LTD Digest Inc

LTD DIGEST - AMBERHA |1
G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he
sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land
within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private ownership prior to the approval
of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private
lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by
any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no
private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right
to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
FRENZEL v. CATITO
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
objective carried out
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored with Ederlina that he bought her
numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in Davao City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of
Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter to
leave her wife alone.
When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter
could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to
live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he
was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his
own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties
acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties
Ruling:
No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are
in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and
void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To
him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting
to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
court granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered
the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away
with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.
Ting Ho vs Teng Gui
GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008
Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng
Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their
deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father
Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties
were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho
who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho,
the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.
Issue:
Whether the lot should be included in the estate of their father even if he is a chinese citizen?
Ruling:
No, our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved for Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. In the present case, the father of petitioners and
respondent was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property in the Philippines. In fact,
he was only occupying the subject lot by virtue of the permission granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office of Olongapo,
Zambales. As correctly found by the CA, the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner of the subject lot in light of the
constitutional proscription and the respondent did not at any instance act as the dummy of his father. Regarding the issue of
ownership of the properties erected on the subject lot, the Court agrees with the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the
appellate court, that the series of transactions resorted to by the deceased were simulated in order to preserve the properties in the
hands of the family. The respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of any evidence, that the simulated sales of the
properties were intended by the deceased to be a donation to him. Thus, the Court holds that the two-storey residential house, two-
storey residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate of the late spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling
the petitioners to a four-fifths (4/5) share thereof.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC
GR No. 154953, June 26, 2008
Facts:
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering a 56.4007 hectares
parcel of lot located in San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
RTC adjudicated the land in favor of respondent wherein it ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration
of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
ISSUES: Whether the land is alienable and disposable
RULING:
The petition has merit. Respondent failed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
The respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR. The June 3, 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925."
The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director,
Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land,
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20 delineated the functions and authorities of the offices
within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50
hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares.
DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the
CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of a lot
over 50 . The CENRO certificate is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has
no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey
by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do
not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs Republic

GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009
Facts:
On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him
to the judicial confirmation of his title. The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters.
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a
certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration.
OSG appealed to the CA arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA reversed the RTC decision and declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.
Malabanan died and was substituted by his heirs who appealed the CA’s decision through a petition for review on Certiorari. The
petition was denied thus this motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether petitioner established possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest
since June 12, 1945
Ruling:
No. Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made
under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that
the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to
the uses to which they may be devoted. The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and
through a positive act of the Executive Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as
lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public
lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified
as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural. A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or
for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
a. By judicial legalization; or
b. By administrative legalization (free patent).
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession
and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never
began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Tirol

GR No. 171535 - June 5, 2009
Facts:
Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners, Edito P. Tirol and Alejandro Y. Ngo, along with their respective spouses, claim to have
purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, from a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a Filipino citizen married to a
certain Mr. Scott Edward Jenkins, an American citizen, per Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees
bought the said property on the strength of the apparent clean title of vendor Jenkins as evidenced by the Tax Declaration and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18216, all under Mrs. Elma Jenkins name, which bear no annotation of liens, encumbrances, lis
pendens or any adverse claim whatsoever. After the sale wherein plaintiffs-appellees were purportedly purchasers for value and in
good faith, they succeeded in titling the said lot under their names per Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 on September 20,
1993, and further proceeded to pay realty taxes thereon. It was only in January 1996 that plaintiffs-appellees discovered a cloud on
their title when their request for a Height Clearance with the Department of Transportation and Communications was referred to
the defendant-appellant Mactan[-]Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of the latters ownership of
the said lot by way of purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.
At this point, it becomes imperative to trace the chain of ownership over Lot No. 4763-D. It is undisputed that the original owners of
said property were the spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who owned the entire Lot No. 4763, of which Lot No. 4763-D is a
portion of (sic). Unfortunately for herein parties, this is where the similarity of facts end (sic), and the instant controversy begins.
According to plaintiffs-appellees: Originally, the entire Lot No. 4763 was decreed in the names of spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef under the provisions of the Land Registration Act on June 1, 1934. [In] January 1974, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef
sold Lot No. 4763 to Spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug. The latter spouses thereafter succeeded to secure the
reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title of Lot No. 4763, Opon Cadastre as evidenced by Court Order dated July 3, 1986. Said
Court Order subsequently became final and executory, thus a reconstituted title, OCT No. RO-2754, was issued in the name of the
original owners-spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. On September 12, 1986, the Deed of Absolute Sale between spouses
Julian Cuison/Marcosa Cosef and spouses Moises Cuizon/Beatriz Patalinghug was registered and annotated on OCT No. RO-2754,
which was cancelled to give way to the issuance of TCT No. 16735 in the name of spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug.
Thereafter, the latter sold a portion, denominated as Lot No. 4763-D, to Mrs. Elma Jenkins on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier
discussed, sold the same lot to herein plaintiffs-appellees on September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that all throughout
the chain of ownership, the titles albeit from a reconstituted one of the previous owners were absolutely devoid of any annotations
of liens, encumbrances, lis pendens, adverse claim, or anything that may cause a reasonable man of ordinary prudence and diligence
to suspect the contrary. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees have been in actual, uninterrupted and peaceful possession of the
property since 1993, and if the possession of their predecessors-in-interest be tacked, plaintiffs-appellees would be in constructive,
uninterrupted and peaceful possession for sixty-two (62) long years as of the date of filing their Complaint for Quieting of Title in the
court a quo.
According to the defendant-appellant: On March 23, 1986[3], the original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot
No. 4763 to the government, through the [then] Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA, for brevity). In a Certificate dated March 19,
1959, vendor Julian Cuison confirmed that he was the possessor and actual owner of Lot No. 4763 which was located within the
Mactan Alternate International Airport and that the duplicate copy of the certificate of title was lost or destroyed during the last war
without him or his predecessor(s)-in-interest having received a copy thereof. Since then, the government, through defendant-
appellant MCIAA, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the property in the concept of owner. Said lot
allegedly became part of the Clear Zone of Runway 22 for purposes of required clearance for take-off and landing. Moreover,
defendant-appellant asserts that plaintiffs-appellees are nothing more than trustees of Lot No. 4763-D in favor of defendant-
appellant MCIAA, being merely successors-in-interest of the original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who
undertook in paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale, to assist in the reconstitution of title so that the land may be registered in
the name of vendee government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA. In paragraph 5 of the same Deed of Absolute Sale, the
parties also agreed that the property be registered under Act 3344 pending the reconstitution and issuance of title. Purportedly, in
gross and evident bad faith and in open violation of their Deed of Absolute Sale, the spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef again
sold the same property to spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug, who in turn sold the lot to Mrs. Elma Jenkins, who
eventually sold the same to herein plaintiffs-appellees. Defendant-appellant MCIAA further imputes bad faith to plaintiffs-appellees
under the rationale that because their title came from a reconstituted one and that Lot No. 4763 was within the Clear Zone of
Runway 22 of the airport, plaintiffs-appellees should have exerted effort in researching the history of ownership and cannot possibly
claim to be innocent of MCIAAs ownership and possession thereof.
RTC ruled that there was a valid transfer of title from Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), and accordingly, the respondents did not buy Lot No. 4763-D from a person who could validly dispose of it. It
likewise ruled that the government (through the CAA, and now respondent MCIAA) has been in possession of the disputed land
since it bought the same in 1958, when a public deed of absolute sale was executed in its favor. Lastly, respondents were considered
as having bought Lot No. 4763-D in bad faith since they ignored circumstances that should have made them curious enough to
investigate beyond the four corners of the Transfer Certificate of Title. In the trial courts view, the facts that Lot No. 4763-D (i) is only
about 320 meters from the center of the runway and therefore part of the clear zone and (ii) has been vacant for several decades
should have alerted the respondents to the possibility that the lot could be part of the airport complex and therefore owned by
petitioner.
Upon motion for reconsideration, RTC reversed their ruling and ruled in favour of the plaintiffs because of the law on double sales
and they were buyers in good faith.
MIAA appealed to the CA which upheld the RTC decision. Since their MR was denied, they filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Between respondents Spouses Tirol and Spouses Ngo, on the one hand, and petitioner MCIAA, on the other, who has the superior
right to the subject property?
Ruling:
SC ruled in favour of spouses Tirol but on an entirely different reason. The rule on double sales does not apply because the buyers
did not purchase the property from the same seller. However, SC ruled that respondents have a better right to Lot No. 4763-D.
Petitioner does not contest that Lot No. 4763, of which the property subject of this case is a part, was registered under Act No. 496
(the Land Registration Act) even before the Second World War. dditionally, in his Certification[18] dated March 19, 1959, Julian
Cuison stated that the duplicate copy of the certificate of title for [Lot No. 4763] was lost or destroyed during the last war without
having been received by [him] or [his] predecessor-in-interest.
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to effect and bind
the land. Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act) governed the recording of
transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the
system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better right. Accordingly, if
a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration
Act, the sale is not considered registered and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole
world.
Consequently, the fact that petitioner MCIAA was able to register its Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344 is of no moment, as
the property subject of the sale is indisputably registered land. Section 50 of Act No. 496 in fact categorically states that it is the act
of registration that shall operate to convey and affect the land; absent any such registration, the instrument executed by the parties
remains only as a contract between them and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration, viz.:
SECTION 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had
not been registered. He may use forms of deeds, mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use and
sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act the registration shall be made in the office of register of
