Street Law Case Summary

Gratz v. Bollinger & Grutter v. Bollinger

Argued: April 1, 2003
Decided: June 23, 2003

Background
Despite the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Bakke, the constitutional viability of affirmative action
seemed increasingly under attack by the late 1990s and was directly challenged by the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Hopwood v. Texas striking down an admissions policy that gave preference to Black and
Mexican American applicants. Rather than granting certiorari in the Hopwood case, the Court saw the
opportunity to define the parameters of the future of affirmative action with two cases that
challenged the undergraduate and law school admission policies at the University of Michigan.
Jennifer Gratz, a white suburban resident of Michigan considered to be within the range of qualified
students, was rejected from the undergraduate program at the prestigious Ann Arbor campus. She
believed that the undergraduate admissions process, a system that assigned points for applicant’s
various qualifications, unfairly disadvantaged her because she was white. The system automatically
awarded 20 points (of the 100 required for guaranteed admission) to students from
underrepresented minorities (Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans) as well as scholarship athletes
and students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Other point assignments included six
points for geographic diversity and three points for an outstanding admissions essay.
Barbara Grutter was a 49-year-old white mother of two who ran her own consulting firm. She was
rejected from the university’s elite law school, and she believed the law school’s admission process,
which looked at applicant’s on an individual basis but admittedly considered the benefits of racial
diversity in assembling its classes, unfairly disadvantaged her.

Decisions
The Court issued separated opinions for each case. Taken together, they reaffirmed the importance
of diversity and the role of affirmative action in achieving it so long as candidates are viewed as
individuals and rigid quota-like systems that mechanically award advantages to all minorities are not
used. Therefore, the law school admissions policy was upheld, while the undergraduate process was
found to be unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice O’Connor, the swing vote in the 5-4 decision in the law school admission process, delivered
the majority opinion holding the Constitution “does not prohibit the law school’s narrowly tailored
use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body.” This endorsed the central holding in Bakke that
diversity is an important state interest that permits some race-conscious approaches to assessing
applicant pools in order to achieve a “critical mass” (but not a quota) of underrepresented
minorities. She stressed the flexibility of the law school's admission policy and individualized
assessment of each applicant. Justice O’Connor did not focus on affirmative action as reparation for
past injustice against minorities. Instead her reasoning was more future-oriented, recognizing the
role of universities in educating tomorrow's leaders and the importance of a diverse work force. She
also expressed her hope that racial preferencing to achieve diversity need only be used for another
25 years. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the decision to uphold the law school
policy.

© 2003 Street Law, Inc. 1

 Gratz v. Bollinger

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissented. Justice Thomas
criticized the majority opinion as suggesting that “classroom aesthetics yield educational benefits”
and the law school's failure to find a race-neutral policy that could achieve similar diversity. The
dissenters also suggested that the schools should have to choose between selectivity and diversity,
rather than using a race-conscious process to achieve the twin goals.
The Court ruled 6-3 that the automatic point system used in the undergraduate admissions process
was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas wrote the majority opinion that objected to the undergraduate program’s failure to consider
applicants on an individual basis as required by Bakke. The undergraduate program may still use
affirmative action but in a form that is less mechanical and mathematical. Justice Breyer agreed the
procedure was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but did not
join the majority’s reasoning.
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Ginsburg argued that a system of automatic
points in achieving diversity might be preferable to other methods because it was an honest, open
approach to the role that race plays in the process and is necessary to correct for disparities among
the races created by a legally endorsed racial caste system that persisted in the country for many
years. She feared that less mathematical approaches simply camouflage the use of race as a factor.

© 2003 Street Law, Inc. 2