Navia vs.
Pardico (2012)
G.R. No. 184467 | 2012-06-19
Subject: Writ of Amparo applies to the protection of the right to
life, liberty and security; Application of the writ ofamparo in
enforced disappearance cases; For the protective writ
of amparo to issue, the disappearance must be carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; Even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private
individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Facts:
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land
Strategies Corporation arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore
in the Grand Royale Subdivision, Malolos City. The arrival of the
vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and
Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house.
When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed
guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately
asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita
could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben
should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because
a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires
and lamps in the subdivision.
Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale
Subdivision. The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner
Edgardo Navia, also arrived thereat.
According to petitioners, they interviewed Bong and Ben who
admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only
transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. However,
upon learning that the complainant was not keen in participating
in the investigation. Navia ordered the release of Bong and
Ben.Lolita and Bong left the security office. Ben was left behind
as Navia was still talking to him, but was eventually allowed to
leave. Ben, like Bong, was made to sign a statement to the effect
that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury
to him.
Subsequently, Navia et al. received an invitation from the
Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat
relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico about her missing
husband Ben.
The version of respondents offered a different story. They claim
that upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly
grumbled “Ikaw na naman?” and slapped him while he was still
seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a
flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts
of his body. Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and
said, “Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si
Ben. Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone.
However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left
the security office at once leaving Ben behind. The following
morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit
her husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already
released him together with Bong the night before.
It dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took advantage of her poor
eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a
witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact
she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw
Ben was when she left him in petitioners’ custody at the security
office.
Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of
Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the court the issuance of a writ of amparo and the
production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008
The RTC, finding sufficient cause, granted the privilege of the
writ of amparo and ordered the NBI to investigate petitioners
Navia et al in relation to the disappearance of Ben. Motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition. Navia et al. contend that the writ
of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal
bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved
party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear. Virginia
miserably failed to establish all these.
Held:
Writ of Amparo applies to the protection of the right to life,
liberty and security
1. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to
provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.”
2. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights recognizes every human being’s inherent right to life,
while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to
liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law
while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except
on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This
overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and
security without due process of law is also embodied in our
fundamental law.
Application of the writ of amparo in enforced
disappearance cases
3. Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled
as the parties do not dispute his identity as the same person
summoned and questioned at petitioners’ security office on the
night of March 31, 2008. However, the pivotal question is
whether Ben’s disappearance as alleged in Virginia’s petition
and proved during the summary proceedings falls within the
ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws. It does not.
4. While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage,
said Rules does not, however, define extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as the
Committee which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it
to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.
5. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court applied the generally
accepted principles of international law and adopted
theInternational Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition
ofenforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law.
6. Congress later enacted Republic Act No. 9851. Section 3(g)
thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as
follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means
the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
7. Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where it was laid
out that A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced
disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section
3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC in relation to RA No. 9851.
8. From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance,
thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
For the protective writ of amparo to issue, the
disappearance must be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization
9. It is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing
are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the
petitioner in anamparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government
participation.
Even if the person sought to be held accountable or
responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or
entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance
remains an indispensable element.
10. We do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a
menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted
fistic blows upon him. In addition, there is nothing on record
which would support petitioners’ assertion that they released
Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath.
Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing
her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein.
However, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is
not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This
indispensable element of State participation is not present in this
case. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or
that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or accountable
persons.
11. We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity.
But even if the person sought to be held accountable or
responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security
guards at Grand Royale Subdivision and their principal, the
Asian Land, is a private entity.
Castillo vs Cruz (2009)
G.R. No. 182165 | 2009-11-25
Subject: The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data
is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and
security; Writ of Amparo cannot be granted to protect property
rights
Facts:
Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco
G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at
Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos refused to vacate the property,
despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the Spouses Cruz. The MTC rendered judgment against the
Spouses Cruz. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC which
became final and executory.
The spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They sought
in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of
injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory
judgment against them.
The RTC issued a permanent writ of injunction until the MTC-
Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of
petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds.
The Province returned the issue for the consideration of the
MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on
August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were
indicated.
The MTC approved the Report and ruled that the permanent
injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. The MTC issued
a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. Spouses Cruz filed a motion
before the RTC for the issuance of a TRO. The Spouses Cruz
entered the property, placed several container vans and
purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property
which was for lease.
Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum
instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession
of the property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the
property. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction
enjoined the Province from repossessing it.
The Spouses Cruz filed a “Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data.” They averred that despite the
Permanent Injunction, the police officers unlawfully entered the
property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed
wire fences and tents, and arrested them when they resisted.
The RTC issued writs of amparo and habeas data.
Held:
The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security
1. The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty andsecurity.
And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful
acts or omissions.
2. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,”
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.”
3. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are
“attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of law.(See Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo)
4. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, Spouses Cruz
must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a
property dispute between the Provincial Government and
Spouses Cruz.
Writ of Amparo cannot be granted to protect property rights
5. What a writ of amparo is not, is a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Notably, none
of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to
the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent
or continuing. (See Tapuz v. Del Rosario)
6. In this case, Spouses Cruz's petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that police officers “in unison,
conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully,
forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation
entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the Spouses Cruz
and arrested them” will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or
detention was present. In fact, Spouses Cruz were even able to
post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
