Civil Law Digests

12. OLLERO, Juan Paolo Atty.
Uribe
Civil Law Review Digests
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO vs.
LUIS G. ANSON
G.R. No. 204494
July 27, 2016
Third Division
J. Reyes
Nature of the Action:
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

assailing the Decision and the Resolution of the CA in affirming the
Decision of the RTC.
Facts:
Anson filed a complaing against petitioners and Gaston Maya seeking the
annulment of the three unilateral deeds of sale and the deed of extra-
judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Severina De Asis. Anson
claims that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina.
According to Anson, the subject properties are conjugal properties. But

without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3 separate
unilateral deeds of sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann. On
the other hand, Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage
contracted by her mother and Anson. She, however, knew that her mother
and Anson had a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged
and formally terminated through a partition agreement.
To refute the counter arguments of the petitioners, Anson presented his

marriage certificate. To which, the petitioners questioned the validity of
the marriage certificate on the ground that the marriage was celebrated
without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Anson and Severina was valid
despite the absence of a marriage license.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the negative. Anson failed to prove the validity of their
marriage based on the evidence he had presented.
Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself

that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the
time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the
said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to
prove that they secured the required marriage license. However, instead of
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12. OLLERO, Juan Paolo Atty. Uribe
proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of
their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of
marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima
facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has established that
no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA
failed to consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the
marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code,
the latter statement being fallacious.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the

law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage
contract because these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of
marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as
a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be
no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."
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NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207406
January 13, 2016
Second Division
J. Leonen
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s decision
and resolution affirming the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner
of the crime of bigamy.
Facts:
After Alice’s marriage with Norberto on December 1994, she heard rumors
that her husband was previously married to another. She eventually
discovered that Norberto was previously married to Gina M. Gaerlan on
July 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the NSO.
This prompted her to file a criminal case against Norberto for the crime of
bigamy.
On the other hand, Norberto alleged that it was Alice who was having an
affair and that upon consulting a lawyer, she filed the instant case as her
defense. He also alleged that Alice knew about the “fake” marriage he had
with his college girlfriend, Gina.
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage, the RTC convicted

him of the crime of bigamy. Upon appeal, this was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Norberto is liable for the crime of Bigamy.
Ruling:
Petition is denied. The Court sustained the decision and the resolution of
the CA
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a

judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with
the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of
bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He
presents as evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage
license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the
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marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first
marriage. The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of
Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage
contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first
marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his
first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with
Alice; and that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been
for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of
bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be

divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the
case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to
the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish
a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may
substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was
issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should
be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now
cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been
issued.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was

solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for
bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was
his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code. The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in
this case.
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RENATO A. CASTILLO vs. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO
G.R. No. 189607
April 18, 2016
First Division
C.J. Sereno
A Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed by the
petitioner assailing the CA Decision which reversed the Decision of the
RTC declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Facts:
Parties in this case married on January 1979. It was latter found out by
the husband that the wife had a subsisting marriage with another man,
Bautista, which was celebrated on May 1972. Renato, the husband, filed
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and prayed that his
marriage with Lea, the wife, be declared void ab initio on the ground of her
subsisting marriage and her psychological incapacity.
Lea contended that the first marriage was void for failure to secure a
marriage license and that neither of them were members of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. Lea filed a
Demurrer to Evidence claiming right from the Decision promulgated by the
court saying that her first marriage was void.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Renato and Lea is valid.
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition and upheld the validity of the marriage.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in

accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case,
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil
Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was
in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this
case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in
particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on
voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in
the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no
marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage
is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be
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ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being
nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable
marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no
conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction,
while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
(5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.
A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly

required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to
the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void. However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court
of Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code
was in force.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.
G.R. No. 199194
February 10, 2016
Second Division
J. Del Castillo
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
the CA dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner.
Facts:
On November 2008, Jose Sareñogon, Jr. filed a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon. Jose testified that
they lived together as husband and wife for only a month because he left
to woek as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.
There was no communication for 3 months and he had no idea about her
whereabouts.
The RTC granted the petition and declared Netchie pesumptively dead for
purposes of remarriage of Jose. The OSG elevated the judgment of the RTC
to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA pronounced
that the OSG used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition for
certiorari and that there was no error in the findings of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose proved that his efforts locating his missing wife
sufficiently supported a well-founded belief that Netchie is probably dead.
Ruling:
The petition is granted, Jose failed to substantiate his allegations.
In the case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse
(Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive search" because
she simply made unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from
neighbors and friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree
of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when
there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse
allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives,
neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing
spouse’s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media,
and (3) when the present spouse’s evidence might or would only show that
the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the
latter was indeed dead.
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Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it
must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that Jose’s
Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in
reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below
the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NILDA B. TAMPUS
G.R. No. 214243
April 13, 2016
First Division
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari to assail the
decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC declaring Dante Del
Mundo presumptively dead.
Facts:
Nilda Tampus married Dante Del Mundo, a member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, on November 1975. Unfortunately, Dante left Nilda and
went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. Since then, Nilda heard no news
from Dante. She tried to locate him but efforts proved futile.
On April 2009, Nilda filed a petition to declare Dante presumptively dead

for purposes of remarriage. She claims that 33 years have lapsed without
any communication with her husband and that she firmly believes that he
is already dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the Decision of the RTC

declaring Dante presumptively dead.
Ruling:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must

be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that
all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since
it is the present spouse who, for purposes o f declaration o f presumptive
death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason
that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
The "well-founded belief' in the absentee's death requires the present

spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not
a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods
prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is
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still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence of
absence under the Family Code would not suffice. The premise is that
Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief' which
can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is
already dead.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II and
OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO
G.R. No. 209180
OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II.

G.R. NO. 209253
February 24, 2016
First Division
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari maintaining

that the husband has not established that his alleged psychological
incapacity is grave, has juridical antecedence, and is incurable.
Facts:
Reghis and Olivia celebrated marriage on May 1972. They were blessed
with 2 children born in 1973 and 1975. The couple first met in Bagio City
where Olivia’s parents played matchmakers for Reghis and Olivia. In the
desire to please Olivia’s parents, Reghis courted Olivia.
Reghis was still a student and wasn’t ready to marry Olivia. Olivia’s
parents, on the other hand, believed that the two had eloped and are
planning to get married. Reghis objected to the planned marriage as he
was unemployed and unprepared. However, Olivia’s parents assured him
that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they
are financially able.
The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often

having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive Olivia for
dragging him into marriage and resented her condescending attitude
towards him. They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a
job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and
focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little
time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a
real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways and Reghis filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage citing his psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity

of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
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The Court finds merit in the petitions. The assailed Decision is reversed
and was set aside.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article

36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Thus, to
warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity
must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with
all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO A. PANGASINAN
G.R. No. 214077
September 2, 2016
Third Division
J. Velasco, Jr.
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and
resolution of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC declaring the
marriage of the parties void on the ground of their respective psychological
incapacity.
Facts:
Danilo and Josephine met sometime in 1981. Three months after

courtship, Josephine became pregnant. To erase any notion of
impropriety, the couple immediately contracted marriage.
Danilo and Josephine generally ran harmoniously. They even became

partners in Danilo’s business pursuits. Signs of marital kinks appeared
when Danilo’s business began to slow down.
In one instance, the couple fought over a business trip and an alleged
throwing of passbooks to the other spouse. Thereafter, Josephine filed a
case for annulment and for violation of RA. No. 9262. Subsequently,
however, she withdrew her action and filed an action for legal separation
instead. After 30 years of marriage, Danilo filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of Josephine’s
psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants the declaration

of nullity of Danilo and Josephine’s marriage based on their psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
“Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify marriage under Article

36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental-not merely
physical-incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
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It is true that in petitions for nullification of marriages, it is not necessary
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. However, the totality of evidence must still prove the
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity. In addition to the forgoing, the psychological illness and its root
cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage.
Second, in view of the insufficiency of factual bases of and generalizations

in her Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Dayan's testimony is
inadequate to establish concretely the correlation between Josephine's
personality and her inability to comply with her essential marital
obligations to Danilo.
The stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of

psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in
our Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the
State. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where
the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential
marital duties.
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NICOLAS S. MATUDAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
MARILYN B. MATUDAN
G.R. No. 203284
November 14, 2016
Second Division
J. Del Castillo
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision and resolution of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC.
Facts:
Nicolas Matudan and Marilyn Matudan were married on October 1976. In

1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the
children lost contact with her as she had not been seen nor heard from
again.
Twenty-three years later, Nicolas filed a petition for declaration of nullity

of marriage based on Marilyn’s psychological incapacity to fulfill her
obligations as a wife and mother. To strengthen his claim, Nicolas
presented a clinical psychologist to prove that Marilyn’s psychological
incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence was sufficient to prove that Marilyn
is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital
obligations.
Ruling:
The Court denies the petition. It upheld the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony;

the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr.
Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the
psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed
evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on
petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can

adequately establish the party's psychological condition." "[T]he complete
facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage."
Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to
show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn
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lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and
moral ethics," and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible,
immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and
particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of
Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is
compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own claims by
testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight,
which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing
Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the
marriage and family when she left to work abroad.
If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very

least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's
claimed psychological incapacity.
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MIRASOL CASTILLO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE
IMPAS
G.R. No. 214064
February 6, 2017
Second Division
J. Peralta
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the

decision and resolution of the CA which ruled against the dissolution and
nullity of the petitioner’s marriage under the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Facts:
During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair
with his former girlfriend. The relationship turned tumultuous but their
parents interfered and made them reconcile. Mirasol and Felipe married
on April 1984.
Thirteen years into the marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Tired of her
husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any
communications with him. Mirasol filed a petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground of Felipe’s psychological incapacity. She cited that
he was irresponsible like cohabiting with other women, not
communicating with her, and not supporting their children. In support of
her case, she presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon who
concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants the declaration

of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter’s
Ruling:
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and
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(c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The existence or
absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts
of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations.
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show

the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would
have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the
expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings.
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological

evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's decision would reveal
that there was no assessment of the veracity of such allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence
presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can serve as bases
for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of

marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and
an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather
in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic
of her conclusion is founded.
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RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO vs. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 222541
February 15, 2017
First Division
J. Perlas-Bernabe
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
and the resolution of the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Spouses Del Rosario void on the ground of
Facts:
Rachel and Jose met at a very young age. Sometime in 1988 Rachel went
to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. While gainfully employed, she
provided for Jose’s tuition fees for his college education. They eventually
got married despite Rachel’s intermittent stay in the Philippines.
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
essential marital obligations. Rachel provided allegations that Jose
conspicuously tried to avoid the discharge of his duties as husband and
father to their son, Wesley. Rachel, with the help of Beverly Juan, caught
Jose and another woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s finding of psychological

incapacity.
Ruling:
The petition was denied. The marriage was upheld.
The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from

dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological
incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer
to no less than mental—not merely physical—incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligation to live together, observe love,
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respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In other words, it must
be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of his duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient

factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility,
or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that
Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent
when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father to Wesley
and as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts
openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-
marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on
several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran
smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply
summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with
APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to
be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his adaptive
systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a
permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and
beyond repair despite any form of intervention." It should be pointed out
that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable
within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological
incapacity.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the
various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility,
and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify
the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize,
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough
that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty
of a married person.
20
MARIA TERESA V. TANI-DE LA FUENTE vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE,
JR.
G.R. No. 188400
March 8, 2017
Second Division
J. Leonen
The petitioner filed a petition for review assailing the decision and the
resolution of the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of the husband’s psychological
incapacity.
Facts:
Prior to the marriage, Maria noticed Rodolfo was an introvert and was
prone to jealousy. She also observed that Rodolfo had no ambition in life
and felt insecure of his siblings who excelled in their studies and careers.
Despite such observation, they got married on June 1984.
Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. Maria
also alleged that Rodolfo treated her like a sex slave as they would have
sex 4 or 5 times a day. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled. In the
heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria’s heard. After the said
incident, Maria left the conjugal home and filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage.
Dr. Arnulfo Lopez, a clinical psychologist, conducted an in-depth interview

with Maria. He concluded that Maria was not suffering from any severe
mental disorder. He also stated that Rodolfo’s disorder was one of the
severe forms of personality disorder. Henceforth, Dr. Lopez recommended
that the marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo’s incapacity to perform his
marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to prove that

Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
Ruling:
The petition was granted. The Court pronounced that the marriage
between Maria and Rodolfo is null and void.
In Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the

parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings
of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very
21
definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." Dr. Lopez's testimony, as
corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered
from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder
made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity,
incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential
obligations of marriage. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to
expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was

hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr.
Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably
started during his late childhood years and developed in his early
adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing
up with a pathogenic parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was

also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed
respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often
follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.
She believed that he would change after they got married; however, this
did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and
severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were

likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid
personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong
and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by
petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment.
Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested
couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her
attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be
examined by Dr. Lopez.
22
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III vs. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA
G.R. No. 217993
September 6, 2017
Third Division
J. Reyes, Jr.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the

decision and resolution of the CA affirming the validity of the marriage.
Facts:
Manuel and Nora got married on July 1975 while both of them were still
college undergraduates. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to
stop his studies to help his father in the family’s construction business.
Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and came home only during
weekends. However, whenever Manuel came back home, he chose to spend
his limited time with friends instead of his family. THis was the cause of
their quarrels.
Later on, Manuel observed Nora’s passiveness and laziness. Thus, Manuel
became more irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to
physical violence.
On June 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage

on the ground that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to compy
with the essential obligations of marriage. Manuel presented a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Manuel has
Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and
aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas
diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a
display of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with
Manuel.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence was sufficient to prove that the
parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with their marital
obligations with one another.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the negative. It affirmed the CA in its pronouncement

that the totality of evidence presented by Manuel is insufficient to prove
that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
23
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive
Disorder and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which
render them psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest
child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not according probative
value to her psychological evaluation report and testimony. In Republic of
the Philippines v. Galang, the Court held that “if the incapacity can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent
proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological
incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination and report."
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel
for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be
considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity
of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could
not have been there at the time his parents were married.
24
MELECIO DOMINGO vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B.
MOLINA, substituted by ESTER MOLINA
G.R. No. 200274
April 20, 2016
Second Division
J. Brion
and the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
In June 1851, Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property

in Camiling, Tarlac. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from
Spouses Molina. Subsequently, 10 years after the death of Flora, Anastacio
sold his interest over the land to Spouses Molina to answer for his debts.
Melecio, one of the children of Spouses Domingo, learned of the transfer

and filed a case for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership on the
ground that Anastacio could not have sold his share without the consent
of Flora and that the documents for the transfer of the property was
falsified.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property to the Spouses Moline,
without Flora’s consent, is valid and legal.
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition and upheld the validity of the sale.
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before

the Family Code’s effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation
is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora
was dissolved when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the
Civil Code
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,
Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other
co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof
were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-
owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This
result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
25
Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the

subject property, is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now
settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a
sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."
26
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG vs. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ,
represented by ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR.
G.R. No. 191936
June 1, 2016
Third Division
J. Reyes
of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC in an action for
annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages.
Facts:
Virginia Calimag and Silvestra Macapaz are co-owners of the subject

property.
Anastacio Macapaz, Jr and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua are the children of

