G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,Petitioners, vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS, CITY MAYOR andCITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY,Respondents.

FACTS The petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City .Half of
their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land
was their only property and only source of income. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the
purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The
petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of
Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the
petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the petitioner will prosper.

HELD: The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation
which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to
lack of cause of action. In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and
providing for the expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause
of action. The remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the
desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners' property was issued. As of then, it was
premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be
exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the
expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist.
Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain.

Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990] First Division, Gancayco (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando
ReinDel Pan streets among them Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some 15 other
defendants (Civil Case 7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of complaint and
arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties. On 29 March 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent
motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with
the taking of immediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. In June 1979, the
Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the
ground that it had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the
amount of compensation stated in the complaint. In an order dated 14 June 1979 the lower court issued a
writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be
condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the lands involved in
the proceedings. On 16 July 1979, de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
(GR No. L-51078) and directed against the order of the lower court dated 14 June 1979 praying that the
Republic be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the expropriation action and from implementing
said order. On 30 October 1980, the Supreme Court rendered a decision, granting the petition for certiorari
and prohibition and setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the Judge Bautista. On 8 August 1981, Maria

1
Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the
expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme
Court which had become final and in order to avoid further damage to latter who were denied possession of
their properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among others, that it had
no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the aforestated decision. However, on
2 September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas
Pambansa 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court in an order of 2
September 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the lower court dated 18 December 1986. De Knecht
appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on 28
December 1988, setting aside the order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings. The
Republic filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the Supreme Court
may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the law of the
case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take private properties for public
use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with the
land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When on 17 February 1983 the
Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings, and
for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of
the Supreme Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando
ReinDel Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be
arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the
EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the solitary
obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the
traffic bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government
in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety
of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding
legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the
anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.

Assoc. of Small landowners vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform 175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands
whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7
hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian
reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
2
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific
amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this
violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation.
This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and
not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and
not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners
of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears
that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there
is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact,
just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without
judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through
appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by
law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If
the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can
go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by
RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be
used for just compensation.

G.R. No. 177611.âApril 18, 2012. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES), petitioner vs. RODOLFO L. LEGASPI, SR., QUEROBIN L. LEGASPI, OFELIA
LEGASPI-MUELA, PURISIMA LEGASPI VDA. DE MONDEJAR, VICENTE LEGASPI,
RODOLFO LEGASPI II, and SPOUSES ROSALINA LIBO-ON and DOMINADOR LIBO-ON,
respondents.

Nature of the Case: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is the Decision dated 26 April 2007Â rendered by the Eighteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85735, denying for lack of merit the Rule 65 petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru the University of the Philippines in the
Visayas (UPV), for the nullification of the orders dated 17 November 2003Â and 31 May 2004 issued by the
Hon. Roger B. Patricio, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, in the
expropriation case docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 19921.

FACTS: In December 1978, Rosalina Libo-on accomplished a letter of intent signifying her willingness to
sell to UPV Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd., situated at Miag-ao, Iloilo registered in her name under OCT
No. F-20020 of the Iloilo provincial registry. A Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties whereby
Rosalina, with the conformity of her then tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the subject parcel of land to UPV
for P56,479.50. UPV immediately took possession of the property and, in line with its educational
development plan, started building thereon road networks, infrastructure and school facilities. On January 4,
1980, Rosalina wrote a letter informing UPV that she was rescinding the sale on the ground that she was no
longer the owner of the property. That she had conveyed the property on September 5, 1978 by way of barter
or exchange in favor of the respondents. UPV learned that Lot 1 was subdivided into ten lots denominated
and registered in the name of respondents.

The Solicitor General filed against the respondents the complaint for eminent domain before the Regional
Trial Court. Petitioner alleged, among other matters, that the subject parcel is within the approved and
delineated campus of the UPV which had well-established its presence in the area by building its
laboratories, classrooms, faculty and student centers, among other facilities; and, that it had been
constrained to resort to expropriation in view of the failure of its efforts to negotiate with respondents for
the retention of the property on which it constructed considerable improvements already being used for
academic purposes. Maintaining that the fair market value of the property at the time of its entry was
P49,298.00, UPV sought confirmation of its right of condemnation as well as the fixing of the just
compensation for the property. On 2 September 1991, the RTC issued an order granting petitioners motion to
allow UPV to continue its possession of the subject parcel upon deposit with the Iloilo Provincial Treasurer
of the sum of P50,070.00, representing the provisional valuation of the property.