7. Although Spouses Cruz’s release from confinement does not
necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent
any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is
undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there
exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their
right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ
cannot be justified. That Spouses Cruz’s are merely seeking the
protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint
Affidavit.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906 | 2008-10-07
Subject: Writ of Amparo, Right to Security
Facts:
The resondents initially filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for prohibition, injunction and temporary restraining orders
(TRO) to prevent the petitioners from depriving them of their
right to liberty and other basic rights. They also sought ancillary
remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other
legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
While this was pending, the Rule on Writ of Amparo took effect,
and thus, the respondents asked the Court to treat their petition
as an Amparo petition. This was allowed by the Court, which
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals granted the writ, thus the petitioners filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Held:
Writ of Amparo
1. The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. “Amparo” literally
means “protection” in Spanish.
2. In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not
explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the amparo
protections are guaranteed by our charter.
3. While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave
Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas
corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may not be adequate to
address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required
to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary
proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin
American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses -
offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof.
4. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of
a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence
to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.
5. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles
in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as
it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and
curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Right to Security
6. In a broad sense, the right to security of person “emanates in
a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.
7. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life
but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires
of the individual.”
8. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear.”
9. The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security.
10. The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of
one’s rights by the government.
11. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction
with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled
that the right to security of person can exist independently
of the right to liberty. In other words,there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked.
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ V HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL
ROSARIO
26
FEB
G.R. No. 182484 | June 17, 2007 | J. Brion
FACTS:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan
MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about
120.
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1)
they are the registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they
were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners
– armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons – entered the disputed land
by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’
permission and against the objections of the private
respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations
and essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior
possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents’
certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the
private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession through the
construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the
immediate implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually
issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private
respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the
private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition.
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’
MR and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order
a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the
Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish
their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take
actual possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the
Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition in CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate
and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with
writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and
habeas data is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of
habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand,
is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the
petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC
orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material
antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of
willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at
the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for
certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies,
for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed
out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary
and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of
the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
– requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must
be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn
and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property issues
as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical
possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at
all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be
discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other
hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare to
the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that
the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of
Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition
fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to
the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not
alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information
under the control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has
not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition”
that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas
data – had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in
order. PETITION DENIED.
Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (2010)
G.R. No. 183871 | 2010-02-18
Subject: President enjoys immunity from suit during
incumbency ; Command responsibility; Command responsibility
does not apply in amparo proceedings; Writ of Amparo intended
to determine responsibility for enforced disappearances and
extra-judicial killings, but not to fix criminal or administrative
liability; Application for issuance of Writ of Amparo must be
supported by substantial evidence; Petitioners have failed to
produce substantial evidence to support the petition for the writ
of amparo; Duty of the state to investigate reports of enforced
disappearance and threats; Consolidation of Amparo petition
and Criminal actions
Facts:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) abducted Lourdes D.
Rubrico at Dasmariñas, Cavite and detained her at the
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City without charges. Lourdes was
then chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan.
Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted
alternately by hooded individuals - Lourdes was returned to her
hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that
she would be a military asset. After her release, the harassment,
in the form of being tailed by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets,
continued.
Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal
complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave
misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, Ruben Alfaro,
Jimmy Santana and a certain Jonathan of the 301st AISS,
Fernando Air Base, but nothing has happened. Likewise, the
threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the
Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but
nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations. In
fact, two of the four witnesses to Lourdes' abduction went into
hiding after being visited by government agents in civilian
clothes.
Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations, conducted
an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would
indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin
Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes.
Unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission
order" which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by
Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
Lourdes, in behalf of herself and her children, filed a petition with
the Court of Appeals directed against President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Esperon, PNP
Director Gen. Razon, Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Maj. Darwin
Sy/Reyes, et al. The petition prayed for writ of amparo issue,
ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing
any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for
damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted
to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
By way of general affirmative defenses, the answering
respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the
President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the
petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required
by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dropped the President as
respondent. The CA likewise dismissed the petition with respect
to respondent Gen. Esperon, Gen. Razon, Supt.Roquero, P/Sr.
Insp. Gomez .
Petitioners filed a petition for review (Rule 45) to question the
propriety of the CA's action in dismissing the amparo petition
and dropping President Arroyo as party respondent.
Held:
President enjoys immunity from suit during incumbency
1. Petitioners are mistaken in their contention that the
Presidential immunity from suit, enjoyed by the chief executive
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has been removed
under the 1987 Constitution.
2. The presidential immunity from suit during the term of office
remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Regarding the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or
her tenure.
3. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella
of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys
immunity during her incumbency, to wit: “ThePresident, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued
in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes
the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation
of the Government.”
4. Moreover, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to
what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened
to violate petitioners' protected rights.

