RULE 128

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 137757, August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of his
neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice
calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known
him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her,
Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right
hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen
which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the
victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded
in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite
Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident
to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough
courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea
to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the
medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge. In his appeal, Turco argues, among others,
that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering
that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same
was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE:

Whether the medical certificate issued by medico-legal officer cannot be admitted as

evidence since he was not presented.
HELD:

No.
In People vs. Bernaldez, the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate
could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued,
it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show
his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility by evidence and the
probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence us determined
by it’s by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, an affair of logic and law. On the other
hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down with the Court. Thus, while
evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which
may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining
physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate stating that there was hymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion as well as “foul-
smelling discharges. The diagnosis was ruptured hymen secondary to rape. In fact, reliance was
made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not
indispensable in the prosecution of rape it is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court
that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient
to convict.
 RULE 129

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA
PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA —
SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ,
LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO
RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA
SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO
BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO
RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN,
LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA —
EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-26053, February 21, 1967

FACTS:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering
Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to
1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They
built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and
without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered were
given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract” to occupy
specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and
Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel
de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
exhibited none. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, which was close, though not contiguous, to the
property had a pressing need to expand. The City Engineer gave the defendands 30 days each to
vacate the premises and to remove the constructions therein. This was followed by the City
Treasurer’s demand on each defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of the
occupancy. The defendants refused, alleging that they have acquired the legal status of tenants by
reason of the written permits issued them.
ISSUE:

Whether the defendants would benefit from the inadmissibility of the certificate as
evidence.

HELD:

No.
The courts in Manila are required to take judicial notice of ordinances by the City of Manila.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00, had been
set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional
building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below,
at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the
trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate
the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.

It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to
make it formable to law and justice. Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the
attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case
solely for this purpose.

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For,
in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken-because he was duty bound to take-judicial
notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting
therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance
4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100, 000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have
absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best
flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty days’ notice. They have been asked to leave; they
refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is
unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical
right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error
is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below.
 RULE 130

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO CAJUMOCAN, appellant.
G.R. No. 155023, May 28, 2004

FACTS:
At 11:30 p.m. of September 30, 1999, while the deceased, Apolinario Mirabueno,
was asleep beside his fourteen year old brother Leo inside their house in Sitio Waray, Barangay
Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal, the latter was roused from his slumber by the rustling of dried leaves
outside the house. He saw a solitary figure walk toward their house, paused outside their room,
and removed the fish net covering the window and looked inside the house. From the light of the
fluorescent lamp inside the house, Leo recognized the man as appellant Cornelio Cajumocan, who
drew a gun and shot Apolinario in the head, and thereafter ran away. Leo cried out to his older
sister, Margarita and they brought Apolinario to a hospital in Morong, but he was declared dead
on arrival.

Appellant was charged with Murder before the RTC of Morong, Rizal. During the
arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de parte pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Ernesto
Carpo, an inspector/investigator of AFSLAI Security Service where appellant was employed as a
security guard was presented by the defense as its first witness. Carpo testified that as inspector,
he was assigned the task of overseeing security detachments. As investigator, his responsibility
was to check unusual incidents and report them directly to the AFSLAI President. He further
testified that appellant was one of the agency’s security guards. According to Carpo, appellant was
assigned at the Monterey Farm in 1999, then he transferred to Tanay, Rizal to the property of Gen.
Rene Cruz, and was assigned a long firearm, specifically a 12-gauge shotgun. In the evening of
September 30, 1999, he made a roving inspection of the detachment in Sitio Bathala, Barangay
Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal, located inside the compound of Gen. Rene Cruz where appellant was
one of the security guards detailed. The head of the security guards stationed in the Cruz property
informed Carpo that appellant was picked up by Tanay police authorities because he was a suspect
in a killing incident. Carpo made inquiries and found out that appellant’s tour of duty was from 7
p.m. to 7 a.m., and concluded that he never left the place as shown by a photocopy of the Detail
Order signed by the head of the security guards stationed in the Cruz property. They told him that
the place where the shooting incident took place was about one kilometer. Carpo inspected the
logbook and saw the signature of the appellant.

For his part, appellant testified that prior to 7 p.m. on September 30, 1999, he arrived at his
assignment in the Cruz property, located in Sitio Bathala, Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal. He went to
their outpost, signed the logbook and stayed up to 8:30 p.m. He then went to the bodega where
construction equipment and materials were kept and, upon seeing that they were secure, he
returned to the outpost and watched television. He asked permission from the head of the security
guards to sleep. At 7 a.m., he signed the logbook to end his tour of duty.While still at the
compound, police officers from Tanay, Rizal came and invited him to the police station. During
the investigation, he denied any participation in the killing of Apolinario. The following day, on
October 1, 1999, he was brought to Camp Crame to undergo paraffin testing. The paraffin test
showed him negative for powder burns.

On January 7, 2002, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of Murder

ISSUE:

Whether the negative findings of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is conclusive
proof of his innocence.

HELD:

No.

Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts
concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. It can only establish
the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test alone cannot determine
whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The presence of nitrates
should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility
that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than
gunpowder.
In the case of People v. Manalo, we stressed:
even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it cannot be definitely concluded
that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as
when the hands are washed before the test

Paraffin tests, it must be emphasized, merely corroborate direct evidence that may be presented by the prosecution.

In the case at bar, the positive, clear and categorical testimony of the lone eyewitness to
the crime deserves full merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of
the paraffin test conducted on the appellant. Verily, establishing the identity of the malefactor
through the testimony of the witness is the heart and cause of the prosecution. All other matters,
such as the paraffin test, are of lesser consequence where there is positive identification by the lone
eyewitness, Leo Mirabueno, of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, a paraffin test
cannot be considered as conclusive proof of appellant’s innocence.