In their answer the respondents averred that petitioners’ right of expropriation should only be limited to the
three lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-8193, 8194 and 8196, finding no opposition,
the RTC issued an order of condemnation upholding UPV’s right to expropriate said three parcels of land.
Petitioner moved for the continuation of the condemnation proceeding insofar as the remaining seven parcels
of land were concerned. Petitioner also filed an amended complaint on November 10, 1994, impleading
additional defendants the Rural Bank of Miag-ao (Iloilo), Inc. (RBMI), the Philippine National Bank
4
(PNB) and the Iloilo Finance Corporation (IFC), in view of the mortgages constituted in their favor by
respondents over some of the lots into which the Lot 1 had been subdivided. Claiming to have relied on the
certificates of title presented to them by the mortgagors, however, RBMI, PNB and IFC filed their
individual answers maintaining that the said mortgages were entered into for value and in good faith.

On April 13, 1998, the Office of the UPV Chancellor sent respondent Rodolfo Legaspi a letter, protesting
against the latter’s occupation of a portion of the property in litigation. Calling the RTC’s attention to its
September 2, 1991 Order which allowed UPV’s continued possession of the property, petitioner also filed its
manifestation and motion praying for the grant of a writ of possession over the entirety of Lot 1. Without
resolving the motion, however, the RTC went on to issue the June 16, 2000 order, fixing the just
compensation for Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E, based on the evidence adduced by the parties
and the report submitted by the commissioners.

On November 17, 2003, the RTC further issued the condemnation order of the same date, upholding
petitioner’s authority to expropriate the remaining seven lots comprising the property. Excluding the area
occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort which respondent Rodolfo Legaspi Sr. operated in the premises.
On December 19, 2003, petitioner and UPV filed motions for reconsideration of the foregoing order on the
ground that the exclusion of the Villa Marina Beach Resort from the condemned lots is bereft of legal basis
and contrary to the evidence presented in the case which showed that the same is an integral part of the
UPV’s developmental plan for research and educational use. On which the court granted.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed on August 16, 2004 the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals, assailing the RTC’s order dated 31 May 2004 on the ground that grave abuse of discretion
attended the denial of the expropriation of the subject lots after the right to expropriate the same was earlier
upheld in the likewise assailed order dated November 17, 2003. On April 26, 2007, the CA denied the
petition on the ground that, under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper remedy from said
assailed orders was an ordinary appeal which, once lost, cannot be substituted by a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari and mandamus. Even if petitioner’s choice of remedy were, moreover, to be considered proper
under the circumstances, the CA ruled that the RTC’s issuance of said assailed orders was well within its
power and duty to review, amend or reverse its findings and conclusions if it deems it necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Without moving for a reconsideration of the
foregoing decision, petitioner filed the petition at bench on 25 June 2007.

ISSUE: The court of appeals erred on a question of law in denying the petition for certiorari and affirming
the order dated May 31, 2004 of branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo city which did not state the
facts and the law on which it is based.

(Whether or not the UPV should be allowed to continue the expropriation.)

RULING: We find the petition impressed with merit.

Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state and of those
entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation.[31] Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings therefor consist
of two (2) stages: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use; and, (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of
private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.[32] The
nature of these two stages was discussed in the following wise in the case of Municipality of Bian vs. Judge
Garcia,[33] to wit:

5
 1. There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a
final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done
by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no
objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed
or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by
the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the
just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners
would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the
parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of
fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by
taking an appeal therefrom.

It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings be it
an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal finally disposes of the case and is, for said reason,
final. The same is true of the second phase that ends with an order determining the amount of just
compensation[34] which, while essential for the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, is but the last
stage of the expropriation proceedings and the outcome of the initial finding by the court that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint.[35] In the same manner that the order of expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing
a record on appeal, a second and separate appeal may likewise be taken from the order fixing the just
compensation. Indeed, jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for
expropriation because of said two stages in every action for expropriation. [36]

Narrow in scope and unflexible in character, a petition for certiorari is, concededly, intended to correct errors
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and lies only when
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hence, the CA
denied the petition filed by petitioner on the principle that certiorari cannot be used as substitute for an
appeal that has been lost. Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court, the rule is settled that a decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated
that the RTC’s issuance of the assailed orders dated 17 November 2003 and 31 May 2004 was attended
with grave abuse of discretion. In the context of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It has been
ruled that the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

6
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA’s Decision dated 26 April 2007 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered NULLYING the assailed orders dated
17 November 2003 and 31 May 2004 and directing the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38 to
resolve the case in compliance with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and in accordance with the
evidence on record.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor [GR 138896, 20 June 2000] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 3
concur, 1 on leave on official business

Facts: Barangay San Roque in Talisay, Cebu filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu
(Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of Heirs of Francisco Pastor (Eugenio Sylianco, Teodoro
Sylianco, Isabel Sylianco, Eugenia S. Ong, Lawrence Sylianco, Lawson Sylianco, Lawina S. Notario,
Leonardo Sylianco, Jr. and Lawford Sylianco). In an Order dated 8 April 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the
power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action
also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court." When the complaint was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the RTC also dismissed the Complaint on 29 March 1999, holding
that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC; therefore
concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was
less than P20,000. The Barangay's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on 14 May 1999. The
Barangay filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over
expropriation cases.

Held: The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts
determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of
due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain,
a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the
court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. Verily, the Court held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance," the forerunners of the regional trial courts (RTC). The said case was decided during the effectivity
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like Batas Pambansa 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of
first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change
these jurisprudential precedents.

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.

GR No. 135087, June 20, 2000

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994] authorizing then
Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Sugui located
at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more
7
particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro
Manila District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong
Medical Center.

Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy his
property, but Suguitan refused to sell.[4] Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a
complaint[5] for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to
dismiss[6] the complaint based on the following grounds -(1) the power of eminent domain is not being
exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject
property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just
compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property
being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to
acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the motion. On
October 24, 1995, the trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss. [7]

On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order
allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of
P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current tax
declaration of such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the
subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995.[8] On July
28, 1998, the court granted the assailed order of expropriation.

Petitioner assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by
means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, [9] and not by means of a
mere resolution.[10] Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent
domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160,
a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial
Court. Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of eminent domain.

HELD.: NO. Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty
of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the
delegating law.[23] In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is
directly exercised by the national legislature.[24]

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the
local government unit concerned:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property .calr

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.[25]

In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners'
property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free
from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power
8
of eminent domain. We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty
Corporation[26] regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that 1998 case we held
that:miso

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but
a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of
all the Sanggunian members.

We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the
court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that
an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this
point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two
stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.[27]

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the
transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which
cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of
condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff
has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to
exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the
proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the
defendant is entitled.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now
CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, respondent.

FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near
the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light
materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code,
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets.The municipality then
decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor
Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-
66585 which is adjoining E. R. Santos Street.

9
 The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance[5] authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public
use as an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching
Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter,
of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same
portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco.
the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI.
JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiffs exercise of eminent domain
was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the
property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it.
JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was
constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest.
The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial
compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the
expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. Hence, the petition.
Petitioner JILCSFI raises the following issues: (1) whether the respondent complied with the
requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the
property prior to the filing of the complaint; (2) whether its property which is already intended to be used for
public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3) whether the requisites for an easement
for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.
The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly requires that a valid and definite offer be made to the
owner of the property and that such offer was not accepted. It argues that, in this case, there was no
evidence to show that such offer has been made either to the previous owner or the petitioner, the present
owner.

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate.

HELD: NO.