Command responsibility
5. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its
context in the development of laws of war and armed combats.
According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
6. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept
of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by
his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over
them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an
omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as
opposed to crimes he ordered).
7. The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the
Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute
imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for
crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is,
however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to
extend concurrence in its ratification.
8. While there are several pending bills on command
responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for
criminal liability under that doctrine
Command responsibility does not apply in amparo
proceedings
9. Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the
case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible
for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates
against petitioners. As the appellate court stated, "the privilege
of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners
have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly
abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her
and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police
force." The two generals, the CA's holding broadly hinted, would
have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the
actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
10. The dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen.
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the
backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed
decision vis-a -vis the two generals, i.e., command
responsibility. This is because command responsibility, as a
concept defined, developed, and applied under international
law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
11. It may be contended that command responsibility, as legal
basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international
law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a
form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents' criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such
proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed.
12. The writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious
and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of
violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons. The amparo suit, however, "is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. (Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo)
Writ of Amparo intended to determine responsibility for
enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings, but not
to fix criminal or administrative liability
13. An amparo suit does not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or
extra-judicial killings]; it [only] determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings]. xxx As the law now
stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances
in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from
the component criminal actsundertaken to carry out these
killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized
under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple
reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the
determination of what acts are criminal are matters of
substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact
14. If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied
to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine
the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has
the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect
rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or
as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
Application for issuance of Writ of Amparo must be
supported by substantial evidence
15. The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy
available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is
a public official or employee or a private individual.
16. However, Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the
Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary
substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of
action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.-
The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.-x x x If the allegations in the petition are
proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

17. Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability
against the person charged. It is more than a scintilla of
evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine
otherwise.
Petitioners have failed to produce substantial evidence to
support the petition for the writ of amparo
18. Petitioners have not adduced substantial evidence pointing
to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To
a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual
perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed
formally or informally formed part of either the military or the
police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation
report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy,
between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly
used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin
Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo.
Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies on events that
transpired which, if taken together, logically point to military
involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as,
but not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being
forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then being brought
to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing
could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that
Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist
Party and of being released when she agreed to become an
"asset." Nevertheless, the identities and links to the AFP or the
PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.
19. According to the evidentiary records, none of the alleged
abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San
Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit of
the Philippine Air Force. A verification with the Personnel
Accounting and Information System of the PNP yielded the
information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the
other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and
Jonathan, were not members of the PNP.
Duty of the state to investigate reports of enforced
disappearance and threats
20. As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court
is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect hand in
the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats
against her daughters. As police officers, though, theirs was the
duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes,
21. The right to security of persons is a guarantee of the
protection of one's right by the government. And this protection
includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind.
As held in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights pronounced: The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as
a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own
legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends
upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.
22. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned,
including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a
preliminary fact-finding on petitioners' complaint. They could not,
however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to
be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to
cooperate. Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez,
provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their
witnesses' attitude, "[They] do not trust the government
agencies to protect them." The seeming reluctance on the part
of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose
a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the
investigation in question to its natural end.
Consolidation of Amparo petition and Criminal actions
23. Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing
of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the
meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the
other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed
subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be
consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule
shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the
Rule.
24. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought
to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the
outright dismissal of the petition is no longer technically feasible
in light of the following developments: (1) the Court has,
pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ
of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed
the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint
in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those
believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant
petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the
kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the
top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal
complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the
consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief
inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
25. The Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application
of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the
situation obtaining under the premises by: (1) the consolidation
of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with
the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and
(2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the
allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to
security.
Castillo vs Cruz (2009)
G.R. No. 182165 | 2009-11-25
Subject: The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data
is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and
security; Writ of Amparo cannot be granted to protect property
rights
Facts
Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco
G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at
Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos refused to vacate the property,
despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the Spouses Cruz. The MTC rendered judgment against the
Spouses Cruz. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC which
became final and executory.
The spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They sought
in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of
injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory
judgment against them.
The RTC issued a permanent writ of injunction until the MTC-
Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of
petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds.
The Province returned the issue for the consideration of the
MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on
August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were
indicated.
The MTC approved the Report and ruled that the permanent
injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. The MTC issued
a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. Spouses Cruz filed a motion
before the RTC for the issuance of a TRO. The Spouses Cruz
entered the property, placed several container vans and
purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property
which was for lease.
Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum
instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession
of the property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the
property. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction
enjoined the Province from repossessing it.
The Spouses Cruz filed a “Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data.” They averred that despite the
Permanent Injunction, the police officers unlawfully entered the
property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed
wire fences and tents, and arrested them when they resisted
The RTC issued writs of amparo and habeas data.
Held:
The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security
1. The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty andsecurity.
And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful
acts or omissions.
2. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,”
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.”
3. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are
“attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of law.(See Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo)
4. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, Spouses Cruz
must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a
property dispute between the Provincial Government and
Spouses Cruz.
Writ of Amparo cannot be granted to protect property rights
