion
either to "bring criminal action against violators of the radio laws or the
regulations and confiscate the radio apparatus in case of illegal or simply
suspend or revoke the offender's station or operator licenses or refuse to
renew such licenses; or just reprimand and warn the offenders." The cited
circular specifically approved by the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications (who has not been shown to have acted beyond his powers
as such in representation of the Secretary of the Department) warning the
offenders, is an act authorized under the law. Secondly, the circular having
been issued by respondents themselves, the latter can not now claim its
illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement.
The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by
petitioner CBN of its right to operate on Channel 9. It is admitted that there
was no express agreement to this effect. The only basis of the contention of
the respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel
10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to
transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to
petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement
between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or
change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10. As explained by
petitioner, it was made to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in
connection with the planned transfer of its station to Baguio, was to be
effective upon the final transfer of the said station. This was necessary to
avoid interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force Base station
in Pampanga, which is operating on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10
would be assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to operate.
When the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not
mean abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast on
Channel 9 in Quezon City.
Respondents also made reference to the remarks appearing in the
construction permit No. 793, issued to the Philippine Broadcasting Service
that "construction of this station shall be begun after DZXL-TV (Channel 9)
Manila of Chronicle broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved." It
is claimed that upon the approval of the request to transfer, the petitioner was
deemed to have renounced or abandoned on Channel 9. This statement
cannot bind petitioner. In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the
clause "Chronicle broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved" was
merely played by respondent's personnel after erasing the original words
written therein. And, it does not appear what were really written there before
the erasure. In the second place, CBN had no participating in the preparation
of said permit. Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it is an inter alios acta which
can not bind it. And, finally, the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did
continue operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed
transfer, is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that
channel upon the approval of its petition to transfer. There being no proof that
petitioner had really waived or renounced its right to operate on Channel 9,
respondents committed error in refusing to grant or approve petitioner's
application for renewal of the license for station DZXL-TV Channel 9.
As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to
state that it having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and
said intervenor on the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, no right
belonging to said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to give
up its present operation of Channel 9. However, it may also be added that as
the records show, the appropriation to operate Philippine Broadcasting
Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget
of the Republic of the Philippines, was provided as follows:
PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE GENERAL FUND
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,
including promotion, programming, operations and general administration;
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation
of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are
television stations. ... P300,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
VI — SPECIAL PROVISIONS
1. ...
xxx xxx xxx
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part
of the Philippines where there are television stations. (Emphasis supplied).
Disallowing some of the items in the said Appropriations Act, the President
included the following in his veto message:
(e) PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
IV — SPECIAL PURPOSE
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, ...:
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation
of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are
television stations.
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part
of the Philippines where there are television stations.
These two provisions if approved will render inoperative the television stations
currently operated by the Philippine Broadcasting Service which started last
September, 1961, in Manila.
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular
item or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an
appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot
veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items
to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the
amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service
was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or
expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are
already existing commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question
of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question.
A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough authority
to guide action on the matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it
was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This
ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.3 If
the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever,4 and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of
installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already
television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition
for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not
difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel
9, said intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.
GONZALES V. MACARAIG
Facts: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the
General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated
or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the
President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills,
Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and
approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and
declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special
Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed. On 2 February
1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 ("Authorizing and Directing the
Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines
the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General
Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989
(H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes") was adopted. On 11 April 1989,
the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales,
Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J.
Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera,
Jose D. Lina, Jr., John Osmeña, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag,
Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Tañada,
Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada,
Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as
members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate
and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this
case," with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the
Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar,
Lourdes Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson, Jose Concepcion,
Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague,
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA 6688. No
Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.'s cause
is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President's line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s;
therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89)
and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects
to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power
but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it
the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. The Solicitor
General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue in the present
case is a political question beyond the power of this Court to determine; that
Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto; that
Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and,
therefore, merits the President's veto; that the power of the President to
augment items in the appropriations for the executive branches had already
been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD
1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is
empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other "distinct and
severable parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
Issue [1]: Whether the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by
the Constitution (Whether the President has the power to veto "provisions" of
an Appropriations Bill)
Held [1]: NO. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI,
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto
power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire
bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto
power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified,
the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In
other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in
an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the
elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any
reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power
as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is
because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The
restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true
sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not
relate to the entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and
Section 16 (FY '90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive
and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the
General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section
25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment
from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY '89)
and 16 (FY '90) prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of
appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to
augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of
disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the power
to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers
within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from
savings. More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation
from savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations
Bill. An Appropriations Bill is "one the primary and specific aim of which is to
make appropriation of money from the public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative authorization of
receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation from savings, on the
other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of
money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
Issue [2]: Whether Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are
provisions, not items, in the appropriation bill.
Held [2]: NO. Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are not provisions
in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987
Constitution provides: "Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall
be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates." Explicit is
the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some " particular appropriation" therein. The challenged
"provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do
not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to
all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original
recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by the
"Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office." Thirdly, the vetoed
Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation.
Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) although labelled
as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as
items for the purpose of the President's veto power.
Issue [3]: Whether the Legislature’s inclusion of qualifications, conditions,
limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill was
proper.
Held [3]: There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation
is the power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to
distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation
Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a
condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself
to stand. The veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include
a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and
without effect whatsoever. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should
be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more
properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an
Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary
sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. "It is
not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which
funds are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an
appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with money items of
appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the
ultimate test is one of appropriateness." Tested by these criteria, Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to be inappropriate
"conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been "artfully
drafted" to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general
law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate
legislation. Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a
schedule of expenditures. The reason is that items reduced or disapproved by
Congress would not appear on the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations
Act itself. They can only be detected when compared with the original
budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY
'90) themselves provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been
disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in this Act." Herein, there is no condition, in the budgetary
sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill
which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90)
partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other
words, "a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an
appropriation bill."
Issue [4]: Whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional.
Held [4]: YES. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes
of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section
27[1], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto.
Gonzales et al.'s argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing
to override" has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been
herein upheld. There need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive
branches of government adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each
exercising its respective powers with due deference to the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of
governmental powers remains on even keel.
BENGZON V. DRILON
Facts:
Republic Act (RA) 910 was enacted in 1953 to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court (SC) and of the Court of Appeals
(CA) who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the
Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained
the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the
residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his
retirement or resignation.
In 1957, Sec 3-A of RA 1797 amended RA 910 authorizing the adjustment
(increase or decrease) of the pensions to the prevailing rates of salaries at the
time of cessation. Sec 3-A of RA 1797 was repealed by Presidential Decree
(PD) 644 in 1975.
Congress approved House Bill (HB) No. 16297 in 1990 for the reenactment of
Sec 3-A of RA 1797. President Aquino, however vetoed HB No. 16297.
Other retired justices of the CA (Barcelona, et. al.) filed Administrative Matter
(AM) No. 91-8-225-CA asking for readjustment of their pensions based on RA
1797 on the ground that PD 644 did not have the force and effect of law as
there was no valid publication. PD 644 was enacted in 1975 but was only
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
published in 1977. The SC ruled in the affirmative and held that RA 1797 was
not repealed by PD 644.
Pursuant to AM No. 91-8-225-CA, Congress included in the General
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 (GAB of 1992) certain appropriations
for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates.
On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed:
1. portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special
Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower
Courts ;
2. portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special
Provisions for the Court of Appeals; and
3. portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the
General Fund Adjustments of the GAB of 1992.
Bengzon, et. al., retired justices of the SC and the CA, seek to set aside the
veto by the President portions of the GAB of 1992 on the following grounds:
1. the subject veto is not an item veto;
2. the veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers;
3. the veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions
due them; and
4. the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Issue: Is the veto of portions of the GAB of 1992 valid?
Held:
NO. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise
of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the
power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not
absolute.
The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act
like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that
he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or
nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the
Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it
cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The
President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including
its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely
provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to
an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice declared "that an "item" of an appropriation
bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill."
Portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts.
Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are
not items. They are provisions. There is no specific appropriation of money
involved.
What were really vetoed are:
1. RA 1797; and
2. AM No. 91-8-225-CA.
The attempt to use the veto power to set aside AM No. 91-8-225-CA, a
Resolution of this Court, and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by RA
1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the
Judiciary. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The veto of
these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice
to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the
constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."
It cannot be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued
pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797. For as long as these retired Justices
are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government cannot
deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ
Facts:
Congress enacted the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994. Congress
appropriated P86.323B for debt servicing but it appropriated only P37B for
education. Philconsa, et. al. (Philconsa for brevity) claim that Congress cannot
give debt servicing the highest priority for it would be violative of the
Constitution requiring education to have the highest funding.
Congress also added a special provision which provides that:
1) The Appropriation for Debt Service shall be used for the payment of
principal and interest of foreign / domestic debts. That any payment in
excess of the amount appropriated shall be subject to the approval of
the President and with concurrence of Congress.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
The President vetoed this provision but did not veto the P86B appropriation
for debt service.
Philconsa claim that the President cannot veto the Special provision without
vetoing the entire amount of P86B.
The Solgen however countered that the Special provision did not relate to the
item of appropriation for debt service, and thus could very well be the subject
of an item veto. The President, in his veto message, said that there is already
an automatic provision on debt servicing provided for under the Foreign
Borrowing Act. The GAA cannot be used to amend to Foreign Borrowing Act.
Issue: Is the veto valid?
Held:
It is readily apparent that the special provision is an INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISION referring to funds other than the P86B appropriated in the GAA.
The vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act
and to reverse the debt payment policy. Thus, the repeal of said law should be
done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
The general rule is that the President has to veto the entire bill, and not
merely parts thereof. The exception is the power of the President to veto any
particular item (item veto) in an appropriations bill. Here, the president must
veto the entire item.
A General Appropriations Bill (GAB) is a special type of legislation whose
content is limited to specified sums of money. Because the Constitution
requires that provisions in an appropriation bill must relate specifically to some
particular appropriation to which it relates, any provision which does not relate
to any particular item or which extends its operation beyond the item will be
considered an INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION, WHICH CAN BE VETOED
SEPARATELY.
Thus the scope of this item veto (inappropriate provision) should be any
provision:
1) which does not relate to any particular item
2) which extends the operation beyond the item of appropriation
3) an unconstitutional provision which are intended to amend other laws.
Thus, the veto of the special provision on debt service is VALID. It is an
