FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS; RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE & PETITION

Freedom of Expression
Importance and scope of freedom of expression
CASE: Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, November 10, 1919 (Read the dissent of J. Holmes, enunciating the clear and present danger rule)
Citation. 549 U.S. 1145; 127 S. Ct. 1012;166 L. Ed. 2d 763; 2007 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants’ convictions for distributing leaflets advocating strikes during the Russian Revolution were upheld because
their speech was not protected by the United States Constitution (Constitution) based on the “clear and present danger” test.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects, which their acts are likely to produce.

Facts. The Defendants, Abrams and others (Defendants) were Russian immigrants. The Defendant were self-proclaimed revolutionists and
anarchists who wrote and distributed thousands of circulars advocating a general strike and appealing to workers in ammunitions factories to
stop the production of weapons to be used against Russian revolutionaries. They were convicted under 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act
that prohibited the curtailment of production of materials necessary to the prosecution of war against Germany with intent to hinder its
prosecution.

Issue. Whether the Defendants’ speech was protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. No. Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects which their acts are likely to produce. The plain purpose of
Defendants’ propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war, disaffection, sedition, riots and as they hoped, revolution in this country for
the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. Therefore, their speech is not protected
by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Dissent. In this case, sentences of twenty years have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that the Defendants had as much right to
publish as the Government had to publish the Constitution.

Discussion. Clear and present danger supposedly assures special attention to the time dimension. Speech may not be curtailed until there is an
immediate risk of an evil. Speech with a remote tendency to cause danger may not be curtailed.

Elements of the provision

CASE: Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public
view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to
their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme
Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If

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there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they
belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the
state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners.
Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

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Right to freedom of expression in the Philippines: restrictivist in essence
CASES:
National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992 (Read also the dissent of J. Cruz)
National Press Club vs Comelec
G.R. No. 102653, March 05, 1992
Facts: It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects
and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election
or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty
to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television
broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or
to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90
and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”
Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional
Held: Yes.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of
the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period — i.e., “during the election period.” It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of
the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that
these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s disposal, is clearly
an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand
that “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely
to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates
with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which
Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space,
for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz)
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It
is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more
and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time good
enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today, smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is screened during wartime to prevent deliberate
or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person
is prohibited from shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster the rule that there should be no prior
restraint upon a person’s right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule applies whether the censorship be in the form of
outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed
maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading
tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.” That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary, the
challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify
it in the name of social justice and clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to suppress
free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter
that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection
of the Constitution.

Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]

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Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an
incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of
Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of
election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among
themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners
meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment
however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of
speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The
danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above
decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency
rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness.
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks
to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of
votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command.

Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from punishment.
CASES:
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, February 10, 1936
Grosjean v. American Press Co.
Facts: Fast-forward to the 1930s, when the colorful if dictatorial Huey “Kingfish” Long was governor of Louisiana. Long’s political machine
controlled the legislature, but not some newspapers. In fact, 12 of the 13 largest newspapers in Louisiana—all newspapers having a circulation
of more than 20,000 a week—were editorially opposed to Governor Long. The Long-controlled legislature passed a statute to put a special 2
percent license tax on all periodicals having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. The nine newspaper publishers who produced
the larger-circulation newspapers targeted by the tax sued, claiming that the special tax violated the First Amendment rights of the newspapers.

Issue: Can a discriminatory tax hitting political foes of a government official withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
Decision: (9-0) A unanimous Supreme Court of the United States
Reasons: (Justice George Sutherland, for the Court, with apparent drafting help from the younger, far more liberal, Justice Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo.)
The Court’s opinion quoted from the legendary 19th Century American constitutional scholar, Judge Thomas Cooley. The Court quoted
Cooley:13
“The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent
such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights
as citizens.”
Grosjean v. American Press Co. remains the leading case awarding the media constitutional protection from discriminatory taxation. And that is
important, for as the Court said in Grosjean, “A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To
allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.”14

13 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936), quoting 2 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) p. 886.
14 Ibid., p. 251.

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Primicias v. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948
Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza
Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there
is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving
emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense
against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First
construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

Mutuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC
when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles
in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right
to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for
the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda
material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could
not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the
constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s
constitutional rights.

Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970 (read the dissents of JJ. Fernando and Castro)
G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970
NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION

GENTLEMEN:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even date:
"In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued the following
Resolution:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following considerations:

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That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered
Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving respondent Mayor's
appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent
danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has
manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders;
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are
closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the
public:
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society;
The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for permit
unconditionally;
The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.

Separate Opinions

VILLAMOR, J., concurring:

The right to freedom of assembly is not denied; but this right is neither unlimited nor absolute. It is not correct to say that the Mayor has
refused to grant the permit applied for; he offered an alternative which, in my opinion, is not unreasonable. There being no arbitrary refusal to
grant permit, petitioner is not entitled to the writ.
CASTRO and FERNANDO, JJ., dissenting:
Two members of the Court, Castro and Fernando, find themselves unable to concur with their brethren and would vote to grant the petition.
The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. If respondent Mayor
premised his refusal to grant the permit as sought by petitioner on a clear showing that he was so empowered under the criteria supplied
by Primicias W. Fugoso, then this petition should not prosper as petitioner himself did invoke such authority. The grounds for his refusal are
however, set forth thus in his letter of February 24, 1970 addressed to petitioner: "In the greater interest of the general public, and in order not
to unduly disturb the life of the community, this Office, guided by a lesson gained from the events of the past few weeks, has temporarily
adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations during week days."1 They do not, in the
opinion of the above two justices, meet the standard of the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior restraint of a
constitutional right. This is not allowable. An excerpt from a 1969 American Supreme Court decision is persuasive. Thus: "For in deciding
whether or not to withhold a permit, the members of the Commission were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public welfare, peace,
safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.' This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the
many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint
of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."2 This is without prejudice to
a more extended opinion being written later.

Footnotes
Annex B, Petition.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162, 167 (1969).

New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, June 30, 1971 (read the concurring and dissenting opinions)
Citation. 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822, 1971 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Government failed to meet the requisite burden of
proof needed to justify a prior restraint of expression when attempting to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing
contents of a classified study.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any system of prior restraints on expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
invalidity. The Government “thus creates a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint.”

Facts. The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing contents of a confidential study about the
Government’s decision making with regards to Vietnam policy. The District Court in the New York Times case and the District Court and the
Court of Appeals in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met the requisite burden justifying such a prior restraint.

Issue. Whether the United States met the heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint on the New York Times
and Washington Post to enjoin them from publishing contents of a classified study?
Held. No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and remanded with
directions to enter a judgment affirming the District Court. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The mandates shall issue
forthwith.

Dissent. The scope of the judicial function in passing upon activities of the Executive Branch in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly
restricted. This view is dictated by the doctrine of Separation of Powers. The doctrine prohibiting prior restraints does not prevent the courts
from maintaining status quo long enough to act responsibly.
The First Amendment is only part of the Constitution. The cases should be remanded to be developed expeditiously.
Concurrence. To find that the President has “inherent power” to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution [Constitution].
The First Amendment of the Constitution leaves no room for governmental restraint on the press. There is, moreover, no statute barring the
publication by the press of the material that the Times and Post seek to publish.

6
The First Amendment of the Constitution tolerates no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward
consequences may result. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support the issuance of an interim restraining order.
Unless and until the Government has clearly made its case, the First Amendment of the Constitution commands that no injunction be issued.
The responsibility must be where the power is. The Executive must have the large duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security
necessary to exercise its power effectively. The Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents here, but disclosure of any of them
will not result in irreparable danger to the public.
The United States has not met the very heavy burden, which it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases.
The ultimate issue in this case is whether this Court or the Congress has the power to make this law. It is plain that Congress has refused to
grant the authority the Government seeks from this Court.

Discussion. This very divided opinion shows how heavy the Government’s burden is to justify a prior restraint of expressi
National Press Club v. Comelec, G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992 (read also the concurrence of J. Davide and the dissent of J. Cruz)
National Press Club vs Comelec
G.R. No. 102653, March 05, 1992
Facts: It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects
and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election
or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty
to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television
broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or
to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90
and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.”
Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional
Held: Yes.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of
the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period — i.e., “during the election period.” It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of
the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that
these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s disposal, is clearly
an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand
that “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely
to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates
with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which
Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space,
for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz)
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It
is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more
and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time good
enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today, smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is screened during wartime to prevent deliberate
or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person
is prohibited from shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster the rule that there should be no prior
restraint upon a person’s right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule applies whether the censorship be in the form of
outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed
maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading
tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.” That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary, the
challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify
it in the name of social justice and clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to suppress

7
free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter
that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection
of the Constitution.

