COMPILATION

OF

CASE DIGESTS

ON

PROBLEM AREAS
IN
LEGAL ETHICS

SUBMITTED BY:

RAMIREZ, KEISHA YNA VINEE V.

CHAPTER I: THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000 1
FACTS
Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Bonifacio on grounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui,
husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. Accordingto petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted
to him about the relationship between them and Atty.Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront
said respondent to stop their illicit affair but to no avail. According however to respondent, she
is a victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor
but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in China. Moreover, the two
got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of
the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she
and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually
accept the situation.

ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent can be disbarred on the ground of immorality.

RULING
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can
be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. That one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Circumstances existed which should have at
least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui,
and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that
Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted
the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite
their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui
was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with
Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his
true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
 In re: Cunanan, et al
G.R. No. L-6784. March 12, 1954
2
FACTS
Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act in
1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from
1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 2 of the Act provided that “ A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/s shall be included in
the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE(S)
Whether R.A No. 972 is unconstitutional.

RULING
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in
the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955
Bar examinations. Section 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take into account of the fact that laws
and jurisprudence are not stationary.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because
they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
 In re Guarina
G.R. No. L-1179, January 8, 1913 3
FACTS
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
The applicant took and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent
in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points
short of the required percentage of 75.
It is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon
motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now
holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes.
The clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without and examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in
the Philippine Islands without an examination." It is contended that this mandatory construction
is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

ISSUE(S)
Whether section 2 of Act No. 1597 is mandatory.

RULING
In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the
intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should change
the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in
question. The construction should be in harmony with this assumption whenever possible.
The word "may" may be construed as either mandatory or permissive in its effect. But to
construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we
conclude therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of the
legislator, that it should be given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that the true
intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to admit to the bar
without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the court is
otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary qualifications.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of
his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that
this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.
 In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 Bar Examinations
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
4
FACTS
Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding. Believing in
good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them,
considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.”
Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk. Meling should have
known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a
law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Even if these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good
moral character.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty.

RULING
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling
did not pass the bar).
Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.”
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed
as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. Unauthorized use of the appellation
“attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE. Limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver
that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is
there any pending case or charge against him/her.”
Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
 Zoreta v. Simpliciano
A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004. 5
FACTS

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of COntract

and Damaes against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to

the latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent

Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who

was not a dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications issued by teh CLerk of

Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by

presented documents.

ISSUE(S)

Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the

lawyer’s oath to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is duly

commissioned when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath

similarly proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct, “Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). The lawyer violates,

likewise, Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the

integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

 Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon
A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000 6
FACTS
Complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the
family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title
over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT
No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the proper
measurements of the subject property. However, complainant and his family were surprised
when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of
complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a
piggery.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply
however, the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to
respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property .
Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale
covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who
notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from
the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling
the subject property without his consent.

ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent should be disbarred.

RULING
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards
of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty
to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the profession.
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares
located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of
complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property
was orally given to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete
knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law,
however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the
registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of
attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to
know, this process.
Respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
 Ronquillo v. Cezar
A.C. No. 6288, June 16, 2006 7
FACTS
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a
piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to return to them
the amount they have paid him for it.
Complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment. Respondent received
from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to
be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus,
complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00
each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.
Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has
not paid in full the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly
executed with Crown Asia.

ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered
into a contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of
his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed
this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid
in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell,
transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
 Radjaie v. Alovera
A.C. No. 4748, August 4, 2000 8
FACTS
On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres,
Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their counsel,
Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case
No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant,
Victoria V. Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The action sought,
among others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in the name of herein
complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of 215,777 square meters situated in Panay,
Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of land as property commonly owned by the Borres
heirs.
Judge Alovera presided over the hearing in the presence of Teresita Bauzon, court
stenographer of Br. 17, Atty. Villaruz, who presented the evidence ex parte. After hearing, Judge
Alovera rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Borres the lease property which is the
subject of this case.
Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the
draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can
still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to decide cases. With this
assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as Judge
Alovera was dictating it.
Complainant who was in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her property and
she was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines.
Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting
presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order. He
observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for decision,
except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the "simulated
proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer
of exhibits.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Alovera should be disbarred.

RULING

In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What
transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty.
Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court,
were present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was actual
court session in open court going on at that time. The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera,
though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge
Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge his submission was refused.