deeds for the province or provinces or city where the land lies. (italics supplied)
Hence, respondents may not be characterized as buyers in bad faith for having bought the property notwithstanding the registration
of the first Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344. An improper registration is no registration at all. Likewise, a sale that is not
correctly registered is binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.
In the instant case, petitioner MCIAA did not bother to have the lost title covering Lot No. 4763-D reconstituted at any time,
notwithstanding the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in 1958, or more than fifty years ago. Vigilantibus, non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy. As a matter of fact, this entire
controversy may very well have been avoided had it not been for petitioners negligence. Furthermore, under the established
principles of land registration, a person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title and
the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of the property, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. Applying this
standard to the facts of this case, we rule that respondents exercised the required diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the
title to the subject property as to be considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
Bulaong vs. Gonzales
GR. No. 156318, September 5, 2011
FACTS:
This case involves conflicting claims of two sets of parties over two parcels of land. The first parcel of land, with an area of 237
square meters and covered by TCT No. T-249639 was originally registered in the name of Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha
Limpo. The other parcel of land, with an area of 86 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-249641,7 was originally registered in
the names of Pacifica E. Limpo, married to Nicanor C. Sincionco, and Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha Limpo. These parcels of
land were mortgaged by the daughter of Fortunato and Bertha Limpo, Regina Christi Limpo, upon the authority of her father, to the
Bulaongs, to secure a loan in the amount of P4,300,000.00. The mortgage was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage dated January 13,
1993. The Bulaongs alleged that before they executed the mortgage, Regina gave them the owner’s duplicates of title of the two
properties. In early January, Anselmo Bulaong, together with his counsel, Atty. Roberto Dionisio, allegedly went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan to check the titles of the properties to be mortgaged. According to the Bulaongs, the Register of Deeds,
Atty. Elenita Corpus, assured them that TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641 were completely clear of any liens or encumbrances from
any party. Relying on this assurance, Anselmo Bulaong agreed to the execution of the mortgage over the two properties. After the
execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs once again went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to register and annotate
the mortgage on the titles. They learned then that the Register of Deed’s copies of the two titles were among the records that were
burned in the fire that destroyed the entire office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on March 7, 1987. Atty. Elenita Corpus
convinced them to cause the reconstitution of the originals of the titles, and further assured them that the mortgage over the
properties would be protected since a copy of the Deed of Mortgage had already been given to her office for annotation. On
February 4, 1993, the newly reconstituted titles were issued, still in the names of Fortunato Limpo, and of Pacifica Limpo and
Fortunato Limpo, respectively. Thereafter, on February 24, 1993, new titles were again issued upon the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Regina’s parents but the new titles in Regina’s name now contained entries pertaining to Writ of Execution. It appears
that a certain Veronica Gonzales had filed a criminal case for estafa against Regina and on October 28, 1991, it rendered a decision
acquitting Regina, but at the same time ordering her to pay Veronica actual damages in the total amount of P275, 000.00. By virtue
of a writ of execution issued on December 29, 1992, the abovequoted notice of levy was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Registry of Bulacan on January 4, 1993. However, this was not annotated on the titles themselves because at the time of the levy,
the properties had not yet been transferred to Regina, but were still registered in the name of her parents. To satisfy Regina’s
judgment debt, the two lots were sold at public auction on June 8, 1993 to Veronica, the only bidder, for P640,354.14. The
Certificate of Sale was annotated on the titles on June 8, 1993 as Entry No. 2075. Upon the lapse of the one year redemption period
on June 20, 1994, Veronica’s titles over the properties were consolidated. A final deed of sale was issued in Veronica’s name and
annotated on June 24, 1994.21 On the other hand, the Bulaongs also had the mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed, with the sheriff
conducting the auction sale on August 22, 1994. The Bulaongs were the highest bidders, buying the properties for the sum
ofP4,300,000.00. They also paid the corresponding capital gains tax of P215,000.00, plus P64,500.00 for the documentary stamp tax,
which were required before the titles to the lots could be transferred in their names. The Certificate of Sale in their favor was
inscribed on August 23, 1994 on TCT No. T-30395 and TCT No. T-30396 as Entry No. 46739. The RTC ruled in favor of the Bulaongs.
According to the RTC, allowing Veronica to levy on the properties worth at least P5,000,000.00 for a judgment of P275,000.00 would
result in gross unjust enrichment. The RTC thus ordered the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue new titles in the name of the
Bulaongs, but only after the Bulaongs had reimbursed the amount of P275,000.00 to Veronica, with interest. Both parties appealed
to the CA. The CA upheld the validity of the Notice of Levy on Execution, noting that it created a lien in favor of the judgment
creditor over the property. According to the CA, when the Bulaongs received the owners’ copies of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396,
the Notice of Levy was already annotated on the titles and, thus, should have put them on guard. As mortgagees of the lots, the
Bulaongs had the option to redeem the properties within the redemption period provided by law. Since they failed to avail of this
remedy, the consolidation of titles in Veronica’s name was proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not Veronica has a superior right over the properties?
Ruling: Petition Granted. Redemption is not the proper remedy The CA faulted the Bulaongs for not redeeming the properties from
Veronica when they had the option of doing so. For failing to exercise this right, the CA concluded that the consolidation of the titles
to the lots in Veronica’s name thus became a matter of course. We disagree. Regina’s interest in the properties is not established.
The levy on execution for judgment is "the act x x x by which an officer sets apart or appropriate[s,] for the purpose of satisfying the
command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment debtor’s property."33 Every interest which the judgment debtor may
have in the property may be subjected to levy on execution.
This statute authorizes the sale under execution of every kind of property, and every interest in property which is, or may be, the
subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere
expressly recognizing or making any distinction between them. We think the real test, as to whether or not property can be attached
L T D D I G E S T - A M B E R H A | 10
and sold upon execution is — does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or otherwise
dispose of it for value? If he does, then the property is subject to execution and payment of his debts. Although we recognize the
validity of the annotation of the levy on the execution in the present case, the question of whether the levy itself is valid remains to
be determined. To do this, Regina’s interest in the subject properties at the time of the levy has to be ascertained. To recall,
Veronica’s notice of levy on execution is based on Regina’s interest in the two properties, which she acquired via the Deed of
Absolute Sale purportedly executed by her parents in her favor on November 5, 1991. The subject properties were finally registered
in Regina’s name, not by virtue of the 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale, but by virtue of succession, specifically by the "Adjudication" that
Regina filed with the Register of Deeds on February 24, 1993,40 pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. If she had
already acquired her parents’ interest in these properties in 1991, she would not have needed any authority from her father to
execute the mortgage with the Bulaongs; she would have done so in her own capacity. The spring cannot rise higher than its source.
Since Regina had no established interest in the subject properties at the time of the levy, Veronica’s levy had nothing to attach to in
the subject properties. Unregistered sale of land cannot bind third parties. Even assuming that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Regina’s
favor was valid, we still cannot uphold the validity of the levy and execution sale in Veronica’s favor. Simply put, if a sale is not
registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.
Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation

GR No. 162322 | March 14, 2012
Facts: On July 17, 1997, Bantigue Point filed with RTC Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over Lot 8060
of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, 10,732 m2 with a total assessed value of P14,920.
On July 18, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on October 22, 1997. On August 7, 1997, it issued a
second Order setting the initial hearing on November 4, 1997.
In 1998, while the records were still with the RTC, Republic filed its Opposition.
RTC Clerk of Court transferred motu propio the records of the case to MTC San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was
less than P100,000.
The MTC issued an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of evidence. Bantigue presented Tax Declarations, a
Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, and a Certification from the DENR CENRO of Batangas City that the lot is within the alienable and
disposable (A&D) zone. MTC awarded the land to Bantigue.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed MTC. Since Republic actively participated in the proceedings, it is estopped from questioning the issue of
jurisdiction on appeal. Bantigue sufficiently established its registrable title over the property after having proven OCEN possession
and occupation.
Issue: Whether the land is alienable and disposable?
Held:
No. CENRO certification not sufficient proof that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant for land registration has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to
be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification;
and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official record.
Only CENRO certification presented. No DENR Secretary's approval of the original classification.
Petition for Review is denied. Case remanded to MTC for reception of evidence of evidence to prove that the property sought to be
registered is A&D land of the public domain.
Republic vs. Metro Index Realty
Facts:
1.Respondent filed w/ the RTC of Cavite an application for judicial confirmation of title over 3 parcels of land located at Brgy. Mataas
na Lupa, Indang Cavitea.During the hearing it presented 2 witnesses, Dimayuga Project Documentation Officer who testified that
respondent bought the property from Herminia, Melinda & Hernando Sicap & that it was declared for taxation in the respondents
name in 2006 & the property is alienable & disposable land evidenced by the certification issued by DENR.
Herminia testified that she & her siblings inherited the land from their parents who had been in possession of the land since 1956 as
shown by the tax declaration & at the time they inherited the property, they had been religiously paying taxes thereon & planted
coconut, banana, santol, palay & corn2. RTC granted the application w/ CA affirmed ruling that the number of trees found in the
land is not the determination of ownership of the land (even only few trees are there, does not mean that they did NOT own the
land) & constructive possession
SC reversed the CA decision for failure to comply w/ the requirements of sec 14, PD 1529 (1st & 2nd par)
Issue: W/N respondent had proven that he is entitled to the benefits of PD 1529 on confirmation of imperfect titles?
Ruling: No. Although respondents might be in open & continuous possession of the land, still it is part of the public dominion. Public
lands become only patrimonial not only w/ a declaration that these are alienable & disposable lands but there must be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
the national wealth and only so will prescription run against it
The classification of the land to be public or alienable should have 1st been addressed to but was regrettably neglected. Public Land
Act requires more than constructive possession & casual cultivation ---- a mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under a claim of ownership.
In this case lot 1 = 2k coconuts = 119 hectaresb.Lot 2 = 1k coconuts = 19 hectares c.Reality = 1 hectare = 114 coconuts w/c means
that only 25 hectares out of 138 hectares being applied for was in fact cleared, cultivated & planted w/ coconut w/c need not be
tendered or watched. This only showed that casual or occasional cultivation of portions of the land in question. In short, possession
is not exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the government.
Valiao vs Republic
GR 170757, Nov 28, 2011
Facts
The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea) filed with the RTC of Kabankalan an
application of a parcel of land with an area of 504, 535 square meters in Barrio Galicia, Ilog, Negros Occidental under the conditions
of PD 1529. They claim that they have acquired the property in 1947 after the death of their uncle Basilio Milliarez who purchased
the land from Fermin Payogao through a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916, entirely handwritten in Spanish. Upon their uncle’s
death, they have possessed the land until 1966 when oppositor Macario Zafra disposed them of their property compelling them to
file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against him. The petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated
September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision to grant the
petitioner’s application for registration.
Issue
Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain and if they had been in an open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a claim of ownership.
Ruling
The petitioners’ application under PD 1529 should be denied.
The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of
the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application
(or claim) is alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government.
The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. There is nothing in the
records that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that Basilio was in possession of the property during the period of possession
required by law.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over
his own property. As regards petitioners’ possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the
same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date. Tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported for other
evidence. It does not necessarily prove ownership.
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER, vs. AVELINA AMORES,
FACTS:
Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980.
Their marriage was declared null by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage.
He purchased and inherited some lots which are now the subject of this case.
The respondent averred that she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that
she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by
way of inheritance.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE: Can a foreign national own lands in the Philippines?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to the ownership
of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the
parties.
While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he
likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. The Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity,
grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all.
Rodriguez vs. CA
GR No. 184589, June 13, 2013
Facts:
On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125
hectares, located in San Mateo, Rizal. On November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered a Decision evaluating the evidence presented by the
parties as follows:
It has been established that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the
spouses Felix San Pascual and Juanita Vertudes, Ignacio Santos and Socorro Santos, Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome,
Gavino Espiritu and Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio Manuel and Justina Ramos, all of whom in January 1960, executed instruments of
conditional sale of their respective parcels of land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a
final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded the conditional sale. The applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by Section
48, of C.A. No. 141, as amended.
The CFI confirmed the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho to the parcel of land under consideration and orders the registration
thereof in her name and personal circumstances aforementioned. The opposition of the Director of Lands was dismissed.
Upon finality, the CFI issued an Order on December 22, 1965 directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC)
“to comply with Section 21 of Act No. 2347” on the issuance of a decree and original certificate of title (OCT). On July 11, 1966, Jose
D. Santos, Register of Deeds (ROD) for the Province of Rizal, issued TCT No. 167681 in Landicho’s name covering the subject
property. Notably, ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an OCT for the subject property; and although TCT No. 167681
stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no other detail regarding the decree and the original registration of the
subject property was filled out.
The subject property was thereafter sold several times, and as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled, new TCTs were
accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of the subject property could be traced from Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI),
which acquired TCT No. 344936 in its own name on November 10, 1971; then to Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT No. 425582,
November 5, 1973; and finally, to herein respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), TCT No. 482970, July 15,
1975.
A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) instituted Civil Case No. 12044 entitled A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. CA, which was
still pending before the RTC of Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject property, which was a portion of a
bigger tract of land measuring around 513 hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999, dated February 20, 1956, in the name of said
corporation. This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the name of Meerkamp Co. under OCT No. 301, pursuant to Decree
No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429, issued on November 22, 1906. ADRDI caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens (as regards
Civil Case No. 12044) on TCT No. 344936 of BCPI. Subsequently, based on the ruling of this Court in A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, ADRDI was also able to have its notice of adverse claim over the subject property annotated on TCT Nos. 344936
and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI, respectively. ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to
whom TCT No. 70589 was issued on March 25, 1983.
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of herein petitioner
Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landicho’s title over the subject property has not been executed. Rodriguez specifically
stated that no decree of registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in Landicho’s name. As Landicho’s successor-in-interest to the
subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register of Deeds for Marikina City, through the Administrator of the Land Registration
Administration to issue the Original Certificate of Title containing the Technical Description as duly confirmed in the said Decision
and Order x x x in the name of the herein petitioner [Rodriguez].
Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged that said
certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing
of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection
therewith.
On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. PCCAI
justified its intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest therein as the
registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy
of TCT No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his
Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct action or final court decree for its
cancellation. Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and
jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could protect its
vested rights and interests over the subject property; to note and admit its Answer-in-Intervention; and to deny Rodriguez’s
Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit.
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10, 2007, reasoning as follows:
Initially, the issue of jurisdiction arose particularly as to whether this Court may take cognizance of the instant case previously
assigned to the CFI Pasig and, subsequently, rule upon the Omnibus Motion of [Rodriguez] despite the lapse of more than forty (40)
years after the finality of the Decision of November 16, 1965.
Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction because, as earlier stated, the proceedings in this Court is merely a continuation of the land
registration proceedings commenced in the CFI Pasig. More importantly, with the creation of this Court under the provisions of the
Judiciary Reorganization Law, all cases involving properties within its territorial jurisdiction, specifically in San Mateo, Rizal, were
transferred to this Court (Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
Secondly, a more important issue was put to fore—whether this Court may issue a writ of execution directing the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration over the subject property and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to issue
an original certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez]. This Court can only reiterate the directives in the Order dated December 22,
1965. It cannot, however, issue, as prayed for, a writ of execution directing the issuance of a decree of registration and an original
certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez].
RTC decreed that the LRA is directed to issue a decree of registration while the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise
directed to issue an original certificate of title of the subject property, both in favor and in the name of applicant Purita Landicho.
PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order of the RTC. The RTC resolved that after receiving evidence that a
Decision was rendered in favor of the applicants spouses Landicho as owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, and that no
title was issued pursuant to the said Decision which has become final and executory even after an Order to that effect was issued,
merely reiterated the said Order for the implementation of the Decision dated November 16, 1966, signed by the Hon. Andres Reyes
as Judge. In other words, Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has become final and executory. The issue in the
instant Petition is the issuance of a decree of registration and nothing more is being tried. In short, the Motion For Leave To
Intervene and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCCAI are both DENIED.
The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, filed a Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 informing the
trial court that it cannot comply with said Order since there were already two existing titles covering the subject property, i.e., TCT
No. 70589 of Araneta (traced back to OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landicho’s TCT
No. 167681); and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in Landicho’s name would only further aggravate the problem of double
titling. The LRA also explained that the ROD issued a TCT, rather than an OCT, to Landicho.
PCCAI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, assailing the
Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the
RTC to issue a writ of execution for a final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued that when subsequent facts and
circumstances transpired which renders the execution of the final and executory decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the trial
court should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. PCCAI likewise asserted that the RTC, as a land registration court, did not have
the jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the subject property. PCCAI lastly maintained that it was an
indispensable party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by the RTC to intervene during the hearing of
Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for the execution of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the
CFI.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated May 26, 2008, found merit in the Petition of PCCAI. The Court of Appeals additionally
opined that the intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was proper. Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of
Information Technology of the Philippines vs. Comelec, G.R. 159139, August 22, 2006, the following doctrine was enunciated, to wit:
“The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no longer be modified, except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes, or
when the judgment is void, or if supervening events or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the decision render its
execution unjust and inequitable. In the interest of substantial justice, this Court has allowed exceptions to this rule. A person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof, may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.”
We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention when the decision of the case was already final and executory and during
the execution stage of the case. However, the supervening event which is the issuance of a decree of registration which was already
implemented and enforced upon [the] order of the Administrator of the LRC way back in July 11, 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No.
167861 in the name of Purita Landicho instead of an OCT makes the said intervention proper and well-taken.
It appears absurd and senseless that an OCT be issued in favor of Mr. Rodriguez. Furthermore, it is in the paramount interest of
justice that the assailed orders be not implemented, [PCCAI] being an indispensable party in the execution and/or implementation of
the said orders. The non-execution of the said orders will prevent further disarray, confusion and complexity on the issue of who is
or who should be the real owner of the subject land which is a matter that can be threshed out in a proper case for quieting of title
between adverse claimants.
CA told, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is proper even though it was filed after rendition of judgment by the
trial court.
Ruling: Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which read:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI. As the registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal
interest in the subject property. The issuance of another certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI, constituting a
cloud on its TCT No. 482970.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several cases,
viz:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the
judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by
this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of
the appropriate circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the
powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the interests
of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 became final and executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT
No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996.
Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of
PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098.
Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18,
2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case only
to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No.
482970, which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such
action was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree
of registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name. For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of
San Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of the dispositive
portion for being a superfluity.
Republic vs. Camacho

GR. No. 185604, June 13, 2013
Facts:
On March 6, 2003, respondent Edward M. Camacho filed a petition 4 denominated as “Re: Petition for Reconstitution of the Original
Title of O.C.T. No. (not legible) and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Copy” before the RTC. In support thereof, respondent alleged
that the Original Certificate of Title5 (OCT) sought to be reconstituted and whose number is no longer legible due to wear and tear, is
covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No. 3732, Record No. 22141 6 issued in the name of Spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana Doliente
(Spouses Lapitan) of Alcala, Pangasinan. Respondent also alleged that the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT is in his possession and
that he is the owner of the two parcels of land covered by the aforementioned OCT by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
with Absolute Sale7 (the Deed) executed on December 26, 2002 by the heirs of Spouses Lapitan in his favor. Said OCT covers two
parcels of land located in San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, (Lot No. 1) and Namulatan, 8 Bautista, Pangasinan.
Upon a Show-Cause Order of the RTC, respondent filed an Amended Petition dated May 21, 2003, alleging that “the land in issue is
bounded on the North by the land covered by Plan Psu-53673; on the North by the properties of Hipolito Sarmiento and Cipriano
Dauz, residents of Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by Lot No. 3; and on the Southwest by the properties of Nicasio Lapitan
vs. Felix Bacolor [who are also] residents of Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan.” Respondent intimated that he desires to have the office/file
copy of the OCT reconstituted based on the Technical Description provided by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office and
thereafter, to be issued a second owner’s duplicate copy in lieu of the old one.
Finding the respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance and setting the same for hearing on September 29, 2003. Copies
of said order were posted on bulletin boards and published twice in the official gazette. However, on January 22, 2004, respondent
filed his second Amended Petitionaverring that “the land in issue is bounded on the North by the land of Ricardo Acosta, a resident
of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the South by the property of Greg Viray, a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by the
land of Roque Lanuza, a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; and on the East by the lot of Juan Cabuan, a resident of Laoac, Alcala,
Pangasinan. The court finding the documentary as well as the parole (sic) evidence adduced to be adequate and sufficiently
persuasive to warrant the reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title covered by Decree No. 444263, Cadastral Case No. 3732,
GLRO Record No. 22141
On April 4, 2006, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the RTC in its Resolution dated May 24, 2006 for lack of merit. The RTC opined that while the number of the OCT is not legible, a
close examination of the entries therein reveals that it is an authentic OCT per the LRA’s findings. Moreover, the RTC held that
respondent complied with Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 considering that the reconstitution in this case is based on the
owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision holding that respondent’s petition is governed by Section 10 of R.A.
No. 26 since the reconstitution proceedings is based on the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT itself. The CA, invoking this Court’s
ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 45 concluded that notice to the owners of the adjoining lots is not
required. Moreover, the CA opined that Decree No. 444263 issued on July 18, 1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 in the name of
Spouses Lapitan exists in the Record Book of the LRA as stated in the LRA’s Report.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether reconstitution of title is valid even if the original certificate of title number is not legible?
Ruling:
No. Jurisdiction is not acquired over property for non compliance with the notice of hearing. The Notice of Hearing issued and
published does not align with the in rem character of the reconstitution proceedings and the mandatory nature of the requirements
under R.A. No. 26.59 There is a mortal insufficiency in the publication when the missing title was merely identified as “OCT No. (not
legible)” which is non-compliant with Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.
Moreover, while the LRA confirmed the issuance of Decree No. 444263 in its Report, it perplexes this Court that the LRA failed to
state that an OCT was actually issued and mention the number of the OCT sought to be reconstituted.
Respondent and the RTC overlooked that there are two parcels of land in this case. It is glaring that respondent had to amend his
petition for reconstitution twice in order to state therein the names of the adjoining owners. Most importantly, the Notice of
Hearing issued by the RTC failed to state the names of interested parties appearing in the OCT sought to be reconstituted,
particularly the adjoining owners to Lot No. 1, namely, Benito Ferrer and Marcelo Monegas. While it is true that notices need not be
sent to the adjoining owners in this case since this is not required under Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 26 as enunciated in our ruling
in Puzon, it is imperative, however, that the notice should specify the names of said interested parties so named in the title sought
to be reconstituted. No less than Section 9 of R.A. No. 26 mandates it.
Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there
should be no departure.61 In view of these lapses, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with the case since the mandatory
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the
proceedings utterly null and void.62 As such, while petitioner overlooked these jurisdictional infirmities and failed to incorporate
them as additional issues in its own petition, this Court has sufficient authority to pass upon and resolve the same since they affect
jurisdiction.
Petition for certiorari is granted and the CA decision is reversed and set aside.
Wee vs. Mardo