inappropriate provision. It refers to funds other than the P86B appropriated in
the GAA. This should be the subject of a separate legislation, not through the
GAA.
(this is a complicated case.. read the orig).
There are other vetoes made:
VALID VETOES:
1. the debt servicing;
2. the State University and Colleges revolving fund;
3. the purchase of military equipment – this is an inappropriate provision.
It is a rider. It provided for Congressional approval;
4. the AFP pension – the AFP Chief of Staff has no power to augment;
5. Deactivation of CAFGU – another rider, inappropriate provision.
INVALID VETOES:
1. the 70%-30% (administrative vs. contract) ratio for road maintenance.
Congress provided that only 30% of the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted out, but the President wanted 70% to
be contracted out because it would be more efficient, economical. When
the president vetoed, he argued that it was inappropriate. VETO INVALID.
The provision is APPROPRIATE. It specifies how the said item shall be
expended, 70% administrative, 30% contract. This cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are
appropriate in the budgetary sense;
2. purchase of AFP medicines .
- this is also APPROPRIATE PROVISION. This is in compliance with the drug
policy of the DOH, it directly relates and is inseparable from appropriation.
Legislative Veto
MILLER V. MARDO
FACTS
- These are different cases taken together as they present only one
identical question
- 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the
DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed
without separation pay
- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the
DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal
Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance
of money claims re violations of labor standards
- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin
Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a
driver in the company
- same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued permanent
injunction against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg.
Plan 2-A is null and void.
- 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against
Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, not being paid overtime,
without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstress
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have
jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL
under Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia
Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of
Romero. But Labor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of
execution of the decision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be
heard
- they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute
and unconstitutional
- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred
Wilson and Co., as he was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without
separation pay, and without sufficient notice.
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no
power to adjudicate money claims
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well – that Reorg Plan
is null and void insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims
Issues:
1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the
authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers
jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on
claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress
HELD:
1. No it is not valid.
 - While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it
referred merely to administrative and not judicial functions such as
deciding on money claims. Judicial power rests exclusively on the
judiciary
- While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial
powers, it must be incident to the exercise of administrative functions
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere
grant of power to create functions in connection with reorganization of the
Executive
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress
- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if
it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997
- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law-
that two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and
the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to
the separate determination of the other.
MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court, Certiorari and Prohibition (July
2003)
Ponencia was penned by J. Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.
The case used the debates in the constitutional convention to determine the
intent of the framers re: Absentee Voting. Nine other justices gave their
separate opinions. This is considered a landmark case since the core issue is
the enfranchisement of some 7 million overseas Filipinos.
FACTS:
→ This is a case filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal, as taxpayer,
against COMELEC, Exec Sec Alberto Romulo and Hon. Emilia Boncodin, Sec
of Dept of Budget and Mgmt.
Petitioner, also a member of the Phil Bar, seeks a declaration that certain
provisions of RA No 9189 suffer from constitutional infirmity.
Such Act appropriates funds under its Sec 29 to carry out the provisions and
as taxpayer, petitioner Macalintal also seeks to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, w/c
results to a misapplication of funds.
→ RA No 9189, more commonly known as The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, was enacted in lieu of Sec 2, Art V of the Consti. It provides
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Congress the system in w/c absentee voting should be done by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
→ Absentee voting- a relatively new concept, completely separable and
distinct from the regular system of voting. It is an exception to the customary
and usual manner of voting. Such right of absentee and disabled voters to
cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory. It is devised to
accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it
impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election.
→ Overseas Absentee Voter- a citizen of the Phils, at least 18 yrs of age, who
is qualified to register and vote under RA No 9189, not otherwise disqualified
by law, who is abroad on the day of the elections.
→ Absentee- not a resident. A person cannot be simultaneously a resident
and an absentee under normal conditions. However, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Phils as residence is considered synonymous
to domicile.
→ Residence- a temporary/permanent place of abode; not a domicile. It
implies factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
→ Domicile- a fixed permanent residence to w/c, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.
→ Difference between residence & domicile- A person can only have a single
domicile but he may have numerous places of residence. The essential
distinction is the intent to return or the intent to leave when the purpose for w/c
the resident has taken up his abode ends.
ISSUES (Resolved in seriatim):
1) WON Sec 5 of RA No 9189 allowing immigrants or permanent residents to
register as voters is violative of the residency requirement in Sec 1 Art V of
Consti?
2)WON Sec 18.5 of RA w/c empowers COMELEC to proclaim all the winning
candidates violates Sec 4 Art VI of Consti, w/c states that theCongres s
proclaim the winning candidates for Pres & VP?
3) WON Congress, via the JCOC, can exercise certain powers over the
COMELEC, w/o violating the latter’s independence under Sec 1 Art IX-A of
the Consti?
HELD: Petition partly granted.
The ff portions (4) of RA No 9189 are declared VOID for being
unconstitutional:

