Jacques Derrida Voice and Phenomenon Introduction To The Problem of The Sign in Husserls Phenomenology

VOICE AND PHENOMENON
V O I C E AND
P HE NOME NON
Introduction to the Problem of the
Sign in Husserl's Phenomenology
Jacques Derrida
Translated from the French by Leonard Lawlor
Northwestern University Press

Evanston, Illinois
Northwestern University Press
www. im press, northw estern.edu
Copyright © 2011 by Northwestern University Press. Published 2011. All rights

reserved. Originally p ub lish ed in French under the title L a voix et le phénomène
by Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.
Printed in the U nited States o f A m erica
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
D errida, Ja cq u es.
[Voix et le p h én om ène. English]
Voice an d ph en om en o n : introduction to the p ro b lem o f the sign in
H u sserl’s ph en om enology / Ja c q u e s D errida ; translated from the F ren ch by
L eon ard Lawlor.
p. cm. — (N orthw estern University studies in p h en om en ology anci
existential philosophy)
“O riginally published in Fren ch u nder the title L a voix et le p h én om èn e
by Presses U niversitaires cle France, 1967”— T.p. verso.
Includes bibliographical ref erences anci inclex.
ISB N 978-0-8101-2765-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. H usserl, Eclmuncl, 1859-1938. 2. Phenom enology. 3. Signs ancl symbols.
4. M eaning (Philosophy) 5. D ifference (Philosophy) I. Lawlor, L eon ard,
1954- II. Title. III. Series: N orthw estern University studies in p h en om en o l
ogy 8c existential philosophy.
B3279.H 94D 3813 2011
142.7— clc22
2011012609
© T h e p ap e r u sed in this publication m eets the m inim um requirem ents o f the

A m erican N ational Standard for Inform ation Scien ces— P erm an en ce o f P ap er
for Printed Library M aterials, A N SI Z39.48-1992.
Contents
Acknowledgm ents ix
Translator's Introduction: The Germinal Structure of Derrida's Thought xi
Translator's Note xxix
Introduction 3
1 Sign and Signs 15
2 The Reduction of Indication 23
3 Meaning as Soliloquy 27
4 Meaning and Representation 41
5 The Sign and the Blink of an Eye 51
6 The Voice That Keeps Silent 60
7 The Originative Supplement 75
Notes 91
Bibliography 107
Index 113
Acknowledgments
While what I have p ro d u ced counts as a new translation o f D errid a’s

1967 L a voix et le phénomène, it is profoundly indebted to David Allison
and to his original 1973 English translation, which appeared un der the
title Speech ancl Phenomena. Professor Allison trained me at Stony B rook
University, an d his English translation h elped train a generation o f An
glophon e ph ilosoph ers in D errid a’s thought. It is hard for me to express
the extent o f my gratitude toward David B. Allison. I m ust thank R onald
Bruzina, who carefully read the first draft o f this translation and gave
me countless invaluable suggestions for revisions. Elizabeth R ottenberg
also advised m e con cern in g a variety o f translation problem s. T hanks
are also due to Jo e Balay, A aron Krem pa, and C am eron O ’M ara at Penn
State University who read later drafts; D aniel P alu m bo assisted in the
p roo fread in g and indexing. I am especially grateful to Anthony Stein-
bock for his suggestions regard in g the translation and for his support o f
the entire project.
Translator's Introduction: The Germinal
Structure of Derrida's Thought
Published in 1967, when D errida was thirty-seven years old, Voice and Phe
nomenon1 ap p eared at the sam e m om ent as Of Grammatologf and Writing
and Difference} All three books an noun ced the new philosophical project
called “d econ struction .” A lthough D errida would later regret the fate o f
the term “decon struction ,”4 he would use it throughout his career to d e
fine his own thinking. While Writing and Difference collects essays written
over a ten-year period on diverse figures and topics, and while O f Gram
matology aims its deconstruction at “the age o f R ousseau,” Voice and Phe
nomenon shows deconstruction en gaged with the m ost im portant philo
sophical m ovem ent o f the last h un d red years: ph en om enology.5 Only
in relation to ph en om en ology is it possible to m easure the im portance
o f deconstruction. Only in relation to H u sserl’s philosophy is it possible
to u n derstand the novelty o f D errid a’s thinking. Voice and Phenomenon
therefore may be the best introduction to D errid a’s thought in general.
It is possible to say o f it what D errida says o f H u sserl’s Logical Investiga
tions. Voice and Phenomenon contains “the germ inal structure” of D errida’s
entire thought (3).
The structure involves three features (which are presented in the
three sections o f this in troduction ). First, and this is the most obvious
feature, D errid a’s thought is structured aroun d the con cept o f d eco n
struction. But the con cept o f deconstruction can be determ ined only in
relation to what it criticizes: “the m etaphysics o f p resen ce.” T he m eta
physics o f presence is a closed system, determ in in g the concept of sign
(and m ore generally language) as derivative, as a m odification o f pres
ence and having no other purpose than representing presence. Starting
with presence and ending with presence, m etaphysics form s a circular
enclosure. Second, D errid a’s thought is structured by classical form s o f
argum en tation , in particular, by the investigation o f unacknow ledged
presupposition s. But it is also structured by the invention o f new con
cepts: différance, the trace (or w riting), and supplem entarity. Reconceiv
ing the sign (or m ore generally lan gu age), these unclassical concepts
are defined by im possible propositions, which, when deposited into the
m etaphysical system, stop the circle from bein g form ed. They attem pt
T R A N S L A T O R ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N
to open the enclosure o f m etaphysics. T h erefore, third, like so m uch

o f the French philosophy developed in the 1960s,6 D errida’s thought is
structured by an exitin g m ovem ent, a line o f flight to the outside. T hat
the outside is a sort o f utopian non-place, an “elsew here,” in which it is
possible to think and live differently, indicates what m otivates d eco n
struction. As we shall see, there are two motivations for deconstruction,
m otivations which one m ight find surprising if one is fam iliar with the
way D errid a’s thought was appropriated and popularized during his own
lifetime. D errida’s thought is m otivated by the desire for truth and for
the transform ation o f all values. Undoubtedly, these are new concepts o f
truth and value, but they are truth an d value nevertheless.
First Structural Feature: The

Deconstruction of Phenomenology as the
Metaphysics of Presence
None o f the 1967 books, including Voice and Phenomenon, provides a for
mal definition of decon struction .7 But soon after, D errida form u lated
one. In the 1971 interview “Positions,” D errida states that deconstruction
consists o f two p h ases.8 T he first, which is critical, attacks the classical
oppositions that structure philosophy. T hese oppositions, D errida states,
are subordinating; they are hierarchies.9 T he first phase o f deconstruc
tion “reverses” the hierarchies. In order to reverse, D errida focuses on
the presupposition s o f the superior term ’s authority. U nder scrutiny, it
turns out that the superior term presupposes traits found in the subor
dinate term. The sharing o f traits points to a necessary structure at the
base o f the hierarchy itself. So, a second phase aims at m arking the basic
necessary structure; it aims at m arking the relation, the difference or
hiatus that m ade the hierarchical opposition possible in the first place
(fo r D errid a’s use o f the word “h iatu s,” see 1 8 ).10 T he basic necessary
structure is the “last court of ap p eal” (8), the law for the “distribution”
o f the term s or ideas foun d in the oppositions (13). Yet, the necessary
structure is aporetical insofar as it cannot be determ ined by the terms
in the hierarchical opposition it m akes possible. Indeed, the necessary
structure is so basic, so fundam ental, so transcen dental— D errida calls
it “ultra-transcendental” (1 3 )— that it cannot be nam ed properly or ad
equately; all nam es selected to designate it will have been determ in ed
by the very opposition s and hierarchies that the structure conditioned
or generated. Nevertheless, D errida will nam e the structure by m eans o f
what he calls “paleonym s,” that is, with old nam es inherited fro m these
oppositions and h ierarch ies.11 In his reutilization o f these nam es, Der
rida aim s “at the em ergence o f a new ‘co n cep t,’ a concept that no longer
lets itself, and has never let itself be included in the previous regim e.”12
T herefore, while decon struction ’s first phase operates on the terrain of
the philosophical oppositions being reversed since the subordinate term
holds the position o f superiority in the sam e hierarchy, the second phase,
through these new concepts (which are also new ways o f thinking and
living), aim s to m ove beyond and exit the terrain o f the philosophical
op p o sitio n .13
Even though it does n ot explicitly form u late this definition of
deconstruction, Voice and Phenomenon operates on the basis o f the two
phases o f reversal internal to the terrain and on new concept em ergence
with the aim o f exiting the terrain. While working through ph en om en ol
ogy in general, Voice and Phenomenons deconstruction specifically targets
H u sserl’s early Logical Investigations (1 9 0 0-1901), and in particular the
First Logical Investigation. D errida selects the First Logical Investigation
because it concerns the sign as a means o f access to the ideal m eanings
o f logic. Voice and Phenomenon s subtitle is, o f course, “Introduction to
the Problem o f the Sign in H u sserl’s Phenom enology.” The problem of
the sign com es from the fact, as H usserl recognizes in the First Investiga
tion, that there is an am biguity in the notion o f the sign .14 Som etim es,
Husserl notices, signs function to indicate a factual state o f affairs, while
at other tim es they function to express an ideal m eaning. T his intertwin
ing o f the indicative function with the expressive function is especially
evident in com m unication (17). H usserl therefore attem pts to m ake an
“essential distin ction ” within this intertwining. H usserl wants to d isen
tangle expression from indication, exclu de indication from expression.
Expression seem s to present, while indication, an indicative sign, merely
m anifests som ething absent. Because expression presents, H usserl valo
rizes it over indication; only expression gives us access to ideal m eanings.
So, in Voice and Phenomenon, the d econ struction works first by D errida
reversing the hierarchy between expression and indication (18). U sing
argum entation internal to phenom enology, he shows that the indicative
function, in particular, the trait o f one thing bein g in the place o f an
other, makes expression possible. In the indicative function o f “bein g in
place o f,” D errida sees an irreducible repeatability. Repeatability is the
necessary structure prior to the hierarchical opposition o f expression
and indication. Repeatability is that to which the new concepts or the
new nam es o f “differen ce,” “trace” (or “w riting”), and “supplem entar-
ity” refer; all three o f these concepts, being prior to and beyo-nd the op
position between expression and indication, point to an “elsew here” of
phenom enology (53).
D errida develops the new concepts o f difference, trace (or writ

ing), and supplem entarity, however, not in relation to the hierarchy lo
cated merely within H u sserl’s phenom enology, but in relation to a hier
archy that determ ines Western m etaphysics in general, the hierarchy o f
presence over the sign. H u sserl’s philosophy belongs to “the philosophy”
(44), it belongs to what D errida calls “the m etaphysics o f presen ce” (22).
The phrase “the m etaphysics o f p resen ce” has been the locus o f much
controversy insofar as it seem s to h om ogenize the history o f Western
philosophy. Nevertheless the application o f the phrase seem s to be ju sti
fied. U sing the term in its Kantian sense, Derr ida speaks o f “sch em as”
o f m etaphysics, outlines that allow the general concept o f m etaphysics
to be unified with the em pirical events o f the history o f W estern phi
losophy. D espite the diversity o f its events, Western philosophy exhib
its schem as such as the substance-attributes relation, where substance
is the presen t bein g which the attributes modify; or the subject-object
opposition, where the subject is presence an d the object is relative to the
subject (72 n ote). D errida is especially interested in the schema o f deri
vation (44). In H u sserl’s p h en om en ology and in Western m etaphysics
in general, language, and in particular the sign, are conceived as being
derived from perception or thought, that is, from intuitive presence or
self-presence— as if p erception and th ought were in d ep en d en t o f the
sign, as if the sign som ehow supervened upon perception or thought as
a kind o f accid en t.15 M aking the sign derivative opens the way fo r it to be
conceived m erely as a m odification o f presence or as merely relative to
presence (44).
The general con cept o f m etaphysics to which these schem as refer
is com plicated. It first o f all involves a decision. Metaphysics is based on
a decision about how to answer the question o f what the sign and m ore
generally lan gu age is. As D errida says, “how to justify . . . the decision
which subordinates a reflection on the sign to a logic?” (7, D errid a’s em
phasis). T he decision seems to be ju stified on the basis o f the knowledge
we have o f ourselves in the clarity o f self: presen ce; it is based on the
foundation, as in Descartes, o f the “I am ,” the foundation o f subjectivity
and consciousness (46). T herefore in m etaphysics, because we seem to
know who we are, because we seem to be presen t to ourselves, because
we seem to be presen t, we desire the sam e, presence and self-presence
(8 9 ).16 Like the decision from which it flows, this desire, which values
nothing other than presence, also defines the metaphysics o f presence.
T h e d e sire m ust be fulfilled. On the basis o f Derr id a ’s translation o f
H u sserl’s G erm an term “B ed eu tu n g ” (m eaning) as “vouloir-dire” (ren
dered in this translation occasionally as “wanting-to-say”), it is clear that
voluntarism, “voluntaristic m etaphysics,” is at issue (29). The fulfillm ent

o f the desire for presence then is brough t about by the will, un derstood
as the faculty that calculates m eans and ends. Motivated by the desire
for presence, the will wills the m eans which lead to the end or purpose
o f presence. T he m eans are a technology o f the sign, the “technical m as
tery” o f the sign (65). T echniques o f speaking and writing (especially
phonetic writing [69] ) m aster the sign insofar as they reduce, elim inate,
and purify the sign o f any aspect o f it which potentially contributes to
equivocity or obscurity; the purification results in the sign being as univ
ocal and diaph an ous as the soun d o f my own voice (66 for diaphaneity,
80 for univocity). In other words, the technology attem pts to lim it the
sense o f the sign (and that o f re-presentation and repetition) so that
the sign functions as nothing m ore than a detou r through which pres
ence returns to itself. T he m etaphysical will wants that the potencies o f
repetition be lim ited to those o f saving p resen ce (43 fo r saving p res
ence; 65 for p oten cies). Lim itin g the p oten cies o f repetition to p res
ence (lim iting to what D errida, follow ing H usserl, calls “the relation to
the ob ject” [84] ) ,17 repetition is always bent back into the circle o f an
enclosure. M etaphysics is a closed system; the m etaphysics o f presence
is, as D errida says, “the closure o f m etaphysics” (4 4 ).18 C losure m eans
that the fou n din g axiom or principle contains in advance deductively
the final conclusion or con sequen ce so that no new possibility appears
as one moves from proposition to proposition within the system.19 If no
un-implied possibility supervenes on the system, then it is possible to live
within the security o f presen ce and proximity. The limitation therefore
am ounts to thinking and living within the security o f the answ er— the
only answ er given so fa r — to the question o f the m ean in g o f being:
presence.
We can recapitulate the general concept o f metaphysics in this way.
The gen eral con cept (which is schem atized onto particular historical
events o f Western philosophy) includes five traits: decision, desire, will,
closure, and security. First, it includes a decision as to how to answer the
question o f the m ean in g o f being. That answer is presence. Second, from
that answer, a desire flows, a desire for presence. Third, in order to ful
fill the desire, the will is required. The will wills certain m eans to the
p u rp o se o f fulfilling the desire. Fourth, the willing o f these m eans (tech
niques aim ing at m astering repetition) m akes a circle: what was intended
at the beginning is found at the end. Metaphysics is a closed system; it is
an enclosure. S o , fifth, there is security within the enclosure. We m ight
even say, as D errida would, that within the enclosure life is not risked;
contam ination, disease, death, foreignness, an d alterity, all o f these have
been push ed to the outside. Yet, in truth, is the enclosure this secure? And
if truthfully the enclosure is porous, must we not change the m eaning o f
who we are} We shall return to these question s in the third section.
As the phrase “the m etaphysics o f p rese n ce ” indicates, what is at
the center o f D errid a’s con cept o f m etaphysics is presence. What is pres
ence? Presence is first and forem ost the content o f an intuition. Being the
content of an intuition means that presence is defined as what is avail
able “in front o f” my eyes or look. In m etaphysics, the principal m ean
ing o f bein g is “being-in-front” ; D errida uses the phrase “être-devant,”
in which we can see the word “pres-ence,” the Latin “prae” (before) +
“esse” (being) (64). Bein g is what is before, nearby, and proxim ate and
therefore what is without distance or hiatus. The content o f an intuition,
however, is diverse and changing. So secondly, presence means the form
that rem ains the sam e th rou ghout the diversity o f content. This dual
definition o f presence is synonymous, D errida asserts, with “the founding
opposition o f m etaphysics”: potentiality (intuitive content) and actuality
(form al idea) (53; see also 6). To conceive, however; the actual form al
idea as otherw orldly is Platonism , “conventional Platonism ” (45); it is,
as H usserl would say, to fall into “degen erate m etaphysics.” In contrast,
“authentic m etaphysics” for H usserl conceives the ideal form (ideality) —
“the authentic m ode o f ideality” (5) — as a repeatable form in which the
diverse content will always appear, to infinity. As Derr i
has always been and will always b e, to infinity, the form in which . . . the
infinite diversity o f contents will be p ro d u ce d ” (6). H usserl determ ines
being, then, not only as what is in front but also as ideality (4 5 -4 6 ), not
only “being-in-front,” bu t also “ideal-being” (65). With these two senses o f
being, H usserl recognizes (as H egel does) that form must be filled with
content, that the form must be lived. But H usserl also recognizes that the
repeatability “to infinity” o f the form is never given as such (87). The
repeatability o f the form is always that o f the indefinite (87). T he indefi
niteness o f the repeatable form implies that intuitive presen ce will always
be incom plete and non-full; there will always be more content. But for
Husserl, the lack o f intuitive fullness is only pro-visional (83). In other
words, whenever presence is not full, whenever it is threatened with non
presence due to the ever-changing content, presence is posited as a telos.
Presence was full and close by in the past and it will be full and close by
in the future. “B ein g” (presence) is the first and last word o f m etaphys
ics, w hether what is at issue is “d egen erate m etaphysics” or “authentic
m etaphysics.”
We are on the verge of exam in in g the secon d structural feature
o f D errid a’s thinking, the argum entation used in Voice and Phenomenon
in particular and in decon struction in gen eral. But before we turn to

that argum entation, we should note one aspect o f deconstruction that
we had not seen before: d econ struction aim s to break out o f the clo
sure o f metaphysics by interrupting m etaphysics’ circular m ovem ent. As
we have seen, deconstruction first reverses the oppositional hierarchy o f
presence and the sign (or m ore locally, in H usserl, reverses the op p o si
tional hierarchy o f expression and in dication ). In the reversal (in the
first phase o f decon struction ), the subordinate term, the sign, becom es
the principal term. Because the m ost general sense o f the sign is “being-
fo r” or “being-in-place-of” (21), the sign coincides with re-presentation.
What has then becom e foundational in the reversal is a term determ ined
by and found within metaphysics: “representation” (38 n o te ). But m aking
representation foundational m eans that the “re-” o f the re-presentation
is no lon ger a m odification supervening on a sim ple presence. The “re-”
o f repetition precedes what is repeated, precedes perception or intuitive
presence, p recedes form or idea, so that everything seem s to begin with
re-presentation (38 n ote). M ore precisely, the phase o f reversal results
in the subordinate term bein g reconceived. We have now passed to the
second phase o f deconstruction. In the second phase re-presentation has
been reconceived in aw ay that is contradictory. T he “re-” o f re-presentation
necessarily m akes the repetition be a second or a supplem ent; the “re-”
seem s to m ake all representations and signs nothing m ore than m odi
fications o f som eth ing given beforeh an d, som eth ing like a m odel. But
in sofar as repetition (through the reversal) is foundational, it is also or
at once a first or an origin. It becom es, as the oxym oronic title o f ch ap
ter 7 says, “an originative su p plem en t.” As we move from the first phase
o f deconstruction to the second, we have rem ained within the system o f
m etaphysics since we are still using the nam e “representation.” But we
have also “deposited” within the system “contradictory or untenable p ro p
ositions” (49 n ote), im possible propositions such as “everything begins
with represen tation ”; “the secon d is first”; “the origin is a su pplem en t.”
T hese im possible or absurd, even false propositions provide the co n cep
tual core o f différance, the trace (or w riting), and, as we see here, supple-
mentarity. Done from within a certain inside o f the system (within the
hierarchy o f presence over the sign), the depositin g o f these aporetical
propositions and unclassical concepts interrupts the circular m ovem ent
and “opens [the closure o f m etaphysics] to its ou tside” (49 n ote). T h e
contradictory proposition s open the system because they do not fu nc
tion as pointing to an object or to a subject, to a form or to a content;
they point to nothing that could be present as such. They point beyond
presence.
Second Structural Feature: The Basic

Argumentation for the Reversal of the
Hierarchy of Presence over the Sign
In general, the argum entation in Voice and Phenomenon dem onstrates the
lack o f cognitive foun dation , that is, the lack o f self-presence, for the
security o f the m etaphysical decision. M ore specifically, one finds three
overlapping argum ents in consecutive ord er in chapters 4, 5, and 6. As
we have seen, in the First Logical Investigation, in order to gain access
to ideal m eanings, H usserl wants to separate expression from indication.
H e thinks he can find expression in its pure state when com m unication
with others has been suspen ded, in other words, in interior m onologue,
“in the solitary life o f the sou l.” Derr ida tells us that, in order to support
the dem onstration o f indication being separate from expression in inte
rior m onologue, H usserl appeals to two types o f argum ents (41).
Voice and Phenomenons ch apter 4 concerns H u sserl’s first type o f
argum ent. H ere is D errida’s sum m ary o f it:
In internal discourse, I com m unicate n othing to myself. I indicate noth

ing to myself. I can at m ost im agine m yself do in g that, I can merely
represen t m yself as m anifesting som eth in g to myself. H ere we have only
a representation ancl an imagination. (41)
As we can see from this quote, the first argum ent revolves around the role
that representation plays in language. In interior m on ologue, it looks as
though one does not really com m unicate anything to oneself; it seem s
as though one merely im agines or represents on eself as a speaking and
com m unicating subject. For D errida, this claim is problem atic because
H usserl uses the word “represen tation ” in m any senses: representation
as the locus o f ideality in general (Vorstellung); representation as repeti
tion or reproduction o f presentation {Vergegenwärtigung as m odifying Ge-
genwcirtigung) ; and finally representation as taking the place o f another
Vorstellung (Repräsentation) (42). On the one hand, therefore, it seem s as
though H usserl applies to lan guage the fundam ental distin ction — “an
essential distinction,” “a sim ple exteriority”— between reality as factual-
ity and representation as ideality (representation in the sense o f Vorstel
lung) (42). The distinction seem s to imply, accordin g to D errida, that
representation as ideality is neither essential nor constitutive but merely
an accident contingently ad din g itself to the actual or factual practice o f
discourse. But, as D errida points out, when I actually use words, that is,
when I con sider signs in general, without any concern for the purpose
o f com m unication, “I m ust from the outset operate (in) a structure o f
repetition whose elem ent can only be representative” (42). D errida says,
“A ph on em e or graph em e is necessarily always other, to a certain extent,
each time that it is presented in a procedu re or a perception, but it can
function as a sign and as lan guage in general only if a form al identity al
lows it to be reissued and to be recogn ized” (43). In other words, the sign
in general m ust be an em pirical event— “necessarily always oth er”— and
it m ust be repeatable— “form al identity.” T his definition o f the sign — a
sign consists in a minimally iterable fo rm — m eans that actual lan guage
is ju st as representative or im aginary as im aginary lan guage and that
im aginary or representative lan guage is ju st as actual as actual language.
W hether representative— “I think that I ’m speaking when I speak to my
se lf” {Je me représente que je parle quand je me parlé)— or actual— “I am actu
ally speaking when I speak to som eon e else” {Je parle effectivement quand
je parle à quelqu’un d ’autre)— the sign in general is re-presentational. On
the other hand, if it is the case that when I speak to m yself I am only
im agining m yself doin g so, only thinking I am doing so {je me représente) ,
then it seem s as though my interior m onologue is worked over by fiction
(48). If this is so, then it seem s that the consciousness in interior m ono
logue is determ in ed entirely as false consciousness (49). T he access to
the epistem ological grounds o f logic then seem s jeop ard ized . But there
is a further problem with representation. A ccording to D errida, H usserl
in the p h en om en ological m eth od has privileged fiction, the fiction of
im agination; by m eans o f im aginative variation, one is able to neutral
ize the existence o f a thing and thereby generate an ideality (47). But
H u sserl’s conception o f “neutrality m odification” never calls into ques
tion the determ ination o f the im age as a representation in the sense o f
Vergegenwärtigung, that is, in the sense o f a representation that refers to
som ething non-present. In other words, in interior m onolog ue, the sense
o f representation appropriate to indication seem s necessary for expres
sion —ju st as in actual com m unication the sense o f represen tation ap
propriate to expression seem s necessary to indication. T he iterability o f
the sign (repeatability, or re-presentation in all senses), therefore, casts
d ou bt on H u sserl’s attem pt to distinguish essentially between im agined
speech as in interior m o n ologu e and actual or em pirical speech as in
com m unication, in short, between expression and indication.
Voice and Phenomenons ch apter 5 concerns H u sserl’s second type o f
argum ent to dem onstrate that expression can be separated from indica
tion in interior m onologue. H ere is D errid a’s sum m ary of it:
In internal discourse, I com m u nicate nothing to m yself ancl I can only

p reten d to, because I have no need ίο communicate anything to myself. Such
an o p eration — com m unication from self to se lf— cannot take place
because it would m ake no sense. Ancl it would m ake no sense because it

would have no purpose. T h e existence o f psychical acts does not have to
be indicated (recall that only an existence can in general be indicated)
because the existence o f psychical acts is im m ediately presen t to the
subject in the p resen t instant. (41, D errid a’s em phasis)
A ccording to H usserl, since lived-experience seem s to be im m ediately

selfLpresent in the m ode o f certitude and absolute necessity, signs are use
less, that is, the m anifestation o f the self to the self through the delega
tion of an indicative sign is superfluous. T here is no need for or purpose
to indicative signs here, since there seem s to be no alterity, no difference
in the identity o f presence as self-presence. Because H usserl says (in the
First L o gical Investigation, §8) that “the acts in question are lived by us
at that very instant [im selben Augenblick, literally, “in the blink o f an eye”] ”
(cited in 41), D errida claim s that H u sserl’s im m ediate self-presence has
to dep en d on the present taken as a now and that dependen ce on the
now leads D errida to investigate H u sserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness (51). T h ese description s of internal time consciousn ess
attem pt to d escribe the exp erien ce o f time (tem poralization), but espe
cially the experience o f the present as I live it right now: the living present.
As D errida reads it, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, on
the one hand, indicates that the living present seem s to have a center
which is the now point. But, on the oth er hand, the time lectures indi
cate that the living present seems to be thick; it includes the im m ediate
m em ory (called the retention) o f the now that has ju st elapsed and the
anticipation (called the protention) o f the now that is about to appear.
For H usserl, the retentional phase is different from m em ory in the usual
sense, which he calls secondary m em ory; the usual sense o f m em ory is
defined by representation (Vergegenwärtigung). Because o f the thickness,
what is at issue, for Derrida, is precisely the kind o f difference that one
can establish between the reten tion al ph ase o f the living presen t and
secondary memory. In oth er words, what is at stake is the kind o f dif
ference we can establish between Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung,
between presentation and re-presentation. While H usserl shows in The
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness the irreducibility of Vergegen
wärtigung to Gegenwärtigung, D errida nevertheless in terrogates— without
questioning the dem onstrative validity o f this distinction— “the eviden
tiary soil and the milieu o f these distinctions, . . . [that is] what relates the
terms distinguished to one an oth er and constitutes the very possibility
o f the comparison ’ (55, Derr id a ’s em phasis). It is im portant to recognize
that D errida is not claim ing that there is no difference between retention
and secondary m em ory (or Vergegenwärtigung). Instead, because H usserl
in §16 calls retention a “non-perception,” D errida argues that there m ust

be a continuity between retention and secondary m em ory such that it
is im possible to claim that there is a radical discontinuity or a radical dif
ference between retention and re-presentation; and therefore because
the living presen t is thick, because the now cannot be separated from
retention, there must be no radical difference between re-presentation
and presentation or between non-perception and perception (55). As
D errida says,
As soon as we adm it this continuity o f the now and the non-now, o f p er
ception anci non-perception in the zone o f original ity that is com m on
to originary im pression ancl to retention, we welcom e the oth er into the
self-iclentity o f the A ugenblick, non-presence ancl non-eviclentness into
the blink of an eye of the instant. T h ere is a duration to the blink o f an eye
ancl the duration closes the eye. This alterity is even the condition of
p resence, o f presen tation , ancl therefore o f Vorstellung in general, p rior
to all the dissociations which coulcl be p rod u ced there. (56)
Within the duration, there is an alterity, a heterogeneity between p ercep

tion and non-perception which is also a continuity. Between retention
and re-production, there is only a difference between two m odifications
o f non-perception (56). T herefore, as Derrida concludes, the alterity o f
the blink o f the eye “cuts into, at its roots,” the argum en t concerning the
uselessness o f the sign in the self-relation (57).
We have been con siderin g the argum entation found in chapters 4
and 5, but the heart o f Voice and Phenomenon lies in chapter 6. C hapter 6
concerns the voice o f the title Voice and Phenomenon, the voice in interior
m onologue. For H usserl, accordin g to D errida— here D errida relies on
H u sserl’s description in Ideas /§ 1 2 4 -°— sense (a thought) is gen erated
from a stratum o f silence, “the absolute silence o f the selfLrelation” (59).
Sense must be gen erated as an object repeatable to infinity (a univer
sality) and yet remain close by to the acts o f repetition (proxim ity). In
oth er words, sense m ust be sim ultaneously present in the sen se o f an
object (the relation to the ob-ject as over and against) and present in
the sen se o f the subject (the proxim ity to se lf in identity, as close as
possible), both ideal-being an d being-in-front together. In order for this
to happen, a specific m edium or elem ent o f expression is n eeded; that
m edium or elem ent is the voice (65). Sense is going to be generated by
m eans o f hearing-oneself-speak, by m eans o f this specific kind o f auto-
affection (67). In effect, D errida provides a phen om en ological descrip
tion o f hearing-oneself-speak. H ere are the basic features o f that descrip
tion. When I speak silently to myself, I do not m ake any sounds go out
through my m outh. Although I do not m ake sounds through my m outh

when I speak silently to m yself, I m ake use o f phonic com plexes, that is,
I make use o f the form s o f words or signs o f a natural language. T he use
o f natural ph onic form s seem s to imply that my interior m onologue is an
actual (not ideal) discourse. Because, however, the m edium o f the voice
is tem poral— the phonic form s are iterated across m om ents— the silent
vocalization endows the ph on ic form s with ideality (66). Thanks to the
phonic form s utilized in hearing-oneseli-speak, one exteriorizes the ideal
sense (a th ought). This exteriorization — ex-pression— seem s to imply
that we have now m oved from time to space. But, since the sound is
heard by the subject during the time he is speaking, what is expressed
seem s to be in absolute proxim ity to its speaker, “within the absolute
proxim ity o f its presen t” (65), “ absolutely close to m e” (66). T he subject
lets him self be affected by the signifier, but apparently without any de
tour through exteriority or through the world, or, as D errida says, appar
ently without any detour through “the non-proper in gen eral” (67); the
subject seems to hear his oton voice. H earing-oneself-speak seem s to be an
absolutely pure auto-affection (68). What m akes hearing-oneself-speak
seem to be a pure auto-affection, accordin g to Derrida, is that it seem s
to “be nothing other than the absolute reduction o f space in gen eral”
(68). T h is ap p are n t absolute red uction o f space in gen eral is why
hearing-one self Lspeak is so ap propriate for universality (68). R equiring
the intervention o f no surface in the world, the voice is an “absolutely
available signifying substan ce” (68). Its transm ission or iteration encoun
ters no obstacles or limits. The signified or what I want to say seem s to
be so close to the signifier that the signifier seem s to be “d iap h an o u s”
(69). Yet the diaphaneity o f the voice is only app aren t since, now revert
ing back to the argum entation found in chapter 5, it is conditioned by
tem poralization. Tem poralization in deed m akes the voice ideal, but by
doing so it also m akes the voice (the phonic form s) repeatable to infinity
and therefore beyond the acts o f expression taking place righ t now. As
repeatable, the phonic form s have the possibility o f not being close by.
They are able to function as referring to som ething (intuitive content)
that is still to com e; they are able to refer to non-presence, which turns
the voice into an o p aq u e m urm ur. In oth er words, the ph on ic form s
are able to function indicatively— within the silence o f expression. So,
even in the auto-affection o f hearing-oneselfLspeak, we find that we are
not able to exclude indication, to separate it out from its entanglem ent
with expression.
T h ese three a rg u m e n ts— the a rgu m e n t from re p re sen tatio n
(ch apter 4); the argum en t from tem poralization (ch apter 5); and the
argum en t from the m edium o f h earin g-on eselfLspeak (auto-affection)
(chapter 6 )— operate on the local terrain o f H u sserl’s phenom enology.

But they also op erate on the larger terrain of m etaphysics in general.
We see this expan sion if we recall th at since P lato ’s Theaetetus (1 8 9 e -
190a) thought has always been defin ed as interior m on ologue, as the
auto-affection o f h earing-oneselfLspeak. The larger terrain o f m etaphys
ics is the ultimate transcendental level. Indeed, when H usserl describes
the m ovem ent o f tem poralization, he recognizes that he is describing
the level from which the sense o f all things and experiences derives. He
calls this level “the u n n a m ea b le ” (72 n ote). It is this un nam eable an d
ultra-transcendental m ovem ent that D errida (that deconstruction) is at
tem pting to nam e. D errid a’s conception o f this m ovem ent is indebted
to on e p h en om en ological insight: the insight that H usserl discovers in
the Fifth Cartesian M editation. Indeed, perhaps all o f D errida’s thought
flows from this insight. H usserl brings to light that the experien ce o f
others (what he calls “Frem d erfah ru n g,” the experience o f the alien) is
always m ediated by a Vergegenwärtigung, a re-presentation, which keeps
the interior life o f others necessarily hidden from m e (6). What D errida
is d oin g throughout Voice ancl Phenomenon (and perh aps th roughout all
o f his writings) is generalizing the sense o f the non-presence o f others to
all experience, even to my own and p ro p er interior experience o f myself.
For D errida, all auto-affection is in truth hetero-affection. G eneralized
Vergegenwärtigung is at the root o f all the new nam es Derrida develops for
the ultimate transcendental level, for the m ovem ent of tem poralization:
“différan ce,” “trace” (or “writing” ), and “supplem entarity.”-1
Let us see how these nam es evolve out of the m ovem ent of tem
poralization. In the living presen t there is a process o f differentiation that
produces the phases o f the now, retention, and protention; the process
o f differentiation also includes repetition (the retentional phase) that al
lows fo r an identity to be p rodu ced and recognized. In other words, if we
think o f interior m onologue, we see that a difference between h earer and
sp eaker is necessary, we see that dialogue comes first. But through that
dialogue (the iteration o f the back and forth) the same, a self, is produced
(71). And yet the process o f dialogue, differentiation-repetition, never
com pletes itself in identity; the m ovem ent continues to go beyond to in
finity so that identity is always deferred, always a step bey o n d ." “D ifférance”
nam es this inseparable m ovem ent (what we called repeatability above) o f
differentiation and deferral (75) We can see how “trace” com es about
if we focus on the feature o f deferral, repeatability to infinity. T he re
tentional phase o f the living presen t retains the intuitive presence that
has ju st elapsed. It retains, however, not its presence but only the outline
o f the presence, as if the retention were a tracing o f it. T he retentional
trace then seem s to be a rem ain der from the past, like a trace left behind
by som e living, but now absent, being. L et us continue with the idea o f
deferral to infinity. The trace refers back to this absence, but it continues
to com e back and function. The trace really resem bles a memory. Inso
far as it continues to function as a m em ory does, it also resem bles som e
thing written (an outline, a drawing, a tracing), and D errida indeed calls
the m ovem ent o f tem poralization “archi-writing” (73). The repeatability
to infinity o f the retentional trace, which defers the final institution of
an identity, is like a book, a book always available for other readers and
therefore for other readings. The nam e o f “supplem entarity” evolves out
o f the written book always available for other readings. T he “bo ok” seem s
to be produced by som eon e who had certain thoughts present to himself,
thoughts that he may have externalized in speech to others. But since
hum an thought is finite— the auth or and his interlocutors have d ie d —
the “b o o k ” refers to that living but now d ead author; it functions as a re
m inder o f those thoughts that were present in the past. It seems then that
the voice that keep s silent (self-present thought) is first, and then we have
expression in speech, and then we have speech being written down. In this
sequence, it looks as though writing com es third. It seem s as though writ
ing could never be “archi.” But the truth is that a m ovem ent o f “writing”
or “tracin g” comes prior to the voice. As we have already noted in the
discussion o f hearing-oneself:speak, the m ovem ent o f tem poralization in
truth constitutes ideal m eaning, constitutes presence. We have already
spoken o f the originative supplem ent. But now we see that what defines
the supplem en t for D errida is a paradoxical structure in which the very
m ovem ent that p rod u ces presen ce com es to be seen as derived from
that which the m ovem ent makes possible (7 5 -7 6 ). Although writing in
the sense o f differentiation-repetition m akes presence possible, writing
in the everyday sense (a book) seem s to be derived from the presence o f
thought; writing seem s to be a m ere supplem ent. As a supplem ent, writ
ing is taken back into the terrain o f metaphysics.
Third Structural Feature (and Conclusion):

The Two Motivations for Deconstruction
The deconstruction enacted in Voice and Phenomenon takes place on four

different but interconnected terrains. First, as we have seen, it operates
on the terrain o f H u sserl’s phenom enology. D err
struction against the “essential distinction” between expression and in
dication which Husserl m akes within the ambiguity o f the sign. Husserl
wants this essential distinction to be radical, a difference o f separation,
T R A N S L A T O R ’ S I N T R O D U C T I O N
exclusion, and exteriority. H e believes that he finds pure expression in

interior m on ologue because, in interior m on ologue, my thoughts seem
to be present to me at the very instant that I say them. In other words,
H usserl thinks that when I speak to myself, the m eaning o f what I say is
im m ediately present to me. D errida shows, however, that H u sserl’s own
descriptions o f the experien ce o f time (tem poralization) dem onstrate
that in the present as I live it right now there is still and always m edia
tion and representation. So H u sserl’s argum ents for the im m ediate self
presence o f expression in interior m on ologue are false. In fact, the living
present is contam inated with non-presence, with the non-presence o f the
trace. Having dissim ulated this contam ination, phenom enology is there
fore a form o f “the m etaphysics o f presen ce.”
T h e phrase “the m etaphysics o f p rese n ce ” brings us to a seco n d
terrain, larger an d deeper, m ore fundam ental than phenom enology: the
terrain o f metaphysics. As for H eid egger in Being ancl Time, for D errida
in Voice ancl Phenomenon, presence has determ ined the m eaning o f being
in the history o f m etaphysics since the ancient G reeks and right up to
H u sserl’s phenom enology.24 Presence is defined as that which is available
in front o f my look; it is what is proxim ate, the content o f an intuition.
But the con ten t o f an intuition is ch an ging and diverse, which m eans
that presence m ust also be the perm anence o f a form or idea. It is pos
sible to conceive the perm an en ce o f the form or idea as otherworldly, in
the heavens. Such a conception is Platonism or “degen erate m etaphys
ics.” Phenom enology, in contrast, conceives form al presence (ideality)
as that which is to be lived; as lived, the form does not fall from the sky.
H usserlian ph enom enology therefore is a form o f anti-Platonism; it looks
to be a way o f exiting m etaphysics. For phenom enology in general, one
overcom es m etaphysics only by m ean s o f the unification o f intuition and
idea, o f content and form , o f actuality and potentiality, o f subject and
substance. But even when ph en om en ology recognizes that the unifica
tion is indefinitely deferred, it conceives that deferral as a history— the
only concept o f history— at the end o f which the unification will occur.
W henever presence is not full or im pure, whenever it is threatened with
non-presence, presence is posited as a telos. Presence rem ains the princi
pal and ultimate value. T herefore, even though it tries to change terrain,
phenom enology rem ains within the terrain o f metaphysics.
T he question o f exitin g m etaphysics brings us to the third ter
rain on which the Voice ancl Phenomenon deconstruction takes place: the
bo rd er o f m etaphysics. Voice ancl Phenomenon puts the system atic soli
darity o f certain p h en om en ological concepts to the test (85). Phenom
enology must be put to the test, because ph en om en ology seems to in
volve two movem ents. On the one hand, through the concepts o f sense,
ideality, objectivity, intuition, perception, and expression, ph en om en ol

ogy seem s to belong to m etaphysics in sofar as m etaphysics constructs a
system o f concepts whose “com m on m atrix” is oriented by the value o f
presen ce (85). On the oth er hand, ph en om en ology seem s to contest
itself fro m within; by m eans o f the con cepts and description s o f tem
poralization and alterity (Vergegenwärtigung) , ph enom enology seems also
not to belong to m etaphysics. In this secon d m ovem ent o f contestation,
phenom enology is a m ovem ent toward the outside o f metaphysics. T he
ph en om en ological reduction, m ore precisely, the epochë, opens up the
first and p erh ap s only way to exit m etaphysics. T herefore, p h en om en ol
ogy presents fo r D errida as it did for H eid egger an original kind o f think
ing, perhaps the first original thinking since Plato and Aristotle. We can
see this tension within ph en om en ology by focusing on the b o o k ’s title.
The b o o k ’s title— Voice and Phenomenon— reverses the roots o f the word
“phenom eno-logy”— logos (voice as the elem en t o f the logos) and phcii-
nomenon (presence as what defines the p h e n o m e n o n ).2’1 T h e reversal
means that instead o f the phainomenon o f the logos being valued, now,
with deconstruction, the logos o f the phainomenon is valued. But it is not
the logos un derstood as the diaphaneity o f the voice. W hat is valued is the
logos as the resource o f representation, m ediation, and non-presence, as
all the potencies o f repetition.
T he p h en om en ological contestation o f m etaphysics brings us to
the fourth terrain, which we have n am ed several times already: the out
side. For D errida who follows what H usserl says explicitly in The Cnsis of
European Sciences, the G reek m etaphysical tradition, in which the m ean
ing o f bein g is defin ed by presen ce, finds its com pletion, 2,000 years
later, in ph enom enology (5). It finds its com pletion and its overcom ing.
Although it cannot be stressed enough that “the prim ary intention and
distant horizon ” o f Voice and Phenomenon does not consist in turning back
away from transcendental ph en om en ology (38 note), and that Voice ancl
Phenomenon and D errida’s thought in general is a form o f transcenden
tal philosophy, one must recognize the radicality o f its p roject.26 Like
transcendental phenom enology itself, the project o f Voice ancl Phenomenon
consists in going back to the roots o f the knowledge o f objects, but it goes
back to roots deeper than those found by phenom enology itself, roots be
yond those foun d in the Greek m etaphysical tradition. It goes back to or
beyond to, as we already m entioned, the ultra-transcendental. Although
it is D errid a’s central, most im portant book on H u sserl’s philosophy, Voice
ancl Phenomenon is m ore than a book about phenom enology and its rela
tion to m etaphysics. The new names that it invents— “différan ce,” “trace”
(or “writing” ), and “supplem entarity”— form a “com m on m atrix” as in
m etaphysics, b u t the deconstructive m atrix is not oriented by the value o f
presence. Not oriented by the value o f presence, this m atrix or terrain,

this plan e or land, is not an enclosure. It looks like no p lace that has ever
been inhabited before. W hen one en gages in a deconstruction, one is
dism antling in the nam e o f this unnam eable p lace.“7
The phrase “in the nam e o f” leads to on e last elaboration. Why
should we want to exit the system o f m etaphysics? T here are two motives
for D errid a’s deconstruction o f the gen eral system o f m etaphysics (of
which H u sserl’s phenom enology, in Voice and Phenomenon, is the specific
historical event). First, what m otivates D errida is a concern with truth.
We have seen that the belief that presence com es first and its repeti
tion com es second, that b elief is false. T hat presence com es first is only
“a p p aren t” (see 66, where D errida says that the “transcendence [o f the
voice] is only ap p are n t” ). T he truth is that there is a necessary struc
ture that includes within itself o p p o sin g and in separable possibilities
and forces (it is the law): event and repetition, proximity and distance.
This truth is even the truth o f ph en om en ology (26). Even though the
necessary structure— ultra-transcendental, unnam eable, even undecon-
structible-8— includes the in-adequation o f the forces o f event and rep
etition, even though it therefore includes dis-adequation and non-truth,
this “fa lse h o o d ” is the truth dissim ulated below the axiom s and prin
ciples o f Western m etaphysics (and religion [88]) (46 n o te).“9
The second motive for deconstruction is deeply connected to the
m otivation o f truth. By m eans o f the argum entation we have seen (espe
cially the argum entation from the m edium o f hearing-oneself-speak), de
construction dem onstrates that the self-knowledge o f the “I am” is only
apparent. The lack o f cognitive foundation allows deconstruction to un
make the m etaphysical decision for presence. In other words, it reopens
the question o f the m eaning o f being. Or, m ore precisely, decon struc
tion aims at hearin g the question in a new way, in asking an “unheard-of
q uestion ” (8 8 ).30 H earin g the question in an unh eard-of way m akes us
recognize that this question has no one absolute answer, that every an
swer given to it is inadequate, that every answer will find itself op p o sed
by another possible answer. H earin g the question in an unheard-of way
is supposed to m ake us exit the enclosure and experience the insecurity
o f the question. A lthough D errida does not use this word in Voice ancl
Phenomenon, the insecurity toward which deconstruction aim s to lead us
is the experien ce o f uncleciclabïlïiy?1 For D errida, the experience o f un
decidability is supposed to m ake us think differently. Thinking differently
m eans that w henever an answer to the question has been position ed,
thereby closing o ff the question with an object or an objective, it is neces
sary to open the question back up, to speak out and speak freely (see 76,
where D errida refers to “the freedom o f language, the outspokenness o f
a d iscourse”). In other words, in the face o f the recognition that there

is no one absolute answer to the question, wê must seek constantly, end
lessly, for the right answer. Seeking the right answer, or better, the ju st
answer im plies that the experien ce o f undecidability is also supposed to
make us live differently. T he experien ce is supposed to call forth a new
collectivity, a new people, a new clevios, a new “we.” We must abandon the
m etaphysical desire for presen ce and aban don the will to the m astery
o f repetition. Because the truth is that repetition com es first and that it
com es last (which m eans that there is no unified origin an d that there is
no final end), prior to an d beyond presence (which m eans that the first
and last word is not “b ein g ” ), because the truth is “the confession o f a
m ortal” (47), we m ust— this “m ust” refers to the force of law— let the de
limitation o f repetition happen, with all its possible yet to com e events.
T h e source o f insecurity in truth lies in that we do not know what event
is com ing. We m ust risk o u r lives in the face o f contam ination, disease,
death, foreignness, and alterity. A bandoning the m etaphysical desire and
will, we m ust “value” non-presence (even though the w ord “value” here
m akes no sense, since how can one value that about which one does not
know?). T herefore we can say that w hat is really at stake in Voice an d Phe
nomenon is som ething like what Nietzsche called the “transvaluation o f
all values.”
Translator's Note
H ere are several points a read er should know abo u t this translation. I
have ord ered them roughly accordin g to the o rd er that the reader will
encounter them.
1 The n um bers in an gle brackets < > co rresp o n d to the p ag e n um

bers o f the French edition o f L a voix et le phénomène (Paris: Presses
U niversitaires cle France, 1967). My own interjections in the body
o f the translation or in D errid a’s notes are also en closed by angle
brackets.
2. D errid a’s notes are placed in footnotes, while my additional notes a p
p ear as en dn otes. Many o f the endnotes, as in ch apter 3, fo r instance,
provide full citations for quotations which Derricla om itted.
3 . In general, in o rd e r to m ak e the English translation o f L a voix et le phé
nomène as seam less as possible, I have alm ost always m odified all the ex
isting English translations citecl. This includes not only the Logical In
vestigâtions bu t also Frecl K ersten ’s English translation o f H u sserl’s
Ideen z u einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie:
Erstes Buch, Ja m e s C h urch ill’s English translation o f H u sserl’s Vorlesun
gen zur Phänomenologie des inner οι 'Zeitbewusstsein, ancl Roy H arris’s trans
lation o f S au ssu re’s Course in General Linguistics. Even though I have al
most always m odified ancl som etim es com pletely retranslated
(ap propriatin g w ording from the French translations) the quotations
from these English translations, I have provided the p age references to
the existin g English translation so that the reader will be able to find
the equivalent passage ancl the context o f the quotations.
4 . A lm ost im m ediately in the introduction (5), Derricla refers to the o n
tological distinctions H usserl m akes in Ideas I (§96-97) between “re al”
in the sense o f som eth in g f actual ancl transcenden t to consciousness;
“reelle” (here Derr icla uses the French word “réelle”) in the sense o f a
part o f consciousness, im m an en t to consciousness; ancl “irreelle” (here
Derr icla uses the French word “irréelle”) in the sense o f som eth in g
ideal but not factual ancl not a p art o f consciousness, an im m anent
transcendence. T h e Kersten English translation renders “reelle” as
T R A N S L A T O R ' S NOTE
“really inh erent” ancl “irreelle” as “really non-inherent.” In ord er

clearly to signal these diff erences through ou t the translation, I am ren
dering “re al” as “re al” ; “reelle” ancl “réelle” as “reell”; ancl “irreelle”
ancl “irréelle” as “irreell.” Derricla has also discussed these ontological
differences in his “ ‘G enèse et stru ctu re’ et la p h én om én o lo gie,” in
L écriture et la différence, 242-44; “ ‘G enesis ancl Str u ctu re’ ancl Ph en om e
nology,” in Writing and Difference, 162-64.
5 . If one looks at note 11 in the introduction (fo u n d on 94), one will see
that Derr icla says that “each time that we shall cite this translation, we
shall indicate this by the signs ‘tr. fr.’ ” He then goes on to say that he has
replaced in the French translation the word “significations” by “Bedeu
tungen.” This com m en t im plies that when Derricla does not use the sign
“tr. fr.,” he is not using the available translation ancl instead is translating
the Logische Untersuchungen him self into French. The infrequency o f this
sign (“tr. fr.”) im plies that throughout Voice and Phenomenon, Derricla is
m aking his own French translations o f Logische Untersuchungen. C onse
quently, I have alm ost always m odified the citations from J. N. Findlay’s
English translation o f H u sserl’s Logical Investigations (which itself has
been revised by D er m ot M oran) in o rd er to make them m ore consis
tent with D errid a’s French translation ancl with the available French
translation o f the Logische Untersuchungen. I have also used the sign “tr.
fr.” in order to indicate the few times when Derricla seem s to be relying
on the available French translation o f the Logische Untersuchungen.
6. I have relied on the e a rlie rja m e s Churchill version o f H u sserl’s Phe
nomenology o f Internal Time-Consciousness since Derr icla relies on the
H enri D ussort French translation (Leçons pour une phénoménologie delà
conscience intime du temps). The Churchill English translation ancl the
D ussort French translation are based on Eclmuncl H usserl, Vorlesungen
zw Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbeiuußtseins. T h e H usserlian a volum e
o f these lectures ap p ea re d only in 1966: 'ZurPhänomenologie des inneren
,Zeitbewußtsein, 1893-1977, H usserlian a X. I have consulted Jo h n
B ro u g h ’s m ore recen t English translation o f H usserlian a X : On the Phe
nomenology of the Consciousness of Interned Time.
7 . Derr ida’s insertions o f H u sserl’s G erm an ancl D errid a’s interpretative
com m ents within H u sserl’s quotes are signaled by square brackets.
8. I am rendering “in stan ce” as “instan ce” or “case” ancl som etim es as
“court” (p. 8, for exam ple) or “agen cy ” (13 ancl 60); at other times,
where the term seem s m o re idiom atic, I re n d e r it as “in the last anal
ysis” (5, 9, ancl 61). D errid a’s use o f the term “instance” seems at
times to be based on its use in Freudian discourse. In reference to
the term “instan ce,” one sh ou ld exam in e the entry on “agen cy ” in
Laplan ch e ancl P ontalis’s The Language o f Psychoanalysis. L ap lan ch e ancl
Pontalis say, “when Freucl introduces the term ‘agen cy’— literally ‘in
stan ce,’ un d erstood in a sense, as Strachey notes, ‘sim ilar to that in
which the word occurs in the phrase “a Court o f the First In
stan ce” *— he introduces it by analogy with tribunals or authorities
which ju d g e what may or may not p ass” (L aplan ch e anci Pontalis, Vocab
ulaire de Ici psychanalyse, 202; The Language of Psychoanalysis, 16). Der
rid a’s use o f the term “instan ce” also alludes to that o f L acan in his
“L ’instance cle la lettre clans l’inconscient ou la raison depuis F reu d ”
(originally p ublished in 1957), since Derricla says, in the 1971 interview
“Positions,” that he had read this article p rior to the publication o f his
earliest text on Freucl, “Freucl ancl the Scene o f W riting” (originally
published in 1966). See Jacq u es Lacan , “L ’instance cle la lettre clans
l’inconscient ou la raison depuis Freucl,” in Ecrits, 493-528; “T h e In
stance o f the Letter in the U nconscious, or R eason Since Freucl, in
Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English, 412-43. See also D errid a’s
long note on Lacan in Positions, 1 12n33; Positions, 107n44.
9 . 1 am ren d erin g “recou vrir” ancl the words b ased on this verb prim arily
by m eans o f “co in cid en ce.” So, for instance in the introduction, when
Derricla is speaking o f the p arallel relation between p h en om en ological
psychology ancl transcendental phenom enology, he speaks o f “ce re
couvrem ent p arfait,” which I have ren d ered as “this p erfect coinci
d en ce.” The reader, however, sh ou ld keep in mincl that the French
term also m eans to conceal, to cover over, to hide, ancl to overlap with.
So one coulcl also say that, in the parallel relation, psychological ex p e
rience is the concealm en t (recouvrement) o f transcendental experience.
Som etim es I have therefore ren d ered “recouvrir” as “to h id e.”
10. Derr icla renders H u sserl’s “A nzeich en” into French as “inclice.” This
French word presents a dif ficulty since it m eans both indication ancl in
dex. C hapter 7 takes up precisely the question o f what an index or in-
clexical is. So I have generally ren d ered “inclice” into English as “ indi
cation,” but at times d e p e n d in g on context, I have ren d ered it as
“inclexical,” as in ch apter 3 when Derricla is sp eak in g o f the solitude of
the self-relation.
11. The variety o f words used to ref er to m ean in g p resen t a com plicated
problem , as indicated already in note 4 above. Derricla at tim es u ses
“signification” to ren d er H u sse rl’s “B ed eu tu n g.” W hen he is d oin g this,
I have u sed the English “signification.” But then he renders “B edeu
tun g” by the French “vouloir-clire.” I have ren d ered D errid a’s use o f
“vouloir-clire,” when he uses it to translate H u sserl’s “B ed eu tu n g,” by
the norm al English ren d erin g o f both the French ancl the G erm an,
that is, as “m ean in g .” T h e French title o f ch apter 3 is “Le vouloir-clire
com m e so lilo q u e”; the French title o f chapter 4 is “Le vouloir-clire et
la représen tation .” However, it is im portant to keep in mincl that Der

rida deliberately renders “B e d e u tu n g” as “vouloir-dire,” since one of
his them es in Voice and Phenomenon is voluntarism . The voluntarism or
the will is im plied by the French verb “xwuloir dire,” if one stresses the
“vouloir” o f the term “vouloir d ire”— alth ough the use o f “vouloir
d ire ” in French is equivalent to the English “I m ean ” (“je voulais d ire ”
eq u als “I m ean t”) . O f ten, in ord er to indicate that “vouloir d ire ” im
plies voluntarism , I have inserted the French verb “vouloir dire” in
angle brackets. At other times, in the context o f anim ation anci the
will, I have rendered it literally as “wanting to say.” I have generally ren
dered the French “sen s”— which renders the G erm an “S in n ”— in En
glish as “sen se,” even though both “sens” ancl “Sinn” re fer to m eaning.
12. The read er o f this translation should also keep in mincl the them e of
possession, which is an n ou n ced by m eans o f the French word “ap
p arten an ce” (here ren d ered as form s o f the verb “to b e lo n g ”) at the
close o f the first ch apter (“m arque Γappartenance cle la p h én o m én o lo
gie à l ’on tologie classiq u e”: “indicates that p hen om enology belongs to
classical on tology”).
13 . The them e o f possession (what is o n e ’s own, what is p ro p er to oneself)
continues through the use o f “p ro p re ” (here ren d ered at tim es as
“o n e ’s own” ancl at other times as “prop er,” d ep en d in g on context).
D en icla uses the French word “p ro p re ” to render H u sserl’s uses o f “ei
ge n ” (in English, “o n e ’s own” or “p ro p e r”) ancl “Eigen h eit” (“own
n ess”) as fou n d in his Fifth Cartesian M editation.
14 . Th e them e o f possession is con n ected to the them e o f taking. T h e verb
“prenclre” ancl its past participles a p p e a r frequently. Th e first time a
form o f the verb “prenclre” ap p ears in a systematic way is at the encl o f
the introduction: “une p rise.” H ere, “lin e p rise ” has been ren d ered as
“a grip .” W here it seem s that Derricla is u sin g fo rm s o f prenclre in a sys
tem atic way (to refer both to the idea o f a belon gin g ancl to contam ina
tion), I have re n d ered it as a for m o f “g rip .” T h e im portant locations
are in the first ch apter ancl at the very encl o f the seventh chapter. T h e
re a d er sh ou ld also b ear in mincl that the French verb “co m p ren d re”—
related to the French verb “prenclre,” to take— m eans both to u nder
stand ancl to be in clu ded in. So, at the very encl o f ch apter 7, when
Derricla is speaking o f the Teniers painting, he says that “this situation
is not co m p reh en d ed [comprise] between intuitions ancl p resen tation s,”
m eaning that it is n ot caught between, grasped, taken in ancl included,
held betw een these two presences, ancl so it can not be u n d ersto od in
terms o f these two presences. Moreover, when Derricla uses the term
“reprise,” for exam ple in relation to the idea o f the dialectic at the encl
of chapter 5 , 1 have rendered it as “resu m p tion .” This term, however,
also has a sense of “taking u p .”
15 . Fincllay renders “k un d geb en d e Fun ktion ” as “intim ating fun ction .” I

am , however, following the French translation, which uses forms o f the
word “m an ifestation .”
16 . Fincllay renders the title “Die A usdrücke im einsam en S eelen leb en ” as
“E xpression s in Solitary L ife.” Derricla renders it as “L e s expressions
clans la vie solitaire cle l’â m e ,” which I have ren d ered here as “E xp res
sions in the Solitary Life o f the Sou l.”
17.1 have rend ered the French “m o tif” as “m otive,” sin ce Derricla u ses the
term in the sen se o f w hat motivates to action, a reason or a cause for
action. T h e term is con n ected to “m otivation,” to “m otor,” ancl to “im
p ulse.” The term also has the sense o f “p attern ,” as in the m otif o f a
m elody (the recurring figure or them e).
18. As one sees in the con clu din g section o f ch apter 7, the distinction
between “en fait” ancl “en droit” is im portant. I have ren d ered this dis
tinction as “in fact” ancl “in p rin ciple.” The word “clroit,” however, has
a ju ridical sense of law or right, as in “the right to exp ression ,” as seen
in ch apter 1.
19.1 have ren d ered “effectivem ent” as “actually,” ancl “en effet” as “actu
ally,” while ren d erin g “actu ellem en t” som etim es as “currently” ancl
som etim es as “actually right now.”
20. Derricla m akes use o f a typographical artifice in the word “représen ta
tion” in ord er to indicate when the term refers to H usserl’s term Verge
genwärtigung; in this case Derricla inserts a hyphen after the “re”: “re
présen tation .” The hyphenated version o f the term also translates
H u sserl’s Repräsentation. When the term app ears without the hyphen
(“represen tatio n ”), it refers to Vorstellung. I have repro du ced this arti
fice in the English translation.
21. In ch apter 7, when Derricla is speaking o f the relation o f intuition ancl
expression in §9 o f the First Logical Investigation, he has ren d ered
H u sserl’s G erm an “eventuell” as “éven tuellem en t.” The French transla
tors o f the Logische Untersuchungen have translated it in the sam e way.
Fincllay renders the term as “possibly.” I am ren d erin g it, however, as
“contingently,” since both the G erm an ancl the French terms have the
sense o f “as it may well turn o u t” or “as it may well h ap p e n .” But on e
can see that both the G erm an ancl French term s contain the word
“event.” What seems to come ab ou t contingently happens as an event.
Moreover, it hap pen s eventually in the sense o f a possibility that was al
ready there.
2 2 .1 have ren d ered D errid a’s neologism “d ifféran ce,” which h as a doub le
m ean in g o f defer ancl differ; by the sam e term. As we see at the b eg in
ning o f ch apter 7 ancl in its closing section, the French verb “d iffére r”
m eans both to defer ancl to differ. For m ore on this term, see D errid a’s
essay “D ifférance,” which is collected in Margins of Philosophy, 1-28.
23 . 1 have ren d ered the French term “écart” as “h iatus.” This term app ears
frequently through ou t French thought of-the 1960s.
24 . Since Voice and Phenomenon is a book in ontology (the question o f the
m eaning o f bein g as p re se n c e ), it was necessary to be particularly at
tentive to D errid a’s use o f on tological ter ms. T h ese terms are fre
quently co m po un ds such as “être-inclice” (20 o f the French) ; “être-
p o u r” (24, 85 o f the F ren ch ); “être-signe” (25 o f the F ren ch );
“être-clevant” (83, 84, 111 o f the F ren ch ); “être-icléal” (84 o f the
F ren ch ); “être-originaire” (95 o f the F ren ch ); ancl “être-m ort” (108 o f
the F re n ch ). T h ese hyphenated ter ms have been respectively ren d ered
as “inclication-being”; “being-for”; “sign-being”; “being-in-front”; “ideal-
bein g”; “originary-being”; ancl “being-cleacl.”
25 . T h e French word “scèn e” ap p ears as early as the introduction (8, there
ren d ered as “scen e,” ancl 14, as “sta g e ”), but it plays alm ost a them atic
role in both chapters 6 ancl 7. It h as usually b ee n ren d ered as “scen e”
in o rd er to be consistent with D errid a’s co n tem poran eou s essay on
Freucl called, in English, “Freucl ancl the Scene o f W riting” (“Freucl et
la scène cle l’écritu re”); this essay is collected in Writing and Difference,
196-231. The French word “scèn e,” however, also m eans “sta g e” (ancl
by metonymy “theater” ) , which im plies the id ea o f representation, o f a
spectacle with several acts ancl o f som eth in g watched or look ed at.
VOICE AND PHENOMENON
If we read the word “I” without knowing who wrote it, it is
p erh aps not m eaningless, but it is at least foreign to its norm al
signification.
— H usserl, Logical Investigations
A nam e uttered in fron t o f us m akes us think o f the D resden

G allery ancl o f ou r last visit there: we w ander through the room s
ancl stop before a picture by Teniers which represen ts a picture
gallery. Let us su p pose, m oreover, that the pictures in this gal
lery represen t again pictures which for their part would m ake
visible inscriptions that we are able to decipher, etc.
— Husserl, Ideas I
I have spoken both of “so u n d ” ancl “voice.” I m ean to say that

the sound was one o f distinct, o f even wonderfully, thrillingly
distinct, syllabifi cation. M. Valclemar spoke, obviously in reply to
the question. . . . H e now saicl:
“Yes;— no;— I have been sleeping— and now— now— I am
dead?
— Eclgar Allan Poe, “The Facts in the Case o f M. Valclemar”
Introduction
< l> T h e Logical Investigations (1900-1901) op en ed a path down which, as

is well known, all o f p h en om en ology has been pushed. Until the fourth
edition (1928), there was no fundam ental shift; nothing was put back
into question in a decisive way. Som e things w ere o f course rearranged,
an d there was a powerful work o f explanation. Ideas I an d Formal ancl Tran
scendental Logic unfold, without a break, the concepts o f intentional or
noem atic sense, the difference between the two strata o f analytics in the
broad sense (pure m orph ology o f ju d gm en ts and consequence-logic),
and they remove the deductivist or n om ological restriction that has
until now affected the con cept o f science in g e n e r a l/’1 T h e conceptual
prem ises o f the Logical Investigations are still at work in The Crisis and
the texts associated with it, in particular in “T h e O rigin o f Geom etry,”-
notably when they con cern all the problem s o f signification and o f lan
guage in general. In this dom ain m ore than anywhere else, a patient
read in g would bring to light in the Logiccd Investigations the germ inal
structure o f all o f H u sserl’s thought. On each p age the necessity— or the
implicit practice— o f the eidetic and p h en om enological reductions can
be read, the detectable presen ce o f all o f that to which the reductions
give access.
Now the First Logical Investigation (“A usdruck und B edeutu n g” )^ s
<2> opens with a chapter devoted to the “essential distinctions” that rigor
ously order all the later analyses. And the coherence o f this chapter owes
everything to a distinction that is proposed in the first paragraph: the word
“sign” (Zeichen) would have a “double sen se” (ein Doppelsinn) .4 T he sign
“sign” can m ean “exp ressio n ” (Ausdruck) or “indication” (Anzeichen)?
:i: Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, §35b, pp. 103-4.
t With the exception of some openings and indispensable anticipations, the present essay
analyzes the doctrine o f m eaning such that it is constituted in the First Logical Investiga
tion. In order to follow better its difficult anci tortuous itinerary, we have generally ab
stained from comparisons, similarities, or oppositions which here and there seem to con
front us between the Husserlian theory of meaning and other classical or modern theories
of meaning. Each time that we go beyond the text of the First Logical Investigation, we
are doing this in order to indicate the principle o f a general interpretation o f Husserl’s
thought and in order to sketch a systematic reading that we hope to attempt one day.
VOI CE AND P H E N O M E N O N
From what question shall we receive and read this distinction,

whose stakes ap p ear to be quite high?
B efo re p ro p o sin g this purely “p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l” distin ction
between the two senses o f the word “sign” or rather before recognizing the
distinction, before raising it up into what intends to be a simple descrip
tion, Husserl proceeds to a sort o f im plicit p h en om en ological reduction.
He puts out o f play all constituted knowledge. He insists on the necessary
absence o f presuppositions {Voraussetzungslosigkeit), w hether they com e
from metaphysics, from psychology, or from the natural sciences. T h e start
ing point in the “Faktum ” o f language is not a presupposition as long as
we are attentive to the contingency o f the exam ple. The analyses thus car
ried out keep their “sen se” and their “epistem ological value”— their value
in the ord er o f the theory o f knowledge (erkenntnistheoretischen Wert) —
whether languages exist or not, whether beings such as hum ans actually
make use o f languages or not, whether hum ans or a nature exist really or
merely “in the im agination and on the basis o f the m ode o f possibility.”*1
T he m ost general form o f ou r question is thus prescribed. Do not
the p h en om en ological necessity, the rigor and the subtlety o f <3> H us
serl’s analysis, the dem an ds to which it responds and the dem an ds we
m ust first o f all satisfy, nevertheless dissim ulate a m etaphysical presu p
position? Do they not hide a dogm atic or speculative attachm ent which
would, certainly, not restrain the p h en om en ological critique from out-
side o f itself, which would not be the residue o f an unnoticed naïveté,
but w ould constitute ph enom enology from its inside, in its critical project
and in the instituting value o f its own prem ises? It would be restrained
precisely in what ph en om en ology will recognize soon as the source and
the guaran tee o f all value, “the principle o f all prin ciples,” namely, the
originary giving evidentness, the present or the presence o f sense in a full
and originary intuition. In other words, we are not w ondering whether
som e sort o f m etaphysical heritage has been able, here or there, to limit
the vigilance o f a phenom enologist. Rather we are w ondering whether
the phenomenological form o f this vigilance is not already ordered by m eta
physics itself. In the lines that we ju st evoked, the m istrust in regard to
the m etaphysical presuppositions is given already as the condition o f an
authentic “theory o f know ledge,” as if this project o f a theory o f knowl
edge, even when it has becom e in d ep en d en t from some such speculative
system by m eans o f a “critique,” does not belong, from the m om ent it
starts up , to the history o f metaphysics. Isn ’t it the case that the idea o f
knowledge a n d a theory o f knowledge are m etaphysical in themselves?
T h erefore what would be at issue, on the basis o f the privileged
exam ple o f the sign, will be to see the ph en o m en ological critique o f
metaphysics an noun ce itself as a m om ent within the security that meta-
I N T R O D U C T I O N
physics provides. Better, what would be at issue will be to begin to verify

that the resource o f the ph en om en ological critique is the m etaphysical
project itself, in its historical com pletion and in the purity o f its origin
albeit restored.
We have attem pted elsew here to follow the m ovem ent by m eans
<4> o f which Husserl, by constantly criticizing m etaphysical speculation,
was truly aim in g his critique only at the perversion or the degeneration
o f what he continues to think and to want to restore as authentic m eta
physics or philosophia proieΛ 7 C on cludin g his Cartesian Meditations, H us
serl still opposes authentic m etaphysics (the one that will owe its achieve
m ent to phenom enology) to m etaphysics in the usual sense. The results
that he presents then are, he writes,
m etaphysical, if it is true th at ultim ate knowledge o f b ein g sh o u ld be

called metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here is anything
but m etaphysical in the usual sense: a historically degen erate m etaphys
ics which by no means confor ms to the spirit in which m etaphysics as
“first philosophy” was originally instituted. P h en om en ology’s purely
intuitive, concrete, ancl also apoclictic m ode o f dem onstration excludes
all “m etaphysical adven tu re,” all speculative excess.8
O ne would be able to bring to light the single an d perm an en t motive

for all the m istakes and all the perversions that H usserl den oun ces in
“d egen erate” metaphysics, across a multiplicity o f dom ains, them es, and
argum ents: it is always a blindness in the face o f the authentic m ode o f
ideality, o f that which is, which can be repeated indefinitely in the identity
o f its presence because o f the very fact that it does not exist, is not reell, is ir-
reell, not in the sense o f fiction, but in an oth er sense which will be able to
receive several nam es, whose possibility will allow us to speak o f the n on
reality and o f the necessity o f essence, o f the n oem a, o f the intelligible
object and o f non-m undanity in gen eral.9 This non-mundanity, not bein g
an oth er mundanity, this ideality not being an existent that com es down
from the sky, will always have its origin in the possibility o f the repetition
o f the act that produces it. So that the possibility o f this repetition can
be o p e n idealiter to infinity, it is necessary that on e ideal form secures this
unity o f the indefinitely and the idealiter: this is the present, o r rather the
presence o f the living present. T he ultim ate form o f ideality, the one in
which in the last analysis we can anticipate o r recall all <5> repetition, the
* Jacq u e s Derricla, “La phénom énologie et la clôture cle la métaphysique,” in ΕΠΟΧΕΣ,

Athens, February 1966.
ideality o f ideality is the living present, the self:presence o f transcendental

life. Presence has always been and will always-be, to infinity, the form in
which— we can say this apodictically— the infinite diversity o f contents
will be produ ced. The o p p o sitio n — the inaugural opposition o f m eta
physics— between form and matter, finds in the concrete ideality o f the
living present its ultim ate and radical justification. We shall com e upon
the enigm a o f the concept o f life in the expressions “the living presen t”
and “transcendental life” again. Let us note, however, in order to specify
our intention here, that p h en om en ology appears to us to be torm ented
if not contested, from the inside, by m eans o f its own descriptions o f the
m ovem ent o f tem poralization and o f the constitution o f intersubjectivity.
At the greatest depth o f what connects these two decisive m om ents o f the
description together, one sees an irreducible non-presence recognized as
a constituting value, and with it a non-life or a non-presence o f the living
present, a non-belonging o f the living present to itself, a non-originarity
that cannot be eradicated. T he nam es that it receives only m ake its resis
tance to the form o f presence m ore vivid; in two words, what is at issue is:
(1) the necessary passage from retention to re-presentation (Vergegenwär
tigung) in the constitution o f the presence o f a tem poral object (Gegen
stand) whose identity can be repeated; (2) the necessary passage through
appresentation in the relation to the alter ego, that is, in the relation to what
also m akes possible an ideal objectivity in general, intersubjectivity being
the condition o f objectivity and this objectivity being absolute only in the
case o f ideal objects. In the two cases, what is nam ed as a m odification
o f presentation (representation and «/^presentation) ( Vergegenwärtigung
or Appräsenlation) does not supervene upon presentation, but conditions
it by fissuring it a priori. T hat does not call into question the apodictic-
ity o f the ph enom enological-transcendental description. It does not cut
into the fo u n d in g value o f presence. This expression, m oreover, “the
foun din g value o f p resen ce,” is a pleonastic expression. What is at issue,
however, is to m ake the original and non-em pirical space o f <6> non
foundation appear, as the irreducible em ptiness from which the security
o f presen ce in the m etaphysical fo rm o f ideality is decided and from
which this security removes itself. It is within this horizon that we are here
interrogating the ph en om en ological con cept o f the sign.
The concept of metaphysics with which we are working will have to
be determ ined, and the generality o f this question, which is too large,
m ust be narrow ed here. In the case in point, we are narrowing down the
question to this: how to justify first o f all the decision which subordinates
a reflection on the sign to a logic? And if the concept o f sign precedes
logical reflection, is given to logic, is delivered to its critique, from where
does the concept o f the sign come? W here does the essence o f the sign,
in relation to which this con cept is regulated, com e from? What grants
authority to a theory o f know ledge in order to determ ine the essence
and origin o f language? Such a decision, we do not attribute it to Husserl;
he takes it u p explicitly, o r rather, he takes u p explicitly its heritage and
validity. T he consequences o f this are limitless. On the one hand, Husserl
has had to defer, from one end o f his itinerary to another, every explicit
m editation on the essence o f language in general He puts the m editation
on the essence o f language in general “out o f play” in Formal and Tran
scendental Logic.10 And, as Fink has indeed shown, H usserl never posed
the question o f the transcendental logos, o f the inherited lan guage in
which phenom enology produces an d exhibits the results o f the workings
o f the reduction. T he unity between ordinary language (or the language
o f traditional metaphysics) and the lan guage o f ph enom enology is never
broken despite all the precautions, quotation m arks, renovations and in
novations. The transform ation o f a traditional concept into an indicative
or m etaphorical con cept does not absolve the heritage; it im poses ques
tions which Husserl has never attem pted to answer. This is due to the fact
that, on the other hand, by bein g interested in language only within the
horizon o f rationality, by determ ining the logos on the basis o f logic, H us
serl has in fact, and in a traditional way, determ in ed the essence o f lan
guage by starting from logicity as the norm alcy o f its telos. What we would
like to suggest here is that this telos <7> is the telos o f being as presence.
T h u s , fo r e x a m p le , w h en w h at is a t issu e is t h e re d e fin itio n o f th e
r e la tio n b e tw e e n p u r e g r a m m a r a n d p u r e lo g ic (a r e la tio n th a t tr a d i
tio n a l lo g ic w o u ld h a v e m iss e d , sin c e it w as p e r v e r t e d by m e ta p h y s ic a l
p r e s u p p o s it io n s ) , w h en w h a t is a t is s u e t h e r e fo r e is th e c o n s titu tio n o f
a p u r e m o r p h o lo g y o f Bedeutungen (w e a r e n o t tr a n s la tin g th is w o rd f o r
r e a s o n s th at will a p p e a r in a m o m e n t ) , th e r e - a p p r e h e n s io n o f p u r e
g ra m m a tic a lity , th e sy stem o f ru le s th a t a llo w u s to r e c o g n iz e w h e th e r a
d is c o u r s e in g e n e r a l is re a lly a d is c o u r s e — if it m a k e s sense o r i f f a ls e h o o d
o r th e a b su rd ity o f c o n t r a d ic t io n ( Widersinnigkeit) d o n o t m a k e it in c o m
p r e h e n s ib le a n d d o n o t d e p r iv e it o f the q u a lity o f m e a n in g fu l d is c o u r s e ,
d o n o t r e n d e r it sinnlos— th e n th e p u r e g e n e r a lity o f this m e ta - e m p ir ic a l
g r a m m a r d o e s n o t c o v e r th e w h o le fie ld o f th e p o ssib ility o f la n g u a g e in
g e n e r a l; it d o e s n o t e x h a u s t th e w h o le e x t e n t o f th e a priori o f la n g u a g e .
T h e p u r e g e n e ra lity o f th e m e ta - e m p ir ic a l g r a m m a r c o n c e r n s o n ly th e
logical apiiori o f la n g u a g e ; it is pure logical grammar. T h is r e s tr ic tio n is f u n c
tio n in g fr o m th e b e g in n in g , a lth o u g h H u sse r l d id n o t stre ss it in th e first
e d itio n o f th e Logical Investigations:
In the First Edition, I spoke o f “pure gram m ar,” a nam e conceived ancl
explicitly clevisecl as b ein g an alo go u s to K an t’s “pure science o f n atu re.”
s
But to the extent that it cannot, however, be asserted that the pure
m orph ology o f Bedeutungen takes in the en tire gram m atical a priori in its
universality— since fo r exam p le the com m unicative relations betw een
psychical subjects, so im portant for the gram m ar, involve their own
a priori, the expression “pure logical gram m ar” is pref erab le .11
Carving out the logical a priori within the gen eral a priori o f lan
guage does not extract a region. As we are going to see, it designates the
dignity o f a telos, the purity o f a norm , and the essence o f a destination.
<8> By locating in the First Logical Investigation the roots that H u sserl’s
later discourse will never disturb, we would like to show here therefore
that the m ovem ent in which the whole o f ph enom enology is already en
gaged repeats the original intention o f m etaphysics itself. The value o f
presence (in the two connected senses o f the proxim ity o f what is set out
as an object o f an intuition and the proxim ity o f the tem poral present
which gives its form to the clear an d actual intuition o f the object), the
last court o f appeal fo r this whole discourse, m odifies itself, without its
being lost, every time what is at issue is the presence o f any object what
soever to consciousness in the clear evidence o f a fulfilled intuition or
when what is at issue is self-presence in consciousness— “con sciousness”
m eaning nothing other than the possibility o f the self-presence o f the
present in the living p resen t.12 Each time that this value o f presence is
threatened, H usserl will awaken it, will recall it, will m ake it return to
itself in the fo rm o f the telos, that is, in the form o f the Idea in the Kant
ian sense. T h ere is no ideality unless an Idea in the Kantian sense is at
work, op en in g the possibility o f an indefinite, the infinity o f a prescribed
progress, or the infinity o f perm itted repetitions. This ideality is the very
form in which the presence o f an object in general can be indefinitely
repeated as the same. T he non-reality o f the Bedeutung, the non-reality o f
the ideal object, the non-reality o f the inclusion o f the sense or o f the
noem a in consciousness (H usserl will say that the noem a does not belon g
in a reell m an n er— yeell— to consciousness) will provide therefore the
security that the presen ce to consciousness will be able to be repeated
indefinitely: ideal presence to an ideal or transcendental consciousness.
Ideality is the salvation or the m astery o f presence in repetition. In its
purity, this presence is the presence of nothing that exists in the world;
it is in correlation with acts o f repetition which are themselves ideal. Is
this to say that what op en s the repetition to infinity or what is open ed
in repetition when the m ovem ent o f idealization is secu red is a certain
relation o f an “existent” to his death? Is this to say that “transcendental
life” is the scene <9> o f this relation? It is too early to say that. First, it
is necessary to pass through the problem o f language. We shall not be
surprised to discover that lan guage is really the m edium o f this play o f
presence and absence. Is it not in language, is not language first o f all
the very thing in which life and ideality could seem to be united? Now, we
must consider on the one hand that the elem ent o f signification— or the
substance o f expression — which seem s best to preserve at once ideality
and living presence in all o f its form s, is living speech, the spirituality o f
the breath as phone. On the other hand, we m ust consider that ph en om
enology, the m etaphysics o f presen ce in the form o f ideality, is also a
philosophy o f life.
It is a philosophy of life not only because, in its center, death is
recognized as having n othin g but an em pirical and extrinsic significa
tion, the signification o f m un dan e accident, but also because the source
o f sense in general is always determ ined as the act o f a thing that lives,
as the act of a living being, as Lebendigkeit. Now the unity o f living, the
hearth fire o f the Lebendigkeit which diffracts its light into all the fu n da
m ental concepts o f ph en om en ology (Leben, Erlebnis, lebendige Gegenwart,
Geistigkeit, etc.), escapes the transcendental reduction, and as the unity
o f m undane life and transcendental life, blazes open even the passage
for the red uction .13 When em pirical life or even the pure region o f the
psychical are bracketed, what H usserl discovers is still a transcendental
life or in the last analysis the transcendentality o f a living p resen t— and
Husserl thematizes it without so m uch as posing the question o f this unity
o f the concept o f life. “C onsciousness without a sou l” (seelenloses) , whose
essential possibility is presen ted in Ideas I (§54), is still a living transcen
dental consciousness. If we conclude, with a gesture that is in fact very
Husserlian in its style, that the concepts o f em pirical life (or in general
m u n d an e life) and transcendental life are radically h eterogen eous and
that a purely indicative or m etaph orical relation is g o in g on between
the two nam es, then the possibility o f this <10> relation bears the entire
weight o f the question. The com m on root that m akes all o f these m eta
phors possible appears to us to still be the concept of lif e. In the last anal
ysis, between the pure psychical— a region o f the world that is op p o sed
to tran scen den tal consciousness and is discovered by m eans o f the re
duction o f the totality o f the natural, transcendent world— and the pure
transcendental life, there is, H usserl says, a relation o f parallelism.
Phenom enological psychology will in fact have to rem ind any work
ing psychology o f its backgroun d o f eidetic presuppositions and the con
ditions o f its own language. It will be incum bent on ph enom en ological
psychology to settle the sense o f the concepts o f psychology, and first o f
all the sense o f what we call the psyché. But what is going to allow us to
distinguish this ph en om en ological psychology, which is an eidetic and
a priori, descriptive science, from transcendental phenom enology itself ?
What is going to allow us to distinguish the epochë which discovers the im
m anent dom ain o f the purely psychical from .the transcendental epochë
itself? For the field o p en ed by this pure psychology has a privilege in
regard to the oth er regions, and its generality dom inates all oth er re
gions. All lived-experiences arise from it necessarily and the sense o f every
region or of every determ inate object is announced by way o f this pure
psychology. Thus too the depen den ce o f the purely psychical in regard
to transcendental consciousness, which is the archi-region, is absolutely
singular. The dom ain o f pure psychological experience in fact coincides
with the totality o f the dom ain o f what H usserl calls transcendental ex*
perience. And yet, despite this p erfect coincidence, a radical difference
rem ains, which has nothing in com m on with any other difference. T his is
a difference which in fact distinguishes nothing, a difference which sepa
rates no being, no lived-experience, no determ inate signification. This
is a difference however which, without altering anything, changes all the
signs, and it is a difference in which alone the possibility o f a transcen
dental question holds, that is, the possibility o f freedom itself. This is,
therefore, the fundam ental difference without which no other difference
in the world would m ake sense or even have a chance o f appearin g as
such. W ithout the possibility and without the <11> recognition o f such a
doubling (Verdoppelung) , whose rigor will tolerate no duplicity, without this
invisible distance stretched between the two acts o f the epochë, transcen
dental phenom enology would be destroyed at its root. The difficulty is
based on the fact that this doubling o f sense m ust not correspon d to any
ontological double. For exam ple, and briefly put, my transcendental I14 is
radically different, Husserl explicitly states, from my natural and hum an
I.13 A nd yet, the transcendental I is distinguished from the natural and
h um an I by nothing, by nothing that m ight be determ ined by the natural
sense o f distinction. The (transcendental) I is not an other. It is especially
not the m etaphysical or form al phantom o f the em pirical self.16 This is
what would lead to denouncing the idea that the absolute spectator I is
the theoretical im age and m etaph or o f its literal psychical self; as well
this m ean s denoun cin g every analogical lan guage o f which we m ust at
times m ake use in order to announce the transcendental reduction an d
in order to describe this unheard-of “ob ject” which is the psychical self
over against the absolute transcendental ego. Truly, no lan gu age is equal
to this operation by which the transcendental ego constitutes and o p
poses its own m undane self, that is, opposes its soul, by reflecting itself
in a verweltlichende Selbstapperzeption. '" {‘ The pure soul is this strange self-
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §45.

objectivation (Selbstobjektivierung) o f the m onad by and in itself."'18 There

also the Soul proceeds from the One (the m onadic ego) and can freely
turn itself back toward the m onadic ego in a R eduction.
All o f these difficulties are concentrated in the enigm atic concept
o f “p arallelism .” H usserl evokes the astonishing, adm irable “parallel
n ature” and even “the coincidence, if we m ay put it this way,” o f p h e
n om enological psychology and transcendental phenom enology, “both
un d erstood as eidetic d isciplin es.”ΐ “T he one <12> inhabits the other,
so to speak, implicitly.” This nothing that distinguishes the parallels, this
nothing without which no explication, that is, no language, would be able
to develop freely in the truth without being distorted by som e real m i
lieu, this nothing without which no transcendental, that is, philosophical,
question would be able to take a breath, this nothing arises, if we can
say this, when the totality o f the world is neutralized in its existence and
reduced to its phen om en on . This operation is that of the transcendental reduc
tion; in any case, it cannot be that of the psycho-phenomenological reduction. T he
pure eidetics o f psychical lived-experience concerns, undoubtedly, no
determ inate existence, no em pirical factuality; it calls fo r no signification
that is transcendent to consciousness. But the essences that it settles in
trinsically presuppose the existence o f the world in that kind o f m undane
region called the psyche. Moreover, we m ust notice that this parallelism
does m ore than release the transcendental ether. What it does is m ake
m ore mysterious still (and it alone is capable o f doin g this) the sense o f
the psychical and o f psychical life, that is, it m akes m ore mysterious the
sense o f a munclanity that is capable o f bearing and in som e way nurtur
ing transcenclentality, having a dom ain equal in extent to transcendental-
ity without, however, m ergin g with the transcendental in some total ad
equation. To conclude from this parallelism with an adequation is the m ost
tem pting, the m ost subtle but also the m ost obscurin g o f confusions:
transcendental psychologism. A gainst this, it is necessary to m aintain the
precarious an d threatened distance between the parallels; against tran
scendental psychologism it is necessary to question constantly. Now, since
transcendental consciousness is not im paired in its sense by the hypoth
esis o f a destruction o f the world (Ideas I, §49), “it is certain that we can
think a consciousness without a body and, as paradoxical as it may seem ,
without a soul [seelenloses\.”19 And yet, transcendental con sciousn ess is
nothing more or other than psychological consciousness. T ranscen den tal
<13> psychologism does not un d erstan d that. It does not u n derstan d
* Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §57.

t Husserl, Phänomenologishe Psychologie, p. 343
that if the world needs a supplement of soul, the soul, which is in the world,
needs this supplementary nothing that is the transcendental and without
which no world would appear. If we are attentive to H u sserl’s renewal
of the notion o f the “transcendental,” then we m ust do the opposite o f
transcendental psychologism and guard against endowing this distance
with som e sort o f reality. We m ust not substantialize this inconsistency or
turn it into, perhaps by sim ple analogy, som e thing or som e factor o f the
world. This would be to freeze the light at its source. If language never
escapes from analogy, even if it is analogy through and through, it must,
having reached this point, and at this very point, freely take up its own
destruction and cast m etaphors against m etaphors. This is to obey the
most traditional o f im peratives, an im perative that has received its m ost
explicit (but not the m ost original) form in the Enneacls, an im perative
that has never stopped being faithfully transm itted all the way down to
the Introduction to Metaphysics (especially that o f B ergso n ). This war o f
language against itself is the price that we have to pay in order to think
sense and the question o f the origin o f sense. We see that this war is not
one war am ong many. A s a polem ic for the possibility o f sen se an d o f the
world, this war takes place in this difference, which, as we have seen, cannot
inhabit the world, but only language, in its transcendental restlessness. In
truth, far from merely inhabiting language, this difference is also its ori
gin and its abode. Lan guage keeps watch over the difference that keeps
watch over language.
Later, in his Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) and in the Cartesian
Meditations (§14 and 57), H usserl will evoke again, and briefly, this “p re
cise parallelism ” between “the pure psychology o f con sciousn ess” and
“the tran scen den tal p h en om en ology o f co n sciou sn ess.”^ And he will
then say, in ord er to im pugn transcendental psychologism which “m akes
an authentic philosophy im possible” (Cartesian Meditations, §14), we have
to practice at all costs the “N uan cierun g” which distinguishes the paral
lels, one o f which is in the world and the other is outside o f the world
without being in anoth er world, that is, without stopping <14> to be, like
every parallel, alongside and right next to the other:21 At all costs, it is neces
sary to collect and shelter in our discourse these subtle (geringfügigen) ,
frivolous, “seem ingly trivial n uan ces” that “decisively decide the paths
and the detours [Wege unci Abwege] o f philosophy” (Cartesian Meditations,
§14). Our discourse must shelter these nuances within itself and at once
thereby in them re-secure its possibility ancl its rigor: But the strange unity o f
these two parallels, what relates the one to the other, does not let itself
be distributed by the parallels, and by dividing itself finally welds the
transcendental to its other: this strange unity is life. One sees in fact very
quickly that the sole kernel o f the con cept o f psyche is life as self-relation,
w hether the relation is p ro d u ced or not in the form o f consciousness.

“Living” is therefore the nam e of what precedes the reduction and es
capes finally from all the distributions that the reduction brings to light.
Life, however, is its own distribution and its own opposition to its other.
By determ ining “living” in this way, we ju st therefore nam ed the resource
o f the insecurity o f discourse, the point at which precisely it can no lon
ger re-secure its possibility ancl its rigor in the nuance. This concept o f life is
then g rasp ed in an agency which is no lon ger that o f pre-transcendental
naïveté, in the lan guage o f everyday life or in the lan gu age o f biologi
cal science. But if this ultra-transcendental con cept o f life allows us to
think life (in the everyday sense or in the sense o f biology) and if it has
never been inscribed in any language, this concept o f life perhaps calls
for another name.
We will be less astonished confronting the effort o f ph en om en ol
ogy— an effort that is laborious and oblique, even tenacious— to keep
watch over speech, in ord er to assert an essential link between the lo
gos and the phone, since the privilege o f consciousness (about which
H usserl fundam entally never w ondered what consciousness is, despite all
the adm irable, interm inable and in many regards revolutionary m edi
tations that he devoted to it) is only the possibility of the living voice.
Since self:consciousness ap p ears only in its relation to an object whose
presence it can keep watch over and repeat, self-consciousness is never
perfectly foreign or p rior to the possibility o f language. As we shall see,
H usserl <15> doubtlessly wanted to m aintain an originarily silent, “pre-
expressive” layer o f lived-experience. But since the possibility of consti
tuting ideal objects belongs to the essence o f consciousness, and since
these ideal objects are historical products, which appear only thanks to
acts o f creation or o f intention, the elem ent o f consciousness and the
elem ent o f language will be m ore and m ore difficult to discern. Now, is
it not the case that their indiscernability will introduce non-presence and
difference (mediacy, the sign, referral, etc.) righ t into the heart o f self
presence? This difficulty calls for a response. This response is called the
voice. The enigm a o f the voice is rich and profo u n d because o f all
the things to which it seem s to be responding. T hat the voice sim ulates
the “keeping watch” over presence and that the history o f spoken language
is the archive o f this sim ulation from now on prevents us from considering
the “difficulty” to which the voice responds, in H u sserl’s ph en o m en ol
ogy, either as a systematic difficulty or as a contradiction that would be
specific to his phenom enology. That as well prevents us from describing
this sim ulation, whose structure involves an infinite complexity, as an il
lusion, a phantasm , or a hallucination. T h ese last concepts in fact refer
to the sim ulation o f lan guage as to their comm on root.
This “difficulty” structures H u sserl’s whole discourse, and we m ust

recognize the work it d oes. By exploitin g all-of its resources with the
greatest critical refinem ent, H usserl will radicalize the necessary privilege
o f the phonê which is im plied by the entire history o f m etaphysics. For
Husserl will not recognize an originative affinity with the logos in general
in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, or in the body o f the
voice in the world; rather the originative affinity will be recogn ized in
the p h en om en ological voice, in the voice in its transcendental flesh, in
the breath, in intentional anim ation which transform s the body o f the
word into flesh, which turns the Körper into Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit. The
ph en om en ological voice would be this spiritual flesh which continues to
speak and to be present to itself— to hear itself-—in the absence o f the <16>
world. O f course, what we grant to the voice is gran ted to the lan guage o f
words, to a language constituted fro m unities— which we could believe ir
reducible and in d ecom p o sable— welding the signified con cept onto the
signifying “phonic co m p lex.” D espite the vigilance o f the description, a
perhaps naive treatm ent o f the con cept o f “word” has no d ou bt failed
to resolve in phenom enology the tension between its two m ajor motives:
the purity o f form alism and the radicality o f intuitionism .
T hat the privilege o f presen ce as consciousness can be established—
that is, can be constituted historically as well as dem on strated— only by
m eans o f the excellence o f the voice is a claim whose obviousness has
never held center stage in phenom enology. A ccording to a m ode that is
neither simply operative nor directly them atic, in a place that is neither
central nor lateral, the necessity o f this claim ’s obviousness seem s to have
secured a sort o f “grip” on all phenom enology.““ The nature o f this “grip”
is badly conceived in the concepts usually devoted to the philosophy o f
the history o f philosophy. But ou r p urp ose here is not to m editate di
rectly on the form o f this “g rip .” Our p urp ose is m erely to show it as
already at work— and powerfully— from the very beginning o f the First
Logical Investigation.
Sign and Signs
<17> H usserl begins by poin tin g out a confusion. Within the word “sign ”
(Zeichen), always in ordinary lan guage and at times in philosophical lan
guage, are h idden two h eterogen eous concepts: that o f expression (Aus
druck) , which we often mistakenly hold as being the synonym of the sign
in general, and that o f indication (Anzeichen). Now, according to Husserl,
there are som e signs that express nothing because these signs carry— we
must still say this in G erm an — nothing that we can call Bedeutung or Sinn.
This is what indication is. Certainly, indication is a sign, like expression.
But it is different from expression because it is, insofar as it is an indica
tion, deprived o f Bedeutung or Sinn: bedeutunglos, sinnlos. Nevertheless it
is not a sign without signification. Essentially, there cann ot be a sign with
out signification, a signifier without a signified. This is why the traditional
translation o f Bedeutung by “signification,” although it is established and
nearly inevitable, risks blu rrin g H u sserl’s entire text, ren derin g it un
intelligible in its axial intention, and consequently renderin g unintel
ligible all o f what will dep en d on these first “essential distinctions.” O ne
can say with H usserl in G erm an, without absurdity, that a sign (Zeichen)
is deprived o f Bedeutung (is bedeutungslos, is not bedeutsam), but one can
not say in French, without con tradiction , that un signe is deprived o f
signification.1 In G erm an on e can speak o f expression (Ausdruck) as a be
deutsame Zeichen, which H usserl does. O ne cannot, without redundancy,
<18> translate bedeutsame Zeichen into French as signe signifiant, which lets
us im agine, against the evidence and against H u sserl’s intention, that we
could have clés signes non signifiants. While being suspicious o f the estab
lished French translations, we m ust nevertheless confess that it will always
be difficult to replace them . T his is why our rem arks are nothing less
than criticisms aim ed at the existing, valuable translations. We shall try
nevertheless to p ropose som e solutions which will keep to being halfway
between com m entary and translation. They will thus be valid only within
the limits o f H u sserl’s texts. Most often, when we are confronting a diffi
culty, we shall, according to a procedu re whose value is at times contest-
able, retain the G erm an word while attem pting to clarify it by m eans of
the analysis.
In this way, it will be very quickly confirm ed that, for Husserl, the
expressivity o f the e xp ressio n — which always assum es the ideality o f a
Bedeutung— has an irreducible link to the possibility o f spoken discourse

{Rede). Expression is a purely linguistic sign and, in the first analysis, this
is precisely what distinguishes it from indication. Although spoken dis
course is a very com plex structure, involving always, in fact, an indicative
layer which, as we shall see, we shall have the greatest trouble trying to
hold within its limits, H usserl reserves for it the exclusivity o f the right to
expression and therefore the exclusivity o f pure logicity.“ W ithout violat
ing H u sserl’s intention, on e could define, if not translate, “b ed eu ten ”
by “vouloir-dire” at once in the sense o f a speaking subject that wants to
say, “expressin g him self,” as H usserl says, “abo u t som eth ing”— and in the
sense o f an expression that means.'"'3 We can then be assured that the Be
deutung is always what som eone or a discourse means <veulent dire>: always
a sense o f discourse, a discursive content.
In contrast to Frege, Husserl, as we know, does not distinguish, in
the Logical Investigations, between Sinn and Bedeutung:
Besides, for us, <19> Bedeutung m eans the sam e thing as Sinn [gilt cils
gleichbedeutend mit Sinn]. On the one hand, it is very convenient, espe
cially in the case o f this concept, to have at o n e ’s disposal parallel, inter
ch angeable terms, particularly since the sense o f the term Bedeutung is
itself to be investigated. A furth er consideration is our ingrain ed habit
to use the two words as m ean in g the sam e thing. In these conditions, it
seem s a rather dubious step if their Bedeutungen axe differentiated, ancl
if (as G. Frege has p ro p o sed ) we use one for Bedeutung in ou r sense,
ancl the other for the objects e x p re sse d .1
In Ideas I, the dissociation that intervenes between the two terms does not
at all have the sam e function as in Frege, and it confirm s our reading:
Bedeutung is reserved for the ideal sense content o f verbal expression, o f
spoken discourse, while sense {Sinn) covers the whole noem atic sphere,
including its non-expressive stratum:
We b egin with the fam iliar distinction between the sensuous, so to

speak, corporeal side o f expression, ancl its non-sensuous o r “spiritual”
side. We need not enter into a closer exam in ation o f the first side;
likewise, we need not con sid er the m an n er o f unifying b oth sides. Obvi
ously, they too designate headings for not u nim portant p h en o m e n o
logical problem s. We shall restrict our regard exclusively to “signifying”
* “To m ean,” “meaning” <in English> are goocl equivalents for “bedeuten,” “Bedeutung,”
which we clo not have in French.
SIGN AND SIGNS
[bedeuten] ancl “B e d e u tu n g .” Originally, these words concern ed only the

linguistic sphere [sprachliche Sphäre], that o f “exp ressin g” [des Aiisdrlich
ens]. But one can scarcely avoid ancl, at the sam e time, take an im por
tant cognitive step, exten d in g the Bedeutung o f these words ancl suitably
m odifying them so that they can find application o f a certain kind to
the whole noetico-noem atic sphere: thus application to all acts, be
they now interwoven [verflochten] with expressive acts or not. Thus we
have continued to speak o f “sense” [Si?z?z] in the case o f all intentional
lived-experience— a w ord which is u sed in general as an equivalent
<20> to Bedeutung. For the sake o f distinctness we shall p refer the ter m
Bedeutung for the old concept, ancl, in particular, in the com plex locu
tion o f “logical Bedeutung” or “expressive B e d e u tu n g We shall continue
to use the w ord “se n se ” as before in the m ost all-inclusive ran ge.’’
After having asserted, in a passage to which we shall have to return, that

there exists a pre-expressive stratum o f lived-experience or sense, and
then that this stratum o f sense could always receive expression and Bedeu
tung, H usserl proposes that “logical Bedeutung \s an expression .”6
The differen ce between indication and expression app ears very
quickly, over the course o f the description, as a difference that is m ore
functioned than substantial. Indication and expression are functions or
signifying relations and not terms. One and the sam e phenom enon can
be ap p reh en d ed as expression or as indication, as a discursive sign or as
a non-discursive sign. T hat depen ds on the intentional lived-experience
that anim ates it. T he functional character o f the description im m ediately
shows the extent o f the difficulty and gets us right to its center. Two func
tions can be interwoven or entangled in the sam e concatenation o f signs,
in the sam e signification. Husserl speaks first o f the addition or o f the
ju xtap osition o f one function with the other: “. . . signs in the sense o f
indication [Anzeichen] (notes, m arks, etc.) do not express, unless they fulfill,
in addition to [H u sserl’s em phasis, neben, “b esid es”] the indicative func
tion, a function o f Bedeutung.”7 But a few lines later, he will speak o f inti
m ate intrication, o f entanglem en t (Verflechtung). This word will reappear
often, at decisive m om ents, and this will not be by chance. It appears al
ready in the first section: “M eaning [bedeuten <vouloir~clire>]— in com m u
nicative discourse [in mitteilenderRecle]— is always interwoven [verflochten]
in a relation with this indication-being.”8
We therefore already know that, in fact, the discursive sign and con
sequently the m eaning <le voidoir-dire> is always entangled, gripped within
an indicative system. <21> T he expressive and logical purity o f the Bedeu
tung that H usserl wants to grasp as the possibility o f the Logos is gripped,
that is, con tam in ated— in fact and always (allzeit verflochten ist) insofar as
the Bedeutung is gripped within a com m unicative discourse. O f course, as

we shall see, com m unication itself is for H usserl a stratum that is extrinsic
to expression. But each time that an expression is produced in fact, it car
ries a com m unicative value, even if the expression does not exhaust itself
in com m unication or if this value is simply associated with it.
It will be necessary to specify the m odalities o f this interweaving.
But it is clear from now on that this factual necessity o f entanglem en t
which intimately associates expression and indication m ust not, in H us
serl’s eyes, underm ine the possibility o f a rigorous essential distinction.
T his possibility is purely ju rid ic al and ph en o m en ological. T he whole
analysis will m ove forward th erefore in this hiatus between fact and right,
existence and essence, reality and the intentional function. By in deed
leapin g over the m ediations and by reversing the ap p aren t order, we
would be tem pted to say that this hiatus, which defines the very space
o f phenom enology, does not preexist the question o f language, and it is
not inserted into phenom enology as within one dom ain or as one prob
lem am on g others. It is op en ed up, on the contrary, only in and by the
possibility o f language. And its ju rid ical value, the right to a distinction
between fact and intentional right, depen ds entirely on lan guage and,
in lan guage, on the validity o f a radical distinction between indication
and expression.
L et us pursue our reading. Every expression would therefore be
gripped, despite itself, by an indicative process. But the opposite, H us
serl recognizes, is not true. We might therefore be tem pted to turn the
expressive sign into a species o f the genus “indication.” In this case, we
would have to say in the end that speech, whatever the dignity or what
ever the originality we still grant it, is only a form o f gesture. In its es*
sential center and not only by m eans o f what H usserl con siders as its
accidents (its physical side, its com m unicative fu nction ), <22> speech
belongs, without exceedin g it, to the gen eral system o f signification. This
system would be m erged with the system o f indication.
This is precisely what H usserl contests. In order to do that, he must
th erefore dem onstrate that expression is not a species o f indication even
though all expressions are m ixed with indication, the reverse not being
true. H usserl writes,
I f o n e limits on eself to expression s em ployed in living colloquy, a s one

usually cloes involuntar ily when expr ession is in question, the co n cept
o f an indication seem s to apply mor e widely than that o f an expr ession,
but this cloes not m ean that its content is the gen u s o f which an exp res
sion is the species. To mean [bedeuten <voidoir-dire>] is not a particular
species of sign-being [Zßichenseins] in the sense of indication [Anzeige]. It has a
SIGN AND SIGNS
narrow er application only because m eaning [bedeuten]— in com m unica

tive discou rse— is always en tan gled [verflochten] with inclication-being
[Anzeichensein] , ancl this in its turn leads to a wider concept, since m ean
ing is also capable o f occurring outside o f this en tan glem en t/ ’9
In order to dem onstrate the rupture o f the species-genus relation,

we then have to rediscover, if there is any, a ph en om en ological situa
tion in which expression is no longer tied up in this entanglem ent, is
no longer interwoven with indication. Since this contam ination is always
produ ced in real colloquy (at once because in real colloquy expression
indicates a con tent that is forever h idden from intuition, namely, the
lived-experience o f the other, and because the ideal content o f the Be
deutung and the spiritual side o f the expression are united in real collo
quy with the sensible side), it is in a language without com m unication,
in a m onological discourse, in the absolutely lowest register o f the voice
o f the “solitary life of the soul” (in einem Seelenleben) that it is necessary to
track down the unm arred purity o f expression. T hrough a strange p ara
dox, the m eaning <le vouloir-clire> would isolate the concentrated purity
o f ex-pressivity only when the relation to a certain outside would be sus
pended. Only to a certain outside, because this <23> reduction will not
erase and in deed shall reveal in pure expressivity the relation to the o b
ject, the aim o f an objective ideality, over and against the intention o f
m ean in g <vouloir-dire>, over and against the Bedeutungsintention. What
we ju st called a p arad o x is in truth only the ph enom en ological project
in its essence. Beyond the opposition between “idealism ” and “realism ,”
“subjectivism ” an d “objectivism ,” etc., phen om en ological transcendental
idealism responds to the necessity to describe the objectivity o f the object
(Gegenstand) and the/w?sence o f the present (Gegemvart)— and the objec
tivity in p resen ce— on the basis o f an “interiority” or rather on the basis
of a selfLproximity, o f an ownness (Eigenheit) which is not a sim ple inside,
but the intim ate possibility o f the relation to an over-there and to an
outside in general. This is why the essence o f intentional consciousness
will be revealed (for exam ple in Ideas /, §49) only in the reduction o f the
totality o f the existing world in general.
This m ovem ent is already sketched in the First Logical Investiga
tion in relation to expression and m eaning <vouloir-dire> as being a re
lation to the object. H usserl says, ‘Expressions un fold their function o f
m eaning [Bedeutungsfunktion <fiinction de vouloir-dire>] even in the solitary
life of the soul, where they no longerfunction as indications. In truth therefore
:i: First Logical Investigation, §1.

the two concepts o f sign are not really related to one another as concepts .
that are wider or narrow er.”ιυ
Before open in g this field o f the solitary life o f the soul in order to
recover expressivity in it, it is necessary therefore to determ ine and re
duce the dom ain of indication. This is what H usserl begins by doing. But
before following him in this analysis, let us p au se for a m om ent.
The m ovem ent that we ju st com m en ted upon is actually open to
two possible readings.
On the one hand, H usserl seem s to repress, with a dogm atic haste,
a question about the structure of the sigyi in general. By prop o sin g from
the start a radical dissociation between two heterogeneous types o f sign,
between indication and expression , he d oes not ask h im self what the
sign in general is. T he concept o f sign in gen eral— which he has to use
<24> at the begin n in g and to which he would have to grant a hearthstead
o f sense— is able to receive its unity only from an essence. T he general
concept can only be patterned on the essence. And the essence must be
recognized in an essential structure o f experien ce and in the fam iliar
ity o f a horizon. In order to hear the word “sign” at the open in g o f the
problem atic, we must already have a relation o f pre-understanding with
the essence, the function, or the essential structure o f the sign in general.
Then, however, will we be able eventually to distinguish between the sign
as indication and the sign as expression, even if the two types o f signs are
not ordered according to the relations o f genus and species. A ccording
to a distinction which is itself H usserlian (cf. First Logical Investigation,
§13), one can say that the category o f the sign in general is not a genus
but rather a form.
What therefore is a sign in general? For many reasons, ou r am bition is
not to answer this question. We only want to suggest the sense in which
H usserl may seem to evade it. “Every sign is a sign fo r som eth in g”—
“for som eth in g” (fü r etwas), these are H u sserl’s first words, the words
that immediately introduce the dissociation o f expression fro m indica
tion: “But not every sign has a ‘B ed eu tu n g,’ a ‘sen se’ [Sinn] that the sign
‘expresses.’ ” This p resupposes that we knew implicitly what “being-for”
m eans, in the sense o f “being-in-the-place-of.” We m ust un derstand in
a fam iliar way this structure o f substitution or o f referral so that, in this
structure, the heterogeneity between indicative referral and expressive
referral becom es consequently intelligible, indeed, dem on strated— and
even so that the evidentness o f their relations com es to be accessible for
us, perhaps in the sense in which H usserl hears it. A little later (in §8),
H usserl will in fact dem on strate that expressive referral (Hinzulenken,
Hinzeigen) is not indicative referral (Anzeigen). But no original question
is posed about Zeigen in general, which, pointing the finger in this way at
SIGN AND SIGNS
the invisible, can then be m odified into Hinzeigen or into Anzeigen. How-
ever, we can already gu ess— and perh aps we shall later verify it— that
this “Z eigen” is the place in which the root and the <25> necessity o f all
the “entanglem ents” between indication and expression are announced.
“Z eigen” is the place in which all the oppositions and differences that will
henceforth crisscross H u sserl’s analysis (and that will be wholly form ed
within the concepts o f traditional m etaphysics) are not yet sketched out.
But H usserl, choosing the logicity o f signification as his theme, believ
ing already that he is able to isolate the logical a prion from pure gram
mar within the general a priori o f grammar, is resolutely engaged in one
o f the m odifications o f the gen eral structure o f Zeigen: Hinzeigen and
not Anzeigen.
Does this absence o f a question in regard to the starting point and
the pre-understanding o f an operative concept necessarily translate into
a dogm atism ? On the other hctncl, may we not interpret this as critical vigi
lance? Is not what is at issue precisely the rejection or erasure o f p re
u n derstan d in g as the ap p aren t starting point, indeed, its rejection or
erasure as a kind o f prejud ice or presum ption ? By what right may we
presum e the essential unity o f som ething like the sign? And what if H us
serl wanted to break up the unity o f the sign, to dem onstrate that it has a
unity only in appearance, to reduce it to a verbality without concept? And
what if there were not one concept o f sign and several types o f sign, but
two irreducible concepts to which we have im properly attached one sole
word? At the begin n in g o f the second section, Husserl speaks precisely
o f “two concepts attached to the word ‘sig n .’ ” By blam ing him for not
beginning with an interrogation o f the sign-being o f the sign in general,
are we not trusting in a rather hasty way the unity o f a word?
More seriously, by asking “what is the sign in gen eral,” we subordi
nate the question o f the sign to an ontological design. We claim to assign
to signification a place, which m ight be fundam ental or regional, within
an ontology. This would be a classical way o f proceeding. We would sub
ordinate the sign to truth, lan guage to being, speech to thought, and
writing to sp e e ch .11 Is it not the case that, by saying that there can be
a truth fo r the sign in general, we are assum ing that the sign is not the
possibility o f truth, that the sign does not constitute truth, but is content
to signify the truth, <26> to reproduce it, to incarnate it, and to inscribe
it secondarily or to refer to it? For, if the sign som ehow preceded what we
call truth or essence, it would m ake no sense to speak o f the truth or the
essence o f the sign. Is it not possible to think— and doubtlessly H usserl
has don e this— that the sign, for exam ple if we consider the sign as the
structure o f an intentional m ovem ent, does not fall un der the category
o f the thing in general (Sache), that the sign is not a “bein g” about whose
being we would have ju st posed a question? Is not the sign som ething
other than a being? Is it not the sole “th in g” which, not being a thing,
does not fall under the question o f “what is”? And in contrast, does not
the sign som etim es p rodu ce the question, thus produce “philosophy” as
the em pire o f the ti esti?
By asserting that “logical Bedeutung is an expression ,” that there is
theoretical truth only in a statem ent,”' by engagin g resolutely in a ques
tion concerning linguistic expression as the possibility o f truth, by not
presu p p o sin g the essential unity o f the sign, H usserl could a p p e a r to
reverse the direction o f the traditional procedu re and respect in the ac
tivity o f signification what, having no truth in itself, conditions the move
m ent and the concept o f truth. And in fact, throughout an itinerary that
ends up at “The O rigin o f Geom etry,” H usserl will give a growing atten
tion to what in signification, in language, and in inscription as it writes
ideal objectivity down, produces truth or ideality rather than records it.
But this last m ovem ent is not sim ple. H ere is our problem and we
will have to return to it. T he historical destiny o f ph en om enology seem s,
no m atter what, to be contained between these two motives. On the one
hand, phenom enology is the reduction o f naive ontology, the return to
an active constitution o f sense and validity, to the activity <27> o f a life
that produces truth and validity in gen eral through its signs. But at the
sam e time, without being simply ju x tap o sed to this m ovement,^ another
necessity confirm s also the classical m etaphysics o f presen ce and indi
cates that ph en om en ology belongs to classical ontology.
We have chosen to be interested in this relation in which ph en om
enology belongs to classical ontology.
* This is a very frequent comment, starting with the Logical Investigations (cf., for example,
introduction, §2) all the way up to “The Origin of Geometry.”
f This is a movement on the basis o f which we can interpret in diverse ways the relation to
metaphysics ancl to classical ontology. It is a critique which would have determinate, lim
ited, but certain affinities with that of Nietzsche and o f Bergson. In any case, the critique
belongs to the unity o f a historical configuration. That this critique, in the historical con
figuration of these reversals, continues metaphysics is one of the most perm anent themes
o f H eidegger’s meditation. So, concer ning these problems (the starting point in the pre
understanding of the sense of a word, the privilege o f the question “what is,” the relation
between language and being or truth, the belonging to classical ontology, etc.), only on
the basis o f a superficial reading of H eidegger’s texts could one conclude that H eidegger’s
texts fall under the blow of these objections. On the contrary, we think, without being able
to develop it here, that no one has ever better escaped from them prior to H eidegger’s
texts, which does not mean that one escapes fi om the objections often after H eidegger’s
texts.
The Reduction of Indication
<28> That phenom enology belongs to metaphysics is revealed doubtlessly

in the them e to which we are now returning: the exteriority o f indication
in relation to expression. H usserl devotes only three sections to “the essence
o f indication” and, in the sam e chapter, eleven sections are devoted to ex
pression. Since, according to a logical and epistem ological concern, what
is at issue is to secure the originality o f expression as “m eaning” <vouloir-
clire> and as the relation to an ideal object, the treatm ent o f indication
must be brief, preliminary, and “reductive.” It is necessary to push indica
tion to the side, abstract it, “red u ce” it as an extrinsic and em pirical phe
nom enon, even though a strict relation unites it in fact to expression, in
terweaves it empirically with expression. But such a reduction is difficult.
Only in ap p earan ce does it look as though at the end o f the third section
the reduction is accom plished. Indicative attachments, at times o f another
type, will not stop ap p earin g later, and their elim ination will be an infi
nite task. H u sserl’s whole enterprise— and well beyond the Logical Inves
tigations— will be threatened if the Verflechtung attaching indication onto
expression is absolutely irreducible and in principle inextricable, if indi
cation were not added onto expression as a m ore or less tenacious bond,
but inhabited the essential intimacy o f the m ovem ent o f expression.
What is an indicative sign? First it can be natural (the canals o f Mars
indicate the possible presence o f intelligent beings) <29> as well as artificial
(the chalk mark, branding, all the instrum ents o f conventional design a
tio n )/' The opposition between nature and institution has no relevance
* In the logic of his exam ples ancl of his analysis, Husserl coulcl have citecl the grapheme in
general. Although writing is for him— there is no doubt about it— indicative in its proper
stratum, it poses a considerable problem which probably explains Husserl’s careful silence
here. Even if we suppose that writing is indicative in the sense that he gives to this word, it
has a strange privilege that risks the disorganization o f all the essential distinctions. What
phonetic writing (or better, in the purely phonetic part o f the kind of writing that is
improperly and globally called phonetic) would “indicate” would be an “expression.” Non-
phonetic writing would be substituted fo r expressive discourse in such a way that non-
phonetic discourse would substitute for that which unites expressive discourse immediately
to the “m eaning” <vouloir~clire> (bedeuten) . We are not here stressing this problem, but it
belongs to the ultimate horizon of this essay.
here and does not divide the unity o f the indicative function. What is this
unity? Husserl describes it as that o f a certain “m otivation” (Motivierung).
Motivation is what gives to som ething like a “thinking bein g” the move
m ent in order to pass in thought from som ething to som ething. For the
m om ent, this definition m ust rem ain rather general. This passage can
be that o f conviction (Überzeugung) or o f presum ption (Vermutung) and
it always links an actual knowledge right now to a non-actual know ledge.1
In relation to m otivation con sidered at this degree o f generality, this
know ledge can concern any object (Gegenstand) or state-of-affair (Sach
verhalt) an d not necessarily em pirical existents, that is, individuals. In
ord er to design ate the category o f the known (actual or non-actual),
H usserl by design m akes use therefore o f very general concepts (Sein,
Bestand) which can cover bein g or subsistence, the structure o f ideal ob
jects as well as em pirical existents. Sein, bestehen, Bestand— words that are
frequent and fundam ental at the begin n in g o f this section — are not to
be reduced to Dasein, existieren, Realität, and this difference is quite im por
tant to H usserl, as we are goin g to verify in a m om ent.
H usserl thus defines the m ost general essential com m on character
istic <30> that gathers together all the indicative functions:
In these cases we discover as a common characteristic the following

situation: certain objects or states of affairs whatsoever whose subsistence
[Bestand] of which someone has actual knowledge indicate [cinzeigen]
to him the s ubsistence of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense
that his conviction in the being [Sein] of the one is experienced as motivating
(though as a non-evident motivation) a conviction or a presumption in the being
of the others."7-
But this essential com m on characteristic is still so gen eral that it

covers the whole field o f indication an d som ething else as well. O r rather,
since it is really an Anzeigen that is bein g described here, let us say that
this essential com m on characteristic overflows indication in the strict sense.
We are now goin g to have to ap proach this strict sense o f indication. And
we see then why it was im portant to distinguish between Sein and Bestand
on the one hand, and Existenz, Dasein, or Realität on the other. General
motivation thus defin ed is that o f a “b ecau se” which can have the sense
o f indicative allusion (Hinweis) as well as that o f deductive, evident, and
apodictic dem onstration (Beweis). In the latter case, the “becau se” links
together evident and ideal necessities which are perm anen t and persis
tent beyond every em pirical liic et nunc. H usserl says, “An ideal rule is
THE R E D U C T I O N OF I N D I C A T I O N
here revealed which extends its sway beyond the ju d gm en ts linked by

motivation hic et nunc and em braces as such in a m eta-em pirical gen eral
ity all the ju d gm en ts o f like content and m oreover all the ju d gm en ts o f
like ‘fo rm ’ [F o m ].”3 M otivations linking lived-experiences, the acts in*
tending objective-ideal, necessary, and evident idealities may be o f the
order o f contingent and em pirical, “non-evident” indication. But the re
lations uniting the contents o f ideal objects, in evidential dem onstration,
do not belon g to indication. The entire analysis o f section 3 d e m o n
strates that ( 1 ) even if A indicates B with a com plete empirical certainty
(with the highest probability), this indication will never be a dem on stra
tion o f apodictic necessity, and, to find here again the classic schem a, it
will never be a dem onstration <31> o f “truths o f reason ” in opposition to
“truths o f fact.” Section 3 ’s analysis also dem onstrates (2) that even if in
dication seems nevertheless to intervene in a dem onstration, it will always
be on the side o f psychical m otivations, acts, convictions, etc., and never
on the side o f the contents o f truths that are linked together.
This indispensable distinction between Hinweis and Beweis, indica
tion and dem onstration, not only poses a problem form ally analogous
to the one that we were op en in g up earlier in relation to Zdgen. What
is m onstration (Weisen) in gen eral prior to its distribution into indica
tion that points the finger (Hinweis) at the non-seen and into dem o n
stration (Beweis) which allows som ething to be seen in the evidentness
o f the p ro o f?4 Also, this distinction sharpens then the difficulty o f the
“entanglem en t” that we have already pointed out.
In fact, we know now that, in the ord er o f signification in general,
every psychical lived-experience, on the side o f its acts, even when the
acts aim at idealities and objective necessities, is involved only with indica
tive concatenations. Indication falls outside o f the content o f absolutely
ideal objectivity, that is, outside o f the truth. H ere again, this exteriority,
or rather this extrinsic characteristic of indication, is inseparable, in its
possibility, from the possibility o f all the reductions to com e, whether
they are eidetic or transcendental. H aving its “origin ” in ph enom en a o f
association-' <32> and always con nectin g em pirical existents in the world,
* Cf. §4: “The psychical facts in which the notion o f indication has its ‘origin,’ i.e., in which
it can be abstractively apprehended, belong to the wider group o f facts which fall under
the historical rubric o f the ‘association of ideas.’ ” <Translator: First Logical Investigation,
§4; the equivalent passage can be found on page 186 of the English translation, volume l.>
We know that, while renewing it ancl using it in the field of transcendental experience, Hus
serl has never stopped working with the concept o f “association.” Here, what is excluded
from pure expressivity is indication and thereby association in the sense of empirical psy
chology. We must bracket empirical psychical livecl-experiences in order to recognize the
ideality of the Bedeutung that orders expression. The distinction between indication and
indicative signification will cover, in lan guage, all o f what falls un der the
blows o f the “reduction s”: factuality, m undane existence, essential non
necessity, non-evidence, etc. Do we not already have the right to say that
the entire future problem atic o f the reduction and all the conceptual
differences in which they are declared (fact/essen ce, transcendentality/
m undanity, and all the opposition s that are systematic with them ) are
developed in a hiatus between two types o f signs? At the sam e time as
the hiatus, if not in it and thanks to it? Is it n ot the case that the concept
o f parallelism., which defines the relations between the p u re psychical—
which is in the w orld— and the pure transcendental— which is not in the
w orld— and which gath ers together in this way the entire enigm a o f H us
serl’s phenom enology, is it not the case that this is announced here in the
form o f a relation between two m odes o f signification? And yet Husserl,
who never wanted to assim ilate experien ce in general (em pirical or tran
scendental experience) to language, is constantly going to try to keep sig
nification outside the self:presence o f transcendental life. The question
that we ju st raised would m ake us pass from com m entary to interpreta
tion. If we could answer the question in the affirmative, we would have to
conclude, against Husser l’s express intention, that the “reduction ,” even
before it becom es a m ethod, would be mer ged with the most spon tan e
ous act of spoken discourse, the sim ple practice o f speech, the power
o f expression. Although this conclusion must constitute in our eyes, in
a certain sense, the “truth” o f phenom enology, it would contradict at a
certain level H u sserl’s express intention for two sorts o f reasons. <33> On
the one hand, this conclusion goes against H u sserl’s express intention
because, as we were recalling earlier, H usserl believes in the existence o f
a pre-expressive and pre-linguistic stratum o f sense which the reduction
will at times have to unveil by excluding the stratum o f language. On
the other hand, if there is no expression and no m eaning <vouloir-dire>
without discourse, not all discourse is “expressive.” A lthough there is no
possible discourse without an expressive kernel, we could alm ost say that
the totality o f discourse is gripped by an indicative web.
expression appears therefore first of all in the necessarily ancl provisionally “objectivist”
phase of phenomenology, when one has to neutralize empirical subjectivity. Does it keep
its value when the transcendental thematic will found the analysis and when we retur n to
constituting subjectivity? Such is the question which Husserl has never opened afterward.
He has continued to make use of the “essential distinctions” from the first of the Logical
Investigations. He has never, however, started over, repeated, in regard to them this work
of thematization by which all his other concepts have been untiringly taken up, verified,
constantly reappearing at the center o f a description.
Meaning as Soliloquy
<34> Let us suppose that indication is excluded. What rem ains is expres
sion. What is expression? It is a sign ch arged with Bedeutung. H usserl
attem pts to define it in the fifth section: Ausdrücke als bedeutsame Zeichen.
Expressions are signs that “m ean ” <veulent-clire> }
A) Doubtlessly Bedeutung com es upon the sign and transform s it
into expression only with speech , with oral discourse. H usserl writes,
“from indicative signs we distinguish meaningf ul signs, i.e., expressio n sBut
why expressions and why “ m ean in gful” signs <signes “voulant-dire”>? We
are able to explain this only by tying together a whole sh eaf of reasons
within the p rofoun d unity o f on e and the sam e intention.
1. Ex-pression is exteriorization. E xpression im prints in a certain
outside a sense which is discovered first in a certain inside. Earlier we
suggested that this outside and this inside were absolutely original: the
outside is neither nature, nor the world, nor a real exteriority in relation
to consciousness. H ere is the place to specify this outside. T he bedeuten
intends an outside which is that o f an ideal o b je ct. This outside then
is ex-pressed, p asses outside o f itself into anoth er outside, which is still
“in” consciousness. As we are goin g to see, expressive discourse has no
need, as such and in its essence, o f bein g factually uttered in the world.
Expression as a m eaningful sign <signe voulant-dire> <35> is therefore a
double exiting o f sense (Sinn) outside o f itself in itself, in consciousness,
in the with-itself and the nearby-itself that H usserl begins by determ in
ing as the “solitary life o f the sou l.”“ Later, after the discovery o f the tran
scendental reduction, he will describe the solitary life o f the soul as the
noetico-noem atic sphere o f consciousness. If we refer, in anticipation
and fo r the sake o f m ore clarity, to the correspon din g sections o f Ideas If
we see how the “unproductive” stratum o f expression com es to reflect,
“to m irror” (widerzuspiegeln) every oth er intentionality in re g a rd to its
form and to its content. T he relation to objectivity therefore indicates
a “pre-expressive” (vor-ausdrücklich) intentionality that aim s at a sense
which will be then transform ed into a Bedeutung and an expression. It is
not at all obvious that this reflected and repeated “exiting” toward the
noem atic sense and then toward expression is an unproductive redou
bling, especially if we con sider that by “unproductivity” H usserl intends
thus a “productivity that is exhausted in the expressing ancl in the form of the
conceptual which is introduced with the expression .”"' 3 T herefore we will
have to return to this. We only wanted to note here what “exp ressio n ”
m eans according to H usserl: the exiting o f an act outside o f itself, then
o f a sen se which is able to rem ain in itself only in the voice, in the “ph e
nom enological” voice.
2. In the Logical Investigations, the w ord “expression ” is already im
posed fo r another reason. Expression is an intentional, thoroughly con
scious, decided, voluntary exteriorization. T here is no expression without
the intention o f a subject anim ating the sign, endowing it with Geistigkeit.
In indication, anim ation has two limits: the body o f the sign which is not
a breath, an d the indicated, which is an existence in the world. In expres
sion, the intention is absolutely on p urpose <36> because it anim ates a
voice which can rem ain wholly internal and because the expressed is a
Bedeutung, that is, an ideality that does not “exist” in the world.
3. L o ok in g at it from an oth er view point will confirm that there
can be no expression without a voluntary intention. In fact, expression
is always inhabited, anim ated by a bedeuten, as a wanting-to-say <vouloir-
clire>, because for H usserl the Deutung, let us say, the interpretation, the
understanding, or the cognition, o f the Bedeutung c m never have taken
place outside o f oral discourse {Recle). Only such a discourse can m ake
itself available to a Deutung. The latter is never essentially a reading but
rath er a hearing. What “wants to say,” what the “m ean in g” wants to say,
the Bedeutung, is reserved for the one who speaks and who speaks insofar
as he says what he wants to say: on purpose, explicitly, and consciously.
Let us verify this.
Husserl recognizes that his use o f the w ord “expression” “constrains”
the language a little. But the constraint which is thus practiced purifies
his intention and at once reveals a com m on stock o f m etaphysical im pli
cations. H usserl writes, “We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility,
that each discourse [Recle\ or part o f discourse [Recleteil], as also each sign
that is essentially o f the sam e sort, shall count as an expression, whether
or not such discourse is actually uttered [wirklich geredet], or addressed
with com m unicative intent to any persons or not.”4 Thus all o f what con
stitutes the actuality o f what is uttered, the physical incarnation o f the
Bedeutung, the body o f speech, which in its ideality belongs to an em piri
cally d eterm in ate lan guage, is, if not outside o f discourse, at least for-
* Ideas 1, §124. Elsewhere we analyze more directly the problematic of “wanting-to-say” ancl
expression in Ideas I. See “La f orme et le vouloir-clire: Note sur la phénom énologie du lan
gage,” in Reime internationale de philosophie, Sept. 1967.
ME ANI NG AS S O L I L O Q U Y
eign to expressivity as such, to this pure intention without which no dis

course would be possible. T he entire stratum o f em pirical actuality, that
is, the factual totality o f discourse, belongs to this indication, the extent
o f which we have not finished recognizing. T h e actuality, the totality o f
these events o f discourse, is not only indicative because it is in the world,
aban don ed to the world, but also, correlatively, because, as <37> such,
the actuality o f discourse keeps in itself som ething o f involuntary associa
tion. For if intentionality has never simply m eant will <volonté>, it indeed
seem s that in the o rd er o f the lived-experiences o f expression (supposing
that it has limits) intentional consciousness and voluntary consciousness
are, in H usserl’s eyes, synonyms. And if we were ju st thinking— as H us
serl will authorize in Ideas I — that every intentional lived-experience can
in principle be taken up into a lived-experience o f expression, we should
perhaps conclude that, despite all the them es o f receptive or intuitive
intentionality and o f passive genesis, the concept o f intentionality is still
taken in the tradition o f a voluntaristic metaphysics, that is, perhaps taken
simply in the metaphysics. T h e explicit teleology that orders all o f tran
scendental phenom enology would basically be only a transcendental vol
untarism . Sense wants to signify itself; it expresses itself only in a wanting-
to-say which is only a wanting-to-say-itself o f the presence o f sense.
This explains that all o f what escapes from pure spiritual intention,
from pure anim ation by the Geist which is the will, all o f that is excluded
from bedeuten and therefore from expression: fo r exam ple, facial expres
sions, the various gestures, the totality o f the body and o f m undane regis
tration, in a word, the totality o f the visible as such and o f the spatial as
such. As such — that is, insofar as they are not w orked over by Geist, by the
will, by the Geistigkeit which, in the word as well as in the hum an body,
transform s the Körper into Leib (into flesh). T he opposition o f the soul
and the body is not only at the center o f this doctrine o f signification, it
is confirm ed by the doctrine and, as it has always basically been d on e in
philosophy, the opposition d ep en d s on an interpretation o f language.
Visibility as such and spatiality as such could only lose the self-presence
o f the will and o f the spiritual anim ation which opens up discourse. They
are literally the death of that self presence. Thus, as H usserl writes,
Such a definition exclud es [from expression ] facial expression s ancl

the various gestures which <38> involuntarily [-unwillkürlich] accom pany
speech without com m unicative intent, or those in which a p erso n ’s
psychic states achieve u n d erstan dab le “ex p re ssio n ” for his environm ent,
without the aclclecl help o f discourse. Such “extern alization s” [Äusserun
gen] are not expression s in the sense o f discourse [Rede], they have no
p h en om en al unity, in the consciousness o f th e o n e who externalizes
VOICE AND P H E N O M E N O N
him self, with the extern alized livecl-expei iences. By m eans o f them, an
individual com m unicates nothing to another. In the externalization of
these livecl-experiences by means o f them , the intention to expose som e
“th ou gh t” in an express way [in aiisdrikkdicher Weise] is m issing, whether
for the individual him self, in his solitary state, or for others. Such “e x
p ressions,” in short, have properly speaking no Bedeutung,r>
They do not want to say anything because they do not want to say anything.
In the ord er o f signification, the express intention is an intention to ex
press. T he im plicit does not belon g to the essence o f discourse. What
H usserl asserts here concerning gestures and facial expressions would o f
course have to hold a fortiori for p recon scious or unconscious language.
T hat we may eventually “in terpret” the gesture, the facial expres
sion, the non-conscious, the involuntary, indication in general, that we
may at times take them up and m ake them explicit in a discursive and
express commentary, that only confirm s, in H usserl’s eyes, the precedin g
distinctions. This interpretation (Deutung) m akes a latent expression be
heard, a wan ting-to-say (bedeuten <voidoir-dire>) which was still h old in g it
self in reserve. Non-expressive signs want to say (bedeuten) only insofar as
one can make them say what was m urm uring in them, what was wanting
to be said in a sort o f m um bling. Gestures want to say only insofar as we
can listen to them, interpret them (deuten). As long as we identify Sinn
and Bedeutung, all o f what resists the Deutung \las no sense and is not lan
gu age in the strict sense. The essence o f lan guage is its telos and its telos
is voluntary consciousness as wanting-to-say. The indicative sphere which
rem ains outside <39> expressivity so defin ed dem arcates the failure o f
this telos. The indicative sphere represents all o f what, while interweaving
itself with expression, cannot be taken up into a deliberate discourse that
is perm eated by wanting-to-say.
For all o f these reasons, we do not have the right to distinguish
between indication and expression as between a non-linguistic sign and
a linguistic sign. H usserl traces out a bo rd er which does not pass between
lan guage and non-language, but, within lan gu age in general, between
the express an d the non-express (with all o f their connotations). For it
would be difficult— and in fact im possible— to exclude from language all
the indicative forms. At most, we can therefore distinguish with H usserl
between linguistic signs “in the strict sen se” and linguistic signs in the
broad sense, ju stify in g his exclusion o f gestures and facial expression,
H usserl in effect concludes:
It is not to the poin t that an o th er person may interpret [deuten] ou r

involuntary externalizations [unwillkürlichen Äusserungen], e.g., our
“expressive m ovem ents,” ancl that he may thereby becom e deeply ac
quain ted with our inner thoughts ancl em otions. They (these external-
izations) “want to say” [bedeuten] som eth in g to him insofar as he inter
prets [deuiet] them, bu t even for him they have no Bedeutungen in the
strict sense o f linguistic signs [ini prägnanten Sinne sprachlicher Zeichen],
but only in the sense o f indicating/' ()
This leads us to look fo r the limit o f the indicative field still farther-.
In fact, even for the one who restores the discursivity in the gestures
o f others, the indicative m anifestations o f others are not transform ed
into expressions. It is the interpreter who expresses him self in regard to
them. Perhaps there is som eth in g in the relation to others that m akes
indication irreducible.
B) In fact, it is not en ough to recognize oral discourse as the m i
lieu o f expressivity. Once we have excluded all the non-discursive signs
which are given im m ediately as exterior to speech (gestures, facial ex
pressions) , still <40> we find, this time within speech, a non-expressivity
whose scope is considerable. This non-expressivity is not only based on
the physical side o f expression (“the sensible sign, the articulate phonic
com plex, the sign written on p a p e r”). Husserl writes, “T he sim ple distinc
tion between physical signs and sense-giving lived-experiences in general
is by no means enough, and not at all enough for logical p u rp o ses.”7
Considering now the non-physical side o f discourse, Husserl there
fo re excludes from it, always under the h eadin g o f indication, all that
arises fro m the communication or from the manifestations o f psychical lived-
experience. The m ovem ent that justifies this exclusion should teach us
a lot about the m etaphysical tenor o f this phenom enology. The them es
which are presented here will never be put back into question by Husserl.
On the contrary, they will constantly get confirm ed. They are goin g to
make us think that what, in the final analysis, separates expression from
indication is what we could call the im m ediate non-selfLpresence o f the
living present. The values o f m undane existence, naturality, sensibility,
empiricity, association, etc., which determ ined the concept of indication,
are p e rh ap s— across o f course m any m ediations that we are anticipat
in g— goin g to find their final unity in this non-presence. And this non-
self-presence o f the living presen t will qualify sim ultaneously the relation
to others in general and the self-relation o f tem poralization.
This is sketched out slowly, discretely, but rigorously in the Logical
Investigations. We have seen that the difference between indication and
expression was functional or intentional but not substantial. H usserl can

therefore con sid er that the elem ents o f the- order that is substantially
discursive (words, the parts o f discourse in general) function in certain
cases as indications. And this indicative function o f discourse is massively
at work. All discourse, insofar as it is engaged in a communicat ion and insofar
as it manifests lived-experiences, operates as indication. In this case, words act
like gestures. Or <41> rather, the very con cept o f gesture should be d e
term ined on the basis o f indication as non-expressivity.
Husserl admits, of course, that the function for which expression
is “originally fra m ed ” is com m unication. ' 8 And yet expression is never
purely itself insofar as it fulfills this originative function. Only when com
m unication is suspen ded is pure expressivity able to appear.
What in fact happens in com m unication? Sensible (audible or vis
ible, etc.) ph en om en a are anim ated by the acts o f a subject who endows
them with sense, and sim ultaneously another subject m ust understand
the anim ating subject’s intention. Now “anim ation” cannot be p u re and
total. It m ust traverse the non-diaphaneity o f a body and in a certain way
be lost there. H usserl writes,
But this com m unication becom es a possibility if the au d ito r also under
stands the sp eak er’s intention. H e does this inasm uch as he takes the
sp eak er to be a person, who is not m erely uttering sounds but speak
ing to him, who is accom panying those soun ds with certain sense-giving
acts, which the sounds reveal to the hearer, or whose sense they seek
to com m unicate to him. What first m akes spiritual exch an ge possible,
ancl turns conn ected discourse into a discourse, lies in the correlation
am on g co rrespo n d in g physical ancl psychic livecl-experiences o f com
m unicating persons which is m ediated by the physical side o f speech .9
Everything in my discourse which is destined to m anifest a lived-

experience to another person must pass through the m ediation o f the
physical side. This irreducible m ediation involves every expression in
an indicative operation. T h e m anifestation function (kundgebende Funk
tion) is an indicative function. H ere we are drawing n ear to the root
o f indication: there is indication each time that an act endow ing sense,
the an im atin g intention, the living spirituality o f a m eaning <vouloir-
dire>, is not fully present. In effect, when I listen to anoth er person, his
lived-experience is not presen t to me “in p erso n ” and originally. I can
have, <42> H usserl thinks, an originary intuition, that is, an im m ediate
perception, o f what is exposed o f that person in the world, the visibility

o f his body, his gestures, a perception o f what lets itself be heard from
the sounds that he utters. But the subjective side o f his experience, his
consciousness, the acts by which in particular he endows sense to the
signs, are not im m ediately and originarily present as they are for him and
as mine are for me. Here we have an irreducible and definitive limit. T he
lived-experience o f another becom es m anifest to me only insofar as it is
m ediately indicated by the signs involving a physical side. The very idea
o f the “physical,” o f the “physical side,” can only be thought in its prop er
difference on the basis o f this m ovem ent o f indication.
In o rd e r to explain the irreducibly indicative character o f m anifes
tation, even in discourse, H usserl already proposes motives whose system
the fifth o f the Cartesian Meditations will develop minutely. O utside o f the
transcendental m onadic sphere o f my own (mir eigenes), outside o f the
propriety o f my own (Eigenheit), o f my presen ce to myself, I have with
what another owns, with the oth er’s presence to himself, only relations
o f analogical appresentation, relations o f mediate ancl potential intentionality.
O riginary presentation is forbidden to me. What will be described then
un der the watchful eye o f a differentiated, audacious, and rigorous tran
scendental reduction is here in the Logical Investigations sketched out in
the “parallel” dim ension o f the psychical. H usserl writes,
Th e h earer perceives the m anifestation in the sam e sense in which he

perceives the very person who m anifests— even though the psychic
p h en om en a which m ake him a person cannot fall, fo r what they are,
in the intuitive grasp o f another. C om m on langu age credits us with
percepts even o f other p e o p le ’s psychic livecl-experiences; we “se e”
their anger, their pain, etc. Such talk is quite correct, as lon g as, e.g.,
we allow outward bodily things likewise to count as perceived, ancl as
lon g as, in general, the notion of <43> perception is not restricted to
ad equ ate perception , to intuition in the strict sense. If the essential
characteristic o f p erception lies in the intuitive intention [Vermeinen]
claim ing to grasp a thing or an event insofar as they are them selves
presen t [gegenwärtigen] — such an intention is possible, ancl it is even
given in the im m ense majority o f cases without any conceptual or
exp ress form ulatio n — then the graspin g o f the m anifestation [Kund-
ncihme] is a sim ple perception o f the m anifestation [Kundgabe] . . . . The
h earer perceives the fact that the one who is speaking is externalizing
certain psychic livecl-experiences, ancl to that extent he also perceives
these livecl-experiences. H e does not, however, live them him self; he
has no “in tern al” p erception o f them, only an “e x tern al” perception.
H ere we have the b ig difference between the actual grasp o f a bein g in
adequ ate intuition, ancl the inten ded [vermeintlichen] grasp o f a b ein g
u pon the fou ndation o f an intuitive but in adequ ate representation. In
the form er case, we have to clo with a b ein g given in livecl-experience, in
the latter case with a p resum ed [supponiertes\ being, to which no truth
correspo n d s at all. Mutual u n d erstan din g dem an ds a certain correla
tion am on g the psychic acts which are un folded fi om the two sides o f
m anifestation ancl in the graspin g o f the m anifestation, but not at all
their full identity.10
T he notion o f presence is the nerve o f this dem onstration. If com m u

nication or m anifestation (Kundgabe) is essentially indicative, it is so be
cause the presence o f the oth er’s lived-experience is denied to our origi
nary intuition. Each time that the im m ediate and full presen ce o f the
signified will be stolen away, the signifier will be o f an indicative nature.
(This is why Kundgabe, which we are translating loosely by “m anifesta
tion,” does not m anifest, renders n othin g m anifest, if m anifest m eans
evident, open, offered “in p erso n .” Kundgabe announces and at the sam e
tim e snatches away what it is inform ing us about.) All discourse, or rather,
all o f what, in discourse, does not restore the im m ediate presence o f the
signified content, is in-expressive. Pure expressivity will be the pure ac
tive intention (spirit, psyche, life, will) o f a <44> bedeuten that is anim ating
a discourse whose content (Bedeutung) will be present. It is present not
in nature, since indication alone takes place in nature and in space, but in
consciousness. T herefore it is presen t to an “internal” intuition or to an
“in tern al” perception. But we ju st un d erstood why it is presen t to an intu
ition that is not that o f the other in a case o f com m unication. T herefore
this is self-present in the life o f a present that has still not exited from itself
into the world, into space, into nature. With all o f these “exitings” exiling
this life o f self-presence into indication, we can be sure that indication,
which covers so far nearly the entire surface o f language, is the process
o f death at work in the signs. And as soon as the other appears, indicative
lan gu age— which is an oth er nam e o f the relation to death — no longer
lets itself be erased.
T he relation to the oth er as non-presence is therefore the im pu
rity o f expression. In ord er to reduce indication in language and attain
once m ore finally pure expressivity, it is therefore necessary to suspend
the relation to others. T h en I would no longer have to pass through the
m ediation o f the physical side or through any appresentation in general.
Section 8, “Expressions in the Solitary Life o f the Soul,” follows therefore
a path which, from two viewpoints, is parallel to the path o f the reduction
to the m onadic sphere o f Eigenheit in the Cartesian Meditations: the paral
lel o f the psychical and the transcendental, and the parallel o f the stra-
ME A NI NG AS S O L I L O Q U Y
turn o f expressive lived-experiences and the stratum o f lived-experiences

in general. H usserl says,
So fa r we have con sid ered expressions as used in com m unication,

which last d ep en d essentially on the fact that they operate inclicatively.
But expression s also play a great part in the life o f the soul insofar as it
is not en gaged in a relation o f com m unication. This change in func
tion plainly has nothing to clo with whatever m akes an expression an
expression. E xpression s continue to have their Bedeutungen as they had
before, ancl the same Bedeutungen as in dialogue. A word only ceases to
be a word when our interest is directed exclusively on <45> the sensible,
when it b ecom es a sim ple phonic form . B u t when we live in the u nder
stan ding o f a word, it expresses som eth in g ancl the sam e thing, whether
we address it to anyone or not. It seem s clear, therefore, th at an expres
sio n ’s Bedeutung, ancl what yet belon gs to it essentially, cannot coincide
with its activity o f m an ifestation .11
The first advantage o f this reduction to the interior m on ologue is

therefore that the physical event o f lan guage seem s to be in deed absent
from interior m onologue. To the extent that the unity o f the w ord— what
m akes it recognizable as a word, as the same word, the unity o f a phonic
com plex and a sen se— can n ot be m erged with the m ultiplicity o f the
sensible events o f its em ploym ent nor does it d ep en d on them, the same
ness o f the word is ideal. It is the ideal possibility o f repetition and it loses
nothing with the reduction o f any, and therefore o f every em pirical event
m arked by its ap p earan ce. While “what we are to use as an indication
[the distinctive sign] m ust be perceived by us as an existent,”12 the unity
o f a word owes nothing to its existence (Dasein, Existenz). Its expressivity,
which does not need an em pirical body but only the ideal and identical
form o f this body insofar as it is an im ated by a wanting-to-say, owes noth
ing to any m undane, em pirical, etc. existence. In “the solitary life o f the
sou l,” the pure unity o f expression as such should therefore finally be
restored to me.
Is this to say that in speaking to m yself I com m unicate nothing to
m yself? Is it the case that then the “K u n d gab e” and the “K u n dn ah m e”
are suspended? Is it the case th at non-presence is reduced and with it in
dication, analogical detour, etc.? Do I then no longer m odify myself? Is
it the case that I learn n othing about m yself?
H usserl considers the objection and then sets it aside: “Shall one say
that one who speaks in solitude to himself, and that for him also the words
serve as signs [Zeichen], namely, indications [Anzeichen] o f his own psychic
lived-experiences? I do not think that such a view m ust be h eld.” 13
<46> H u sserl’s argum entation here is decisive and we m ust follow it

closely. T h e whole theory o f signification announced in this first chapter o f
essential distinctions w ould collapse if a function o f Kundgabe/Kunclnah me
would not let itself be reduced in the sphere o f my own lived-experiences,
and if overall the ideal or absolute solitude o f “p ro p e r” subjectivity still
needed indications in ord er to constitute its own self-relation. And fun
dam entally let us not deceive ourselves here: the need fo r indications
m eans quite sim ply the n eed for signs. For it is m ore and m ore clear that,
despite the initial distinction between the indicative sign and the expres
sive sign, only indication is truly a sign for H usserl. Full exp ressio n —
that is, as we shall see later, the fulfilled intention o f the m ean in g— in a
certain way, escapes from the con cept o f sign. Already in the sentence
that we ju st cited from H u sserl, we could read: “signs, namely, indica
tions.” But let us still con sider that as a slip o f the tongue whose truth will
be revealed only later. Instead o f saying “signs, namely, indications” (als
Zeichen, nämlich als Anzeichen), let us say: “signs, namely, signs in the form
o f in dication s.” For on the surface o f his text, Husserl continues to re
spect for the m om ent the initial distinction between two sorts o f signs.
In order to dem onstrate th at indication no lon ger functions in the
solitary life o f the soul, Husserl begins by m arking the difference between
two kinds o f “referral”: referral as Hinzdgen (which we must keep from
translating as indication, at least for conventional reasons and if we do
not want to destroy the coherence o f the text; let us say arbitrarily “m on
stration”) and referral as Anzeigen (indication). Now, as H usserl writes, if
in silent m onologue “words function as signs here as they do everywhere,”
an d if “everywhere we can speak simply o f an act o f m onstration [Hinzei-
gen\,”[4 then the transgression o f expression toward sense, o f the signifier
toward the signified, is here no lon ger an indication. T he Hinzeigen is not
an Anzeigen. For this transgression or, if you like, here this referral <47>
does without all existence (Dasein, Existenz). In contrast, in indication,
an existing sign, an em pirical event refers to a content w hose existence
is at least presum ed. It motivates ou r anticipation or our conviction o f
the existence o f what is indicated. We cannot think indication without
m aking the category o f em pirical, that is, m erely prob ab le, existence
intervene, and this will also be the definition o f m undane existence for
Husserl in opposition to the existence o f the ego cogito. T he reduction to
m onologue is really a bracketing o f em pirical, m undane existence. In the
“solitary life of the soul,” we no lon ger m ake use of real (wirklich) words,
but only o f represented (vorgestellt) words. A nd lived-experience— about
which we w ere w ondering if it was not itse lf “indicated” to the speaking
subject— does not have to be thus indicated; it is im m ediately certain and
self-present. While in real com m unication, existing signs indicate other
M E A NI NG AS S O L I L O Q U Y
existents which are only p robable and m ediately evoked, in m onologue,

when the expression is full,'"'15 non-existent signs show <48> the signifieds
(Bedeutungen), which are ideal and therefore non-existent, and certain,
for they are presen t to intuition. As for the certainty o f internal exis
tence, it has no need, H usserl thinks, o f being signified. It is im m ediately
present to itself. It is living consciousness.
In interior m on ologue, the word would therefore be m erely rep
resented. Its place can be the im aginary (Phantasie). We are content to
imagine the word whose existence is in this way neutralized. In this im agi
nation o f the word, in this im aginary representation o f the word (Phan
tasievorstellung) , we no lon ger need the em pirical event o f the word. We
are indifferent to its existence or non-existence. For if we need then the
imagination o f the word, at the sam e time we do without the imagined
word. The im agination o f the word, the im agined, the im agined-being
o f the word, its “im age,” is not the (im agined) word. Ju st as in the per
ception o f the word, the (perceived or appearin g) word which is “in the
world” belongs to a radically different ord er fro m that o f the perception
or the ap p earin g o f the word, the perceived-being o f the word, likewise
the (im agined) word is o f a radically heterogeneous order from that o f
the im agination o f the word. T his difference, which is at once sim ple and
subtle, m akes the irreducible specificity o f phenom enality appear. We are
able to understand nothing o f ph en om en ology if we do not pay constant
and vigilant attention to this specificity.
But why is Husserl not satisfied with the difference between the ex
isting (perceived) word and the perception or the perceived being, the
:i: In order not to confuse ancl multiply the difficulties, we are considering here in this
precise place only perfect expressions, that is, the ones fo r which the “Bedeutungsinten
tion” is “fulfilled.” We are authorized to do this insofar as this fullness, as we shall see, is
the telos and the achievement of what Husserl wants here to isolate under the name o f
wanting-to-say and expression. Non-fulfillment will bring to the surface originary problem s
to which we shall return below.
Let us cite the passage which suppor ts what we were just saying: “But if we reflect on
the relation o f expression and Bedeutung, anci to this end break up our complex, intimately
unified lived-experience o f the expression fulfilled with sense, into the two factors of word
and sense, the word comes before us intrinsically indifferent, whereas the sense seems the
thing aimed at by the verbal sign, and meant by its means: the expression seems to direct
interest away fr om itself towards its sense [von sich ab und au f den Sinn hinzulenken], and to
refer [,hinzuzeigen] to the latter. But this reference [Hinzeigen] is not an indication [das Anzei
gen] in the sense previously discussed. The existence [Dasein] of the sign neither ‘motivates’
the existence of the meaning, nor, properly expressed, our conviction in the existence of
the Bedeutung. What we are to use as an indication [the distinctive sign] must be perceived
by us as existent [als daseiend]. This holds also of expressions used in communicative dis
course, but not for expressions used in solitary discourse” (First Logical Investigation, §8).
p h en om en on o f the word? It is because in the ph en om enon o f percep

tion, a reference is located in phenom enality itself to the existence o f the
word. T he sense “existen ce” belongs then to the phen om en on . This is
no longer the case in the ph en om en on o f im agination. In im agination,
the existence o f the word is not im plied, not even by m eans o f the inten
tional sense. What then exists is only the im agination o f the word, which is
itself absolutely certain and self:present insofar as it is a lived-experience.
What we already have here is a phenom enological reduction, that isolates
the subjective lived-experience as the <49> sphere o f absolute certainty
and absolute existence. This absolute o f existence appears only in the
reduction o f existence that is relative to the transcendent world. And it
is already im agination, “the vital elem ent o f ph en om en ology” {Ideas I ) ,16
which gives this m ovem ent its privileged m edium . H usserl writes,
H ere [in solitary discou rse], we are in general content with represented
w ords rather than with real words. In im agination, a spoken or printed
word floats before us, though in reality it has no existence. We sh ould
not, however, confuse im aginative represen tatio n s [Phantasievorstellun
gen], ancl still less the contents o f im agination on which they rest, with
their im agined objects. The im agined verbal sound, or the im agined
printed word, does not exist, only its im aginative representation does
so. T h e diff eren ce is the differen ce betw een im agined centaurs ancl the
im agination o f such beings. T h e w ord’s non-existence [Nicht-Exislenz]
n either disturbs nor interests us, since it leaves the w ord’s expressive
function u n affecte d .17
T h is argum entation would be very fragile if it app ealed only to a

classical psychology o f im agination. And it would be really unwise to un
derstand it in this way. For such a psychology, the im age is a picture-sign
whose reality (whether it is physical or psychical) indicates the im agined
object. Husserl will show in Ideas I how such a conception leads to aporias."'
* Cf. §90 ancl the entire chapter 4 of part 3, in par ticular §99, 109,111, ancl especially 112: “This
will only be changed when there will be more extensive practice in genuine phenomenologi
cal analysis than heretofore has been the case. As long as one deals with livecl-experiences as
‘contents’ or as psychical ‘elements’ which are still regarded as bits of things [Sächelchen] de
spite all the fashionable arguments against atomizing and physicalizing psychology, as long
as one believes that he has found, accordingly, the distinction between ‘sensation-contents’
an d corresponding ‘fantasy-contents’ only in the material traits o f ‘intensity,’ ‘fullness,’ or
the like, there can be no improvement. One must first learn to see that at issue here is a dif
ference pertaining to consciousness.” <Translator: The equivalent passage can be found on
pages 262-63 o f the Kersten English tran slations T h e phenomenological originality that
Husserl wants thus to respect leads him to posit an absolute heterogeneity between percep
M E A NI NG AS S O L I L O Q U Y
Insofar as it is the intentional sense <50> or noem a, and although it be

longs to the sphere o f the existence and absolute certainty o f conscious
ness, the im age is not a reality duplicating another reality This is the case
not only because the im age is not a reality (Realität) in nature, but also
because the noem a is a non-reell (reell) com pon en t o f consciousness.
Saussure was also careful to distinguish between the real word and
its im age. He acknow ledged the expressive value o f the “signifier” solely
in the form o f the “acoustic im age.”"'18 <51> “Signifier” means “acoustic
tion or originary presentation (Gegenwärtigung, Präsentation) ancl re-presentation or rep

resentative re-production, which we also translate by presentifications (Vergegenwärtigung).
Memory, the image, the sign are re-presentations in this sense. Truly, Husserl is not led to
acknowledge this heterogeneity. This heterogeneity constitutes the whole possibility of phe
nomenology which makes sense only if a pure and originary presentation is possible and
original. Therefore, although we cannot study here directly the complex and fundamental
system o f such a distinction (to which we must add, at the least, the distinction between posi
tional [setzende] re-presentation and imaginary re-presentation [Phan tasieAlergegemuärtigung]
which is neutral in this regard), it is therefore the indispensable instrument for a criti
cism o f classical psychology, and in particular for a criticism o f the classical psycholog)7
of the imagination and o f the sign. But are we able to take this criticism o f naive psychol
ogy only up to a certain point? And are we able to show finally that the theme and value
of “pure presentation,” of originary and pure perception, of full and simple presence,
etc., constitute the complicity of phenomenology with classical psychology, their common
metaphysical presupposition? By asserting that perception does not exist or that what we call
perception is not originary, and that in a certain way everything “begins” by means of “re
presentation” (this is a proposition which obviously can be sustained only within the era
sure of these last two concepts; this proposition means that there is no “beginning” and
the “re-presentation” o f which we are speaking is not the modification o f a “re” that has
supewened upon an originary presentation), by re-inserting the difference of the “sign” in
the heart o f the “originary,” what is at issue is not to tur n back away from transcendental
phenom enology— and it does not matter whether this turning back would be toward an
“empiricism” or toward a “Kantian” critique o f the claim to an originary intuition. In this
way we have just designated the primary intention— and the distant horizon— of the pres
ent essay.
* It is necessary to put the following passage of the Course in General Linguistics sicle by
sicle with the text o f the Logical investigations: “The linguistic sign is not a link between a
thing and a name, but between a concept and an acoustic image. The acoustic image is
not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. The acoustic image is the h earer’s
psychological impression of a sound, a representation as given to him by the evidence of
his senses. The acoustic image may be called a ‘m aterial’ element only in that it is the rep
resentation o f our sensory impression. The acoustic image may thus be distinguished from
the other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally o f a
more abstract kind: the concept. The psychological nature of our acoustic images becomes
clear when we consider our own linguistic activity. Without moving either lips or tongue, we can
speak to ourselves or recite silently a piece o f verse” (Course in General Linguistics, page 66; my ital
ics). And Saussure adds this warning that we have really quickly forgotten: “We grasp the
words of a language as acoustic images. That is why it is best to avoid referring to them as
com posed o f the ‘phonem es’ that make up the words. Such a term, implying the activity
im age.” But since Saussure does not take the “phen om en ological” precau
tion, he turns the acoustic im age, the sign ifieras a “psychical im pression,”
into a reality whose sole originality is to be interior; by doin g this, he only
moves the problem to a different place. Now, if Husserl, in the Logical In
vestigations, leads his description into a psychical and not transcendental
zone, he then nevertheless discerns the essential com ponents o f a struc
ture that he will delineate in Ideas I: ph en om en al lived-experience does
not belon g to reality (Realität). In p h en om en al lived-experience, certain
elem ents belon g in a reell m an n er (reell) to consciousness (hyle, morphè,
and noesis), but the noem atic content, the <52> sense is a non-reell (reell)
com pon en t o f the lived-experience.: The irreality o f internal discourse
is therefore a very differentiated structure. Husserl very precisely writes,
although without em phasis:
. . . a spoken or p rin ted w ord floats b efo re us, though in reality, it has
no existence. We sh ou ld not, however, confuse im aginative representa
tions [Phantasievorstellungen], and still less [my em phasis] the contents o f
im agination on which they rest, with their im agined o b jects.19
T herefore, not only d o e s the im agination o f the word, which is not the
im agined word, not exist, but the content (the noem a) o f this im agination
exists still less than the act.
of the vocal apparatus, is appropriate to the spoken word, to the realization of the inner
image in discourse.” This warning has been forgotten, but this is probably so because the
proposition that Saussure advances as a replacem ent only aggravates the risk: “Speaking o f
the sounds ancl syllables of a word need not give rise to any misunderstanding, provided that
one always bears in mind that the nam es refer to the acoustic image.” We must of course
acknowledge that it is easier to remember that warning when we speak of the phoneme
than when we speak of the sound. The sound is thought outside of any real vocal activity
only insofar as we situate it as an object in nature, and this situating in nature is clone more
easily with the sound than with the phoneme.
In order to avoid these misunderstandings, Saussure concludes in this way: “The ambi
guity would be removed if these three notions in question were designated by ter ms which
are related but contrasted. We propose to keep the term sign to designate the whole, but
to replace concept and acoustic image respectively by signified and signifier'” (Course in General
Linguistics, page 67). We could posit the equivalence signifier/expression, sig n ifie d /^ -
deutung, if the structure bedeuten/Bedeutung/sen se/ob ject were not a lot more complex in
Husserl than in Saussure. Also it would be necessaiy to compare systematically the opera
tion to which Husserl proceeds in the First Logical Investigation to the delimitation by
Saussure of the “internal system” o f language.
:i: Concerning the non-reality o f the noema in the case of the image and the sign, see, in
particular,/rfefls I, §102.
Meaning and Representation
<53> Let us recall the objective and nerve o f this dem onstration: the
pure function o f expression and o f m ean in g <vouloir~clire> lies not in
com m unicating, inform ing, m anifesting, that is, not in indicating. Now,
the “solitary life o f the so u l” would prove that this kind o f expression
without indication is possible. In solitary discourse, the subject learns
nothing about himself, m anifests nothing to himself. In order to sustain
this dem onstration, whose con sequ en ces will be limitless in ph en om e
nology, Husserl appeals to two types o f argum ents.
1. In internal discourse, I com m unicate nothing to myself. I indi
cate nothing to myself. I can at most im agine m yself doing that, I can
m erely represen t m yself as m an ifestin g som eth in g to myself. H ere we
have only a representation and an imagination.
2. In internal discourse, I com m unicate nothing to m yself and I
can only pretend to, because I have no neecl to communicate anything to my
self. Such an op eratio n — com m unication from self to self— cannot take
place because it would m ake no sense. And it would m ake no sense be
cause it would have no purpose. The existence o f psychical acts does not
have to be indicated (recall that only an existence can in gen eral be indi
cated) because the existence o f psychical acts is im m ediately present to
the subject in the present instant.
<54> Let us first read the paragraph that ties together the two ar
guments:
O ne o f course speaks, in a certain sense, even in solitary discourse, ancl

it is certainly possible to think o f on eself as speaking, ancl even as speak
ing to oneself, as, for exam ple, when som eon e says to himself: “you
have gon e wrong, you c a n ’t go on like that.” But in the genuine sense
o f com m unication, there is no speech in such cases, n or cloes one tell
o n eself anything: one m erely represents oneself [man stellt sich vor] as
speaking ancl com m unicating. In a m o n ologu e words can p erform no
function o f indicating the existence [Dasein] o f psychic acts, since such
indication would there be quite purp oseless [ganz zwecklos wäre]. For the
acts in question are them selves lived by us at that very instant [im selben
Augenblick] . 1
These assertions raise very diverse questions. But they concern the
entire status o f representation in language. H ere we have to consider rep
resentation in the general sense o f Vorstellung, but also in the sense o f re
presentation as the repetition or reproduction o f presentation, as Verge-
gejiwcirtigimg m odifying Präsentation or Gegenwärtigung. Finally we have to
consider the sense o f a representative taking the place of, occupying the
place o f another Vorstellung (Repräsentation, Repräsentant, Stellverstreter)
Let us first consider the first argument. In m onologue, we com m u
nicate nothing to ourselves; one represents on eself (man stellt sich vor)
as being a speaking and com m unicating subject. H usserl here seem s to
apply to language the fundam ental distinction between reality and rep
resentation. Between actual com m unication (indication) and “repre
sen ted ” com m unication, there would be an essential difference, a sim ple
exteriority. Moreover, in ord er to gain access to <55> internal language
(in the sense o f com m unication) as pure representation ( Vorstellung),
we would have to pass through fiction, that is, through a particular type
o f representation: the im aginary representation that Husserl will define
later as neutralizing representation (Vergegenwärtigung).
Can we apply this system o f distinctions to language? First, we would
have to assum e that in com m unication, in the so-called “actual” practice
o f language, representation (in all the senses o f this word) would not be
essential and constitutive. We would have to assum e that representation
is only an accident ad d ed contingently onto the practice o f discourse.
Now, there are grounds for thinking that in language representation and
reality are not ad d ed together here and there, fo r the sim ple reason that
it is im possible in principle to distinguish them rigorously. And no doubt
we must not say that that im possibility is p rod u ced in lan guage. L an
guage in general is that im possibility— by m eans o f itself alone.
H usserl him self provides us with the m eans to argue fo r th at against
him. In fact, when I, actually, as we say, m ake use o f words, whether I do
this for com m unicative purposes or not (let us place ourselves here prior
to this distinction and in the case o f the sign in gen eral), from the start
I must operate (in) a structure o f repetition whose elem ent can only be
representative. A sign is never an event if event means an em pirical sin
gularity that is irreplaceable and irreversible. A sign that would take place
only “o n ce” would not be a sign. A purely idiom atic sign would not be
a sign. A signifier (in general) m ust be recognizable in its form despite
* See on this subject the note by the French translators of the Logical Investigations {Re
cherches logiques, vol· 2, part 1, p. 276) ancl that by the French translators of The Phenomenology
of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Leçons, p. 26).
ME A NI NG AND R E P R E S E N T A T I O N
and across the diversity o f the em pirical characteristics that can modify
it. It m ust rem ain the same an d be able to be repeated as such despite and
across the deform ations that what we call the em pirical event m akes it
necessarily undergo. A p h on em e or graphem e is necessarily always other,
to a certain extent, each time that it is presen ted in a procedu re or a
perception, but it can function as a sign and as language in general only
<56> if a form al identity allows it to be reissued and to be recognized.
This identity is necessarily ideal. It therefore necessarily im plies a repre
sentation, as Vorstellung, the place o f ideality in general, as Vergegenwärti
gung, the possibility o f reproductive repetition in general, as Repräsenta
tion, insofar as each signifying event is a substitute (o f the signified as well
as o f the ideal form o f the signifier). Since this representative structure is
signification itself, I cannot open up an “actual” discourse without bein g
originarily engaged in an indefinite representativity.
Perhaps som eone will object to us that H usserl wants precisely to
bring to light this exclusively representative character o f expressivity by
means o f his hypothesis o f a solitary discourse which would respon d to
the essence o f discourse by d rop p in g the com m unicative and indicative
shell. This person m ight continue by saying that we have form ulated ou r
question precisely with H usserlian concepts. O f course. But the point is
that H usserl wants to describe only the way that expression, and not signi
fication in general, belongs to the order o f representation as Vorstellung.
Now we ju st suggested that representation as VorStellung and its other rep
resentative m odifications are im plied by every sign in general. On the
oth er hand and especially, as soon as we adm it that discourse belongs es
sentially to the order o f representation, the distinction between “actu al”
discourse and discursive represen tation becom es suspect, whether the
discourse is purely “expressive” or en gaged in a “com m u n ication .” By
reason o f the originarily repetitive structure o f the sign in general, there
is every chance fo r “actu al” lan guage to be as im aginary as im aginary
discourse and fo r im aginary discourse to be as actual as actual discourse.
W hether w hat is at issue is expression or indicative com m unication, the
difference between reality an d representation, between the true and the
imaginary, between sim ple presen ce and repetition has always already
started to erase itself. D oes not the m aintenance o f this differen ce— in
the history o f m etaphysics and still in H usserl— respond <57> to the ob
stinate desire to save presence and to reduce the sign or to make it be d e
rivative? And with the sign all the potencies o f repetition? This is as well
to live in the— assured, secured, constituted— effect o f repetition, o f re p
resentation, in the effect o f the difference which snatches presence away.
To assert, as we have ju st done, that in the sign the difference does not take
place between reality and representation, etc., am ounts to saying there-
fore that the gesture that sanctions this difference is the very erasure o f
the sign. But there are two ways to erase the* originality o f the sign, and
we m ust be attentive to the instability o f all these movements. T hey pass
in fact very quickly and very subtly from one to the other. We can erase
the sign in the classical way o f a philosophy o f intuition and o f pres
ence. This philosophy erases the sign by m aking it derivative; it cancels
reproduction and representation by turning them into a m odification
that supervenes over a sim ple presence. But since such a philosophy—
and in truth it is the philosophy and history o f the West— has in this way
constituted and established the very con cept o f the sign, this concept, at
the m om ent o f its origin and in the heart o f its sense, is m arked by this
will to derivation and erasure. Consequently, to restore the originality
and the non-derivative character o f the sign against classical m etaphys
ics is also, by m eans o f an ap p aren t paradox, to erase the con cept o f the
sign whose entire history and entire sense belong to the adventure o f
the metaphysics o f presence. This schem a holds as well for the concepts
o f representation, o f repetition, o f difference, etc., as well as for their
entire system. The m ovem ent o f this schem a will only be able, fo r the
m om ent and for a long time, to work over from within, fro m a certain
inside, the language o f m etaphysics. This work undoubtedly has always
already begun. We would have to grasp what happens in this inside when
the closure o f metaphysics comes to be nam ed.
With the difference between real p resen ce and presen ce in rep
resentation as Vorstellung, we find thus, by m eans o f lan guage, a whole
system o f differences drawn into the sam e decon struction :3 <58> the dif
ferences between the represented and the representative in general, the
signified and the signifier, simple presence and its reproduction, presen
tation as Vorstellung and re-presentation as Vergegenwärtigung. This happens
because re-presentation has a presen tation (Präsentation) as Vorstellung
for its represented. In this way— against H u sserl’s express intention— we
com e to m ake Vorstellung in general and, as such, depen d on the possi
bility o f repetition, and the m ost simple Vorstellung, presentation (Gegen-
wärtigung), d ep en d on the possibility o f re-presentation (Vergegenwärti
gung) . We derive the presence-of-the-present from repetition and not the
reverse. This claim is against H u sserl’s express intention, but not without
taking into accoun t— as will perhaps a p p e a r later— what is discovered in
his description o f the m ovem ent o f tem poralization and o f the relation
to the other.
Naturally, the concept o f ideality m ust be at the center o f this kind
o f problem atic. T he structure o f discourse can only be described, ac
cording to Husserl, as ideality. T here is the ideality o f the sensible form
o f the signifier (for exam ple, the sensible form o f the word) which m ust
rem ain the same and can rem ain the sam e only in sofar as it is an ideality.
ME ANI NG AND R E P R E S E N T A T I O N
T hen there is the ideality o f the signified (of the Bedeutung) or o f the
intended sense, which is to be confused neither with the act of intending
nor with the object, since these last two cases m ight, as it may turn out,
not be ideal. Finally, there is the ideality, in certain cases, o f the object
itself which then secures (this is what h appens in the exact sciences) the
ideal transparency and perfect univocity o f lan gu age. Λ But this ideality,
which is only the nam e o f the perm an en ce of the same and the possi
bility o f its repetition, does not exist in the world and it does not com e
from an oth er world. It depen ds entirely on the possibility o f acts o f rep
etition. It is constituted by the possibility o f acts o f repetition. Its “b e in g ”
is proportion ate to the power o f repetition. A bsolute ideality is the cor
relate o f a possibility o f indefinite repetition. We can therefore say that
b ein g is determ ined by Husserl as ideality, that is, as repetition. Historical
p rogress <59> always has for its essential form, according to Husserl, the
constitution o f idealities whose repetition, and therefore tradition, will
be assured to infinity: repetition and tradition, that is, the transm ission
and reactivation o f the origin. And this determ ination o f being as ideality
is really a valuation, an ethico-theoretical act which reawakens the origi-
nary decision o f philosophy in its Platonic form . Husserl at times adm its
this; what he always opposes is a conventional Platonism . When he asserts
the non-existence or the non-reality o f ideality, he does this in ord er to
acknowledge that ideality is accordin g to a m ode that is irreducible to
sensible existence or to em pirical reality, indeed, to their fiction.ΐ By d e
term ining the ontos on as eidos, Plato was doing nothing else.
Now— and here once again we have to articulate the com m entary
on the in terpretation — this determ ination o f being as ideality is m erged
in a p arad o x ical way with the d eterm in ation o f bein g as presen ce.
This is the case n ot only because pure ideality is always that o f an ideal
:i: See on this subject “The Origin of Geometry,” ancl §5 o f the introduction to the French
translation.
t The assertion implied by all o f phenom enology is that of B eing (Sein) as non-reality, non
existence, that o f the Ideal This pre-determination is the first word o f phenomenology.
Although it does not exist, ideality is nothing less than a non-being. Husserl says, “Each
attempt to transform the b ein g of what is ideal [das Sein des Idealen] into the possible being
o f what is real [in ein mögliches Sein non Reedern] must obviously suff er shipwreck on the fact
that possibilities themselves are ideal objects. Possibilities can as little be found in the real
world as can numbers in general, or triangles in general” (Logical Investigations, Second
Investigation, chapter 1, §4). <Translator: T h e equivalent passage can be found on page
243 of the English translation, volume l.> Husserl also writes, “It is naturally not our inten
tion to put the being of what is ideal on a level with the thought-being of the fictitious or the absurd
[Widersinnigeriy’ (Logical Investigations, Second Investigation, chapter 1, §8). <Translator:
The equivalent passage can be found on page 249 o f the English translation, volume 1;
these are Husserl’s italics.>
“ob-ject,” standing over and against, bein g pre-sent in front of, the act
o f repetition— Vorstellung b ein g the general-form o f presence as prox
imity to a look— but also because alone a temporality, determ in ed on
the basis o f the living present as its source, determ ined on the basis o f
the now as “source-point,” can secure the purity o f ideality, that is, the
openness o f the repetition o f the sam e to infinity What does the “prin
ciple o f all p rin cip les” <60> o f ph en o m en ology actually m ean? What
does the value o f originary presence to intuition as the source o f sense
and evidence, as the a priori o f a priori, m ean? It m eans first the certainty,
which is itself ideal and absolute, that the universal form of all experi
ence {Erlebnis) and th erefore o f all life, has always been and always will
be the present. T here is and there will have never been anything but the
present. Being is presen ce or the m odification o f presence. The relation
to the presence o f the presen t as the ultimate form o f being and ideal
ity is the m ovem ent by which I transgress em pirical existence, factuality,
contingency, mundanity, e tc.— and first o f all mine. To think presence as
the universal form o f transcendental life is to open me to the knowledge
that in my absence, beyond my em pirical existence, prior to my birth and
after my death, the present is. I can empty it o f all em pirical content; I can
im agine an absolute upheaval o f the content o f all possible experience, a
radical transform ation o f the world. D oing this will not affect the univer
sal form o f presence about which I have a strange and unique certitude,
since th at form concerns no determ inate bein g. It is therefore the rela
tion to my death (to my disappearance in general) that is h idden in this
determ ination o f being as presence, ideality, as the absolute possibility o f
repetition. T he possibility o f the sign is this relation to death. T h e deter
m ination and the erasure o f the sign in m etaphysics is the dissim ulation
o f this relation to death which nevertheless was produ cin g signification.
If the possibility o f my disappearance in general m ust be in a cer
tain way experientially lived so that a relation to presence in general can
be instituted, we can no lon ger say that the experience o f the possibility
o f my absolute disappearance (of my death) com es to affect me, super
venes over an I am and m odifies a subject. The I am, being experientially
lived only as an I am present, presupposes in itself the relation to presence
in general, to bein g as presence. T he ap p earin g o f the / to itself in the
I am is th erefore originarily the relation to its own possible disappear
ance. I am m eans therefore originarily / am <61> mortal. I am immortal is
an im possible proposition. " We can therefore go further. Insofar as it is
* Making use of the distinctions fiorn the “pure logical gramm ar” ancl from Formal and
Transcendental Logic, we have to specify this impossibility as follows. This proposition o f
course makes sense. It constitutes an intelligible discourse. It is not sinnlos. But within this
language, “I am the one who is” is the confession o f a mortal. T he move

m ent that leads from the I am to the determ ination o f my being as res
cogitans (therefore as immortality) is the m ovem ent by which the origin
o f presence and o f ideality snatches itself away within the presence and
the ideality that it m akes possible.
T h e erasure (or the derivation) o f the sign is thereby m erged with
the reduction from im agination. H usserl’s situation in regard to the tradi
tion is am biguous here. U ndoubtedly, H usserl profoundly renews the
problem atic o f im agination. And the role that he reserves for fiction in
the phenom enological m ethod indeed indicates that im agination is not
in his eyes one faculty am on g many. Nevertheless, without neglecting the
novelty and the rigor o f the phenom enological descriptions o f the im age,
we m ust notice the inheritance there. Although Husserl constantly em
phasizes that, in contrast to memory, the im age is a “neutralizing” and
non-“positin g” representation, that this characteristic gives it a privileged
place in “p h en o m en ological” practice, all this does not call into question
the gen eral concept under which the im age is classified with memory: “re
presentation” (Vergegemuärtigung ) , that is, the reproduction o f a presence,
even if what is p rodu ced is a pure fictional object o f that presence. It fol
lows that im agination is not a sim ple “neutralizing m odification,” even if
it is neutralizing (“Avery likely confusion m ust be guarded against, <62>
namely the confusion between neutrality-modification and imagination”) ?
It also follows that its neutralizing operation com es to m odify a posit
ing re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung), namely, that o f m em ory (“M ore
precisely stated: universally imagination is the neutrality modification o f
‘positing’ presentification, therefore o f m em ory in the widest conceivable
sen se”) .r> Consequently, if it is a good auxiliary instrum ent for ph en om
enological neutralization, the im age is not pure neutralization. It keeps
within itself the prim ary reference to an originary presentation, that is, to
a perception and to a positing o f existence, to a belief in general.
This is why the pure ideality to which neutralization provides ac
cess is not fictional. This them e appears very early" and it will constantly
fortify the polem ic against H um e. But it is not by accident that H u m e’s
th ough t m ore and m ore fascin ated H usserl. T he pow er o f pure repe
tition that opens ideality and the power that liberates the im aginative
intelligibility, ancl for the reason that we ju st indicated, this proposition is “absurd” (with
the absurdity o f contradiction— Widersinmgkeit) and a fortiori “false.” But since the classical
idea o f truth which guides these distinctions has itself issued from this way of getting rid
o f the relation to death, this “falseness” is the truth itself o f truth. Therefore, it would be
necessary to interpret these movements by means of other, wholly other “categories” (if we
can still call such thoughts “categories” ).
* See in particular, the Second Logical Investigation, chapter 2.
reproduction o f em pirical perception cannot be foreign to one another.

The sam e holds for what they produce.
Also, on m ore than one point, the First Logical Investigation is
quite disconcerting in this regard.
1. First, it is disconcerting insofar as expressive ph en om en a in their
expressive purity are considered representations o f im agination (.Phan
tasievorstellungen).
2. In the sphere o f interiority which is thus open ed by this fiction,
we are calling the com m unicative discourse that a subject can contin
gently address to him self (“you have gone w rong”) fictional. Calling it
fictional allows one to think that a non-com municative, purely expressive
discourse can actually take place in the “solitary life o f the soul.”
3. T hereby we assum e that, in com m unication, where the sam e
words, the sam e expressive kernels are at work, where <63> consequently
pure idealities are in dispen sable, a rigorous distinction can be m ade
between the fictional and the actual, and then between the ideal and
the real, and that, consequently, actuality com es to be put on like an
em pirical piece o f clothing that is external to expression, ju st like a body
on a soul. And Husserl really m akes use o f these notions, even when he
em phasizes the unity o f the soul and the body in intentional animation.
This unity does not underm ine the essential distinction since it rem ains
always a unity o f com position.
4. Within the pure, internal “representivity,” in the “solitary life o f
the sou l,” certain types o f discourse could actually be held, as actually rep
resentative (this would be the case o f expressive language and, let us say
this already, purely objective, theoretico-logical d isco u rse), while certain
others are still purely fictional (these fictions located in the fiction would
be the indicative acts o f com m unication between m yself and myself, my
self as an oth er and myself as myself, etc.).
If we admit, as we have tried to show, that every sign in general con
sists in an originarily repetitive structure, the general distinction between
fictional usage and actual usage o f a sign is threatened. The sign is origi
narily tuorkecl overbyfiction. T herefore, whether we are dealing with indica
tive com m unication or expression, there is no sure criterion by m eans
o f which to distinguish between an extern al lan guage and an internal
language, and even if we grant the hypothesis o f an internal language,
there is no sure criterion fo r distinguishing between an actual lan guage
and a fictional language. Such a distinction, however, is indispensable for
Husserl in order to prove that indication is external to expression, and
for all that this distinction governs. If we declare that this distinction is
illegitim ate, we foresee a whole chain o f form idable consequences for
phenom enology.
What we ju st said abo u t the sign holds thereby for the act o f the
speaking subject. H usserl was saying therefore that “in the genuine sense
o f com m unication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell
on eself anything: one m erely represents [man stellt sich vor] on eself as
speaking and com m unicatin g.”7 T hat statem ent <64> leads us to the sec
ond argument that Husserl announced. Husserl m ust assum e therefore a
difference between actual com m unication and the representation o f the
self as speaking subject such that the self R epresentation can com e only to
be jo in e d onto the act o f com m unication contingently and from the ex
terior”. Now the originary structure o f repetition that we ju st evoked in re
lation to the sign m ust govern the totality o f the acts o f signification. T he
subject cannot speak without giving to him self his representation, and
that representation is not an accident. We can therefore no m ore im agine
an actual discourse without self-representation than a representation o f
discourse without actual discourse. U ndoubtedly this representivity can
be m odified, com plicated, reflected accordin g to the originary m odes
that the linguist, the sem iologist, the psychologist, the theoretician o f
literature or art, even the ph ilosoph er will be able to study. These m odes
can be very original. But all o f them p resu p p o se the originary unity o f
discourse and the representation o f discourse. Discourse represents it
self, is its representation. Better, discourse is the self-representation.'”
In a m ore general way, H usserl seem s to adm it that there can be
a sim ple exteriority between the subject such as he is in his actual ex
perien ce and what he represen ts to him self to be living. The subject
would believe that he is saying som ething to him self an d com m unicat
ing som ething to him self; in truth he would do nothing o f the kind. We
m ight be tem pted to conclude on this basis that, since consciousness is
then entirely invaded by the b elief or the illusion o f speaking-to-himself,
an entirely false consciousness, the truth o f the experience would be o f
<65> the order o f non-consciousness. It is the opposite: consciousness is
the self-presence o f the living, o f the Erleben, o f experience. The latter is
sim ple and is never, essentially, affected by illusion since it relates only to
But if the re- of this re-presentation does not say the simple duplication— repetitive or
reflective— that supervenes over a simple presence (which is what the word “representation”
has always wanted to say) , then what we are approaching or advancing here concerning the
relation between presence ancl representation must be opened up to other names. What
we are describing as originary representation can be designated under this title only within
the closure that we are attempting here to transgress, depositing in the closure, dem on
strating in the closure contradictory or untenable propositions, attempting to produce se
curely insecurity in the closure, opening it up to its outside, which can be clone only from
a certain inside.
itself in an absolute proximity. T he illusion o f speaking-to-oneself would

float on its surface as an empty, peripheral, and secondary consciousness.
L an g u age and its represen tation would com e to be added to a sim ple
consciousness simply present to itself, to a lived-experience, in any case,
which can reflect in silence its own presence. As H usserl will say in Ideas
I, “Each lived-experience in general (each lived-experience actually alive,
if we can say that) is a lived-experience according to the m ode o f ‘being
presen t.’ B elo n gin g to its essence is the possibility o f reflection on the
sam e essence in which it is necessarily characterized as being certain and
presen t.”8 T he sign would be foreign to this selfp resen ce, which is the
foun dation o f p resen ce in general. B ecause the sign is foreign to the
self-present o f the living present, we can say that it is foreign to presence
in general, in what we believe to be able to recognize u n der the nam e o f
intuition or perception.
Fo r— and this is the final argum ent in this section o f the Investiga
tions— if representation in indicative discourse is false, in m on ologue it is
useless. If the subject indicates nothing to him self, this is because he can
not do it and he cannot indicate anything to him self because he has no
need to do so. Since the lived-experience is im m ediately present to itself
according to the m ode o f certainty and absolute necessity, the m anifes
tation o f the self to itself by m eans o f delegation or the representation
o f an indexical is im possible because it is superfluous. It would be, in all
senses o f the word, without reason— therefore without cause. It would be
without a cause because it would be without a purpose, “zwecklos,” as
Husserl says.
This Zwecklosigkeit o f internal com m unication is the non-alterity, the
non-difference in the identity o f p resen ce as self-presence. O f course,
this con cept o f presence d oes not m erely involve the enigm a o f the ap
pearing o f a bein g in absolute proxim ity to itself; it also designates the
tem poral essence o f this <66> proximity, and this does not help to dispel
the enigm a. The self-presence o f lived-experience has to be p rodu ced
in the present as now. And this is really what H usserl says: if “psychical
acts” are not an noun ced by them selves through the interm ediary o f a
“K u n d gab e,” if they are not to be inform ed about them selves through
the interm ediary o f indications, this is because they are “experientially
lived by us at that very instant \im selben Augenblick] .”9 T he present o f self
presence would be as indivisible as a blink of an eye.
The Sign and the Blink of an Eye
<67> T he sharp point o f the instant, the identity o f lived-experience pres

ent to itself in the sam e instant bears therefore the whole weight o f this
dem onstration. Self:presen ce m ust be p ro d u ced in the undivided unity
o f a tem poral present in ord er to have nothing to make known to itself
by the proxy o f the sign. Such a perception or intuition o f the self by
the self in presence would be not only the instance in which “significa
tion” in general would not be able to have a place, it would also secure
the possibility o f an originary perception or intuition in general, that is,
non-signification as the “principle o f all prin ciples.” And later, each time
that H usserl would like to indicate the sense o f originary intuition, he
will recall that originary intuition is the experience o f the absence and
uselessness o f the sign/'
<68> The dem onstration that concerns us occurs at a point in time
earlier than The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. And for sys
tematic as well as historical reasons, the tem porality o f lived-experience is
not a them e o f the Logical Investigations. However, given the point where
* For example, the entire Sixth Logical Investigation constantly demonstrates that, between
the acts ancl intuitive content on the one hancl and the acts and the signifying contents
on the other, the phenom enological difference is “irreducible.” See especially §26. And yet
the possibility of a “mixture” is admitted there, and this mixture would raise more than
one question. The entire Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness rests on the radical dis
continuity between intuitive presentation and “the symbolic representation which not only
represents the object in an empty way, but also the representation ‘through’ signs or im
ages.” <Translator: Throughout this chapter, Derrida cites Dussort’s French translation o f
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. The equivalent passage for this citation can
be found in appendix 2, on page 134.> In Ideas I, we can read, “Between perception on one
sicle and symbolic representation through image or sign on the other, an unbridgeable eidetic dif
ference exists. . . . We lapse into absurdity when we mix, as is clone ordinarily, these m odes
of representation whose structures differ essentially, etc.” Ideas I, §43. <Translator: The
passage can be found on page 93 of the Kersten tran slation s And what Husserl says about
the perception of the sensible, corporeal thing is how he thinks of perception in general,
namely, that, being given in person in its presence, the sensible, corporeal thing is a “sign
for itself” {Ideas I, §52 <Translator: The passage can be found on page 121.>). Isn’t it the
case that being a sign of itself {indexsui) is the same thing as not being a sign? In this sense,
“at the very instant” it is perceived, the lived-experience is a sign of itself, present to itself
without indicative detour.
we are in the Logical Investigations, we cannot avoid noting that a certain

con cept o f the “now,” o f the presen t as the punctuality o f the instant,
authorizes discretely but in a decisive way the entire system o f “essential
distinctions.” If the punctuality o f the instant is a myth, a spatial or m e
chanical m etaphor, a m etaphysical con cept inherited, or all o f that at
once, if the present o f the presence to self is not simple, if it is constituted
in an origin ary or irreducible synthesis, then the principle o f H u sserl’s
entire argum entation is threatened.
H ere we cannot exam ine closely the adm irable analyses fo u n d in
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, analyses abo u t which
H eid egg er says in Sein unci Zeit that they are the first, in the history
o f philosophy, to break with a con cep t o f time inh erited from Aris
totle’s Physics and determ in ed on the basis o f the notions o f “now,” o f
“poin t,” o f “lim it,” and o f “circle.” 1Let us, however, try to take from H us
serl’s analyses som e points o f referen ce fo r the viewpoint that we are
occupying.
1. T he co n cep t o f punctuality, o f the now, o f the stignië, regardless
o f w hether or not it is a m etaphysical p resupposition , still plays a role
there that is major. Undoubtedly, no now can be isolated as an instant
and pure punctuality. N ot only does H usserl recognize it (“it belongs to
the essence o f lived-experiences that they m ust be spread out in this way,
that lived-experience can never have in it an isolated punctual ph ase” ),-
<69> but his entire description is adapted, with an incom parable supple
ness and perceptiveness, to the original m odifications o f this irreducible
spreading-out. N evertheless this spreadin g-out is still thought and d e
scribed on the basis o f the self:identity o f the now as a point, as “source-
poin t.” T he idea o f originary presence and in general o f “begin n in g,” the
“absolute begin n in g,” the principiiivi, '' always refers, in phenom enology,
to this “source-point.” A lthough the flowing of time is “indivisible into
* This is perhaps the right place to reread the definition of the “principle of all principles”:
“Enough o f absurd theories. No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the
principle of all prin ciples: that every originary giving intuition is a legitimizing source [Rechtsquelle]
of knowledge, that everything that is offered to us in “ intuition” in an originmy way (so to speak
in its cor poreal reality) must be simply received as what it gives itself out to be, but only within the
limits in which it then gives itself. Let our insight grasp this fact that the theory itself in its
turn coulcl not derive its truth except from originary givens. Every statement which does
nothing more than give expression to such givens through merely unfolding their signifi
cation ancl acljlisting it accurately is thus really, as I have put it in the introductory words
o f this chapter, an absolute beginning, called in a genuine sense to provide foundations, a
principium” Ideas I, §24. <Translator: The equivalent passage can be found on page 44 of
the Kersten translation. The italics are HusserTs.>
THE SIGN AND THE BLI NK OF AN EYE
fragm ents that could be by themselves, and indivisible into phases that
could be by them selves, into points o f continuity,” the “m odes o f the
flowing o f an im m anent tem poral object have a beginning, a, so to speak,
source-point. This is the m ode o f flowing by which the im m anent ob
je c t begins to be. It is characterized as p resen t.”'5 D espite all the com
plexity o f its structure, tem porality has a non-displaceable center, an eye
or a living nucleus, and that is the punctuality o f the actual now. T he
“appreh ension -of:the-now is as it w ere the nucleus o f a co m et’s tail o f
retentions,”4 and “there is each tim e but a present punctual phase that is
now, while the others link themselves to it as a retentional tail.”’1 “T he ac
tually present now is necessarily som ething punctual and rem ains som e
thing punctual [ein Punktuelles] <70>; it is a form that persists while the
m atter is always new.”'1
It is to this selfLidentity o f the actual current now that H usserl is
referring with the “im selben A ugenblick,” with which we started. M ore
over, there is no possible objection, within philosophy, in regard to this
privilege o f the present-now. This privilege defines the very elem ent o f
philosophical thought. It is evidentness itself, conscious thought itself. It
governs every possible con cept o f truth and o f sense. We cannot raise sus
picions about it without begin n in g to enucleate consciousness itself from
an elsewhere o f philosophy which takes away from discourse all possible
security and every possible foundation. And it is really around the privilege
o f the actual present, o f the now, that, in the last analysis, this debate,
which resem bles no other, is played out between philosophy, which is
always a philosophy o f presence, an d a thought o f non-presence, which
is not inevitably its opposite nor necessarily a m editation on negative ab
sence, or even a theory o f non-presence as unconscious.
T he dom ination o f the now is not only systematic with the fo u n d
ing opposition of m etaphysics, namely, that of form (or eiclos or idea)
and matter as the opposition o f actuality and potentiality (“The actually
present now is necessarily an d rem ains som ething punctual: it is a form
that persists [Verharrende] while the m atter is always new”) .7 It secures
the tradition that continues the G reek m etaphysics o f presence into the
“m od ern ” m etaphysics o f presen ce as self-consciousness, the m etaphys
ics o f the idea as representation (Vorstellung). It therefore prescribes the
place o f a problem atic that puts ph en om en ology into confrontation with
every thought o f non-consciousness that would know how to approach
the genuine stakes and profoun d agency where the decision is m ade: the
concept o f time. It is not by chance that The Phenomenology oflnternal Time-
Consciousness < 7 l> confirm s the dom ination o f the present and rejects
at once the “after-the-fact” way that an “unconscious content” becom es
conscious, that is, the structure o f tem porality im plied by all o f F reu d ’s
texts.'1' In fact, Husserl writes,
It is a genuine absurdity to speak o f an “u n con scious” conten t that be

com es conscious after the fact [nachträglich]. C onsciousness [.Bewußtsein]
is necessarily being-conscious [bewiißlsein] in each o f its phases. Ju st
as the retentional phase is conscious o f the p recedin g phase, without
m aking it an object, what is originarily given is already con scious— ancl
u n d er the specific fo rm o f the “now”— without being objective. . . . Th e
retention o f an u n conscious conten t is im possible. . . . If each “con ten t”
is in itself ancl necessarily “originarily co n sciou s,” it would be absurd to
question one abou t a consciousness that would be given to it la ter. Î
2. Despite this motive for the punctual now as the “archi-form ” (Ur
form) (Ideas I) o f consciousness, the con tent o f the description in The
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness and elsewhere forbids us from
speaking of a sim ple self-identity of the present. We thereby find shaken
not only what we could call the m etaphysical security par excellence, but
also, m ore locally, the argum ent o f the “im selben A ugenblick” found in
the Logic cd Investigations.
* See on this subject our essay, “Freucl and the Scene o f Writing,” in Writing and Difference,
<Translator: The essay can be found on pages 196-231. The phrase “after-the-fact” r ender s
“après-coup,” which is the standard Fr ench tr anslation of Freud’s “Nachträglichkeit.” In
this essay, Derricla says, “Let us note in passing that the concepts o f Nachträglichkeit and Ver
spätung, concepts which govern the whole of Freud’s thought and determine all his other
concepts, are alr eady pr esent and named in the Project [for a Scientific Psychology]” (p. 203).
For a r epr esentative discussion o f Nachträglichkeit, see The Complete Psychological Works of Sig
mund Treud, Volume XII (1911-1913), The Case ofSchreber (London: Hogar th, 1958), 67; here
“Nachträglichkeit” is r ender ed as “after-pressure.”>
t The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, appendix 9. <Translator: The equivalent
passage can be found on pages 162-63. Her e Der ricla seems to have misread Husserl’s text.
First, H usserl’s text twice states “Bewußtsein” and not, as Derr ida’s tr anslation implies, one
time “Bewußtsein” (consciousness) and the second time “bewußtsein” (being-conscious).
Churchill’s English tr anslation says, “Consciousness is necessar ily consciousness i n each of
its phases.” Then at the end of the citation Derricla seems to be using the Dussort transla
tion of the original 1928 edition o f Husserl’s lectur es on time-consciousness. The 1928 edi
tion (edited by Heidegger) has “unbewußt” (see page 473); thus the Dussor t Fr ench trans
lation states “inconscient” (see page 161). The later Husser liana volume X (page 119) has
“urbewußt,” which is r ender ed by Br ough as “pr imal consciousness”; see page 123 of On the
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time and note 18. Churchill’s English transla
tion, which is also based on the 1928 edition, states “unconscious.” Here I have followed
the corrected edition, which more clear ly supports Der r ida’s inter pr etation. My thanks to
Rudolf Ber net who pointed this mistake out to me.>
All o f 'The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Conscioiisness, in its critical

work as well as in its descriptive work, d em onstrates and confirm s o f
course the irreducibility o f re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung, Repräsen
tation) to presentational perception (Gegenwärtigung, Präsentation), the
irreducibility o f secondary and reproductive m em ory to retention, o f
im agination to originary im pression, and o f the reproduced now to the
actual curren t now, whether it is perceived or retained, etc. W ithout
being able to follow here the rigorous way in which 'The Phenomenology of
Internal Time-Conscioiisness proceeds, and without it being <72> necessary
thereby to question the dem onstrative validity o f its treatm ent, we can
still question its evidentiary soil and the milieu o f these distinctions, ques
tion them about what relates the terms distinguished to one another and
constitutes the very possibility o f the comparison.
We see very quickly then that the presence o f the perceived presen t
is able to ap p ear as such only insofar as it is in continuous composition with
a non-presence and a non-perception, namely, prim ary m em ory and pri
m ary anticipation (retention and protention). These non-perceptions are
not added on, do not accom pany contingently the actually perceived now;
indispensably and essentially they participate in its possibility. No dou bt
Husserl says that retention is still a perception. But it is the absolutely unique
case— H usserl has never spoken o f an o th er— o f a perception whose
perceived is not a present but a past as the m odification o f the present:
If we call p erception the act in luliich every origin resides, the act that consti
tutes originarily, then primary memory is perception. For it is only in primary
memory that we see the past, it is only in it that the past is constituted, ancl
this happens not in a re-presentational way but on the contrary in a
presentational way.8
Thus, in retention, the presentation that gives us som ething to see deliv
ers a non-present, a past and inactual present. We can therefore suspect
that if H usserl nevertheless calls this perception, it is because he is h old
ing on to the radical discontinuity as passing between retention and re
production, between perception and im agination, etc., and not between
perception and retention. This is the nervus demonstrandi o f his criticism
o f Brentano. H usserl absolutely holds onto there being “absolutely no
question o f a continuous m ediation o f perception with its op p o site.”9
And yet, in the preced in g section, was not the question o f a con
tinuous m ediation posed in a really explicit way? Husserl says,
If we now relate the term p erception with the differences in the way oj
being given which tem poral objects have, the opposite oj perception is then
<73> primary memory ancl primcuy anticipation (retention ancl protention)

which here com es on the scene, so that perception ancl non-perception pass
continuously into one an o th er.10
And later, he writes,
In the ideal sense, p erception (im pression ) would then b e the phase o f
consciousness that constitutes the pure now, ancl memory, an entirely
different phase o f the continuity. But here we are only dealing precisely
with an ideal limit, som eth in g abstract which can be nothing by itself.
N evertheless, even this ideal now is not som eth in g different toto caelo
from the non-now, but on the contrary is in continuous com m erce with
it. Ancl the continuous passage o f p erception into primary m em ory cor
responds to that.11
As soon as we adm it this continuity o f the now and the non-now,

o f perception and non-perception in the zone o f originarity that is com-
mon to originary im pression and to retention, we w elcom e the oth er
into the self-identity o f the Augenblick, non-presence and non-evidentness
into the blink of an eye of the instant. T here is a duration to the blink o f
an eye and the duration closes the eye. This alterity is even the condi
tion o f presence, o f presentation, and therefore o f Vorstellung in general,
prior to all the dissociations which could be p rodu ced there. T h e dif
ference between retention and reproduction, between prim ary m em ory
and secondary memory, is not the differen ce— not the radical difference
that H usserl would w ant— between perception and non-perception, but
between two m odifications o f non-perception. W hatever the ph en om
enological difference might be between these two m odifications, despite
the im m ense problem s that the difference poses and the necessity o f tak
ing them into account, it separates only two ways o f bein g related to the
irreducible non-presence o f an oth er now. This relation to non-presence,
once m ore, does not take by surprise, surround, or even dissim ulate the
presence o f the originary im pression; it allows its upsurge and its ever
reborn virginity. But it radically destroys every possibility o f self-identity
in its simplicity. And th at holds for the constituting flow itself at its great
est <74> depth:
If we com pare now the constituting p h en om en a to these constituted uni

ties, we find a flow, ancl at each phase o f this flow is a continuity of shad
ing. But in principle it is im possible to display any phase o f this flow in
a continuous succession ancl therefore to transform in thought the flow
to such an extent that this phase is extended into identity with itself.12
This intimacy o f non-presence and alterity with presence cuts into, at its
root, the argum ent for the uselessness o f the sign in the self-relation.
3. No dou bt H usserl would refuse to assim ilate the necessity o f re
tention with the necessity o f the sign, since the sign alone belongs, like
the im age, to the genus o f re-presentation and symbol. And H usserl can
not renoun ce this rigorous distinction without putting the axiom atic
principium o f phenom enology in question. The vigor with which he sup
ports the idea that retention and protention belon g to the sphere o f orig-
inarity provided that we understand it in a “broad sense,” the insistence
with which he opposes the absolute validity o f prim ary m em ory to the
relative validity o f secondary memory, " these in deed m anifest <75> his
intention and uneasiness. He is uneasy because what is at issue is to save
together two apparently irrecon cilable possibilities: (a) the living now
is constituted as the absolute perceptual source only in continuity with
retention as non-perception. T he faithfulness to experience and to “the
things them selves” forbids that the source be constituted in any other
way. (b) Since the source o f certainty in gen eral is the originarity o f the
living now, it is necessary to m aintain retention in the sphere o f originary
certainty and shift the border between originarity and non-originarity
* See, for example, am ong many other analogous texts, appendix 3 to The Phenomenol
ogy of Internal T ime-Cons cionsn ess: “We have therefore, as essential modes o f the conscious
ness of time: 1) the ‘sensation’ as presentation, ancl retention and protention interwoven
[verflochtene] essentially with it, but which can also become independent (the originary
sphere in the large sense); 2) thetic re-presentation (memory), thetic re-presentation of
what can accompany or return (anticipation); 3) imaginary re-presentation, as pure imag
ination, in which we discover all these same modes, in a consciousness that imagines.”
<The equivalent passage can be found on page 142 of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness.> Here again, as we have noticed, the nucleus of the pr oblem has the form of
the interweaving (Verflechtung) of threads, which phenomenology painstakingly unravels
in their essence.
This extension of the sphere of originar ity is what allows us to distinguish between the
absolute certainty attached to retention and the relative certainty dependent on second
ary memory and recollection (Wiedererinnerung) in the form of re-presentation. Speaking
o f perceptions as archi-livecl-experiences (Urerlebnisse), Husserl writes in Ideas I: “They have
in their concretion, more precisely considered, only one, but also always a continuously
flowing, absolutely originary phase— the moment of the living now.” He goes on, “Thus, for
example, we seize upon the absolute validity o f reflection insofar as it is immanent perce/h
tion, that is, pure and simple immanent perception, and more particularly, with respect to
what, in its flowing away, it actually makes given originarily; similarly, the absolute validity of
retention of something imma nent with respect to what is intended in it in the characteristic of
what is ‘still’ living and what has ‘just now’ been, but of course only so far as the content of
what is thus characterized reaches. . . . We likewise seize upon the relative validity o f recol
lection of something im manent” {Ideas I, §78). <Translator: The equivalent passages can
be found on pages 180-81 o f the Kersten translation. The emphasis is Husserl’s.>
so that it passes, not between the pure p resen t and the non-present,
between the actuality and the non-actuality o f a living now, but between
two form s of re-turn or o f the re-stitution o f the present, re-tention and
re-presentation.
W ithout reducin g the abyss that can in fact separate retention from
re-presentation, without concealing that the problem o f their relations is
nothing other than the history o f “life” and o f life’s becom ing-conscious,
we m ust be able to say a priori that their com m on root, the possibility
of re-petition in its m ost gen eral form , the trace in the m ost universal
sense, is a possibility that not only must inhabit the pure actuality o f the
now, but also must constitute it by m eans o f the very m ovem ent o f the
différance that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality o f the now.13
Such a trace is, if we are able to hold onto this lan guage w ithout con
tradicting it and erasing it immediately, m ore “originary” than the ph e
n om enological originality itself. The ideality o f the form (Form) o f pres
ence itself implies consequently that it can be repeated to infinity, that
its return, as the return o f the sam e, is to infinity necessary an d inscribed
in <76> presence as such; that the re-turn is the return o f a present that
will be retained in a finite m ovem ent o f retention; that there is originary
truth, in the ph en om en ological sense, only insofar as it is enrooted in
the fm itude o f this retention; finally that the relation to infinity can be
instituted only in the openness to the ideality o f the form o f presence as
the possibility o f a re-turn to infinity. W ithout this non-identity to on eself
o f so-called originary presen ce, how are we to explain that the possi
bility o f reflection and o f re-presentation belongs to the essence o f every
lived-experience? How are we to explain that reflection belon gs as an
ideal and pure freedom to the essen ce o f consciousness? H u sserl con
stantly em phasizes this fo r reflection in Ideas I f and fo r re-presentation
already in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-ConsciousnessΛIn all o f these
directions, the presence o f the present is thought beginning from the fold
o f the return, beginning from the m ovem ent o f repetition and not the
reverse. Does not the fact that this fold in presence or in self-presence is
irreducible, that this trace or this différance is always older than presence
and obtains for it its openness, forbid us from speaking o f a sim ple self-
identity “im selben A ugenblick”? Does not this fact com prom ise the use
* In particular, see §77, where he raises the problem of the difference ancl of the relations
between reflection ancl re-presentation, for example, in secondary memory,
t See, for example, §42: “But the ideal possibility of an exactly matching re-presentation of
this consciousness cor responds to every present and presenting consciousness.” <Transla-
tor: The equivalent passage can be found on page 115 o f The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness.>
THE SIGN AND THE BLINK OF AN EYE
Husserl wants to m ake o f the “solitary life o f the sou l” and consequently
the rigorous distribution between indication and expression? Is it not the
case that indication and all the concepts from which we have attem pted
so far to think it (existence, nature, m ediation, empiricity, etc.) have in
the m ovem ent o f transcendental tem poralization an origin that cannot
be uprooted? Likewise, is it not the case that all o f what is an n o u n ced in
this reduction to the “solitary life o f the so u l” (the transcendental reduc
tion in all o f its stages and notably the reduction to the m onodological
sphere o f the “proper ’— Eigenheit— etc.) is not, as it were, fissured <77> in
its possibility by what is called time? It is fissured by what has been called
time and to which it would be necessary to give another title, since “tim e”
has always designated a m ovem ent th ough t begin n in g from the present
an d since “tim e” can say nothing bu t the present. Must we not say that
the con cept o f pure solitu d e— and o f the m on ad in the ph en o m en o
logical sen se— is split open by its own origin, by the very condition o f its
self-presence: “tim e” rethought begin n in g from the différanee in auto
affection, beginning from the identity o f identity and non-identity in the
“sam e” o f the im selben Augenblick? H usserl has him self evoked the analogy
between the relation to the alter ego such that it is constituted within the
absolute m onad o f the ego and the relation to the other (past) presen t
such th at it is constituted in the absolute actuality o f the living present
{Cartesian Meditations, §52). Is it not the case that this “dialectic”— in all
the senses o f this word and p rior to every speculative resum ption o f this
con cept— opens living to différance, constituting in the pure im m anence
o f lived-experience the hiatus o f indicative com m unication and even o f
signification in general? We are in d eed saying the hiatus o f indicative
com m unication and of signification in general. For Husserl intends not only
to exclude indication from the “solitary life o f the soul.” He will consider
language in general, the elem ent o f the logos, in its expressive form itself,
as a secondary event, and ad d ed on to an originary and pre-expressive
stratum o f sense. Expressive lan guage itself would have to supervene on
the absolute silence o f the self:relation.
The Voice That Keeps Silent
<78> P h enom en ological “silen ce” can therefore be reconstituted only

by a double exclusion or a double reduction: that o f the relation to the
other in me in indicative com m unication, and that of expression as
a later stratum , superior to and external to the stratum of sense. The
agency o f the voice will m ake its strange authority be heard in the rela
tion between these two exclusions.
L et us at the outset con sider the first reduction, in the form in
which it is an n o u n ced in the “essential distinctions,” to which we have
taken as a rule to hold ourselves here. Indeed, it is necessary to recognize
that the criterion o f the distinction between expression and indication
is in the end entrusted to an all too sum m ary description o f “interior-
life”: in this interior life, there would be no indication because there is
no com m unication; and there is no com m unication because there is no
alter ego. A nd when the secon d person arises in interior language, it is a
fiction, and fiction is only fiction. “You have gone wrong, you c a n ’t go on
like that” is only a false com m unication, a pretending.
L et us not form ulate from the exterior the questions which im pose
them selves upon the possibility and the status o f such pretendings or
fictions, or upon the place from which this “you” in the m onologue may
arise. Let us not pose these questions yet. T heir necessity will be still m ore
keen when H usserl will in deed have to note that, besides the “you,” the
personal pronoun in gen eral and singularly the “I” are expressions that
are “essentially occasion al,” deprived o f “objective sen se,” and function
ing always <79> as indexicals in actual discourse. The “I” alone achieves
its m ean in g <vouloir-clire> in solitary discourse and functions outside o f
solitary discourse as a “universally operative indexical.”1
F o r the m om ent, let us ask in what sense an d in view o f what the
structure o f interior life is here “sim plified” and in what way the choice
o f exam ples is revelatory o f Husser l’s project. It is revelatory at least in
two features.
1. T hese exam ples are o f the practical order. In the proposition s
chosen, the subject addresses him self to h im self as to a secon d person
that he blam es, exhorts, invites to a decision or to a regret. T hat proves,
o f course, that we are not d ealin g here with “in dication s.” N othing is
shown, directly or indirectly. T he subject learns nothing about himself.
THE VOI CE THAT KEEPS S ILENT
H is lan guage refers to nothing that “exists.” T h e subject is not inform ed

about him self; neither Kundgabe nor Kundnahme are functioning. H us
serl needs to choose his exam ples within the practical sphere in order
to show at once that in them nothing is “in dicated” and that these con
sist o f false discourses. In fact, we m ight be tem pted to conclude from
these exam ples, by supposin g that we are unable to find another genus
o f them, that interior discourse is always essentially practical, axiological,
or axiopoetic. Even when one says to on eself “you are this way,” is it not
the case that the predication involves a valorizing or productive act? But
it is precisely this tem ptation that H usserl wants above all and at all costs
to avoid. He has always determ ined the m odel o f language in general—
indicative as well as expressive— by starting in the theorem. W hatever care
he subsequently took to respect the originality o f the practical stratum of
sense and expression, whatever then has been the success and rigor o f his
analyses, H usserl never stopped asserting the reducibility o f the axiologi
cal to its logico-theoretical nucleus.'1'- <80> We rediscover here the neces
sity that drove him to study lan guage from a logical and epistem ological
viewpoint, pure gram m ar as pure logical gram m ar that is governed m ore
or less im m ediately by the possibility of a relation to the object. A false
discourse is a discourse, a contradictory discourse (widersinnig) escapes
from non-sense {Unsinnigkeit), only if its gram m aticality does not forbid
a m eaning or an intention-of-Bedeutung, which itself can be determ ined
only as the aim o f an object.
T h erefore we m ust notice that theoretical logicity, the theorem in
general, governs not only the determ ination o f expression, o f logical sig
nification, but also already what is excluded from it, namely, indication,
m onstration as Weisen or Zeigen in the Hinweis or the Anzeigen. A n d it is
rem arkable that Husserl must, at a certain depth, have recourse to an essential
theoretical nucleus of indication in order to be able to exclude it from an expressiv
ity that is itself purely theoretical Perhaps, at this depth, the determ ination
o f expression is contam inated by the very thing that it excludes: pointing
the finger at what is in front o f o n e ’s eyes or at what must always be able
to ap p ear to an intuition in its visibility, the Zdgen— the relation to the
object as indicative m on stration — is invisible only provisionally. The Zeigen
is always an intention {Meinen) which pre-determ ines the p rofoun d es
sential unity between the Anzeigen o f indication and the Hinzeigen o f ex
pression. And the sign {Zeichen) would always refer, in the last analysis,
* See notably chapter 4 ancl especially §114 to 127 of Ideas I (part 3). We will study them
elsewhere more closely and on their own. See “Form and M eaning,” which has already
been cited.
to Zeigen, to the space, to the visibility, to the field and horizon o f what
is ob-jected and pro-jected, to phenom enality as vis-à-vis and surface, evi
dentness or intuition, and first o f all as light.
What, then, o f the voice and time? If m onstration is the unity o f
gesture and perception in the sign, if signification is attributed to the
finger and to the eye, and if this attribution is prescribed to every sign,
whether it is indicative or expressive, discursive or non-discursive, what
do the voice and time have to do with it? If the invisible is the pro visional,
what do the voice and time have to do with it? And why does H usserl
make such an effort <81> to separate indication and expression? Does
p ron oun cin g or hearing a sign reduce indicative spatiality or indicative
mediacy? Let us be patient a bit longer.
2. The exam ple chosen by H usserl (“you have gone wrong, you
can ’t go on like that” ) m ust therefore prove two things at once. It must
prove on the one hand that this proposition is not indicative (and there
fore that it is a fictional com m unication); on the other that it provides
no knowledge o f the subject to himself. Paradoxically, the proposition
is not indicative because, insofar as it is non-theoretical, non-logical, and
non-cognitive, it is as well not expressive. T his is why it would be a ph e
n om enon o f perfectly fictional signification. T hereby the unity o f the
Zägen p rior to its diffraction into indication and expression is verified.
Now, the temporal modality o f these propositions is not a m atter o f indif
ference. If these proposition s are not proposition s o f knowledge, this
is because they are not im m ediately in the form o f predication. They
do not utilize im m ediately the verb “to b e ,” and their sense, if not their
gram m atical form , is not in the present. They take note o f a past in the
form o f a reproach, an exh ortation to regret som ething and to m ake
am ends. The present indicative of the verb “to be” is the pure, teleological
form o f the logicity o f expression; or, better, it is the present indicative
o f the verb to be in the third person. Even m ore, it is the type o f p rop o si
tion, “S is P,” in which the S is not a person for which we can replace a
personal pron oun , the latter having in all real discourse a value that is
solely indicative/' T he subject S m ust be a nam e and a nam e o f an object.
* S e e th e First Logical Investigation, chapter 3, §26: “Every expression, in fact, that includes
a personal pronoun lacks an objective sense. The worcl ‘I’ names a different person from case
to case. . . . In its case, rather, an indicative function mediates ancl, so to speak, warns the
hearer that the one who is in front of you aims at himself.” <Translator: The equivalent
passage can be found on pages 218-19 of the English translation, volume 1. Here, Derrida
indicates that he is using the French translation with a “tr. fr.”> The whole problem consists
in knowing whether in solitary discourse, where, as Husserl says, the Bedeutung of the “I” is
fulfilled and accomplished, the element of universality proper to expressivity as such does
THE VOICE THAT KEEPS SILENT
And we <82> know that for H usserl “S is P” is the fundam ental and prim i
tive form, the originary apoph an tic operation from which every logical
proposition must be able to be derived by sim ple com plication.'"’ ’' If one
posits the identity o f expression and logical Bedeutung (Ideas I, §124),
one must therefore acknowledge that the third “p erso n ” o f the present
indicative o f the verb “to b e ” is the irreducible and p u re kern el o f ex
pression. Husserl was saying, we recall, about an expression, that it was
not primitively an “expressing itself,” but from the very beginning it is an
“expressin g itself about som eth in g” (über etwas sich auszern, see §7). T h e
“speaking to on eself” that here Husserl wants to restore is not a “speaking-
about-oneself;-to-oneself,” unless the latter can take the form o f a “speak
ing to on eself that S is P.”
It is here that one must speak, T he sense o f the verb “to b e ” (about
which H eidegger tells us that its infinitive form has been enigm atically
determ ined by philosophy on the basis o f the third person o f the pres
ent in d icativ e)1 entertains with the word, that is, with the unity o f the
phone and sense, a relation that is entirely singular. U ndoubtedly it is not
a “sim ple w ord,” since we can translate it into different languages. But as
well it is not a conceptual generality, ΐ Since, however, <83> its sense des
ignates nothing, no thing, no being nor any ontic determ ination, since
not forbicl this fulfillment ancl dispossesses the subject o f the full intuition of the Bedeutung
“I.” As well, we have to know if solitary discourse interrupts or merely interiorizes the situa
tion of dialogue in which, as Husserl says, “since each person, while speaking o f himself,
says ‘I,’ the word has the character o f a universally operative indexical o f this situation.”
<Translator: T h e equivalent passage can be found on page 219 of the English translation,
volume l.>
Thus we understand better the difference between the manifested which is always subjec
tive and the expressed as named. Each time that the “I” appears, what is at issue is a proposition
of indicative manifestation. The manifested and the named can at times partially overlap
(“a glass of water, please” names the thing and manifests the desire), but the two are in prin
ciple perfectly disjunctive, as in the following example where they are perfectly disjunctive:
2 x 2 = 4. “This statement does not say what is said by ‘I judge that 2 x 2 = 4 / They are not
even equivalent statements, since the one can be true when the other is false” (First Logical
Investigation, §25). <Translator: The equivalent passage can be found on page 313.>
*S e e , in particular, Formal and Transcendental Logic, part 1, chapter 1, §13.
f Whether we demonstrate this in the Aristotelian way or in the Heideggerian way, the
sense of being must precede the general concept of being. Concerning the singularity of
the relation between the word and the sense of being, as well as fo r the problem of the pres
ent indicative, we refer to Sein und Zeit and to Introduction to Metaphysics. Perhaps it already
seems that, while finding support at decisive points in H eidegger’s motives, we would like
to wonder whether; in regard to the relations between logos and phone and the claimed ir
reducibility of certain unities of words (of the word “being” or other “radical words” ), Hei
d egg er’s thought at times calls forth the same questions as the metaphysics of presence.
we en cou n ter it nowhere outside o f the word, its irreducibility is that

o f the verbum or o f the legein, that o f the unity o f thought and voice in
the logos. T h e privilege o f being can n ot resist the deconstruction o f the
word. “B ein g” is the first or the last word to resist the deconstruction o f
a lan gu age o f words. But why is verbality m erged with the determ ination
o f bein g in gen eral as presence? And why the privilege o f the presen t
indicative? Why is the epoch o f the phone the epoch o f being in the form
o f presence, that is, in the form o f ideality?
It is here that one m ust hear oneself. L et us return to H usserl. Pure
expression, logical expression, must be for him an “unproductive” “m e
d iu m ” that h ap p en s to “reflect” (widerzuspiegeln) the stratum of pre-
expressive sense.5 Its sole productivity consists in m aking the sense pass
into the ideality o f the conceptual and universal form."' A lthough there
are essential reasons why the sense is not com pletely repeated in the
expression and why the expression involves dep en den t and incom plete
significations (syncategorem es, etc.), the telos o f com plete expression is
the restoration, in the form o f presence, o f the totality o f a sense actu
ally given to intuition. Since the sense is determ ined on the basis o f a
relation to the object, the m edium o f expression must protect, respect,
and restore the presence o f the sense, at once as the being-in-front of the object
available to a look, and as the proximity to oneself in interiority. The pre of
the present object now-in-front-of is an against (Gegenwart, Gegenstand) at
once <84> in the sense o f the up-cigciinst o f proxim ity and the over-cigciinst
o f the op-posite.
Now between idealization and the voice, the complicity is here un
failing. An ideal object is an object whose m onstration can be indefinitely
repeated, whose presen ce in the 'Lägen is indefinitely reiterable precisely
because, freed from all m undane spatiality, it is a pure noem a which I can
express without having, at least in appearance, to pass through the world.
In this sense, the ph en om en ological voice, which seem s to achieve this
operation “in tim e,” does not break with the order o f Zdgen; it belongs to
the same system and brings its function to com pletion. The passage to in
finity in the idealization o f the object is unified with the historial advent
o f th e phone? This does not m ean that we are able finally to un derstand
what the m ovem ent o f idealization is on the basis o f a determ inate “func
tion” or “faculty,” concerning which we could know what it is, thanks to
the familiarity o f experience, the “phenom enology o f o n e ’s own body,”
or an objective science (phonetics, phonology, or physiology o f phona-
* Ideen I, §124. <Translator: Here Derricla uses the German title, but perhaps it is a typo
graphical error;>
THE VOI CE THAT KEEPS SILENT
tion). On the contrary. T hat the history o f idealization, that is, the “his
tory o f spirit,” or history as such, is inseparable from the history o f the
phone, this inseparability restores to the phone i\s enigm atic potency.
In order to really understand that in which the power o f the voice
resides, and that in which m etaphysics, philosophy, the determ ination
o f being as presen ce are the epoch o f the voice as the technical mas-
tery o f object-being, in order to really understand the unity o f technê and
phone, it is necessary to think the objectivity o f the object. T he ideal ob
je ct is the most objective o f objects; it is in depen den t o f the hic et nunc
o f events and o f the acts o f the em pirical subjectivity who intends it. The
ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while rem aining the sam e. Its
presence to intuition, its being-in-front-of for the look depen ds essen
tially on no m undane or em pirical synthesis; the restoration o f its sense
in the form o f presence becom es a universal and unlim ited possibility.
But its ideal-being is nothing outside of the world; it m ust be constituted,
repeated, <85> and exp ressed in a m ed iu m that d oes not im p air the
presence and the self-presence o f the acts that intend it: a m edium that
preserves at once the presence of the object in front o f the intuition and
the presence to oneself, the absolute proxim ity o f the acts to themselves.
Since the ideality o f the object is only its being-for a non-em pirical con
sciousness, it can be expressed only in an elem ent whose phenom enal-
ity does not have the form o f mundanity. The voice is the name of this ele
ment. The voice hears itself. Phonic signs (“acoustic im ages” in S au ssu re’s
sense, the p h en om en ological voice) are “h eard ” by the subject who ut
ters them in the absolute proxim ity o f their present. The subject does
not have to pass outside o f h im self in ord er to be im m ediately affected
by its activity o f expression. My w ords are “alive” because they seem not
to leave me, seem not to fall outside o f m e, outside o f my breath, into a
visible distance; they do not stop belon gin g to me, to be at my disposal,
“without anything accessory.” In any case, in this way, the ph en om enon
o f the voice, the ph en om en ological voice, is given. Som eon e will object
perhaps th at this interiority belongs to the p h en om en ological an d ideal
side o f every signifier. For exam ple, the ideal fo rm o f a written signi
fier is not in the world, and the distinction between graphem e and the
em pirical body o f the co rresp on d in g graphic sign separates an inside
o f ph en om en ological consciousness and an outside o f the world. And
that is true o f every visible or spatial signifier. O f course. Nevertheless
every non-phonetic signifier involves, right within its “p h en o m e n o n ,”
within the (non-m undane) ph en om en ological sphere o f experience in
which it is given, a spatial reference; the sense o f “outside,” “in the w orld”
is an essential com pon en t o f its ph en om en on. In appearance, there is
nothing like that in the ph en om en on o f the voice. Within phenom eno-
logical interiority, hearin g on eself and seein g on eself are two orders o f
the self-relation that are radically d ifferen t/E v en before a description
o f this difference is sketched, we un derstand why the hypothesis o f the
“m o n o lo g u e” could authorize the distinction between indication and
expression only by assum ing an essential connection between expression
and the <86> phone. Between the phonic elem ent (in the p h en o m en o
logical sense and not in the sense of intra-m undane sonority) and expres
sivity, that is, the logicity of a signifier animated in view o f the ideal pres*
ence o f a Bedeutung (which is itself related to an object), there would be
a necessary connection. H usserl cannot bracket what the glossem aticians
call the “substance o f exp ression ” without threatening his entire project.7
T h e appeal to this substance plays therefore a m ajor philosophical role.
L et us th erefore attem pt to in terrogate the p h en o m en ological
value o f the voice, the transcendence o f its dignity in relation to every
other signifying substance. We think and we are trying to show that this
transcendence is only apparen t. But this “ap p earan ce” is the very essence
o f consciousness and its history, and it determ ines an epoch to which
the philosophical idea o f truth, the opposition o f truth and appearan ce,
such as it still functions in phenom enology, belongs. We can therefore
neither call it “a p p e a ra n c e ” n or nam e it within m etaphysical co n cep
tuality. We can n ot attem pt to decon struct this tran scen den ce without
p lu n gin g in, and grop in g ou r way through inherited concepts, toward
the unnam eable.
The “ap p aren t tran scen den ce” of the voice, therefore, is based on
the fact that the signified, which is always essentially ideal, the “expressed”
Bedeutung, is im m ediately presen t to the act o f expression. This im m e
diate presen ce is based on the fact that the ph en om en ological “body”
o f the signifier seem s to erase itself in the very m om ent it is produced.
From this point on, it seem s to belon g to the elem en t o f ideality. It re
duces itself phenom enologically and transform s the m undane opacity o f
its body into pure diaphaneity. This erasure o f the sensible body and o f
its exteriority is for consciousness the very form o f the im m ediate presence
o f the signified.
Why is the ph onem e the m ost “id e al” o f signs? W here does this
complicity between soun d and ideality, or rath er between voice and id e
ality, com e from ? (H egel h ad been m ore attentive to this complicity than
anyone else; and from the viewpoint <87> o f the history o f metaphysics,
this is a rem arkable fact that we shall in terrogate elsew here).8 When I
speak, it belongs to the p h en om en ological essence o f this operation that
I hear myself during the time that I speak. The signifier that is anim ated by
my breath and by the intention o f signification (in H usserlian language
the expression anim ated by the Bedeutungsintention) is absolutely close to
THE VOICE THAT KEEPS SILENT
me. The living act, the act that gives life, the Lebendigkeit that anim ates the
body o f the signifier and transform s it into an expression that wants to
say, the soul o f language, seems not to separate itself from itself, from its
presence to itself. The soul of lan guage does not risk death in the body o f
a signifier aban don ed to the world and to the visibility o f space. T h e soul
can show the ideal object or the ideal Bedeutung, which relates to it, with
out venturing outside o f ideality, outside o f the interiority o f life present
to itself. The system o f Zeigen, the m ovem ents o f the fin ger and the eye
(abou t which we were w ondering earlier if those m ovem ents were not
inseparable from phenom enality) are not absent here; they are internal
ized. T he p h en om en on does n ot stop bein g an object fo r the voice. On
the contrary, insofar as the ideality o f the object seem s to d epen d on the
voice and thus becom es absolutely available in it, the system that connects
phenom enality to the possibility o f Zeigen functions better than ever in
the voice. The phoneme gives itself as the mastered ideality of the phenomenon.
This presence to itself o f the anim ating act in the transparent spiri
tuality o f what it anim ates, this intimacy o f life to itself, which has always
led us to say that speech is alive, all o f this assum es therefore that the
speaking subject hears h im self in the present. Such is the essence or the
norm alcy o f speech. It is im plied in the very structure o f speech that
the speaker hear himself: that he at once perceive the sensible fo rm o f
the ph on em es and u n derstan d his own intention o f expression. If ac
cidents arise, which seem to contradict this teleological necessity, either
they are surm ounted by som e supplem en tin g operation or there will be
no speech. B ein g d u m b and bein g d e af go together. T h e d e a f can partici
pate in colloquy only by slippin g <88> his actions into the form o f words
whose telos entails that they are heard by the one who utters them.
Considered from a purely ph en om en ological viewpoint, within the
reduction, the process o f speech has the originality o f being already d e
livered as a pure ph en om en on , having already suspen ded the natural at
titude and the existential thesis o f the world. The operation o f “hearing-
oneself-speak” is an auto-affection o f an absolutely unique type. On the
one hand, it operates in the m edium o f universality. The signifieds which
ap p ear in it m ust be idealities that we m u st idealiter be able to repeat or
transmit indefinitely as the sam e. On the other hand, the subject is able to
hear him self or speak to himself, is able to let h im self be affected by the
signifier that he produces without any detou r through the agency o f ex
teriority, o f the world, or o f the non-proper in general. Every other form
o f auto-affection must either pass through the non-proper or renounce
universality. When I see myself, regardless o f whether it occurs because
a lim ited area o f my body is given to my look or it occurs by m eans o f a
specular reflection, the non-proper is already there in the field of this
auto-affection which th ereafter is no lon ger pure. It is the sam e thing

in the experience o f touching-touched. In th e two cases, the surface o f
my body, as a relation to exteriority, m ust begin by exp o sin g itself in
the world. Are there not, som eon e will say, form s o f pure auto-affection
which, in the interiority o f o n e ’s own body, do not require the interven
tion o f any m undane exhibitive surface and yet are not of the order o f
the voice? But then these form s rem ain purely em pirical; they cannot b e
long to a m edium of universal signification. It is necessary therefore, in
o rd er to give an account o f the p h en om en ological power o f the voice, to
specify this concept o f pure auto-affection and describe what in it makes
it p ro p er to universality. Insofar as it is pure auto-affection, the opera
tion o f hearing-oneself-speak seem s to reduce even the internal surface
o f o n e ’s own body. In its ph en om en on , it seem s to be able to do with
out this exteriority within interiority, to do without this internal space in
which o u r experience <89> or o u r im age o f o n e ’s own body is stretched
out. This is why h earing-oneself:speak is lived as absolutely pure auto
affection, in a proxim ity to self which would be nothing other than the
absolute reduction o f space in general. It is this purity that m akes it apt
for universality. R equirin g the intervention o f no determ inate surface
in the world, producing itself in the world as an auto-affection that is pure, it
is an absolutely available signifying substance. For the voice encounters
no obstacle to its em ission in the world precisely insofar as it produces
itself there as pure auto-affection. U n doubtedly this auto-affection is the
possibility o f what we call subjectivity or the for-itself, but without it no
w orld would ap p ear as such. For, in its depth, the voice assum es the unity
o f the soun d (which is in the w orld) an d the phone (in the p h en o m
enological sense). An objective “m u n d an e” science can surely teach us
nothing about the essence o f the voice. But the unity o f the sound and
the voice, which allows the voice to p rodu ce itself in the w orld as pure
auto-affection, is the unique instance that escapes from the distinction
between intram undanity an d transcendentality; and by the sam e token,
it m akes this distinction possible.
It is this universality that results in the fact that, structurally and
in principle, no consciousness is possible without the voice. T he voice
is being close to itself in the form o f universality, as con-sciousness. The
voice is consciousness. In colloquy, the propagation o f signifiers seem s
to encounter no obstacle because it puts two phenomenological origins o f
pure auto-affection in relation. To speak to som eone is undoubtedly to
hear on eself speak, to be heard by oneself, but also and by the sam e to
ken, if one is heard by the other, it is to m ake the other repeat immediately
in h im self the hearing-oneself:speak in the very form in which I have
p rod u ced it. R epeat it im m ediately, that is, repro du ce the pure auto-
affection without the aid o f any exteriority. This possibility of reproduc

tion, whose structure is absolutely unique, gives itself as the ph en om enon
of an unlim ited m astery or an unlim ited power over the signifier, since
the latter has the form o f <90> non-exteriority itself. Ideally in the teleo-
logical essence o f speech, it would therefore be possible that the signifier
be absolutely near to the signified intended by intuition and guiding the
m eaning. T he signifier w ould becom e perfectly diap h an ous by reason o f
the absolute proxim ity o f the signified. This proxim ity is broken, how
ever, when, instead of h earin g myself speak, I see myself write or signify
by gestures.
H usserl will be able to con sider the m edium of expression as “un
productive” and “reflective” precisely on the condition o f this absolute
proxim ity o f the signifier to the signified, and on the condition o f the sig-
n ifier’s erasure in im m ediate presence. Also, on this condition, H usserl
will be able, paradoxically, to reduce the m edium with no harm bein g
done and assert that a pre-expressive stratum o f sense exists. O n this
condition too H usserl will give h im self the right to reduce the totality o f
language, regardless o f w hether it is indicative or expressive, in order to
regain the possession o f the originarity o f sense.
How are we to un d erstan d this red u ction o f lan guage in light o f
the fact that H usserl, from the Logical Investigations up to “T h e O rigin
o f Geom etry,” continues to con sider there to be scientific truths, that is,
absolutely ideal objects, only in “statem ents”? How are we to understand
this reduction when he continued to think o f not only spoken language
but also inscription as indispensable for the constitution o f ideal objects,
that is, o f objects that can b e transm itted and repeated as the sam e?
First o f all, one needs to recogn ize this: although the m ovem ent
that results in “T he O rigin o f G eom etry” was started lon g before, in its
m ost obvious aspect it confirm s the p rofoun d way in which lan guage is
lim ited to a secondary stratum o f experience, and, in the consideration
o f this secondary stratum , it confirm s the traditional ph on ologism o f
metaphysics. If writing com pletes the constitution o f ideal objects, it does
this only insofar as it is phonetic w riting.1' Writing com es to stabilize, in
scribe, < 9 1> write down, incarnate a speech that is already prepared. And
to reactivate writing is always to reawaken an expression within an indica
tion, a word in the body o f a letter which was carrying in it the threat of
* It is strange that, despite the for malist motif ancl the Leibnizian fidelity that he asserts
from one end of his work to the other, Husserl has never placed the problem of writing at
the center o f his reflections, nor does he, in “The Origin of Geometry,” take account of the
difference between phonetic writing and non-phonetic writing.
the crisis, insofar as the letter was a symbol that can always rem ain empty.
Speech was already playing the sam e role in regard to the identity o f
sense such as it is first constituted in thought. For exam ple, the “proto-
geom eter” m ust produce in thought, by means o f a passage to the limit,
the pure ideality o f the geom etrical object, by securing its transmissibility
by speech and then entrusting it to a writing by m eans o f which som eone
will be able to rep eat the originative sense, that is, the act o f pure thought
which created the ideality o f the sense. With the possibility o f progress
that such an incarnation authorizes, the risk o f “forgetfuln ess” and o f loss
o f the sense grows constantly. It is m ore and m ore difficult to reconstitute
the presence o f the act that is buried under historical sedim entations.
The m om ent o f the crisis is always that o f the sign. M oreover, despite
the m eticulousness, the rigor, and the absolute novelty o f his analyses,
H usserl always describes all o f these m ovem ents in m etaphysical con cep
tuality. The absolute difference between the soul and the body is what
governs. W riting is a body that expresses only if we actually pron oun ce
the verbal expression that anim ates it, if its space is tem poralized. The
word is a body that m eans som ething only if an actual intention anim ates
it and m akes it pass from the state o f inert sonority (Körper) to the state
o f anim ated body (Leib). This body p rop er o f the word expresses only if
it is anim ated (sinnbelebt) by the act o f a wanting-to-say (bedeuten) which
transform s it into spiritual flesh (geistige Leiblichkeit). But only Geistigkeit
or Leiblichkeit is in depen den t and originary/' 9 As such, Geistigkeit needs no
signifier in order to be present to itself. It is as much against its signifiers
as thanks to them that Geistigkeit is awakened and m aintained in life. Such
is the traditional side o f H u sserl’s discourse.
<92> B u t if H usserl h ad to acknow ledge, even as salutary threats,
the necessity o f these “incarn ation s,” this is because a profoun d motive
was torm enting and contesting, from within, the security of these tradi
tional distinctions. Because too the possibility o f writing was inhabiting
the inside o f speech which itself was at work in the intimacy o f thought.
And here we return to all the resources o f originary non-presence
whose outcrop we have already located several times. Even though he
represses difference by pushing it back into the exteriority o f the signi
fier, Husserl could not fail to recognize its work at the origin o f sense and
o f presence. Auto-affection as the operation o f the voice assum ed that a
pure difference cam e to divide self:presence. The possibility o f everything
that we believe we are able to exclu de from auto-affection is enrooted in
this pure difference: space, the outside, the world, the body, etc. As soon
See the introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” §7.

as we adm it that auto-affection is the condition of self-presence, no pure

transcendental reduction is possible. But it is necessary to pass through
the reduction in order to recapture the difference in closest proximity to
itself: not to its identity, nor its purity, nor its origin. It has none o f these.
But in closest proxim ity to the m ovem ent o f différance.
This m ovem ent o f différance does not supervene upon a transcen
dental subject. The m ovem ent o f différance produces the transcenden
tal subject. Auto-affection is not a m odality o f experience that character
izes a being that would already be itself (autos). Auto-affection produces
the sam e as the self:relation in the difference with itself, the sam e as the
non-identical.
Shall we say that the auto-affection about which we have been speak
ing so far concerns only the operation o f the voice, that the difference
concerns the ord er o f the phonic “signifier” or the “secondary stratum ”
o f expression? Shall we say that we can always reserve the possibility o f a
pure and purely self:present identity at the level that Husserl wanted to
open up, the level o f pre-expressive lived-experience, the level of sense
insofar as it p receded Bedeutung and expression?
<93> But it w ould be easy to show that such a possibility is excluded
at the very root o f transcendental experience.
In fact, why is the con cept o f auto-affection im posed on us? T h e
originality o f speech, that by which speech is distinguished from every
other m ilieu o f signification, com es from the way its fabric seems to be
purely tem poral. And this tem porality does not unfold a sense that would
be itself timeless. Even p rio r to being expressed, the sense is through
and through tem poral. The om nitem porality o f ideal objects, according
to Husserl, is only a m ode o f temporality. And when H usserl describes a
sense that seem s to escape from temporality, he hastens to specify that
what is at issue in it is a provisional stage o f the analysis and that he is
considering a constituted temporality. Now as soon as we take account
o f the m ovem ent o f tem poralization, such as it is already described in
The Phenomenology of Inter nal Time-Consciousness, it is indeed necessary to
use the concept o f pure auto-affection, the con cept that H eidegger uses,
as we know, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics precisely in regard to
tim e.10 The “source-point,” the “originary im pression,” that on the basis
o f which the m ovem ent o f tem poralization is produ ced is already pure
auto-affection. First, it is a pure produ ction since tem porality is never
a real predicate o f a being. T he intuition o f time itself cannot be em
pirical. It is a reception that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of
each now is therefore en gen d ered by nothing. It consists in an origi
nary im pression that engen ders itself: “T he originary im pression is the
* absolute beginning o f this production, the originary source, that start-
in g from which all the rest is continuously produced. But it itself is not
produced. It is not born as som ething produced, but by genesis spontanea,
it is originary g en eratio n .” 11 This pure spontaneity is an im pression. It
creates nothing. The new now is n ot a being, is n ot an object produced,
and every language fails to describe this pure m ovem ent except by m eans
o f m etaphor, that is, by borrow ing its concepts from <94> the order o f
objects o f experience that this tem poralization m akes possible. Husserl
constantly warns us against these m etaphors." The process by m eans o f
which the living now, p rod u cin g itself <95> by spontaneous generation,
* See, for example, the admirable §36 o f The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,
which demonstrates the absence of a proper name for this strange “movement,” which
moreover is not a movement. “For all of that,” Husserl concludes, “names fail us.” We
would still have to radicalize H usserl’s intention here in a specific direction. For it is no
accident if he still designates this unnameable as “absolute subjectivity,” that is, as a being
thought by starting from presence as substance, ousia, hypokeimenon: a self-iclentical being
in self-presence, the self-presence making a subject out of the substance. What is saicl to
be unnameable in this section is not literally som ething about which we know that it is a
being that is present in the form o f self-presence, a substance modified into a subject, into
the absolute subject, whose self-presence is pure ancl depends on no external affection, on
no outside. All of that is present and we can name it; its proof is that we cannot put into question the
being possessed by absolute subjectivity. What are unnameable, according to Husserl, are only
the “absolute properties” o f this subject, which is therefore indeed designated according
to the classical metaphysical schema that distinguishes the substance (the present being)
from its attributes. Another schema that keeps the incomparable depth of analysis within
the closure of the metaphysics o f presence is the subject-object opposition. This being
for whom the “absolute proper ties” are indescribable is present as absolute subjectivity, is
a being that is absolutely present and absolutely present to itself, only in its opposition to
the object. The object is relative; the subject is absolute: “We are unable to express this
in any other way than: we describe this flow in this way according to what is constit uted, but it
consists in nothing that is temporally ‘objective.’ This is absolute subjectivity, and it has
the absolute properties of something that we have to designate metaphorically as ‘flow,’
something that springs up ‘now,’ in a point o f actuality, an originary source-point, etc. In
the lived-experience o f actuality, we have the originary source-point anci a continuity of
moments of retentions. For all o f that, names fail us” (The Phenomenology of Interned Time-
Consciousness, §36, my em phasis). <Translator: The equivalent passage can be found on
page 100 o f the Churchill tran slation s Theref ore the determination o f “absolute subjectiv
ity” would also have to be erased as soon as we think the present on the basis o f clifférance
anci not the reverse. The concept of subjectivity belongs a priori and in general to the order
of the constituted. This holds a fortiori for the analogical appresentation that constitutes in
tersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is inseparable from temporalization as the openness of the
present to an outside-ofitself, to an other absolute present. This outside-of-itself of time is
its spacing: an au hi-scene. This scene, as the relation o f a present to an other present as such,
that is, as non-clerived re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung or Repräsentation), produces the
structure of the sign in general as “referral,” as being-for-something (für etwas sein) and
radically forbids its reduction. There is no constituting subjectivity. And it is necessary to
deconstruct all the way down to the concept of constitution.
THE VOI CE THAT KE E PS S ILENT
must, in ord er to be a now, be retained in another now, m ust affect itself,

without em pirical recourse, with a new originary actuality in which it will
becom e a non-now as a past now, etc.; and such a process is in deed a
pure auto-affection in which the sam e is the sam e only by affecting itself
with an other, by becom ing the oth er o f the sam e. This auto-affection
m ust be pure since the originary im pression is affected there by n othing
other than by itself, by the absolute “novelty” o f an oth er originary im
pression which is another now. As soon as we insert a determ inate being
into the description o f this “m ovem ent,” we are speaking by m etaphor.
We say the “m ovem ent” with the terms for what the “m ovem ent” m akes
possible. But we have always already drifted into ontic m etaphor. T em po
ralization is the root o f a m etaph or that can be only originary. T he word
“tim e” itself, such as it has always been un derstood in the history o f m eta
physics, is a m etaph or that indicates and dissim ulates at the same time the
“m ovem ent” o f this auto-affection. All the concepts o f m etaphysics— in
particular those o f activity an d passivity, will and non-will, and therefore
those o f affection or auto-affection, o f purity and impurity, etc.— cover
over ancl coincide with the strange “m ovem ent” o f this difference.
But this p u re difference, which constitutes the self-presence o f the
living present, reintroduces into it originarily all the impurity that we had
believed we were able to exclude from it. The living present arises on the
basis o f its non-self-identity, and on the basis o f the retentional trace. It is
always already a trace. This trace is unthinkable if we start fro m the sim
plicity o f a present whose life would be interior to itself. The self o f the liv
ing present is originarily a trace. The trace is not an attribute about which
we could say that the self o f the living present “is originarily” the trace.
It is necessary to think originary-being from the trace and not the trace
from originary-being. This archi-writing is at work in the origin o f sense.
Since sense, as H usserl has recognized, has a tem poral nature, it is never
simply <96> present. It is always already engaged in the “m ovem ent” o f
the trace, that is, in the ord er o f “signification.” Sense has always already
exited fro m itself into the “expressive stratum ” o f lived-experience. Since
the trace is the relation o f intimacy o f the living present to its outside,
the open n ess to exteriority in general, to the non-proper, etc., the tevipo-
ralization of sense is from the very beginning “spacing” As soon as we adm it
spacing at once as “interval” or difference and as openness to the out
side, there is no absolute interiority. The “ou tside” insinuates itself into
the m ovem ent by m eans o f which the inside o f non-space, which bears
the name “tim e,” appears to itself, constitutes itself, and “presen ts” itself.
Space is “in ” time. It is the pure exiting o f time to the outside o f itself. It
is outside-of-itself as the self-relation o f time. T h e exteriority o f space, ex
teriority as space, does not take time by surprise. Exteriority opens itself
as the pure “ou tsid e” “in ” the m ovem ent o f tem poralization. If we now
rem em ber that the pure interiority o f phonic auto-affection assum ed the
purely tem poral nature o f the “expressive” process, we see that the theme
o f a pure interiority o f speech or o f “hearing-oneself:speak” is radically
contradicted by “tim e” itself. Even the exiting “into the w orld” is also
originarily implied by the m ovem ent o f tem poralization. “T im e” cannot
be an “absolute subjectivity” precisely because we are not able to think
it on the basis o f the present and on the basis o f the presence to itself
of a present being. Like everything that is thought un der this h eading
and like everything that is exclu d ed by the m ost rigorous transcendental
reduction, the “world” is originarily im plied by the m ovem ent o f tem po
ralization. Like the relation between an inside and an outside in general,
an existent and a non-existent in general, a constitute!· and a constituted
in general, tem poralization is at once the ver y pow er and the very limit
of the ph en om en ological reduction. H earing-oneself:speak is not the in
teriority o f an inside closed in upon itself. It is the irreducible openness
in the inside, the eye and the world in speech. The ph en om en ological
reduction is a scene.
<97> Also, ju st as expression does n ot com e to be ad d ed on as a
“stratum ”"' to the presence o f a pre-expressive sense, the outside o f in
dication does not com e to affect accidentally the inside o f expression.
T h eir interw eaving (Verflechtung) is originary. T h e intertwining is not
th e kind o f contingent association that m ethodical care and a patient
reduction could undo. Even as necessary as the analysis is, it encounters
here an absolute limit. If indication is not ad d ed onto expression which
is not ad d ed onto sense, we can nevertheless speak, in regard to them,
about an originary “su p plem en t.” T heir addition com es to supplem ent
a lack, an originary non-self-presence. And if indication, fo r exam ple,
writing in the everyday sense, m ust necessarily “add itself” onto speech
in ord er to com plete the constitution o f the ideal object, if speech m ust
“add itself” onto the identity o f the object in thought, this is because the
“p resen ce” o f sense and o f speech has already begun to be lacking in
regard to itself.
* In the important § 124 to § 127 o f Ideas I, which we shall follow elsewhere step by step, Husserl
invites us, while continuously speaking of a substratum of pre-expressive livecl-experience,
not “to expect too much from this image of stratification [Schichtung].” H usserl says, “Ex
pression is not a sort of overlaid varnish or covering garment; it is a spiritual formation that
exercises new intentional functions on the intentional substratum [Unterschicht].” t r a n s l a
tor: The equivalent passage from §124 can be f ound on page 297 o f the Kersten translation
o f Ideas I. When Derricla says that he will follow these sections step by step elsewhere, he is
referring to “Form and Meaning,” collected in Margins ojPhilosophy.>
The Originative Supplement
<98> Thus understood, supplem entarity is really différance, the operation

o f differing that, at once, splits and delays presence, subjecting it by the
sam e action to originary division and originary delay. D ifférance is to be
thought prior to the separation between deferral <différer> as delay and
differing <clifférer> as the active work o f difference <clifférence>. It m ust
be un d erstood that différan ce is unthinkable startin g from conscious
ness, that is, starting from presence, or starting simply from the opposite
o f presence, absence or non-consciousness. It is also unthinkable as the
sim ple homogeneous com plication o f a diagram or a line o f time, as com
plex “succession .” Supplem en tary différance vicariates for presen ce in
its originary lack in regard to itself. We must now verify, going through the
First Logical Investigation, in what way these concepts respect the rela
tion between the sign in general (indicative as m uch as expressive) and
presence in general. Going through H u sserl’s text, that is, in a reading that
can be simply neither that o f com m entary nor that o f interpretation.
Let us first note that this concept o f originary supplem entarity not
only im plies the non-fullness o f presence (or in H usserl’s language, the
non-fulfillm ent o f an intuition), it also designates this function o f sub
stitutive supplem enting in general, the structure o f the “in the place o f”
( für etwas) that belongs to every sign in general and about which at the
beginning we were astonished that H usserl subjected <99> the possibility
o f this structure to no critical question, taking its possibility for granted
when he distinguished between the indicative sign and the expressive
sign. What we would like finally to start thinking about is the fact that
the for-itself o f self-presence (fiir-sich), traditionally determ ined in its
dative dim ension as ph en om en ological, reflective, or pre-reflective auto
donation, arises in the m ovem ent o f supplem entarity as originary substi
tution, in the form o f the “in the place o f ” (für etwas), that is, as we have
seen, in the very operation o f signification in general. T he for-itselfwould
be an in-the-place-of-itself: put for itself, in the place o f itself. T he strange
structure o f the supplem en t appears here: a possibility produces by delay
that to which it is said to be added.
This structure o f supplem entarity is very com plicated. Insofar as it
is a supplem ent, the signifier does not first re-present merely the absent
signified. It substitutes itself for another signifier, for another signifying
order, which carries on an oth er relation with the m issing presence, an
other relation that is more valuable owing to-the play o f difference. It is
m ore valuable since the play o f difference is the m ovem ent o f idealiza
tion and because the m ore the signifier is ideal, the m ore it augm ents
the potency o f repetition of presence, the m ore it protects, reserves, and
capitalizes on sense. In this way, the indication is not only the substitute
that supplem ents the absence or the invisibility o f the indicated. The in
dicated, as we remem ber, is always an existent. T he indication also replaces
another type o f signifier: the expressive sign, that is, a signifier whose sig
nified (the Bedeutung) is ideal. In fact, in real, com m unicative, etc. dis
course, expression yields its place to indication because, as we recall, the
sense intended by another and, in a general way, the lived-experience o f
another are not and can never be present in person. This is why, as H us
serl says, expression then functions “as indication .”
We still need to know now— and this is m ost im portan t— in what
way expression itself implies in its structure a non-fullness. Expression is
known, however, as being fuller than indication <100> since the appre-
sentational detour is no lon ger necessary to it, and because it could func
tion as such in the alleged self:presence o f solitary discourse.
In fact, it is in deed im portant to m easure at what distance— at what
articulated distance— an intuitionistic theory o f knowledge governs Hus
serl’s concept o f language. The entire originality o f this concept depends
on the fact that its final subjection to intuitionism does not oppress what
we could call the freedom o f language, the outspokenness o f a discourse,
even if it is false and contradictory. One is able to speak without knowing.
A gainst the entire ph ilosoph ical tradition, H usserl dem onstrates that
speech then is still fully legitim ate speech provided that it is obedient
to certain rules which are not im m ediately given as rules o f knowledge.
Pure logical gram m ar, the pure m orphology o f significations, must tell
us a piiori under what conditions a discourse can be a discourse, even if
it m akes no knowledge possible.
We m ust h ere co n sider the final exclu sio n — or re d u ctio n — to
which H usserl brings us in order to isolate the specific purity o f expres
sion. This is his m ost audacious exclusion. It consists in putting out o f
play, as “unessential co m p o n en ts” o f expression , the acts o f intuitive
knowledge that “fulfill” the m eaning <vouloir-dire>.
We know that the act o f m eaning, the one that gives the Bedeutung
(Bedeutungsintention) , is always the aim o f a relation to the object. But
it is enough that this intention anim ates the body o f a signifier for that
discourse to take place. T he fulfillm ent o f the intention by an intuition
is not indispensable. It belongs to the original structure of expression to
be able to do without the full presence o f the object aim ed at in intuition.
THE O R I G I N A T I V E S U P P L E M E N T
Evoking once m ore the confusion which is born from the entanglem ent
(Verflechtung) o f relations, H usserl writes (in §9):
If we seek to plant ourselves firmly in the soil o f pure description, the

concrete p h en om en o n o f expression anim ated with a sense [sinne-
belebten] is articulated, on the one hand, into a physiccilphenomenon in
which the expression < 101 > is constituted accordin g to its physical side,
ancl on the other hand, into acts which endow it with the Bedeutung an d
contingently intuitivefidlness, in which the relation to the expressed ob
jective correlate is constituted. Th anks to these acts, expression is m ore
than a sim ple flatus vocis. It intends som ething, ancl insofar as expression
intends som ething, it is related to som eth in g objective.1
Fullness is therefore m erely contingent. The absence o f the in ten ded

object does not com prom ise the m eaning; the absen ce does not reduce
the expression to its unanim ated and in itself m eaningless physical side.
H usserl writes,
This objective som ething [to which the intention relates itself] can or
indeed does a p p ea r as actually presen t [aktuell gegenwärtig] thanks to
the accom panying or at least represen ted [vergegenwärtig] intuitions (for
exam ple in an im aginary form ). In th e case where that h as taken place,
the relation to the objective correlate is realized. O r else, when this is
not the case, th e expression functions with its charge o f sense [fungiert
sinnvoll], ancl is always m ore than a sim ple flatu s vocis, although it is d e
prived o f the intuition that founds it, which provides it with an object.2
The “fulfilling” intuition is not therefore essential to the expression, to

the intention o f the m eaning. T he rest o f this chapter is devoted to accu
m ulating proofs o f this difference between intention and intuition. Since
all classical theories o f lan guage have been blind to the difference,'"3 they
have been unable to avoid aporias and absurdities. These, Husserl m arks
out as he proceeds. Over the course o f subtle and decisive analyses that
we are unable to follow here, the dem onstration is given o f the ideality
o f the Bedeutung and o f the non-coincidence between the expression, the
Bedeutung (both insofar as they are ideal un ities), and the object. Two iden-
* According to Husserl, of course. This is undoubtedly truer of the modern theories that
he refutes than, for exam ple, certain medieval attem pts to which he hardly ever refers.
The exception is a brief allusion, in Formed and Transcendental Logic, to Thomas of Erf urt’s
Grarnmatica speculativa.
tical expressions can have the sam e Bedeutung, m eaning the sam e thing
and yet having a different object (for exam ple, in the two propositions
“Bucephalus is a horse” and “This steed is a horse”). Two different expres
sions <102> are able to have different Bedeutungen, but intend the same
object (for exam ple, in the two expressions “T he victor a tje n a ” and “The
vanquished at W aterloo” ) . Finally, two different expressions are able to
have the sam e Bedeutung and the sam e object (Londres, London, zwei, two,
duo, etc.).
W ithout such distinctions, no pure logical gram m ar would be pos
sible. Consequently, the pure m orph ology o f ju d gm en ts, whose possi
bility supports the entire structure of Formal and Transcendental Logic,
would be forbidden. In fact, we know that pure logical gram m ar depends
entirely on the distinction between Widersinnigkeit and Sinnlosigkeit. If it
is obedient to certain rules, an expression can be widersinnig (contradic
tory, false, absurd acco rd in g to a certain type o f absurdity) while still
having an intelligible sense that allows a norm al discourse to take place,
without becom in g non-sense {Unsinn). It can have no possible object for
em pirical reasons (a golden m ountain) or for a priori reasons (a square
circle) while still having an intelligible sense, without being sinnlos. The
absence o f the object (Gegenstandlosigkeit) is not therefore the absence o f
m eaning (Bedeutungslosigkeit). Pure logical gram m ar therefore excludes
fro m the norm alcy o f discourse only non-sense in the sense o f Unsinn
(.Abracadabra, vert est on).4 If we were not able to understand what “square
circle” or “golden m ou n tain ” means, how could we come to a conclusion
about the absence o f a possible object? In Unsinn, in the a-grammaticality
o f non-sense, this m inim um o f un derstandin g is denied to us.
Follow ing the logic and necessity o f these distinctions, we m ight
be tem pted to support the idea not only that the m eaning does not es
sentially imply the intuition o f the object, but also that it essentially ex
cludes the intuition. The structural originality o f the m ean in g would be
the Gegenstandlosigkeit, the absence of the object given to intuition. In
the fullness o f the presence that com es to fulfill the aim o f the m eaning,
intuition and intention fuse into one another; they “form a unity o f inti
mate <103> m erging [eine innig verschmolzene Einheit] that has an original
character.”'1' This is to say that the lan guage that speaks in the presence
:i: “In the realized relation of the expression to its objective correlate, the expression that
is animated with sense becomes one [eint sich] with the acts of the fulfillment of the Be
deutung, The phonic sonority of the word is first made one with [ist eins mit] the intention
of Bedeutung, ancl this in its turn is made one (as intentions in general are made one with
their fulfillments) with the cor responding fulfillment of Bedeutung’'’ (§9). <Translator: The
equivalent passage can be found on page 192 o f the English translation, volume 1. The
French quote has “ist einst mit,” but this phrase appears to be a typographical e rro rs At
o f its object erases or lets its own originality dissolve; it erases this struc
ture that belongs only to it and that allows it to function all alone when
its intention is severed from intuition. H ere, instead o f suspecting that
H usserl begins the analysis with its dissociation too soon, we m ight won
der if he is not unifying too m uch and too soon. Is it not excluded, for
essential and structural reason s— the very reasons that Husserl recalls—
that the unity o f intuition and intention are ever hom ogeneous and that
the m eaning fuses into intuition without disappearing? Is it not the case
that we will never in principle be able, in expression, “to h onor the draft
drawn on intuition,” here taking up H u sserl’s language?5
L et us consider the extrem e case o f a “statem ent about p e rc ep
tion.” Let us suppose that it is p rodu ced in the very m om ent o f p ercep
tual intuition. I say, “I see now a particular person by the window,” at the
m om ent I actually see that person. What is im plied structurally in what I
am doin g is that the content o f this expression is ideal and that its unity
is not im paired by the absence o f the hic et nunc perception. ' 6 The one
who, next to me or at an infinite distance in time an d space, hears this
p roposition m ust, in principle, un derstand w hat I in ten d to say. Since
this possibility is the possibility o f discourse, it m ust structure the very act
o f the one who speaks <104> while perceiving. My non-perception, my
non-intuition, my hic et nunc absence are said by that which I say, by what
I say and because I say it. N ever will this structure be able to m ake with
intuition a “unity o f intim ate m ergin g.” The absence o f intuition— and
therefore o f the subject o f the intuition— is not only tolerated by the dis
course, the absence is required by the str ucture o f signification in general,
were one to consider it in itself. T he absence is radically required: the to
tal absence o f the subject and o f the object o f the statem ent— the death
o f the writer a n d /o r the d isappearan ce o f the objects that he has been
able to describe— does not prevent a text from “m ean in g” <vouloir-clire>.
On the contrary, this possibility gives birth to m ean in g <vouloir-clire> as
such, hands it over to being h eard and being read.
Let us go further. In what way is writing— the comm on nam e for
signs that function despite the total absence of the subject, by m eans o f
the beginning of §10, Husser l will still specify that this unity is not a simple “being-together”
in simultaneity but “a unity of intimate confusion.” <Translator: The English tr anslation
says (page 193): “The above distinguished acts involving the expr ession’s appear ance, on
the one hand, ancl the meaning-intention, on the other, do not constitute a mere aggre
gate o f simultaneously given items in consciousness. They rather form an intimately fused
unity o f peculiar character.”>
* “In the statement of a perception, we distinguish, as for every statement, between content
and object, and we do this in such a way that by content we understand the self-identical Be
deutung that the hearer can grasp even if he him self is not perceiving” (§14).
(and beyond) his death — im plied in the very m ovem ent o f signification
in general, in particular, in speech that is called “live”? In what way does
writing inaugurate and com plete idealization, being itself neither real
nor ideal? Finally, in what way are death, idealization, repetition, and
signification thinkable, in their pure possibility, only on the basis o f one
and the sam e openness? This time, let us take the exam ple o f the per
sonal pron oun “I.” H usserl classifies it am on g the expressions that are
“essentially occasion al.” It shares this characteristic with a whole “group
presenting a conceptual unity o f possible Bedeutungen, such that it is es
sential fo r this expression to orient its actual Bedeutung each time to the
occasion, to the person who is speaking, or his situation.”7 This group is
distinguished at once from the group o f expressions whose plurivocity
is contingent and reducible by m eans o f a convention (the word “rule,”
for exam ple, m eans both a wooden instrum ent and a prescription ), and
from the g ro u p o f “objective” expressions whose univocity the discursive
circum stances, context, and situation o f the speaking subject do not af
fect (for exam ple, “all the expressions in theory, expressions out o f which
the principles and theorem s, the proofs <105> and theories o f the ‘ab
stract’ sciences are m ade u p .” The m athem atical expression is the m odel
for this g ro u p ).8 Only these objective expressions are absolutely pure o f
indicative contam ination. We are able to recognize an essentially occa
sional expression by m eans o f the fact that we cannot in principle replace
it in the discourse by a perm anent, objective, conceptual representation
without distorting the Bedeutung o f the statem ent. If, fo r exam ple, I tried
to substitute for the word “I,” such as it ap pears in a statem ent, with
what I believe to be its objective conceptual content (“whatever person
who, while speaking, is designating h im self”), I would end up in absur
dities. Instead o f “I am p le a se d ,” I would have “whatever person who,
while speaking, is design ating him self is p le ase d .” Each time that such
a substitution distorts the statem ent, we are dealin g with an essentially
subjective and occasion al expression , whose function rem ains indica
tive. Thus indication penetrates wherever a reference in the discourse
to the situation o f the subject does not let itself be reduced, wherever
the situation o f the subject lets itself be indicated by a person al p ro
noun, a dem onstrative pronoun, or a “subjective” adverb o f the following
type: “h ere,” “th ere,” “above,” “below,” “now,” “yesterday,” “tom orrow ,”
“b efo re,” “after,” etc. This massive return o f indication into expression
forces H usserl to conclude:
An essentially indicating character naturally spreads to all expression s

which include these and sim ilar representations as parts: this includes
all the m ultiple form s o f discourse where the speaker gives norm al
expression to som eth in g concern in g him self, or which is thought o f in

relation to himself, All expression s for perception s, convictions, cloubts,
wishes, fears, com m an ds b elo n g h ere.9
The root o f all o f these expressions, as we see very quickly, is the

zero-point o f the subjective origin, the “I,” the “h ere,” the “now.” The Be
deutung o f these expressions is carried o ff into indication each time that
it anim ates a real discourse fo r others. But H usserl seem s to think that
for the one who speaks this Bedeutung, as the relation to <106> the object (I,
here, now), is “realized.” 1' H usserl says, “In solitary discourse, the Bedeu
tung of the ‘I’ is realized essentially in the im m ediate representation o f
our own personality. . . . ”
Is this certain? Even if we assum e that such an im m ediate represen
tation is possible and actually given, does not the appearance o f the word
“I” in solitary discourse (a supplem en t whose reason for being is m ore
over not clear if the im m ediate representation is possible) already func
tion as an ideality? Consequently, does not the appearance o f the word
“I” offer itself as able to rem ain the same fo r an I-here-now in general,
keeping its sense even if my em pirical presence is erased or is m odified
radically? When I say “I,” even in solitary discourse, am I able to endow
my statem ent with sense in any other way than by implying in it, as always,
the possible absence o f the object o f the discourse, in this case, m yself?
W hen I say “I am ” to myself, this expression , as with every expression
accordin g to Husserl, has the status o f bein g discourse only if it is intel
ligible in the absence o f the object, in the absence of the intuitive pres
ence, therefore in this case, in the absence o f myself. Moreover, it is in
this way that the ergo sum is introduced into the philosophical tradition
and a discourse on the transcendental ego is possible. W hether or not
I have the actual intuition o f myself, “I” does express. W hether or not I
am living, the words “I am ” “m ean ” <veulent dire>. Here too the fulfilling
intuition is not an “essential com pon en t” o f the expression. W hether or
not “I” functions in solitary discourse, with or without the self:presence
o f the speaking being, it is sinnvoll. A nd one has <107> no need o f know-
* “In solitary discourse, the Bedeutung of the “I” is realized essentially in the immediate rep
resentation o f our own personality, which is also the meaning of the word in communica
tive discourse. Each interlocutor has his I-representation (ancl with his individual concept
of the “I”) and this is why the w ord’s Bedeutung differs with each individual” One cannot
help being astonished in the face o f this individual concept and this Bedeutung which differ
with each individual. And Husserl’s premises themselves encourage the astonishment. Hus
serl pursues the idea by saying, “But since each person, by speaking of himself, says ‘I,’ the
word has the character of a universally operative inclexical of this fact.”
in g who is speaking in ord er to un derstand it or even to utter it. O nce

m ore, the b o rd er appears hardly certain between solitary discourse and
com m unication, between the reality and the representation o f the dis
course. Does H usserl not contradict what he established in regard to the
difference between GegenstandlosigkeitU) and Bedeutungslosigkeit when he
writes: “The word T nam es a different person from case to case, and does
so by way o f an always new Bedeutung ’? Do not discourse and the ideal
nature o f every Bedeutung exclude that a Bedeutung is “always new”? Does
Husserl not contradict what he asserted about the in depen den ce o f the
intention and the fulfilling intuition by writing: “What constitutes each
tim e its Bedeutung (that o f the word T ) can be drawn only from the liv
ing discourse and intuitive givens that participate in it. When we read this
word without knowing who has written it, we have a word, if not deprived
o f Bedeutung, at least foreign to its norm al Bedeutung.”u Husserl’s premises
should authorize us to say exactly the opposite. Ju st as I do not need to per
ceive in ord er to understand a perceptual statem ent, I do not need the
intuition o f the object “I” in order to understand the word “I.” T he possi
bility o f this non-intuition constitutes the Bedeutung as such, the normal
Bedeutung as such. When the word “I” appears, the ideality o f its Bedeu
tung, insofar as it is distinct from its “object,” puts us in the situation that
Husserl describes as abnorm al: as if the word “I” were written by som eone
unknown. Only this situation allows us to account fo r the fact that we
understand the word “I” not only when its “author” is unknown, but also
when he is perfectly fictional— and when he is dead. T he ideality o f the
Bedeutung has here a value that is structurally testim onial. And ju st as the
value o f a perceptual statem ent d ep en d ed on neither the actuality nor
the possibility o f the perception, the signifying value o f the “I” d oes not
depen d on the life o f the speaking subject. W hether the perception ac
com panies or not the perceptual statem ent, whether life as self:presence
accom panies or not the statem ent <108> o f the “I,” this is perfectly indif
ferent to the functioning o f the m eaning. My death is structurally neces
sary to p ron oun cin g the “I.” W hether I am also “living” and w hether I
am certain about being alive, that com es over and above the m ovem ent
o f the m eaning. A nd this structure is active. It keeps its original efficacy
even when I say “I am living” at the precise m om ent when, if that is pos
sible, I have its full and actual intuition. T he Bedeutung “I am ” or “I am
living,” or even “my living present is,” is what it is, it has the ideal identity
p roper to all Bedeutung only if it does not let itself be im paired by false
hood, that is, if I can be dead at the m om ent during which it functions.
Undoubtedly, it will be diff erent from the Bedeutung “I am d e a d ,” but not
necessarily from the fact that “I am d e ad .” T he statem ent “I am living” is
accom panied by my being-dead and the statem en t’s possibility requires
the possibility that I be d e ad — and the reverse. This is not an extraordi

nary story by Poe, but the ordinary story o f lan g u ag e.1- Earlier, we gain ed
access to the “I am m o rta r from the “I am .” H ere we understand the “I
a m ” from the “I am d ead .” T h e anonymity o f the written “I,” the im pro
priety o f the “I write” is, contrary to what H usserl says, the norm al situa
tion. The autonom y o f the m eaning in regard to intuitive knowledge, the
autonom y that H usserl dem on strates and that we were calling earlier
the freedom o f language, “outspokenness,” has its norm in writing and the
relation to death. This writing is not able to com e as added onto speech
because as soon as speech awakens writing has doubled it by anim ating
it. H ere indication neither d egrad es n or diverts expression; indication
dictates it. We are drawing this conclusion from the idea o f pure logical
gram m ar, from the rigorous distinction between the intention o f the
m ean in g (Becletangsintention) which can always function “em ptily” and
its “con tin gen t” fulfillm ent by the intuition o f the object. T h is conclu
sion is reinforced even m ore by the supplem entary distinction, which is
also rigorous, between the fulfillm ent by the “sense” and the fulfillm ent
by the “object.” T h e form er d o es not necessarily dem an d the latter, and
we could draw the sam e lesso n from a careful reading o f §14 (“Content
<109> as Object, Content as Fulfilling Sense and Content as Sim ple Sense
or Bedeutung”) .
Why does H usserl refuse to draw these conclusions from the sam e
prem ises? The motive for fu ll “p resen ce,” the intuitionist imperative and
the project o f knowledge continue to govern— at a distance, let us say—
the whole o f the description. In one and the sam e m ovem ent, H usserl
describes and erases the em ancipation o f discourse as non-knowledge.
The originality o f the m ean in g as an aim is limited by the telos o f vision.
T h e difference that separates intention from intuition, in o rd e r to be
radical, would nevertheless be pro-visional. And, despite everything, this
pro-vision would constitute the essence o f m ean in g <vouloir~dire>. The
eidos is determ in ed in depth by the telos. T he “sym bol” always signals
toward the “truth” whose lack it is constituted as:
If the “possibility” or the “tru th” h ap pen s to be lacking, the intention of

the statem ent is obviously achieved only “sym bolically”; it cannot derive
the fullness which constitutes its epistem ological value from intuition
or from the categorial functions which m ust be exercised in its fo u n d a
tion. It then lacks, as one says, a “tru e,” an “auth en tic” Bedeutung;13
In oth er words, the true and authentic m ean in g is the wanting to say-
the-truth.14 This subtle shift is the resum ption o f the eidos in the telos and
o f language in knowledge. A discourse m ay have already conform ed to
its discursive essence when it was false, but it nevertheless attains its en-
telechy when it is true. One can well speak by saying “the circle is squ are,”
b u t o n e speaks well by saying that the circle is not square. T here is already
sense in the first proposition. But we would be wrong to infer from it that
the sense does not await the truth. It does not wait fo r the truth insofar
as it expects it; it p recedes the truth only as its anticipation. In truth, the
telos that announces the achievem ent that is prom ised for “later” has al
ready, earlier, open ed up the sense as the relation to the object. This is
what the concept o f normalcy m eans each time that it intervenes in H us
serl’s descriptions. T he < 1 1 0> norm is know ledge, the intuition that is
adequate to its object, the evidence that is not only distinct but “clear”:
the full presence o f the sense to a consciousness that is itself present to
itself in the fullness o f its life, in the fullness o f its living present. Also,
without overlooking the rigor and the audacity o f the “pure logical gram
m ar,” without forgetting the advantages that it can offer if we com pare
it to the classical projects o f rational gram m ar, it is indeed necessary to
acknowledge that its “form ality” is limited. We could say as much about
the pure m orph ology o f judgments, which, in Formed and Transcendental
Logic, determ ines the pure logical gram m ar or pure m orphology o f sig
nifications. T he purification o f the form al is regu lated accordin g to a
concept o f sense that is itself determ ined on the basis o f a relation to the
object. The form is always the form o f a sense, and the sense is open only
in the epistem ological intentionality o f the relation to an object. T he
form is only the empty, pure intention o f this intentionality. Perhaps no
project o f pure gram m ar escapes it, perh aps the telos o f epistem ological
rationality is the irreducible origin o f the idea o f pure gram m ar, perh aps
the sem antic them e, as “em pty” as it is, always limits the form alist project.
Always in Husserl, the transcendental intuitionism weighs very heavily on
the form alist theme. A pparently in d ep en d en t o f the fulfilling intuitions,
the “p u re ” form s o f signification are always, insofar as they are “em pty”
or crossed out, regulated by the epistem ological criterion o f a relation
to the object. T he difference between “the circle is square” and “green is
o r” or “abracad abra” (and H usserl a bit quickly associates these last two
exam ples and is perh aps not careful en ough in regard to their differ-
ence) consists in the fact that the form o f a relation to the object and o f
a unitary intuition appears only in the first exam ple. This aim will always
be disappoin ted here, but this proposition m akes sense only because an
other content, bein g w hispered in this form (S is P), coidcl provide us with
an object to be known and seen. The “circle is squ are,” an expression
endow ed with sense (sinnvoll), has no possible object, but it m akes <1 1 1>
sense only to the extent that its gram m atical form tolerates the possi
bility o f a relation to the object. T he efficacy and the form o f signs that
do not obey these rules, that is, that prom ise no knowledge, can be de
term ined as non-sense (Unsinn) only if we have already, according to the
most traditional philosophical gesture, defined sense in general on the
basis o f truth as objectivity. Otherwise, we would have to throw away into
absolute nonsense all poetical language that transgresses and does not let
itself ever be reduced to the laws o f this gram m ar o f knowledge. Within
the form s o f non-discursive signification (m usic and non-literary arts in
general) as well as in discourses o f the type “abracadabra” or “green is
or,” there are resources o f sense which do not signal toward the possible
object. H usserl would not deny the signifying force o f such form ations;
he w ould simply not gran t them the form al quality o f expressions en
dowed with sense, that is, the form al quality o f logic as the relation to an
object. R ecognizing this is to recognize the initial lim itation o f sen se to
knowledge, o f the logos to objectivity, o f language to reason.
We have put to the test the system atic solidarity o f the con cepts o f
sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, perception, and expression.
T heir com m on m atrix is bein g as presence: the absolute proxim ity o f self1
identity; the being-in-front o f the object in its availability for repetition;
the m aintaining o f the tem poral present, the ideal form o f which is the
selfLpresen ce o f transcendental life whose ideal identity allows iclealiter
repetition to infinity. The living-present, which is a concept that cannot
be decom posed into a subject and an attribute, is therefore the foun ding
concept o f phenom enology as m etaphysics.
However, since all o f what is purely th ought under this concept is by
the sam e token determ in ed as ideality, the living-present is in fact really,
factually, etc. deferred to infinity. This différance is <112> the difference
between ideality and non-ideality. T his is a proposition that we could have
ascertained already at the begin n in g o f the Logical Investigations, from the
point o f view that concerns us. Thus, after having proposed an essential
distinction between objective expressions and expression s that are essen
tially subjective, H usserl shows that absolute ideality can be only on the
side o f objective expressions. T here is nothing surprising in that. But he
adds im m ediately that even in essentially subjective expressions, the fluc
tuation is not in the objective content o f the expression (the Bedeutung) ,
but only in the act of m ean in g (bedeuten <vouloir~dire: wanting-to-say>).
This allows him to conclude, apparently against his earlier dem onstra
tion, that in a subjective expression, the content can always be replaced
by an objective content which is therefore ideal. Only the act is then lost
to ideality. But this substitution (which, let us note in passing, w ould still
confirm what we were saying about the play o f life and death in the “I”)
is ideal. Since the ideal is always thought by Husserl in the form o f the
Idea in the Kantian sense, this substitution o f ideality for non-ideality, o f
objectivity for non-objectivity, is deferred to infinity. Attributing a subjective
origin to the fluctuation, contesting the theory according to which the
fluctuation would belong to the objective content o f the Bedeutung, and
would thus underm ine its ideality, Husserl writes,
We shall have to look on such a conception as invalid. T h e content that

the subjective expression orienting its Bedeutung accordin g to the situa
tion aims at is an ideal unit o f Bedeutung in precisely the same sense as
the content o f a fixed expression. This is shown by the fact that, ideally
speaking, each subjective expression is replaceable by an objective ex
pression which will preserve the identity o f each m om entary Bedeutung.
Truly, tue shall have to recognize that this substitution cannot be effectuated not
only for reasons o f practical necessity, for example, because of its complexity, but
also that, to a large degree, it is not realizable in fact and even that it will remain
<113> always unrealizable. Clearly, in fact, to say that each subjective ex
pression could be replaced by an objective expression is no m ore than
to assert the absence of limits [Schrankenlosigkeit] of objective reason. Every
thing that is, can be known “in itself.” Its being is a bein g definite in
content, an d docu m en ted in such and such “truths in them selves.” . . .
But what is objectively quite definite, m ust perm it objective determ in a
tion, and what perm its objective determ in ation , must, ideally speaking,
perm it expression through wholly determ inate word Bedeutungen. . . .
But we are infinitely distant from this ideal. . . . Strike out the essentially oc
casional expressionsfrom one's language, try to describe any subjective experi
ence in a univocal and objectively stable way: such an attempt of this kind is
obviously v a in }5
“The O rigin o f Geom etry” will take up in a form that is literally identical
these propositions concerning the univocity o f the objective expression
as an inaccessible ideal.
In its ideal value, the whole system of the “essential distinctions” is therefore
a purely teleological structure. By the sam e token, the possibility of distin
guishing between sign and non-sign, between the linguistic sign and the
non-linguistic sign, expression and indication, ideality and non-ideality,
between subject and object, gram m aticality and non-gram m aticality,
pure gram m aticality and em pirical grammaticality, pure general gram
maticality and pure logical grammaticality, intention and intuition, etc.:
this pure possibility is deferred to infinity. T h ereu pon , these “essential
distinctions” are gripped by the following aporia: in fact, realiter; they are
never respected, and H usserl recognizes this. In principle ancl iclealite7;

they are erased since they only live as distinctions from the difference
between principle and fact, ideality and reality. T h eir possibility is their
im possibility
<114> But how does this difference give itself to be thought? What
does “to infinity” m ean here? What does presence as différance to infin
ity m ean? What does the life o f the living present as différance to infinity
m ean?
T hat Husserl has always thought infinity as an Idea in the Kantian
sense, as the indefiniteness o f a “to infinity,” that m akes us believe that he
has never derived difference from the fullness o f a parousia, from the full
presence o f a positive infinite, that he has never believed in the achieve
m ent o f an “absolute know ledge” as presence nearby to itself, in the Lo
gos, in the achievem ent o f an infinite concept. And what he shows us in
regard to the m ovem ent o f tem poralization leaves no doubt on this m at
ter: although he has not m ade “articulation” his them e, namely, the “dia
critical” work o f difference in the constitution o f sense and o f the sign,
in depth he recognizes the necessity o f d oin g this. And yet the entire
ph en om en ological discourse is, as we have seen, gripped by the schem a
o f a metaphysics o f presence which relentlessly exhausts itself trying to
make difference derivative. Within this schem a, H egelianism seem s m ore
radical: par excellence at the poin t where it brings to light that the positive
infinite m ust be thought (which is possible only if it thinks itself ) so that
the indefiniteness o f différance m ay a p p e a r as such. H egel’s criticism o f
Kant would no d o u b t also be valid against Husserl. But this ap pearin g o f
the Ideal as infinite différance can only be produ ced in a relationship to
death in general. Only a relationship to my-death can m ake the infinite
différance o f presence a p p e a r By the sam e token, com pared to the ideal
ity o f the positive infinite, this relation to my-death becom es an accident
o f finite empiricity. T h e ap p earin g o f infinite différance is itself finite.
D ifférance, which is nothing outside o f this relationship, thereupon be
com es the finitude o f life as the essential relation to itself as to its death.
The infinite différance is finite. We are no longer able to think it within the
opposition o f the finite and the infinite, absence and presence, negation
an d affirm ation.
<1 1 5> In this sense, within the m etaphysics o f presen ce, o f ph i
losophy as the knowledge o f the presen ce of the object, as know ing’s
being-nearby-itself in consciousness, we believe quite simply in absolute
knowledge as the closure if not the end o f history. We believe in it liter
ally— and that such a closure has taken place. The history o f being as pres
ence, as self-presence in absolute knowledge, as consciousness (of) self
in the infinity o f parousia, this history is closed. T he history o f presence
is closed, for “history” has never m eant anything but this: presentation
(Gegenwcirtigung) o f being <Fêtre>, production an d gathering o f the being
<Tétcint> in presence, as knowledge and mastery. Since full presen ce has
the vocation o f infinity as absolute presence to itself in con-sciousness, the
achievem ent o f absolute knowledge is the end o f the infinite which can
only be the unity o f the concept, logos, and consciousness in a voice with
out différance. The history of metaphysics is the absolute wanting-to-hear-itself
speak This history is closed when this absolute infinity appears to itself
as its own death. A voice without différance, a voice without zoriting is at once
absolutely cdive and absolutely dead.
As for what “begin s” then “beyond” absolute knowledge, unheard-of
thoughts are required, thoughts that are sough t across the m em ory of
old signs. As lon g as différance rem ains a con cept about which we ask
ourselves w hether it must be thought from presen ce or p rio r to it, it
remains one o f these old signs. And it tells us that it is necessary to con
tinue indefinitely to interrogate presen ce within the closure o f knowl
edge. It is necessary to hear it in this way and otherw ise— otherwise, that
is, within the open n ess o f an unheard-of question that opens itself nei
ther onto knowledge nor onto a non-knowledge as knowledge to come.
In the open n ess o f this question, we no longer know. T his does not m ean
that we know nothing, but that we are beyon d absolute knowledge (and
its ethical, aesthetic, or religious system), ap p roach in g that on the basis
o f which its closure is an noun ced and decided. Such a question will be
legitim ately heard <116> as wanting to say nothing, as no lon ger belonging
to the system o f wanting-to-say.
We no longer know therefore whether what is always presented as
the derived and m odified re-presentation o f sim ple presentation, as the
“supplem en t,” as “sign,” “writing,” “trace,” “is” not, in a sense necessar
ily but in a new way a-historical, “o ld e r” than presen ce and the system
o f truth, older than “history”— “o ld e r” than sense and the senses, older
than the originary donating intuition, than the actual and full perception
o f the “thing itself,” older than vision, hearing, touch, even before one
distinguishes between their “sen sible” literality and their m etaphorical
appearance in the scene o f the entire history o f philosophy. We no lon
ger know therefore whether what has always been reduced and abased
as an accident, m odification, and re-turn in the old nam es o f “sign” and
o f “re-presentation” has not repressed what would relate truth to its own
death as to its origin, w hether the force o f Vergegenwärtigung in which
the Gegenwcirtigung16 is de-presented in ord er to be re-presented as such,
whether the force o f repetition o f the living presen t which re-presents
itself in a supplement because it has never been present to itself, whether
what we call the old nam es of force and différance, is not m ore “ancient”
than the “originary.”
In ord er to think this age, in ord er to “sp eak ” o f it, other nam es
would be necessary than those o f sign or re-presentation. A nd it is nec
essary to think as “n orm al” and pre-originary what Husserl believes he
is able to isolate as a particular, accidental, dep en den t, and secondary
experience: the experience o f the indefinite drift o f signs as errancy and
change o f scenes (Verwandlung), linking the re-presentations (Vergegen
wärtigungen) to one another, without begin n ing or end. T here has never
been perception, and “p resen tatio n ” is a representation o f representa
tion that desires itself within representation as its birth or its death.
Everything no dou bt began in this way: “A nam e uttered in front o f
us m akes us think o f the D resden gallery. . . . We w ander <117> through
the room s. . . . A picture by Teniers . . . represents a picture gallery . . .
The pictures in this gallery represen t again pictures which for their part
would m ake visible inscriptions that we are able to decipher, etc.”17
N othing has o f course p reced ed this situation. N othing will sus
pend it with security. It is not comprehended, as H usserl would like, am on g
intuitions and presen tation s. O utside o f the gallery, no perception o f
the full light o f presence is given to us nor prom ised with security.18 T h e
gallery is the labyrinth, which includes its own ways out within itself. We
have never fallen into it as into a particular case19 of experience, the case
that H usserl then believes he is describing.
T hus one still has to speak, to m ake the voice resonate in the cor
ridors in order to supplem en t the shining forth o f presence. The p h o
nem e, the cikoumenon is the phenomenon of the labyrinth. This is the case o f
th e phone. Soarin g up to the sun o f presence, it is the path o f Icarus.
A nd contrary to what p h en o m en o lo g y — which is always a ph e
n om enology o f p e rcep tio n — has tried to m ake us believe, contrary to
what ou r desire cannot not be tem pted to believe, the thing itself always
steals away.
Contrary to the assurance that H usserl gives us about it a little later,
“the look” cannot “rem ain .”-0
Notes
Translator's Introduction
1. T h e first English translation o f L a voix et le phénomène was clone by Davicl B.

Allison as Speech ancl Phenomena (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press,
1972); an d fo r decades Derr id a ’s book was known in the A nglophon e world by
the title Speech and Phenomena.
2. Ja cq u e s Derricla, De la grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967); English trans
lation by Gayatri Spivak as O f Grammatology (Baltim ore: Jo h n s H opkins University
Press, 1997, corrected ed ition ).
3. Ja c q u e s D errida, L'écriture et la différance (Paris: Seuil Points, 1967); En
glish translation by Alan Bass as Writing and Difference (C hicago: University o f
C hicago Press, 1967).
4. See Jacq u es Derricla, “Ponctuations: Le tem ps cie la these,” in Du droit à la
philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 1990), 452; English translation by Kathleen M cLaugh
lin as “Punctuations: T h e Tim e o f a T h esis,” in Eyes of the University: Right to Phi
losophy 2 (Stanford, Calif.: Stan ford University Press, 2004), 123. The “Ponctua
tions” text dates from 1980.
5. D errid a’s oth er books on H usserl a re E d m u n d H usserl, L ’origine de la
géométrie, traduction et introduction par Jacques Derridci (Paris: Presses U niversitaires
cie France, 1962); English translation by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr., as Edmund Husserl’s
“Origin o f Geometry”: An Introduction (Lincoln: University o f N ebraska Press, 1989
[1978]). D errida then p u blished his M ém oire (the equivalent o f a m aster’s the
sis) from the academ ic year 19 5 3 -5 4 in 1990 as Le problem de la genèse dans la phi
losophie de Husserl (Paris: Presses U niversitaires cle France, 1990); English transla
tion by Marian H obson as The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy (C hicago:
University o f C hicago Press, 2003). D errida retu rn ed to H usserl again in 2000
in his Le toucher—-Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: G alilée, 2000), 183-208; En glish transla
tion by Christine Irizarry as On Touching—fecin-Luc Nancy (Stanford, Calif.: Stan-
forci University Press, 2005), 159-82.
6. See Michel Foucault, “L a p en sée clu d eh o rs,” in Dits et écrits 1 1954-1975
(Paris: Q uarto G allim ard, 2001), 546-67; English translation by Brian M assum i
as “T h e T h ou gh t o f the O u tsid e,” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume
2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology (New York: New, 1998), 147-70. The origi
nal publication date o f the Foucault text is 1966. D eleuze anci G uattari speak
explicitly o f a utopian place. See Gilles D eleuze ancl Félix G uattari, Q u ’est-ce que
NOTES TO PAGES x i i - x i i i
Ici philosophie? (Paris: Minuit, 1991), 95-96; English translation by H ugh Tom lin
son ancl G raham Burchell as Whcit Is Philosophy? (New York: C olum bia Univer
sity Press, 1994), 99-100. D eleuze ancl Guattari speak o f the outside in A Thou
sand Plateaus. See Gilles D eleuze ancl Félix Guattari, Mille plateaux (Paris: Minuit,
1980), 34; English translation by Brian M assum i as Λ Thousand Plateaus (M inne
apolis: University o f M innesota Press, 1987), 23. For the outside, see especially
Gilles D eleuze, Foucault (Paris: Minuit, 1986); English translation by Sean H and
as Foucault (M inneapolis: University o f M innesota Press, 1988). T h e outside in
Derricla anticipates his idea o f a dem ocracy to com e. S e e ja c q u e s Derricla, Spectres
cle M arx (Paris: Galilée, 1993), 143; English translation by Peggy K am uf as Specters
of Marx (New York: Routleclge, 1994), 87.
7. In “Letter to a Ja p a n e se F rien d ,” Derricla explains how he cam e to this
word “cleconstruction.” S e e ja c q u e s Derricla, “Lettre à un am i ja p o n a is (1 9 8 5 ),”
in Psyché: Inventions cle Vautre (Paris: Galilée, 1987), 387-93; English translation
by Davicl W ood ancl Andrew Benjam in as “L etter to a Ja p a n e se F rien d ,” in Psyche:
Inventions of the Other, Volume II, edited by Peggy K am u f ancl Elizabeth R ottenberg
(Stanford, Calif.: Stan ford University Press, 2008), 1-6.
8. O ther classical definitions o f cleconstruction can be fou n d in Ja cq u es
Derricla, Force de loi (Paris: G alilée, 1994), 4 7 -6 3 ; English translation by Mary
Q uintance as “Th e Force o f Law,” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of pis the,
edited by D rucilla Cornell, M ichael Rosenfelcl, ancl Davicl Gray Carlson (New
York: Routleclge, 1992), 21 -2 9 . A nother definition (m uch later) can be fou n d
in the essay “Et cetera,” translated by Geoffrey B ennington in Deconstructions: A
Users Guide, ed ited by N icholas Royle (L on d on : Palgrave, 2000), 300. B ecause
D errid a’s concept o f cleconstruction is so dependen t on that o f H eidegger, it is
perhaps p ossib le to think that Derr id a’s 1987 Of Spirit is the m ost im portant text
on what cleconstruction is. S e e ja c q u e s Derricla, De l ’esprit (Paris: Galilée, 1987);
English translation by Geoffrey Benn in gton ancl Rachel Bowlby as O f Spirit (Chi
cago: University o f Chicago Press, 1989).
9. Derricla also says that the oppositions are “violent.” The first phase o f cle
construction therefore participates in Derr ida’s long discourse on violence, which
begins in 1964 with “V iolence ancl M etaphysics” (“V iolence et m étaphysique,” in
L ’écriture et la différence, 117-228; “Violence ancl M etaphysics,” in Writing an d Differ
ence, 7 9 -1 5 2 ), continues through “Force of Law,” part 2 (which concerns Walter
B en jam in ’s “Critique of V iolen ce”), ancl finishes with The Animal That Therefore I
Am (Jacq u es Derricla, L ’animal cjue donc je suis [Paris: Galilée, 2006]; English trans
lation by Davicl Wills as The Animal That Therefore I Am [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2008).
10. In his English translation o f Positions, Alan Bass renders the word “écart”
as “interval.” S e e ja c q u e s Derricla, Positions (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 57; English trans
lation by Alan Bass as Positions (C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1981), 42.
11. Derricla, Positions, 95; Positions, 71. See also 88 o f this book.
12. Derricla, Positions, 57; Positions, 42, translation m odified.
13. C oncern ing cleconstruction ancl exiting the terrain o f metaphysics, see
D errid a’s final com m ents in “T h e Ends o f M an .” Ja c q u e s Derricla, “L a fin cle
NOTES TO PAGES x i i i - x v
l ’h o m m e,” in Marges cle la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 162-63; English trans
lation by Alan Bass as “The Ends o f M an,” in Margins of Philosophy (C hicago: U ni
versity o f C hicago Press, 1982), 135.
14. What is really bein g p u t to the test is H u sserl’s concept o f language.
Can the being o f lan gu age be oriented by the value o f presence? Th e sign in its
indicating or pointing function, d o e sn ’t it make the function o f exp ressin g the
self-presence o f a m eaning problematic? Now we can shift the em phasis in the sub
title: “An Introduction to the Problem o f the Sign in H u sserl’s Ph enom enology.”
L ater in his career, Derricla will return to the word “p rob lem ” ancl distinguish it
from aporia. See Jacq u es Derricla, Apories (Paris: Galilée, 1996), 30-31; English
translation by T h om as D utoit as Aporias (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1993), 11-12.
15. Evidence o f H usserl m aking the sign derivative can be fou n d in his
“principle of all prin ciples,” which Derricla cites (51); this principle instructs us
to accept as evidence only what is intuitively— not sem iotically— given. Evidence
o f Western metaphysics in gen eral m ak in g the sign derivative can be fou n d in
P lato’s Phaedrus, as Derricla has shown in “L a phar macie cle Platon,” in L a dissémi
nation (Paris: Seuil, 1972), 69-188; English translation by Barbara Jo h n so n as
“P lato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination (C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1981),
61-171.
16. See Derricla, “Positions,” i n Positions, 74; “Positions,” in Positions, 54—55
(my em ph asis): “W herever the values o f propriety, o f a proper m eaning, o f p rox
imity to the self, o f etymology, etc. im posed themselves in relation to the body,
consciousness, language, writing, etc., I have attem pted to analyze the m eta
physical desire ancl p resupposition s that were at work.”
17. When Derricla is criticizing these ideas o f desire ancl will, he is also criti
cizing H u sserl’s fun dam en tal co n cep t o f intentionality. Instead of intentionality
which is always directed to an object, Derr icla is trying to conceive a m ovem ent
which aim s at a non-object. A im ing at a non-object m eans aim in g at indéterm i
nation or incom pleteness, as in a question for which there is no absolute answer.
Later in his career (as in Specters of Marx), Derricla will try to exp an d the idea of
the question into that o f the prom ise, ancl therefore his thinking will be m essi
anic. But the m essiah com ing cloes not necessarily m ean salvation since the mes-
siah’s com ing cannot be calculated. T h e m essiah m ight ju st as well be a threat.
Ancl since there is no b egin n in g ancl encl, the m essiah never really com es in
full presen ce. But Derricla is also reconceiving desire when he speak s o f frien d
ship ancl especially when he coins the ter m “aim an ce,” which has been ren d ered
in English as “lovence.” See Ja c q u e s Derricla, Politiques de Vamitié (Paris: Galilée,
1994), 88; English translation by G eorge C ollin s as Politics of Friendship (L on d on :
Verso Books, 1997), 69-70.
18. For a later use of the word “clotu re” (“closu re”), see Derricla, Apories,
79; Aporias, 40. The word “clo su re” still seem s to be still invoked as late as Der
rid a’s 2003 Rogues when he speaks of the “tour,” a circular im age. See Ja cq u e s
Derricla, Voyous (Paris: Galilée, 2003); English translation by Pascale-Anne Brault
ancl M ichael Naas as Rogues (Stan ford, Calif.: S tan ford University Press, 2005).
NOTES TO PAGES x v - x x v i
19. For the word “closu re,” see especially “ ‘G enèse et stru ctu re’ et la p h é
n om én ologie,” in Lécriiure et la différance, 240-41 ; / “ G enesis ancl Stru ctu re’ ancl
Phenom enology,” in Writing and Différence, 162. H ere Derricla cites H usserl, Ideas 1\
§72, where H usserl describes eicletic sciences. See also De la gmmmatologie, 25; Of
Grammalology, 14.
20. See Jacq u e s Derricla, “La form e et le vouloir-clire,” in Marges cle la phi
losophie, 185-207; Margins of Philosophy, 155-74.
21. See D errid a’s 1988 interview with Je a n -L u c Nancy for an oth er dis
cussion o f Vergegenwärtigung. Jacq u es Derricla, “Il faut bien m an ger,” in Points cle
suspension (Paris: Galilée, 1992), 277-78; English translation by Peter C on n or
ancl Avital Ronnell as “E atin g Well,” in Points . . . Interviews 1974-1994 (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 263-64.
22. With the idea o f a “beyon d” (see 88), it is clear that Derricla is still
en g a g e d in som e sort o f meta-physical thinking. This “beyon d” would not be
anoth er world, not som eth in g transcendent, but a “beyond” o f this world. M ore
over, the idea o f “beyond” im plies that ju st as Derricla was able to reconceive the
nam e “d ifferen ce,” he was able to reconceive the nam e “m etaphysics.” “M eta
physics” is a paleonym . If “m etaphysics” is a paleonym , then D eleuze’s com m ent
ab o u t bein g a “pure m etaphysician” cloes not seem alien to D errid a’s thought.
“P u re” here may m ean a recon ception o f “bey o n d ,” not as som eth in g transcen
dent, but as the “beyon d” o f a line o f flight. See Gilles D eleuze, “R esponses to a
Series o f Q uestion s,” in Collapse: Philosophical Research ancl Development 3 (2007):
39-44.
23. See Jacq u es Derricla, “D ifféran ce,” in Marges de Ici philosophie, 3-29; “Dif
féran ce,” in Margins ofPhilosophy, 1-27.
24. T h e massive influence o f H eid egger on D errid a’s thought is clear.
However throughout his career Derricla will attem pt to find the schem as o f the
metaphysics o f presence at work in H e id e g g e r’s thought (see 63 note vi). In
short, Derricla en gages in a lifelong debate with H eidegger. This debate begins
with D errid a’s 1968 essay “T h e Ends o f M an,” in Margins of Philosophy.
25. The b o o k ’s title com es from ch apter 6: “Th e p h en om en o n cloes not
stop bein g an object fo r the voice. On the contrary . . . the ideality o f the ob
je c t seem s to d ep en d on the voice ancl thus becom es absolutely available in [the
vo ice]” (67).
26. We can see that the entire m ovem ent o f French thought o f the 1960s
bases itself on transcendental philosophy, if we look at two other books which
belon g to the sam e m om en t as D errid a’s Voice ancl Phenomenon: F o u cau lt’s 1966
The Order of Things, whose project consists o f determ in ing “historical a p rio ri”;
ancl D eleuze’s 1968 Difference ancl Repetition, whose project consists o f deter
m ining a “transcenden tal em piricism .” See Gilles D eleuze, Difference et répétition
(Paris: Presses Universitaires cle France, 1968), 192; English translation by Paul
Patton as Difference and Repetiti (New York: C olum bia University Press, 1994),
147; Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (Paris: Tel Gallim ard, 1966), 170-71;
anonym ous English translation as The Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1994),
157-58.
NOTE S TO PAGES x x v i i - 3
27. Because the old nam es are determ in ed by the opposition s and hierar
chies u n d er deconstruction, D errida has investigated negative theology and he
h as m ade u se o f the Platonic n am e “k h ôra.” See Ja c q u e s Derr ida, “C om m ent
ne p as parler, D én égation s” (1986), in Psyché: Inventions de Vautre (Paris: Galilée,
1987), 5 3 5 -9 5 ; English translation by Ken Frieden an d Elizabeth R ottenberg as
“How to Avoid Speaking: D en ials,” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, 143—
94. See also Ja cq u e s D errida, Scmf le nom (Paris: Galilée, 1993); English transla
tion by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr., as “S a u f le n om ,” in On the Name, edited by T h om as
D utoit (Stanford, Calif.: S tan ford University Press, 1995), 35-87. Ja cq u e s D er
rida, Khôra (Paris: Galilée, 1993); English translation by Ian M cLeod as “K h ô ra,”
in On the Name, edited by T h om as D utoit (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1995), 89-129.
28. See Force de loi, 35; “F orce o f Law,” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of
Justice, 15.
29. This claim m ust be m ade, even though Derr ida is reconceiving what
truth m eans. For Derr ida, the truth consists o f a structure or law which can never
be m ade fully present, which can never be fully unveiled. T h e truth o f truth for
D errida is the fact that there is no full presence. T h at there is no fu ll presen ce
m eans that truth as presen ce never app ears as such , independently o f falseh ood
or non-presence. For D errida, falseh ood in this sense is the truth o f truth. See
Ja cq u es Derr ida, Eperons: Les styles de Nietzsche (Paris: C h am p s Flam m arion, 1978),
92-93; English translation by B arb ara Harlow as Spurs: Nietzsches Styles (C hicago:
University o f C hicago Press, 1979), 111.
30. For the role o f h earin g in deconstruction, and interior m on ologue
in H eidegger, se e Ja c q u e s D errida, “L ’oreille de H eidegger: Philopolém olo-
gie (G eschlecht IV ),” in Politiques de Γamitié, 358; English translation by Jo h n P.
Leavey, Jr., as “H eid e g g e r’s Ear: Philopolem ology (G eschlecht IV ),” in Reading
Heidegger: Commemorations, edited by Jo h n Sallis (B loom ington: Indiana Univer
sity Press), 175.
31. For undecidability, see Ja c q u e s D errida, “L a doub le séan ce,” in L a dis-
sémination, 248-51; “T h e D ouble S ession ,” in Dissemination, 219-21. The exp eri
ence o f undecidability can also be u n d erstood as the experience o f responsibil
ity. We see the them e o f responsibility in D errida as early as his 1962 translation
o f H u sserl’s “O rigin o f G eom etry” (E dm un d H usserl, L ’origine delci géométrie, 166;
Edmund H usserl’s “Origin of Geometry”: An Introduction, 149) and a s late a s his 1992
Aporias (D errida, Apories, 40-42; Aporias, 1 8 -1 9 ).
Introduction
1. D errida is citing Suzan ne B ach elard ’s French translation from 1957,

Logique formelle et Logique transe end enteile, §35b, p. 137.
2. D errida had translated the fragm ent from The Crisis period called “T h e
O rigin o f G eom etry” into French in 1962; see the bibliography fo r the English
translation by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr.
NOTES TO PAGES 3-9
3. Derricla never wrote this general interpretation, although through out

his career he alluclecl to, cited, or explicitly discussed Husserl, especially TheCiisis
ancl its associated texts. The English title o f the First Logical Investigation is “E x
pression ancl M eaning.”
4. T h e text to which Derricla is referrin g is from p ag e 183 o f the English
translation o f the Logiecd Investigations; Finclley renders “D op pelsin n ” as “am b igu
ity.” Derricla will cite the French translation com pleted in 1963 by H u b ert Elie,
A rion L. Kelkel, ancl René Schérer. T h rou gh out, all references to H u sserl’s Logi-
eal Investigations are to the revised M oran edition: Eclmuncl H usserl, Logieal Inves
tigations, two volum es, translated by J. N. Fincllay, with a new preface by Michael
D um m ett ancl edited with a new introduction by Dei m ot M oran (L on d on : Rout
leclge, 2001).
5. D errida renders “A nzeich en ” by “inclice,” which also m eans “in d ex ” like
a personal pronoun. Th e p erson al pronoun “I” will be at the center o f chapter 7.
See “T ran slator’s N ote,” p oin t 10.
6. Derricla is citing the final pages o f H u sserl’s introduction to volum e 2 of
the Logical Investigations, pages 21-22 o f the G erm an edition (which is contained
in the English translation, volum e 1, p ages 1 7 8-79).
7. This text is publish ed in Greek. T h ere is an English translation. See
Jacq u e s Derricla, “Ph en om enology ancl M etaphysical C lo su re,” translated by
F. Joseph Smith, in Philosophy Today 11, no. 2 (Sum m er 1967): 106-23. There is
an u p d ated English translation by R onald Bruzina, in The New Yearbook of Phenom
enology 3 (Seattle: N oesis, 2003), 102-20. Bruzina has made this translation from
D errid a’s French version.
8. Derricla cites only §60 o f the Cartesian Meditations. He lists no French edi
tion or translators. But the qu ote is identical to the French translation p ro d u ced
by Gabrielle Pfeiffer ancl Em m an uel Levinas in 1947. This passage is from pages
2 23-2 4 o f the French edition; the equivalent p assage can be fou n d on page 139
o f the English translation.
9. H ere Derricla is allu din g to the ontological distinctions that H usserl
makes in Ideas I (§96-97) between “real” in the sense o f som ething factual, “reelle”
(here Derricla uses the French word “réelle”) in the sense o f a part o f conscious
ness, ancl “irreelle” (here Derricla uses the French word “irréelle”) in the sense o f
som ething ideal but not factual ancl not a part o f consciousness. See “T ranslator’s
N ote,” p oin t 4, fo r a m ore detailed explanation o f these differences.
10. Derricla cites simply “Preparatory C onsiderations, §2.” T h e com m ent
that he seem s to have in mincl is from page 21 o f the English translation o f Formed
and Transcendental Logic.
11. Derr icla cites p. 136 o f the secon d volum e o f the French translation o f
the Logical Investigations. O ne can find this passage in volum e 2 o f the English
translation on page 75. H ere Derricla also says, “Each time that we shall cite this
translation, we shall indicate this by the signs ‘tr. fr.’ ” H e then goes on to say that
he has replaced in the French translation the word “significations” by “Bedeutun
g e n ” This com m ent im plies that when Derricla does not use the sign “tr. fr.,” he is
n ot using the available translation ancl instead is translatin g the Logical Investiga
tions him self into French. See “T ran slator’s N o te ,” poin t 5.
NOTES TO PAGES 10-15
12. This is D errid a’s first them atic use o f the Freudian term “instan ce,”
here ren d ered as “court o f a p p e a l.” See “T ran slator’s N ote,” point 8.
13. T h e French term b ein g ren d ered as “hearth fire” is “foyer,” T h e term is
norm ally rendered in English as “focal point.” But here Derricla is using the term
to suggest the im age o f light. See also Jacq u es Der ricla, Positions (Paris: Minuit,
1972), 55; English translation by Alan Bass as Positions (Chicago: University o f Chi
cago Press, 1981), 40. See especially Alan B ass’s translator’s note 6 on p. 100 (for
p. 40). T h e hearth ( foyer) app ears later in D errid a’s work. S e e ja c q u e s Derricla, De
l'esprit (Paris: Galilée, 1987), 162; English translation by Geoffrey Bennington ancl
Rachel Bowlby as O f Spirit (C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1989), 99.
14. Derrida uses the French personal pronoun “le J e ’ ” (in uppercase), which
I have ren d ered as “the T ”; “le m o i” as “the m e”; ancl the Latin “e g o ” as “e g o .”
15. Derricla cites the H usserlian a volum e o f Phänomenologische Psychologie,
H usserlian a volum e IX, p. 342. T h e English translation of the volum e does n ot
contain th e passage.
16. Derricla is alluding to one o f R im b au d ’s “L etters o f a Visionary” (letter
o f 15 May 1871 to Paul D em eny): “J e est un au tre.”
17. This allusion is to the passage in the Fifth M editation, on page 99 o f
the English translation. Cairns translates the Germ an phrase as “m unclanizing
selL app ercep tion .”
18. Again Derricla is referrin g to the passage in th e Fifth Cartesian M edita
tion, page 131 o f the English translation.
19. H ere Derr icla cites R ico eu r’s French translation o f Ideen I, that is, Idées I,
p. 182, which is §54. We have follow ed R ico eu r’s translation here in the English.
The equivalent passage is from page 127 o f the Kersten English translation o f
Ideas I.
20. Derricla provides no citation for this quote. An English translation of
the “Nachw ort” can be fou nd in Husserl: Shorter Works. A pparently Derricla is re
ferring to com m ents that one can find in the English translation on pages 45 ancl
46. The equivalent passages may be fou n d in §3 o f the “N achw ort” collected in
Ideen III, p ages 144-48. T h e pages in the E n glish Cartesian Meditations seem to be
page 32 ancl p a g e 131.
21. Derricla cites “N achw ort,” p. 557. T h e equivalent passage is from page
46 o f the Nachwort’s English translation called “A uth or’s Preface to the English
Edition o f Id eas,” in Husserl: Shorter Works; here “N u an cieru n g” is ren d ered as
“ch ange in the sh adin g.” See “Nachw ort” in Ideen III, p. 148.
22. D errid a’s word h ere is “une p rise.” See “T ran slator’s N ote,” p oin t 14.
Chapter 1
1. The established French translation o f Husser l’s “B e d e u tu n g” is “signifi

cation ”; the stan dard English translation is “m ean in g.” Derricla says that in Ger
man one can say that a 'Zeichen is deprived of Bedeutung, but “on ne peu t dire en
français, sans contradiction, q u ’un sign est privé cle signification.” As in G erm an,
in English it is not a contradiction to say th at a sign has no m eaning since such
a sign (lacking, let us say, a conceptual m eaning) may still indicate som eth in g or
m ake a ref erence. But an A n glop h on e sp eak er w ould, it seem s, never say that a
sign signifies (that is, refers to) nothing; if it indicates nothing, the sign would
no lon ger be a sign. H ere English seem s to overlap m ore with French. D errid a’s
point in the next f ew sentences is that a F ran coph on e sp eak er w ould never speak
o f a sign that signifies nothing (“cles signes non sign ifiants”) because such a sign
or thing w ould not be a sign, while in Ger man one may speak o f a bedeutunglose
'Zeichen; such a sign would be an indicative sign since it lacks only a conceptual
m eaning while still referring to som ething. For instance, app rop riatin g H u sserl’s
exam ple o f an indicative sign, one may say that the canals on Mars that are visible
through a telescope indicate or re fe r to som eth in g (ancient rainfall, perhaps, or
ancient M artian civilization), but the M artian canals lack the conceptual m ean
ing that a sign such as a triangle contains.
2. Th is is the first time in the b ook that Derricla contrasts clefacto (en fait)
with cle jure (en droit), when he speaks o f “the right <clu droit> to exp ression .”
3. Derricla is su ggesting that we can translate the verb “b ed eu ten ” into
French as “vouloir clire,” which in English m eans literally “to want to say,” or m ore
normally, “to m ean .” Th en the noun “B e d e u tu n g” can be rend ered in French as
“vouloir-clire,” “wanting-to-say,” or “m ean in g.” See “T ran slator’s N o te ,” point 11.
4. Between p aren th eses at the encl o f the quotation, Derricla ref ers to Logi
cal Investigations, §15. T h ere is no footnote that elab orates on the reference. Th e
equivalent passage can be fou n d in the English translation, volum e 1, p age 201.
Derricla cloes n ot translate into French the term s “B e d e u tu n g” ancl “Sin n ,” ancl
he highlights the G erm an w ord “g leich b ed eu ten d .”
5. Between paren th eses at the encl o f the qu ote (without any footn ote),
Derricla refers to Idées I, §124. The equivalent passage can be found on page
294 o f the Kersten English translation; Kersten renders “b ed eu ten ” as “signify
ing,” “B ed eu tu n g” as “sign ification,” ancl “Sin n ” as “sen se.” In the quote, Derricla
m odifies R ico eu r’s French translation o f “b ed eu ten ,” substituting “vouloir-clire”
for R ico eu r’s “signifier.” In this case, we have ren d ered “vouloir -clire” as “to want
to say.” Derricla cloes not translate into French the n um erous occurren ces o f “Be
d e u tu n g” in the quotation; we have clone the sam e in the English. Derricla also
renders “v erflochten ” as “en trelacé,” while R icoeur renders it as “co m b in é.”
6. H ere, Derricla refers to Idées I, §124, betw een paren th eses at the encl o f
the quotation. T h e equivalent passage is from p age 295 o f the Kersten English
translation.
7. H ere, Derricla refers to the First Logical Investigation, §1, between p a
rentheses at the encl o f the quotation; the equivalent passage can be found on
page 183 o f the English translation, volum e 1.
8. H ere, Derricla refers to First Logical Investigation, §1, betw een paren
theses at the encl o f the quote; the equivalent passage can be found on p age 183
o f the English translation, volum e 1. Fincllay ren d ers “V erflechtung” as “conn ec
tion” ancl “verfloch ten ” as “b ou n d up with.”
9. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou n d on p age 183 o f the English transla
tion, volume 1; translation m odified. H u sserl’s em phasis. Square brackets indi
cate D errid a’s additions.
10. H ere, Derricla refers to § 1 between p aren th eses at the encl o f the q u o
tation. T h e equivalent passage can be fou n d on p age 183 of the English trans
lation, volum e 1; the italics are H u sserl’s. D errid a’s French translation is m ore
faithful to H u sserl’s G erm an, but Derricla mistakenly inserts the word “Becleu-
tungsintention” when the G erm an says “Becleutungsfunktion.”
11. T h is is the fi rst time Derricla has u sed the w ord “writing” (écriture).
Chapter 2
1. Derricla cites the passage to which he is referring in the next paragraph.

2. Here, Derricla refers to the First Logical Investigation, §2, between pa
rentheses at the encl o f the quotation. The equivalent passage can be fou n d on
p age 184 o f the English translation, volum e 1. Fincllay renders “Ü b erzeu g u n g”
as “b elief” ancl “V erm utung” as “su rm ise”; he renders “B estan d” as “reality” ancl
“S ein ” as “reality.” Derricla renders “Ü b erzeu g u n g” as “conviction” ancl “Ver m u
tung” as “présom p tion ,” ancl I have ren d ered the two French terms literally as
“conviction” ancl “p resu m ptio n .” T h en Derricla renders “B estan d” as “consis
tence” ancl “Sein ” as “être,” which I have ren d ered respectively as “su bsisten ce”
ancl “b ein g.” Th e italics are H u sserl’s, which Derricla reprodu ces.
3. Derricla provides no reference for this quotation. It can be fou n d in the
First L o gical Investigation, §3; the equivalent passage can be fou nd on p age 185
o f the English translation, volum e 1. The English translation om its H u sserl’s
quotation m arks arou n d the w ord “fo rm ”; they are p resen t in the French trans
lation ancl repro d u ced here. “Indicative allu sion ” (allusion indicative) renders
“Hinweis,” which in the English translation is simply “indication ” (as in the En
glish translation o f the title to §3), while “d em on stration ” (démonstration) ren
ders “Bew eis.”
4. T h e term “m on stration ,” which we have ren d ered in English with the
sam e word, derives from the Latin “m on strare,” which m eans “to show.” Th e
Latin verb is the root o f the French verb “m ontrer,” again, “to show.” The phrase
“points the fin ger” translates the French “m ontrer clu cloigt.” Derr icla is trying to
get to the root o f the distinctions between Hinweis (pointing at or poin tin g to)
ancl Beweis (cle-m onstration), which the word “W eisen” (“to p oin t”) represents.
As showing, D errid a’s use o f the term “m onstration ” sh ould m ake one think
o f H eid e g g e r’s definition o f the p h en om en o n , in Being and Time, (§7a) as that
which shows itself from itself (sich zeigen, das, was sich zeigt). Later, in his con fron
tation with H eidegger, especially co n cern in g the hand, Derricla will return to the
idea o f m onstration. See Ja cq u es Derricla, “Geschlecht II: H eid e gge r’s H and,” in
Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, 32.
Chapter 3
1. Derr icla is ren d erin g “B ed eu tu n g” as “vouloir-clire,” that is, in English

literally as “wanting-to-say.” Fincllay renders H u sserl’s “bedeu tsam e Zeichen” as
“m eaningful sign s” on page 187 o f the English translation o f the Logical Investiga
tions. We are ren d erin g “vouloir-dire” in the norm al way as “m ean in g”; at times,
however, we shall insert “vouloir-dire” in the translation to rem ind the reader
that “m ean in g” loses the sense o f voluntarism which “vouloir-clire” im plies. See
“T ran slator’s N ote,” point 11.
2. H u sserl’s G erm an is “einsam en S eelen leb en ,” which Fincllay, on page
278 o f the English translation, renders as “solitary life.” D errid a’s French, which
we are following, is “vie solitaire cle l’âm e .”
3. Derricla is citing p age 421 o f R ico eu r’s French translation o f Ideas /. See
p age 296 o f K ersten ’s English translation fo r the equivalent passage. T h e italics
in the qu ote from §124 are those o f H usserl. T h e Derricla essay from 1967 was
later collected in Marges cle Ici philosophie, pp. 186-207; this volum e exists in En
glish translation as Margins of Philosophy; the essay, “Form ancl Meaning': A Note
on the Ph en om enology o f L a n g u a g e ,” is from pp. 155-73.
4. Derricla provides no reference for this quotation. See the First Logical
Investigation, §5. Th e equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 187 o f the En
glish translation, volum e 1.
5. Derricla provides n o reference for this citation. See the First Logical
Investigation, §5. T h e equivalent p assage can be found on p ages 187-88 o f the
English translation, volum e 1.
6. Th e equivalent passage can b e fou n d o n p age 188 o f the English transla
tion, volum e 1.
7. Derricla provides n o reference for this quotation. See the First Logical
Investigation, §6. T h e equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 188 o f the En
glish translation, volume 1.
8. T h e phrase “originally fram ed ” is from p age 189 o f the English transla
tion, volum e 1.
9. Derricla provides n o reference for this citation. See the First Logical In
vestigation, §7. The equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 189 o f the English
translation, volum e 1.
Investigation, §7. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou n d on p ages 189-90 o f the
English translation, volum e 1.
Investigation, §8. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou n d on page 190 o f the En
Investigation, §8. Th e equivalent p assage can be fou n d on p age 191 o f the En
glish translation, volume 1. Square brackets indicate D errid a’s addition.
Investigation, §8. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou nd on page 190 o f the En
glish translation, volume 1.
Investigation, §8. T h e equivalent passage can be fou nd on p age 190 o f the En
glish translation, volum e 1. Fincllay translates “H inzeigen ” as “to point to” ancl
“A nzeigen” as “indication .”
15. T h e equivalent passage can lue fo u n d on p ages 190-91 o f the English

translation, volum e 1. Squ are brackets indicate Derr id a ’s additions, ancl Derricla
has put the G erm an “B e d e u tu n g” back into the body o f the translation.
16. H ere Derricla is referrin g to Ideas I, §70. See p age 160 o f K ersten ’s En
glish translation o f Ideas I fo r the equivalent passage.
Investigation, §8. T h e equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 191 o f the En
glish translation, volum e 1. S qu are brackets indicate D errid a’s additions.
18. In Of Grammatology, which is co n tem poran eou s with Voice ancl Phenom
enon (1967), Derricla discusses Saussure at length; see the entire ch apter “Lin
guistics ancl G ram m atology.”
Investigation, §8. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou n d on page 191 o f the En
glish translation, volum e 1. Fincllay cloes not ren d er H u sserl’s “gar,” which the
French translation renders as “en core m oin s,” “still less.”
Chapter 4
Investigation, §8. The equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 191 o f the En
glish translation, volum e 1. Squ are brackets indicate D errid a’s additions. Derricla
reprodu ces H u sserl’s em phasis o f “sp eak s” (spricht), which Findlay’s translation
om its.
2. In the note to Leçon pour une phénoménologie cle la conscience intime du temps,
H enri D ussort writes (this is my translation from D ussort), “Vergegenw ärtigung,
term generally translated <into French> as ‘présen tification .’ But rather than
this clumsy n eologism , we p refer to have recourse to a typographical artifice
<Dussort is referring to the hyphen in ‘re-présen tation ,’ an artifice that Derricla
adopts here> (while reserving ‘rep résen tatio n ’ fo r the translation o f Vorstellung) .
This current term in G erm an (ancl the verb vergegenwärtigen) correspond in effect
exactly to the French expression ‘se rep résen ter’ (in thought). <It correspond s
to represen tin g som eth in g to o n eself in thought or thinking ab ou t som eth in g.>
In H usserl it is o p p o sed to perception (see the Sixth Logical Investigation, §37:
‘T h e intentional ch aracter o f p erception is, in opposition to the m ere represen
tation o f im agination, direct p resen tation .’ <T h e Husserl quotation is from p age
260 o f volum e 2 o f the English tra n sla tio n ^ )” D ussort continues: “M oreover we
will discover, several times, when the two terms Repräsentation ancl Vergegenwärti
gung are used as equivalents.” In regard to the French translation of the Logical
Investigations, Derricla is referrin g to an ap p en d ix on how to translate H u sserl’s
G erm an term s into French. T h ere is a one-page discussion o f the term s Vorstel
lung ancl Repräsentation. The French translators distinguish the two terms by say
ing that Vorstellung is a representation in the sense o f an idea or im age ancl is
im m ediately present to consciousness; they m oreover suggest that this term is
closer to “presen tation .” Repräsentation, they say, is a representation in the sense
o f a substitute or a placeholder, a representative; they aclcl that it is still a rep-
reservation in the sense o f a Vorstellung since it is p resen t to consciousness. Th e

Fren ch translators decided to ren d er both by “représen tatio n .”
3. This is the first occurren ce o f the word “decon struction ” in Voice an d Phe
nomenon, although the word “destru ction ” occurs in the introduction.
4. Derrida is citing his own introduction to his own French translation o f “The
Origin o f Geometry.” He cites pages 60-69, which are in §5 o f the introduction. See
Edmund Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”: An Introductioni, pp. 69-76. David C arr’s En
glish translation o f “Th e O rigin o f G eom etry” is also contained in this volume.
5. H ere, D errida refers to Idées I, §111, between parentheses at the en d o f
the quotation. T h e equivalent passage can be found in Ideas I (Kersten transla
tion), p. 260; these are H u sserl’s italics.
6. H ere, D errida refers to Idées /, §111, between p aren th eses at the end o f
the quotation. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou n d in Ideas I (Kersten transla
tion), p. 260; these are H u sserl’s italics.
7. D errida provides no reference fo r this quotation. See the First Lo gical
Investigation, §8. T h e equivalent passage can be found on p ag e 191 o f the En
glish translation, volum e 1. Squ are brackets indicate D errid a’s additions.
8. H ere, D errida refers to Idées I, §111, between parentheses at the end o f
the quotation. Th e equivalent passage can be fou n d in Ideas I (Kersten transla
tion) , p. 261.
9. D errida provides no reference for this quotation. See the First Logical
Investigation, §8. Th e equivalent p assage can be found on p age 191 o f the En
Chapter 5
1. Derr ida does not provide a reference for his claim abou t H eidegger.
2. H ere, between p aren th eses at the en d o f the quotation, D errida re
fers to the French translation o f Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zßit-
beiüusstsein, that is, Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps,
p. 65. T h e equivalent passage can be found in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness, §19, p. 70.
fers to the French translation o f Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeit-
beiuusstsein, that is, Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps,
p. 42. The equivalent passage can be fou n d in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness, §10, pp. 48 -4 9 .
4. H ere, between p aren th eses at the en d of the quotation, Derr ida re
fers to the French translation o f Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeit-
beiiriisstsein, that is, Leçons pour une phénoménologie de Ici conscience intime clu temps,
p. 45. The equivalent passage can be fou n d in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
fers to the French translation o f Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren 'Zeit-
bewusstsein, that is, Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps,
p. 55. The equivalent passage can be found in The Phenomenology o f Internal Time-
6. H ere, Derricla refers to §81 o f Idées I between parentheses at the encl o f
the quotation. T h e equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 195 o f the Kersten
translation o f Ideas I; these are Husser l’s italics.
7. H ere, Derricla refers to §81 o f Idées /b etw een parentheses at the encl o f
the quotation. Th e equivalent passage can be fo u n d on page 195 o f the Kersten
translation o f Ideas I; this is Husser l’s em phasis.
8. H ere, between p aren th eses at the encl o f the quotation, Derricla re
fers to the French translation o f Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren 7ßiΊ-
bexvusstsein, that is, Leçons pour une phénoménologie cle la conscience intime du temps,
p. 58, §17. The equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 64 o f The Phenomenology
of Interned Time-Consciousness; the italics are H u sserl’s.
9. H ere, between p aren th eses at the encl o f the quotation, Derricla has
a sim ple “ibicl.” H e is referrin g to Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience
intime du temps, 58, §17. The equivalent passage can be found on p age 64 o f The
Phenomenology of Inter nal Time-Consciousness.
10. Derricla provides no reference for this quotation. The quotation can be
fo u n d in The Phenomenology of Interned Tivie-Coiiscioiisiiess, §16, page 62. D errid a’s
em phasis.
11. Derricla provides no reference fo r this quotation. T h e quotation can be
found in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, §16, page 63; the italics
are H u sserl’s.
12. H ere, between paren th eses at the encl o f the quotation, Derricla refers
to Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps, p. 98, §36. T h e
reference is incorrect. T h e qu otatio n in fact cornes fr om §35. T h e equivalent pas
sage can be found on p age 99 o f The Phenomenology of Interned Time-Consciousness.
13. This is the first occurren ce in this book o f D errid a’s neologism “dif-
féran ce” ancl the first occurren ce o f the word “trace.”
Chapter 6
1. H ere, Derr'icla refers to ch apter 3 between paren th eses at the encl o f the
quotation. H e is referring to the First Logical Investigation, §26. The equivalent
passage can be fou nd on page 219 o f the English translation, volume 1.
2. “Form ancl M eaning” is collected in Margins of Philosophy. Aside from
“Form ancl M eaning,” Derricla never p ro d u ced this close study o f these sections
o f Ideas I.
3. Derricla cites Suzanne Bachelarcl’s French translation, Logic[ue formelle
et logicfue transcendentale, page 75. Bachelard, however, has ren d ered Husser l’s
G erm an as “portant en soi aussitôt un nouveau principle p our cles construc
tions cle form es.” Th e worcl “com plication ” does not ap p ear in this section. D er
rid a’s use o f the ter m is per haps an error. The passage to which Derricla is refer-
ring is from p ages 5 2 -5 3 o f the English translation. Cairns also uses the word
“construction .”
4. Derricla provides no reference for this com m ent. H e is apparently re
ferring to H eid e g g e r’s Introduction to Metaphysics, chapter 2, “The G ram m ar ancl
Etymology o f 'B e in g ,’ ” pages 55-78.
5. Derricla has the w ord “W ieclerzuspiegeln.” But this w ord ap p ears to be
a typographical erro r; the correct word is “W iclerzuspiegeln.” See also 27, where
Derricla speaks o f the sam e idea o f m in or reflection.
6. T h e French adjective, “historial,” here transliterated into English, is a
neologism . It seem s to indicate a sense o f history that is prior to, as a condition
o f possibility, “the history o f idealization, that is, the ‘history o f sp irit’ or history
as su ch .” In other words, history would not be possible without the essential role
that the phonë plays, m aking possible repetition o f the sam e, in idealization. This
linguistic repetition in idealization sh ould not be conceived as what Derricla here
calls “the history o f idealization ,” which refers to the different ways idealization
has been conceived in history o f m etaphysics. In his earlier introduction to H u s
serl’s “T h e O rigin o f Geom etry,” Derricla h ad investigated the role o f langu age
in idealization; see §7 o f the introduction. T h e term “historial” ap p ears later in
D errid a’s work. See De l'esprit, 164-65; O f Spirit, 100.
7. With the word “glossam atics,” Derricla is referring to the work o f the
linguist Louis Hjelmslev. In the co n tem poran eou s O f Grammatology, Derricla dis
cusses H jelm slev at length; see Of Grammatology, 57-61.
8. Derricla cloes not indicate a particular text or title. B u t o n e coulcl
exam in e his two m ain texts on H egel, “T h e Pit ancl the Pyram id,” collected in
Margins of Philosophy, ancl Glas.
9. Derricla is citing his own introduction to his own French translation o f
“T he O rigin o f G eom etry.” He cites pages 8 3-100, which is the b egin n in g o f §7.
See Edmun d HusserVs “Origin of Geometry”: An Introduction, 87-99.
10. Derricla provides no ref erence here. See H eidegger, Kant ancl the Prob
lem o f Metaphysics, §34.
11. H ere, between p aren th eses at the encl o f the quotation, Derricla ref ers
to Leçons, su p plém en t 1, p. 131. The equivalent p assage can be fou n d in The Phe
nomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ap p en d ix 1, p. 131.
Chapter 7
1. The qu ote is from the First L ogical Investigation, §9. The equivalent pas
sage can be fou n d on p ages 191-92 o f the English translation, volum e 1.
2. Derricla provides n o reference for this quotation. It com es from the First
Logical Investigation, §9. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou nd on page 192 o f
the English translation, volum e 1.
3. Derricla is referring to §12 o f Formal ancl Transcendental Logic, page
49 o f C airn s’s English translation. In the co n tem poran eou s Of Grammatology
(pp. 4 8 -4 9 ), Derricla says, “As in H usserl (but the analogy, although it is m ost
thought-provoking, would stop there ancl one must apply it carefully), the lowest
level, the foundation o f the possibility o f logic (or sem iotics) corresponds to the
p roject o f the Grammatica speculativa o f T h om as of Erfurt, falsely attributed to
Duns Scotus. Like H usserl, Peirce expressly refers to it. It is a m atter o f elaborat
ing, in both cases, a formal doctrine o f conditions which a discourse m ust satisfy in
order to have a sense, in order to ‘want to say, ’ even if it is false or contradictory.”
4. Derricla is referrin g to the First Logical Investigation, §15. He continues
the discussion o f non-sense expression s such as “vert est o u ” (“Grün ist o d er,”
“green is o r”) in his 1971 essay on Austin, “Signature, Event, C on text,” collected
in Margins of Philosophy; see in p articu lar p ag es 318-21.
5. Derricla is referrin g to the First Logical Investigation, §15. The equiva
lent passage can be fou nd on p age 203 o f the English translation, volume 1.
Th e G erm an terms to which Derricla is referrin g can b e found in the following
sentence from p age 56 o f volum e 2, part 1 o f the G erm an edition: “D er Wechsel
gleichsam , cler a u f clie A n schauun g ausgestellt ist, wird ein gelöst.” Derricla ren
ders “ein lö sen ” as “h on orer.” T h e m etaphor is that o f cashing in a check drawn
on a bank account.
6. The equivalent passage can be fou n d on pages 199-200 of the English
translation, volum e 1.
Investigation, §26. T h e equivalent passage can be fou n d on page 218 o f the E n
Investigation, §26. T h e equivalent p assage can be fou n d on p age 218 o f the En
9. H ere Derricla cites the French translation, “tr. fr., p . 100.” T h e equiva
lent passage can be fou n d in the First Logical Investigation, §26, on page 220 o f
the English translation, volum e 1.
10. H ere the word “G egen losigskeit” appears as “G egen losik eit”; this m is
spelling is probably a prin ter’s error.
11. This quote is the first ep igraph fo r the book. It can be fou n d in H u s
serl’s First Logical Investigation, ch apter 3, §26; the quote is located on p ag e 82 o f
volum e 2, p art 1, o f the G erm an edition ancl pages 218-19 o f volum e 1 o f the
En glish translation.
12. This sentence alludes to the Eclgar Allan Poe ep igraph at the b egin
ning o f Voice and Phenomenon: “I have spoken both o f ‘so u n d ’ ancl ‘vo ice.’ I m ean
to say that the so u n d was one o f distinct, o f even wonderfully, thrillingly dis
tinct, syllabification. M. Valclemar spoke, obviously in reply to the question. . . .
H e now saicl: ‘Yes;— n o;— I have been sleeping— ancl now— now— I am dead’.” T h e
Poe quote, which I have m o dified in o rd er to m ake it consistent with D errid a’s
French, can be fou n d in The Unabridged Eclgar Allan Poe (Philadelphia: Running,
1983), on p ag e 1070, P o e’s italics. T h e title o f the volum e in which the French
translation o f this story can be fou n d is Histoires extraordinaires (extraordinary
stories), hence D errid a’s phrase “extraordinary story” here. It is not clear which
edition o f Histoires extraodinaires Derricla was using, but both were translations
m ade by Charles Baudelaire. It is p robable that D errida was using the 1962 edi
tion. See E d gar Allan Poe, Histoires extraordinaires (Paris: Editions Gar nier Frères,
1962), p. 226.
13. Within the text, D errida cites §11. T h e equivalent passage can be
fo u n d in the First L o gical Investigation on p ag e 196 o f the E n glish translation,
volum e 1.
14. Th e sentence is “A utrem ent clit, le vrai e t authentique vouloir-clire est
le vouloir clire-vrai.” T h e “subtle shift” (“subtil d ép lacem en t”) to which Derricla
refers in the next sentence is the shift in the hyphen from “vouloir-clire” to “le
vouloir clire-vrai,” from m ean in g to a will to say-the-truth.
15. H ere, Derricla refers to §28 between parentheses at the encl o f the q u o
tation. In a footnote, Derricla then cites pages 106-7 o f the French translation
(tr. fr.) ancl says, “We have inserted the word ‘B e d e u tu n g ’ ancl aclclecl the em ph a
sis to the two full sen ten ces.” Th e equivalent passage can be fou n d in the First
Logical Investigation on p ages 2 2 3 -2 4 o f the English translation, volum e 1.
16. H ere the word “G egen w artigung” ap p ears as “G egen värtigu n g”; this
m isspelling is probably a p rin ter’s error.
17. Th e p assage com es from Ideas I, §100; the equivalent p assage can be
found on p ages 246-47 o f the Kersten English translation. This qu otation is the
second ep igraph for Voice and Phenomenon. T h e quotation com es from Ideas I,
ch apter 4, §100. It can be fou n d on page 211 o f the G erm an, p age 246 of the
K ersten translation, ancl p age 350 o f R ico eu r’s French translation. K ersten ’s En
glish translation has been m odified in ord er to m ake it consistent with D errid a’s
French translation, which is that o f Paul R ico eu r R icoeur had u sed “etc.” to ren
der H u sserl’s “unci so weiter.” Th e French word ren d ered as “w ander” is “erro n s,”
ancl thus “w ander” sh ou ld be associated with errancy.
18. The French word ren d ered by “co m p reh e n d ed ” is “co m prise,” which is
the past participle o f “co m p ren d re,” a word con n ected to “prenclre,” the prim ary
verb Derricla uses here to conn ote contam ination. Th e word “co m p ren d re” is
the French word for “to u n d erstan d ,” “to co m p reh e n d ,” ancl “to in clu d e.”
19. Derricla italicizes “case” (cas) b ecause H usserl, inldecis I, §100, calls the
description of the gallery “such a com plicated case” (so sehr komplizierter Fälle).
R icoeur renders this as “d ’exem ple si co m p liq u é” (p. 350), ancl Kersten renders
ita s “such very com plicated exam p les” (p. 247). H ere D errid a’s w ording is closer
to H u sserl’s Germ an.
20. H ere when Derricla says “a little later,” he is referrin g to Ideas I, §101,
where H usserl again speaks o f the D resden gallery exam ple o r “ case.” T h ere
H usserl says, “Im obigen Beispiele: Der· Blick kann in cler Stufe D resdn er G alerie
blieben .” Ricoeur renders this sentence as “Pour repren d re l’exem ple ci-clessus,
le re g ard peut s ’arrêter au clegré: gallerie cle D resde” (p. 352). K ersten renders
this sentence as “In the previous exam ple: the regard can rem ain at the level
o f the D resden G allery” (p. 248). U nlike Ricoeur, Derricla is ren d erin g Husserl
“bleib en ” as “dem eurer.” So here, following K ersten ’s English-language render
ing, we have used “rem ain ” to render “dem eurer.” T h rou gh out, we have ren
dered “re g ard ” (the French translation o f H u sserl’s “Blick” ) as “look ” (ancl not
as “re g a rd ” as Kersten renders “Blick” h e re ).”
Bibliography
Books by Edm und Husserl
Husserliana volumes
H ua I: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, edited by S. Strasser. T h e

H agu e: M artinus N ijhoff, 1963. 2nd edition. English translation by
D orian Cairns as Cartesian Meditations. T h e H ague: M artinus N ijhoff,
1960. French translation by G abrielle Pfeiffer an d Em m anuel Levinas as
Méditations Cartésiennes. Paris: Vrin, 1992.
H u a II: Die Idee der Phänomenologie, edited by Walter Biem el. The H agu e: M artinus
N ijhoff, 1958. English translation by William P. Alston and G eorge Nakh-
nikian as The Idea of Phenomenology. T h e H ague: M artinus N ijhoff, 1964.
H ua III. 1 : Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie:
Erstes Buch, edited by Karl Schuhm ann. T h e H ague: Martinus N ijhoff,
1976. English translation by F. Kersten as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenom
enology ancl to a Phénoménologie cd Philosophy. The H ague: M artinus N ijhoff,
1982/
H u a III.2: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie:
Ergänzende Texte (1912-1929), edited by Karl Schuhm ann. The H ague:
M artinus Nijhoff, 1976. English translation by Richard Rojcewicz a n d
A ndré Schuwer as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology ancl to a Phenom
enological Philosophy: Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitu
tion. D ordrecht: Kluwer A cadem ic, 1989.
H ua V: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie:
Drilles Buch, ed ited by Marly Biem el. Th e H ague: M artinus Nijhoff, 1952.
English translation by Ted E. Kelin a n d William E. Pohl as Phenomenol
ogy ancl the Foundation of the Sciences: Third Book; Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology ancl to ci Phénoménologiecd Philosophy. The H ague: M artinus
N ijhof, 1980. H ua V contains the “Nachw ort” to Ideas I, but the English
translation does not contain it. T h e English translation o f the “N ach
wort” can be fou n d in Husserl: Shorter Works; see below.
Hua VI: Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phäno
menologie. Th e H ague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. English translation by David
C arr as The Crisis of European Sciences ancl Transcendental Phenomenology.
Evanston, 111.: N orthw estern University Press, 1970.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
H ua IX: Phänomenologische Psychologie, edited by W alter Biem el. Th e H ague: Mar-

tinus Nijhoff, 1966. Partial English translation by Jo h n Scanlon as Phe
nomenological Psychology. Th e H ague: M artinus Nijhoff, 1977.
H ua X: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeilbeiuusstseins (1893-1917), edited by Ru
d o lf Boehm . The H agu e: M artinus N ijhoff, 1966. English translation by
Jo h n Brough as The Phenomenology of the, Consciousness of Internal Time. The
H ague: M artinus Nijhoff , 1990.
H ua XVII: Formal unci Transzendentale Logik, ed ited by Paul Jan ssen . T h e H ague:
M artinus Nijhoff , 1974. English translation by D orian C airn s as Formal
and Transcendental Logic. The H ague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. French
translation by Suzanne Bachelard as Logique formelle et logique transcenden
tal e. Paris: Presses U niversitaires cle France, 1957.
Other Books by Edmund Husserl
Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, trans. Paul Ricoeur. Paris: G allim ard, 1950.
Logische Unterschlingen, two volum es, with volum e 2 having two parts. Tubingen:
Niemeyer, 1980. English translation b y j. N. Fincllay as Logical Investiga
tions, two volum es. With a new preface by M ichael D um m ett ancl edited
with a new introduction by D erm ot M oran. L on d on : Routleclge Taylor
ancl Francis, 2001. French translation by H ubert Elie, A rion L. Kelkel,
ancl René Schérer as Recherches logiques, in three volum es. Paris: Presses
U niversitaires cle France, 1959-63.
Erfahrung und Urteil, eel. Luclwig Lan dgreb e. H am b u rg: Classen, 1938. English
translation by Ja m e s Churchill ancl Karl A m eriks as Experience and Judg
ment. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Husserl: Shorter Works, eel. Peter M cC orm ick ancl Frederick Elliston. N otre Dam e,
Incl.: N otre Dam e University Press, 1981.
Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren ZHtbeiuusstsein, ecl. M artin H eidegger.
H alle: M ax Niemeyer, 1928. English translation by Jam es Churchill as
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Conscioiisness. The H ague: M artinus
Nijhoff, 1964. French translation by H enri Dussort as Leçons pour une phé
noménologie cle la conscience intime du temps. Paris: Presses U niversitaires cle
France, 1964.
Books and Articles by Jacques Derrida
L animal que donc je suis. Paris: Galilée, 2006. English translation by Davicl Wills as
The Animal That Therefore I Am. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
2008.
Apories. Paris: Galilée, 1996. English translation by T h o m as D utoit as Aporias.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993.
L a dissémination. Paris: Seuil, 1972. English translation by Barbara Jo h n so n as Dis
semination. Chicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1981.
Du droit à la philosophie. Paris: Galilée, 1990. English translation by Ja n Plug ancl

others as Eyes ofthe University. Right to Philosophy 2. Stanford, Calif.: Stan
ford University Press, 2004,
Leniture et la différence. Paris: Seuil, 1967. English translation by A lan B ass as Writ
ing and Difference. C hicago: University o f C hicago, 1978.
Eperons: Les styles de Nietzsche. Paris: C ham ps Flam m arion, 1978. English transla
tion by Barbara Harmow as Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles. Chicago: University o f
C hicago Press, 1979.
De resprit. Paris: Galilée, 1987. English translation by Geoffrey B ennington ancl
R achel Bow lbyas Of Spirit, C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1989.
“E tc e te r a ,” translated by G eoffrey Bennington, in Deconstructions: A Users Guide,
edited by Nicholas Royle. L ondon: Palgrave, 2000, pp. 282-305.
Force de loi. Paris: Galilée, 1994. English translation by Mary Q uintance as “Th e
Force o f Law ,” in Deconstruction ancl the Possibility of Justice, edited by
D rucilla Cornell, M ichael Rosenfelcl, ancl Davicl Gray Carlson. New York:
Routleclge, 1992. 21-29.
Glas. Paris: D en oël/G on th eier, 1981 [1974], two volumes. English translation
by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr., ancl Richard Ranci as Glas. Lincoln: University o f
N ebraska Press, 1986.
De la grammatologie. Paris: Minuit, 1967. English translation by Gayatri Spivak as
O f Grammatology. Baltim ore: Jo h n s H opkins University Press, 1997, cor
rected edition.
“Il faut bien m anger,” in Points cle Suspension. Paris: G alilée, 1992, pp. 269-301.
English translation by Peter C on n or ancl Avital Ronnell as “Eating Well,”
in Points . . . Interviews 1974-1994. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1995, pp. 255-87.
Khorci. Paris: Galilée, 1993. English translation by Ian M cLeocl as “K h ôra,” in On
the Name, edited by T h om as Dutoit. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1995, 89-129.
“L a main cle H eid egger (Geschlecht II) (1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 5 ).” In Psyché. Paris: Galilée,
1987, 415-52. English translation by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr., ancl Elizabeth
R ottenberg as “Geschlecht II: H eid e g g e r’s H an d ,” in Psyche: Inventions ofthe
Other, Volume II, edited by Peggy K am u f ancl Elizabeth R ottenberg. Stan
ford, Calif.: Stan fo rd University Press, 2008, 27-62.
Marges de la philosophie. Paris: Minuit, 1972. English translation by Alan Bass as
M argins of Philosophy. C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1982.
“L ’oreille cle H eidegger: P h ilopolém ologie (G eschlecht IV).” In Politiques cle
Γamitié. Paris: Galilée, 1994, 343-419. English translation by Jo h n P.
Leavey, Jr., as “H e id e g g e r’s Ear: Philopolem ology (G eschlecht Ιλ7) ,” in
Reading Heidegger: Govimemorations, edited by Jo h n Sallis. Bloom ington:
Indiana University Press, 163-219.
[H usserl, Eclmuncl.] L origine de la géométrie, traduction et introduction p ar Jacques
Derricla, Paris: Presses U niversitaires cle France, 1974 [1962]. English
translation by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr., as Eclmuncl Husserls ‘Origin o f Geo metry
An Introduction. Lincoln: University of N ebraska Press, 1989 [1978].
“L a ph én om én o lo gie et la clôture cle la m étaphysique.” In ΕΠΟΧΕΣ, Athens, Feb

ruary 1966. English translation by F. Jo se p h Smith as “Ph en om enology
and M etaphysical C losu re,” in Philosophy Today 11, no. 2 (Su m m er 1967):
106-23. English translation by R onald Bruzina, in TheNezv Yearbook of Phe
nomenology 3 (Seattle, N oesis, 2003): 102-20. Bruzina has m ade this trans
lation from D errid a’s French version.
Politiques de Vamitié. Paris: Galilée, 1994. English translation by G eorge Collins as
Politics of Friendship. L on d on : Verso Books, 1997.
Positions. Paris: Minuit, 1972. English translation by Alan Bass as Positions. Chi
cago: University o f C hicago Press, 1981
Le problem de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl. Paris: Presses U niversitaires d e
France, 1990. English translation by M arian H obson as The Problem of Gen
esis in Husserl’s Philosophy. C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 2003.
Psyché: Inventions de l ’autre. Paris: Galilée, 1987. English translation ed ited by
Peggy Kam uf and Elizabeth R otten berg as Psyche: Inventions o f the Other,
Volume II. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008.
S a u f le nom. Paris: Galilée, 1993. English translation by Jo h n P. Leavey, Jr., as “S a u f
le nom,” in On the Name, ed ited by T h om as Dutoit. Stanford, Calif.: Stan
ford University Press, 1995, 35-87.
Spectres de Marx. Paris: G alilée, 1993. E n glish translation by Peggy K a m u f as Spec
ters of'Marx. New York: R outledge, 1994.
Le toucher— Jean-Luc Nancy. Paris: Galilée, 2000. English translation by Christine
Irizarry as On Touching—-Jean-Luc Nancy. Stan ford, Calif.: Stanford U ni
versity Press, 2005.
Voyous. Paris: Galilée, 2003. English translation by Pascale-Anne Brault an d Mi
chael Naas as Rogues. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005.
Books by Other Authors
Deleuze, Gilles. Différence et répétititon. Paris: Presses U niversitaires de France,

1968. E n glish translation by Paul Patton as Difference and Repetition. New
York: C olum bia University Press, 1994.
---------. Foucault. Paris: Minuit, 1986. English translation by S eân H an d as Fou
cault. M inneapolis: University of M innesota Press, 1988.
---------. “R espon ses to a Serres o f Q u estion s.” In Collapse: Philosophical Research
and Development 3 (2007) : 39-44.
D eleuze, Gilles, an d Félix Guattari. Mille plateaux. Paris: Minuit, 1980. English
translation by Brian M assumi as Λ Thousand Plateaus. M inneapolis: U ni
versity o f M innesota Press, 1987.
---------. Q u’est-ce que la philosophie? Paris: Minuit, 1991. English translation by
Hugh Tom linson and G raham Burchell as What Is Philosophy ? New Yor k:
C olum bia University Press, 1994.
F oucault, Michel. Les mots et les choses. Paris: Tel G allim ard, 1966. A nonym ous E n
glish translation as The Order of Things. New York: Vintage, 1994.
---------. “L a pen sée clu dehors." In Dits et écrits I 1954-1975. Paris: Q uarto G al
lim ard, 2001, 546-67. English translation by Brian Massumi as “T h e
T h ou gh t of the O u tsid e,” in Essential Works o f Foucault 1954-1984: Vol
ume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. New York: New, 1998, 147-70.
Freud, Sigm und. The Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, Volume X II
( 1911-1913), The Case of Schreber London: H ogarth, 1958.
H eidegger, Martin, Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen: M ax N iem eyer Ver
lag, 1987. English translation by G regory Fried an d Richard Polt as Intro
duction to Metaphysics. New Haven, C onn.: Yale University Press, 2000.
-------- . Kant und d as Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: K losterm ann,
1973. English translation by R ichard Taft as Kant and the Problem of Meta
physics, 4th edition, en larged. Bloom ington: In dian a University Press,
1990.
-------- . Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: M ax N iem eyer Verlag, 1979. E n glish translation
by Jo a n Stam baugh as Being and Time, revised an d with a forew ord by
D ennis J. Schm idt. Albany: SU NY Press, 2010.
Hjelmslev, Louis. Outline of Glossematics: A Study in the Methodology of the Humanities
with Special Reference to Linguistics (Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Copen
hague). C openh agen : N ordisk sprog- og kulturforlag, 1957.
Lacan, Jacq u es. Ecrits. Paris: Seu il, 1966. English translation by B ru ce Fin k as
Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English. New York: Norton, 2007.
Laplan ch e, Jean , and Jean -B ertran d Pontalis. Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1967. English translation by Donaci
Nicholson-Sm ith as The Language of Psychoanalysis. New York: W.W. N or
ton, 1973.
Poe, E d g a r Allan. Histoires extraordinaires. Paris: G am ier, 1962.
-------- . The Unabridged Edgar A llan Poe. Philadelphia: Running, 1983.
Saussu re, Ferdin and de. Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot, 1916. English
translation by Roy H arris as Course in General Linguistics. O pen Court,
1998.
Index
The selection o f page numbers for fr equently appearing terms such as expression, indica
tion, discourse, language, sign, signification, meaning, sense, ancl presence has been guiclecl by
the apparent importance of what Derr icla says at that point in the commentary. Likewise,
separate entries have been form ed for variants of a term when it seems as though Der
rida’s commentary is distinguishing them (for instance, between expression and expressivity,
representation and representivity, and especially between sign, signifier; signified, and significa
tion). Other terms have been combined under the main invariant (for instance, norm and
abnormal are both found under the term normalcy).
absence, xiii, xxiv, 4, 9, 14, 21, 35, 46, 51, Allison, David B., 91
53, 67, 72n, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 86, 87 alterity, xv, xx, xxi, xxvi, xxviii, 56, 57. See
absolute, xx, xxi, xxii, xxvii, xxviii, 6, 10, also non-alterity; other
19, 23, 25, 27, 2 8 ,3 6 ,3 8 , 38n, 39, 45, analogy, xxxi, 7, 10, 12, 25, 33, 35, 57n,
46, 50, 52, 52n, 55, 57, 57n, 59, 65, 66, 59, 72n, 104n3
67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72n, 73, 74, 80, 85, ancient, xxv; ancient Greeks, 89. See also
87, 88, 93n l7,94n 25 age; older
absurdity, xxvii, 7, 15, 45nj~, 46n, 5 In, animation, xxxii, 14, 17, 28, 29, 32, 34,
52n, 54, 77, 78, 80 35, 48, 66, 67, 70, 76, 77, 78n, 81, 83;
accident, xiv, xviii, 9, 18, 42, 47, 49, 67, unanimatecl, 77
72n, 74, 87, 88, 89 anonymity, 83. See also name
act, xx, xxi, xxii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 5, 8, 9, 10, aporia, xii, xvii, 38, 77, 86, 93n l4
13, 17, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 40, 41, appear {apparaître, paraître), xv, xvi, x x , 4,
45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51 n, 55, 61, 65, 66, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 22, 23, 25n, 32,
67, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78n, 79, 85 34, 37, 38, 44, 46, 47, 50, 55, 61, 62n,
activity, 22, 34, 35, 39n, 65, 73, 75, 82; 67, 68, 73, 75, 77, 78n, 80, 82, 84, 87,
reactivate, 69; reactivation, 45 88, 95n29, 97n l3, 103n3, 104n5; re
actual (actuel, effectif ), actually {effective appear, 17
ment, en effet; see xxxiii #19), xvi, x\iii, — appearance {apparence), 21, 23, 35, 64,
xix, xxii, 4, 8, 20, 24, 28, 33, 39n, 42, 65, 81, 86, 88; apparent, 86
43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 55, 57n, 60, 64, — See cdso disappearance
70, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 88; inactual, 55. appresentation {apprésentation), 6, 33,
See also non-actual 34, 72 n, 76. See cdso presentification
actuality {effectivité), xvi, xxv, 28, 29, 48, {Vergegenwärtigung); representation
53, 58, 59, 72n, 73, 82 ( Vergegenwärtigung)
advent, 64 archive, 13
aesthetic, 88 Aristotle, xxvi, 52, 63nj~
affirmation, 87 art, 49, 85
age, 89. See also older articulation, 31, 45, 76, 77, 87
agrammaticality, 78 artificial, 23
INDEX
attitude (natural attitude), 67 belonging {appartenance) , xiv, xxvi, xxxii

attribute, xiv, 72n, 73, 85 #12, xxxii#14, 4, 8, 13, 18, 22, 22nf,
Austin, J. L., 105n4 23, 23n, 25, 25n, 28, 29, 30, 35, 37, 38,
author, xxiv, 82 39, 40, 43, 44, 50, 52, 57, 58, 64, 65, 66,
authority, xii, xxxi #8, 7, 60 68, 72n, 75, 76, 79, 81, 86, 88, 94n2;
authorize, 29, 37n, 52, 66, 70, 82 non-belonging, 66. See also grip {pren
auto-affection, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 59, 67, 6 8 - dre); proper (propre)
69, 70, 71, 73, 74. See also self-relation Benjamin, Andrew, 92n7
auto-donation, 75 Benjamin, Walter, 92n9
autonomy, 83 Bennington, Geoffrey, 92n8, 97n l3
availability, xvi, xxii, xxiv, xxv, 28, 64, 67, Bergson, Henri, 12, 22nf. See also
68, 85, 94n25 duration
axiology, 61. See also ethics; value beyond {au-delà, par-delà, déborder), xiii,
axiom, xv, xxvii, 57 xvii, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, xxviii, 3nf, 19, 23,
axiopoetic, 61 24, 25, 46, 80, 88, 94n22. See also meta
physics; outside {hors de, dehors)
Bachelard, Suzanne, 95nl, 103n3 biology, 13
Bass, Alan, 91, 92n l0, 93n l3, 97n l2 body, 11,14, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 48, 64,
Baudelaire, Charles, 106nl2 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 76, 93nl6; on e’s
becoming, 58, 73, 78; becom e {devenir), own, 68
xvii, 4, 20, 26, 31, 32, 33, 35, 39n, 43, Bowlby, Rachel, 92n8, 97 n l3
53, 54, 57n, 65, 67, 69, 73, 78n, 87, Brault, Pascale-Anne, 93n l8
94n25 breath, 9, 11, 14,28, 65, 66
Bedeutung. See meaning {vouloir-dire, Brentano, Franz, 55
Bedeutungen) Brough, John, xxx #6, 54n f
beginning {commencement, début, entrée), Bruzina, Ronald, 96n7
xv, 7, 14, 20, 21, 24, 38η, 52, 53, 58, 59, Burchell, Graham, 92n6
63, 71, 73, 75, 78η, 85, 89, 93η17
being {être, étant; j<?<?xxxiv #24), xiii, Cairns, Dorian, 97n l7, 104n3
xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xxi, xxii, xxiv, xxv, Carlson, David Gray, 92n8
xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, Carr, David, 102n4
22, 22nf, 23, 24, 33, 34, 38, 45nf, 47, certainty, 25, 37, 38, 39, 46, 50, 57, 57n
51n, 54nj~, 55, 63, 63nj~, 71, 72, 72n, Churchill, Jam es, xxix, xxx, 54nj~, 72n
74, 81, 85, 86, 88, 93nl4, 99n2; being circle, xi, xv, 52, 78, 84
alive, being-cleacl, 82; being-conscious, classical, xi, xii, 3nj~, 21, 22, 22nj~, 38,
54; being-for, being-in-the-place-of, 20; 38n, 44, 46n, 72n, 77, 84, 92n8; unclas-
being-in-front, 64; being-nearby-itself, sical, xvii
87; being present, 50; being pre-sent closure {clôture), xi, xii, xv, xvi, xvii, xxvii,
in front of, 46; being-together, 78n; 44, 49n, 72n, 87, 88, 93n l8, 94n l9;
imaginecl-being, perceivecl-being, 37; inside closed in upon itself, 74
inclication-being, 17; object-being, coincidence {recouvrir; see xxx #9), 10, 11 ;
being-in-front-of, icleal-being, being- non-coincidence, 77
for, 65; ontos on, 45; originary-being, 73; Collins, George, 93n l7
sign-being, 21; sign-being, inclication- coming {à venir), xxii, xxiv, xxviii, 25,
being, 18. See also ideality; ontology; 83, 92n6, 93nl7; to come, 88. See also
presence advent; waiting
belief {croire, croyance), xxv, xxvii, 14, 21, commentary, 15, 26, 30, 45, 75
26, 38n, 47, 49, 50, 70, 73, 80, 87, 89, communication, xiii, xviii, xix, 8, 17, 18,
99n2 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
INDEX
41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 59, 60, 62, 76, dative, 75
8 1 η ,82 deaf, 67. See also hearing
comparison, xx, 3nf, 55 death, xv, xxiv, xxviii, xxxiv#24, 8, 9, 29,
complexity, xxii, 13, 14, 16, 17, 31, 35, 34, 46, 46n, 67, 79, 80, 82, 83, 86, 87,
37n, 39n, 53, 75, 86; complex, complic 88, 89, 105nl2
ity, 38n, 64, 66; complicated, xiv, 49; decision, xiv, xv, xviii, xxvii, 6, 7, 12, 17,
complication, 63, 75, 103n3, 106nl9. 36, 45, 52, 53, 60, 63nj~; decisive, 3, 77
See also fold; simplicity deconstruction (déconstruire, déconstruc
concept, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xix, tion), xi, xii, xiii, xvii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv,
xxiii, X X V , xxvi, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, xxvi, xxvii, 44, 64, 66, 72n, 92nn7-9,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 92nl 3, 95nn27-28, 95n30, 102n3. See
28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, also destruction
47, 50, 52, 53, 54n*, 59, 63, 63nf, 64, delay, 75
66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 72n, 73, 75, 76, 80, Deleuze, Gilles, 91 n6, 92n6, 94n22,
8 In, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92n8, 93n l4, 94n26
93nl7, 94n22, 98nl Demeny, Paul, 97nl6
confession (avouer; aveu), xxviii, 15, 47 demonstration, xviii, xix, xx, xxv, xxvii,
Connor, Peter, 94n21 5, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 34, 36, 41,
consciousness (conscience), xiv, xix, xx, 49n, 51, 51n, 63nf, 72n, 76, 77, 80, 83,
xxix, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 27, 85, 99n3; nerims demonstrandi, 55
28, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38n, 39, 40, 49, 50, derivative, xi, xiv, xxiii, xxiv, 43, 44,47,
53, 54, 54nj~, 56, 57n, 58, 58n:i:, 65, 66, 52n8, 63, 83, 87, 88, 93n l5
68, 75, 78n, 84, 87, 88, 93n l6, 96n9, Descartes, René, xiv; ego cogito, 36; ergo
101n2; preconscious, 30 sum, 81; res cogitans, 47
constitution, xviii, xx, xxiv, 3nj~, 4, 6, 7, desire, xii, xiv, xv, xxviii, 43, 62n, 89,
10, 13, 14, 21, 22, 26, 28, 36, 38n, 42, 9 3n n l6-17
43, 44, 45, 46n, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, destination, 8
60, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72n, 73, 74, 77, 78n, destiny, 22, 32
82, 83, 87 destruction, 10, 11, 12, 36, 56, 102n3.
contamination ( i^ x x x ii#14), xv, xxv, See also deconstruction (déconstruire,
xxviii, 17, 19, 61, 80, 106nl8. See also déconstruction)
grip (prendre) detour, xv, xxii, 12, 35, 5 In, 67, 76
content, xvi, xvii, xxii, xxv, 6, 16, 18, 19, diacritical, 87
21, 25, 27, 34, 36, 38, 38n, 40, 46, 5 In, diagram, 75
53, 54, 57n, 79, 79n, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86. dialectic, xxxii #14, 59
See also matter diaphaneity, xv, xxii, xxvi, 66, 69. See also
context, 80 non-diaphaneity
contingent (éventuellement; w x x x iii #21), differ ance (.w xxxiii #22), xi, xiii, xiv,
xviii, 4, 25, 42, 46, 48, 49, 55, 74, 77, xvii, xxiii, xxvi, 58, 59, 71, 72n, 75, 85,
80, 83 88, 89, 103nl3; infinite, 87
continuity, xxi, 53, 56, 57, 72n. See also difference, xii, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 3, 10,
discontinuity 12, 13, 17, 21, 24, 26, 31, 33, 36, 37,
contradiction, xvii, 7, 13, 15, 26, 46n, 38, 38n, 42, 43, 44, 49, 51 n, 55, 56,
49n, 58, 61, 67, 74, 76, 78, 82, 97n l, 58n:i:, 63n:i:, 66, 69n, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76,
105n3 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 94n22; indiffer
Cornell, Drucilla, 92n8 ence, 62
crisis, 70 difficulty, 10, 13, 14, 17, 25
critique, xi, xii, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 21, 22nj~, disappearance, 46, 79
38n, 55, 75, 87, 93n l7 discontinuity, xxi, 5 In, 55
INDEX
discourse, xviii, xix, xxii, xxx, 7, 8, 12, 13, disentangle, xiii. See also interweaving
14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23n, 26, 27, 28, 29, {entrelacer, Verflechtung)
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37n, 38, 39n, 40, 41, en telechy, 84. See also telos
42, 43, 44, 46n, 48, 49, 50, 53, 60, 61, epistemology, xix, 4, 23, 61, 83, 84
62, 62n, 70, 78, 79, 80, 81, 81n, 82, 85, epoch, 64, 65, 66
87, 92n9, 105n3; outspokenness, 83; epochë, xxvi, 10
outspokenness of, xxviii, 76 erasure {effacement), 19, 21, 34, 38n, 43,
cliscursivity, 31 44, 46, 47, 58, 66, 69, 72n, 79, 81, 83, 87
disease, xv, xxviii essence, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 19, 20, 21, 23,
dissimulation, xxv, xxvii, 4, 46, 56, 73 26, 27, 30, 43, 50, 58, 67, 68, 69, 83, 84
dissociation, xxi, 16, 20, 56, 79 — essential, xiii, xviii, xix, xxiv, 9, 13, 15,
distance, xvi, xvii, xxvi, xxvii, 10, 11, 12, 18, 21, 22, 23, 23n, 2 4 ,2 6 ,2 8 ,3 3 ,3 4 ,
65, 76, 79, 83, 86. See also hiatus {écart) 35, 36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 51n, 52,
distinction, xiii, xviii, xx, xxiv, xxix, 3, 4, 55, 57n, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 76; unes
10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 25n, 30, sential, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 8 In, 85, 86,
31, 35, 36, 37n, 38n, 42, 43, 46n, 48, 87, 104n6
52, 55, 57, 60, 65, 66, 68, 70, 78, 82, 83, — See also necessity
84, 85, 86, 87, 96n9, 99n4, 105nl2 ethics, 45, 88
distribution {partage), xii, 12, 13, 25, 59 event {see xxxiii #21), xiv, xv, xix, xxvii,
division, 12, 24, 70, 75; indivisible, 50, 52, xxviii, 29, 33, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 59, 65
53; undivided, 51 evidence, evidentness, xiii, xx, xxi, 4, 8,
double, xxxiii, 3, 10, 27, 60, 83 15, 20, 24, 25, 34, 39n, 46, 53, 55, 62,
Dresden, 89, 106n20 84, 93nl5. See cdso non-eviclence
dumb, 67. See also speech example, 4, 23n, 60, 61, 62, 63, 80, 84,
Dummett, Michael, 96n4 98nl, 106nl9, 106n20
Duns Scotus, John, 105n3 existence, xix, xx, 4, 5, 8, 11, 17, 18, 19,
duration, xxi, 56. See also Bergson, Henri 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 35, 36, 37, 37n, 38,
Dussort, Henri, xxx, 5 In, 54n f, 101n2 38n, 39, 40, 41, 45, 45nf, 46, 47, 5 In,
Dutoit, Thomas, 93nl4, 95n27 59, 61, 69, 74, 76; existential thesis, 67.
See cdso non-existence
ego, alter. See other exiting {sortir), xii, xiii, xxv, xxvi, xxvii,
eicletic, 3, 9, 11, 25, 51n, 94n l9 27, 28, 34, 73, 74, 92n l3
eiclos, 45, 53, 83. See also idea experience, xx, xxiii, xxv, xxvii, xxviii,
element, xix, xxi, xxvi, 9, 13, 32, 38, 38n, xxxi, 10, 20, 24, 25n, 26, 33, 46, 49, 51,
39n, 40, 42, 53, 59, 62n, 65, 66. See also 57, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 86, 89, 95n31.
medium; milieu See cdso lived-experience {vécu, Erlebnis)
Elie, Hubert, 96n4 expression, xiii, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii,
empirical, xiv, xix, 9, 10, 11, 23, 24, 25, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxxiii, 3, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16,
25n, 26, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 45, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23n, 25n, 26,
46, 48, 65, 68, 71, 73, 78, 81, 86; meta- 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
empirical, 7, 25. See also non-empirical 37n, 40, 41, 43, 48, 52n, 59, 60, 61, 62,
empiricism, 38n; Deleuze’s “transcenden 62n, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74,
tal empiricism,” 94n26 74n, 76, 77, 78, 78n, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84,
empty {vide), 6, 46, 50, 51, 70, 83, 84 85, 86, 93n l4, 98n2, 105n4
encl {fin), xv, xxv, xxviii, 87, 88, 89, expressivity, xiii, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20,
93nl7; ending with presence, xi 23n, 25n, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 39,
enigma, 6, 11, 13, 26, 50, 63, 65 43, 48, 59, 61, 62, 62n, 64, 66, 69, 71,
entanglement {enchevêtrement, Verflech 73, 74, 74n, 75, 76; in-expressive, 34.
tung), xxii, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 77; See cdso non-expressivity
INDEX
exteriority, xviii, xxii, xxv, 23, 25, 27, 28, 38, 41, 43, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 74n,
31, 42, 49, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73. See 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 9 3n l4
also non-exteriority
eye, xvi, xx, xxi, 18, 26, 29, 30, 47, 50, 51, generality (in general), xiv, xv, xvii, xviii,
53, 5 6 ,6 1 ,6 2 , 67, 74 xix, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxv, xxvii, 3,
3nt, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20,
fact (5££xxxiii #18), xiii, 16, 17, 18, 25, 21, 22, 23n, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33,
25n, 26, 30, 33, 35, 45nf, 52n, 82, 85, 34, 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45nf, 46, 47,
86, 98n2; faktum, 4 48, 50, 51, 51n, 52, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61,
factuality, xiii, xviii, xxix, 11, 18, 26, 27, 63, 63nf, 64, 67, 68, 72n, 73, 74, 75,
29, 46, 85, 96n9 78n, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 93nl5
faculty, xv, 47, 64 generation, 72; degeneration, 5
falsehood, xxvii, 7, 82, 95n29 genesis, 29, 72
fiction, xix, 5, 42, 45, 45nj~, 47, 48, 60, genus, 18, 19, 2 0 ,5 7 ,6 1
62,82 geometry, 70
Findlay, J. N., xxx, xxxiii, 96n4, 98n8, gesture, 9, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 44, 62,
9 9 n 2 ,9 9 n l (chap. 3), 100n2, 100nl4, 69, 85
101nl9 glossomatics, 66
finger, 2 0 ,2 5 ,6 1 ,6 2 , 67, 99n4 grammar, 7, 8, 21, 46n, 61, 76, 78, 83,
finite, xxiv, 58, 87 84, 85
finitucle, 58, 87 gi ammaticality, 7, 61, 86. See also agram-
Fink, Eugen, 7 maticality; non-grammaticality
flesh (chair, Körper, Leib), 14, 29, 70. See grapheme, xix, 23n, 43, 65
also body; incarnation Greek, xxv, xxvi, 53
fold, 58; unfold, 3, 19, 34, 52η, 71. See grip (prendre; see xxxii #14), 14, 17, 18,
also complexity; reflection; simplicity 2 6 ,8 6 , 87. See also contamination
force, xxvii, xxviii, 88, 89 Guattari, Félix, 91n6
foreign, xv, xxviii, 13, 28-29, 48, 50, 82
forgetfulness, 70, 84 Hand, Séan, 92n6
form, xvi, xvii, xix, xxii, xxv, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, Harlow, Barbara, 95n29
20, 25, 27, 28, 30, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44, Harris, Roy, xxix
45, 46, 53, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, hearing, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvii, 14, 20,
72n, 75, 84, 85, 86, 99n3; archi-form, 28, 30, 32, 33, 39, 60, 62, 62n, 64, 65,
Urform, 54 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 79, 79n, 88, 95n30;
formalism, xvi, xix, xxv, 10, 14, 43, unheard-of, 10
6 9 n ,84 hearth (foyer), 9, 20, 97n l3
Foucault, Michel, 91n6, 92n6, 94n26 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, xvi, 66,
foundation, xiv, xvii, xviii, xxvii, 6, 25n, 87, 104n8
34, 50, 52, 53, 77, 83, 85, 105n3. See also Hegelianism, 87
non-founclation Heidegger, Martin, xxv, xxvi, 22nj~, 52,
freedom, xxvii, 10, 58, 76, 83 54, 63, 63nf, 71, 92n8, 94n24, 99n4,
Frege, Gottlieb, 16 102nl, 104n4, 104nl0
Freucl, Sigmund, xxx, xxxi, xxxiv, 54, heritage, xii, 4, 7; inheritance, 47; inher
54n:i:, 97n l2 ited, 52, 66. See also history; tradition
Frieden, Ken, 95n27 hetero-affection, xxiii
fullness, xvi, 37n, 38n, 77, 78, 83, 84, 87. heterogeneity, xxi, 9, 15, 20, 37, 38n
See also non-fullness hiatus (écart; seexxxiv#23), xii, xvi, 18,
function, xiii, xv, xvii, xix, xxii, xxiv, 26, 59
xxxiii, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 32, 35, 36, historial, 64, 104n6
INDEX
history, xiv, xv, xxv, xxvii, 4, 5, 13, 14, 22, impression, xxi, 39n, 40, 55, 56, 71, 72, 73
22nf, 25n, 43, 44, 45, 51, 52, 58, 65, impropriety. 83. See also ownness; proper
66, 70, 73, 87, 88; Foucault’s “historical ( propre)
a priori,” 94n26. See also encl (fin) ; impurity, 34, 73
heritage; tradition incarnation, 28, 70. See also body; fl esh
Hjelmslev, Louis, 104n7 (chair, Körper, Leib)
Hobson, Marian, 91n5 indefinite, xvi, xxv, 5, 8, 43, 45, 64, 67,
homogeneous, 75, 79 87, 88, 89
horizon, xxvi, 6, 7, 20, 23n, 38n, 62 index (indice; seexxxi #10), 50, 51n,
human, xxiv, 29 60, 62, 81n, 96n5. See also indication
Hume, David, 47 ( indice)
hyle, 40 indication (indice; see xxxi #10), xiii, xvii,
xviii, xix, xxii, xxiv, xxxiv, 3, 15, 16, 17,
Icarus, 89 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 25n, 27, 28,
idea, xvi, xvii, xxv, 4; eidos, 53, 83, 84. See 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37n, 41,
also eidos 42, 48, 50, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 69, 74, 76,
idea, in the Kantian sense, 8, 86, 87 80, 81, 83, 86, 99n2, 99n3, 100nl4. See
ideal, xiii, xvi, xviii, xxi, xxii, xxiv, xxix, also index (indice)
xxxiv, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, infinité, xvi, 6, 13, 79, 86, 88; positive, 87
25n, 27, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 45, 45nf, infinity, xvi, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, 5, 6, 8,
46, 48, 56, 58, 58nf, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 45, 46, 58, 64, 65, 85, 86, 87, 88
71, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, insecurity, xxvii, xxviii, 13, 49n. See also
96n9. See also irreell; non-reell; real; security
reell inside (dedans), xvii, 4, 6, 19, 27, 44, 49n,
idealism, 19 65, 70, 73, 74
iclealiter, 5, 6 7 ,8 5 , 87 instance ( w x x x # 8), 51, 68; agency, 13,
ideality, xvi, xviii, xix, xxii, xxv, xxvi, 5, 6, 53, 67, 78; case, 42; court, xii, xxx, 8,
8, 9, 15, 19, 22, 25, 25n, 28, 43, 44, 45, 97n l2; in the last analysis, xxx, 5, 9,
45nf, 46, 47, 48, 58, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 53, 61
77, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 94n25. See also instant, xx, xxi, xxv, 41, 50, 51, 51n,
non-icleality 52, 56
idealization, 8, 64, 65, 76, 80, 104n6 institution, xxiv, 4, 5, 23, 46, 58
identity, xix, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 5, 6, 34, intention, xxvi, 6, 8, 13, 15, 16, 19, 26,
43, 50, 51, 59, 63, 70, 71, 74, 82, 85, 86. 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 44, 57,
See also non-iclentity; self-identity 61, 66, 67, 70, 76, 77, 78, 78n, 79, 82,
idiom, 42 83, 84, 86
illusion, 13, 49, 50 intentionality, 3, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28,
image, xix, 10, 37, 38, 38n, 39, 39n, 40, 29, 32, 33, 38, 39, 48, 74n, 84, 93nl7,
47, 51, 57, 65, 68, 74n, 93n l8, 97n l3, 101n2
101n2 interiority, 19, 48, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68,
imagination, xviii, xix, 4, 37, 38, 38n, 40, 73, 74
41,47, 48, 55, 57, 101n2 inter pretation, 28, 29, 30, 45, 75
immanence, xxix, 10, 53, 57n, 59 intersubjectivity, 6, 72n
immediate, xx, xxv, 17, 20, 23n, 31, 32, interval, 73, 92n l0
33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 50, 58, 61, 62, 65, 66, interweaving (entrelacer, Verflechtung), 18,
68, 69, 76, 81, 8 In, 101n2 23, 30, 57, 57η, 74. See cdso entangle-
imperative, 12, 83. See also telos; value m ent (encheiwtrement, Verflechtung)
impossibility, xi, xvii, xxi, 12, 30, 42, 46, intuition, xvi, xxv, xxvi, xxxiii, 4, 8, 19,
46n, 50, 54, 56, 87; cannot, 74 32, 33, 34, 37, 38n, 44, 46, 50, 51, 52n,
INDEX
61, 62η, 64, 65, 69, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, light, 9, 12, 62, 97n l3
79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89. See also limit, xv, xxii, xxviii, 4, 7, 15, 16, 18,
non-intuition 22nf, 28, 29, 31, 33, 39n, 41, 52, 52n,
intuitionism, 14, 76, 83, 84 56, 67, 69, 70, 74, 83, 84, 85, 86; unlim
invisible, 10, 21, 61, 62, 76 ited, 65
Irizarry, Christine, 91n5 line, 75
irreell {see xxix #4), 5. See also ideal; non- listen, 30, 32
reell; real; reell literality, 88
iteration, xix, xxii, xxiii, 64 literature, 49
livecl-experience (vécu, Erlebnis) ,xx, 10,
Johnson, Barbara, 93n l5 11,13, 17, 19, 25, 25n, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37n, 38, 38n, 40, 50, 51,
Kamuf, Peggy, 92nn6-7 51 n, 52, 57n, 58, 59, 71, 72n, 73, 74n,
Kant, Immanuel, xiv, 7, 8, 39, 71, 86, 87 76. See also experience
keep {garder), xxiv, 4, 12, 13, 25n, 29, 47, logic, xiii, xiv, xix, 3, 6, 7, 8, 23n, 61, 78,
60, 81, 82 85, 105n3
Kelkel, Arion L , 96n4 logicity, 7, 16, 2 1 ,6 1 ,6 2 , 66
Kersten, Fred, xxix, xxix, 38n, 51 n, logos, xxvi, 7, 13, 14, 17, 59, 63nj~, 85, 87,
52n, 57n, 74n, 97n l9, 98nn5-6, 88; verbum, legein, 64
100n3, 101nl6, 102nn5-8, 103nn6-7, look (regard), xvi, xxv, xxxiv, 46, 64, 65,
106nn17-20 67, 89, 106n20
knowledge, xiv, xxvi; absolute, 88; con
naissance, 4, 5, 7, 24, 52, 62, 76, 83, m aintenance, maintain, 11, 13, 43, 57,
84, 85; savoir; 4, 46, 83, 85, 87; self- 70, 85
knowledge, xxvii manifestation (w xxxiii#15), xiii, xviii, xx,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 50, 57, 62n, 63
labyrinth, 89 Massumi, Brian, 91n6
Lacan, Jacques, xxxi mastery, xv, xxviii, 8, 65, 67, 69, 88
lack, xviii, xxvii, 62n, 74, 75, 83; miss mathematics, 80
ing, 76 matter, 6, 53. See also content
language, xi, xiv, xviii, xix, xxii, 3, 4, 7, 8, McLaughlin, Kathleen, 91n4
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, M cLeod, Ian, 95n27
22n:i:, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 39n, m eaning (vouloir-dire, Bedeutungen; see
42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 58, 59, 60, xxxi #11), xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xviii, xxiv,
61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 72, 75, 78, 79, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, 3nj~, 7, 8, 16, 16n, 17,
85, 86, 93n l4, 93nl6, 104n6; classical 19, 23, 23n, 26, 27, 28, 32, 36, 37n, 41,
theories of, 77; freedom of, xxvii, 60, 61, 61n, 69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81n,
76, 83 82, 83, 85, 93nl4, 93nl6, 97n l, 98n3,
Laplanche, Jean, xxx-xxxi lOOnl, 106nl4. See also signification
Leavey,John P., 91 n5, 95n27, 95n30, mechanical, 52
95n2 mediation, xxiii, xxv, xxvi, 13, 18, 31, 32,
Leibniz, Gottfried, 69n 33, 37, 55, 59, 62, 62n
letter, 69, 70 meditation, 7, 13, 14, 22, 53
Levinas, Emmanuel, 96n8 medium, xxi, xxii, xxvii, 9, 38, 64, 65, 67,
life, xv, xviii, xxiii, xxxiii, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 68, 69. See also element; milieu
19, 20, 22, 26, 27, 34, 35, 36, 41, 46, 48, memory, xx, xxi, xxiv, 38n, 47, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 60, 67, 70, 73, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 57n, 58n:i:, 88
100n2. See also lived-experience (vécu, metaphor, 7, 9, 10, 12, 52, 72, 72n, 73,
Erlebnis) 88, 105n5
INDEX
metaphysics, xi, xii, xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, Nancy, Jean-Luc, 91n5, 94n21
xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, 4, nature, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 23, 27, 31, 34,
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 21, 22nf, 23, 28, 29, 39, 39n, 59, 67, 73, 74, 80, 82
31, 38n, 43, 44,4 6 , 52, 53, 54, 65, 66, nearby, xvi, 27, 87
69, 70, 72n, 73, 85, 88, 92n l3, 93n l5, necessity, xii, xiii, xvii, xix, xx, xxiii, xxvii,
93nl6, 94n22, 104n6; degenerate 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25,
metaphysics, xvi, xxv, 5; metaphysics 25n, 43, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60,
of presence, xi, xii, xiv, xv, xvi, xxv, 9, 61, 66, 67, 70, 74, 78, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88.
22, 22, 44, 53, 63nf, 72n, 87, 94n24; See also essence; non-necessity
voluntaristic metaphysics, xv, 29. See negation, 87
also beyoncl (au-delà, par-delà, déborder); nerve, 34, 41; nervus demonstrandi, 55
outside (hors de, dehors) ; philosophy; new, 53, 72, 73, 74n, 82, 88
presence; value noema, 3, 5, 8, 16, 17, 27, 39, 40, 40n, 64
method, xix, 26, 47, 74 noesis, 17, 27, 40
milieu, xx, 11, 31, 55, 71. See also ele non-actual, 24
ment; meclium non-actuality, 58
mirror, 27, 67, 104n5. See also reflection non-alterity, 50
modification, xi, xiv, xvii, xix, xxi, 6, 8, non-being, 45nj~
17, 21, 35, 38n, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, non-cognitive, 62
52, 55, 56, 72n, 81, 88 non-coinciclence, 77
monacl, 11, 33, 34, 59 non-consciousness, 49, 53, 75
m onologue, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxv, non-cliaphaneity, 32
35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 50, 60, 66, 97n30 non-clerivative, 44
monstration (Zeigen), 36, 61, 62, 64, 99n4 non-clifference, 50
Moran, Dermot, xxx, 96n4, 108 non-cliscursive, 17, 31, 62, 85
morphê, 40 non-empirical, 6, 65
morphology, 3, 7, 8, 76, 78, 84 non-eviclence, xxi, 24, 25, 26, 56
motivation, xii, xv, xxiv, xxvii, xxxiii, 24, non-existence, 37, 38, 45, 4 5n f, 74
25, 36, 37n non-expressivity, 16, 30, 31, 32; in«
motive (motif; w x x x iii #17), xxvii, xxvii, expressive, 34
5, 14, 22, 33, 54, 63nf, 70, 83 non-exteriority, 69
movement, xii, xvii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, non-founclation, 6
5, 6, 8, 19, 20, 21, 22, 22nf, 23, 24, 31, non-fulfillment, 37n, 75
33, 38, 44, 46, 46n, 47, 58, 59, 64, 67, non-fullness, xvi, 75, 76
69, 70, 71, 72, 72n, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, non-grammaticality, 86
82, 83, 87, 93n 17 non-icleality, 85, 86
m undanity, 5 ,9 , 10, 11, 26, 29, 31, non-iclentity, 58, 59, 71
35,36, 46, 64, 65, 68, 97nl7; non-intuition, 79, 82
intra-munclane-sonority, 66. See also non-knowleclge (non^savoir), 83, 88
non-munclanity; world non-language, 30
murmur, xxii, 30 non-linguistic, 3 0 ,8 6
myth, 52 non-literary, 85
non-logical, 62
Naas, Michael, 93nl8 non-munclanity, 5, 65
naïveté, 4 ,1 3 , 14, 22, 38n non-necessity, 26
name, xii, xiii, xvii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, non-now, xxi, 53, 73
5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 34, 37n, 39n, 44, 45, 49n, non-objectivity, 86
50, 54, 62, 62n, 65, 66, 72n, 73, 79, 82, noivoriginarity, 6, 57
89, 94n22, 95n27; old, 88. See also ano non-perception, xxi, 55, 56, 57, 79
nymity; unnameable non-phonetic, 65, 69n
INDEX
non-presence, xvi, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxv, 55, 56, 57, 57n, 58, 59, 6 3 ,7 0 , 71, 72,
xxvi, xxviii, 6, 13, 31, 34, 35, 53, 55, 56, 72n, 73, 74, 75, 88, 89
57, 70, 95n29 other, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 10, 12, 13, 19, 31,
non-proper, xxii, 67, 73 32, 33, 34, 43, 44, 48, 56, 59, 60, 72n,
non-reality, 5, 8, 40n, 45, 45nf 73, 76, 8 1, 84, 88; alter ego, 6, 59, 60. See
non-reell, 39, 40. See also icleal; real; also alterity
reell outside (hors cle, dehors), xii, xvi, xvii, xxvi,
non-self-belonging, 6 4, 12, 19, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 39n,
non-self-iclentity, 73 49n, 60, 64, 65, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 87,
non-self-presence, 31, 74 89, 92n6. See cdso beyond (au-delà, par-
nonsense, non-sense, 61, 78, 85 delà, déborder) ; metaphysics
non-sign, 51, 86 ownness (i^^xxxii #13), xv, xxii, xxiii;
non-theoretical, 62 Eigenheit, 19, 34, 59
non-will, 73 — my own, 33; Eigenheit, 46
normalcy, 7, 67, 78, 80, 83, 84, 89; abnor
mal, 82 paleonym, xii, 94n22
nothing, xiv, xvii, xviii, xix, 8, 10, 11, 12, paradox, xxiv, 11, 19, 44, 45, 62, 69
15, 30, 34, 35, 41, 42, 50, 51, 56, 59, 60, parallelism, 9, 11, 12, 26
61, 63, 65, 71, 72, 87, 88, 89, 98nl passage, 6, 9, 24, 56, 64, 70
novelty, 47, 70, 71, 73 passivity, 29, 73
now, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80; Patton, Paul, 94n26
mine, 24, 25, 65; stigmë, 52 Peirce, Charles Sanders, 105n3
perception, xiv, xvii, xix, xxi, xxvi, 33, 34,
object, xiv, xv, xvii, xxi, xxvi, xxvii, 5, 6, 8, 37, 38, 38n, 39, 43, 47, 48, 50, 51, 5 In,
10, 13, 16, 19, 23, 24, 25, 38, 39n, 40, 55, 56, 57n, 62, 79, 79n, 81, 82, 85, 88,
45, 45nf, 47, 51n, 53, 54, 55, 61, 62, 89, 101n2
64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 72n, 74, permanence, xxv, 45
76, 77, 78, 79, 79n, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, Pfeiffer, Gabrielle, 96n8
86, 87, 93nl7, 94n25 phantasm, 13
objectivity, xxvi, xxvii, 6, 11, 19, 22, 25, phenomenality, 38, 62, 65, 67
25n, 27, 48, 54, 60, 62n, 64, 65, 68, phenomenology, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xx, xxiii,
72n, 77, 78n, 80, 85, 86 xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxxi, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
objectivity, icleal, 6, 22, 25 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 22, 23, 25n,
occasional, 60, 80, 86 26, 29, 31, 37, 38, 38n, 41, 42n, 45nf,
olcler, 58, 88 46, 48, 52, 53, 57, 57n, 64, 66, 85, 89
omnitemporality, 71 phenomenon, xxvi, 11, 17, 23, 38, 62, 65,
ontology, xxx, 21,22, 22nf 67, 68, 69, 77, 89, 94n25, 99n4
openness, 46, 49η, 58, 72, 73, 74, 80, 88 philosophy, xii, xiv, xv, xxvi, 12, 14,
opposition, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi, xvii, xxvii, 22, 29, 45, 49, 52, 63, 65, 66, 87, 88,
3nf, 6, 13, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 36, 53, 94n26; philosophia protë, 5; philo
66, 72n, 87, 92n9, 95n27, 101n2 sophical gesture, 85; philosophical
origin, xvii, xxviii, 5, 7, 12, 25n, 44, 45, language, 15; philosophical question,
47, 55, 59, 68, 70, 71, 73, 81, 84, 86, 88. 11; philosophical tradition, 76, 81; the
See also beginning (commencement, début, philosophy, 44; philosophy o f life, 9;
entrée); source philosophy o f presence, 53
originality, 18, 23, 38n, 40, 44, 61, 67, 71, phonation, 64-65
76, 78, 79, 83 phone. See voice
original ity, xxi, 56, 57, 57n, 58, 69 phoneme, xix, 39n, 43, 66, 67; akou-
originary, xxi, xxxiv, 4, 32, 33, 34, 37n, menon, 89
38n, 45, 46, 47, 49, 49n, 51, 52, 52n, phonetics, xv, 23n, 64, 69, 69n
INDEX
phonologism, 69 problem, xiii, xix, 3, 8, 16, 18, 22, 22nf,

phonology, 64 23n, 25, 37; 40, 56, 57n, 58, 58n:i:, 62n,
physical, 14, 18, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 63nj\ 69n, 9 3n l4
39n, 77 promise, 84, 85, 89, 93n l7
physiology, 64 proper {propre), xxiii, xxxii, 23n, 33, 36,
Plato, xxiii, xxvi, 45, 93nl5, 95n27 59, 62n, 68, 70, 72n, 82, 93nl6. See also
Platonism, xvi, xxv, 45 own ness; propriety
play, xviii, 9, 35, 52, 53, 66, 70, 76, 86, proposition, xi, xv, xvii, 38n, 39n, 46,
104n6 46n, 49n, 60, 62, 63, 62n, 78, 79, 84,
Poe, Eclgar Allan, 83, 105nl2 85, 86
poetry, 85 propriety, 33, 93nl6. See also ownness;
point, 46, 51, 52, 71, 72n, 81 proper {propre)
pointing, xvii, 20, 25, 61, 93n l4, 99n4 protention, xx, xxiii, 55, 56, 57, 57n
Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand, xxx-xxxi provisional, xvi, 25n, 28, 61, 62, 71, 83.
possibility, xv, xx, xxii, xxxiii, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, See also vision
9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, proximity, xv, xxi, xxii, xxv, xxvii, 8, 46,
32, 35, 38n, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 51n, 50, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 85, 93n l6
55, 56, 58, 58n:i:, 59, 60, 61, 65, 67, 68, psyche, 9, 11, 12, 34
69, 70, 71, 75, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, psychic, psychical, xx, 8, 9, 10, 11, 25,
87, 104n6 25n, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 38n,
potency {puissance), xv, xxvi, 43, 65, 76 40, 41, 50
potentiality {potentialité), xvi, xxv, 53 psychologism, 11, 12
power {pouvoir), 26, 45, 47, 65, 68, 69, 74 psychology, xxxi, 4, 10, 12, 25n, 54n:i:;
presence, xi, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xx, xxi, classical, naive, 38n; of imagination,
xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, xxxiii, 38; phenomenological, 9, 11
xxxiv, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 22, punctuality, 52, 53
23, 29, 33, 34, 38n, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, purity, xv, xviii, xxii, xxv, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,
49n, 50, 51, 51n, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23n, 25n,
63nf, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72n, 74, 26, 28, 29, 32, 34, 35, 38n, 41, 42, 43,
75, 76, 78, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 56, 57n, 58, 59, 61,
93n l4, 93nl7, 94n24, 95n29, See also 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 72n,
substance 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85,
present, xiii, xiv, xvii, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 86, 94n22
xxiv, xxv, xxvi, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 19, 31,
32, 33, 34, 37, 41, 44, 46, 50, 51, 51n, question, xiv, xv, xix, xx, xxv, xxvii, xxviii,
52, 53, 54, 54n:i:, 55, 58, 58n f, 59, 62, xxxiv, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 20,
63, 63nf, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72n, 73, 74, 21, 22nf, 25n, 26, 31, 41, 43, 51n, 55,
76, 77, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 95n29, 101n2 60, 63nj\ 75, 93n l7, 105nl2; ti esti, 22;
present, living, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxv, 5, 6, 8, unheard-of, 88
9, 31, 46, 50, 59, 73, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88 Quin ta nee, Mary, 92n8
presentation {Gegenwcirtigung), xviii, xx,
xxi, 6, 33, 38n, 42, 44, 47, 5 In, 55, 56, radical, xxi, xxiv, xxvi, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 20,
57n, 88, 89, 101n2 37, 46, 51n, 55, 56, 63nj\ 66, 72n, 74,
presentification {Vergegenwcirtigung), 38n, 7 9 ,8 1 ,8 3 , 87
47, 101n2 rationality, 7, 84
pre-understanding, 20, 21, 22nj~ reading, 3, 3η |, 16, 18, 20, 22nf, 28, 75, 83
principle {see xxxiii #18), xv, xxvii, 23, 29, real, xxix, 11, 19, 27, 36, 38, 39, 39n, 44,
42, 46, 56, 63, 68, 79, 80, 87, 93nl5; 45nt, 48, 62, 71, 76, 80, 81, 96n9. See
principium,, 52, 57; principle of all prin also ideal; irreell; non-reell; reell
ciples, 4, 46, 51, 52n realism, 19
INDEX
reality, xviii, 12, 18, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, right (droit; see xxxiii #18), 16, 18, 21, 26,
52, 82, 87, 99n2 30, 69, 98n2. See also principle
reason, 25, 50, 78, 79, 85, 86 Rimbaucl, Arthur, 97n l6
reduction, xv, xxii, xxvi, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, Ronnell, Avital, 94
13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, root, xxi, xxvi, 8, 9, 10, 13, 21, 32, 57, 58,
34, 35, 36, 38, 43, 47, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 70, 71, 73, 81, 99n4; uprooted, 59. See
66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72n, 74, 76, 77, 80, also radical
85, 88; irreducible, 6, 14, 16, 21, 23, Rosenfeld, Michael, 92n8
31, 32, 33, 37, 45, 51n, 52, 55, 56, 58, Rottenberg, Elizabeth, 92n7, 95n27
63, 63n |, 64, 84 Royle, Nicholas, 92n8
reell (see xxix #4), 5, 8, 39, 40, 96n9. See
also ideal; irreell; non-reell; real Sallis, Jo h n , 95n30
referral {renvoi), 13, 20, 36, 72η salvation, 8, 93nl7; salutary threats, 70;
reflection, xiv, 6, 10, 27, 37n, 49, 50, 57n, save, 43, 57
58, 58n:i:, 64, 67, 69, 69n, 75, 104n5. See same, xiv, xvi, xxiii, 8, 17, 35, 43, 44, 45,
also mirror; repetition; return 46, 51, 58, 59, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 81,
relation, xii, xiv, xv, xxi, xxvi, xxxiii, 6, 7, 104n6
8, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 22nf, 23, 24, 25, Saussure, Ferdinand cle, xxix #3, 39, 39n,
26, 27, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 44, 46, 46n, 40, 65, 101 n 18
49, 49n, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 63n f, scene (scène; see xxxiv #25), 8, 74, 88, 89;
64, 66, 68, 72n, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, archi-scene, 72n
81,83, 84, 85, 87, 93n l6 schema, xiv, xv, 25, 44, 72n, 87, 94n24
religion, xxvii, 88 Schérer, René, 96n4
repetition, xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, science, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, 45, 64, 68, 80,
xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, 5, 6, 94n l9
8, 13, 25n, 27, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, security, xv, xvi, xviii, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14,
48, 49, 58, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 76, 80, 23, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 54, 70, 89;
85, 88, 104n6. See also reflection; return re-secure, 12. See also insecurity
representation (Vergegenwärtigung; see seeing, 66. See also vision
xxxiii #20), xviii, xix, xx, xxiii, xxxvi, self:consciousness, 13, 53
6, 38n, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49n, 55, 72n, self-identity, xxi, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 72n,
77, 88, 89, 94n21, 101n2; Representa 79n, 85. See also non-self-iclentity
tion (Vorstellung), xviii, xxi, 36, 37, 38, self-objectivation, 10-11
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 53, 56, 101n2 self-presence, xiv, xviii, xx, xxv, 6, 8, 13,
representation, re-presentation, xi, xv, 26, 29, 34, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 65, 70, 71,
xvii, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, xxv, xxvi, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 85, 93nl4;
xxxiii, 34, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, 49n, [mrousia, 87. See also non-self-presence
50, 51n, 57, 57n, 58, 58n:i:, 80, 81, 81n, self-proximity, 19
82, 89, 101n2 self-relation, xxi, xxxi, 12, 31, 36, 57, 59,
representivity, 48, 49 66, 71, 73. See also auto-affection
repression, 20, 70, 88 sense (sens, Sinn; w x x x i i # l l ) , xxi, xxii,
resistance, 6, 30, 64 xxiii, xxv, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20,
retention, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 6, 53, 54, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35,
55, 56, 57, 57n, 58, 72n, 73 36, 37n, 38, 39, 39n, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46,
return, xv, 8, 22, 58, 80. See also reflec 51, 52n, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63,
tion; repetition 64, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78,
reversal, xii, xiii, xvii, xviii, xxvi, 18, 22, 78n, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 98n5, 105n3
22nj~, 44, 58, 72n, 83; irreversible, 42 — Sinnlos, 7, 15, 46n; Sinnlosigkeit, 78
Ricoeur, Paul, 97nl9, 98n5, 100n3, — Sinnvoll, 77, 81, 84
1 0 6n l7,106n n 19-20 — Unsinn, 78, 85; unsinnigke.it, 61
INDEX
sign, xiv, xv, xvii, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, spirituality, 9, 14, 16, 19, 29, 32, 67, 70,
xxiv, xxxiv, 3, 4, 6, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 74n; Geistige, Geistigkeit, 9, 14, 28, 29, 70
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, Spivak, Gay atri, 91 n 2
34, 35, 36, 37, 37n, 38, 38n, 39n, 40n, spontaneity, 72
42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 51n, 57, statement, 22, 49, 52, 63, 69, 79, 79n, 80,
61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 72n, 75, 76, 79, 84, 81, 82, 83
86, 87, 89, 93nl4, 93n l5, 97n l, lOOnl; structure, xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xviii, xxiv, xxvii,
semiologist, 49; old, 88 3, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 24, 39n, 40, 42, 43,
signification (see xxxi #11), xxx, 3, 9, 10, 44, 48, 49, 51n, 53, 54, 60, 67, 68, 69,
11, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 36, 72n, 75, 76, 78, 79, 82, 86, 95n29
43, 46, 49, 51, 59, 61, 62, 64, 66, 68, 71, subject, xiv, xvii, xviii, xx, xxi, xxii, xxv,
73, 75, 76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 9 6 n ll, 98n5. 8, 16, 28, 32, 36, 41, 42, 46, 48, 49, 50,
See also m eaning (vouloir-dire, Bedeutun 60, 61, 62, 62n, 65, 67, 71, 72n, 79, 80,
gen); sense (sens, Sinn) 82, 85, 86
signifi ed, xxii, 14, 15, 34, 36, 37, 39n, 43, subjectivism, 19
44, 45, 66, 67, 69, 75, 76 subjectivity, xiv, 25n, 36, 65, 68, 72n, 74
signifier, xxii, 15, 34, 35, 36, 39, 39n, 40, substance, xiv, xxii, xxv, 9, 14, 66, 68; oit-
42, 43, 44, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, sia, hypokeimenori, 72n. See also presence
76, 98n5 substitution, 20, 75, 80, 85, 86
silence, xxi, xxii, 13, 23n, 36, 39n, 50, succession, 56, 75
59, 60 supervene, xiv, xv, xvii, 6, 38n, 44, 46,
simplicity, xvii, xviii, 19, 22, 33, 35, 37, 49n, 59, 71
38n, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, 49n, 50, 52, 54, supplement, xvii, xxiv, 12, 74, 75, 76, 81,
56, 57n, 58, 60, 63, 73, 75, 77, 78n, 88 88, 89
simulation, 13 supplementarity, xi, xiii, xiv, xvii, xxiii,
Smith, Joseph F., 96n7 xxiv, xxvi, 75
solitude, xxxi, 35, 36, 59 symbol, 57, 70, 83
something, xiii, xvii, xviii, xix, xxii, xxiv, system, xi, xv, xvii, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, 3n f, 4,
xxix, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 31, 35, 7, 13, 17, 18, 26, 33, 38n, 40, 42, 44, 51,
39n, 41, 49, 53, 55, 56, 57n, 62, 63, 70, 52, 53, 64, 67, 85, 86, 88
72, 72n, 77, 81, 94n22, 98nl
soul (ârne, Seele; see xxxiii #16), xviii, 9, 10, technical, xv; techne, 65
11, 12, 19, 20, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 41, 48, teleology, 20, 62, 67, 69, 86
59, 67, 70 telos, xvi, xxv, 7, 8, 30, 37n, 64, 67, 83, 84.
sound, xv, xxi, xxii, 32, 33, 38, 39n, 40, See also encl (fin); entelechy; impera
66, 68, 105nl2 tive; value
source, xxviii, 4 ,9 , 12, 52nf, 57, 71; temporalization, xx, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv,
source-point, 46, 52, 53, 71, 72n. See xxvi, 6, 31, 44, 59, 71, 72, 72n, 73, 74,
also beginning (commencement, début, 87. See cdso present; time
entrée) ; origin Teniers, David, xxxii #14, 89
space, xxii, 6, 18, 34, 62, 67, 68, 70, testimony, 82
73, 79 text, 79
spacing, 72n, 73 theory, 3nf, 4, 7, 10, 22, 36, 45, 48, 49,
spatiality, 29, 62, 64 52n, 53, 76, 77, 77n, 80, 86; theorem, 61
species, 18, 19, 20 thing, xiii, xix, xxiii, 9, 13, 22, 33, 38,
speculation, 4, 5, 59 39n, 5 In, 57, 62n, 63, 88, 89, 98n l;
speech, xix, xxiv, 9, 13, 18, 21, 26, 27, 28, Sache, 21
29, 31, 32, 41, 49, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74, Thom as o f Erfurt, 77, 105n3
76, 80, 83 thought, xiv, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, 21,
spirit, 5, 34, 65, 104n6; Geist, 29 24, 30, 31, 33, 40, 45, 46n, 52, 53, 56,
I NDEX
58, 63, 70, 72η, 74, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 82, 83, 86, 93nl4, 93nl6. See also axiol
101n2 ogy; axiopoetic; imperative; telos
time, xix, xx, xxii, xxv, 51, 52, 53, 59, 62, verb, 62, 63, 64; adverb, 80. See also logos
64, 66, 71, 72n, 73, 74, 75, 79. See also verbality, 21, 64
present; temporalization vigilance, 4, 14, 21
Tomlinson, Hugh, 92n6 visibility, 2 9 ,3 3 , 61, 62, 67
touch, 68, 88 vision, 8 3 ,8 8 . See also provisional; seeing
trace, xi, xiii, xiv, xvii, xxiii, xxiv, xxv, vocation, 88
xxvi, 58, 73, 88, 103nl3 voice, xv, xxi, xxii, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, 13, 14,
tradition, xxvi, 7, 12, 15, 21, 22, 29, 45, 19, 28, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71,
47, 53, 69, 70, 75, 76, 81, 85. See also 88, 89, 94n25, 105nl2; Phonê, 9, 13, 14,
heritage; history 63, 63nf, 64, 65, 66, 68, 89, 104n6
transcendence, xxvii, xxix, 66 voluntarism, xv, xxxii, 29, lOOnl
transcendental, xii, xxiii, xxvi, xxix, xxxi, voluntary, 28, 29, 30; involuntary, 29, 30
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 25, 25n, vouloir-dire. See meaning (vouloir-dire,
26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 38, 38n, 40, 46, 59, Bedeutungen)
71, 74, 81, 84, 85, 94n22, 94n26
transcenclentality, 9, 11, 26, 68 waiting, 84. See also coming (à venir)
translation, 15, 63 war, 12
truth, xii, xvi, xxiv, xxvii, xxviii, 11, 21, west, the, 44; Western, xiv, xv, xvii,
22, 22nf, 25, 26, 34, 36, 46n, 49, 52n, 93nl5
53, 58, 66, 69, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 95n29, will, xv, xviii, xxxii, 29, 34, 44, 7 3 ,93nl7,
106nl4 106nl4
Wills, Davicl, 92n9
ultra-transcenclental, xii, xxiii, xxvi, Wood, Davicl, 92n7
xxvii, 13 word, xvi, xxii, xxvi, xxviii, 3, 4, 6, 14, 15,
unconscious, 30, 53, 54, 54nf 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 32, 35, 36, 37,
uncleciclability, xxvii, xxviii, 95n31 37n, 38, 39, 39n, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45nf,
understanding, 20, 21, 22, 28, 34, 35, 78 48, 49n, 50, 59, 62n, 63, 63nf, 64, 65,
unity, 5, 7, 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 22nf, 24, 27, 67, 69, 70, 73, 78, 80, 81, 8 In, 82, 86
29, 31, 35, 48, 49, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, world, xvi, xxii, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 19,
68, 78, 78n, 79, 80, 88 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38, 45,
universality, xxi, xxii, 8, 46, 58, 62n, 64, 45nt, 46, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 74, 94n22.
65, 67, 68 See also mund anity
univocity, xv, 45, 80, 86 writer, 79
unnameable, xxiii, xxvii, 66, 72n. See also writing, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, xvii, xxiii, xxiv,
name xxvi, 21, 23n, 69, 69n, 70, 74, 79,
80, 82, 83, 88, 93nl6, 9 9 n ll; Archi-
validity, xx, 7, 18, 22, 55, 57, 57n Writing, xxiv, 73
value, xii, xiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, 4, 6,
8, 15, 18, 25n, 31, 38n, 39, 46, 62, 66, Zeigen. See monstration (Zeigen)

Jacques Derrida Voice and Phenomenon Introduction To The Problem of The Sign in Husserls Phenomenology

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Jacques Derrida Voice and Phenomenon Introduction To The Problem of The Sign in Husserls Phenomenology

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VOICE AND PHENOMENON

Translated from the French by Leonard Lawlor

Northwestern University Press

Copyright © 2011 by Northwestern University Press. Published 2011. All rights

Printed in the U nited States o f A m erica

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

© T h e p ap e r u sed in this publication m eets the m inim um requirem ents o f the

Translator's Introduction: The Germinal Structure of Derrida's Thought xi

Translator's Note xxix

1 Sign and Signs 15

2 The Reduction of Indication 23

4 Meaning and Representation 41

5 The Sign and the Blink of an Eye 51

6 The Voice That Keeps Silent 60

7 The Originative Supplement 75

While what I have p ro d u ced counts as a new translation o f D errid a’s

to open the enclosure o f m etaphysics. T h erefore, third, like so m uch

First Structural Feature: The

D errida develops the new concepts o f difference, trace (or writ­

voluntarism, “voluntaristic m etaphysics,” is at issue (29). The fulfillm ent

in particular and in decon struction in gen eral. But before we turn to

Second Structural Feature: The Basic

In internal discourse, I com m unicate n othing to myself. I indicate noth­

In internal discourse, I com m u nicate nothing to m yself ancl I can only

because it would m ake no sense. Ancl it would m ake no sense because it

A ccording to H usserl, since lived-experience seem s to be im m ediately

in §16 calls retention a “non-perception,” D errida argues that there m ust

Within the duration, there is an alterity, a heterogeneity between p ercep­

through my m outh. Although I do not m ake sounds through my m outh

(chapter 6 )— operate on the local terrain o f H u sserl’s phenom enology.

Third Structural Feature (and Conclusion):

The deconstruction enacted in Voice and Phenomenon takes place on four

exclusion, and exteriority. H e believes that he finds pure expression in

ideality, objectivity, intuition, perception, and expression, ph en om en ol­

presence. Not oriented by the value o f presence, this m atrix or terrain,

a d iscourse”). In other words, in the face o f the recognition that there

1 The n um bers in an gle brackets < > co rresp o n d to the p ag e n um ­

“really inh erent” ancl “irreelle” as “really non-inherent.” In ord er

la représen tation .” However, it is im portant to keep in mincl that Der­

15 . Fincllay renders “k un d geb en d e Fun ktion ” as “intim ating fun ction .” I

A nam e uttered in fron t o f us m akes us think o f the D resden

I have spoken both of “so u n d ” ancl “voice.” I m ean to say that

< l> T h e Logical Investigations (1900-1901) op en ed a path down which, as

From what question shall we receive and read this distinction,

physics provides. Better, what would be at issue will be to begin to verify

m etaphysical, if it is true th at ultim ate knowledge o f b ein g sh o u ld be

O ne would be able to bring to light the single an d perm an en t motive

* Jacq u e s Derricla, “La phénom énologie et la clôture cle la métaphysique,” in ΕΠΟΧΕΣ,

ideality o f ideality is the living present, the self:presence o f transcendental

Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §45.

objectivation (Selbstobjektivierung) o f the m onad by and in itself."'18 There

* Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §57.

w hether the relation is p ro d u ced or not in the form o f consciousness.

This “difficulty” structures H u sserl’s whole discourse, and we m ust

Bedeutung— has an irreducible link to the possibility o f spoken discourse

We b egin with the fam iliar distinction between the sensuous, so to

[bedeuten] ancl “B e d e u tu n g .” Originally, these words concern ed only the

After having asserted, in a passage to which we shall have to return, that

the Bedeutung is gripped within a com m unicative discourse. O f course, as

I f o n e limits on eself to expression s em ployed in living colloquy, a s one

narrow er application only because m eaning [bedeuten]— in com m unica­

In order to dem onstrate the rupture o f the species-genus relation,

:i: First Logical Investigation, §1.

D errida develops the new concepts o f difference, trace (or writ

In internal discourse, I com m unicate n othing to myself. I indicate noth

Within the duration, there is an alterity, a heterogeneity between p ercep

ideality, objectivity, intuition, perception, and expression, ph en om en ol

1 The n um bers in an gle brackets < > co rresp o n d to the p ag e n um

la représen tation .” However, it is im portant to keep in mincl that Der

narrow er application only because m eaning [bedeuten]— in com m unica

eign to expressivity as such, to this pure intention without which no dis

T he notion o f presence is the nerve o f this dem onstration. If com m u

p h en om en on o f the word? It is because in the ph en om enon o f percep

Insofar as it is the intentional sense <50> or noem a, and although it be

tion or originary presentation (Gegenwärtigung, Präsentation) ancl re-presentation or rep

language, “I am the one who is” is the confession o f a mortal. T he move

<67> T he sharp point o f the instant, the identity o f lived-experience pres

It is a genuine absurdity to speak o f an “u n con scious” conten t that be

If we com pare now the constituting p h en om en a to these constituted uni

affection without the aid o f any exteriority. This possibility of reproduc

the possibility that I be d e ad — and the reverse. This is not an extraordi

1. The established French translation o f Husser l’s “B e d e u tu n g” is “signifi

“L a ph én om én o lo gie et la clôture cle la m étaphysique.” In ΕΠΟΧΕΣ, Athens, Feb