This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of
his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law. Respondent ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED.
CHAPTER II: THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
Diao v. Martinez
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
9
FACTS
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez
charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he
had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor
General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending
that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education,
specially, in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b)
Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom —
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination,
and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left
high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Diao be admitted to the Bar despite his misrepresentation.

RULING
No.Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations. RATIO: Diao
never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination
represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had
obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. This
explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University,
it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and
the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous"). The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential.
 10
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
Requesting Exemption From Payment of IBP Dues
B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005

FACTS
On September 22, 2004, Atty Cecilo Arevalo, Jr. sought the exemption from the
payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 in the years between 1977-2005. Atty. Cecilio
Arevalo‘s contention is that when he was admitted in the Philippines Bar in 1961, he became
part of the Philippines Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, and then migrated to and worked in, the
USA until his retirement in 2003. He maintained that he cannot be made to pay the IBP dues
because, when he is working in the Philippine Civil Service, the Civil Service Law prohibits the
practice off one‘s profession while in the Government service, also when he was in the USA the
IBP dues cannot extend to him. On November 16, 2004, the IBP submitted its comment, that the
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be
included in the roll of attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of
the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP board of
governors; the policy of the IBP board of governors of no exemption of payment of annual dues
is but an implementation of the Court‘s directives for all members of the IBP to help defray the
cost of integration of the Bar. It is maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption, of
payment of annual dues as requested by Atty Arevalo, what is allowed is the voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. What he could have done was to inform the
secretary of IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated, thus, reliving him from his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. On
February 25, 2005, in reply to the letter of the IBP, Atty. Arevalo questions the policy of the IBP
board of governors of the non-exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of they are engaged in active or inactive practice. Asserting that the said policy is a
suffers constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was
inactive in the practice of law.

RULING
NO. The Integration of the Philippines Bar means that official unification of the entire
lawyer population, which requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and retention of his name in the Roll of attorneys of
the Supreme Court. The Court stated that there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and in integration of the Philippine Bar. The fee required by the IBP is a
necessary consequence of membership in the IBP for the integration of the Philippine Bar to
defray the expenses of regulation of the profession, Lawyers, which no one is exempt.
 Likong vs. Lim
A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994
11
FACTS
Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L.
Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US
pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully
paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension
checks from the post office. About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed
the post office that she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against
Cerina. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B.
Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for Cerina. Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which
does not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to allow the Yap to withdraw the pension
checks. They likewise entered into a compromise agreement without the participation of
Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina admitted
an obligation to Yap and that they agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments.
Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented from
seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty.
Lim that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this
could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she
consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry
about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards
to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that
she was prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other
form of mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without authority,
assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat. Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s
counsel had abandoned her and it was upon her request that he made the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lim states that he first instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed that her
lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees. The compromise
agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerina‘s debt to Yap and the terms contained
therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for violating Rule 8.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, constituting malpractice and grave misconduct.
Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons
enumerated in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform opposing
counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the
trial court of the alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel.Instead, even assuming that she
was really abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the
situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly and
patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's conduct is
unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
 IN RE: EDILLON

FACTS
A.C. 1928, December 19, 1980
12
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership
fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that
as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

RULING
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court
has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
CHAPTER III: THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

In re Almacen
G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970 13
FACTS
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. The trial court,
after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client, but Almacen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time
and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the
Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court
which also denied his appeal in a minute resolution. Almacen called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer‘s
certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when
members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120,
000 without knowing the reasons why and that he became ―one of the sacrificial victims before
the altar of hypocrisy.ǁ He also stated ―that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.ǁ The Supreme Court did not
immediately act on Almacen‘s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually
surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer‘s certificate though as he now
argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted ―to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.ǁ
He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is ―the complainant, prosecutor
and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Almacen should be disciplined.

RULING
Yes. He was suspended indefinitely. RATIO: The Supreme Court first clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion
for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out
its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide ―only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particularfacts and parties involved.ǁ It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the court‘s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals‘ opinion. On Almacen‘s attack against the Supreme
Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. It is true that a lawyer, both
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize
the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. In the case at bar, Almacen‘s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also
notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). He has
only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
 Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
B.M. No. 1222. February 4, 2004 14
FACTS
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the
2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law
firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile
Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating
Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions
from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008
filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of
equity and compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his
reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Danilo de Guzman is worthy of clemency.

RULING
We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven
(7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already
served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While
the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed
on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct
of his public life during his years outside of the bar.
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his
disbarment towards public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The
attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal
profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario
Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such
as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate
events of 2003.
The Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN
PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law
is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
 De Victoria v. Court of Appeals
G.R. NO. 147550 - January 26, 2005
15
FACTS
The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria (Victoria) an extended period to
file the petition, conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of remedial law
that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. Where a motion for extension of time is filed beyond the period of appeal, the same is
of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be
appealed from the will have become final and executory.
In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to
appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of Victoria’s motion for extension
of time on April 10, 2001. The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissing the CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by
counsel for Victoria’s agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, Victoria had only until June 20, 2000
within which to file an appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration.
In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria, with the aid of his counsel, Atty.
Abdul Basar (Atty. Basar), made misleading statements in his Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari and in his subsequent Petition respecting the timeliness of
his appeal and the status of the Resolutions of the CA.
Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty. Basar, to show cause, within 10 days
from receipt of the Decision, why they should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily
dealt with for violation of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. Basar can be held liable in contempt of court and for misconduct

RULING
As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act with ―candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.ǁ Thus, a lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in his relations with his client, the opposing
part and his counsel, and the court before which he pleads his client’s cause.
Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates lawyers to ―observe the
rules of procedure and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.ǁ
It is, therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal from
a final and executor Resolution of the Court of Appeals, chose to disregard the fundamental
tenets of the legal profession. In fact, from his explanation, he was well aware that the
reglementary period for appeal from the Decision of the RTC had already lapsed, but he
nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on certiorari.
 16
Samar Mining Company v. Arnado
G.R. No. L-22304 July 30, 1968.

FACTS
In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was
awarded compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while working for
Samar Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by
Francisco Arnado, a regional administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar
Mining’s lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari before CFI
Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said case because he was a
“mere labor lawyer” who had no authority to render the award being complained of. CFI Cebu
dismissed the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v.
Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional
administrators of the labor department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas
still filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the appeal has merit.

RULING
No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the
hope of “draining the resources of the poorer party” “and of compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion.” The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist
in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered
Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.
 Torres v. Javier
A.M. No. 5910, September 21, 2005
17
FACTS
Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his giving vent to ill-feelings stated in the
pleading is not covered by the absolute immunity or privileged communication.
Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged Atty. Jose Concepcion
Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyer’s
oath for employing statements and remarks on his pleadings which are false, unsubstantiated,
with malicious imputation, abusive, offensive and improper with the character of an attorney as
a quasi-judicial officer.
Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing his pleadings
considering that his wife was included to the burglary exposed in the present case. Also, he
invokes that those statements he made are privileged communication, it forming part of a
judicial proceeding.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. Javier is administratively liable for the alleged offensive statements he made in
his pleadings

RULING
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy,
utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions
and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject
inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. A matter, however, to which the privilege does
not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that
no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety. That matter alleged in a pleading
need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be
legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become
the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.
Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings
was his emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute
with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained; that the Atty. Javier is representing his wife is
not at all an excuse.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language must be dignified and
choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client’s
rights, a lawyer — even one gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein up his temper.
Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his
giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute
immunity does not extend.
 Bildner v. Ilusorio
G.R. Nos. 139789 & 139808 May 12, 2000 18
FACTS
The disbarment case against respondent Atty. Singson stemmed from his alleged attempt,
as counsel of Ramon Ilusorio (Ramon) in Civil Case No. 4537-R, to exert influence on presiding
Regional Trial Court Judge Antonio Reyes to rule in Ramon’s favor. To complainant-petitioners,
the bid to influence, which allegedly came in the form of a bribe offer, may be deduced from the
following exchanges during the May 31, 2000 hearing on Ramon’s motion for Judge Reyes to
inhibit himself from hearing Civil Case No. 4537-R. In the said hearing, Judge Reyes narrated
that Atty. Singson has been calling his residence in Baguio City for about 20 to 50 times already
and had offered Atty. Oscar Sevilla, his classmate at Ateneo Law School P500,000 to give it to
him for the purpose of ruling in favor of Ramon. Complainant-petitioners likewise submitted an
affidavit made by Judge Reyes concerning the attempts of Atty. Singson to bribe him
concerning the case of Ramon Ilusorio vs. Baguio Country Club. The attempts to bribe him
consisted of visiting him about three times in his office and making a dozen calls to his Manila
and Baguio Residences offering him bribe money. Complainant-petitioners also submitted Atty.
Oscar Sevilla’s affidavit to support the attempted bribery charge against Atty. Singson.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioners prayed for the disbarment or
discipline of Atty. Singson for attempted bribery and gross misconduct.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. Singson be administratively disciplined or disbarred from the practice of law for
alleged gross misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge Reyes

RULING
There is a well-grounded reason to believe that Atty. Singson indeed attempted to
influence Judge Reyes decide a case in favor of Atty. Singson’s client. The interplay of the
documentary evidence presented provide for the reason. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted
having made phone calls to Judge Reyes, either in his residence or office in Baguio City during
the period material. He offers the lame excuse, however, that he was merely following up the
status of a temporary restraining order applied for and sometimes asking for the resetting of
hearings.The Court finds the explanation proffered as puerile as it is preposterous. Matters
touching on case status could and should be done through the court staff, and resetting is usually
accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court. And going by Judge Reyes’ affidavit,
the incriminating calls were sometimes made late in the evening and sometimes in the most
unusual hours, such as while Judge Reyes was playing golf with Atty. Sevilla. Atty. Sevilla lent
corroborative support to Judge Reyes’ statements, particularly about the fact that Atty. Singson
wanted Judge Reyes apprised that they, Singson and Sevilla, were law school classmates.
The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially
through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying
to influence the judge to rule in his client’s favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal
profession for it violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In assessing the case, we must stress the difficulty of proving bribery. The transaction is
always done in secret and often only between the two parties concerned. Indeed, there is no
concrete evidence in the records regarding the commission by Atty. Singson of attempted
bribery. Even Atty. Sevilla did not mention any related matter in his affidavit. Nevertheless,
Judge Reyes’ disclosures in his affidavit and in open court deserve some weight. The possibility
of an attempted bribery is not far from reality considering Atty. Singson’s persistent phone calls,
one of which he made while Judge Reyes was with Atty. Sevilla. Judge Reyes’ declaration may
have been an "emotional outburst" as described by Atty. Singson, but the spontaneity of an
outburst only gives it more weight. While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be
supported by evidence other than Judge Reyes’ statements, there is nevertheless enough proof to
hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical behavior of attempting to influence a judge, itself a
transgression of considerable gravity. However, heeding the injunction against decreeing
disbarment where a lesser sanction would suffice to accomplish the desired end, a suspension for
one year from the practice of law appears appropriate.
 Mercado vs. Virtolo
A.C. 5108 : May 26, 2005 19
FACTS
Herein complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards. The respondent on the other hand, is
a Deputy Executive Director of CHED. Complainant‘s husband filed a Civil Case for the
annulment of their marriage with the RTC of Pasig, which was dismissed by the TC and the
dismissal thereof was final and executory on July 15,1992. In August 1992 however, the counsel
of complainant died and on February 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial
court as collaborating counsel for complainant. He also informed the RTC that he has been
appointed as counsel for the complainant. It also appears that respondent filed criminal cases
against complainant for allegedly falsifying the birth certificates of her children.
Consequently, complainant filed other charges against respondent that are pending
before or decided upon by other tribunals including a libel suit, administrative case for
dishonesty and grave misconduct, and the violation of R.A. 6713 also known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and employees before the SB. Complainant
Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed
confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by
respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action
against respondent claiming that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty
of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth
which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. In February 9, 2000, the Court referred the AM to the IBP
for investigation. The hearings were set but complainant failed to attend both. On June 21, 2003,
the Board approved the report of investigating commissioner and finding the respondent guilty
for violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. However,
complainant, upon learning of the punishment, issued a desistance letter and explicitly forgives
respondent.

ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client
when he filed a criminal case against his former client.

RULING
No.The Court held that in engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him
special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that
is required by necessity and public interest. Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation
will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount
importance to the administration of justice. The communication made by a client to his attorney
must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his
attorney as to his rights or obligations. Furthermore, the communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. Complainant did
not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent
violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her
for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to
the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. Complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent.
CHAPTER IV: THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

20
Blanza, et al. vs. Arcangel
A.C. No. 492. September 5, 1967

FACTS
Blanza and Pasion complain that way back in April, 1955, respondent Arcangel volunteered to
help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands,
both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and
also attached their signatures on blank papers. However, they noticed that since then, Arcangel
had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their
papers six years later, Arcangel refused to surrender them. Arcangel admitted having received
the documents from complainants but argued that it was for photostating purposes only. His
failure to immediately return them was due to complainants Blanza and Pasion's refusal to hand
him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said
documents from the photostat service. Nonetheless, he had already advanced the expenses
himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective photostats and
the photostat service receipt to the fiscal.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Arcangel violated Rule 18.04 wherein a lawyer must inform the client on status of case