Adiong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82
of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The
COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for
by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so
much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as
to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the
privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right
to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on
the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on
cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated
by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate
to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is
that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate
were to adopt his over what has been done.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996 (read also the different approaches found in the concurring and dissenting opinions of JJ.
Panganiban, Padilla, Mendoza, Vitug and Kapunan)
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
DECISION

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for
public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed]

8
and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical
interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent
Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute
an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”
Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to
review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify]
should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5,
Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy
on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and
continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free
exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and
its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference
between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that
can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City
of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

9
Tests in free speech cases
The dangerous tendency test
CASES:
Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957
FACTS:
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the delay in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The judge
ordered Cabansag and his lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending such letter which tended to
degrade the court in the eyes of the President (Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing, the court rendered a decision finding Cabansag
and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them to pay a fine.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice?
RULING:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of
action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the
Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of
justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the writer
merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
Petition is GRANTED and appealed decision is REVERSED.

Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925) (read also the dissent of J. Holmes)
Citation. 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138, 1925 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Gitlow (Petitioner), published a communist manifesto for distribution in the United States. He was charged
with plotting to overthrow the United States government.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. State statutes are unconstitutional if they are arbitrary and unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the
state to protect public interests.

Facts. The Petitioner was charged with criminal anarchy because he was an advocate of socialist reform in the United States. The Petitioner is a
member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party. He served as the business manager for the paper that was run by the organization. In
1919 he published the group’s manifesto and prepared for widespread distribution from the New York City headquarters.

Issue. Did the statute prohibiting such activity deprive the Petitioner of his First Amendment constitutional right to freedom of expression?
Held. No. The current statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of exercising the state’s police power. It is within the state’s power to
prevent the disturbance of the peace and regulate speech that may incite crime even if the threat of such action is not immediate.

Dissent. A state may not prohibit speech unless it presents a clear and present danger to the public interest.

Discussion. Freedom of speech and press do not confer an absolute right to publish or speak without being held responsible for the results of
such speech. The state may regulate to protect its interests in general welfare of its citizens.
The balancing of interests test
CASES:
American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 US 382 (1950)

Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. de Gonzales, G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.G.R. No. L-32066 August 6,
1979

FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises
Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor
Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the public
life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria
Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales,
objected to the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. After some
bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as LICENSOR
granted Lagunzad authority and permission to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for
consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters
all over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the
present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from
of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from,
among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property
right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial
court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.

ISSUES
Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
figure.

10
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public
figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she
may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises
Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is
not, however, without limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests
test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern

The clear and present danger test: the prevailing test in the Phil. jurisdiction
CASES:
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919)
Citation. 308 U.S. 585; 60 S. Ct. 109;84 L. Ed. 490; 1939 U.S.
Brief Fact Summary. The distribution of leaflets using impassioned language claiming that the draft was a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and encouraging people to “assert your opposition to the draft” was held not to be
protected speech.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The character of every act depends on the circumstances in which it is done. The question in every case is whether the
words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to protect.

Facts. This case is based on a three count indictment. The first charge was a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The second alleges
a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. The third count alleges an unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of
unlawful matter. The document in question claims that the draft is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution and encourages
people to “assert your opposition to the draft.” The Defendants, Schenck and other publishers of the leaflets (Defendants), were found guilty on
all of the counts.

Issue. Whether the words used in the leaflets are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In many places and in ordinary times, the Defendants in saying all that was said in the leaflets
would have been within their constitutional rights. However, the character of every act depends on the circumstances in which it is done. The
question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in a time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right. Therefore, the words used in the leaflets are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect.

Discussion. This case gave birth to the “clear and present danger” test.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)

Citation. 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 1969 U.S. 1367.
Brief Fact Summary. An Ohio law prohibited the teaching or advocacy of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. The Defendant, Brandenburg
(Defendant), a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech promoting the taking of vengeful actions against government and was therefore
convicted under the Ohio Law.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Speech can be prohibited if it is “directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and it is likely to incite or
produce such action.

Facts. The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act (the “Act”) made it illegal to advocate “crime, sabotage, violence or . . . terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform.” It also prohibited “assembling with any society, group, or assemblage or persons formed to teach
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. The Defendant, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech promoting the taking of revenge
against the government if it did not stop suppressing the white race and was therefore convicted under the Act.

Issue. Did the Statute, prohibiting public speech that advocated certain violent activities, violate the Defendant’s right to free speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes.
(Per Curiam) The Act properly made it illegal to advocate or teach doctrines of violence, but did not address the issue of whether such advocacy
or teaching would actually incite imminent lawlessness. The mere abstract teaching of the need or propriety to resort to violence is not the same
as preparing a group for violent action. Because the statute failed to provide for the second part of the test it was overly broad and thus in

11
violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
Concurrence.
Justice Hugo (J. Black) I agree with Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) in his concurring opinion of this case that the “clear and present danger”
doctrine should have no place in our interpretation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
J. Douglas argues that the how the “clear and present danger” test has been applied in the past is disconcerting. First, the threats to which it was
applied were often loud but puny. Second, the test was so perverted as to make trial of those teachers of Marxism all out political trials, which
had the effect of eroding substantial parts of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Discussion. In order for “incitement to violence” speech to be constitutionally barred, Brandenburg sets a new standard. The language must (1)
expressly advocate violence; (2) advocate immediate violence and (3) relate to violence likely to occur.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
DECISION

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for
public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed]
and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical
interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent
Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute
an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”
Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to
review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify]
should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5,
Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy
on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and
continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free
exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and
its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.

12
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference
between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that
can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City
of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

Gonzales v. Comelec, supra

21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Political Question vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there
would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election
rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution
(RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the
courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress.
On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes
amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not
a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such
act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this
provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the
previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.

Navarro v. Villegas, supra

G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970
NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION

GENTLEMEN:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even date:
"In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued the following
Resolution:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following considerations:
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered
Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving respondent Mayor's
appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent
danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has
manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders;

13
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are
closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the
public:
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society;
The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for permit
unconditionally;
The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.

Separate Opinions

VILLAMOR, J., concurring:

The right to freedom of assembly is not denied; but this right is neither unlimited nor absolute. It is not correct to say that the Mayor has
refused to grant the permit applied for; he offered an alternative which, in my opinion, is not unreasonable. There being no arbitrary refusal to
grant permit, petitioner is not entitled to the writ.
CASTRO and FERNANDO, JJ., dissenting:
Two members of the Court, Castro and Fernando, find themselves unable to concur with their brethren and would vote to grant the petition.
The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. If respondent Mayor
premised his refusal to grant the permit as sought by petitioner on a clear showing that he was so empowered under the criteria supplied
by Primicias W. Fugoso, then this petition should not prosper as petitioner himself did invoke such authority. The grounds for his refusal are
however, set forth thus in his letter of February 24, 1970 addressed to petitioner: "In the greater interest of the general public, and in order not
to unduly disturb the life of the community, this Office, guided by a lesson gained from the events of the past few weeks, has temporarily
adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations during week days."1 They do not, in the
opinion of the above two justices, meet the standard of the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior restraint of a
constitutional right. This is not allowable. An excerpt from a 1969 American Supreme Court decision is persuasive. Thus: "For in deciding
whether or not to withhold a permit, the members of the Commission were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public welfare, peace,
safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.' This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the
many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint
of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."2 This is without prejudice to
a more extended opinion being written later.

Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983 (read also the concurrence of J. Teehankee)
125 SCRA 553 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech – Primacy of the Constitution over International Law
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of
the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed
that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No.
7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide
protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that
under our constitution we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention
is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the
Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance
issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of
the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a
peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius
(besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an
issue in this case).

Ruiz v. Gordon, G.R. No. L-65695, December 19, 1983

Speech against official conduct, public figures and subjects of legitimate public interest
CASES:
U.S. v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
J. Malcolm

Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace
of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for
personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the
defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged

14
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition
forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of
the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos
Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.” It also said
“the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice
of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public
opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications may in
some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints
made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection
of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a
duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the
absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the
beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits
made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to
secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable
citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were
sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971)

Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. de Gonzales, supra

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.G.R. No. L-32066 August 6,
1979

FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises
Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor
Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the public
life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria
Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales,
objected to the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. After some
bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as LICENSOR
granted Lagunzad authority and permission to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for
consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters
all over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the
present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from
of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from,

15
among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property
right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial
court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.