GR 202414, June 4, 2014
Facts:
Respondent FelicidadMardo was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348,
situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through
a Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of P250,000.00 which was fully paid.
Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.
Petitioner file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she is the owner of said unregistered land by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the
application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and
second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the RTC. Upon
presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent appealed to the CA.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession and occupation under
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and
oppositions to her title suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element
in the requirement and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Petitioner is entitled to the subject property?
Ruling:
Based on the legal paramaters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011
The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land. It was of the view that she could not have complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.
A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-
03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo.
The Petition is DENIED.
Francisco vs. Emiliana M. Rojas

GR 167120, April 23, 2014
FACTS: Emiliana M. Rojas is the widow of the late Jose Rojas, while the other [respondents] are the children of the spouses.
On the other hand, Rosalina V. Francisco, [petitioner] Rodolfo V. Francisco, and Carmela V. Francisco, hereafter collectively referred
to as the Franciscos, are the applicants for registration in Land.
Subject of the controversy is a portion of 3,181.74 hectares, vast track of land, known as the Hacienda de Angono, in Angono, Rizal.
The entire hacienda used to be owned by one Don Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana upon whose death left a portion thereof, to his
two (2) sons Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido.
Sometime in September 1911, Decreto No. 6145, covering the same hectare portion of Hacienda de Angono was issued in favor of
the brothers Francisco and Hermogenes. On the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title over the same hectares was issued in the
names of the two (2) brothers.
Nine (9) years later, or sometime in 1942, the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes adjudicated among themselves the same hectares
and transferred the one-half (1/2) portion thereof to Jose A. Rojas, predecessor-in-interest of the Rojases. Confusingly, some few
months thereafter, the heirs of Guido y Santa Ana requested the then Land Registration Commission (now, Land Registration
Authority) to issue the corresponding original certificate of title. The request, however, was denied by the said office. The entire
parcel of land covered by Decreto No. 6145 was subdivided into twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of
title were issued in lieu of the reconstituted TCT No. 23377.
Thereafter, the heirs who executed the aforesaid document of extrajudicial settlement, including the now spouses Jose Rojas and
Emiliana Rojas, sold the property to Pacil Management Corporation (Pacil, for short), and new titles were issued in favor of Pacil on
June 26, 1976. Three months later, or on August 26, 1976, Pacil reconveyed all the 21 lots to the former owners.
The court declared the Franciscos the true and absolute owners of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The aforequoted decision having become final and executory, the Franciscos filed with the same court a petition for the issuance of
a decree of registration. The court directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue the desired decree.
To complicate matters, it appears in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor General, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6145 and the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377
against the heirs of Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido, the spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, the Pacil Development
Corporation and Interport Resources Corporation, it being alleged in the same complaint that both the Decreto No. 6145 and the
owner’s copy of TCT No. 23377 were false, spurious and fabricated
The Court held that, a decree of registration binds the land and quiets title thereto, is conclusive upon all persons and cannot be
reopened or revived after the lapse of one year after entry of the decree.
CA: Likewise DENIED the appeal