5. What a writ of amparo is not, is a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Notably, none
of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to
the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent
or continuing. (See Tapuz v. Del Rosario)
6. In this case, Spouses Cruz's petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that police officers “in unison,
conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully,
forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation
entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the Spouses Cruz
and arrested them” will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or
detention was present. In fact, Spouses Cruz were even able to
post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
7. Although Spouses Cruz’s release from confinement does not
necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent
any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is
undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there
exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their
right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ
cannot be justified. That Spouses Cruz’s are merely seeking the
protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint
Affidavit.
In re: Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo in favor of
Lilibeth Ladaga vs. Major General Reynaldo Mapagu (2012)
G.R. No. 189689 and G.R. No. 189690 and G.R. No. 189691 |
2012-11-13
Subject: Writ of Amparo; In amparo petitions, the rule on
relaxed admissibility of evidence does not do away with the
standard of proof of substantial evidence; Petitioners failed to
establish by substantial evidence the alleged threat to their right
to life, liberty and security; Court may direct further investigation
in cases of abduction, torture or enforced disappearance
Facts:
On May 19, 2009, during a press conference marking the
conclusion of an International Solidarity Mission (ISM) -
organized to investigate alleged human rights violations in
Southern Mindanao by state's forces - Bayan Muna Party-list
Representative Satur Ocampo revealed the existence of a
"watch list," officially known in military parlance as "Order of
Battle" prepared by the intelligence arm of Philippine Army's
10th ID, headed by respondent Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu.
Petitioners Atty. Lilibeth Ladaga, Atty. Angela Librado Trinidad
and Atty. Carlos Isagani Zarate had their names included in the
Order of Battle (OB List), which is a list containing the names of
personalities supposedly connected to the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's
Army (NPA). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names
in the said OB List, they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings - a real threat to their life,
liberty and security.
Atty. Ladaga is the Secretary General of the Union of People's
Lawyer Movement (UPLM). Atty. Angela Librado Trinidad is a
Davao City Councilor. Atty. Carlos Isagani Zarate is the current
Secretary General of the Union of Peoples' Lawyers in
Mindanao (UPLM) and Davao City Coordinator of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG).
Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as
allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three
victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked
directly to the OB List, to wit: Celso B. Pojas, Lodenio S.
Monzon, Dr. Rogelio Peñera.
Petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Application for a Production
Order. The RTC initially issued separate Writs of Amparo and
directed respondents (Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu, et al) to file
a verified written return within 72 hours. However, after hearing,
the RTC issued an order denying the writ after finding no
substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to
petitioners' life, liberty and security was attributable to the
unlawful act or omission of the respondents
Hence, these petitions for review on certiorari. The sole and
common issue presented in these petitions is whether the totality
of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under
the Amparo Rule; Threat to life liberty and security must be
actual, not merely speculative.
Held:
Writ of Amparo
1. The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant
to its rule making powers in response to the alarming rise in the
number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial
killings. It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation
of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the
subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.
2. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to
address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or
security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it
is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only
upon reasonable certainty. (see Tapuz v. Del Rosario)
3. Every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be
supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following
matters:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general
prayer for other just and equitable reliefs
In amparo petitions, the rule on relaxed admissibility of
evidence does not do away with the standard of proof of
substantial evidence
4. Under Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo ,
the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence...
If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate, otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied.
5. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing
or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the
person charged. The summary nature of amparo proceedings,
as well as, the use of substantial evidence as standard of
proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address
situations of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings,
or threats thereof, with what is akin to administrative
proceedings.
6. The Court eventually recognized the evidentiary difficulties
that beset amparo petitioners, arising as they normally would
from the fact that the State itself, through its own agents, is
involved in the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing
that it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus,
in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new standard of
relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to
meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct or
indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair
and proper rule inamparo cases "to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality" and "to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if
it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced." Put
simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is
inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies "the most
basic test of reason - i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue
at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence."
7. This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence,
however, does not do away with the requirement of substantial
evidence in showing the State's involvement in the enforced
disappearance, extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely
permits, in the absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a
closer look at the relevance and significance of every available
evidence including those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay
where the circumstances of the case so require, and allows the
consideration of the evidence adduced in terms of their
consistency with the totality of the evidence.
Petitioners failed to establish by substantial evidence the
alleged threat to their right to life, liberty and security
8. In cases of enforced disappearance, the evidence that would
directly establish a violation of the right to life, liberty and security
is indubitably in the State's possession. The same is not equally
true in cases where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this
case) a threatened violation of his/her rights since the facts,
circumstances and the link between these that create an actual
threat to his/her life are measurably within the ability of
the amparo petitioner to prove.
9. A mere inclusion of one's name in the OB List, without more,
does not suffice to discharge the burden to establish actual
threat to one's right to life, liberty and security by substantial
evidence.