ISSUES
Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
figure.
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public
figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she
may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises
Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is
not, however, without limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests
test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011 (read also the opinions of JJ. Carpio, Villarama and Sereno)
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
Facts:
SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his
ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to
compel certain officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government
for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its
dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they
treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the
articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on
the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of
the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that
would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice.

Issue:
Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Held:
Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
per issues stated above.
[case is ongoing]
Dissenting Opinion:
(1) Serreno, J.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected
in any way by the UP Law Faculty’s statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders would be eroded by the
release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was received by the public is well-known. It is not as if any
16
outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty,
integrity and competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is honest, has integrity, or is
competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is
headlined by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the second paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy
that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this would only further erode
faith and confidence in the judicial system.” In the next paragraph, it says: “The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral
authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach.” In the same paragraph, it
further says: “It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all controversies: a position that
requires competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional
ethics.”
Carpio Morales, J.
The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-
jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is “totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act
of misplaced vigilance.”
Full Case: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/am_10-10-4-sc_2011.html

Free speech and libel/defamation suits

CASES:
MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da’wah Council, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

MVRS vs Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. (2003)

Bellosillo,
J.
FACTS:a.
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy(70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual
Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman,da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as aclass suit in behalf of
the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications, Inc.,arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily
tabloid. The article reads:"
ALAM BA NINYO
?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim
?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit nasila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam
sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyosat sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
natinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'
."
b.
Islamic Da’Wah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; notonly published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to
hurt the feelings, cast insultand disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these libelous words
Bulgar
insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world
c.
MVRS Publications, Inc.,: the article did not mention respondents as the object of thearticle and therefore were not entitled to damages; and,
that the article was merely anexpression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to causedamage
d.
RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were notspecifically identified
e.
CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamicfaith. The suit for damages was a "class suit" and that
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it therequisite personality to
sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.
ISSUES:
1. WON Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of action for libel.
NO.
2. WON in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and notlibel.
NO.
3. WON this is a valid class suit.
NO.

HELD:1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel.DOCTRINES:


Defamation - which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person'scharacter, fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements.

It is that which tends toinjure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff orto excite derogatory
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
6
It is the publication of anythingwhich is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him intodisrepute.
7
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion whichothers in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff.

Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and merewords of general abuse however ill-natured, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute abasis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.

17
 Thefact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
10

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to anidentified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to aparticular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at allimpairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press.
APPLICATION:
there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the
Bulgar
article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondentshave no individual causes of action; hence, they
cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community.A
Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as anopportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-
believers and the "infidels." There isno injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that cangive rise to an
action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation
that will give them a commonor general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
DOCTRINE:
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is consideredto have no application to anyone in particular, since one might
as well defame all mankind. Asthe size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recoverdamages on tortious libel
become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies:
first
, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader wouldtake the statements as so literally applying to each
individual member.
second
, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech andexpression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound
compromise between the conflictingfundamental interests involved in libel cases.

APPLICATION:
The Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among theMuslims were particularly defamed.
CASES/AUTHORITY CITED:
i.)
Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
: associations of sugarcane plantersin Negros Occidental filed against Newsweek over an article "Island of Fear"allegedly depicting Negros
Province as a place dominated by exploitative wealthylandowners and sugar planters who also brutalized and killed underpaid planters.SC
dismissed complaint on the ground that no allegation in the complaint that thearticle complained of specifically referred to any of them. Where
the defamation isalleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statementmust be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
apply to every individual in that groupor class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group canprove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he canbring the action separately, if need be.
ii.)
Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company
: US CA held that the one guidingprinciple of group libel is that
defamation of a large group does not give rise to acause of action on the part of an individual unless it can be shown that he is thetarget of the
defamatory matter
.
iii.)
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno’s opinion :

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel (written) and slander (oral). In either form,defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation
and good name. This is a "relationalinterest" since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.

The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation — the interest in acquiring,retaining and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's
character and conduct warrant.Defamation requires that something be communicated to a third person that may affect theopinion others may
have of the plaintiff. It must be shown that this communication wouldtend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing in the
community.

Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of adefamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory
statement itself and its predictableeffect upon third persons.

The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that "tends to so harmthe reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deterthird persons from associating or dealing with him."

Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove: (1)published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and
concerning the plaintiff. The rulein libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatorycharge has been made.
Plaintiff must be the person with reference to whom the statementwas made.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, theyapplied to any member of the group, and an individual
member could maintain an action fordefamation. In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or

GMA v. Bustos, G.R. No. 146848, October 17, 2006

GMA NETWORK vs BUSTOS Case Digest
GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. vs. JESUS G. BUSTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006
18
FACTS: A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey Vidal. The issue started from the Petition for Mandamus
filed by the unsuccessful examinees of the physician’s licensure examinations before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of
medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking
of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations.

As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey
Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for
the ten o'clock evening news edition of GMA's Channel 7 Headline News, quoting thereof the allegations of the unsuccessful examiners that the
gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped once and for all.
Simultaneous with the news, was an old video footage showing physicians wearing black armbands.

Along these lines, respondents claimed that the said report was false, malicious and one-sided. Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless
disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7. They added
that, the showing of the unrelated old footage was done purposely so as to make a forceful impact on their audience making it appear that
other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees.

In defense of the alleged libel, GMA Network argued that the same was but a privileged communication.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication
2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and the used of video footage were libelous

HELD:

1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for Mandamus filed by the medical
examinees making the same fall within the protected ambit of privileged communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages
claimed by respondents for simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern.

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In
absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the
action. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory
utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author
susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs
"private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354
of the Revised Penal Code.

However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.The
news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter.

2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the ambit of privileged communication. For, although every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged.

Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video constitute malice on the part of the petitioners. Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying
character-generated words "file video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the
idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent
misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use of file footage in TV news
reporting is a standard practice." the absence of the accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not nevertheless, change the
legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. In view of the state of things, the
video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing
derogatory in nature.

Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999

CASE DIGEST : Borjal Vs CA
G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999 ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents.

Facts : During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on
Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by
the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation
crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for
presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded
through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or
participants. 2 On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive
Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between May and July
1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged
anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the
conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates they were published Issue :

Issue : Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel

Held : A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those

19
which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which
exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand,
qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks To
reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation
to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably
be inferred from the facts There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A reading of the imputations of
petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental
fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of
information about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of
the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference itself. Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private
respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his
conduct

Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical, G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005

Free speech and the right to privacy

CASE: Ayer Production v. Capulong, G.R. No. 82380, April 29, 1988
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his
approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this
demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a
complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference
to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or
marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent
trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of
any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the
country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile
was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right
of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
Free speech and the Cybercrime Law
CASE: Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014

Regulation of speech: must be content-neutral

CASE: Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

20
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public
view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to
their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme
Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If
there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they
belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed
and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.

21
 Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the
state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners.
Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

Art and Obscenity

CASES:
People v. Go Pin, G.R. No. L-7491, August 8, 1955
People v. Padan, G.R. No. L-7295, June 28, 1957
People v Padan G.R. No. L-7295 June 28, 1957

J. Montemayor

Facts:
The accused exhibited immoral scenes and acts in one of the Manila nightclubs. Moreover, the manager and ticket collector were also part of
the accused for hiring the women to perform sexual intercourse in the presence of many spectators.
They were charged with a violation of the RPC Article 201 in the trial court. All pleaded not guilty. One of the accused however, changed her
mind and pleaded guilty. All were convicted. The evidence of the lewd show was confiscated.
The accused filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. 2 of the appellants, manager Fajardo and ticket collector Yabut, failed to file their briefs
within the period prescribed by law and their appeal was dismissed by resolution of this Court of November 25, 1955, and the decision as to
them became final and executory on January 7, 1956.
The defendant who pleaded guilty, Marina Padan, in her appeal did not question her conviction; she merely urged the reduction of the penalty
by eliminating the prison sentence. The Supereme Court did not consider this because the trial court judge reduced the fine from 600 to 200.

Issue: Were the acts obscene and thereby punishable by Art 201 of the RPC?

Held: Yes.

Ratio:
This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, have been called upon to take cognizance of an offense against morals and decency of
this kind. We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have
condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that
connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited
in sheer nakedness.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One
can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing
but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that because of all this, the penalty
imposed by the trial court on Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
On the appeal of Fajardo, he claimed that he was an innocent bystander but that because of his popularity in the neighborhood, he was
requested by the spectators to select the man and the woman to engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus before the spectators. After
making the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but left the scene and returned to it only when he heard a commotion produced
by the raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager and one in charge of the show is however ample, even conclusive. In
1953, the place used for ping-pong was used for an exhibition of human "fighting fish", the actual act of coitus or copulation. Tickets were sold
at P3 each, and the show was supposed to begin at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.