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS IS THE “APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING” CONTEMPLATED
IN THIS HONORABLE COURT’S PRONOUNCEMENT IN “GUIDO CASE”? IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR
‘RECONVEYANCE’ BEING MAINTAINED BY THE RESPONDENTS IS THE “APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING”?
HELD: In disputing respondents’ contention that the “appropriate proceeding” should be an action for reconveyance, petitioner
states that such action may be proper but is still not an exclusive remedy. He maintains that actual fraud in securing a title must be
proved so as to succeed in an action for reconveyance, but the Court already held in Guido that TCT No. 23377 is authentic and
genuine; hence, it is assumed that there is no infirmity or defect therein. Also, an action for reconveyance cannot be availed of like
an application for registration of land as it would be dismissed forthwith on the ground of prescription.
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier
land registration case. Issuance of another decree covering the same land is, therefore, null and void.
Truly, one of the appropriate legal remedies that should have been availed of by the Franciscos is an action for reconveyance.
Contrary to petitioner’s declaration, proof of actual fraud is not required as it may be filed even when no fraud intervened such as
when there is mistake in including the land for registration. In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly
respected as incontrovertible; what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud and if it is based on an implied
or a constructive trust it prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property.
However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person enforcing
the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does
not prescribe.
In this case, the Franciscos claim to be in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lots. It
appears that they never lost possession of said properties, and as such, they are in a position to file the complaint with the trial court
to protect their alleged rights and clear whatever doubts has been cast thereon.
Okabe vs. Saturnino

G.R. No. 196040, August 26, 2014
FACTS:
The subject of the controversy is an 81 square meter property located in Makati City, which was initially covered by TCT No. 175741
under the name of the wife of respondent Ernesto A. Saturnino. Sometime in 1994, the couple obtained a loan with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), which was secured by the subject property. Because of the couple’s failure to settle their loan obligation with
the bank, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
On August 24, 1999, the Certificate of Sale was inscribed on TCT No. 175741. Considering that the property was not redeemed by
respondent during the redemption period, consolidation of ownership was inscribed on October 13, 2006 and a new TCT was issued
in favor of PNB. Without taking possession of the subject property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe H. Okabe on June 17, 2008.
TCT No. 225265 was later issued in petitioner’s name on August 13, 2008.
On November 27, 2008, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the subject property.
The RTC ruled, among other things, that the right of the petitioner to be placed in absolute possession of the subject property was a
consequence of her right of ownership and that petitioner cannot be deprived of said possession being now the registered owner of
the property. Meanwhile, on November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, which granted her ex-parte
petition and ordered that the corresponding writ of possession over the subject property be issued in her favor.
The CA reversed RTC’s decision and opined, among other things, that although it may be true that by virtue of the contract of sale,
petitioner obtained the same rights of a purchaser-owner and which rights she derived from erstwhile mortgagee turned owner
PNB, this does not mean that the right to file an ex-parte motion for a writ of possession under Act 3135 had also been transferred
to the petitioner. Such a special right is granted only to purchasers in a sale made under the provisions of Act 3135.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was the proper remedy of the petitioner in obtaining
possession of the subject property.
HELD:
NO. Section 7 of Act No. 3135,28 as amended by Act No. 4118,29 states:
Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or
place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing
bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown
that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall
be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a
writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
Under the provision cited above, the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for a
writ of possession during the redemption period, upon an ex-parte motion and after furnishing a bond.
GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank: the Court held that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title.
China Banking Corporation v. Ordinario: the Court held that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is
entitled to possession of the property.
Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog: although the Court allowed the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land during the redemption period, it still required the posting of a
bond under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title.
When bond required
The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not
redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application
and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Here, petitioner does not fall under the circumstances of the aforequoted case and the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, since she bought the property long after the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is PNB, if it was the purchaser
in the foreclosure sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure sale, who can file the ex-parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession during the redemption period, but it will only issue upon compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
Remedy of purchaser subsequent to the foreclosure sale purchaser
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by
whom executed or given. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and
no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is
entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the
date of registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or his successor in
office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed
it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights,
title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be
given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor.
When issuance of writ of possession is ex-parte and non-adversarial
From the foregoing, upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and
acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property, and its possession shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which case,
the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex-parte and non-adversarial.
When issuance of writ of possession requires hearing
Thus, where the property levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the
court to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of said possession, i.e., whether or not he is in possession of the subject
property under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor.
Republic vs. Jose and Perla Castuera

GR 203384, January 14, 2015
Facts:
Andres Valiente owned a 3,135-square meter land in Barangay Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales. In 1978, he sold the property to
respondents Jose and Perla Castuera (Spouses Castuera). On 21 May 2003, the Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an
application[5]... for original registration of title over the property.
The Spouses Castuera also presented documentary evidence to support their application. The documents included tax receipts and
an advance plan[6] with a notation, "Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office and is for... registration
purposes. This survey is within the Alienable and Disposable land proj. No. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927 per
LC Map No. 669 Sheet 1."
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application
for original registration.
RTC granted the application for original registration of title over the property
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court of Appeals held that:
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a person may
file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land:
"Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of first Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or... earlier."
Accordingly, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive... and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Section 14(1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration is... filed.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, We find and so rule that the trial court is correct in granting appellees' application for
original registration of the subject land. A scrutiny of the records shows that there is substantial compliance with the requirement
that the... subject land is alienable and disposable land.
In Republic v. Serrano, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and this Court that the parcel of land subject of
registration was alienable and disposable. It held that a DENR Regional Technical Director's certification, which is annotated on the
subdivision... plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement
While in the case of Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original
application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land
is... alienable and disposable
However, in the recent case of Republic vs. Carlos R. Vega, et al., as an exception to the strict application of the stringent rule
imposed in the above pronouncement that the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of an application for
registration, the Supreme
Court, in its sound discretion, and based solely on the evidence on record, may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground
of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land
and an... absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration
currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the trial court only on January 31, 2005, prior to the above pronouncement[.]
We believe that the same rule shall apply to the present case allowing the registration of the subject property as there is substantial
compliance... with the requirement that the land subject of registration is an alienable and disposable land
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
Issues:
Petitioner raises as issue that the advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable
character of the property.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the property. The
Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must present a certified true copy of the Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources Secretary's declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
Principles:
In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,[11] citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[12] the Court held... that:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition,... the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as
declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretary's declaration or the President's
proclamation must be certified as a... true copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[
Republic vs. Cesar Pasicolan

GR 198543, April 15, 2015
Facts:
Respondents Cesar C. Pasicolan (Cesar) and Gregorio C. Pasicolan (Gregorio) filed a Petition for Reconstitution5 of OCT No. 8450 in
the name of Pedro Callueng (Pedro) before the RTC of Tuguegarao City. Respondents claimed to be the legal and forced heirs of the
late Pedro. The RTC granted the Petition. The Republic through the OSG filed their opposition contending that the respondents failed
to present competent evidence to show that the alleged lost certificate of title was valid and subsisting at the time of its alleged loss
and that a mere copy of decree no. 339880 is not a sufficient basis for reconstituting original certificate of title no. 8450.
The CA dismissed the appeal and gave credence to the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the respondents and the
report of the LRA. It ruled that factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that have acquired expertise in the
performance of their official duties and the exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at
times, even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether reconstitution of title is justified on the basis of a copy of an unauthenticated decree and the evidence on record?
Ruling:
No. Absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for
correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.
SC ruled that the Respondents failed to present a competent source of reconstitution. Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates the sources
from which reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates of title may be based:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from (such of) the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in
the following order:
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate
of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been
registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
Respondents predicate their Petition for Reconstitution on a decree of registration under Section 2(d) of RA 26. As both the original
and the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 8450 are lost or destroyed, it is only proper, no doubt, that we scrutinize the authenticity of
Decree No. 339880.
A review of the records of this case shows that the CA did not directly address the issue of the decree’s authenticity. In fact, it
merely stated that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court “were further sustained by the unmistakable and reliable
findings of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).”
However, a cursory reading of the LRA’s report would reveal that the LRA made an admission only as to the existence of Decree No.
339880. Then, it went on to state that “[h]owever, [a] copy of said decree is no longer available in this Authority.”23 The Court
cannot therefore help but wonder how can a decree that is undisputedly unavailable with the LRA – the “central repository of all
land records involving registered or titled lands [which] keeps the title history or records of transaction involving titled or registered
lands.”24 – be suddenly presented before the trial court and accepted by it as authentic?
As if this was not disconcerting enough, what is more mind boggling would be the LRA’s recommendation that “if the Honorable
Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, an authenticated
copy of Decree No. 339880 may be used as a source of the desired reconstitution pursuant to Section 2(d) of said Act”25despite its
admission of the decree’s absence in its records. Respondents’ other documentary evidence such as the technical description, sepia
film and tax declarations are not sufficient pieces of evidence to grant a Petition for Reconstitution under Section 2(f) of RA 26.
SC also share the OSG’s observation that the non-submission of an affidavit of loss by the person who was allegedly in actual
possession of OCT No. 8450 at the time of its loss casts doubt on respondents’ claim that OCT No. 8450 once existed and
subsequently got lost. Under Section 10938 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,39 the owner must file with the proper Registry of Deeds
a notice of loss executed under oath.
SC stated that at this point, it is imperative to remind trial courts that granting Petitions for Reconstitution is not a ministerial task. It
involves diligent and circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented, lest the chilling
consequences of mistakenly issuing a reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed.
Republic vs. Sogod Development Corporation

GR 175760
Facts:
Respondent Sogod Development Corporation (Sogod) filed an application for registration and confirmation of land that it purchased
from Catalina Rivera, averring that “by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest[,] [it had] been in open, continuous, exclusive[,]
and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since June 12, 1945[.]” DENR filed an Opposition on the ground that the land
was previously forest land and was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986. Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod ruled in favour herein respondent Sogod, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the occupation of forest lands prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land may be considered for
purposes of complying with the requirements for judicial confirmation of title.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, 70 otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which requires
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 for a judicial confirmation of title:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
A similar provision is found in Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
which reads:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: AIDSTE
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
This court in Heirs of Mario v. Republic has clarified that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 qualifies possession and occupation, not
land classification, as alienable and disposable. The agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thus:
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise
have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date
qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant's
imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire
lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time
of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

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G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.

Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC

GR No. 154953, June 26, 2008

The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.

ISSUES: Whether the land is alienable and disposable

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs Republic

(1) For homestead settlement;

Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Tirol

Bulaong vs. Gonzales

GR. No. 156318, September 5, 2011

Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation

Issue: Whether the land is alienable and disposable?

Republic vs. Metro Index Realty

The petitioners’ application under PD 1529 should be denied.

G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

ISSUE: Can a foreign national own lands in the Philippines?

Republic vs. Camacho

Hence this petition.

Wee vs. Mardo

Issue: Whether Petitioner is entitled to the subject property?

The Petition is DENIED.

Francisco vs. Emiliana M. Rojas

CA: Likewise DENIED the appeal

Okabe vs. Saturnino

When bond required

Remedy of purchaser subsequent to the foreclosure sale purchaser

When issuance of writ of possession is ex-parte and non-adversarial

When issuance of writ of possession requires hearing

Republic vs. Jose and Perla Castuera

Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

The petition is meritorious.

Resources Secretary's declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.

Republic vs. Cesar Pasicolan

Hence this petition.

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

Republic vs. Sogod Development Corporation

xxx xxx xxx

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