10. The statement of Representative Ocampo that the
respondents are the real source of the OB List is unquestionably
hearsay evidence because, except for the fact that he himself
received the OB List from an unnamed source merely described
as "a conscientious soldier," he had no personal knowledge
concerning its preparation. But even if the Court were to apply
the appropriate measure of flexibility in the instant cases by
admitting the hearsay testimony of Representative Ocampo, a
consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality of those
adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by the 10th ID
admitting the existence of a military-prepared Order of Battle,
the affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening visits and
tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the
violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to the
conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not be
adequately proven.
11. This Court likewise sees no direct relation between the
violent deaths of Celso Pojas, Ludenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio
Peñera and the subject "OB List." There is no evidence pointing
to the claim that they were killed because their names or the
organizations they were involved in were mentioned in the same
"OB List." More importantly, there is no official finding by the
proper authorities that their deaths were precipitated by their
involvement in organizations sympathetic to, or connected with,
the Communist Party of the Philippines, or its military arm, the
New People's Army. Also, except for Celso Pojas, the names of
the supposed victims of extrajudicial killings are manifestly
absent in the subject OB List and the supposed connection of
the victims to the militant groups explicitly identified in the OB
List is nothing short of nebulous. Lastly, and more telling,
the existence of the subject "OB List" has not been adequately
proven, as discussed heretofore, hence, reference to the same
finds no basis.
Threat to life liberty and security must be actual, not merely
speculative
12. Assuming that the Press Releases do amount to an
admission not only of the existence but also the authenticity of
the subject OB List, the inclusion of petitioners' names therein
does not, by itself, constitute an actual threat to their rights to
life, liberty and security as to warrant the issuance of a writ
of amparo.
13. A person's right to security is, in one sense, "freedom from
fear" and that any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is
an actionable wrong. The term "any threat," however, cannot be
taken to mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may
cause one to fear for his life, liberty or security. The Court
explicated that "fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action.” (see Secretary of National Defense
v. Manalo)
14. The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty
and security must be actual, and not merely one of
supposition or with the likelihood of happening. And, when the
evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as
opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying that the
threshold requirement of substantial evidence
inamparo proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the context
of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established
from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as
a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
15. Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in
the OB List is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate
harm to victims Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio
Peñera without corroborative evidence from which it can be
presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people
were, in fact, on account of their militant affiliations or that their
violent fates had been actually planned out by the military
through its Order of Battle.
Court may direct further investigation in cases of
abduction, torture or enforced disappearance
16. An amparo petitioner's failure to establish by substantial
evidence the involvement of government forces in the alleged
violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the
conduct of further investigation where it appears that the
government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction
and torture or enforced disappearance. (see Roxas vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis)
17. However, unlike Roxas and Razon, Jr., the present petitions
do not involve actual cases of abduction or disappearance that
can be the basis of an investigation. Petitioners would insist that
respondents be investigated and directed to produce the Order
of Battle that they have admitted to be in their safekeeping and
justify the inclusion of petitioners' names therein. However,
without substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners'
rights to life, liberty and security that consists more than just the
inclusion of their names in an OB List, an order for further
investigation into, or production of, the military's Order of Battle,
would have no concrete basis.
Razon vs. Tagitis (2009)
G.R. No. 182498 | 2009-12-03
Subject:
The Death of Kasim Rendered the Directive to Implead him as
a Party to the Case Moot and Academic; Kasim’s Death does
not Erase the Burden of Disclosure and Investigation which
Rests on the PNP; The 2009 Decision Considered Other
Evidence and Not Only Kasim’s Report; The Kasim Evidence
Amounted to Substantial Evidence Required by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo
Facts:
In the 2009 case decided by the Supreme Court, Morced Tagitis,
a consultant for the World Bank, arrived in Jolo by boat together
with Arsimin Kunnong. When Kunnong returned after buying a
boat ticket for Tagitis, the latter was no longer around. His
disappearance was reported to the Jolo Police Station by
Kunnong and one Muhammad Matli, a professor of Muslim
Studies. More than a month later, respondent Mary Jean Tagitis,
Morced’s wife, filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo with the Court of Appeals, which issued the writ. The
PNP Officers then appealed before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that the disappearance of Tagitis was
an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. The government was declared accountable for the
enforced disappearance. The Court also held that the PNP was
directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts by Kasim
relevant to the disappearance. The case was then referred to
the Court of Appeals for the appropriate proceedings directed at
the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations,