22
The Manila Police Department must have gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets and provided several of its members who later attended the
show, but in plain clothes, and after the show conducted a raid and made arrests. At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually took
place inside the building. About two civilians who attended the affair gave testimony as to what they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto Reyes. He also collected tickets. In all, there were
about ninety paying customers, while about sixteen were allowed to enter free, presumably friends of the management. Jose Fajardo y Garcia
was clearly the manager of the show. He was at the door to see to it that the customers either were provided with tickets or paid P3.00 entrance
fee. He even asked them from whom they had bought the tickets. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the floor,
covered with an army blanket and provided with a pillow. Once the spectators, about 106 in number, were crowded inside that small building,
the show started.
Besides, as found by the trial court and as shown by some of the tickets collected from the spectators, submitted as exhibits, said tickets while
bearing on one side superimposed with rubber stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which defendant Fajardo admits to be his name.
Considering all the above circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the most guilty of the four, for he was the one who
conducted the show and presumably derived the most profit or gain from the same.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Citation. 08-cv-01932 OWW YNP SMS (PC), 2010 BL 75512 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 05, 2010)
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Miller’s (Defendant) conviction for mailing advertisements for “adult” books to unwilling recipients was
vacated and remanded in an effort to shift the burden of obscenity determinations to the state and local courts.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average
person, applying contemporary community standards” would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Facts. The Defendant was convicted under the California Penal Code for mailing advertisements for “adult” material to non-soliciting recipients.

Issue. Whether state statutes may regulate obscene material without limits?
Held. No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic
guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find the material,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific
value. The Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional standard the “utterly without redeeming
social value” test. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, First Amendment constitutional values
are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necess
ary.

Dissent. To send men to jail for violating standards that they cannot understand due to vagueness, denies them of due process.
The statute in question is overbroad and thus, unconstitutional.

Discussion. This case attempts a new definition and clarification of obscenity while also trying to shift the burden of obscenity determinations to
the state and local courts.
Gonzales v. Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
Gonzales v Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
CJ Fernando

Facts:

Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for adults only by a subcommittee of the movie
review board together with the required cuts and scene deletions. He justified that these requirements were without basis and were restrains on
artistic expression. He adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated
objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board
as basis for its classification.
He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decion of the sub committee.
When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed and the requirement to submit the master
negative was taken out but the film was still rated for adults only. The petition was amended to contest the rating only.

Issue: Was the rating made with grave avuse of discretion (Note I put in those regarding obscenity for future purposes)

Held: No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK OF VOTES

Ratio:
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse
Burstyn-importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to
inform
(No clear dividing line between what affords knowledge and that of pleasure or else there will be a diminution to a right to self-expression)
Bagatsing- Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.”
Censorship doesn’t full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation of basic rights. However, there must be in exceptional
circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right without denying the freedom from liability.
Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board of review is limited to classification of films to safeguard other
constitutional objections, hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings.
That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not
to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity

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The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive
character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is
feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension
about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable.
Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
Roth- "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance — unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”
Given obscenity as the nemesis of censorship, there is difficulty in determining what is obsecene.
Roth- The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly
susceptible persons
The test was whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest. Some material can legitimately deal with sex and its effects on susceptible persons. Such a censorship can be
considered violative of the constitution. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of
constitutional infirmity.
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom
of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind
through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the
patronage of the State.
Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of
autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a
true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense.
What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered
obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any
taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of
construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain
and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former.
There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard.
There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive.
But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in
the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the
petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set.
It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

Pita v. CA, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989

Pita V CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
J. Sarmiento

Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a
violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order against indiscriminate seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by
the stall owners and the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence
per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
dismissing the case for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the
basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its
merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?

Held: No. Petition granted

Ratio:

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Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be
decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." (Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of
the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a
judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic
guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to
recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has
allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut.
For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-
ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily
repulsive to the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of
men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this
Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference
and action. But the burden to show this lies with the authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be
said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to
justify State action to stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can
conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of
due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to
challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility
because there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search
warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner
rolled into one.

Freedom of the press

CASES:
In Re Sotto, G.R. No. 14576, September 6, 1918
IN RE SOTTO

Facts:

♦Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty.
Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court.
♦
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers
upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be
promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of
offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he
has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses
observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes
Ratio:
♦
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law
and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt
♦

25
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by
the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned
after those of that country.
♦
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
♦
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice.
♦
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he
may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

In Re Jurado, A.M. No. 93-2-037-SC, April 6, 1995 (read also the dissent of J. Puno)
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate
to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is
that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate
were to adopt his over what has been done.

Right to Assemble and Petition the Government

Read B.P. 880, the Public Assembly Act
Regulation of right to assemble must be content-neutral
CASE: Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and
Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen.
ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
FACTS:
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., who alleged that they were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on
October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country
under an “undeclared” martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al., allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of
their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
“Calibrated Preemptive Response” being followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them
along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on

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October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University
of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding
further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of
CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because
they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present
danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not B.P. No, 880 which delegates powers to the Mayor provides clear standards.
RULING:
Yes. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in
Sec. 6 (a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6 (c) substantially means the same thing and is not an
inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary
to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place
and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to
the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.
RATIO: Examples of standards held sufficient. – The following are legislative specifications are among those which have been held to state a
sufficiently definite standard for administrative action in specific fields… “a clear and present danger,” and “imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil.”

Regulation of right to assemble, tests: (1) auspices test; and (2) purpose test
CASES:
Evangelista v. Earnshaw, G.R. No. 36453, September 28, 1932

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)

Facts of the case
On July 27, 1934, at a meeting held by the Communist Party, Dirk De Jonge addressed the audience regarding jail conditions in the county and a
maritime strike in progress in Portland. While the meeting was in progress, police raided it. De Jonge was arrested and charged with violating
the State's criminal syndicalism statute. The law defines criminal syndicalism as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage
or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." After being convicted, De
Jonge moved for an acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his conviction. Disagreeing, the State Supreme Court
distinguished that the indictment did not charge De Jonge with criminal syndicalism, but rather that he presided at, conducted and assisted in
conducting an assemblage of persons, organization, society and group called by the Communist Party, which was unlawfully teaching and
advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage.
Question
Does Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes, the Court held that the Oregon statute, as applied, violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the record, the Court determined that De Jonge's sole offense was assisting in a public
meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court reasoned that to preserve the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly - principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment - not the auspices under which a meeting is held, but the purpose of the
meeting and whether the speakers' remarks transcend the bounds of freedom of speech must be examined, which had not occurred in De
Jonge's case. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Disorderly conduct in assemblies not per se punishable

CASE: U.S. v. Apurado, G.R. No. 1210, February 7, 1907

Right to assemble of students in school premises

CASES:
Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-62270, May 21, 1984
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students,
they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in
the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the
Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed.
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982,
they were informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the

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violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to
peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and
judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be
a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the
law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Villar v. TIP, G.R. No. L-69198 April 17, 1985
VILLAR VS TIP
FACTS: Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression
against the respondents, in their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the Philippines. However, reference was
made to some of the petitioners' school records. Petitioners Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco, Venecio Villar, Inocencio Recitis had failed in
one or two of their subjectsin 1983-1985. However, petitioner Noverto Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the first school
year, six failing grades in the second semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon Jr. had three failing grades, one passing grade and one
subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grade with no passing grade in
the first semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such
failing grades.
SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the TIP Board.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of the respondent Technological Institute of the
Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment.

HELD: NO, as is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, theinvocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it
the implication that the right to free speech has likewise beendisregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom ofexpression, which is
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which `is not
limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of clear and present danger of substantive evil that the state has the right to prevent.' They
do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker
v. Des Moines Community School District, `shed their constitutionalrights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners VenecioVillar, Inocencio F. Recitis, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to
nullify the action taken by respondents in violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted to such petitioners to
enjoin respondents from the acts of surveillance, black listing, suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the coming academic year 1985-
1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgrado de Leon Jr. and
Regloben Laxamana. No costs.

Non v. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990 (modification of Alcuaz doctrine)
Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for
the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of
the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They
now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first
semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College
code of conduct and discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-
settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the
school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior
should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

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Right to assemble of employees of private establishments
CASE: Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 197
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE
LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their
grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO.
During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike
against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech
and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the
1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan,
the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held:

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the
rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
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