Silvesta’s brother, Anastacio Macapaz.
On November 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 2005, the TCT
regisistered under the name of Silvesta was cancelled and a new certificate
of title was issued in the name of Virginia Calimag by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. On Decemner 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public document. However, said criminal charges were
eventually dismissed. Instead, the respondents instituted an action for
annulment of the deed of sale and the cancellation of the new TCT against
Virgina. They alleged that they are the heirs of Silvestra.
Virginia averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute

the case on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir
of Silvestra, she, however, claims that the respondents failed to establish
their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage
between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven. According
to the petitioner, the marriage contract presented by the respondents is
not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or
photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even
authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar. Moreover, the
petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do
not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
Issue:
Whether or not legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action

seasonably filed by a party who is related to them.
27
Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of the respondents.
While it is true that a person’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct

action seasonably filed by the proper party, the Court however deems it
necessary to pass upon the respondents’ relationship to Silvestra so as to
determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question
of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs
of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-
trial.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant

evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the
respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by
the National Statistics Office both documents. A perusal of said documents
shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents -
their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's
maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete.
“A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries

(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)." Thus, being
public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed
valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates o f live birth
were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the
registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures
of Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because Fidela only
signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as
legitimate children. Nonetheless, the respondents' ce1iificates of live birth
also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as
husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two
children-the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years
after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage.
28
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY
(CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE
C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE NSO),
FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211724
September 20, 2016
First Division
J. Perlas-Bernabe
rendered by the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
granding his petition for correction of entry in the certificate of live birth.
Facts:
For almost 60 years, petitioner has been using the surname “Almojuela”.
However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the
NSO, he was surprised to discover that he was registered as “FELIPE
CONDENO”. Thus, he filed a Petition for Correction of Entry.
He claims that he was the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V.

Almojuela and Francisca V. Condeno. While his parents did not marry
each other, he claims that he is recognized by his family and friends as
“FELIPE ALMOJUELA”.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on

petitioner’s birth certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit. The decision of the CA is affirmed.

Consequently, the granting of the petition for correction of entry is
nullified.
In Republic v. Uy, order to correct respondent's entry for the latter's failure
to implead and notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by
the changes or corrections sought.
In this case, the CA correctly found that the petitioner failed to implead
both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings. Although he claims
that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural
rules nonetheless mandate complainace with the requirements in the
29
interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has

allowed the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure the
petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is
inadvertently left out, these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in
this case. In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed
requirements of Rule I08 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in
the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations
renders the entire proceedings therein null and void. In Republic v. CA,
held that the proceedings of the trial court were null and void for lack of
the Court jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil
registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of entry.
30

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12. OLLERO, Juan Paolo Atty.

Nature of the Action:

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

According to Anson, the subject properties are conjugal properties. But

To refute the counter arguments of the petitioners, Anson presented his

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the

Nature of the Action:

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage, the RTC convicted

Whether or not Norberto is liable for the crime of Bigamy.

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was

Nature of the Action:

Whether or not the marriage between Renato and Lea is valid.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in

A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly

Nature of the Action:

The petition is granted, Jose failed to substantiate his allegations.

Nature of the Action:

On April 2009, Nilda filed a petition to declare Dante presumptively dead

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the Decision of the RTC

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must

The "well-founded belief' in the absentee's death requires the present

OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II.

Nature of the Action:

The Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari maintaining

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity

Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article

Nature of the Action:

Danilo and Josephine met sometime in 1981. Three months after

Danilo and Josephine generally ran harmoniously. They even became

Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants the declaration

“Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify marriage under Article

Second, in view of the insufficiency of factual bases of and generalizations

The stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of

Nature of the Action:

Nicolas Matudan and Marilyn Matudan were married on October 1976. In

Twenty-three years later, Nicolas filed a petition for declaration of nullity

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony;

Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can

If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very

Nature of the Action:

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the

Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants the declaration

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show

The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of

Nature of the Action:

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s finding of psychological

The petition was denied. The marriage was upheld.

The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from

Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient

Nature of the Action:

Dr. Arnulfo Lopez, a clinical psychologist, conducted an in-depth interview

Whether or not the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to prove that

In Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were

Nature of the Action:

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the