The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the
owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. [48] It is incumbent
upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. [49] Failure to
prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint.[50]
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a
contract.[51] It creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the
offerors promise into a contractual obligation.[52] Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with
sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the
proposed contract.[53] An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the
cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.[54]
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense
and delay of a court action.[55] The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land
without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right
which should be protected in every instance.[56] It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not
only the landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It permits the landowner
to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the
10
property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property
for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. [57] A single bona fide offer that is rejected by
the owner will suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of
the property. However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be
expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it
is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to
go beyond what appears on its face.[58]
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written
definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by
the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the
letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco. The letter reads:

MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO

18 Alcalde Jose Street
Capasigan, Pasig
Metro Manila

Dear Mr. Cuanco:

This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro Manila
embraced in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of fifty-one (51) square meters
is needed by the Municipal Government of Pasig for conversion into a road-right of way for the benefit of
several residents living in the vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your
information.

In this connection, may we respectfully request your presence in our office to discuss this project and the
price that may be mutually agreed upon by you and the Municipality of Pasig.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
ENGR. JOSE L. REYES
Technical Asst. to the Mayor
on Infrastructure[59]

(Nilagay ko to para mabasa mo yung sulat, kasi jan naka-anchor yung claim nung City na may valid offer to
expropriate)

11
City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar [GR 137152, 29 January 2001] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur

Facts: Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar, constructed residential houses several
decades ago on a portion of the 3 lots located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of
Mandaluyong. The Aguilars had since leased out these houses to tenants until the present. In 1983, the lots
were classified by Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation 1967 and 2284 of
then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to
purchase the land from the Aguilars, but the latter refused to sell. On 7 November 1996, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaluyong, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of
the subject land, adopted Resolution 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of
Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise
condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On 10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a letter
to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter. On 4 August 1997, the
City filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation,
seeking to expropriate 3 adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters in the names
of the Aguilars, and praying that the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per
square meter. In their answer, the Aguilars, except Eusebio who died in 1995, denied having received a copy
of Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary
and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; that the subject lots are their only real property and are too
small for expropriation, while the City has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; and that the
fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages of P21
million. On 5 November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant
Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs. The City also
excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three
(3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters.The Amended Complaint was admitted by
the trial court on 18 December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small property owners" whose land is exempt from
expropriation under Republic Act 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public
purpose for the City's failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved for reconsideration. On 29 December 1998,
the court denied the motion. The City filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of private persons, but
which is within the Areas for Priority Development (APD).

Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President Marcos in
1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities from blight, congestion and
hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national
resource for public welfare. Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire
Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980
by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro
Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The acquisition of lands for
socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for
socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the
public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority
Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR)
sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6)

12
privatelyowned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other
provisions of the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized
housing under RA 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1)
community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to
the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of
expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such
acquisition. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions
set forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD may be acquired only in the
modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10. Herein, the City claims that it had faithfully
observed the different modes of land acquisition for socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the
priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It, however, did not state with
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to
expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted." The City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase.
The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the Aguilars but the latter refused to sell.
As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the
subject property states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture
agreement under Section 9 of the law.

13
 FERMIN MANAPAT, vs. CA and NHA
DOMINGO LIM vs CA and NHA
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. MAXIMO LOBERANES, et.al.

[G.R. No. 110478; G.R. No. 116176; G.R. Nos. 116491-503; October 15, 2007] Constitutional Law|
Eminent Domain|

FACTS:
RCAM – Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
LTA – Land Tenure Administration
NHA – National Housing Authority

RCAM owned parcels of land known as Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City. Sometime in 1960’s,
RCAM allowed the property to be occupied on condition that the premises would be vacated should the
former push through with the plan to construct a school in the area. The plan, however, did not materialize,
thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAM’s
proposed price, the occupants petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property and the
resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price. The Government, through the LTA, negotiated for the
acquisition of the property but was later on discontinued because of the high asking price of RCAM and the
budgetary constraints of the government. RCAM then decided to sell the property into subdivided lots to the
public. Petitioners Manapat and Lim and respondents Loberanes, et. al in these consolidated cases were
among those who purchased individual subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM.

In 1977, then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 1072,8 appropriating ₱1.2M to cover the
additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. The NHA then filed several expropriation
proceedings for the purpose of developing Grace Park.

ISSUE:
Whether the NHA may validly expropriate the parcels of land subject of these cases.

HELD:
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Also called the power of
expropriation, it is described as “the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government”
that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method “in the nature of a compulsory sale to the
State.” The power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by
Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private enterprises
performing public services.

The following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain:

1. the property taken must be private property;

2. there must be genuine necessity to take the private property;
3. the taking must be for public use;
4. there must be payment of just compensation; and
5. the taking must comply with due process of law.
Thus,

1. The subject parcels of land are private property.

2. With respect to the second, it is well to recall that the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character.

14
3. As to the third requisite of “public use,” NHA justifies the taking of the subject property for “socialized
housing” lots and sale at a low cost to qualified beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time occupants
of Grace Park.
4. The subject cases is remanded to the trial court for the determination of the amount of just compensation.
5. In the expropriation proceedings, all the parties have been given their day in court. That they are now
before this Court is attestation enough that they were not denied due process of law.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is unmistakable that all the requirements for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain have been complied with.

The NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.

MASIKIP vs PASIG G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006 Power of Eminent Domain, Expropriation,
Genuine Necessity
NOVEMBER 3, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a
1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities”
of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by
the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive.

Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation,

ISSUE:

Was the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity” to expropriate?

RULING:

The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association,
a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown,
especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those
of Caniogan.

Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of
private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must
also be shown to exist.

15
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al. - GR No. 171101
Case Digest

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition
filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the
right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the
effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked
to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks,
as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and
not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?

(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November
21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?

(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10,
1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita
to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

16
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with
respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to
remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered
its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and
UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to
the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also
applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of
laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that
must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.
The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011
decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and
homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the
lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of
the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no
ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no
apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full
6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only
involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as
regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its
mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural
lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by
RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered
commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may
be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting
the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to
ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and
considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian
reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with
which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

17
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda
Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the
separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the
assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of
the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the
FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date
when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess
the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21,
1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the
contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation
of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to
receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock
distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC
acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with
finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on
May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the
issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the
10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP
or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs
be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at
agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred
to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands]
given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the
HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to
remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control
means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares.
Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is

18
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The
118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101
shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Lagcao vs. Labra G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004 Eminent Domain
NOVEMBER 28, 2017

FACTS:

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued. However, when the demolition order was about to
be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of
the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on
the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days.
Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of
people.

ISSUE:

What is Eminent Domain? Was this validly exercised in this case?

RULING:

1)It is where a local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent.

2) No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to the fact that The foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain should be a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government
may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there
was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or
what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice
of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project.

It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of
eviction against the illegal occupants of their property but Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend
the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters.
However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly
enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and
simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

19
G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA
MENDOZA SAN PEDRO

FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-‐owned-‐and-‐controlled

corporation created to undertake the development of hydro-‐electric generation of power and the
production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the construction, operation, and
maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines,
power stations and substations, and other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power
from any river, lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power to
the inhabitants thereof. Under Republic Act No.6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter
private property provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage
caused thereby. For the construction of its San Manuel-‐San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and
Tower No.SMJ-‐389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her
son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property,
which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida,
Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria
executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid
her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon. The payment voucher for the residential
portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (atP600.00 per square meter) was then processed.
However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-‐246 stating that it
would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the
agricultural portion. On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their report,
recommending as payment for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and
P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment,
declaring as well-‐grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended
by Atty.Baltazar and Engr. Cruz.

ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair market value
of the residential and agricultural property?

HELD: The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows: (1) P499.00 per sq
m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on
the6,565 sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept the
recommendation of majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and
P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account the evidence
of the parties, in tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of the
commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is
reasonable as it is and supported by the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to
disturb the same. The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers and
transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners that
the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of their
lot will affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to
buy the remaining portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the
damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to be
derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation.

20
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION (NIA) v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 185124, 15 January 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Sereno, J.)

In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated
land because real properties are characteristically indivisible; hence, the ownership of the land extends to the
surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

FACTS:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan (RTC) a
complaint for expropriation of a portion of three parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters for
its Malitubog-Marigadao irrigation project. The committee formed by the RTC pegged the fair market value of
the land at Php 65.00 per square meter. It also added to its computation the value of soil excavated from
portions of two lots. RTC adopted the findings of the committee despite the objections of NIA to the inclusion of
the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land.

NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
with modification the RTC’s decision. CA deleted the value of the soil in determination of compensation but
affirmed RTC’s valuation of the improvements made on the properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the value of the excavated soil should be included in the computation of just
compensation.

HELD:
NO.

Just compensation was the full and fair equivalent of the propertytaken from its owner by the
expropriator. Measured not by taker’s gain,but the owner’s loss. The equivalent to be rendered to
the propertyshould be real, substantial, full and ample.
◦ Sum equivalent to the market value of the property (broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; the fair value of the property; as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government).

There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties,
contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate
from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for
what the owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.

In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al. The SC held that rights over lands are indivisible. This
conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides: “The owner of a parcel of land is the
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations
and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.” Thus, the ownership of land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.

Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial court’s Decision when it ruled it is preposterous that NIA will
be made to pay not only for the value of the land but also for the soil excavated from such land when such
excavation is a necessary phase in the building of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated
soil is of no moment and is of no concern to the landowner who has been paid the fair market value of his land.
As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only. To
21
sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land
at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would
discourage the construction of important public improvements.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act
No. 6395, as amended, with the mandate of developing hydroelectric power, producing transmission lines,
and developing hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement
of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction
and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project.

On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an
easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square meters, respectively, or a total of
84.425 square meters.

After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP
5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order

However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-
defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order, 6 in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
respondent/intervenorVirgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from
respondents spouses DelaCruz.The trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was
concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation. As to the just compensation
for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered the latter
and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement.

The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics’ property, and on October 8,
1999, they submitted a report to the trial court and recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to be
expropriated by petitioner be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

The records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue
notices to the parties to attend hearings nor provide the concerned parties the opportunity to argue their
respective causes.

Upon the submission of the commissioners’ report, petitioner was not notified of the completion or
filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its objections to it.

On December 1, 1999, respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the commissioners’ report
with respect to the valuation of his property. On December 28, 1999, the trial court consequently issued the
Order approving the commissioners’ report, and granted respondent Ferrer’s motion to adopt the subject
report. Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate properties to be expropriated by petitioner for
its project was uniformly pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

Incidentally, on February 11, 2000, respondent S.K. Dynamics filed a motion informing the trial court that
in addition to the portion of its property covered by TCT No. T-454278 sought to be expropriated by
petitioner, the latter also took possession of an 8.55-square meter portion of S.K. Dynamics’ property covered
by TCT No. 503484 for the same purpose––to acquire an easement of right-of-way for the construction and
22
maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. Respondent S.K.
Dynamics prayed that said portion be included in the computation of the just compensation to be paid by
petitioner.The Imus, Cavite RTC granted S.K. Dynamics’ motion to have the 8.55-square meter portion of its
property included in the computation of just compensation.1awphi1.net

The Regional Trial Court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per
square meter.

On January 20, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the abovementioned Order,
but said motion was denied in the trial court’s March 23, 2000 Order.

Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to present evidence on the
reasonable value of the expropriated property before the board of commissioners.

2. Whether or not the valuation of just compensation herein was not based from the evidence on record
and other authentic documents.

RULING:

We find this petition meritorious.

First Issue: Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to present
evidence before the commissioners

It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before them, issue notices to the parties to attend hearings, and
provide the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes. It is also undisputed that petitioner
was not notified of the completion or filing of the commissioners’ report, and that petitioner was also not
given any opportunity to file its objections to the said report.

Based on Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Rule 67, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection
performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or
hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said
hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during
the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said
hearings.

The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken
is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the principal
issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is indispensable to allow
the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true that the findings of
commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter
may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.

In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to
present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners’ findings. The
absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court because the parties’
(in particular, petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.

Second Issue: The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient

23
 In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be
pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The commissioners arrived at the figure in question after their
ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding structures, the property’s location
and, allegedly, the prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the area. Furthermore, based on the
commissioners’ report, the recommended just compensation was determined as of the time of the preparation
of said report on October 5, 1999.

In B.H. Berkenkotter& Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be
fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his
property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the
property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential
benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the consequential
damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in
every case.