RULING
The court is compelled to dismiss the charges against respondent Arcangel for being
legally insufficient because of the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent and because of
the non appearance of Complainant Pasion nor her counsel to substantiate her charges in the
hearing set. The courtcannot but advise against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer
has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the
minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must be par excellence, especially
when he volunteers his professional services. Arcangel has not lived up to that ideal standard. It
was unnecessary to have complainants Blanza and Pasion wait, and hope, for six long years on
their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent Arcangel should have
terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And
although the court decided he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, this should serve as a
reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him.
 Regala v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996 21
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB),
through the Presidential Commission on Good Gov‘t (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
includes shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP
vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed
legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the members of the law
firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings. In the
course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members
of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted
in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd
Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco having promised he‘ll reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
# 33. Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed,
conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the
financial & corporate framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including
the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA
Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of
UCPB. In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their
participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate
lawyering Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten
wealth. Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG
exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Consequently,
PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the same conditions
precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didn‘t refute petitioners' contention that he
did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he
undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. In a
Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions
required by PCGG. It held, ―ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.ǁ ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied.
Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his
own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, assailing SB‘s
resolution on essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely: SB gravely abused its
discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of the law of agency. SB gravely
abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus, deserving
equal treatment.SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case,
the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) and
the other information requested by the PCGG. SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring
that dropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to
constitutional rts of petitioners PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention,
alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected,
because they are evidence of nominee status.

ISSUE/S
Whether Attorney-Client privilege prohibits petitioner from revealing the identity of their clients
and other information requested by the PCGG

RULING
Yes, the resolution by the Sandiganbayan was annulled and set aside. As a matter of
public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exists only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach
until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.
He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. The general rule is, however,
qualified by some important exception. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which
he sought the lawyer's advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged. 3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's
client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's
name is privileged.
 Burbe v. Magulta
A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2001 22
FACTS
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money
against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not
successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner
paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the
status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The
lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to
the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the
prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the
case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent
that day. Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk
of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been
filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he
admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee
for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing
two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the lawyer should be disbarred.

RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as
follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for
the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that
was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure
of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent
of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds.”
 Pormento v. Pontevedra
A.C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005 23
FACTS
Respondent was the Pormento family s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The
family’s relationship with the respondentextends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations. The
rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant s counterclaim in a civil
case filed with the RTCof Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform
complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim whichresulted to the latter being
deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento
wasforced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the
subject property.In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros
Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and
notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property,
complainant alleges that he heeded respondent s advice to build a small house on the property
and to allow his(complainant’ s) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for
complainant to establish his possession of the said property.Subsequently, complainant s
nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with
theMunicipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of
complainant’s nephew.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. Pontevedra is guilty of misconduct for conflict of interest.

RULING
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of thefacts.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will requirethe attorney to do anything which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether hewill be called
upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.
Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent anattorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness ordouble dealing
in the performance thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when
the subject matter of the presentcontroversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the formerclient. Conversely, he may
properly act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client
in amatter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no
conflict of interests. Where, however,the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer’s
new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former client’s action,
the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel
for theformer client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.
 24
Rabanal v. Tugade
A.C. NO. 1372. JUNE 27, 2002

FACTS
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio
Rabanal against Atty. Faustino F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for
complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the appellant’s brief in the Court of Appeals despite
having been granted by the appellate court an extension of time to file the same, as a result of
which the appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed and the decision of the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final and executory.
Respondent claims however that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano
Rabanal prior to the filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he
could not be held responsible for the dismissal of complainant’s appeal for failure of counsel to
file the appellant’s brief.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the lawyer should be disciplined

RULING
Yes. The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. A
written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may
be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of
an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. In this case,
complainant sought and received legal advice from respondent Tugade, who admitted that he
agreed to sign the appellant’s brief to be filed and that he received P600.00 from complainant
spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the two. He thus
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
 Uy v. Gonzales
A.C. No. 5280, March 30, 2004 25
FACTS
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances
surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and
submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office
demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his
office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to
find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title,
respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances
pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which
respondent was supposed to have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that
he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file
the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant;
that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the
letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the
Office of the Register of Deeds.
The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

RULING
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to
his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the
issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there
was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and
the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by
respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by
his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein
complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent
was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the
affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case
against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Alcala vs De Vera
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974 26
FACTS
Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera
failed to inform Alcala about the adverse decision.
On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was
the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De Vera’s failure to inform
him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal his case had already
lapsed.
As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to
collect damages as he averred that he sustained damages due to Atty. De Vera’s negligence. The
court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to damages.
Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his client of the
status of the case.

