Nacu vs CSC

Facts:

PEZA issued a memorandum prohibiting its employees from

charging and collecting overtime fees from PEZA registered
enterprises. EBCC filed a complaint against Nacu for allegedly
charging it overtime fees despite the memorandum order. During
the investigation, Ligan attested, among others, that the overtime
fees went to Nacu's group, and that, during the time Nacu was
confined in the hospital, she pre-signed documents and gave
them to him. Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the
ten overtime billing statements were hers.

Issue:

Whether or not the signatures appearing on the overtime billing

was of Nacu.

Ruling: YES!

Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu,

also identified the latter's signatures on the SOS. Such testimony
deserves credence. It has been held that an ordinary witness may
testify on a signature he is familiar with. Anyone who is familiar
with a person's writing from having seen him write, from carrying
on a correspondence with him, or from having become familiar
with his writing through handling documents and papers known to
have been signed by him may give his opinion as to the
genuineness of that person's purported signature when it
becomes material in the case

Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 50 provides:SEC. 50. Opinion of

ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper
basis is

given, may be received in evidence regarding --

xxxx(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity.

Heirs of Ochoa vs GS Transport

Facts:

Jose Marcial died in an accident on board a taxicab owned and

operated by G & S. A complaint for damages was filed against the
latter. The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of
carriage and awarded the victim damages for loss of earning
capacity. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC, but modified the
award on the ground that on the ground that the income
certificate issued by Jose Marcial’s employer, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), is self-serving,
unreliable and biased, and that the same was not supported by
competent evidence such as income tax returns or receipts.

G & S file an MR arguing that the USAID Certification used as

basis in computing the award for loss of income is inadmissible in
evidence because it was not properly authenticated and identified
in court by the signatory thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not authentication of the USAID certification is

admissible.

Ruling:

It therefore becomes necessary to first ascertain whether the

subject USAID Certification is a private or public document before
this Court can rule upon the correctness of its admission and
consequent use as basis for the award of loss of income in these
cases.

Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents as

either public or private, viz: Sec. 19. Classes of Documents – For
the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private. Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts

of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;

The USAID is an official government agency of a foreign country,

the United States. Hence, Cruz, as USAID’s Chief of the Human
Resources Division in the Philippines, is actually a public officer.
Apparently, Cruz’s issuance of the subject USAID Certification was
made in the performance of his official functions, he having
charge of all employee files and information as such officer. In
view of these, it is clear that the USAID Certification is a public
document pursuant to paragraph (a), Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, and consistent with our above discussion,
the authenticity and due execution of said Certification are
already presumed.

It is true that before a private document offered as authentic be

received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must first
be proved. However, it must be remembered that this
requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents
and “does not apply to public documents, these being admissible
without further proof of their due execution or genuineness. Two
reasons may be advanced in support of this rule, namely: said
documents have been executed in the proper registry and are
presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by
clear and convincing proof; and, second, because public
documents are authenticated by the official signature and seals
which they bear and of which seals, courts may take judicial
notice.”

RE: COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MEMBERS OF CHINESE

GROCERS ASSOCIATION AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B.
INTING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J, April 12, 2011

Facts:

CGA is the owner of a parcel of land. Sometime in 2008, Dela Cruz

filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy
alleging that the old owner’s duplicate copy had been misplaced.
Dela Cruz based his petition on his interest as the vendee of the
property, as evidenced by a Deed Of Absolute Sale, allegedly
signed by Ang Bio, representative of CGA. The court granted the
petition. The CGA filed a petition against the judge contending
that the latter acted in gross neglect in granting Dela Cruz’s
petition. The claim that the deed should have aroused tje judge
suspicion as it was allegedly signed by Ang Bio who died on 2001.

Issue:

Ruling:

The uncertified death certificate cannot be admitted as

evidence.

It is settled that if a document is a public document, to

prove its contents, there is a need to present a certified
copy of this document, issued by the public officer in
custody of the original document.

In this case, Complainant had not presented any other

evidence to support the charge of misconduct leveled
against J. The complainants only offered as evidence
a mere photocopy of its agent’s Certificate of Death.
Clearly it is lack of certification from the in-charged
public officer. Thus, it is inadmissible as evidence, and
is considered a mere scrap of paper without any
evidentiary value. In the absence of proof of
misconduct, the presumption that respondent regularly
performed her duties will prevail.

G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL

AND MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT
PETITIONERS, VS. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Echin was hired by ATC In behalf of the Ministry of Public Health of

Kuwait. Echin was employed as medical technologist under a two-
year contract. The contract provides further that Echin is to
undergo a probationary period of 1 year. Echin was dismissed, the
latter not having passed the probationary period. Echin later filed
a petition for illegal dismissal in the NLRC. The petitioner maintain
that they should not be held liable since the employment contract
provides that her employment shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They allege that it is a
patent error to apply the labor code provisions on probationary
employment.

Issue:

Whether or not kuwaiti laws and regulation should apply in this

case.

Ruling:

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking

the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving
the law.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,

hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the

following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as
represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is
subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the
host country's Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter
to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation
terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
translated copy of the certificate of termination

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do

not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil
service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the
pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were
mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of
the translations of the MOA and the termination letter
which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service
laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such
Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated