G.R. No.
138453 May 29, 2002 Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present
case for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence
of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua,
not death.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños2 y
Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion and sentencing him to death. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby
renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim;
and P22,800.00 s actual damages."3
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife
and the fetus inside her. It reads thus:
"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro,
Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused Melecio Robinos, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches long,
his legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant causing
the instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside her womb."5
When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,6 pleaded not
guilty.7 After due trial, the RTC convicted him.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution's version of how appellant
assaulted his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:
"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old
Lorenzo Robiños was in his parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac.
While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and
the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at the sala, quarrelling.
"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't
you just leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about
five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right
shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor.
house and ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the
incident.1âwphi1.nêt
"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the
brother of the victim Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios
Bueno at Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui,
Tarlac, went to his mother's house for the purpose of informing his relatives that
on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robiños,
at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mother's house, he
received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by
appellant.
"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house
because he was afraid of what appellant might do. From his mother's house, which
was about 150 meters away from his sister's home, Benjamin saw appellant who
shouted at him, 'It's good you would see how your sister died.'
"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the
police station at Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin,
together with the other members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac,
immediately went to Barangay San Isidro. The police, together with Benjamin
Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of
the crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of appellant and Lorenza.
The police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant failed to come
out, the police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from
the part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed
that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.
"6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his
side and holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was
embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, 'I will kill myself, I will kill myself.'
Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward, was no longer breathing.
She appeared to be dead.
"7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled
appellant away from Lorenza's body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken
by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was
overpowered. The police, with the help of the barangay officials present, tied his
hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from the
body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez,
a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him
the bloodstained knife.
"8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was
pale and not breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to
take Lorenza's body for autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at
 Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be taken to the Camiling District Hospital for
the treatment of a stab wound.
"9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at
Camiling, Tarlac, prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
'The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41
stab wounds on the different parts of her body.
'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk
[who] came home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect
got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows.
'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial
Hospital.
'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight
(8) inches long including handle.'
"10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor
who conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robiños' body. Nor, was the autopsy report
presented as evidence."8
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his
wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as
follows:
"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense
presented the testimonies of the following:
"FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents
had occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had
seen a person went [sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March
23, 1995, he heard his father told the same thing to his mother and because of this,
his parents quarreled and exchanged heated words.
"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to
know Melecio Robiños only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his
cell, accused isolated himself, 'laging nakatingin sa malayo', rarely talked, just stared
at her and murmured alone.
"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that
he and the accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in the
morning up to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. He had observed that accused
sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed
in his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.
"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony,
testified that as the accused's inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the
latter. Accused sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and
without companion, laughing and sometimes crying.
"MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he
was in their house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date.
He did not know that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. He could not remember when he was informed by his children that he
killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife."9
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this
Court for review.10
The Issues
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:
"I
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and
psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-
appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia,
paranoid type.
"II
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity."11
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Main Issue
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the
allegation that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity
of the culprit and the commission of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. Appellant, however, interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself of
criminal liability.
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal
case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact
of insanity at the very moment when the crime was committed.13 Only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.14
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. 16 Failing this, one will be
presumed to be sane when the crime was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is
unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and
defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of
reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation
preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no
reason at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing
her was a deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him
as attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo's testimony appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even
in part as follows: showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Valdez's testimony proceeded as follows:
"Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if "Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio
they talked to one and the other? Robiños?
A: Yes, sir. A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited
ATTY. IBARRA: for the police officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we
Q: Did you hear what they talked about? started going around the house and when we saw blood, some of our companions
A: Yes, sir. removed the walling of the house and at that time, we saw the wife of Melecio
Q: What did you hear? Robiños lying down as if at that moment, the wife of Melecio Robiños was already
A: 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?', Sir. dead, Sir.
COURT: Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?
In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home. A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir.
ATTY. IBARRA: xxx xxx xxx
Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your father do? Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?
A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir."17 A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even said he killed his wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.
bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus: Q: What is that weapon?
"ATTY. JOAQUIN: A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.
Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister? COURT:
A: Yes, sir. What is that, knife?
Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already A: It's a double bladed knife, sir.
there in the house of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness? xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes, sir. COURT:
Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead? He admitted to you that he killed his wife?
A: Yes, Sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog,
dead? ilocano or what?
A: No, Sir. A: What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket ko' meaning 'I killed my
ATTY. JOAQUIN: wife,' Sir."19
Q: Why? Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the
A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir. atrocity of his act.
COURT: Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim
Q: Why do you know that he was amok? of insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental
A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir. condition after the commission of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico
Q: How? Robiños,20 all the other defense witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his
A: It's good you would see how your sister died, Sir."18 insanity after he had already been detained in prison.
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the
his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment accused must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally
of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the responsible.21 Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at
killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of the precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter.
what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of In People v. Villa,22 this Court incisively ratiocinated on the matter as follows:
 "It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the
center. But, in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his
detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of
the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the
offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these
circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must
be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate
to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is
the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during
the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine,
this Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental condition of the person
alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the
exempting circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x x."23 (Italics
supplied)
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the
evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment
of its execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime,
the accused cannot be acquitted.24
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an
examination of the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in
determining his state of mind at the time of the killing. It must be noted that she examined
him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after the commission of the
crime.25Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history of his mental
condition prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather data
on the matter.26
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been
suffering from psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise admitted
that her conclusion was not definite and was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by
the trial court, her declarations were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a
positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:
"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the
National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of
examination accused Melecio Robiños was still mentally ill; that accused was
experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and it is possible that the
sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination; and in her
opinion accused was suffering from delusion and hallucination. And her opinion
that at the time accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is merely
her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental,
physical and neurological examinations on the accused seven (7) months after the
commission of the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given accused an
opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no
opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused
immediately before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense.
Her finding is conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct background
examination of the mental condition of the accused before the incident by
interviewing persons who had the opportunity to associate with him."29
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been
completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by
the defense did not indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or
freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a
confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish its
existence.31Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to
overthrow the presumption of sanity.1âwphi1.nêt
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing
the death penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the
presence or the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the
capital penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of penalties
as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor General concedes this
error in the imposition of the death penalty.32
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion,
the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide.
This is in accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
"When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x."
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties,
the court is mandated to impose one or the other, depending on the presence or the
absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the
application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be
imposed.34 Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were
established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.35
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable
with death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two
indivisible penalties, the application of either one of which depends on the presence or the
absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in
Criminal Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay
the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual
damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However,
when facts are misinterpreted and the innocence of the accused depends on a proper
appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. In
the present case, a careful reexamination convinces this Court that an accident caused the
victims death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses create a
reasonable doubt on appellants guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the February 28, 2001 Decision[2] and the October 30, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8,
1995 judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case
No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner]
ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four
(4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.[6]
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and
without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then
provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which
directly caused the death of said victim thereafter.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondents version of the facts as
follows:
Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Concepcion, Iloilo.
On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at
the Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took
place in the municipality in December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the
policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary School where his wife, Jessica, was in a
get-together party with other School Administrators. When his wife asked him, Why will you
be arrested? [H]e answered [Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even
going there in order to find out the reason for my arrest.
Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321 st Philippine Constabulary
Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with
Edgar Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.
Later that day, about a little past 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police
sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter
to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he told
Balboa: Lets go to the investigation room. The investigation room is at the main building of
the compound where the jail is located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened
the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.
At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging
by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the
gun protruding from the holster.
When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation
room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner
was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood,
about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he
disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first
name not provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the
Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was
unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted
an autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by sutures,
surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline,
121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially backwards from left to right, penetrating chest
wall thru 5th intercostals space into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe,
left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8 ththoracic vertebra
and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures, back, right side,
8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented
medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on its widest portion, at infero-medial border,
hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel,
directed backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and
thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm.,
oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9 th intercostal space, 4.5
cms. From posterior midline, 110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest and
abdomen.
REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.
Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboas body were gunshot
wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple
and exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from
left to right. As to the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle
of the gun was probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and the gun
must have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located
immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally
upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed
the guns nozzle to the right side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance
points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0 centimeters.[8]
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn
culled them from the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses
Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and
petitioner himself, as follows:
Erna Basa:
x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon;
at about past 2 oclock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise
and exchange of words which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she
opened the door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the
possession of the gun; she was inside the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy
and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters away from the door; the grappling
happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then
there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun. x x x.
Eden Legaspi:
x x x [A]s early as 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the
investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 oclock that same
afternoon while there inside, she heard a commotion outside and she remained seated on
the bench; when the commotion started they were seated on the bench and after the
commotion that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and
she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun and immediately two successive
shots rang out; she did not leave the place where she was seated but she just stood up; after
the shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.
Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then
attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit;
about 2 oclock or past that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade
for tactical interrogation; as he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room
and about to open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take
hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was
apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in
their stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of the stockade for
interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber pistol
placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was holding the doorknob
with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away from him,
suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his
gun with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right
hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the
gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he
used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his
right hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and
Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of
them held the gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from
its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began
and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were
still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he
left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to
prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach
the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller
than Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of them
was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying stop that and he saw Sgt. Alag
approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got
his gun, and said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when
his gun was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.
Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that happened
during the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of
San Dionisio and that case involves other persons who were also detained; before January
4, 1990 he had also the chance to invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery
case; x x x [I]t was after he took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct
the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he
(Balboa) was to be investigated in the investigation room which was housed in the main
building which is fifty meters, more or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the
administrative office, the office of the commanding officer, officer of the operations division
and that of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim tried to grab it (gun);
from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the hand
of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun;
that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell
whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from
the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his gun was
fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed them and probably
reported the incident to their commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he
(Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his commanding officer came some five to ten
minutes later and took away his gun he did not tell him anything.
Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas
Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he made
an autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left
chest with trajectory medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the
stomach with trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of his examination he
saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn
by the victim, he did not see or find any powder burns and marks and that those dotted
marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to be powder burns as they look like one; he also
found a deformed slug in the pocket of the jacket of the victim.[9]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not
successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon
when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident
and immediately before it went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he
deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the
deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a grappling for the
gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that
the death of Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,[10] the CA maintained
that a revolver is not prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased
as appellant claims because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked
and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were
uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.
Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional because pressure on
the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire.[11]
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:
[Petitioners] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been shot
only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby
establishing [petitioners] determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the
imagination, even assuming without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it
should not have been followed by another shot on another vital part of the body. The fact
that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two different and distant parts
of the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles, means that there was an intent
to cause the victims death, contrary to [petitioners] pretensions of the
alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that the location, number and gravity
of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened
during the incident. x x x.[12]
 Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that
petitioner had miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an
indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the
conclusion of the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position
had attended the commission of the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was
modified by the appellate court in this manner:
x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official
must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his
purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position,
then there is no abuse of public position. (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant
case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when
the former fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public
position of the [petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial courts
finding that the said aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his public
position to commit the crime cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and
no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. x x
x.[13]
Hence, this Petition.[14]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming
petitioners conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence
to convict the petitioner, in contrast to petitioners overwhelming evidence to
support his theory/defense of accident.
II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the
conviction of the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the
gun fired, the petitioner was in full control of the handle of the gun, because
what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was
that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in
forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor generals
observation that the fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes
petitioners determined effort to kill the victim.
IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence
presented when it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back
belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-side
each other when the grappling ensued.
V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioners reaction to
the incident when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after
the incident strongly argues against his claim of accidental shooting.
VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack
of it in determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of
petitioner to shoot at the victim when the same was put in serious doubt by
the evidence presented.
VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and
self-defense are inconsistent.
VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and
damages.[15]
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting
of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to
prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, are conclusive.[16] Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the
field of fact finding.But where some facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the
Supreme Court may overturn the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where,
as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the
accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intent of causing it.
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim
was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not
have been foreseen or controlled.[17] Thus, in determining whether an accident attended the
incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence
of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in
the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the
shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who
witnessed the incident firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-
 examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon of January 4, 1990 Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
as follows: A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
ATTY. TEODOSIO: Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboas hand was also
commotion. That commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as there. Both of them were holding the gun.
part of that commotion which you heard? Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not A. The handle.
be understood. Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion? hand?
A. No, sir. A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice Q. So later, they were facing each other?
while you were inside the investigation room as part of that commotion? A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
were talking somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort COURT:
of trouble in their talks. Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
COURT: A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation? Q. What was the distance?
A. Yes, sir. A. Very close to each other.
xxxxxxxxx Q. How close?
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased A. Very near each other.
in this case? Am I correct? Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Yes, sir. A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun? would touch each other.
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
I saw both of them grappling for that gun. A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. Where was the gun at that time? Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.) A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the COURT:
gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand? Proceed.
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
and Sgt. Pomoy. A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was
COURT: released from its holster and then there was an explosion.
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster? Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
the possession of the gun. because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see? Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Two. A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim? Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir. A. Yes, sir.
COURT: Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
Proceed. A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to
ATTY TEODOSIO: because the gun was turning.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt.
Pomoy. He was the one holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt.
Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each
other, it was then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding
the handle of the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as
you testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was
he in front of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoys right and
Balboas left sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side at a
closer distance towards each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that
time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the
gun and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was
being held by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or
the portion near the trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the
gun with his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy,
the same hand holding the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly
anymore whose hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were
holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, Daw duha na sila nagakapot, what you
really mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you
have previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoys right hand was
still on the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right
hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like this(witness illustrating by showing his right hand
with her left hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of
the left hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out
form its holster and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of
the gun up to the time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left
hand of Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa
which is about to grab the handle of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim
away from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right
hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using
his left hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun
of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
 A. Yes, sir.[18]
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun
during the scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him,
while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the
victim were all over the weapon was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course
of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was
trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It
would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and
effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the
victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following
declaration of the appellate court: [Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the
handle of the gun while the left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was
fired. This declaration would safely lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off
herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun.[19]
Release of the Guns Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock
that, unless released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature,
however, the evidence showed that the weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but
twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only mean that petitioner had deliberately
unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.
This frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of
seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical
conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could
have been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively
negate the claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be
attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical
description of the weapon in question, explained how the disputed second shot may have
been brought about:
x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol,
when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns
immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in
succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of
the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going
downward from left to right thus pushing Balboas upper body, tilting it to the left while
Balboa was still clutching petitioners hand over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the
stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboas body as he was falling down and releasing
his hold on petitioners hand x x x.[20]
Thus, the appellate courts reliance on People v. Reyes[21] was misplaced. In that
case, the Court disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he
was simply handing it over to the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has
consistently maintained that the gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the
victim. More significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism
of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes.[22] Unlike a revolver,
a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing
when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased
were all frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioners claim that a grappling for the
weapon ever occurred. It held that if there was indeed a grappling between the two, and
that they had been side [by] side x x x each other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have
had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead to an inference that the victim was shot
frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta.[23]
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties
at the precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to
a determination of the existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds
becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were
grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the
process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable
and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows
that the parties positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither
definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as
follows:
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to
because the gun was turning.[24]
xxxxxxxxx
Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right
hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady
as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.[25]
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First, because
the position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons
holding the gun when it fired. This is especially true when two persons were grappling
for the possession of the gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x
x.
[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the victim
during the grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise:
when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the knocking
power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and
the gun, Balboa pulling the gun down as he was going down. When the gun went off the
second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboas body was going upward
because his upper body was pushed downward twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa
let go of his grip. On cross-examination, petitioner testified, what I noticed was that after
successive shots we separated from each other. This sequence of events is logical
because the protagonists were grappling over the gun and were moving very fast. x
x x. [26]
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a
lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the
part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.[27] From the facts, it
is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a
member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior,
he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner
tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it
from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the
snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons
in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions
to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously
maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury
to the deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of
the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would
indicate the intent to harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts
committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the
law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of
the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently
demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of
petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latters
culpability.
Petitioners Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after
the incident was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he
was dumbfounded, according to the CA; was mum, pale and trembling, according to the trial
court. These behavioral reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His
behavior was understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a
person from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was
looking at his companions bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected of one in a state
of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he
intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and
immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which
there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a
premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger.[28] Apparently,
the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort
to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression;
rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties attempts
to possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of
petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -
- a further discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-
defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner
is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-
American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the
municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the
last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him,
went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new
relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then went
to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a
soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old
mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the
Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of said room; in response
thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation,
Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following
question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is
all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she
may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made
up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a
revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his
hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding
himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who
was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she
fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render
assistance and wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. The latter immediately
fled from the house and gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin,
asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in
and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to
be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window;
these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the
cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of
murder. Proceedings were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced,
entered judgment on the 10th of September of the same year, sentencing the accused to
the penalty of death, to be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this
court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the
crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman
Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia),
she being suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber
revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and
unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a conversation, in which she was
concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and after usual and customary words
had passed between her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred
that means, manners, and forms were employed in attack that directly and specially insured
the consummation of the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might have been
offered by the victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to
flee from the place where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory
allegations which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is
absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively establishes, beyond peradventure of
doubt, his culpability as the sole fully convicted author of the violent and treacherous death
of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had
seized him, he fell backward but managed to support himself on his two hands, and when
he got up again the said corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face;
whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him from behind,
when his revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace
Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their respective declaration,
especially with that of the second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by
the aggressor at the deceased, as shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached
the accused in order to take his weapon away from him which he succeeded in doing after
a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the house. Thus, the shot that struck
the deceased in the breast and caused her death was not due to an accident but to a willful
and premeditated act on the part of the aggressor with intent to deprive the victim of her
life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence
of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the deceased should be taken into consideration. The last-
mentioned circumstances appears proven from the testimony of several witnesses who
were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with
treachery, the circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic
one. Premeditation is, however, manifest and evident by reason of the open acts executed
by the accused. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks
asked leave from the former to be absent from the canteen where he was working on the
morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his mind was unsettled and that
he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks'
house about noon upon the latter's invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while
the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was lying on the table on which were also several
loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time
had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and
when the accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when
called, the witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the
cuprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly
for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after
due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order
to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was
already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges
besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously
and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his
intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to
successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planed to
do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is
present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss
of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the
only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and
immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with
the law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with
costs, provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed according to the law in
force, and that in the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory
penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon.
So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.