(a)The phrase in the 1st sentence of 1st par of Sec 17.1, to wit: subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
(b)The portion of the last par of Sec 17.1, to wit: only upon review and
approval
of the JCOC;
(c)The 2nd sentence of par 1 of Sec 19, to wit: The IRR shall be submitted to
the
JCOC created by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and
(d)The 2nd sentence in par 2 of Sec 25, to wit: It shall review, revise, amend
and
approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission.
RATIO:
1)No. Sec 5 of RA No 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting
under
this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration, anaffidav it prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Phils not later than 3 yrs from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal
of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the Natl Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims this is violative of the residency requirement in Sec 1 Art V of
the Consti w/c requires the voter must be a resident in the Phils for at least
one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6
mos immediately preceding an election. He presents the ruling in Caasi v. CA
wherein Court held that a “green card” holder US immigrant is deemed to
have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Phils.
3)
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present,
and
that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling.
Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for w/o it, the presumption of
abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Phils and
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. Sec 5 of RA No 9189 does not only require the promise to resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Phils not later than 3 yrs after
approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare
that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she
must return to the Phils otherwise consequences will be met accdg to RA No
9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has
exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom
of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found impractical. However, it
can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and
provided for a deterrence w/c is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast
shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the
elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole
meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases.
In fine, considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in
its statutory construction and intent of the framers, w/c is to grant Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage (Sec 1 Art V), the Court finds that Sec 5 of RA
No 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
2)Yes, Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it.
The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates
forPresident andVP for the entire nation must remain in the hands of
Congress as its duty and power under Sec 4 ART VII of the Consti.
COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for
Senators and Party-list Reps.
No, by vesting itself w/ the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No 9189, Congress went beyond
the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left w/ no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence
(silence) in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
Unlike the first 2 issues where it remained silent, this is the sole issue reacted
to by COMELEC
Bellosillo, J., Concurring Opinion
→ Opined his views on WON Sec 5 of RA NO 9189 is violative of the
residency requirement.
→ Actual and physical residence abroad should not ipso jure result or
automatically be equated w/ abandonment of Phil domicile. The values of
animus manendi (intent to remain) and animus revertendi (intent to return)
must not be brushed off in determining WON immigrants and permanent
residents should be denied of their right to vote.
→ Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances.
3 rules to be considered:
1) a man must have a residence/domicile somewhere;
2) domicile is not easily lost, once established it is retained until a new
one is acquired; and
3) a man can have but 1 residence/domicile at a time.
Puno, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
→ Elements of domicile:
♦ Fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place
♦ Animus manendi: intention of returning there permanently
→ The mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence w/o the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
→ To successfully effect change in domicile, itsactual removal or change must
be demonstrated.
→ Where he concurs:
♦ Congress could not have allowed COMELEC to exercise a power
exclusively bestowed upon it by the Consti in its constitutional duty to canvass
and proclaim the winning candidates for Pres and VP
♦ Congress should not have been given power over IRR of COMELEC for the
latter was granted the power to strengthen its independence. Hence, its
exercise is beyond invasion by Congress.
→ Where he dissents:
♦ The affidavit merely proves the intent to return but not other requisites for
reacquiring the domicile of origin. Domicile could not be established as soon
as the old is abandoned even though the person has not yet arrived at the
new domicile.
♦ The burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who
asserts it. It should not merely rely on a person’s declarations as to what he
considers his home, residence or domicile.
♦ Therefore, the burden rests on an immigrant or a permanent resident to
prove that he has abandoned his foreign domicile and reestablished his
domicile in the Phils. Until the intent is fulfilled upon one’s return to the Phils,
he continues to be a domiciliary of another country and cannot be considered
a qualified voter. Physical presence is not a mere test of intent but the
Principal confirming evidence of the intention of the person.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Extent of exercise of Congress of its oversight powers in the implementation
of RA No 9189:
♦ Power of oversight: embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. It is intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself
and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
govt.
♦ Categories: congressional scrutiny (determine economy & efficiency of
operation of govt activities), congressional investigation (inherent power w/c
involves a more intense digging of facts), legislative supervision (most
encompassing; allows Congress to supervise over executive agencies
through its veto power).
→ COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary.
The Court has no general power of supervision over it except those
specifically granted by the Consti.However, the COMELEC is subject to
congressional scrutiny especially during budget hearings. Congress cannot
abolish it as it can other agencies under the executive branch. COMELEC is
not a mere creature of the legislature, it owe its origin from the Constitution.
Vitug, J., Concurring Opinion:
→ COMELEC’s power is limited only to proclaiming Senators and Party-list
Reps as winners. The election returns for the positions of Pres & VP should
be certified by the Bd of Canvassers to Congress & not COMELEC.
Panganiban, J., Concurring Opinion:
→ 3 Requisites of Voters: citizenship, age and residence.
→ Importance of residence: enables one to know the needs and the problems
of the locality/area.
→ Nowadays, through e-age communication facilities, actual presence is no
longer necessary to make Fils abroad aware of the country’s conditions and
the suitability of candidates for natl offices.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
→ Immigrant defined: a person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence
→ Dissent: Sec 5 of RA No 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a category of
voters who do not possess the constitutional requirement of residence and
therefore should be declared UNconstitutional. Immigrants have voluntarily
and unambiguously chosen actual, physical and permanent residence in a
foreign country.
→ Concurs in the rest of the decisions on the given issues.
Sandoval-Gutierez, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
→Since the Consti fixes qualifications of voters, such cannot be increased,
diminished or changed by legislative enactment, unless the power to do so is
expressly granted or necessarily implied.
→ Residency requirement aims to serve as an invaluable protection against
fraud and interference. It is not competent for Congress to diminish or alter
such qualification. Thus, Sec 5 of RA No 9189 is Unconstitutional.
Sandoval-Gutierez, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
→ Since the Consti fixes qualifications of voters, such cannot be increased,
diminished or changed by legislative enactment, unless the power to do so is
expressly granted or necessarily implied.
→ Residency requirement aims to serve as an invaluable protection against
fraud and interference. It is not competent for Congress to diminish or alter
such qualification. Thus, Sec 5 of RA No 9189 is Unconstitutional.
Callejo, Sr., J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
→ Sec 5 of RA No 9189 Unconstitutional insofar that qualifications of voters
set in
Sec 1 Art V is clear and unambiguous
Effectivity of Laws Civil Code, Art 2, EO 200 (1987)
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in
the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the
Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29,
1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication
need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited
readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly"; and
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should
accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the
Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-seven.
TANADA V. TUVERA
Facts:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish in the Official Gazette (OG) various PDs, LOIs, General orders,
proclamations, Eos, Letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Petitioners invoked Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Consti and the principle
that laws should be published in the OG in order to be valid and enforceable.
Respondents wanted the case to be dismissed on the ground that the
petitioners have no legal personality - not being “aggrieved parties” within the
meaning of Section 3, Rules 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
(effectivity of laws) W/N the said laws should be published
(legal standing) W/N petitioners have legal standing
Ruling:
Effectivity of Laws
Publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date – for then the date of publication
(Article 2 of the Civil Code) is material for determining its date of effectivity
which is the 15th day following its publication – but not when thaw law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
However, this is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publications. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides that the following shall be
published in the OG:
1. all important legislative acts and resolution of public nature of the
Congress
2. all EOs and admin orders and proclamation, except those which
have no general applicability
3. Decisions and Resolutions of the SC and Court of Appeals which
are of sufficient importance
4. Documents and classes of documents so required by law to be
published
5. Documents and classed of documents as the President shall
determine to have general applicability or those which he authorize to
be published.
Publication of all presidential issuance of public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Included are PDs those that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties or those which impose a burden on people such as tax
and revenue measures. Presidential issuances of general publication which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Objective of such law: adequate notice for the public of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions. Otherwise, there will be no basis for “ignorantia
legis non excusat.”
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of
the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the OG, only
PDs 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs
has ever been implemented or enforced by the government
SHALL used in Section 1 imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty.
♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥
Respondents are to publish in the OG all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
Legal Standing
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. SC recognized
the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay,
Negros Occidental.
TANADA V. TUVERA (MR)
Facts:
The petitioners move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.
Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication."
Ruling:
• The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case,
but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. All statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
 their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

• The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

• Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose

is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

• Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be

made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere

WHAT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED:

1. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws

2. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the

President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution.

3. Administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or

implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation

4. Charter of a city

5. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are

meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED:

1. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public

2. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning

the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.

3. Instructions issued on the case studies to be made in petitions for

adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency
on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms.

♥ ALBANO ♥ APORTADERA ♥ BALDON ♥ DAVID ♥ LAGASCA ♥ MANGAHAS ♥ MARONILLA TWINS ♥ ORIGINAL ♥ ORILLAZA ♥ PEDRENA ♥ SANDOVAL ♥ SAWIT ♥ TRINIDAD ♥
♥♥♥ WE ARE THE SHARE BEARS!!! ♥♥♥