actions and validation of their results with respect to the
enforced disappearance. Lastly, the Court ordered that Kasim
be impleaded in the case.
In this 2010 case, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
petitioners. They contended that there was no sufficient
evidence to conclude that Kalim’s disclosure pointed to some
government complicity in the disappearance of Tagiits. Further,
the subsequent death of Kasim made it impossible for the
compliance of the order of the Supreme Court to implead him.
Held:
The Death of Kasim Rendered the Directive to Implead him
as a Party to the Case Moot and Academic
1. This directive can no longer be enforced, and has been
rendered moot and academic, given Kasim's demise. The Court
ruled that his intervening death does not necessarily signify the
loss of the information Kasim may have left behind, particularly
the network of assets he utilized while he was in the service.
Kasim’s Death does not Erase the Burden of Disclosure and
Investigation which Rests on the PNP
2. The Court ruled that the extinction of Kasim’s personal
accountability and obligation to disclose material information,
known to him and his assets, does not also erase the burden of
disclosure and investigation that rests with the PNP and the
CIDG.
3. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation,
and involves an interwoven network of informants existing on the
basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military.
4. A resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, can still access or
reconstruct the information Kasim received from his asset or
network of assets during his lifetime.
5. The continuing obligations imposed by the Supreme Court will
not truly be terminated until the enforced disappearance of the
victim Tagitis is fully addressed by the responsible or
accountable parties, as directed in the 2009 Decision.
The 2009 Decision Considered Other Evidence and Not
Only Kasim’s Report
6. The Court ruled that the 2009 Decision plainly and pointedly
considered other evidence supporting the Court’s conclusion,
particularly the consistent denials by government authorities of
any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the dismissive
approach of the police authorities to the report of the
disappearance and the conduct of haphazard investigations that
did not translate into any meaningful results.
The Kasim Evidence Amounted to Substantial Evidence
Required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
7. The Court found the argument that the Kasim evidence does
not amount to substantial evidence required by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo to be unmeritorious.
8. The Court reminded that it continued to adhere to the
substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the
evidence presented.
9. When the court ruled that hearsay evidence, which was
usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence, may be admitted as the circumstances of the case
may require, it did not thereby dispense with the substantial
evidence rule but merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the
admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards
of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary
situation.
Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (2010)
G.R. No. 189155 | 2010-09-07
Subject:
The Doctrine of Command Responsibility is not Applicable in
Amparo Proceedings; The Nature of Command Responsibility;
The Writ of Amparo Does Not Fix Liability for Disappearances,
Killings and Threats; The Commanders may be Impleaded not
because of Command Responsibility but rather on the Ground
of their Responsibility; Responsibility vs. Accountability; The
Totality of Evidence Presented insufficient to conclude that the
Government Orchestrated her Abduction; Petitioner’s Claim that
she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was Speculative; An Order
Directing the Public Respondents to Return Roxas’ Personal
Belongings is Tantamount to a Conclusive Pronouncement of
Liability; Property Rights are Not Within the Ambit of Protection
of the Writ of Amparo; A Grant of Prayer for Inspection of the
Detention Areas of Fort Magsaysay is Tantamount to
Sanctioning Fishing Expeditions; The Nature of an Inspection
Order; Petitioner Failed to Make a Prima Facie Case for the
Issuance of an Inspection Order; The Nature of the Writ of
Habeas Data; Petitioner Failed to Show Actual or Threatened
Violation of the Right to Privacy in Life, Liberty or Security; The
Supreme Court’s Recommendations in the Case
Facts:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, enrolled
in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she was a member. After doing survey
work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the house
of Mr. Jesus Paolo. While Roxas and her companions were
resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered
the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted
from the van, she was informed that she was being detained for
being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her
companions and was brought to a room, from where she could
hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing,
and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince
her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a
person named “RC” that those who tortured her came from the
“Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because
her name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with
a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to
the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her
and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive
calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of
apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.
Thereafter, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court,
impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine
National Police, on the belief that it was the government agents
who were behind her abduction and torture.
The Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege
of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court
absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the
respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of
Roxas.
Held:
The Doctrine of Command Responsibility is not Applicable
in Amparo Proceedings
1. Petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she
impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. Thus,
petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the
respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as
liable for the return of her belongings.