RULING
No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been
remiss in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him of the status of the
case, however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage by reason of such negligence.
But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only
serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of simple
negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Vera’s failure to notify his
clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to the
client’s interest expected of Atty. De Vera under the lawyer’s oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to
collect damages from the negligent lawyer.
 Artezuela v. Maderazo
A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002 27
FACTS
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage suit
and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when her case
was scheduled for pre-trial conference, respondent asked for its postponement although all the
parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant’s persistent and repeated follow-up,
respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without
obtaining complainant’s consent.
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The said document was even printed in respondent’s office. Complainant further averred that it
was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that
the dismissal was with her consent.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the lawyer should be disbarred.

RULING
Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need
not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as
the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting
interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of
the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original
client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the
most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
 Abragan v. Rodriguez
A.C. NO. 4346. APRIL 3, 2002 28
FACTS

Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to represent in a

case before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won by the complainants.

Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with

other persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer – client relationship.

On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against Sheriff Fernando

Loncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent represented the sheriff. Since the counsel

employed by the complainants was a former student of respondent, said counsel, egged by the

suggestions of respondent withdrew the case without the petitioner’s consent. That as a result of

such withdrawal, subsequent events occurred to the prejudice of the complainants.

ISSUE(S)

Whether Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred.

RULING

Yes.

In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.”
 Barbuco vs. Beltran
A.C. No. 5092. August 11, 2004
29
FACTS
Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent Beltran for malpractice of
law. Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, which adverese to the complainants interest. On the same day, complainant,
through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.
However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant's brief. The
brief was only filed by respondent 43 days after the deadline of submission of the same.
When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade liability by alleging that he met a vehicular
accident, which incapacitated him for several days, thus he cannot finish the appellants brief.
Moreover, he sustained injuries in the head, which as a result respondent lost track of schedules
of hearings and deadlines for submitting briefs.

ISSUE(S)
Whetherrespondent's failure to file appellant's brief warrants sanctions.

RULING
Yes. the SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers states:A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest
to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary
period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY THREE (43)
days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical
injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time
considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. This is shown
by the receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of
the Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent could have asked any of his
partners in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for
Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
Moreover, every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his
client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He
is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of the
law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. "
 Abiero v. Juanino
A.C. No. 5302. February 18, 2005 30
FACTS
Atty. Juanino, representing Abiero, won in a labor case. However, on appeal, the NLRC
reversed the arbiters decision and dismissed the case for lack of basis. Each time Abiero would f
ollow up the case, respondent would advise him to call on a later date at which time he may hav
e some news of any development with the case. Atty Juanino then filed with the Court of Appeal
s a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and paid the corresponding docket f
ee. When complainant verified with the Court of Appeals the status of the case, he found out that
respondent never filed a Petition for Review of his labor case. Consequently, the NLRC decisio
n became final and executory. In his defense, he said that he honestly believed that he could enfo
rce the decision against those who did not appeal, so he went to the labor arbiter and discussed it,
but the arbiter said he could not since the decision was reversed and there would be no basis for
the enforcement. Too late, the period to file petition for certiorari had already expired.

ISSUE(S)
Whether discussing a legal action to a judge constitutes violation of the Code of Professional Re
sponsibility.

RULING
Yes. As a lawyer, Atty. Juanino should’ve known that he is not required to seek prior ap
proval from the labor arbiter before he could file a motion for execution. Nevertheless, he presen
ted himself, not once, but thrice, before the office of the arbiter to discuss his plan to file a motio
n for execution, only to discover that such recourse was not feasible. Worse, while respondent w
as waiting for the arbiters opinion, the period to file the petition before the Court of Appeals con
tinued to run, as in fact, it eventually expired.
Failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals despite instructions by the client to do so consti
tutes inexcusable negligence on the part of counsel because once a lawyer consents to defend the
cause of his client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must at all times be mindful of the trust a
nd confidence reposed in him. His inexcusable negligence on such matter renders him liable for
violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Juanino is SUSP
ENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months