The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not
compelled to enter into the contract of sale. Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a piece of property
would agree to pay more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would agree to accept less, than what it is
actually worth. x xx

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of
acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of
lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon.

It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.18

We note that in this case, the filing of the complaint for expropriation preceded the petitioner’s entry
into the property.

Therefore, it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just compensation was
the commissioners’ ocular inspection of the properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners’ October
5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on the said report is a serious error considering that the recommended
compensation was highly speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not
indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City
Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments cited.

Furthermore, the commissioners’ report itself is flawed considering that its recommended just
compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report was issued, and not the
just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998.

Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient as earlier
enunciated.

24
[G.R. No. 158563. June 30, 2005]
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) and MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioners, vs. APOLONIO GOPUCO, JR., respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995 square
meters located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 13061-T.
Sometime in 1949, the NAC (National Airport Corporation) informed the owners of the various lots
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein respondent, that the government was acquiring their
lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell their properties on the assurance
that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used by the airport. Others,
including Gopuco, refused to do so.
Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its neighboring realties, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-1881.

CFI granted the complaint. No appeal was taken from the Decision on Lot No. 72, and the judgment of
condemnation became final and executory. Thereafter, on 23 May 1962, absolute title to Lot No. 72 was
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. 25030. [5]

Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug Airport was
ordered closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino in a Memorandum of 29 November 1989. [6] Lot No. 72
was thus virtually abandoned.[7]
On 16 March 1990, Gopuco wrote[8] the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of the
Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offering to return the money previously received by him as
payment for the expropriation. This letter was ignored.[9]
In the same year, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6958 creating the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA) and in part providing for the transfer of the assets of the Lahug Airport
thereto. Consequently, on 08 May 1992, ownership of Lot No. 72 was transferred to MCIAA under TCT
No. 120356.[10]
On 06 August 1992, Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. filed an amended complaint [11] for recovery of ownership of
Lot No. 72 against the Air Transportation Office[12] and the Province of Cebu with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu, Branch X, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11914. He maintained that by virtue of the
closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the property was expropriated had ceased or
otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had therefore reverted to him.
Gopuco further alleged that when the original judgment of expropriation had been handed down, and
before they could file an appeal thereto, the CAA offered them a compromise settlement whereby they were
assured that the expropriated lots would be resold to them for the same price as when it was expropriated in
the event that the Lahug Airport would be abandoned. Gopuco claims to have accepted this
offer.[13] However, he failed to present any proof on this matter, and later admitted that insofar as the said
lot was concerned, no compromise agreement was entered into by the government and the previous owners.[14]
Lastly, Gopuco asserted that he had come across several announcements in the papers that the Lahug
Airport was soon to be developed into a commercial complex, which he took to be a scheme of the Province of
Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his property.
TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the complaint.
CA: Overturned the RTC decision

ISSUE:
25
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS THE
RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED LOT BASED ON
THE IMPORT OF THE DECEMBER 29, 1961 DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 1881.

When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public use is abandoned,
does the land so expropriated return to its former owner?[22]

HELD:

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned
or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner. (Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.)
(Emphases Supplied)[23]

Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State.[32] Also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation,
it is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate,
rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within
the state for public use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in
its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. [33] In fact, all separate interests of individuals
in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding
the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the
government, or in the aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume
the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.[34]
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.[35]
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.[36] This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse
and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.[37]
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the compensation received
have long become final. We have also already held that the terms of that judgment granted title in fee simple
to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant to our ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v.
National Housing Authority,[38] no rights to Lot No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the
herein respondent.
The trial court was thus correct in denying Gopucos claim for the reconveyance of Lot No. 72 in his
favor. However, for failure of the petitioners to present any proof that this case was clearly unfounded or
filed for purposes of harassment, or that the herein respondent acted in gross and evident bad faith, the
reimposition of litigation expenses and costs has no basis. It is not sound public policy to set a premium upon
the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as in the present case.[42]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
49898 dated 28 February 2001, and its Resolution of 22 May 2003 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of RTC-Branch X of Cebu dated 20 May 1994 in Civil Case No. CEB-11914 is
REINSTATED with the modification that the award of exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs
are DELETED.

26
27