2. The use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule
of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in
an amparo petition.
The Nature of Command Responsibility
3. Command Responsibility means the responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.
4. It is is an omission mode of individual criminal liability,
whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed
by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators.
5. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes
an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a
full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the
nature of the writ itself
The Writ of Amparo Does Not Fix Liability for
Disappearances, Killings and Threats
6. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures
and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.
7. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal
killing or threats thereof had transpired, the writ does not, by so
doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law.
8. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner.
9. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.
The Commanders may be Impleaded not because of
Command Responsibility but rather on the Ground of their
Responsibility
10. The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility
in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct
or indirect acquiescence.
11. Commanders may be impleaded, not actually on the basis
of command responsibility, but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.
Responsibility vs. Accountability
12. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies the Supreme
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts.
13. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
The Totality of Evidence Presented insufficient to conclude
that the Government Orchestrated her Abduction
14. The Supreme Court was not impressed with the
asseverations of the petitioner. The totality of the evidence
presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable
conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel
and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
15. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
16. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns
and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
The abductors were not proven to be part of either the military
or the police chain of command.
Petitioner’s Claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay
was Speculative
17. The Court was not inclined to take the estimate and
observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face, not only
because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but
also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the
Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel
time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.
An Order Directing the Public Respondents to Return
Roxas’ Personal Belongings is Tantamount to a Conclusive
Pronouncement of Liability
18. An order directing the public respondents to return the
personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a
conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is
a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of
the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive
proceeding.
Property Rights are Not Within the Ambit of Protection of
the Writ of Amparo
19. The Court ruled that the fact that a person's right to be
restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general
rubric of property rights, which are no longer protected by the
writ of amparo.
A Grant of Prayer for Inspection of the Detention Areas of
Fort Magsaysay is Tantamount to Sanctioning Fishing
Expeditions
20. Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to
any military involvement in petitioner's ordeal, the Supreme
Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay.
21. It agreed with the appellate court that a contrary stance
would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which
was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the
interim relief of inspection order.
The Nature of an Inspection Order
22. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give
support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.
29. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations
and other reports about the petitioner's ties with the CPP-
NPA, was not adequately proven, considering that the origin of
such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, only
inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph
released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the
public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
30. Until such time that any of the public respondents
were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and
torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of
reports being kept in violation of the petitioner's right to privacy
becomes farfetched, and premature.
The Supreme Court’s Recommendations in the Case
31. Further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence
must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the
abduction and torture of the petitioner.
32. The Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,
must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial
voids.

23. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an

inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably
determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order.

Petitioner Failed to Make a Prima Facie Case for the

Issuance of an Inspection Order

24. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be
inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order
that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so
as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above,
petitioner failed to do.

25. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner

are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she
was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military
camp cannot be ordered.

The Nature of the Writ of Habeas Data

26. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial

remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals.

27. The writ operates to protect a person's right to control

information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where
such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.

Petitioner Failed to Show Actual or Threatened Violation of

the Right to Privacy in Life, Liberty or Security

28. An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ

may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial